Appendix 9

Documents in Response to the August 27,1998 Homicide at CCA's Western Tennessee Detention Facility

DOC After-Action Report

CCA Follow-up to the After-Action Report

 

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AFTER ACT ION REPORT

HOMICIDE

INTRODUCTION

This report contains the observations, findings, concerns and Recommendations of John H. Thomas Deputy Director of Operations for the Department of Corrections. The aforementioned relates specifically to the circumstances contributing to and surrounding the murder of inmate Corey Smith by inmate ----------- on 8/11/98 at the West Tennessee, Detention Facility operated by CCA.

The following report and its contents have been discussed with Warden Casey and his staff in a close out on 8/31/98 at 11 am at WTDC. Most of the findings and Recommendations had been touched upon by WTDC staff as they have moved quickly to rectify issues and problems related in the incident. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigations (TBI) criminal investigation of the murder continues. The initial charges are expected to be Felony murder for inmate ------- felony murder and inmate ------- accessory to murder.

I wish to express sincere thanks to Warden Carey sad the staff of WTDC for their courtesy and full cooperation.

BACKGROUND

On 8/27/98, at approximately 9:15pm, inmate Corey Smith, ------- was taken out of his cell to complete an authorized phone call. Prior to leaving his cell he was placed in hand cuffs, black box, and leg irons and then escorted by Correctional Officer's -------- and ------- to phone #3 on the pods first floor. Shortly thereafter inmate --------- made a request to shower. CO's ---------- and ----------- proceeded to inmate --------- cell leaving inmate Smith on phone #3. The two officers placed handcuffs on ---------aud then had the cell door opened. Inmate ---------- bolted past the officers and ran down the stirs to where inmate Smith was on the phone. They began fighting immediately. Both were armed with shanks. Inmate Smith's shank was approx. 4" long. Inmate Smith received seven wounds: 3 to vital organs based on a preliminary medical report. Inmate ---------- received a scratch. Officers -------- and --------- came down the steps following inmate --------, called a code and attempted to break the fight up. Inmate Smith began running toward tho pod sallyport with Officers --------- following. Smith was ordered to drop his weapon and he complied and was taken to medical and died at 9:40pm.

Inmate ----------- ran back up the steps and down to cell--------, spoke into the food port briefly and then went back to call to pass the weapon to his cell-mate . It was subsequently found.

Six inmates were in the pod day room and were secured by officers responding to the

code.

Please find attached a diagram of the pot and a synopsis report from WTDC.

In addition to the above it was noted that an incident had taken place on 8/12/98 involving Smith and ----------- (See attached.) On Monday 8/12/98 Smith was observed poking a broken mop handle through the food pan at ---------. Smith had requested and received cleaning materials which included a mop. The cause of the animosity between the two inmates could not be discovered by a file review.

Inmates ---------- is now housed in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit of WTDC. As previously noted, the TBI investigation continues.

Contributing factors

The following were found to be contributing factors in this incident:

1.) CO's did not follow policy with regard to inmate movement and handcuffing procedures

2.) No black box or leg irons on -------- and he was not kneeling with legs crossed to be shackled before cell door was opened.

3.) The Facility has no formal separation policy; blue stars are used on the pod's status board to denote separations. The officer's neglected to see this. Smith's phone call and -------- shower took place outside of the specific time frame. Calls and showers are allowed in the mornings and afternoons.

4.) No strip search of or use of hand held metal detectors on either inmate prior to leaving their cells. As a consequence --------- was able to hide a shank inside of metical wrapping.

5.) Lack of cell inspections in conjunction with searches to look for shanks, bare spots where a shank may have been sharpened, broken, furniture, etc.

6.) Lockers with metal feet and flanges were used in the cell.

7.) Each cell is supposed to be searched inmate are out but this can't happen when a Blue Stared inmate and an inmate receiving pod privileges live together.

8.) Collateral interviews were not completed to determine the nature of issues between ------- and Smith. All inmates in the pod should have interviewed.

9.) Lack of cameras in strategic areas with the pod. Critical information may have gone undetected.

Finding 1

CO's did not follow policy with regard to inmate movement and handcuffing procedures.

Recommendations

1.) Increase visibility and monitoring of high security units by supervisors administration command staff for oversight purpose.

2.) Enhance training to further emphasize policy and procedures adherence along with the consequences of failing to do so.

3.) Cameras need to be installed to monitor inmates as well as staff compliance to P and PS

4.) Establish a sound security to audit program to assist in the maintenance of program

continuity, operational effectiveness while increasing public safety.

Findings 2

No black box or leg irons on ------- and he was not kneeling with legs crossed to be shackled before cell door was opened.

Recommendations

l.) Develop a written separation policy immediately. This must happen expeditiously

2.) Train staff with emphasis on knowledge of and appropriate handling of separatees.

3.) Use a security audit, to monitor practices and policy adherence

Finding 3

The Facility no formal separation policy; blue stars are used on the pod's status board to

denote separations. The officer's neglected to see this. Smith's phone call and -------- shower took place outside of the specific time frame. Calls and showers are allowed in the mornings and afternoons.

Recommendations

1.) Increase command staff visibility to ensure compliance

2.) Audit and actively monitor

3.) Cameras need to be placed is strategic areas with in the pod to monitor all activities.

4.) Training on the use of cameras and handcuffs

Finding 4

No strip search of or use of hand held metal detectors on either inmate prior to leaving their cells.

As a consequence -------- was able to hide a shank inside of medical wrapping.

Recommendations

1.) Add specific operational procedures to the pod's post order such as strip search with

every movement and the use of hand held meter detectors.

2.) Policy and procedure must be enforced with active command presence. Supervisors and Executive Administrative Staff need to increase presence's in high security areas.

3.) Command staff member assigned to segregation unit/H Section Units. A higher level of unit efficiency and accountability could be reached with the addition of a seasoned supervisor who has the responsibility for high security areas.

4.) Acquire hand held metal detectors and use them, especially when an inmate has any type of body coverings applied by medical, i.e. leg and arm casts, arm slings and large bandages.

Finding 5

Lack of cell inspections in conjunction with searches, to look for shanks, bare spots where a shank may have been sharpened, broken, furniture, etc.

Recommendations

1.) Add inspection process to search processes in policy and procedure. A clearly defined cell inspection process needs to be developed and added to cell search procedure.

2.) Train staff on proper cell inspection procedures and document.

3.) Document all cell inspections searches.

4.) Rotate inmate housing assignments to disallow the opportunities and time to make weapons and destroy property.

Finding 6

Lockers with metal feet and flanges were used in the cells.

Recommendations

1.) Remove metal foot lockers and well lockers. Their pieces are used to make weapons.

Finding 7

Each cell is supposed to be searched when inmates are out but this can't happen when a "blue

starred" inmate and an inmate receiving pod privileges live together.

Recommendations

1.) Do not house an inmate who is categorized "special handling" with other inmates who have greater privileges.

2.) Do further housing assignments analysis to determine if other problems exist, such as that aforementioned.

Findings 8

Collateral interviews were not completed to determine that nature of issues between ------ and Smith. All inmates in the pod should have interviewed

Recommendations

1.) Interview all inmates involved in or proximity of an incident, i.e., all those out at recreation on 8/11/98, all inmates in the pods when the homicide too place.

2.) Enhance efforts to develop intelligence gathering in pod through the use of collateral interviews

Finding 9

Lack of cameras in strategic areas within the pod. Critical information may have gone

undetected.

Recommendations

1.) Add stationary cameras as soon as possible. During the interim period, place a camera in the pod control center.

2.) Add hand held metal detectors to the pod's', operation inventory, videotape monitoring of high security and segregation areas and all movements.

General Observations and Conclusions

While the findings outlined in this report were felt to be contributing factors in the homicide, there were a number of observations, which need to be brought forward. They are pertinent as they relate to DCDC inmates.

Inorder to clearly discern the facial features o an individual using a stationary camera in that pod, the illumination levels must be increased. It was quite low during my visit and sis not lend itself to video recording.

A higher level of inmate supervision and observation could be obtained by changing officer's rounds from 30 minutes (random) to 15 minutes (random). The pod is small, having only 20 cells; 10 on the top and 10 on the bottom.

Phones should be brought to high security inmates. This process eliminates a movement outside of the cell.

Presently inmates phone calls are randomly monitored. Phone cells made in high security areas should be continuously monitored.

Use of a leg iron port should be considered. This port would further reduce an officer's contact with an inmate during the movement process.

Increased use of computer technology would allow facilities that handle DC inmates to communicate in a timely fashion and much more efficiently.

A color-coded form should be placed in the inmate file if he is special handling or has a separation order. This would assist in quickly identifying such individuals.

The two staff members manning the unit at the time of the Homicide, CO's ---- and ---- had 8 and 2 years of service prospectively. Correctional Officer ------ had worked with DC inmates in the past .

It is recommended that a standardized set of policies and procedures be developed to ensure that care, custody and control of DC inmates when being housed in contract facilities. This would provide continuity in several areas; monitoring auditing and most importantly, the provision of services. It is my professional belief that doing so, incidents of violence would decrease dramatically.

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Robinson, Division I Director

FROM: Patrick Casey, Warden

DATE: November 12, 1998

RE: After Action Report (Homicide)
Smith, Corey DCDOC #241394

As you have requested, the following is a status report on the Recommendations made by Mr. J.T. Thomas, Deputy Director of Operations for the Department of Corrections, District of Columbia, in his After Report, dated September 4, 1998. Mr. Thomas' report is attached for reference.

Finding#1

#1: Unit Manager and UM team have ben assigned oversight of Special Management Unit. Additional administrative oversight is required by frequent visual inspection on a daily basis by Chief of Security/Asst. Warden and each shift by the Shift Supervisor. Unit Security staffing has been increased to 2 full time permanent assigned officers.

#2: Additional training has been provided by supervisory staff and formalized in-service training will be provided on a regular basis for staff assigned to work with segregated inmates. In the event W. T. D. F. again houses Maximum Custody inmates, specialized training will be conducted for the assigned staff.

#3: Five additional cameras have been added to the Special Management Unit.

#4: As noted in response #1, this is being done by Administrative and Supervisory staff on a daily basis to ensure compliance with established Policy and Post Orders.

Findings #2

#1: Restraint guidelines for inmates in Special Management Unit are being revised. Restraint requirements will be indicated for each inmate in Special Management Unit adjacent to each assigned call. Separatees in Special Management Unit will never be allowed out of cells at the same time. Separatees will be identified on this information board adjacent to cell with levels of restraints and movement.

#2: See above

Recommendations.

#3: See response to finding #1, recommendation #4.

Finding #3

#1: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#2: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1 & #4.

#3: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#4: Training will be provided on an on-going basis.

Finding #4:

#1: Search procedures are outlined in current post order for Special Management Unit and a hand-held metal scanner has been assigned to the unit.

#2: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#3: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#4: As noted in Finding #4, recommendation #1, this has been done.

Finding #5:

#1: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#2: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#3: See response to finding #1, recommendation #1.

#4: housing assignment will be made based on institutional needs, inmate behavior and stratification level and other factors deemed pertinent by the Unit Manager.

Finding #6

#1: All metal lockers have been removed from each cell.

Finding #7:

#1: This will be the normal routine procedure if bed availability does not contradict.

#2: The Unit Manager and Administrative Review Committee will assess housing cell assignments as part of the routine Special Management procedures and initiate moves as appropriate.

Finding #8:

#1: As the investigative responsibility in a homicide or other serious felony is by statute the responsibility of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, the facility response should be and was limited to containing, controlling and securing the crime scene until their arrival. Upon Tennessee Bureau of Investigation's arrival, interview's were conducted of those inmates in the day room at the time of the incident.

#2: See response to fining #1, recommendation #1 where-in additional staff presence has been increased, there-by increasing levels of intelligence gathering information as well as assistance from the Administrative Review Committee.

Finding #9:

#1: Stationary camera on tri-pod was placed in Unit to record inmate movement from the cell while Maximum Custody inmates were assigned to W. T. D.F. Additionally, as indicated, 5 cameras were obtained and installed in the Unit with video monitor placed in the Housing Control Center.

#2: In the event of Maximum Custody inmates returning to this Unit, Hand Held metal detector has been assigned and will be utilized for metal detection purposes.