| Case |
Product |
Number of
Firms |
HHI/Delta |
Plus Factors |
|---|
Northwest/
Continental
(1998) |
Airlines |
Partial
acquisition
involving 1st and
2nd largest firms
on some routes |
Depending on
route market:
4500 to 10000 /
2380 to 4870 |
Eliminate maverick
Homogenous products
Information exchange
History of tacit collusion
Barriers to entry
Partial ownership stake |
British Airways/
American Airlines
(2001) |
Airlines |
Antitrust
Immunity on
multiple 5-to-4,
4-to-3, 2-to-1
markets |
N/A |
Homogenous products
Information exchange
History of tacit coordination
Barriers to entry
Multi-market contact |
United/
US Airways
(2001)
|
Airlines |
Multiple 4-to-3,
3-to-2, 2-to-1
markets |
N/A |
Homogenous products
Information exchange
History of tacit coordination
Barriers to entry
Multi-market contact |
Formica/
International
Paper
(1999) |
High pressure
laminate |
Merger of 2nd
and 3rd largest
in a 4 firm
market |
3850/670 |
Acquired firm was a possible
maverick
Homogeneous products
Price matching policies
Barriers to entry
Inelastic demand
Competitive fringe had limited
ability to expand |