3.4 Sufficiency of Entry
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Inasmuch as multiple entry generally is possible and
individual
entrants may flexibly choose their scale, committed entry generally will be sufficient to
deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern whenever entry is likely under the
analysis of Section 3.3. However, entry, although likely, will not be sufficient if, as a
result of incumbent control, the tangible and intangible assets required for entry are not
adequately available for entrants to respond fully to their sales opportunities. In
addition, where the competitive effect of concern is not uniform across the relevant
market, in order for entry to be sufficient, the character and scope of entrants' products
must be responsive to the localized sales opportunities that include the output reduction
associated with the competitive effect of concern. For example, where the concern is
unilateral price elevation as a result of a merger between producers of differentiated
products, entry, in order to be sufficient, must involve a product so close to the
products of the merging firms that the merged firm will be unable to internalize enough
of
the sales loss due to the price rise, rendering the price increase unprofitable.