DOJ/Antitrust


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  

                                    Plaintiff,

                  v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

                                 Defendant.


STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel.
Attorney General ELIOT SPITZER, et al.,   

                                    Plaintiffs,

                  v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

                                 Defendant.


|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|         
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|         

Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ)

REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION

Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ)


PLAINTIFFS' JOINT PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT - REVISED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

Volume 1


  1. Background
  2. Microsoft Possesses Monopoly Power Over Operating Systems
    1. Microsoft's monopoly power is established by direct evidence of its existence and exercise
    2. Microsoft's monopoly power is also demonstrated by a structural analysis
    3. Microsoft's ability to control the price of Windows evidences its monopoly power
    4. Dean Schmalensee's contrary analysis is unreliable
  3. Alternative Platform-Level Technologies, Especially Internet Browsers and Java, Threaten Microsoft's Operating System Monopoly
    1. Middleware technologies have the potential to reduce the applications barrier to entry and facilitate operating system competition
    2. The widespread use of non-Microsoft Internet browsers threatened to erode the applications barrier to entry and Microsoft's monopoly power
    3. Cross-Platform Java also presented a middleware threat to Microsoft's operating system monopoly
    4. The threats to Microsoft's monopoly posed by Internet browsers and Java are mutually reinforcing, and they could be essential to the emergence of other platform-level threats to Microsoft's operating system monopoly
  4. Microsoft Attempted To Enter Market-Division Agreements To Eliminate Platform-Level Software That Threatened Its Operating System Monopoly
    1. Microsoft tried to eliminate the browser threat by proposing a naked market-division agreement to Netscape
    2. Microsoft's proposal of market-division agreements to eliminate other potentially threatening middleware confirms the anticompetitive character of its course of conduct against the browser
  5. Microsoft Engaged In A Predatory Campaign To Crush The Browser Threat To Its Operating System Monopoly
    1. After Netscape refused Microsoft's offer to divide the browser market, Microsoft embarked on a predatory campaign to eliminate the browser threat
    2. Microsoft tied its Internet Explorer browser to Windows 95 and Windows 98 in order to impede browser rivals such as Netscape, and for no legitimate purpose
    3. Microsoft imposed a variety of other anticompetitive restraints on the OEM channel in order to impede rivals such as Netscape
    4. Microsoft entered into anticompetitive and exclusionary agreements with OLSs and ISPs
    5. Microsoft entered into anticompetitive, exclusionary agreements with Internet Content Providers
    6. Microsoft entered into exclusionary agreements with other firms that restricted their ability to promote, support, and distribute non-Microsoft browsers
    7. Microsoft set a predatory price for Internet Explorer
  6. Microsoft Used Predatory and Anticompetitive Conduct to Impede Other Platform Threats as Well, Thereby Further Entrenching Its Operating System Monopoly
    1. Microsoft responded to the threat that Java posed to the applications barrier to entry by engaging in predatory and anticompetitive conduct
    2. Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct to induce Intel to abandon or restrict platform-level software
  7. Through its predatory and anticompetitive conduct, Microsoft has maintained its operating system monopoly, dangerously threatened monopolization of the browser market, and inflicted substantial and far-reaching consumer harm
    1. Microsoft's campaign to blunt the browser threat further entrenched Microsoft's operating system monopoly
    2. Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct created a dangerous probability that Microsoft would monopolize the market for Internet browsers
    3. AOL's acquisition of Netscape will not undo the harm to competition caused by Microsoft's predatory and anticompetitive conduct
    4. Microsoft's entire course of conduct has caused, and will continue to cause, substantial and far-reaching harm to competition
    5. Microsoft's conduct has caused, and will continue to cause, substantial and far-reaching consumer harm

Appendix

Updated August 14, 2015