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| 1 | DISCLAIMER
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| 2 |
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| 3 | The views expressed in this conference are the
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| 4 | views of the participants alone and are not
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| 5 | necessarily the views of the Justice Department,
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| 6 | the Federal Trade Commission or any
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| 7 | Commissioner. Likewise, the selection of any
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| 8 | panelist or moderator does not necessarily
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| 9 | reflect the view of the Justice Department, the
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| 10 | Federal Trade Commission or any Commissioner
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| 11 | regarding the views or qualifications of any
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| 12 | panelist of moderator.
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| 1 | COMPETITION POLICY
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| 2 | AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY
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| 3 |
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| 4 |
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| 5 |
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| 6 | A PUBLIC WORKSHOP HOSTED BY THE
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| 7 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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| 8 | AND THE
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| 9 | DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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| 10 |
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| 11 |
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| 12 | TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2005
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| 13 | 9:00 A.M.
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| 14 |
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| 15 |
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| 16 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
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| 17 | 601 NEW JERSEY AVENUE, N.W.
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| 18 | WASHINGTON, D.C.
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| 19 |
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| 1 | P R O C E E D I N G S
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| 2 | - - - - -
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| 3 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much for coming
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| 4 | on such a wet, windy day. I'm pleased to welcome you to
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| 5 | the FTC and DOJ's Conference on Competition Policy in
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| 6 | the Real Estate Industry. I'm Maureen Ohlhausen. I'm
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| 7 | the Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the
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| 8 | Federal Trade Commission. Before we get started this
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| 9 | morning, I wanted to go over a few details.
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| 10 | First, the matter of security. You're required
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| 11 | at all times by the Federal Protective Service to wear
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| 12 | your visitors' badges or these name tags. If for any
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| 13 | reason you leave the building, my script says to catch a
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| 14 | breath of fresh air because you're the really hearty
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| 15 | type to want to be out in the rain today to do that, but
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| 16 | in case you want to or when you leave for lunch, you
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| 17 | will need to go back through security when you come in.
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| 18 | And I'll give you more specifics about the process
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| 19 | before we leave for lunch.
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| 20 | In case of an emergency, there are two exits
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| 21 | that you should know about. One is the front door where
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| 22 | you came in, and there's another one behind you, there's
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| 23 | a corridor there next to where the coffee table is. If
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| 24 | for any reason there's an emergency and we need to stay
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| 25 | inside, the security personnel will advise us on what to |
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| 1 | do.
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| 2 | If you need to use the restrooms, they're very
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| 3 | close by. They are on the other side of the lobby.
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| 4 | Simply go through the lobby and follow the signs. And
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| 5 | you can always ask any of the staff members or security
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| 6 | for assistance.
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| 7 | As for cell phones, our audio/visual staff asked
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| 8 | me to remind you that our microphones are very
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| 9 | sensitive, so please turn them off, and if you are out
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| 10 | in the hallway, actually sometimes the conversations can
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| 11 | be picked up as well. So, for your own privacy, if you
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| 12 | are going to make a cell phone call, you may want to go
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| 13 | out to the main lobby out there.
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| 14 | During the panels, there will be time for
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| 15 | questions from the audience. What we are going to do is
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| 16 | have people write them on cards. They should be in your
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| 17 | packet. If you need additional question cards or pens,
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| 18 | our kind staff of paralegals will be walking around with
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| 19 | additional cards and pens, and if you have a question to
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| 20 | hand in, you know, hold it up, and they will bring it up
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| 21 | to the moderator. That way, time is tight, and we're
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| 22 | able to get through a lot more questions that way.
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| 23 | Also, if there are any additional comments you
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| 24 | need to make, the record for the workshop will be open
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| 25 | another month, until November 25th, and we definitely |
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| 1 | welcome comments from anyone and everyone. You should
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| 2 | file your comments with the Federal Trade Commission and
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| 3 | with the Department of Justice on our web sites. The
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| 4 | FTC web site is www.ftc.gov, and the DOJ web site is
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| 5 | www.usdoj.gov/apr/index.html.
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| 6 | Finally, I would like to emphasize that the
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| 7 | views expressed in this conference are the views of the
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| 8 | participants alone and are not necessarily the views of
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| 9 | the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade
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| 10 | Commission or any Commissioner. Likewise, the selection
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| 11 | of any panelist or moderator does not necessarily
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| 12 | reflect the views of the Justice Department, the Federal
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| 13 | Trade Commission or any Commissioner regarding the views
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| 14 | or qualifications of any moderator or panelist.
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| 15 | So, if everyone has turned off their cell phones
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| 16 | and pagers, to begin our proceedings today, I'm honored
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| 17 | to present the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission,
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| 18 | Deborah Platt Majoras.
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| 19 | (Applause.)
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| 20 | CHAIRMAN MAJORAS: Thank you so much, Maureen.
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| 21 | Good morning, everyone, and welcome to our workshop.
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| 22 | The real estate industry is critical to our
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| 23 | citizens. For many, the purchase of a home represents
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| 24 | tangible fulfillment of the American Dream, the reward
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| 25 | for hard work and dedication, sometimes spanning |
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| 1 | decades. It may also be the most significant personal
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| 2 | investment that some make in their lifetimes.
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| 3 | Competition in the real estate industry, therefore, is
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| 4 | not merely of interest to those involved in the real
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| 5 | estate industry or to enforcers, but rather to anyone
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| 6 | who has ever bought or sold or is thinking about buying
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| 7 | or selling a house.
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| 8 | As housing prices across the country have
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| 9 | continued to rise at significant rates, the stakes have
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| 10 | been raised for home sellers and buyers, as well as for
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| 11 | those professionals working for sellers and buyers in
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| 12 | this market environment.
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| 13 | The vast majority of residential real estate
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| 14 | sales involve real estate brokers who may assist at
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| 15 | different times both home buyers and home sellers.
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| 16 | Traditionally, real estate brokers and their affiliated
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| 17 | agents have performed virtually all services relating to
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| 18 | the sale of a home, including listing the home in the
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| 19 | Multiple Listing Service or MLS, marketing the home,
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| 20 | negotiating with the potential buyers, and helping to
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| 21 | coordinate the closing of the transaction.
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| 22 | Several related developments are presenting
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| 23 | challenges to the traditional brokerage model. First,
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| 24 | in response to perceived consumer demand, some real
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| 25 | estate professionals are offering to provide services |
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| 1 | more on an a la carte basis rather than as an entire
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| 2 | package of services. In a so-called fee-for-service or
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| 3 | limited service brokerage model, a home seller might
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| 4 | choose, for example, to pay a broker only for the
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| 5 | service of listing the home in the local MLS and placing
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| 6 | advertisements and then choose to handle negotiations or
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| 7 | paperwork for him or herself.
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| 8 | Second, real estate professionals are
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| 9 | increasingly incorporating the internet into their
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| 10 | business models in a variety of ways, as many other
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| 11 | industries are as well. In general, these models use
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| 12 | the internet to allow someone else to perform a task
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| 13 | perhaps traditionally performed by the broker or agent.
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| 14 | Some brokers, for example, offer potential buyers the
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| 15 | option of viewing full, detailed listing information
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| 16 | online, allowing them perhaps to delay contacting a real
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| 17 | estate professional until they are ready to buy. Other
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| 18 | firms use web sites to gather lead information on
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| 19 | customers who seek real estate services and sell those
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| 20 | leads to real estate professionals, usually for a fee,
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| 21 | based on the commission that the professional earns in
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| 22 | the transaction. Still other business models exist that
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| 23 | use the internet to match home buyers and sellers.
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| 24 | Actions by individual firms of real estate
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| 25 | professionals, by groups of professionals acting through |
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| 1 | MLSs, by industry trade associations and by state
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| 2 | regulatory or legislative bodies have all spawned recent
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| 3 | controversies or even lawsuits. Some of the issues
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| 4 | concern how existing industry members and institutions
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| 5 | have responded to real estate professionals that offer
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| 6 | these new business models. Several states have
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| 7 | considered or passed laws or regulations that would
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| 8 | effectively curtail fee-for-service brokerage. Further,
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| 9 | some states have either passed new laws or regulations
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| 10 | or interpreted existing laws or regulations to prevent
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| 11 | brokers from passing a portion of their commissions
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| 12 | along to consumers.
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| 13 | As you may know, the FTC has a strong and
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| 14 | growing advocacy program. We not only bring cases to
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| 15 | challenge anti-competitive conduct or unfair
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| 16 | competition, we also advocate for competition in the
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| 17 | marketplace. The FTC, often in conjunction with our
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| 18 | colleagues at the Department of Justice Antitrust
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| 19 | Division, provides comments to legislators and other
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| 20 | policy makers on proposed legislation or actions that
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| 21 | may impact competition either adversely or sometimes
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| 22 | even favorably. It is important that competition have a
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| 23 | voice apart from individual interests, because
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| 24 | government-imposed barriers to or restrictions on
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| 25 | competition may have at least as adverse an effect on |
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| 1 | consumers as private restrictions, if not an even
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| 2 | greater effect.
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| 3 | Proponents of government-imposed restrictions
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| 4 | often tout the consumer benefits of their restrictions,
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| 5 | perhaps without focus on the potential harms that such
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| 6 | restrictions may impose on consumers. At the FTC, we
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| 7 | need to look at both. In our advocacy comments, we try
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| 8 | to identify the potential harms and suggest ways in
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| 9 | which decision-makers might accomplish their goals while
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| 10 | still minimizing restrictions on competition.
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| 11 | Recently, as you know, the FTC and the DOJ
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| 12 | together have advocated in a number of states against
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| 13 | the passage of laws and regulations that would impose
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| 14 | minimum service requirements on real estate brokers. In
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| 15 | general terms, under the proposed legislation, real
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| 16 | estate professionals who agree to list homeowners'
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| 17 | property for sale would be required to provide a
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| 18 | state-mandated minimum service package, effectively
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| 19 | impeding consumers' ability to purchase a more limited
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| 20 | and perhaps less expensive set of real estate services.
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| 21 | We have argued that the proposed legislation would
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| 22 | likely harm competition in two ways.
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| 23 | First, consumers who want to hire a broker to
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| 24 | list their property in the MLS will have to purchase
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| 25 | additional services that they may not want or need, |
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| 1 | which may cost them more. And second, without
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| 2 | competition from fee-for-service brokers, the prices for
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| 3 | traditional full-service options will likely be higher.
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| 4 | What we want for consumers is choice.
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| 5 | Admittedly, our efforts thus far in state
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| 6 | legislatures have not been terribly successful, as
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| 7 | several have imposed statutory minimum service
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| 8 | requirements on brokers that likely will limit the range
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| 9 | of services available to consumers. Nonetheless, we
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| 10 | have continued to advocate against such measures and, in
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| 11 | fact, have submitted an advocacy letter urging the
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| 12 | Michigan Legislature not to impose a minimum service
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| 13 | requirement on brokers in that state.
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| 14 | Critical to being a champion for competition is
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| 15 | careful study and analysis of the marketplace, as well
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| 16 | as then educating the public on its workings. The
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| 17 | Commission regularly holds public workshops on issues of
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| 18 | importance to consumers in an effort to further educate
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| 19 | ourselves and others. Given the substantial changes
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| 20 | occurring in the real estate brokerage marketplace,
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| 21 | given consumers' strong interest in a competitive real
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| 22 | estate brokerage industry, and given that industry
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| 23 | participants have told us that they think that our
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| 24 | advocacy in this industry thus far has been misplaced,
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| 25 | the FTC and DOJ are hosting today's workshop, to provide |
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| 1 | a public forum to discuss current issues affecting the
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| 2 | competitiveness of real estate brokerage.
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| 3 | This workshop will afford us the opportunity to
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| 4 | hear from all sides on the many issues facing the
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| 5 | industry, hopefully to increase everyone's understanding
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| 6 | and identify ways to preserve competition while
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| 7 | protecting consumers.
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| 8 | In our first panel this morning, we will lay the
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| 9 | groundwork for discussion of these issues by providing
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| 10 | an overview of the real estate transaction from both the
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| 11 | buyer's and seller's sides, defining key terms and
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| 12 | identifying the various relationships and business
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| 13 | models that currently exist in this industry. One of
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| 14 | the areas of focus will be how industry participants are
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| 15 | using the internet as an efficiency-enhancing tool.
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| 16 | The second morning panel will address issues
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| 17 | affecting competition among sellers' brokers, including
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| 18 | minimum service requirements, state licensing and other
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| 19 | requirements affecting for-sale-by-owner web sites,
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| 20 | local MLS rules, and other private actions that may
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| 21 | impact brokers with non-traditional models.
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| 22 | In the first afternoon panel following the lunch
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| 23 | break, we will turn to issues affecting competition
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| 24 | among buyers' brokers, including state anti-rebate
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| 25 | legislation, policies that limit the online display of |
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| 1 | real estate listings, and the effect of minimum service
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| 2 | requirements on buyers' brokers. With each of the
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| 3 | issues to be discussed today, we will explore how the
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| 4 | restrictions or actions impact consumers, either by
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| 5 | producing benefits or imposing higher costs on them.
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| 6 | In the final panel, we will address empirical
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| 7 | evidence on competition in this industry. The panelists
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| 8 | will examine the data available to test the various
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| 9 | hypotheses and look at recommended areas for future
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| 10 | empirical analysis. They will discuss what the data
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| 11 | show about competition in this industry, for example,
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| 12 | whether commission rates have been perennially fixed at
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| 13 | 6 percent or have fluctuated over time in response to
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| 14 | market conditions.
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| 15 | In conclusion, I would like to thank our many
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| 16 | distinguished panelists for coming from all over the
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| 17 | country to share their insights and experiences. We are
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| 18 | very pleased to have a wide variety of viewpoints
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| 19 | represented at this workshop. Based on pre-registration
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| 20 | information, we have in attendance today representatives
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| 21 | from several real estate trade associations, including
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| 22 | the National Association of Realtors. In addition, our
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| 23 | attendees represent several different types of
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| 24 | brokerages, including traditional, discount and
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| 25 | fee-for-service. I am encouraged by the large number |
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| 1 | who are willing to participate in this workshop, which I
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| 2 | think demonstrates the importance of these issues.
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| 3 | I would also like to thank the staffs of the
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| 4 | Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission for
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| 5 | their work in putting this program together. With that,
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| 6 | I am now pleased to turn the panel over to my good
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| 7 | friend and colleague, the Acting Assistant Attorney
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| 8 | General in charge of the Antitrust Division, Tom
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| 9 | Barnett.
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| 10 | Thank you.
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| 11 | (Applause.)
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| 12 | MR. BARNETT: Thank you, Debbie, and good
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| 13 | morning. I, too, want to welcome you to our workshop.
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| 14 | I'm delighted to be here.
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| 15 | These workshops I think are an excellent example
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| 16 | of the good and healthy working relationship that the
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| 17 | Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division have
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| 18 | these days, and in particular these workshops I think
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| 19 | are extraordinarily helpful to us in educating ourselves
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| 20 | about the industries that we are monitoring and policing
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| 21 | and educating the public about many of the issues.
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| 22 | Indeed, as I was driving here this morning
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| 23 | sitting in traffic, much delayed by the rain, I was
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| 24 | thinking about what I was going to say today, and the
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| 25 | concept that came to mind, shockingly, was sunshine. |
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| 1 | I'd like to have more sunshine today, and I'm glad that
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| 2 | you all are here to help us today to shed some light on
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| 3 | issues of great importance.
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| 4 | These workshops, while very valuable, do require
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| 5 | a lot of work, and I want to thank up front the staffs
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| 6 | of the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
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| 7 | Commission for all of the work that they have put into
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| 8 | organizing the workshop today and to thank you all in
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| 9 | advance for your help in carrying it forward. Because
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| 10 | they require a lot of work, we can't do them for every
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| 11 | industry for every issue, but I think the real estate
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| 12 | industry is clearly an industry that warrants much
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| 13 | scrutiny.
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| 14 | As Debbie indicated, owning a home is the
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| 15 | American Dream. In recent years, I think selling your
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| 16 | home has become the American Dream given the rapid
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| 17 | increase in prices, and in connection with that, it's
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| 18 | reported that in 2004, American consumers paid over $60
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| 19 | billion in commissions for basically real estate
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| 20 | brokerage services. That's an increase of $20 billion
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| 21 | or almost 50 percent from the commissions paid the year
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| 22 | before.
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| 23 | One question we might ask is, why are brokers
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| 24 | making so much money? Inquiring minds want to know.
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| 25 | And certainly the FTC and the Antitrust Division want to |
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| 1 | know. There could be a number of reasons for that.
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| 2 | There is great change in the industry going on. As
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| 3 | Debbie pointed out, the introduction or expansion of the
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| 4 | internet, our ability to collect and disseminate
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| 5 | information, have caused new business models to begin to
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| 6 | emerge.
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| 7 | I guess what I thought I would like to do is
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| 8 | just briefly talk about a couple of the areas which one
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| 9 | could possibly think about or factors that one could
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| 10 | point to as explaining that increase in the amount of
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| 11 | money that American consumers paid for real estate
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| 12 | brokerage services.
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| 13 | One is that the number of transactions could
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| 14 | well have gone up. I have no doubt that that's at least
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| 15 | part of the explanation. It could be that the value of
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| 16 | homes have gone up substantially and that brokers are
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| 17 | paid on a percentage basis, but that raises to my mind a
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| 18 | question, have the costs of providing these services
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| 19 | gone up that much as well?
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| 20 | In general, in a competitive market, it's not
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| 21 | the value of the services that leads to the price. The
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| 22 | economists tell us it's the cost of those services, and
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| 23 | many of the technological innovations that we see
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| 24 | suggest that the costs, if anything, are going down.
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| 25 | Our ability to collect and disseminate information at a |
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| 1 | low cost is far superior to what it was even five or ten
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| 2 | years ago, and as a result, that leads to a suggestion
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| 3 | of whether or not there are other factors that may be at
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| 4 | work here.
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| 5 | I emphasize I am raising these as questions. I
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| 6 | have -- and based on some of the public statements that
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| 7 | we have made and actions that we have taken, we
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| 8 | obviously have some views -- on some specific issues,
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| 9 | but our purpose here today is to raise questions and to
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| 10 | listen.
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| 11 | One area in particular that Debbie has already
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| 12 | alluded to is, when there is change, you would expect
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| 13 | many in the industry to react to that change. They can
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| 14 | react by bringing out new products, services, trying to
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| 15 | compete harder, or they may react by going to their
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| 16 | state real estate commission, their state legislature,
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| 17 | trying to obtain measures that will protect them from
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| 18 | the forces of those changes. It's not a new phenomenon.
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| 19 | I strongly suspect that the manufacturers of horses and
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| 20 | buggies were not big fans of Henry Clay Ford, and
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| 21 | similarly, it's probably true that the makers of the IBM
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| 22 | Selectric were not big fans of the Wang word processing
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| 23 | system, but from the consumer perspective, these types
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| 24 | of changes can be good.
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| 25 | Now, again, I want to emphasize here that I'm |
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| 1 | not suggesting that every time somebody goes to a real
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| 2 | estate commission or legislature that that's not good.
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| 3 | There are many laws, many regulations that are passed
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| 4 | that can be helpful to consumers. We certainly suspect
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| 5 | that there are some efforts that have been undertaken
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| 6 | recently that are not so helpful for consumers, and
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| 7 | Debbie alluded to a couple of those.
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| 8 | One of those -- and it's been going on for a
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| 9 | number of years -- has to do with the definition of the
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| 10 | practice of law. There are a number of states that
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| 11 | allow laypersons, non-lawyers, to provide certain
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| 12 | closing services relating to these transactions, and in
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| 13 | the states where that's allowed, people have done
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| 14 | studies, and they've found out that there doesn't appear
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| 15 | to be any greater incidence of consumer complaints of
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| 16 | consumer harm. The cost of those services provided by
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| 17 | laypersons is lower, and indeed, the cost of those same
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| 18 | services provided by attorneys is lower because they
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| 19 | face competition from the non-lawyers. That's an
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| 20 | example of when we believe something is good and
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| 21 | successful regulation or, shall we say, limited
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| 22 | regulation that advances the interests of consumer
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| 23 | welfare.
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| 24 | There have been a number of states who have
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| 25 | looked at expanding the definition of "practice of law" |
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| 1 | to prevent laypersons from providing those real estate
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| 2 | closing services. We have been asked in a number of
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| 3 | instances to provide our perspective, and we have done
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| 4 | so, and we have had a number of what we view as
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| 5 | successes in terms of encouraging people to keep the
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| 6 | definition relatively narrow.
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| 7 | More recently, Debbie again alluded to the what
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| 8 | I call minimum service legislation or regulations. On
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| 9 | the one hand, these can be presented as a consumer
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| 10 | protection measure designed to ensure that when I retain
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| 11 | a real estate broker, I am going to get the services
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| 12 | that I expect. There's another perspective out there
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| 13 | that suggests that it's no different than passing a
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| 14 | regulation that says, "When I walk into McDonald's and
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| 15 | order a hamburger, I'm told that I also have to buy some
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| 16 | french fries, because the state has decided that it
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| 17 | might be deceptive or misleading or bad if I only got
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| 18 | the hamburger, paid for it and didn't realize I wasn't
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| 19 | going to get the french fries." I may not want french
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| 20 | fries, and from that perspective, being able to choose
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| 21 | from amongst a menu of services to buy only the things
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| 22 | that you want to buy we generally view as a good and
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| 23 | positive thing.
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| 24 | What do we do about these situations? Our role
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| 25 | is threefold. First is to educate ourselves, and that's |
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| 1 | what we're here to do today. Second is to use the
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| 2 | benefit of our experience and the information that we
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| 3 | collect to educate others who have to make a decision,
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| 4 | and when, for example, a state legislature is
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| 5 | considering a proposed minimum service law, we have been
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| 6 | asked to and we try to respond to those requests to give
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| 7 | the benefit of our knowledge and information, and I'm
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| 8 | slightly more optimistic than Debbie on this one. I
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| 9 | think we have had some successes.
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| 10 | In a fairly public example, the State of
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| 11 | Oklahoma amended the legislation after looking at what
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| 12 | we and others had to say about it, to narrow the
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| 13 | restrictions, to provide and preserve more consumer
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| 14 | choice. There have been several other states where they
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| 15 | have reached out, asked us for input, and in response to
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| 16 | some of that input, they made changes. That, from our
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| 17 | perspective, is positive.
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| 18 | Our message to these lawmakers is before you
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| 19 | restrict consumer choice, before you require a purchase
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| 20 | of certain services, make sure there's a need to do so,
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| 21 | and if you decide that there's a need to do so, we
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| 22 | recommend doing it as narrowly and on limited a basis as
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| 23 | possible. Ultimately, with respect to the legislatures,
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| 24 | we understand and respect that it is their choice. Our
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| 25 | role is to help them make the most informed choices |
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| 1 | possible.
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| 2 | There are times, however, where we run across a
|
| 3 | state-related restriction that we think allows us to
|
| 4 | have a more active role. An example of that would be
|
| 5 | the case that the Antitrust Division brought against the
|
| 6 | Kentucky Real Estate Commission earlier this year. It
|
| 7 | related to a rebate prohibition that prohibited brokers
|
| 8 | from giving a rebate on their commission to their
|
| 9 | clients. From what we could tell, there was no
|
| 10 | pro-competitive justification for this rule. There was
|
| 11 | certainly an obvious restriction on competition. When
|
| 12 | we looked into it, we looked at some of the statements
|
| 13 | from the brokers themselves who said -- in their words,
|
| 14 | not mine -- that "this regulation was preventing the
|
| 15 | outbreak of a bidding war. It was preventing consumers
|
| 16 | from demanding things that would reduce broker profits,"
|
| 17 | and from our perspective, that made the regulation a bad
|
| 18 | thing, anti-consumer, and we challenged it. I'm pleased
|
| 19 | to say that we have a proposed settlement pending with
|
| 20 | the Court right now and that brokers in the State of
|
| 21 | Kentucky are already beginning to offer rebates and
|
| 22 | other inducements, which we view as a positive thing.
|
| 23 | Stepping back a little bit, I note that, again,
|
| 24 | coming back to what I said, what we are trying to do is
|
| 25 | shed light on the facts, the issues or what is going on, |
Page 23
| 1 | so legislatures can make informed choices, real estate
|
| 2 | commissions can make informed choices, and if necessary,
|
| 3 | judges can make informed choices.
|
| 4 | Finally, I will mention just briefly that one
|
| 5 | other possible source of the rise in real estate
|
| 6 | commissions and potentially profits is, of course,
|
| 7 | private agreements beyond the scope of what I've just
|
| 8 | been talking about, and I'll have no further comment on
|
| 9 | that for now.
|
| 10 | So, again, thank you very much for
|
| 11 | participating. We do think that this is an
|
| 12 | extraordinarily important issue, appreciate the effort
|
| 13 | that the staff have put into this. We look forward to
|
| 14 | hearing from you, to evaluating the results and seeing
|
| 15 | what we can all do to improve the welfare of consumers
|
| 16 | in this important industry.
|
| 17 | Thank you.
|
| 18 | (Applause.)
|
| 19 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you very much, Tom and
|
| 20 | Debbie, for your remarks.
|
| 21 | At this point, we are going to start the first
|
| 22 | panel. So, if you will just give us a moment's
|
| 23 | indulgence, I ask Cathy Whatley and Robert Hahn to come
|
| 24 | up, and we will get started.
|
| 25 | (Pause in the proceedings.) |
Page 24
| 1 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, this is the overview
|
| 2 | panel, and the purpose of this panel is to, as Chairman
|
| 3 | Majoras mentioned, give an overview of the transaction
|
| 4 | and go through some of the relationships between buyers
|
| 5 | and sellers and brokers and the MLS and different things
|
| 6 | like that and also identify some of the areas that may
|
| 7 | be raising competitive issues and competitive concerns.
|
| 8 | To help educate us all and inform us, we have
|
| 9 | Cathy Whatley, the 2003 President of the National
|
| 10 | Association of Realtors. Cathy is a realtor from
|
| 11 | Jacksonville, Florida, and I should mention that the NAR
|
| 12 | is the largest professional association with over a
|
| 13 | million members. She's been a realtor since 1969 and is
|
| 14 | the broker/owner of Buck & Buck, a family firm
|
| 15 | established by her grandfather in 1907.
|
| 16 | Cathy has also been very active at the state
|
| 17 | level, and she was the President of the Florida
|
| 18 | Association of Realtors in 1996 and received the Realtor
|
| 19 | of the Year Award in 1998. She currently serves as one
|
| 20 | of the nine commissioners on the Florida Commission on
|
| 21 | Ethics and also is a member of the State's Impact Fee
|
| 22 | Task Force. She lives in Jacksonville with her husband,
|
| 23 | and she has five children and seven grandchildren.
|
| 24 | On my left, your right, is Robert Hahn.
|
| 25 | It's all right if we call you Bob? Okay. |
Page 25
| 1 | He is the Co-Founder and Executive Director of
|
| 2 | the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint
|
| 3 | Center, which focuses on regulation and antitrust.
|
| 4 | Previously, Bob worked for the Council of Economic
|
| 5 | Advisers. He has also served on the faculties of
|
| 6 | Harvard University and Carnegie Mellon University, and
|
| 7 | he frequently contributes to leading scholarly journals
|
| 8 | and general-interest periodicals, including the American
|
| 9 | Economic Review, Yale Law Journal, Science, and the New
|
| 10 | York Times.
|
| 11 | He is the author of "Reviving Regulatory Reform:
|
| 12 | A Global Perspective," which is put out by
|
| 13 | AEI-Brookings, and several other books. He is also
|
| 14 | Co-Founder of the Community Prep School, an inner-city
|
| 15 | middle school in Providence, Rhode Island that provides
|
| 16 | opportunities for disadvantaged youth to achieve their
|
| 17 | full potential.
|
| 18 | I would like to just thank you both for coming
|
| 19 | today.
|
| 20 | This is just going to be basically -- we are not
|
| 21 | going to do formal presentations. It's just a
|
| 22 | discussion, so I'll be playing the Oprah character this
|
| 23 | morning, I guess, posing some questions and just going
|
| 24 | through some of these topics and getting the viewpoints
|
| 25 | of these both very well-informed and experienced people. |
Page 26
| 1 | First of all, I guess, the first question is,
|
| 2 | who are the relevant players in the real estate
|
| 3 | brokerage industry and what roles do they play?
|
| 4 | Maybe, Cathy, you can -- feel free to both jump
|
| 5 | in, but maybe we will start with Cathy on that one.
|
| 6 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure.
|
| 7 | There are a number of relevant players in the
|
| 8 | real estate transaction. You certainly start with the
|
| 9 | buyer, the seller. You have the real estate
|
| 10 | professional, and then you have a lot of additional
|
| 11 | relevant players, such as the mortgage lender, the
|
| 12 | insurance agent, the home inspector, the termite or WDO,
|
| 13 | as we call it, wood-destroying organism inspector, the
|
| 14 | surveyor, the appraiser, the closing attorney, the title
|
| 15 | company, the escrow agent. There are a number of
|
| 16 | relevant parts to the transaction that are essential to
|
| 17 | get from the buyer and seller actually having a
|
| 18 | discussion about the purchase and sale of that home to
|
| 19 | actually getting the keys to the home when they get to
|
| 20 | closing.
|
| 21 | I think just to start the discussion, I'd like
|
| 22 | to maybe paint a picture, and I think of it as somewhat
|
| 23 | analogous to a play. You might be at a theater. If
|
| 24 | you're in the audience, everything seems to go very
|
| 25 | smoothly because everyone has a role. They know their |
Page 27
| 1 | part. They know their part in the script. In the event
|
| 2 | that something were not to go well and someone either
|
| 3 | enters at the wrong time, forgets their lines, it
|
| 4 | becomes very disruptive to the process. The ultimate
|
| 5 | end goal for both the buyer and the seller is to have a
|
| 6 | successful closing. So, all parts of the transaction
|
| 7 | are extremely relevant to make sure that it is a very
|
| 8 | seamless and successful transaction for the buyer and
|
| 9 | seller.
|
| 10 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, maybe you could follow up
|
| 11 | on that and just say, what role does the real estate
|
| 12 | agent play in -- like a number of the things you
|
| 13 | mentioned involved the legal requirements for
|
| 14 | transferring the property in a particular state and
|
| 15 | certain financial requirements.
|
| 16 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, in my role as a real estate
|
| 17 | professional, depending upon whether I'm assisting the
|
| 18 | buyer or the seller, I have different roles in that
|
| 19 | transaction, but ultimately a real estate professional,
|
| 20 | and if there are more than one in the transaction, will
|
| 21 | work together to make sure that all parts of that
|
| 22 | transaction are facilitated appropriately, not only in
|
| 23 | terms of actually showing the property, marketing the
|
| 24 | property, working through the transaction itself,
|
| 25 | meeting the home inspector, helping the seller and/or |
Page 28
| 1 | the buyer understand what the results of that inspection
|
| 2 | were, overseeing repairs, making sure that things that
|
| 3 | are necessarily time-sensitive get responded to in a
|
| 4 | time-sensitive manner.
|
| 5 | I think that the transaction itself, if you talk
|
| 6 | about what has technology done to the transaction, it's
|
| 7 | not just the internet that has driven things.
|
| 8 | Technology has shortened the entire process time for the
|
| 9 | buyer and seller to be able to transact this sale, and
|
| 10 | so when you talk about the internet, the internet is
|
| 11 | just one part of technology that has driven a shortened
|
| 12 | time frame, which really makes it more critical than
|
| 13 | ever to have someone who understands the script, to be
|
| 14 | able to make every stage of that process work, to come
|
| 15 | to a successful closing.
|
| 16 | DR. HAHN: Can I just comment?
|
| 17 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Yes, sure, Bob.
|
| 18 | DR. HAHN: I agree with most of what Cathy says,
|
| 19 | but what strikes me -- my mom was a real estate agent
|
| 20 | and my dad was a real estate broker but dealing with
|
| 21 | commercial, and my mom dealt with residential.
|
| 22 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We can't hear you.
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: I can swallow the mic if you like.
|
| 24 | I was saying that my mom was a real estate agent
|
| 25 | in the residential market, and my dad dealt with |
Page 29
| 1 | commercial and real estate management, but what's
|
| 2 | striking, even though Cathy is talking about changes in
|
| 3 | technology, is when I look at the kind of transaction
|
| 4 | that my mom engaged in, if I'm allowed to say it, 30
|
| 5 | years ago or 40 years ago since she's not here, it's
|
| 6 | virtually the same as the transaction that most of you
|
| 7 | engage in today when you buy or sell a house.
|
| 8 | I don't see a whole lot of new technology
|
| 9 | entering into this transaction or the kinds of gains
|
| 10 | that we've seen in other industries and the internet
|
| 11 | resulting, at least in the residential market, in
|
| 12 | benefits for consumers. So, in that sense, while I
|
| 13 | think we're beginning to see some new models emerge, I
|
| 14 | think public policy -- and I think Mr. Barnett alluded
|
| 15 | to this in his remarks -- public policy could have an
|
| 16 | impact on the pace at which they emerge and the likely
|
| 17 | benefits that could accrue to consumers.
|
| 18 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: So, Bob, just to make sure that
|
| 19 | I understand what you're saying, you're saying there is
|
| 20 | technology out there, and there is a role for it, but
|
| 21 | it's not being adopted as quickly into the process as
|
| 22 | one might expect?
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: Certainly based on other industries.
|
| 24 | If you were to look at airlines, for example, you would
|
| 25 | probably go and bring up your favorite web site -- I am |
Page 30
| 1 | not going to give an advertisement for one of them --
|
| 2 | and go get an airline ticket. You don't have that kind
|
| 3 | of menu of choices, at least the way I and my
|
| 4 | colleagues, Bob Litan and Jesse Gurman, who wrote a
|
| 5 | paper on this recently for the real estate industry.
|
| 6 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that brings me to my
|
| 7 | next question, which is the menu of services, because I
|
| 8 | also wanted to talk a little bit about the MLS and the
|
| 9 | part of the transaction, the service that the real
|
| 10 | estate agent provides in listing a seller's property in
|
| 11 | the MLS or showing MLS data to a buyer.
|
| 12 | Maybe, Cathy, you could expand on that a little
|
| 13 | bit.
|
| 14 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. The Multiple Listing
|
| 15 | Service -- let me start with the understanding that the
|
| 16 | MLS is a broker-to-broker information exchange that
|
| 17 | provides the opportunity for cooperation and
|
| 18 | compensation. It establishes rules by which we all
|
| 19 | understand are discussion points. It tells me if I put
|
| 20 | the property in as a listing agent, I'm then allowing
|
| 21 | those who are cooperating in the marketplace, in my
|
| 22 | marketplace, to have access to that information, and it
|
| 23 | tells them at what fee that I am willing to cooperate
|
| 24 | with them. So, that's all disclosed up front, and
|
| 25 | that's a very important part, because if you talk about |
Page 31
| 1 | what brings an efficient marketplace, the ability to
|
| 2 | have aggregated information for me, as a practitioner,
|
| 3 | to be able to go and have information that other brokers
|
| 4 | in my marketplace are willing to share with me, to allow
|
| 5 | me to have the information that I can assist my customer
|
| 6 | and client with.
|
| 7 | It also spells out what the cooperation is that
|
| 8 | that listing agent is willing to pay me if I'm going to
|
| 9 | show the property, and that is highly competitive. I
|
| 10 | can tell you that that is extremely competitive in the
|
| 11 | marketplace. A lot of things are driven by supply and
|
| 12 | demand, and we have been through a period of increasing
|
| 13 | demand for real estate and limited supply. So, if there
|
| 14 | is anything that really can motivate competition, it is
|
| 15 | limited supply and strong demand and vice versa. So,
|
| 16 | you know, it is important.
|
| 17 | The MLS is strategically one of the most
|
| 18 | valuable things to me, and that's done because the
|
| 19 | brokers in my marketplace are all willing to cooperate
|
| 20 | and provide that information in a competitive
|
| 21 | environment but still working in the best interests of
|
| 22 | their customers or clients.
|
| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Let me just follow up, Cathy --
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: Can I --
|
| 25 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Okay, Bob, and then -- |
Page 32
| 1 | DR. HAHN: This is absolutely crucial and an
|
| 2 | area where weary economists like myself might differ
|
| 3 | from the average person on the street, but I want to
|
| 4 | talk about the MLS for a minute and try to quote what
|
| 5 | Cathy just said.
|
| 6 | The MLS provides for cooperation among
|
| 7 | competitors, I think that's what she said, and I think I
|
| 8 | would also agree -- before I explain where I might
|
| 9 | disagree with Cathy -- that sometimes cooperation among
|
| 10 | competitors can be a really good thing, but by the same
|
| 11 | token, what we as economists know is when we allow
|
| 12 | competitors to cooperate, we want to look very closely
|
| 13 | at the rules that they might have about who can
|
| 14 | cooperate with each other and the conditions under which
|
| 15 | they can cooperate with each other.
|
| 16 | The MLS is essentially a club, and its members
|
| 17 | decide who gets to be in this club, who gets to share
|
| 18 | the listings, and the conditions under which they get to
|
| 19 | share the listings. From an economist's perspective,
|
| 20 | the more different types of folks who might get to share
|
| 21 | those listings, the more likely it is that the consumers
|
| 22 | are likely to be presented with a wide array of choices.
|
| 23 | So, I think this is a point that will come up later
|
| 24 | today, but it's important to note that when Cathy talks
|
| 25 | about competition, yes, it's absolutely true that my mom |
Page 33
| 1 | would compete vigorously for listings, just as people do
|
| 2 | today, but that's very different from competition about
|
| 3 | who gets in the club, because the club decides the rules
|
| 4 | on who gets to be a member.
|
| 5 | So, for example, in the extreme, if a club
|
| 6 | decided only two people could be members and 17 people
|
| 7 | had a legitimate reason or a legitimate business model,
|
| 8 | albeit slightly different from those in the club, you
|
| 9 | might not think that that's an arrangement that the
|
| 10 | Department of Justice or the FTC would necessarily think
|
| 11 | was a good thing or was necessarily a good thing for
|
| 12 | consumers. So, I think that in a way we might be
|
| 13 | talking past each other, but economists see the problem
|
| 14 | a little bit differently.
|
| 15 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that feeds into what
|
| 16 | my question was going to be for you, Cathy, is who runs
|
| 17 | the MLSs and the kinds of rules that they promulgate?
|
| 18 | What do you see as sort of the most important rules that
|
| 19 | an MLS may promulgate for its members?
|
| 20 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, most of the MLSs do have
|
| 21 | boards. They are made up of realtor members. That
|
| 22 | varies from MLS to MLS, because the MLS is unique to
|
| 23 | each individual market. The National Association of
|
| 24 | Realtors does not have, you know, guidelines that
|
| 25 | everyone must establish, they are unique to the |
Page 34
| 1 | marketplace, but they are highly competitive as well.
|
| 2 | I want to state, too, that understand that the
|
| 3 | Multiple Listing Service has been validated by the
|
| 4 | courts. So, don't miss the point that it is an
|
| 5 | allowable opportunity to have this information provided
|
| 6 | to us as a benefit of our membership in the realtor
|
| 7 | organization, and the fact is that it is
|
| 8 | broker-to-broker cooperation. It's not trying to limit
|
| 9 | the club. It's trying to make sure that there are
|
| 10 | cooperation and compensation guidelines which everyone
|
| 11 | knows, because that's in the best interests of the
|
| 12 | consumer.
|
| 13 | Actually, again, the fact that you've got a
|
| 14 | distinguishable database of aggregated information helps
|
| 15 | the consumer because it allows us and now the consumer
|
| 16 | in those marketplaces where it's highly visible, such as
|
| 17 | REALTOR.com, to be able to see information and to have
|
| 18 | that efficient marketplace roll smoothly.
|
| 19 | DR. HAHN: I want to respond to that, if I
|
| 20 | might.
|
| 21 | Cathy said the MLS has been validated by the
|
| 22 | club, but it's also --
|
| 23 | MS. WHATLEY: By the courts.
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: Or by the courts, excuse me, but it's
|
| 25 | also true that at one point commissions were totally |
Page 35
| 1 | non-negotiable, which economists would call price fixing
|
| 2 | of a sort, and the courts struck that down. So, it's
|
| 3 | not as if this club has engaged only in activity that I
|
| 4 | would view as pro-consumer or pro-competitive. I would
|
| 5 | say that there have been major benefits from the setting
|
| 6 | up of a platform however many years ago that was called
|
| 7 | the MLS, but I also think it's time to take a serious
|
| 8 | look at what the institution can and cannot do and
|
| 9 | whether that's good for consumers, which is what I care
|
| 10 | about.
|
| 11 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, sticking with the MLS,
|
| 12 | I understand that not all listings go in in the same
|
| 13 | form, and I was hoping, Cathy, you could explain to us
|
| 14 | the differences between an exclusive right to sell, an
|
| 15 | exclusive agency, and something that's sometimes called
|
| 16 | an open listing contract.
|
| 17 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. An exclusive right to sell
|
| 18 | agreement is one where the seller lists their property
|
| 19 | with a real estate firm, and there is a fee, either a
|
| 20 | percentage or a flat fee, that is agreed to, and that
|
| 21 | fee is paid regardless of who finds the purchaser for
|
| 22 | the property. So, even if the seller has someone to
|
| 23 | approach him in the store and they say, you know, "I've
|
| 24 | got my house up for sale." The seller then says,
|
| 25 | "Contact my real estate professional." The lead may |
Page 36
| 1 | have come from the seller, and that comes to me, but
|
| 2 | there is still an agreed-upon commission structure.
|
| 3 | Most oftentimes, it is cooperation between real estate
|
| 4 | companies, an exclusive right to sell.
|
| 5 | An exclusive agency agreement, if that same
|
| 6 | seller lists with me, if any other real estate
|
| 7 | professional brings the buyer to the transaction, there
|
| 8 | is still a fee paid; however, if the seller has someone
|
| 9 | that they may have a pre-arrangement with, that they've
|
| 10 | said, you know, four people have contacted me and said
|
| 11 | I'm really interested, if you ever sell your house,
|
| 12 | please let me know, and they were exclusions and/or the
|
| 13 | seller retained the right to sell to someone that they
|
| 14 | found individually, that would be an exclusive agency
|
| 15 | relationship.
|
| 16 | The third is an open listing, and an open
|
| 17 | listing is where the seller could tell each one of us as
|
| 18 | licensees, "If you bring me a customer, I will pay you a
|
| 19 | fee," but there is nothing exclusive about it. It is
|
| 20 | independent, each one operating in that own environment.
|
| 21 | And I just can't leave the last comment without
|
| 22 | saying to Bob, I think we all serve consumers. The real
|
| 23 | estate professional's major responsibility is to work
|
| 24 | for their customer and client. We are in the business
|
| 25 | to serve the consumer. So, in that regard, we are both |
Page 37
| 1 | on the same level.
|
| 2 | DR. HAHN: I don't dispute that. The airline
|
| 3 | industry, when essentially fares had to be filed with
|
| 4 | the Civil Aeronautics Board, also could make a strong
|
| 5 | argument that they served consumers in the sense that
|
| 6 | when people purchased a ticket, we knew that it was at
|
| 7 | least worth the value of that ticket to take the ride
|
| 8 | from San Francisco to New York.
|
| 9 | The question from an economic perspective is is
|
| 10 | this industrial structure that we call the residential
|
| 11 | real estate market the best way to serve consumers? I'm
|
| 12 | not suggesting that any individual agent would not work
|
| 13 | to promote the interests of necessarily the buyer or the
|
| 14 | seller, because that's what they're supposed to do.
|
| 15 | MS. WHATLEY: But a real estate transaction is
|
| 16 | unique in that there are multiple consumers who have to
|
| 17 | be served. When you're talking about the airlines, when
|
| 18 | you're talking about other industries such as that, you
|
| 19 | have one consumer who is able to interact with the
|
| 20 | business environment. It's different in the real estate
|
| 21 | transaction where you have two consumers who both need
|
| 22 | to be served, and the public interest, you know, that is
|
| 23 | a very strong component, which I think makes it distinct
|
| 24 | and different from some of the other areas that may be
|
| 25 | discussed. |
Page 38
| 1 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, Cathy --
|
| 2 | DR. HAHN: There are a number of markets in
|
| 3 | which you have buyers and sellers and platforms,
|
| 4 | including your cousin, commercial real estate. So, I
|
| 5 | don't see that there's anything particularly unique
|
| 6 | about it. But you're right that you need to cater to
|
| 7 | buyers and sellers to get people to yes.
|
| 8 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, this might be a good
|
| 9 | point, Cathy, to go into the issue of the relationship
|
| 10 | between the agent who brings the buyer in and the duties
|
| 11 | that that agent may owe to the buyer and to the seller
|
| 12 | and the interaction between the listing agent and the
|
| 13 | agent who brings in the buyer.
|
| 14 | MS. WHATLEY: Understand that the state -- and
|
| 15 | it was mentioned earlier -- that the licensing is
|
| 16 | regulated at the state level. So, you have 50 states
|
| 17 | who have 50 state legislatures who enact laws and 50
|
| 18 | state real estate commissions who implement those laws.
|
| 19 | It varies in terms of what the real estate
|
| 20 | professional's duties and responsibilities are based
|
| 21 | upon what the state may have determined are those duties
|
| 22 | and responsibilities.
|
| 23 | By and large, most states work in an agency
|
| 24 | environment, meaning that there's common law areas,
|
| 25 | common law of agency, which talks about fiduciary duties |
Page 39
| 1 | of obedience, loyalty, confidentiality, disclosure.
|
| 2 | There are some states who have established a little bit
|
| 3 | different type of fiduciary responsibilities and the
|
| 4 | real estate professional may be working in a transaction
|
| 5 | or a facilitator capacity, and so there are different
|
| 6 | defined fiduciary duties in those circumstances.
|
| 7 | There are times when a real estate professional
|
| 8 | may be working with a buyer who is actually their
|
| 9 | customer as opposed to their client. So, there are
|
| 10 | various levels at which the responsibility of the real
|
| 11 | estate professional may be in terms of fiduciary duties
|
| 12 | to their buyer, customer or client.
|
| 13 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: And in that also, could you
|
| 14 | explain how the splitting of the commission works
|
| 15 | between the listing and the cooperating brokers?
|
| 16 | Typically. I understand it varies.
|
| 17 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. When I go out and I list a
|
| 18 | property, at the time that I list that and put it into
|
| 19 | the Multiple Listing Service, I make a definitive
|
| 20 | determination of what my real estate company will pay to
|
| 21 | a cooperating real estate firm and that broker. That is
|
| 22 | disclosed in the Multiple Listing Service where anyone
|
| 23 | who is going to show that property knows what I'm
|
| 24 | willing to pay.
|
| 25 | If they have any question about that payment, |
Page 40
| 1 | they have to address that with me and either renegotiate
|
| 2 | it up front if they're unhappy with it, because once
|
| 3 | they've shown the property, then I have presumed that
|
| 4 | they have understood that is my compensation and that's
|
| 5 | what they will receive if they bring a customer and a
|
| 6 | buyer and we ultimately negotiate the contract.
|
| 7 | Everyone is considered a cooperating broker.
|
| 8 | You may have a cooperating broker who is a buyer's
|
| 9 | agent, who is working exclusively for the buyer, has
|
| 10 | exclusive fiduciary duties to that buyer. You may have
|
| 11 | a cooperating broker who is a subagent, actually is
|
| 12 | working on behalf of the seller. You may have a
|
| 13 | cooperating broker who is a transaction broker who has
|
| 14 | limited fiduciary duties, but their role is to make sure
|
| 15 | that the transaction works smoothly.
|
| 16 | But the compensation part is actually
|
| 17 | established, and that's why it's so important that it is
|
| 18 | known up front, because it would be extremely disruptive
|
| 19 | in the marketplace if I didn't know that, if I couldn't
|
| 20 | go into the MLS and it tell me what it was that the
|
| 21 | other broker was willing to pay me in the event I had a
|
| 22 | customer who was willing to buy that.
|
| 23 | DR. HAHN: Let's explore that for a minute.
|
| 24 | First of all, I just want to make a comment about these
|
| 25 | split arrangements. Sometimes they have been required |
Page 41
| 1 | by the MLS bylaws, these traditional split arrangements,
|
| 2 | and from an economics point of view, that isn't
|
| 3 | necessarily a good thing.
|
| 4 | But when you tune in to -- if you're thinking
|
| 5 | about taking a flight, say, from Washington, D.C. to
|
| 6 | Providence or Boston, you don't necessarily have your
|
| 7 | fees or your splits set up front. You go look at the
|
| 8 | computer screen, and you say, "Today it's going to cost
|
| 9 | me $100 on Airline X and 50 bucks on Airline Y," and you
|
| 10 | decide whether the time's convenient or not and you
|
| 11 | choose.
|
| 12 | So, it's not necessarily clear to me that having
|
| 13 | the consumer know everything with certainty up front as
|
| 14 | a particular fixed price is a good thing. I mean, we
|
| 15 | may want to see more competition over price and
|
| 16 | certainly the menu of services that's offered. So, I
|
| 17 | think that's an open question, and that's why economists
|
| 18 | like the idea of different business models out there so
|
| 19 | we can see which ones actually will win in the
|
| 20 | marketplace.
|
| 21 | MS. WHATLEY: As a practitioner, though, if I
|
| 22 | did not have that information and I am working in an
|
| 23 | exclusive buyer agency relationship and I don't know
|
| 24 | that and my customer has a commitment to a certain level
|
| 25 | of compensation to me, in the event that that is not |
Page 42
| 1 | achieved and I can't tell my customer that up front, I
|
| 2 | haven't served my consumer customer. So, it's very
|
| 3 | important that the entire process is known.
|
| 4 | For instance -- and it is highly competitive --
|
| 5 | in my marketplace, I can look on my MLS, and it will
|
| 6 | vary from listing to listing as to whatever the
|
| 7 | cooperating compensation is to me. Some it might be X
|
| 8 | percent, some it might be $1, because it can be a flat
|
| 9 | fee, and it can be as low as $1.
|
| 10 | Now, if it is a $1 cooperating compensation and
|
| 11 | I have a buyer broker agreement and the buyer is
|
| 12 | committed that I am going to receive at least a minimum
|
| 13 | compensation of X and I can't tell my buyer that before
|
| 14 | we even start in to go look at this property, I don't
|
| 15 | think I'm serving my buyer well. So, I think that the
|
| 16 | fact that the information is disclosed is very
|
| 17 | competitive, and the marketplace itself has driven very
|
| 18 | competitive pricing in terms of, you know, what the
|
| 19 | cooperating commission is.
|
| 20 | DR. HAHN: I'd like to take a poll here, see a
|
| 21 | show of hands of those people who own houses and have
|
| 22 | actually sold them, how many people sold them and had to
|
| 23 | pay a commission of 5 and a half to 6 percent?
|
| 24 | That doesn't suggest that there's necessarily
|
| 25 | collusion, but it does raise a flag that you want to be |
Page 43
| 1 | thinking about, that this price-setting arrangement may
|
| 2 | not necessarily be the best way of serving consumers
|
| 3 | generally.
|
| 4 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, that also brings up
|
| 5 | another question I think that Tom Barnett had brought up
|
| 6 | in the Kentucky case, on the buyer side, the rebates
|
| 7 | that occasionally are paid to the buyers, and I just
|
| 8 | wanted to get your impression, Cathy, of whether that's
|
| 9 | common. Does that raise issues that you think can
|
| 10 | affect the effectiveness of the MLS, or do you see any
|
| 11 | issues or concerns with that?
|
| 12 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I'm not sure how it would
|
| 13 | play in your question as to the MLS. You know, are
|
| 14 | there opportunities for people to be able to work with
|
| 15 | their buyers and sellers? Yes, there are. In Florida,
|
| 16 | am I allowed to compensate the buyer or seller back for
|
| 17 | my commission? Yes, I am, and that may come in some
|
| 18 | type of negotiated arrangement. In.
|
| 19 | The event that we get into discussions with the
|
| 20 | seller, if I'm working with the buyer, if we get into
|
| 21 | discussions with the seller and I find that what it's
|
| 22 | going to take to actually put this transaction together
|
| 23 | is eliminating a part of my fee or something, I mean,
|
| 24 | there are ways that compensation is rebated. Sometimes
|
| 25 | it's direct. I'm limited to directing it only to the |
Page 44
| 1 | buyer, to the parties in the transaction, in my state,
|
| 2 | but state by state makes those determinations.
|
| 3 | That's why you have state legislatures, and
|
| 4 | that's why you have regulatory bodies who implement the
|
| 5 | state legislation. They adopt what they believe is best
|
| 6 | for the consumers who have elected them.
|
| 7 | DR. HAHN: I don't get involved too much in
|
| 8 | state legislation, but from what I read in the papers
|
| 9 | and the academic literature, it's not unusual for the
|
| 10 | National Association of Realtors to come out on the side
|
| 11 | that price competition, which is essentially allowing
|
| 12 | rebates, is not a good thing and also supporting what
|
| 13 | Mr. Barnett alluded to, minimum quality standards
|
| 14 | related to real estate transactions, which is a flag
|
| 15 | also for economists, keeping certain competitors out who
|
| 16 | may only want to offer one part of the menu and not the
|
| 17 | total menu.
|
| 18 | So, I'm delighted to hear that Cathy is
|
| 19 | suggesting that this price competition is out there
|
| 20 | among realtors, and I would just urge the NAR and other
|
| 21 | groups at the state level to vote against legislation
|
| 22 | that puts restrictions on price competition.
|
| 23 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I don't think minimum
|
| 24 | standards actually place restrictions on competition.
|
| 25 | In fact, I think minimum standards -- and I'm not |
Page 45
| 1 | speaking for the National Association of Realtors,
|
| 2 | because NAR is very neutral on this position -- but as a
|
| 3 | practitioner, what I believe is important is that both
|
| 4 | parties are able to actually get to the closing, and you
|
| 5 | cannot make unilateral decisions oftentimes as one party
|
| 6 | that don't ultimately have an impact on the other party
|
| 7 | in the transaction.
|
| 8 | If the consumer is making the selective decision
|
| 9 | that they're going to try to work through this process
|
| 10 | on their own, there's no issue to that as long as they
|
| 11 | understand all of the things that are responsible in
|
| 12 | that entire transaction, where they understand the level
|
| 13 | of service that is necessary, that they are having to
|
| 14 | bring to the transaction. There are financial
|
| 15 | consequences to buyers and sellers when the transaction
|
| 16 | does not close.
|
| 17 | Buyers have paid for appraisals. They've paid
|
| 18 | for credit reports. Often their lenders have charged
|
| 19 | them up-front processing or application fees. They are
|
| 20 | time-restricted to be able to close the transaction.
|
| 21 | They have lock-ins on their loans, and if they do not
|
| 22 | close within 30 days, their interest rate is at risk,
|
| 23 | and those costs are at risk for them. In addition, the
|
| 24 | buyer is out there. They've actually given notice to
|
| 25 | their apartment or wherever it is they're living. So, |
Page 46
| 1 | there are real time constraints in which the process has
|
| 2 | to work.
|
| 3 | And you're talking from one side of the seller's
|
| 4 | capability to be able to do all of it on his or her own,
|
| 5 | and that's fine as long as they understand. Oftentimes,
|
| 6 | though, the negotiation part requires somebody to help
|
| 7 | them understand exactly what it is that they're
|
| 8 | obligating themselves to, and in some contracts, the
|
| 9 | seller is obligated for those financial consequences if
|
| 10 | they are not able to bring the closing to the
|
| 11 | transaction.
|
| 12 | So, you know, if the seller is not told, "If you
|
| 13 | don't get to closing by 30 days, then you can't do
|
| 14 | this," then you have got all these buyer costs, and
|
| 15 | although the buyer said they were going to pay them in
|
| 16 | the contract, they are yours to pay now, Mr. Seller.
|
| 17 | It's just the understanding of the entire
|
| 18 | process, and the minimum level is either just making the
|
| 19 | seller aware that there are things that they need to
|
| 20 | know or minimal steps to be able to assure that both
|
| 21 | parties in that transaction can actually get to the
|
| 22 | point where the seller is handing the buyer the keys to
|
| 23 | the house.
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: I agree with that. I also think
|
| 25 | that's one area where the different kinds of internet |
Page 47
| 1 | models can play an incredibly important role simply
|
| 2 | because all you have to do is have one web site, and you
|
| 3 | know, if you're trying to build a new business model,
|
| 4 | and you can decide whether you want to target sellers
|
| 5 | and educate them and maybe get some fee for that or do
|
| 6 | the opposite for buyers. So, I agree with you that the
|
| 7 | transaction is complicated, but I also think there are
|
| 8 | other ways of skinning the cat and other models that
|
| 9 | should be allowed to emerge.
|
| 10 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, actually, I wanted to
|
| 11 | follow up. In our competition advocacy filings, we've
|
| 12 | certainly brought out the issue that consumers, to the
|
| 13 | extent they're not understanding an issue, what they're
|
| 14 | giving up, you know, the unbundled services that maybe a
|
| 15 | disclaimer or waiver or something might work, but also,
|
| 16 | the other issue that we've heard is concerns from agents
|
| 17 | that they might be put in an undisclosed dual agency
|
| 18 | situation, and maybe if you could expand a little bit on
|
| 19 | that, what that entails.
|
| 20 | MS. WHATLEY: I would say if either party in the
|
| 21 | transaction has questions, what tends to happen is that
|
| 22 | they will ask whoever is there in front of them. So, if
|
| 23 | I'm representing the buyer and the obligation for me,
|
| 24 | based upon the relationship that the listing agent has
|
| 25 | with the seller, is that I'm to fax the contract to the |
Page 48
| 1 | seller, I'm to present the contract to the seller, and
|
| 2 | that's not customary in my marketplace. In my
|
| 3 | marketplace, the listing agent presents all offers.
|
| 4 | That's not necessarily the case across the country, but
|
| 5 | that's what it is in my marketplace.
|
| 6 | I have a fiduciary duty to my buyer, but the
|
| 7 | seller who is sitting there is going to very naturally
|
| 8 | ask me questions about the contract. I mean, that's
|
| 9 | just typical. As they ask me those questions, I'm put
|
| 10 | in the position of either trying to say to the seller,
|
| 11 | "You know, I really can't answer that for you," which
|
| 12 | tends to not put my buyer in the best position, because
|
| 13 | the seller's automatically thinking I'm not trying to
|
| 14 | help them out. So, there are situations where it's a
|
| 15 | darned if you do and darned if you don't.
|
| 16 | If you try to answer those questions, you may be
|
| 17 | putting yourself in a position that you are not allowed
|
| 18 | to do based upon your fiduciary buyer duties with your
|
| 19 | client, and you are darned if you don't because the
|
| 20 | seller takes offense and they don't want to sell to your
|
| 21 | buyer.
|
| 22 | DR. HAHN: I think it's a difficult area. As
|
| 23 | Cathy points out, there can be conflicts of interest,
|
| 24 | and even if you sell your house and you have an agent,
|
| 25 | there are issues about how much effort that agent will |
Page 49
| 1 | put into selling your house. Steve Levitt, the
|
| 2 | author -- I guess the now famous author of Freakonomics,
|
| 3 | did this amazing little study where he looked at sellers
|
| 4 | selling their own houses versus sellers selling other
|
| 5 | people's houses and the prices that were fetched for
|
| 6 | comparable houses, and needless to say, when the agent
|
| 7 | sold her own house, the price fetched was considerably
|
| 8 | higher. They put a little bit more effort in, because
|
| 9 | at the margin, it was worth it to them, they were
|
| 10 | getting the pull pay-off, versus if they got an extra
|
| 11 | $20,000 for a seller, they are going to get, say, 1 and
|
| 12 | a half percent of that. So, there are incentive issues
|
| 13 | all over the place in the real estate market.
|
| 14 | It's a complicated market. I'm not saying
|
| 15 | there's anything wrong with putting more effort into
|
| 16 | selling your own house if you're an agent than if you're
|
| 17 | selling somebody else's house, but we need to look at
|
| 18 | those, and that's all the more reason -- I realize I'm
|
| 19 | becoming a broken record on this -- but that's all the
|
| 20 | more reason to have different competitive models out
|
| 21 | there and different kinds of services being offered to
|
| 22 | the consumer.
|
| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Cathy, I wanted to give you the
|
| 24 | opportunity if you wanted to say anything on that.
|
| 25 | MS. WHATLEY: Sure. You know, sellers make |
Page 50
| 1 | decisions for a lot of different reasons. They may
|
| 2 | elect to take a negotiated price because, in fact, if
|
| 3 | they figured that they had to pay another mortgage
|
| 4 | payment or two, it would be the same dollars to them.
|
| 5 | Maybe based upon the time sensitivity of the market,
|
| 6 | when you're in a hot seller's market -- in fact, our
|
| 7 | market is still an extremely strong seller's market.
|
| 8 | There isn't any seller who is going to take a property
|
| 9 | contingent upon the sale of their home.
|
| 10 | So, the time sensitivity of being able to get a
|
| 11 | contract, know that they can then go out into the
|
| 12 | marketplace and buy a home and not be at the price point
|
| 13 | of what it is today versus what it might be six months
|
| 14 | from now, it's all relative. Those are all things that
|
| 15 | the buyers and sellers take into consideration as
|
| 16 | they're considering offers.
|
| 17 | I won't speak to whether or not, you know, an
|
| 18 | agent may or may not make additional money. There may
|
| 19 | be an investment property versus something where the
|
| 20 | home seller is needing to get out. So, there are
|
| 21 | different stages of things, but I think it's very
|
| 22 | important to know that when I'm meeting with sellers
|
| 23 | every day, they make their selling decisions based upon
|
| 24 | a number of factors that influence what their housing
|
| 25 | decisions are going to be. |
Page 51
| 1 | Homestead Exemption, you know, are they going to
|
| 2 | be able to get in and be able to qualify for Homestead
|
| 3 | Exemption for that next year? In Florida, we have a 3
|
| 4 | percent cap on properties. So, it's very important that
|
| 5 | once you can get to that stage, then the property taxes
|
| 6 | are not going to increase by more than 3 percent. So,
|
| 7 | establishing that value as early on as possible is very
|
| 8 | important for people in my marketplace.
|
| 9 | So, there are a lot of things that weigh into
|
| 10 | the fact of why sellers make decisions based upon what
|
| 11 | they think is a reasonable price at which they're
|
| 12 | willing to sell.
|
| 13 | DR. HAHN: I agree.
|
| 14 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Bob, you had mentioned how many
|
| 15 | people had sold homes and paid the 6 or 7 percent
|
| 16 | commission. Based on some of the research that you've
|
| 17 | reviewed, does it suggest that there is some sort of
|
| 18 | optional rate out there, commission rate?
|
| 19 | DR. HAHN: There may be, but I have no idea what
|
| 20 | it is, and I don't think anybody else does either. I
|
| 21 | think the more interesting question that came up a
|
| 22 | little earlier is are these rates going down and what do
|
| 23 | we know about them? That's why I kind of did this
|
| 24 | little poll. The sad truth is that we know very little
|
| 25 | about them. |
Page 52
| 1 | When I issued or we issued an initial draft of
|
| 2 | our paper, we had hoped that we were going to get
|
| 3 | detailed microdata, not Mrs. Smith's, you know, we don't
|
| 4 | get to know who that is, but we wanted to see whether
|
| 5 | most folks were still paying 5, 6, whatever it is, and
|
| 6 | how that had changed over time.
|
| 7 | Steve Murray, who very graciously agreed to
|
| 8 | share with us some of his aggregate data along with the
|
| 9 | Wall Street Journal and everyone else, I mean, he has
|
| 10 | this generalized data, but I don't think it tells us
|
| 11 | very much about the structure of this market. So, one
|
| 12 | of the things that I would hope the FTC or Justice
|
| 13 | Department or Congress would do would be to figure out a
|
| 14 | way to get better data, but that's what economists like
|
| 15 | anyway, so we can publish papers.
|
| 16 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: That's what I've heard from our
|
| 17 | economists all the time, better data.
|
| 18 | Well, turning away from price competition, the
|
| 19 | recent GAO study suggested that brokers are competing
|
| 20 | more on non-price variables such as quality and
|
| 21 | reputation and level of service, and Cathy, I was
|
| 22 | wondering, do you think this is happening and sort of
|
| 23 | how does that play out in the market?
|
| 24 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, I can say I would disagree
|
| 25 | with the GAO in that there is price competition. I'm |
Page 53
| 1 | dealing with it every day in the marketplace. So, to
|
| 2 | presume that it is not there I think is a false
|
| 3 | presumption. And Bob, I would also presume that you
|
| 4 | feel that is a very positive thing. I think that's good
|
| 5 | for consumers. I think consumers need to be able to
|
| 6 | weigh the level of service, the quality of the company,
|
| 7 | the quality of the activity that's going to be brought
|
| 8 | to them, what they need to do versus what someone else
|
| 9 | is going to handle for them, and they weigh that in
|
| 10 | relationship to whatever their fee structure is.
|
| 11 | I think people are concerned about the
|
| 12 | transaction, because as was mentioned right at the
|
| 13 | beginning, it's the single largest transaction most
|
| 14 | people ever make in their lifetimes. They want it to go
|
| 15 | smoothly. When they're sitting in the theater, they
|
| 16 | want the play to end with a happy ending. They don't
|
| 17 | want someone to have messed it up along the way and not
|
| 18 | be able to get to the closing.
|
| 19 | So, I do think people do weigh -- you know, they
|
| 20 | ask their friends, you know, "Who have you used? Did
|
| 21 | you have a successful transaction with them? Would you
|
| 22 | recommend them again?" A lot of people, word of mouth,
|
| 23 | networking, ask those type of questions, because that's
|
| 24 | what's important to them. That is truly what is
|
| 25 | important to the consumer, is that they are able to get |
Page 54
| 1 | to the closing.
|
| 2 | They have told their family they're moving, they
|
| 3 | have made all of these arrangements, and so determining
|
| 4 | who is best capable of bringing that to them, and
|
| 5 | whether that's in a bundled service, a fee-for-service,
|
| 6 | a flat fee, I do part of it myself and somebody else
|
| 7 | does part of it, or a full-service relationship, I think
|
| 8 | all is in the discussion points with the consumer today.
|
| 9 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: So, you are sort of making the
|
| 10 | point, which certainly I would agree with, that there is
|
| 11 | no one consumer, there is a variety of consumers, and
|
| 12 | they have different experience levels, abilities, risk
|
| 13 | tolerance, so certainly it sounds like -- I think, Bob,
|
| 14 | in your paper you said 77 percent of home buyers use a
|
| 15 | real estate agent or broker. So, there is certainly a
|
| 16 | large majority of consumers who seem to want the
|
| 17 | traditional model, but for those consumers who maybe
|
| 18 | have more experience or just would like to try a
|
| 19 | different model, I wanted to spend a little bit of time
|
| 20 | now, we have got 10 minutes left on the panel, turning
|
| 21 | to some of the new real estate models and how they
|
| 22 | operate.
|
| 23 | Bob, I may have you speak on that first.
|
| 24 | DR. HAHN: I'm not sure I consider myself an
|
| 25 | expert on this, so I'll do something I was taught in my |
Page 55
| 1 | TV training, which I never do very well, which is I'll
|
| 2 | try to answer another question and then come back to the
|
| 3 | question, and hopefully Cathy can bail me out on this
|
| 4 | one, because I don't consider myself an expert on the
|
| 5 | business models.
|
| 6 | But one of the findings in the GAO report which
|
| 7 | Cathy disagreed with may or may not be right, but I
|
| 8 | think it's a logical consequence if what they're saying
|
| 9 | is true of not having a lot of price competition.
|
| 10 | They're noting that they're competing over other
|
| 11 | variables other than price. Well, that's exactly what
|
| 12 | we observed in the airline industry before Fred Kahn,
|
| 13 | Steve Breyer, Ted Kennedy deregulated airlines, got rid
|
| 14 | of the Civil Aeronautics Board.
|
| 15 | For those of you who are old enough to remember,
|
| 16 | we had things like the sandwich wars on some airlines to
|
| 17 | get people to come on. We had things like -- dare I say
|
| 18 | it in mixed company -- the mini-skirt wars to get some
|
| 19 | people to come on planes. So, it's not surprising to me
|
| 20 | that we observe non-price competition if, in fact, there
|
| 21 | isn't a lot of price competition.
|
| 22 | As for different models, I think Cathy alluded
|
| 23 | to most of them in her remarks. There are also
|
| 24 | full-service internet brokers. You can have flat fees
|
| 25 | for getting on the Multiple Listing Service, although I |
Page 56
| 1 | have to tell you I have one anecdote where my office
|
| 2 | mate or the guy next door tried to sell his house as
|
| 3 | sort of a for-sale-by-owner and get on the Multiple
|
| 4 | Listing Service only to learn that he did not get the
|
| 5 | same level of privileges as your typical agent did when
|
| 6 | he or she has access to the Multiple Listing Service, so
|
| 7 | he couldn't put his phone number there or whatever, and
|
| 8 | it was just hard for people to get in touch with him.
|
| 9 | But there are a whole lot of models out there.
|
| 10 | I don't think that's the issue. I think for me, there
|
| 11 | are really two issues. One is the fact that competition
|
| 12 | is being restricted at the state level, which may or may
|
| 13 | not be a federal issue, and we talked about price
|
| 14 | competition in these minimum service standards, which I
|
| 15 | don't necessarily think are a good thing.
|
| 16 | The second thing is the MLS, and I think that's
|
| 17 | kind of the 800-ton gorilla in the room, and the fact
|
| 18 | that the folks who are in that club get to make the
|
| 19 | rules needs to be scrutinized very carefully.
|
| 20 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: So, Bob, you kind of answered
|
| 21 | the previous question and at the tail end jumped into a
|
| 22 | little bit of what I was asking about, but, for example,
|
| 23 | you mentioned the MLS. So, if somebody has a, you know,
|
| 24 | a flat fee listing, they put their house in the MLS, and
|
| 25 | then they may offer compensation to a buyer's broker or |
Page 57
| 1 | they may --
|
| 2 | DR. HAHN: Right.
|
| 3 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: -- give a flat fee.
|
| 4 | Now, there was another business model I don't
|
| 5 | think we've touched on, which is customer referral
|
| 6 | firms, where, for example, we have a representative from
|
| 7 | Lending Tree on a panel later in the day, and so they
|
| 8 | have information they're providing to interested buyers
|
| 9 | who are certainly coming on the site to find out about
|
| 10 | what size mortgage they can qualify for, and then if
|
| 11 | those customers are interested in using a real estate
|
| 12 | agent, then they refer them to a realtor in a network
|
| 13 | and I guess for a referral fee.
|
| 14 | I just wanted to get your views on that, Cathy,
|
| 15 | is that a growing area of the market? Has that always
|
| 16 | existed? Is it something new? Is it causing, you know,
|
| 17 | new issues to arise?
|
| 18 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, there's always been referral
|
| 19 | business, broker-to-broker referral business. You want
|
| 20 | to refer your important customer, because they
|
| 21 | ultimately would drive business to you, you want to
|
| 22 | refer them to someone that you believe is trusted and
|
| 23 | capable of handling their transaction for them. So,
|
| 24 | referral activity is not new.
|
| 25 | Keep in mind, there are two distinct databases. |
Page 58
| 1 | The first one is the Multiple Listing Service, which I
|
| 2 | want to reiterate is broker to broker. That talks about
|
| 3 | cooperation and compensation. If a seller wants to get
|
| 4 | their property put into the Multiple Listing Service,
|
| 5 | they do that through a real estate professional. They
|
| 6 | don't enter it directly, because the consumer is not a
|
| 7 | member of the realtor organization. So, they contact a
|
| 8 | real estate professional.
|
| 9 | If the real estate professional, they reach an
|
| 10 | agreed-upon fee or for free or whatever their
|
| 11 | arrangement is, that goes into the MLS, but then there
|
| 12 | is, again, the part of the MLS is not only cooperation,
|
| 13 | but compensation, and the broker who is adding that
|
| 14 | information in is the one who is agreeing to the
|
| 15 | compensation. So, they are agreeing that they will pay
|
| 16 | my firm $1 or X percent or whatever it is if I bring
|
| 17 | them a buyer ready, willing and able. They have a
|
| 18 | separate relationship with the seller, and the seller
|
| 19 | has said this is the fee that I'm willing to pay, but
|
| 20 | what's in the MLS is cooperation offered broker to
|
| 21 | broker.
|
| 22 | There's a separate informational resource that
|
| 23 | the consumer has the capability to see, but that's
|
| 24 | advertising. That's basically, when you go out on my
|
| 25 | web site and you see my information and other people's |
Page 59
| 1 | information, that's advertising, and a broker ought to
|
| 2 | be able to have the ability to say who has the right to
|
| 3 | advertise his or her properties for the public to see.
|
| 4 | They have had to work hard to get that listing, and in
|
| 5 | fact, some real estate commissions actually -- most are
|
| 6 | required to have permission of that listing broker to be
|
| 7 | able to advertise their property.
|
| 8 | So, have there been referrals? Yes, there are
|
| 9 | ongoing referrals every day. I send referrals to
|
| 10 | qualified real estate professionals that I know in other
|
| 11 | marketplaces. If they're successful in closing the
|
| 12 | transaction, I may receive a fee for that, but that is
|
| 13 | done broker to broker within the MLS. The separate
|
| 14 | thing of what is allowed on the internet and viewable
|
| 15 | and the access to that by the consumers should have some
|
| 16 | opportunity for the broker who has spent time, money and
|
| 17 | vested a lot of information in that to be able to
|
| 18 | determine that it's being advertised in places that they
|
| 19 | are comfortable.
|
| 20 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Okay.
|
| 21 | DR. HAHN: I want to respond to that at a couple
|
| 22 | levels.
|
| 23 | Cathy, Joseph Heller once wrote a book called
|
| 24 | Catch-22, some of you may have seen the movie or read
|
| 25 | the book, but the catch-22 here is that the MLS -- |
Page 60
| 1 | remember we talked about that earlier? -- the MLS
|
| 2 | decides on who gets to be in the club and decides on
|
| 3 | what's a broker. So, you or I may think that a
|
| 4 | full-service internet provider of real estate services
|
| 5 | might be a broker, but the MLS can decide whether that
|
| 6 | person or whether that entity is a broker.
|
| 7 | I may think that the firm HomeGame is a broker,
|
| 8 | but the MLS in Dade County, Florida or wherever it is
|
| 9 | might decide it's not a broker. It also decides that my
|
| 10 | colleague Scott cannot post his phone number when he
|
| 11 | wants for-sale-by-owner and access to the Multiple
|
| 12 | Listing Service, which makes it a heck of a lot harder
|
| 13 | for him to sell his house directly if he wants to do
|
| 14 | that, even if he purchases that privilege from an agent
|
| 15 | or broker to get onto the MLS.
|
| 16 | So, my only point is the MLS has quite a bit of
|
| 17 | power to set the rules and therefore affect the kinds of
|
| 18 | services that consumers get offered, and some of the
|
| 19 | rules that they endorse may neither be pro-competitive
|
| 20 | nor pro-consumer, and that's where there is a role for
|
| 21 | people, analysts and public servants like yourself, to
|
| 22 | take a serious look.
|
| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: I wanted to emphasize that this
|
| 24 | is an overview panel. So, a lot of these issues that
|
| 25 | we've raised, we're sort of giving you the appetizers, |
Page 61
| 1 | and you'll get a little more into the entrees in the
|
| 2 | specific panels that will deal with buyers' issues and
|
| 3 | sellers' issues and some of the empirical evidence.
|
| 4 | In our last three minutes here, I wanted to give
|
| 5 | both of our panelists just a chance to say -- we have
|
| 6 | covered a lot of topics here, but what other issues and
|
| 7 | challenges do you see coming down the road for real
|
| 8 | estate brokerage?
|
| 9 | MS. WHATLEY: As a real estate practitioner, I
|
| 10 | am challenged every day to ensure that affordable
|
| 11 | housing is available for the consumers that I try to
|
| 12 | serve. I think there are a number of things that play
|
| 13 | in the marketplace. You've got changing insurance
|
| 14 | availability and affordability. That's an issue for the
|
| 15 | real estate community as a whole to have to deal with,
|
| 16 | and certainly with all the hurricanes and things that
|
| 17 | are happening, that's an issue that we have to deal
|
| 18 | with.
|
| 19 | I think potential tax law changes could be an
|
| 20 | extremely big issue that we have to deal with, and I
|
| 21 | think the availability of mortgage money, if limited,
|
| 22 | could be a huge thing that we have to deal with in the
|
| 23 | brokerage community, because right now, consumers are
|
| 24 | very, very well served by being able to go out and know
|
| 25 | that there is available money, assuming that they have |
Page 62
| 1 | the qualifications, that there is available money there
|
| 2 | for them to be able to borrow. They know what benefits
|
| 3 | are there based upon their home ownership purchase, and
|
| 4 | you know, if they find the right house and they can't
|
| 5 | get insurance, they're not going to buy the house,
|
| 6 | because the lender isn't going to make the loan.
|
| 7 | So, those are all things that I think are
|
| 8 | greatly influencing and impacting the real estate
|
| 9 | brokerage community today, and I see that in the future.
|
| 10 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Thanks.
|
| 11 | Bob?
|
| 12 | DR. HAHN: I think the real challenge for all of
|
| 13 | us is how we're going to or how this industry is going
|
| 14 | to evolve from the 20th Century into the 21st Century,
|
| 15 | and again, I'm just a narrow card-carrying economist,
|
| 16 | and the way I think about it is what policies can we
|
| 17 | promote to get us from here to there, and at the state
|
| 18 | level, it's a no-brainer. Forgive me. I mean, the
|
| 19 | literature on regulation has shown time and time again
|
| 20 | that price and entry regulation, i.e., minimum service
|
| 21 | standards and other things like that, are bad for
|
| 22 | consumers.
|
| 23 | I think the MLS is a more complicated issue. I
|
| 24 | think Cathy makes a good case that there have been
|
| 25 | definite benefits for consumers over time with respect |
Page 63
| 1 | to having a platform where buyers and sellers can meet
|
| 2 | and share listings. The question is, what should be the
|
| 3 | rules for that and what should be the rules for access
|
| 4 | and so forth?
|
| 5 | And even though I was told not to talk about it,
|
| 6 | I'm going to spend five seconds by mentioning that I
|
| 7 | also think it's not a bad idea to allow banks into the
|
| 8 | real estate business under certain conditions, because
|
| 9 | it would promote competition, and that's what this
|
| 10 | seminar is supposed to be about.
|
| 11 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Just to clarify, what I told Bob
|
| 12 | was it was beyond the scope of the workshop. It's all
|
| 13 | in the interpretation certainly.
|
| 14 | DR. HAHN: I'm just pulling your leg.
|
| 15 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, I would like you to join
|
| 16 | me in thanking our panel, Cathy and Bob.
|
| 17 | (Applause.)
|
| 18 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: We will reconvene at 10:45,
|
| 19 | where we will look at sellers' issues. Thank you.
|
| 20 | (A brief recess was taken.)
|
| 21 | DR. COOPER: Thanks. Thanks for coming and
|
| 22 | welcome to today's second panel.
|
| 23 | We are going to focus today on issues affecting
|
| 24 | competition among the sellers' brokers. I'm James
|
| 25 | Cooper, the Assistant Director of the Office of Policy |
Page 64
| 1 | Planning here at the Federal Trade Commission.
|
| 2 | Before we get started, I want to remind you all
|
| 3 | that we will have questions from the audience during
|
| 4 | this session. They will be on written cards. For those
|
| 5 | of you who picked up packets, there should be a card in
|
| 6 | your packet. There will be ushers walking around to
|
| 7 | pick up those cards, and in case you didn't get a card
|
| 8 | or you don't have a question card, those ushers will
|
| 9 | also have a card and a pen. So, please feel free to
|
| 10 | fill out your card and give it back to the usher, they
|
| 11 | will work their way through some magic and end up with
|
| 12 | me, so we'll go from there.
|
| 13 | A recent NAR survey reports that 82 percent of
|
| 14 | home sellers hire a real estate agent to help them sell
|
| 15 | their home, and the vast majority of these people appear
|
| 16 | to be contracting with real estate agents to provide
|
| 17 | them with a full range of services associated with
|
| 18 | selling that home; for instance, providing pricing
|
| 19 | advice, listing the house in the MLS, conducting open
|
| 20 | houses, otherwise marketing the home, showing the home
|
| 21 | to prospective buyers, negotiating with the buyer, and
|
| 22 | then accompanying them to the closing.
|
| 23 | Although the data seem to indicate that this is
|
| 24 | the predominant model, the one that most consumers
|
| 25 | currently purchase, there are new business models that |
Page 65
| 1 | are arising that offer consumers the option of
|
| 2 | purchasing some of the services as opposed to the full
|
| 3 | bundle. For example, a popular option offered by
|
| 4 | so-called fee-for-service brokers is the MLS listing.
|
| 5 | Under that sort of service contract, the listing agent
|
| 6 | will place the home in the MLS, but the rest of the
|
| 7 | transaction is pretty much left up to the home seller.
|
| 8 | Taking it one step further, there's a whole
|
| 9 | class of home sellers that do it on their own, and these
|
| 10 | so-called FSBOs or for-sale-by-owners, they don't pay a
|
| 11 | broker's fee, but at the same time, they take on all the
|
| 12 | effort themselves. An entire industry now exists to
|
| 13 | help these home sellers perform the tasks involved in
|
| 14 | selling their home.
|
| 15 | In this panel, we hope to explore these
|
| 16 | different business models and discuss how they compete
|
| 17 | to gain home sellers' business. We are also going to
|
| 18 | examine state-imposed restrictions on some of these
|
| 19 | models; for instance, minimum service laws which several
|
| 20 | states recently have considered or adopted and which, I
|
| 21 | might add, that the FTC and DOJ is opposed to, most
|
| 22 | recently in Michigan. We sent a letter to the Michigan
|
| 23 | Legislature last week which some of you may or may not
|
| 24 | be aware of, and if you're not, it's in your packet.
|
| 25 | We'll also discuss reported discrimination |
Page 66
| 1 | against for-sale-by-owners and other fee-for-service
|
| 2 | business models by private parties.
|
| 3 | We are lucky to have a distinguished panel to
|
| 4 | discuss these diverse issues. First, over here on my
|
| 5 | far right, we have Aaron Farmer. He's the owner Texas
|
| 6 | Discount Realty and recently named one of real estate's
|
| 7 | most influential people for his vociferous struggle
|
| 8 | against minimum service regulation in Texas.
|
| 9 | Next we have Thomas Kunz, President and CEO of
|
| 10 | Century 21 Real Estate. He's been involved in virtually
|
| 11 | all aspects of the real estate transaction for over 30
|
| 12 | years or around 30 years, I'm not sure which.
|
| 13 | We also have over here to my immediate left
|
| 14 | Colby Sambrotto. He's the Chief Operating Officer of
|
| 15 | ForSaleByOwner.com. This is a web site that offers FSBO
|
| 16 | listings and also offers consumers who are trying to
|
| 17 | sell their house on their own a wide array of products
|
| 18 | and services to help them sell their house on their own.
|
| 19 | And finally, we're pleased to have Wayne
|
| 20 | Thorburn down at the far end of the table. Dr. Thorburn
|
| 21 | has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of
|
| 22 | Maryland. He's been a professor. He's worked with HUD,
|
| 23 | the Department of Housing and Urban Development. He's
|
| 24 | the Immediate Past President of the Association of Real
|
| 25 | Estate License Law Officials and currently is |
Page 67
| 1 | Administrator of the Texas Real Estate Commission.
|
| 2 | Sam Licklider, who was supposed to be with us
|
| 3 | today, unfortunately will not able to join us.
|
| 4 | Each panelist is going to give a brief
|
| 5 | presentation, and then we will have what I hope is a
|
| 6 | very lively discussion about these issues.
|
| 7 | So, without further adieu, let me turn it over
|
| 8 | to Aaron Farmer.
|
| 9 | MR. FARMER: Hello, my name is Aaron Farmer. I
|
| 10 | am the broker/owner of Texas Discount Realty out of
|
| 11 | Austin, and I would first like to thank the FTC and the
|
| 12 | Department of Justice, specifically James Cooper and
|
| 13 | Maureen Ohlhausen, for inviting me to be on this panel.
|
| 14 | I'm very honored. I appreciate it.
|
| 15 | I'd first like to start with showing the
|
| 16 | organizations that I'm a member of. I'm a member of the
|
| 17 | National Association of Realtors, of course, the Texas
|
| 18 | Association of Realtors, Austin Board of Realtors,
|
| 19 | Houston, San Antonio, Arlington Board of Realtors and
|
| 20 | MLS, Brian/College Station, Waco Board of Realtors, New
|
| 21 | Braunfels Board of Realtors, Alice Board of Realtors,
|
| 22 | and finally, the Tyler Board of Realtors. Last year I
|
| 23 | paid over $4,000 in dues and fees to various realtor
|
| 24 | organizations. So, I consider myself a realtor.
|
| 25 | I'd first like to get into my business, a little |
Page 68
| 1 | bit about my business model. I founded Texas Discount
|
| 2 | Realty as a one-man operation in Austin, Texas in the
|
| 3 | summer of 2000. We work, as today, primarily with
|
| 4 | sellers. We offer three different listing packages, a
|
| 5 | menu of services, if you will.
|
| 6 | The first one and the most controversial one is
|
| 7 | our limited service package. We charge $595 now. When
|
| 8 | I first started, we charged $395 and have since raised
|
| 9 | our prices to $495 and then up to $595, and this is the
|
| 10 | most controversial package that we offer and the one all
|
| 11 | of the fights have been about.
|
| 12 | The next service we offer, I call it our flat
|
| 13 | fee plus. We charge $495 at the time of listing and
|
| 14 | then a flat rate of $1,500 at closing for full-service
|
| 15 | assistance to the seller once a buyer is found. We
|
| 16 | don't do any additional marketing of the house other
|
| 17 | than putting it onto MLS, and it goes onto REALTOR.com,
|
| 18 | AustinHomeSearch.com, IDX sites, various places like
|
| 19 | that. Of course, out of all of our packages, we do
|
| 20 | offer 3 percent to the buyer's agent.
|
| 21 | Finally, I have a full-service plan. Granted, I
|
| 22 | don't sell a lot of these, but we do charge 4 to 6
|
| 23 | percent paid at closing, and yes, we have charged 6
|
| 24 | percent to some certain sellers with very low-priced
|
| 25 | properties. Finally, we do offer rebates to buyers who |
Page 69
| 1 | do a lot of their own legwork.
|
| 2 | How I got involved with all this was through the
|
| 3 | minimum service laws. Texas was the first state in the
|
| 4 | U.S. to pass a minimum service law in September of 2002,
|
| 5 | and I'd like to read a little bit to you of the first
|
| 6 | shot I guess that was fired through the minimum service
|
| 7 | laws, and this is directly out of the Texas Register.
|
| 8 | It says, "This amendment adds new Section 535.2
|
| 9 | to define minimum level of service that a consumer may
|
| 10 | expect to receive from a broker who represents the
|
| 11 | consumer. This clarification is proposed based on
|
| 12 | concerns raised by various industry organizations
|
| 13 | regarding limited service listings. A limited service
|
| 14 | listing agreement is an agreement by which a broker
|
| 15 | provides fewer services than those provided for in a
|
| 16 | traditional real estate listing agreement. A limited
|
| 17 | service agreement may provide for a menu of services or
|
| 18 | reduced fees for certain specified services rather than
|
| 19 | a full commission for the complete range of brokerage
|
| 20 | services generally found in a traditional real estate
|
| 21 | agency relationship."
|
| 22 | Now, this is the State of Texas that is putting
|
| 23 | this out. This is not the National Association of
|
| 24 | Realtors. This is not TAR. This is the State of Texas
|
| 25 | who's telling me that I should charge a full commission |
Page 70
| 1 | instead of a menu of services, and of course, this
|
| 2 | outraged me, and this is what provoked me to go and do
|
| 3 | what I've done.
|
| 4 | So, I filed suit. I did what any warm-blooded
|
| 5 | American does these days, I filed a lawsuit against the
|
| 6 | State of Texas and the Texas Real Estate Commission
|
| 7 | specifically. In fact, I believe Dr. Thorburn was the
|
| 8 | one who was served with the papers, I believe.
|
| 9 | We were immediately granted a temporary
|
| 10 | restraining order. The next day, after this restraining
|
| 11 | order was granted, the State Attorney General's Office
|
| 12 | called my attorney and said, "How do we make this thing
|
| 13 | go away? How do we make this lawsuit go away?" We
|
| 14 | said, "Simply repeal the rule. Just repeal the rule,
|
| 15 | that's all we want." And immediately the rule was
|
| 16 | repealed.
|
| 17 | There is a process, you know, later in 2003, it
|
| 18 | was repealed, but immediately, the wheels began in
|
| 19 | motion again to pass a new rule, so to speak, I guess
|
| 20 | that TAR and the TREC thought maybe could make it
|
| 21 | through the courts, I guess, and so we attempted to
|
| 22 | negotiate and were invited on several occasions to try
|
| 23 | to make a more consumer friendly rule or law.
|
| 24 | Then, in February of 2005, a law that was deemed
|
| 25 | to be not consumer friendly by myself and by others was |
Page 71
| 1 | proposed through the Real Estate Commission again, and
|
| 2 | then this is when the Department of Justice and the
|
| 3 | Federal Trade Commission stepped in and wrote their
|
| 4 | letter saying that this new rule would harm consumers,
|
| 5 | of which I agreed with most of the letter.
|
| 6 | At that point, seeing that we were probably in
|
| 7 | for another fight in the court system, Texas Association
|
| 8 | of Realtors goes through the Legislature and has a law
|
| 9 | attached to a general housekeeping bill 11 days before
|
| 10 | the end of session, and of course, Governor Perry signs
|
| 11 | the law into effect on September 1st of 2005.
|
| 12 | So, now we get to the present day, and I want to
|
| 13 | talk a little bit about kind of who was behind these
|
| 14 | laws. In Texas, the law was filed or the amendment was
|
| 15 | tacked onto the housekeeping law by a state
|
| 16 | representative who also happens to be a real estate
|
| 17 | broker out of El Paso and also happens to be a ranking
|
| 18 | member in the Texas Association of Realtors. Something
|
| 19 | I find more egregious is in Utah, a minimum service law
|
| 20 | recently passed, and it was pushed through by a state
|
| 21 | senator out of Utah who also happens to be the President
|
| 22 | this year of the National Association of Realtors. But
|
| 23 | of course, NAR is neutral on the minimum service
|
| 24 | clauses.
|
| 25 | But you kind of see a pattern here. This is not |
Page 72
| 1 | Ralph Nader or John Stossel or any other consumer
|
| 2 | organization coming out for these laws. These are
|
| 3 | industry insiders who are pushing these laws through,
|
| 4 | and in fact, just the opposite is happening with the
|
| 5 | consumer rights groups, they are coming out against
|
| 6 | these rules and laws.
|
| 7 | So, what are some of the arguments nowadays?
|
| 8 | You know, the first argument was, well, you know, we
|
| 9 | think agents should charge a full commission, whatever
|
| 10 | that may be, instead of a menu of services. Well, now
|
| 11 | the arguments for this new law have changed a little
|
| 12 | bit, and now they say, but we owe a fiduciary duty to
|
| 13 | our clients, which I absolutely agree with. I agree
|
| 14 | that we owe a fiduciary duty to our clients. But when I
|
| 15 | was going through school, I learned fiduciary duty meant
|
| 16 | you do what's in the best interests of your client ahead
|
| 17 | of your best interests.
|
| 18 | If my client comes to me and says, "You know
|
| 19 | what, Aaron, I know more than you. I can negotiate my
|
| 20 | contract better than you. I can sell my house better
|
| 21 | than you. I just need you to help me with this, this or
|
| 22 | this," am I not doing my fiduciary duty by doing what my
|
| 23 | client is telling me is in his best interests?
|
| 24 | So, another thing that I find that these laws,
|
| 25 | these minimum service laws do is we're essentially |
Page 73
| 1 | saying someone who just took 120 hours of real estate
|
| 2 | classes maybe online, who's maybe never bought or sold a
|
| 3 | house, who passed a real estate exam yesterday, is more
|
| 4 | qualified to sell a house than someone who maybe has
|
| 5 | been a real estate attorney for the last 30 years and is
|
| 6 | not a member of an MLS. That's what these laws are
|
| 7 | essentially saying.
|
| 8 | Last year in Texas there was around 3500
|
| 9 | complaints against traditional brokers in the State of
|
| 10 | Texas. How many against limited service brokers? None.
|
| 11 | Against limited service transactions? Zero. Never.
|
| 12 | There's never been a consumer complaint in the State of
|
| 13 | Texas on a limited service transaction. I think if the
|
| 14 | realtor establishment would really like to help the
|
| 15 | consumer, let's look at some of these 3500 complaints.
|
| 16 | Let's look at the root causes of some of those. Let's
|
| 17 | go after some of those instead of going after something
|
| 18 | that there's no consumer outcry for.
|
| 19 | And what about competition? NAR says that
|
| 20 | there's competition in the real estate industry, and I
|
| 21 | agree. I agree there's a lot of competition in the real
|
| 22 | estate industry, but the competition is among
|
| 23 | traditional brokers. There's not the competition
|
| 24 | between traditional agents and alternative brokers.
|
| 25 | This is the kind of competition that I see practiced on |
Page 74
| 1 | me in my markets.
|
| 2 | I've personally had brokers, agents, tell
|
| 3 | potential sellers that no one would show my listing. If
|
| 4 | they listed their house with me, no one would show the
|
| 5 | house. I have had brokers tell people that, hey, he's
|
| 6 | gone out of business. I heard he's going out of
|
| 7 | business soon. You know, I have had signs stolen. I've
|
| 8 | received hateful emails. I even had one agent who was
|
| 9 | ridiculed in public for being a discount broker at a
|
| 10 | public realtor event, and other agents around the
|
| 11 | country have had frivolous complaints filed against
|
| 12 | them, have had their listings removed from MLS for no
|
| 13 | reason, have been asked for every copy of every listing.
|
| 14 | I don't really call this competition. I call
|
| 15 | this harassment and discrimination. Not only is it
|
| 16 | discrimination against us as brokers, it's
|
| 17 | discrimination against the consumer, the seller, who
|
| 18 | might be drawn to us, who doesn't feel like that they
|
| 19 | need a traditional agent. The discrimination doesn't
|
| 20 | even stop there. You know, it goes up to, you know, the
|
| 21 | State of Texas, who's saying that I shouldn't have a
|
| 22 | menu of services. I should charge a full commission.
|
| 23 | Now, something that we're seeing go through some
|
| 24 | of the local MLSs now are exclusive agency laws that are
|
| 25 | being passed that says that if a seller chooses to have |
Page 75
| 1 | an exclusive agency listing, well, you can list your
|
| 2 | home on MLS, but it's not going to be listed on the
|
| 3 | REALTOR.com or any of the IDX web sites, and this is
|
| 4 | something that's happening through some of the local
|
| 5 | MLSs, including my home MLS of Austin, Texas.
|
| 6 | So, what does the future of the industry bring?
|
| 7 | I believe that we must stop the lies and discrimination
|
| 8 | as an industry against people who are different, against
|
| 9 | brokers who are different, against consumers who want to
|
| 10 | do things different. We have got to remember that not
|
| 11 | every consumer is the same, not everyone fits in the
|
| 12 | same little box, not everyone has the same experiences
|
| 13 | as other people. There may be people who have bought
|
| 14 | and sold 20 houses over the last five years, which I
|
| 15 | have several of those clients, real estate investors,
|
| 16 | and we can't treat them the same as traditional agents
|
| 17 | have in the past.
|
| 18 | Also, most alternative brokers are also
|
| 19 | realtors. I personally agree with the National
|
| 20 | Association of Realtors and the realtor establishment
|
| 21 | most of the time. Seventy-five to 80 percent of the
|
| 22 | time, I believe that they do great things for the
|
| 23 | communities. You know, in Texas, they have raised a lot
|
| 24 | of money for hurricane victims, and they do great
|
| 25 | things, and they provide great resources for me as a |
Page 76
| 1 | broker and me and my agents. They provide great
|
| 2 | resources and tools for us.
|
| 3 | I think they have lots of value, and you know, I
|
| 4 | wouldn't be paying $4,000 a year if I didn't agree that
|
| 5 | I was getting value out of that, but I just don't agree
|
| 6 | with their definition of competition and how they
|
| 7 | practice it.
|
| 8 | Thanks.
|
| 9 | (Applause.)
|
| 10 | MR. KUNZ: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a
|
| 11 | privilege for me to be here with you today. My name is
|
| 12 | Tom Kunz, and I am President and CEO of Century 21
|
| 13 | Realty, LLC. I hope to show the unique perspective of
|
| 14 | someone who currently sells franchises to real estate
|
| 15 | brokers and provides services to affiliated brokers and
|
| 16 | sales professionals.
|
| 17 | Previously, I have been president of an
|
| 18 | independently owned and operated real estate brokerage
|
| 19 | company in Southern California and also head of a
|
| 20 | software company earlier in my career. I am here to
|
| 21 | represent the over 137,000 small, independent
|
| 22 | businessmen and women who are members of the Century 21
|
| 23 | Franchise System either as brokers or sales associates.
|
| 24 | We have more than 7500 offices worldwide, but half of
|
| 25 | our offices have 17 or fewer sales associates, and the |
Page 77
| 1 | median number of closed transactions by offices last
|
| 2 | year were 141 closed transactions. We're a big system
|
| 3 | but one that is proud to have so many small to
|
| 4 | medium-sized businesses in our ranks along with our
|
| 5 | larger brokers.
|
| 6 | I also can speak from a real estate consumer's
|
| 7 | perspective, because in the past year, I sold my primary
|
| 8 | residence in California, moved across the country,
|
| 9 | purchased a new home in New Jersey, and I might add that
|
| 10 | precisely because of my 31 years of experience in the
|
| 11 | industry, I made an educated decision to work with a
|
| 12 | full-service real estate professional on both
|
| 13 | transactions, using both a seller's agent and a buyer's
|
| 14 | agent. I got what I paid for, too. Excellent
|
| 15 | marketing, local knowledge and advice and counsel
|
| 16 | throughout the process.
|
| 17 | Since this is a seller's panel, I'd like to open
|
| 18 | by talking about the listing. The issue of who owns the
|
| 19 | listing is fundamental to this conversation. I will
|
| 20 | tell you in rather no uncertain terms that a listing is
|
| 21 | a broker's work product. It is interesting to hear some
|
| 22 | people espouse that the theory that selling a home is a
|
| 23 | simple process and that one must only list it with an
|
| 24 | MLS in order to make a sale, anyone who has ever sold a
|
| 25 | home fully appreciates that the listing is merely the |
Page 78
| 1 | first of many steps in the process.
|
| 2 | A listing is the agreement between a broker and
|
| 3 | a homeowner that describes the manner in which a home
|
| 4 | will be marketed and sold. It often defines the manner
|
| 5 | in which the home will be presented, marketed to the
|
| 6 | body of prospective buyers. The terms of this agreement
|
| 7 | are, and we believe should remain, a matter for private
|
| 8 | negotiation between the listing homeowner and the broker
|
| 9 | of his or her choice rather than the subject of
|
| 10 | government regulation at the federal, state or local
|
| 11 | level.
|
| 12 | If anything, the increased use of the internet
|
| 13 | by potential sellers and buyers of residential real
|
| 14 | estate have significantly increased the negotiation
|
| 15 | power of the listing homeowner in setting the terms of
|
| 16 | such transactions, which are already significant as a
|
| 17 | result of his or her control of the key asset, that
|
| 18 | being the home itself. It is our firm belief that the
|
| 19 | Federal Government should not get involved in dictating
|
| 20 | to state-licensed real estate professionals and
|
| 21 | homeowners on how these individual marketing plans
|
| 22 | should or should not be implemented.
|
| 23 | Let me ask you, in what other industry do
|
| 24 | individual service providers negotiate a competitive
|
| 25 | price for their services and then aggressively market |
Page 79
| 1 | their products to the competition, sharing upwards of 50
|
| 2 | percent or more of their fees to attract buyers? And in
|
| 3 | what other industry do individual competitors
|
| 4 | voluntarily make their inventory available to other
|
| 5 | industry participants, empowering the competition to
|
| 6 | avoid the cost of infrastructure necessary to produce
|
| 7 | their own inventory?
|
| 8 | I'll tell you, the residential real estate
|
| 9 | industry is one of the last great industries where
|
| 10 | entrepreneurs can open up shop next door to the largest
|
| 11 | brokerage firm in town, join a cooperative group called
|
| 12 | an MLS, and share in their competitors' inventory,
|
| 13 | investing relatively little in startup costs and
|
| 14 | actually making a living.
|
| 15 | This industry is dominated by small to
|
| 16 | medium-sized family-owned-and-operated firms, many
|
| 17 | handed down from generation to generation. There are
|
| 18 | more than one million sales associates and brokers
|
| 19 | operating in nearly 100,000 offices around the country.
|
| 20 | They are fiercely independent, yet with the voluntary
|
| 21 | efforts unique to the industry, they are cooperative
|
| 22 | with the competition in ways unheard of in any other
|
| 23 | industry that I know of. And why? Because cooperation
|
| 24 | best meets the needs of the consumer.
|
| 25 | This is facilitated through a cooperative known |
Page 80
| 1 | as the Multiple Listing Service or MLS. Depending on
|
| 2 | who you ask, there are anywhere between 800 and 2000
|
| 3 | MLSs operated in the country today. Long ago, the
|
| 4 | industry recognized that through cooperative efforts,
|
| 5 | brokers and agents can sell a consumer's home faster and
|
| 6 | more efficiently. If you look at the past several years
|
| 7 | in particular, where many transactional investments and
|
| 8 | those who manage them have failed, real estate
|
| 9 | professionals have done their job quite well. Simply
|
| 10 | put, the process works and works rather well.
|
| 11 | In a performance-driven economy, I would say the
|
| 12 | real estate industry has outperformed. The simple fact
|
| 13 | of the matter is that the U.S. housing marketplace tends
|
| 14 | to be very efficient for consumers. When a real estate
|
| 15 | professional represents himself to a prospective home
|
| 16 | seller and makes a listing presentation, she does so
|
| 17 | with a full understanding of the very real pricing
|
| 18 | pressures and competitive issues. She presents her
|
| 19 | skills, resources, technology, marketing plan for the
|
| 20 | home. She also presents and explains her fees.
|
| 21 | Generally, the typical homeowner will invite
|
| 22 | listing presentations from more than one agent. Through
|
| 23 | the cooperative effort in the industry, the internet
|
| 24 | empowers home sellers to be well educated on the market,
|
| 25 | attributes of various firms and specific sales |
Page 81
| 1 | associates, pricing, and the list just goes on and on
|
| 2 | and on.
|
| 3 | Ultimately, the home seller selects the real
|
| 4 | estate professional, he or she, and her brokerage firm.
|
| 5 | Each real estate professional competes against the other
|
| 6 | ultimately in a very efficient process driven by the
|
| 7 | homeowner determining which fee and which services best
|
| 8 | meets the homeowner's needs. As you are aware, sales
|
| 9 | associates are almost always independent contractors,
|
| 10 | and our experience shows that all commission fees are
|
| 11 | negotiable. This very efficient price/value proposition
|
| 12 | process takes place thousands of times each day
|
| 13 | throughout this country.
|
| 14 | Some sales associates are simply better than
|
| 15 | others, and they are able to demand and earn higher
|
| 16 | fees. Some choose to discount their fees, which may or
|
| 17 | may not reflect their service levels. At the end of the
|
| 18 | day, it is the homeowner who decides if the price/value
|
| 19 | proposition meets his or her needs.
|
| 20 | The home seller ultimately controls the listing
|
| 21 | decision, which gives him a great deal of influence over
|
| 22 | the price of the services. As my father used to say to
|
| 23 | me, "People vote with their cash." Thus, the
|
| 24 | marketplace determines what is acceptable.
|
| 25 | The fact is that the national average broker |
Page 82
| 1 | commission rate over the past dozen or so years has
|
| 2 | trended down from the 6 to 7 percent range down to 5.1
|
| 3 | percent according to REALTrends, a leading industry
|
| 4 | consultant and analyst firm. That said, it is almost
|
| 5 | impossible to determine what the competitive price level
|
| 6 | is in any industry, especially one as dynamic as the
|
| 7 | real estate business, where there are highly individual
|
| 8 | services and rapid technological changes taking place
|
| 9 | every day.
|
| 10 | If you are the listing broker, a number of
|
| 11 | states have determined that you must actually have a
|
| 12 | physical presence to properly represent sellers and
|
| 13 | provide the services necessary to manage the sales
|
| 14 | process. More than a dozen states have determined that
|
| 15 | one cannot properly represent a seller's interest while
|
| 16 | operating out of a call center located two states away.
|
| 17 | Thus, we have seen a recent uptake in minimum service
|
| 18 | requirement laws passed at the state level.
|
| 19 | First and foremost, this is a states rights
|
| 20 | issue. I cannot, nor can you, dissuade the states from
|
| 21 | doing what they think is best for their respective
|
| 22 | citizens. They are acting to protect their customers or
|
| 23 | their consumers, not to shield the real estate industry
|
| 24 | in some way.
|
| 25 | For the record, while we have no reason to |
Page 83
| 1 | believe that the states' motives are anything but
|
| 2 | well-intentioned, neither Century 21 nor our parent
|
| 3 | company, Cendant, believes that minimum standards
|
| 4 | legislation is truly necessary. We believe in
|
| 5 | consumers' rights to choose their real estate
|
| 6 | representation, or not, and we also believe that the
|
| 7 | full-service real estate model employed by the majority
|
| 8 | of our brokers presents a compelling value proposition
|
| 9 | that is recognized on its own merits by today's
|
| 10 | increasingly savvy consumers.
|
| 11 | That being said, it is important to note that in
|
| 12 | the past five years, there have been a variety of
|
| 13 | alternative real estate models launched, which is strong
|
| 14 | evidence that competition and the ability to innovate
|
| 15 | are alive and well and thriving in our industry. And
|
| 16 | who benefits most from this competition? The consumer.
|
| 17 | They have more choices than ever before.
|
| 18 | At the end of the day, the consumer should
|
| 19 | determine what is in his or her best interests, and in
|
| 20 | fact, when I look across residential real estate in
|
| 21 | America, I see a very dynamic and competitive industry
|
| 22 | that should be left free of Federal Government
|
| 23 | regulatory intervention to sort itself out.
|
| 24 | Thank you very much.
|
| 25 | (Applause.) |
Page 84
| 1 | (Technical difficulty.)
|
| 2 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Once again, my name is Colby
|
| 3 | Sambrotto. I'm the Chief Operating Officer of
|
| 4 | ForSaleByOwner.com, and I'd like to thank the FTC for,
|
| 5 | A, convening the workshop today, but B, for allowing us
|
| 6 | to take part in it. It is a privilege. Thank you very
|
| 7 | much.
|
| 8 | I'm here to talk about ForSaleByOwner.com but
|
| 9 | also to talk about changes that are taking place in the
|
| 10 | real estate services industry, changes that we think
|
| 11 | we're playing a part in driving. ForSaleByOwner.com is
|
| 12 | dedicated, of course, to no-commission real estate, to
|
| 13 | not using agents at all, but we do have a section of our
|
| 14 | services that is predicated upon us closely interacting
|
| 15 | with realtors. So, while it does get adversarial at
|
| 16 | times when we talk about our model relative to realtors,
|
| 17 | we do work closely with them oftentimes.
|
| 18 | Over the course of the last six years, we've
|
| 19 | built this business on the internet, primarily on the
|
| 20 | internet, although we do have bricks and mortar offices
|
| 21 | across the country. Over the course of those six years,
|
| 22 | there are a number of trends that we've noticed taking
|
| 23 | place, becoming evident in the industry, trends being
|
| 24 | driven by consumers and the changing aspect of consumer
|
| 25 | demands. |
Page 85
| 1 | One thing is that consumers want unbundled real
|
| 2 | estate services. That's a certainty. The second and
|
| 3 | probably the biggest driving force in the growth of
|
| 4 | ForSaleByOwner.com is the fact they want to reduce
|
| 5 | transaction costs associated with buying and selling
|
| 6 | real estate. So, those are the two big factors that
|
| 7 | have driven the growth in our business. I think those
|
| 8 | are the two biggest factors driving growth in the real
|
| 9 | estate services industry today.
|
| 10 | To a certain degree, the traditional real estate
|
| 11 | service industry, that end of the industry that's, you
|
| 12 | know, populated by agents, has resisted change I think
|
| 13 | to a certain degree. What most concerns us is that over
|
| 14 | the course of the last year and a half to two years,
|
| 15 | they seem to be actively moving to prevent us from
|
| 16 | offering services that consumers have a great deal of
|
| 17 | demand for. So, that's why we're here today.
|
| 18 | One of the things I wanted to talk about -- and
|
| 19 | if I had my Power Point presentation, I would have a
|
| 20 | snappy page here to show you -- the internet is driving
|
| 21 | the change in real estate. Real estate, it seems to
|
| 22 | ForSaleByOwner.com, has changed more over the course of
|
| 23 | the last five years than it did probably in the previous
|
| 24 | 90 combined, and the reason that that change has taken
|
| 25 | place -- well, the change is being driven by consumer |
Page 86
| 1 | demand, but it's being facilitated by the internet, and
|
| 2 | the fact is that the internet brings enormous
|
| 3 | efficiencies to the process of buying and selling real
|
| 4 | estate, and those are the efficiencies that we use and
|
| 5 | deliver to the consumer, and the consumer seems to be
|
| 6 | reacting positively.
|
| 7 | It is having an effect on commissions. We have
|
| 8 | heard that talked about already today, but you know,
|
| 9 | traditionally while we've seen commissions up above 6
|
| 10 | percent, they are still between 5 and 5 and a half
|
| 11 | percent, and it's our feeling that if you're selling
|
| 12 | your largest asset, which is the case for most
|
| 13 | Americans, you should be able to hold onto that equity
|
| 14 | that you have worked so hard to build up over the course
|
| 15 | of the lifetime of being in the home.
|
| 16 | The internet is an ideal platform for marketing
|
| 17 | real estate. You can post color photos. You can post
|
| 18 | virtual tours. In the case of ForSaleByOwner.com, you
|
| 19 | can put up a 3000-word description of your property.
|
| 20 | And you can have that information easily searched and
|
| 21 | frequently searched by buyers from their own homes on
|
| 22 | the internet. So, to a certain degree, we consider
|
| 23 | ForSaleByOwner.com and models like us to be a consumer
|
| 24 | version of the MLS. The MLS is kind of a closed
|
| 25 | corporate intranet. We're available to the whole |
Page 87
| 1 | public, to the entire public, via the internet.
|
| 2 | I do have my Power Point now, so I am going to
|
| 3 | try to skip ahead.
|
| 4 | Again, the change isn't being driven by new
|
| 5 | models. The new models are there in response to demand
|
| 6 | on the part of consumers.
|
| 7 | A thumbnail sketch on ForSaleByOwner.com, it was
|
| 8 | founded in 1999. It is primarily a web-centric
|
| 9 | business. It started really with the URL and grew from
|
| 10 | there to the point now where we have 70,000 or roughly
|
| 11 | 70,000 listings across all 50 states. We're one of the
|
| 12 | largest real estate web sites in the world based on
|
| 13 | traffic, probably fifth or sixth if you rate them across
|
| 14 | all different categories.
|
| 15 | While our core competency is no-commission real
|
| 16 | estate, a significant part of our business is centered
|
| 17 | around offering consumers reduced-commission access to
|
| 18 | the local MLSs in their area. So, in that sense, we do
|
| 19 | have a vested interest in talking about minimum service
|
| 20 | requirements, and I'll get into that a little bit later
|
| 21 | on.
|
| 22 | We do have a portion of the business that also
|
| 23 | refers out real estate to agents through an affiliated
|
| 24 | brokerage. So, on a number of different levels, we
|
| 25 | interact with traditional real estate, but obviously |
Page 88
| 1 | we're focused really on no commission.
|
| 2 | I think one of the biggest factors in our
|
| 3 | success, beyond the fact that there's enormous demand
|
| 4 | for our services, is that while we're affordable, we're
|
| 5 | also effective, and one of the things that we pay close
|
| 6 | attention to is the success rate of the sellers on our
|
| 7 | web site. So, we do poll them on a regular basis. When
|
| 8 | they take a listing off the site, we ask them did the
|
| 9 | home sell, and 65 percent of those respondents say that
|
| 10 | the home did sell, and it was due to the fact that we
|
| 11 | drove buyer interest to the ad.
|
| 12 | The size of the market that we serve, although
|
| 13 | we consider all real estate consumers to be a target for
|
| 14 | our services, the size of the ForSaleByOwner market is
|
| 15 | often debated. The NAR typically pegs the size of that
|
| 16 | market at about 14 percent of all sellers, but there are
|
| 17 | competing studies that indicate that it could be
|
| 18 | significantly higher, as high as one in five sellers
|
| 19 | consummating real estate transactions without an agent.
|
| 20 | So, I mean, just from an anecdotal standpoint, it seems
|
| 21 | to us that that rate is growing, and it's growing
|
| 22 | significantly over the course of the last three years,
|
| 23 | three to four years.
|
| 24 | The demand for our services has allowed us to
|
| 25 | grow at the rate we have. We grow on an average rate of |
Page 89
| 1 | about 100 percent year over year. So, we have grown
|
| 2 | very rapidly. We have been profitable from year one.
|
| 3 | We think those figures go a long way towards validating
|
| 4 | the efficacy of our model.
|
| 5 | The fact of the matter is, if you're going to
|
| 6 | sell a $200,000 house and you're going to use an agent,
|
| 7 | you are going to spend, on average, close to $12,000 to
|
| 8 | sell that house. If you use ForSaleByOwner.com or a
|
| 9 | service like ForSaleByOwner.com, you're going to spend,
|
| 10 | on average, about $300. So, the extreme differences in
|
| 11 | price makes it very compelling for the average seller.
|
| 12 | It's very easy for us to get our foot in the
|
| 13 | door when we can say, "Look, what do you have to lose?
|
| 14 | Give it a shot. Give it a shot for a couple months.
|
| 15 | Spend a couple hundred dollars. We're very effective,
|
| 16 | we're very affordable. You can always move on to the
|
| 17 | full commission approach down the line if you so
|
| 18 | choose."
|
| 19 | As I alluded to earlier, there seems to be an
|
| 20 | effort to throw up roadblocks to change to allow
|
| 21 | competition to flourish in the industry. These are the
|
| 22 | three big ones, four big ones actually, and I think the
|
| 23 | first one, not to belabor it, is probably the easiest
|
| 24 | for us to knock down. There seems to be no rational way
|
| 25 | to defend minimum service requirements, so I'm not even |
Page 90
| 1 | going to bother, but that's something that we struggle
|
| 2 | with on a state-by-state basis. Certainly Texas is the
|
| 3 | biggest example of that.
|
| 4 | Efforts to prevent our customers from getting
|
| 5 | full distribution of their EA listing, exclusive agency
|
| 6 | listings. When one of our customers opts for an MLS
|
| 7 | package, they go into the MLS as an exclusive agency.
|
| 8 | That means that they're obligated to pay an agent, if
|
| 9 | the agent brings a buyer, 3 percent, but we seem to be
|
| 10 | running into some resistance to how those listings are
|
| 11 | distributed after they get placed into the MLS. Most
|
| 12 | importantly, do the listings get uploaded to
|
| 13 | REALTOR.com, and there seems to be a degree of
|
| 14 | resistance to uploading them to REALTOR.com if they're
|
| 15 | an EA listing.
|
| 16 | Second, something that we have had trouble with
|
| 17 | in the past is an overly broad interpretation of
|
| 18 | licensing laws at the state level. We have had states
|
| 19 | send us cease and desist letters, saying the services
|
| 20 | that you offer rise to the level of an agent. You
|
| 21 | should be licensed as such, and until you are, stop
|
| 22 | doing business. So, we did fight a legal battle in the
|
| 23 | State of California on that issue.
|
| 24 | Finally, I think one of the things that drives
|
| 25 | some of the resistance to change is the fact that |
Page 91
| 1 | departments of real estate around the country are for
|
| 2 | the most part controlled by agents and realtors, and
|
| 3 | they're able to kind of rubber-stamp that legislation
|
| 4 | when it comes down the pike. I would point out the
|
| 5 | State of Texas as being an example of that with minimum
|
| 6 | service requirements. Six of nine of their board
|
| 7 | members, I believe, are agents or realtors, and four
|
| 8 | should be removed. I'm sorry, that shouldn't be there.
|
| 9 | The forms that we think would help us to
|
| 10 | continue offering services that are competitive and
|
| 11 | there's a great demand for on the part of the consumer,
|
| 12 | repealing on a state-by-state basis minimum service
|
| 13 | agreements; ensuring that EA listings receive full
|
| 14 | distribution; eliminating onerous licensing requirements
|
| 15 | on a state-by-state basis that prevent for-sale-by-owner
|
| 16 | type models from existing and flourishing; ensuring that
|
| 17 | there's more of a balance in the departments of real
|
| 18 | estate in regard to who sits on those boards, so that
|
| 19 | there's maybe a more diverse set of professionals on the
|
| 20 | board helping implement real estate law around the
|
| 21 | country; and then again, number four is making sure that
|
| 22 | the EA listings get full distribution.
|
| 23 | That's really it. Thank you very much.
|
| 24 | (Applause.)
|
| 25 | DR. THORBURN: Well, this is one time in my life |
Page 92
| 1 | where I'm glad that I'm technologically challenged,
|
| 2 | because I don't know the first thing about using that,
|
| 3 | and it won't break down on me.
|
| 4 | I'm Wayne Thorburn, and I am here today as the
|
| 5 | Immediate Past President of the Association of Real
|
| 6 | Estate License Law Officials and also as Administrator
|
| 7 | of the Texas Real Estate Commission, and correspondent
|
| 8 | with Aaron on various matters, as you can imagine.
|
| 9 | Now, however, my comments today are solely mine
|
| 10 | and should not be construed as an official position of
|
| 11 | either ARELLO or the Texas Real Estate Commission, and
|
| 12 | while the issue of competition in real estate is a most
|
| 13 | important one for regulators and for ARELLO, the
|
| 14 | organization has not taken any official position on
|
| 15 | modes of competition or the requirement of providing
|
| 16 | specific services in an agency agreement.
|
| 17 | I would start by saying that about 50 years ago,
|
| 18 | a gentleman by the name of Richard Weaver wrote a very
|
| 19 | important book, and its title says everything. The
|
| 20 | title of the book was Ideas have Consequences, and it's
|
| 21 | an important reminder that just as ideas have
|
| 22 | consequences for future action, so, too, despite what
|
| 23 | the Mad Hatter said, words do have specific meanings,
|
| 24 | and I would urge everyone to concentrate on what is
|
| 25 | actually the meaning of the word "agency" and what is |
Page 93
| 1 | meant by the concept of representation, because I think
|
| 2 | those are two of the things that sometimes, in some of
|
| 3 | the perspectives that you have heard today -- and you
|
| 4 | will hear from others, including some federal
|
| 5 | officials -- there seems to be a sliding over of what is
|
| 6 | the concept of agency and what are the fiduciary
|
| 7 | responsibilities of one who holds one's self out to be
|
| 8 | an agent of another.
|
| 9 | I would just as a quick analogy say that I think
|
| 10 | Professor Hahn was making a very poor analogy when he
|
| 11 | made the comparison to airline tickets. I think when
|
| 12 | you consider, I came up yesterday, certainly I went on
|
| 13 | the internet and I purchased an airline ticket. I had a
|
| 14 | service that was delivered to me yesterday, and that was
|
| 15 | the end of that transaction. It was a one-time event on
|
| 16 | one day, quickly delivered. What we're talking about
|
| 17 | here, I think, as Mrs. Whatley pointed out and others
|
| 18 | have pointed out, is not a one-time occurrence, but
|
| 19 | rather, a transaction, over time, that involves a number
|
| 20 | of players working together, all of whom are directed --
|
| 21 | again to use her analogy -- it is the director of the
|
| 22 | play who is responsible for all of the activity that
|
| 23 | takes place in that event. It is the real estate broker
|
| 24 | or salesperson who enters into an agency agreement with
|
| 25 | a client who is responsible for making sure that all |
Page 94
| 1 | those elements come together.
|
| 2 | Let me begin by saying that it has been accepted
|
| 3 | for some time that a real estate broker, while acting as
|
| 4 | an agent for another, is a fiduciary. As a fiduciary, a
|
| 5 | real estate broker is held to owe specific duties to his
|
| 6 | or her principal, including, as was cited earlier,
|
| 7 | loyalty, disclosure, confidentiality, reasonable care
|
| 8 | and diligence, and as an agent, the broker has agreed to
|
| 9 | provide representation to his or her client throughout
|
| 10 | the entire real estate transaction, not solely on the
|
| 11 | day that the agency agreement is signed.
|
| 12 | In its last regular session, as Aaron has
|
| 13 | pointed out, the Texas Legislature enacted a provision
|
| 14 | whereby a broker who obtains an exclusive right to sell
|
| 15 | or an exclusive agency agreement to represent a party in
|
| 16 | a real estate transaction is that party's agent. Such a
|
| 17 | person may not instruct another broker to negotiate
|
| 18 | directly with the first broker's client. Those of you
|
| 19 | in the audience who are attorneys are very familiar with
|
| 20 | this concept. If someone is represented by an attorney
|
| 21 | in any kind of a legal matter, it is not appropriate,
|
| 22 | without the consent of the other attorney, for that
|
| 23 | individual, that attorney, to talk directly to your
|
| 24 | client, and that is the similar situation in our state
|
| 25 | law and has been there for some time. |
Page 95
| 1 | Also, the individual must inform his client if
|
| 2 | he receives material information related to a
|
| 3 | transaction and must answer the client's questions and
|
| 4 | present any offers to or from the client. Answer
|
| 5 | questions relating to the transaction, presents any
|
| 6 | offers to or from the client, and provide any material
|
| 7 | information that comes into that person's possession
|
| 8 | relative to the transaction.
|
| 9 | Now, these seem to me to be rather basic
|
| 10 | characteristics and requirements of representation, the
|
| 11 | kinds of services that virtually all consumers would
|
| 12 | expect when they do what? They hire someone to
|
| 13 | represent them as their agent in an undertaking.
|
| 14 | Now, under our system of federalism, the
|
| 15 | responsibility for licensing and regulating real estate
|
| 16 | professionals has been placed in the hands of the
|
| 17 | various states, and as regulators, we are required to
|
| 18 | apply state statutes and set forth the requirements for
|
| 19 | obtaining and retaining a real estate license.
|
| 20 | However, somehow it appears that certain
|
| 21 | individuals here in Washington do not believe that these
|
| 22 | basic elements should be requirements for
|
| 23 | representation, that an individual can claim to be an
|
| 24 | agent without performing any of these duties for the
|
| 25 | person they are claiming to represent in a real estate |
Page 96
| 1 | transaction.
|
| 2 | Perhaps it would be more helpful if their
|
| 3 | emphasis were placed on what I would say is preventing
|
| 4 | false claims by those who sign an agency agreement with
|
| 5 | a client, promise to provide representation, place the
|
| 6 | property on the internet, and then walk away from any
|
| 7 | further involvement in the real estate transaction.
|
| 8 | Frankly, I have no problem with this alternative
|
| 9 | business model as it has been called, except that it is
|
| 10 | neither agency nor representation. Simply stated, it's
|
| 11 | a marketing or advertising agreement that an individual
|
| 12 | has with a client.
|
| 13 | I think that brings us to a related issue which
|
| 14 | lies beneath the surface of much of the involvement of
|
| 15 | the federal agencies and their efforts to support
|
| 16 | alternative business models for consumers. Somehow,
|
| 17 | there has developed a belief in Washington that there is
|
| 18 | only one way of effectively marketing residential real
|
| 19 | estate, and that is through the private entity called
|
| 20 | the Multiple Listing Service.
|
| 21 | Now, as state licensing agencies, we do not
|
| 22 | regulate the MLS. It is a private, voluntary
|
| 23 | organization which establishes its own membership
|
| 24 | criteria, as you've heard earlier today. Now, since the
|
| 25 | FTC and the DOJ apparently are unable to coerce this |
Page 97
| 1 | private entity into changing its criteria for membership
|
| 2 | to meet their demands, they are approaching the issue
|
| 3 | indirectly by attempting to influence state legislatures
|
| 4 | and regulatory bodies.
|
| 5 | Let's just look for a moment at competition in
|
| 6 | the marketing of residential real estate. Not only is
|
| 7 | there this entity called the MLS, but every daily
|
| 8 | newspaper in the country -- this is one from the Austin
|
| 9 | paper -- runs classified and display ads that can be
|
| 10 | placed by owners, by agents, by others, and I think if
|
| 11 | you talk to the newspaper industry, they would tell you
|
| 12 | that this is an effective means of selling residential
|
| 13 | real estate.
|
| 14 | In addition, I went to my neighborhood
|
| 15 | supermarket, and I picked up something called Homes of
|
| 16 | Greater Austin, For Sale By Owner, Homes & Land of
|
| 17 | Greater Austin. Individuals pay good money to place
|
| 18 | advertisements in these publications. Why? Because
|
| 19 | they believe that they are effective methods of
|
| 20 | marketing and advertising their residential real estate.
|
| 21 | There's been a lot of discussion today of the
|
| 22 | internet. Well, let's look at the internet for a
|
| 23 | minute. Here's just a few, you know, there are pages
|
| 24 | and pages. This is called American Home Guides, this is
|
| 25 | the Austin Home Network, this is House.Info, this is |
Page 98
| 1 | ForSaleByOwnerandBuilder on HomesByOwner.com, and now
|
| 2 | what's been happening is just like in the timeshare
|
| 3 | industry, the major entities are getting involved in
|
| 4 | this. So, very respected trade names are now entering
|
| 5 | into the process.
|
| 6 | Here's Yahoo Real Estate, here's Lycos Home
|
| 7 | Sales, and of course, the inevitable eBay Real Estate
|
| 8 | that is also available. The next thing you know, it's
|
| 9 | going to be amazon.com real estate. Is there
|
| 10 | competition? Certainly there is, and it's not just
|
| 11 | REALTOR.com or the MLS system. There are any number of
|
| 12 | other entities that are available for the marketing and
|
| 13 | advertising of real estate.
|
| 14 | To pretend that the MLS system is the only way
|
| 15 | to market real estate belies the reality of the
|
| 16 | competition present throughout the United States. To
|
| 17 | purport that an agent who claims to represent another
|
| 18 | has no fiduciary duty to provide minimum service runs
|
| 19 | counter to both public expectations and negates the
|
| 20 | ability of states to effectively license and regulate
|
| 21 | real estate professionals.
|
| 22 | I think it's safe to say that most state
|
| 23 | regulators have no problem at all with individuals
|
| 24 | entering into marketing or advertising agreements with
|
| 25 | clients to promote the sale of real estate. In fact, in |
Page 99
| 1 | most states, one does not even need a real estate
|
| 2 | license to do so, but I do object, and so do many other
|
| 3 | regulators, to individuals claiming to be an agent and
|
| 4 | then refusing to perform the most basic duties of
|
| 5 | representation.
|
| 6 | I think, in conclusion, that is a matter which
|
| 7 | should be of interest to the Federal Trade Commission in
|
| 8 | ensuring that the public is truly receiving the service
|
| 9 | for which they have entered into an agreement, an
|
| 10 | agreement for representation.
|
| 11 | Thank you.
|
| 12 | (Applause.)
|
| 13 | DR. COOPER: I want to thank all the panelists
|
| 14 | for very enlightening presentations.
|
| 15 | Let me just start off our discussion here
|
| 16 | with -- this panel's about competition among sellers'
|
| 17 | brokers, so I just want to talk, go back to first
|
| 18 | principles, how do sellers' brokers compete? How do
|
| 19 | they compete for listings?
|
| 20 | What I have in mind is how price-sensitive are
|
| 21 | consumers? Do they often negotiate for commission? How
|
| 22 | many listing brokers will they typically look at if
|
| 23 | they're trying to sell their house? Are they typically
|
| 24 | under time pressure? We heard earlier that often
|
| 25 | they're under a time pressure to sell their house and |
Page 100
| 1 | move on to the next one because of some sort of
|
| 2 | exogenous factors going on. So, I will just turn it
|
| 3 | over to each of you to discuss -- we have different
|
| 4 | business models here, or maybe we don't -- and find out
|
| 5 | how this competition really works.
|
| 6 | MR. FARMER: Well, I would first like to touch
|
| 7 | on some of Wayne's comments about the advertising. If
|
| 8 | you look at his -- some of his examples, virtually every
|
| 9 | house in those examples are in MLS, and I've done some
|
| 10 | informal polling in my marketplace with some different
|
| 11 | title companies, and I know Colby said, you know, that
|
| 12 | 15 to 20 percent of all homes are for-sale-by-owners.
|
| 13 | In my marketplace, I'm finding that it's less
|
| 14 | than 5 percent. Very rarely, if you look through
|
| 15 | Wayne's example from the Austin newspaper, virtually
|
| 16 | every one of those properties will be in MLS. There are
|
| 17 | probably no more than 10, 15 for-sale-by-owners out of
|
| 18 | that whole book. So, the MLS is the marketplace in most
|
| 19 | areas.
|
| 20 | As far as competition goes, you know, we get a
|
| 21 | lot of our leads through the internet, but also
|
| 22 | referrals from past clients because we do a good job.
|
| 23 | You know, we try to personally go out there and touch
|
| 24 | every consumer that we go to. We don't just sit behind
|
| 25 | a computer like some limited service brokers do. |
Page 101
| 1 | Now, my company may be different than some
|
| 2 | companies. I mean, one of my agents goes to every one
|
| 3 | of our listings, and so we do offer value.
|
| 4 | I'll turn it over to Tom.
|
| 5 | MR. KUNZ: Well, I guess I probably sit in a
|
| 6 | little bit different position, but I would dare say that
|
| 7 | if you look at our franchise organization and the
|
| 8 | realtors that we have in our organization, you would
|
| 9 | probably find pretty much most of the models that have
|
| 10 | been talked about here today, with the exception, we
|
| 11 | haven't quite figured out how to franchise the
|
| 12 | for-sale-by-owner person, but maybe we should look at
|
| 13 | that. I don't know.
|
| 14 | In terms of the number of agents that a consumer
|
| 15 | would have sitting in front of them, I don't know that
|
| 16 | there's any number that has been put there. I can tell
|
| 17 | you, as a consumer, I sat and listened to seven agents
|
| 18 | do their listing presentation for me before I made a
|
| 19 | decision as to who I was going to have represent me in
|
| 20 | the property that I had, and I can also tell you that as
|
| 21 | a consumer, that there are a number of things that I
|
| 22 | look at, especially because, as you heard, in my
|
| 23 | transaction, I was moving across the country, and I was
|
| 24 | taking on a job that was very demanding in terms of
|
| 25 | time, and I wouldn't have sold my home had that not been |
Page 102
| 1 | the case, and I think that's the situation that a lot of
|
| 2 | us tend to forget, is that most transactions happen
|
| 3 | because of events happening in people's lives. Most
|
| 4 | people don't get up in the morning and decide to just
|
| 5 | move.
|
| 6 | I did choose a full-service person and I was
|
| 7 | willing to pay those fees because of what I was asking
|
| 8 | that person to do, and that was not something that they
|
| 9 | came in and said that this was just the fee that you
|
| 10 | have to pay. It was something that we sat down and
|
| 11 | talked about and negotiated, because I told them exactly
|
| 12 | what I wanted, and I wanted services over and above what
|
| 13 | would be typical in a normal transaction, and that was
|
| 14 | that I needed somebody who could be at that home when I
|
| 15 | needed somebody there to help me move across the
|
| 16 | country. And I don't think I'm too unlike a lot of the
|
| 17 | services that are out there.
|
| 18 | In terms of marketing and advertising, I mean,
|
| 19 | come on, anybody that has any type of ability to put --
|
| 20 | if I'm going to go out and represent somebody in the
|
| 21 | marketplace in terms of marketing their home, that's
|
| 22 | what they're hiring me for, and so if I can expose that,
|
| 23 | I want to expose that to as many possible buyers as I
|
| 24 | possibly can, and that's one of the things at Century 21
|
| 25 | that we look at, is that we, because of our name |
Page 103
| 1 | recognition in the marketplace over the last 30-plus
|
| 2 | years, you know, we have a large draw to our web site,
|
| 3 | and in some cases, it might even be a situation where,
|
| 4 | you know, we have as many consumers come to us as some
|
| 5 | of our major competitors or even, you know, the industry
|
| 6 | web sites.
|
| 7 | So, I think that a real estate agent really is
|
| 8 | sitting down and looking at all of the areas that they
|
| 9 | possibly can list that property to put out there,
|
| 10 | because at the end of the day, what we're looking for is
|
| 11 | somebody who's taking a listing, is to see how many
|
| 12 | buyers we can bring to that table and how we can
|
| 13 | negotiate the best possible price in the quickest
|
| 14 | possible time period for the consumer based on what
|
| 15 | they're looking to get out of it.
|
| 16 | DR. COOPER: Colby?
|
| 17 | MR. SAMBROTTO: We acquire our sellers off the
|
| 18 | internet primarily. We spend a significant amount of
|
| 19 | money on paper click advertising, but in addition to
|
| 20 | that, we get a significant number of customers who are
|
| 21 | referred to us after talking to a friend who has used
|
| 22 | our service and who has seen our yard sign in a
|
| 23 | neighbor's yard or in their neighborhood.
|
| 24 | Our sellers are conscious of price, and I think
|
| 25 | they do shop around, to answer your question, but I |
Page 104
| 1 | don't think that price is the biggest motivating factor.
|
| 2 | Certainly there are services like ours that are cheaper.
|
| 3 | I think the primary motivating factor is, A, not having
|
| 4 | to pay 5-6 percent to an agent, but B, making sure that
|
| 5 | the company that they are paying to market their
|
| 6 | property has the reach to actually sell that property.
|
| 7 | So, people are cognizant of, yeah, price, but
|
| 8 | also how many people are on the site. So, they are very
|
| 9 | interested in the number of visitors we get to the site
|
| 10 | and how many buyers we can drive to their listing, and
|
| 11 | those are the two big motivating factors for
|
| 12 | ForSaleByOwner.com.
|
| 13 | DR. THORBURN: I have no comment.
|
| 14 | DR. COOPER: Yeah, we will leave you out of this
|
| 15 | one.
|
| 16 | Aaron, this goes to you and perhaps Colby, but
|
| 17 | how often when you are competing to get a listing, say,
|
| 18 | is the consumer's next best option going to be going
|
| 19 | with more of a traditional broker? They are trying to
|
| 20 | weigh it. Should I go traditional, should I go MLS
|
| 21 | only, should I go FSBO? What is the marginal consumer
|
| 22 | like, I guess to use an economic term here?
|
| 23 | MR. FARMER: Sure. Well, you know, I'm not
|
| 24 | knocking traditional agents at all. I think there's a
|
| 25 | lot of great traditional agents out there that earn |
Page 105
| 1 | their 6 percent, earn their 5 percent or whatever, it is
|
| 2 | what they charge, but there are also a lot of agents
|
| 3 | that charge those same rates that have the 3P marketing
|
| 4 | plan, which is put up a sign, put it in MLS and pray.
|
| 5 | You know, there's a lot of agents out there that offer
|
| 6 | little or no value to the transaction, and
|
| 7 | unfortunately, for the traditional industry, that's the
|
| 8 | majority of the agents that we're competing against, and
|
| 9 | they see that, hey, you know, Texas Discount Realty will
|
| 10 | do the same thing, but they won't charge as much.
|
| 11 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Well, our customers I think,
|
| 12 | given the fact that they're on our site, they have
|
| 13 | gotten to our site, are predisposed to not paying a
|
| 14 | traditional broker or agent the typical 5-6 percent.
|
| 15 | The vast majority of our customers want to pay no
|
| 16 | commission whatsoever. Those who do understand that
|
| 17 | they might benefit from the marketing power of the MLS
|
| 18 | are interested only if they can pay a reduced
|
| 19 | commission, and in our case, that's a 2-3 percent
|
| 20 | commission to the buyer's agent as opposed to the
|
| 21 | traditional 5-6 percent. So, they are definitely
|
| 22 | interested in saving on the commission if they have to
|
| 23 | pay commission at all.
|
| 24 | DR. COOPER: Related to that, I just want to
|
| 25 | follow up. Your site obviously offers both the FSBO, |
Page 106
| 1 | the pure sort of I'm going to do everything on my own,
|
| 2 | but you also offer the MLS listing only.
|
| 3 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Right.
|
| 4 | DR. COOPER: I guess one question is, what
|
| 5 | percentage of your clients, say, start out as an FSBO,
|
| 6 | then go to MLS, and I guess related to that, what would
|
| 7 | be the marginal impact of being on the MLS versus just
|
| 8 | being a FSBO as far as if you have data or have anything
|
| 9 | anecdotal.
|
| 10 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Sure. Well, less than 10
|
| 11 | percent of our sellers utilize the MLS package, but
|
| 12 | still, you know, to date we've done something like 5000
|
| 13 | MLS listings nationwide, reduced-commission MLS
|
| 14 | listings, and the way that works is we have a network,
|
| 15 | proprietary network of listing agents that we farm that
|
| 16 | work out to. They put it into the MLS for a flat fee, a
|
| 17 | portion of the fee that the consumer pays us, and then,
|
| 18 | of course, the buyer's agent is still incentivised to
|
| 19 | the same degree that he or she might otherwise always be
|
| 20 | incentivised. They still get that 2-3 percent
|
| 21 | commission if they bring a buyer that the seller
|
| 22 | accepts.
|
| 23 | At the same time, they're listed on
|
| 24 | ForSaleByOwner.com. We don't allow people to just do
|
| 25 | MLS listings. We bundle them together, an EA listing on |
Page 107
| 1 | the MLS in conjunction with a listing on
|
| 2 | ForSaleByOwner.com.
|
| 3 | DR. COOPER: Okay. Do you have any idea what
|
| 4 | the marginal impact of that is? Say if I'm on the MLS,
|
| 5 | I have a higher probability of selling my house versus
|
| 6 | just being on the web site as a FSBO?
|
| 7 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Right. We haven't to date
|
| 8 | tracked how including the MLS in addition to the
|
| 9 | ForSaleByOwner.com listing improves your success rate.
|
| 10 | That's something we've just started tracking. Today
|
| 11 | we've only tracked, has it sold via ForSaleByOwner.com?
|
| 12 | Do you as a seller believe it sold via
|
| 13 | ForSaleByOwner.com?
|
| 14 | DR. COOPER: Okay, Aaron, I have a -- sorry to
|
| 15 | keep picking on Colby and Aaron here, but I want to ask
|
| 16 | a little more about that, the fee for service that you
|
| 17 | offer.
|
| 18 | The people who come to you and say I just want
|
| 19 | the MLS only package, how often do they come back later
|
| 20 | on? They get the MLS only package, they think they're
|
| 21 | ahead of the game that, you know, I can take care of
|
| 22 | this, I can sell my house, but later on they realize,
|
| 23 | maybe I do need a little help here. Does that happen
|
| 24 | often?
|
| 25 | MR. FARMER: I would say it's less than -- |
Page 108
| 1 | probably about 30 percent of the time that the consumer
|
| 2 | who does a limited service listing with us will come
|
| 3 | back and ask for more services, but it does happen. You
|
| 4 | know, I would guess, you know, somewhere in the 30
|
| 5 | percent range.
|
| 6 | But you know, the demographic of our typical
|
| 7 | limited service consumer is someone who is generally
|
| 8 | more educated. Our average list price in Austin last
|
| 9 | year was $295,000, where the average list price overall
|
| 10 | was about $160,000. You know, they've generally -- very
|
| 11 | rarely do we get first-time home sellers or first-time
|
| 12 | home buyers that are attracted to us. It's people who
|
| 13 | have been through several transactions and who know how
|
| 14 | the game's played, so to speak.
|
| 15 | DR. COOPER: Yeah, go ahead.
|
| 16 | MR. KUNZ: Sitting here listening to this, it's
|
| 17 | very interesting, and I referred to this in my remarks,
|
| 18 | too, and I think this is the perception of a lot of the
|
| 19 | consumers in the marketplace, is that all I need to do
|
| 20 | is get my home on the MLS, and everything is taken care
|
| 21 | of and it's done, when in fact, the majority of what
|
| 22 | probably a real estate agent really does happens at the
|
| 23 | time when there's an offer put on the table. From that
|
| 24 | point until closing, there's a tremendous amount of
|
| 25 | effort that's put in, a tremendous amount of money |
Page 109
| 1 | that's expended to go out and make sure that the
|
| 2 | transaction gets closed, and yet we still keep focusing
|
| 3 | on just the aspect of, okay, let's put it on MLS and put
|
| 4 | it on some kind of service that gets it out there.
|
| 5 | Now, I think if we're going to look at what a
|
| 6 | real estate agent does and how the transaction takes
|
| 7 | place and the fees that get paid for that, then I think
|
| 8 | we need to look at the whole transaction, from the time
|
| 9 | that a consumer starts to decide to put a home up for
|
| 10 | sale or a consumer decides to buy a home until they
|
| 11 | actually move into that property and maybe even until
|
| 12 | the next time that they put the home back up for sale,
|
| 13 | and that's the transaction process I think we need to
|
| 14 | look at if we're really going to get to the facts of
|
| 15 | what really happens in a real estate sale transaction.
|
| 16 | MR. FARMER: I couldn't agree more, but I just
|
| 17 | think that we can't put every consumer -- not every
|
| 18 | consumer is the same. I mean, in general, I think that,
|
| 19 | you know, no more than probably 10-15 percent of the
|
| 20 | consumers out there are even qualified to do a limited
|
| 21 | service listing and should do a limited service listing.
|
| 22 | DR. THORBURN: James, if I could just throw out
|
| 23 | a few numbers and calculations here.
|
| 24 | DR. COOPER: Sure.
|
| 25 | DR. THORBURN: If we accept what Professor Hahn |
Page 110
| 1 | indicated earlier was about 23 percent of residential
|
| 2 | sales occur without the use of a broker, and then we
|
| 3 | keep in mind, also, the terms "broker" and "realtor" are
|
| 4 | distinct terms, and a realtor is a member of the
|
| 5 | association that Mrs. Whatley represents or did
|
| 6 | represent as president, and there are other people out
|
| 7 | there with licenses who are engaging in real estate
|
| 8 | brokerage who are not members of that organization.
|
| 9 | Also, in most communities, although not all, to
|
| 10 | get into the Multiple Listing Service, a broker has to
|
| 11 | be a realtor. I don't think it's universal, but it's
|
| 12 | almost everywhere. So, if we have at least 23 percent
|
| 13 | of all sales that are occurring without a broker,
|
| 14 | there's also a percentage that's unknown above that that
|
| 15 | are occurring without a realtor. So, to focus solely on
|
| 16 | the MLS and the realtor I think is missing the entire
|
| 17 | picture.
|
| 18 | I'll give you another perspective. The latest
|
| 19 | numbers I heard is that there are 2.3 million
|
| 20 | individuals in the United States who have a real estate
|
| 21 | license, broker, salesperson, whatever. Correct me if
|
| 22 | I'm wrong, but I think maybe the National Association of
|
| 23 | Realtors is at like 1.1-1.2 million? What is that,
|
| 24 | about 50 percent? In my own state, we have 135,000
|
| 25 | people who today have a license as a salesperson or a |
Page 111
| 1 | broker. There's slightly over 70,000 members of the
|
| 2 | Texas Association of Realtors.
|
| 3 | So, while I will certainly concede that the
|
| 4 | Multiple Listing Service is an important ingredient in
|
| 5 | this whole equation of how there's competition in real
|
| 6 | estate, and while I will agree that the National
|
| 7 | Association of Realtors is the premier trade association
|
| 8 | for real estate professionals, let's not lose
|
| 9 | perspective on the fact that there are real estate
|
| 10 | transactions occurring outside of the MLS, outside of
|
| 11 | use of a member of the National Association of Realtors,
|
| 12 | and I think all this emphasis on the MLS as the only
|
| 13 | vehicle to market and sell homes has put a smoke screen
|
| 14 | in front of a lot of Washington bureaucrats who focus on
|
| 15 | that and realize that they can't perhaps do anything to
|
| 16 | affect that private organization, so they're going
|
| 17 | roundabout to state regulators and legislatures to
|
| 18 | impose their position on them.
|
| 19 | DR. COOPER: I guess I'll jump ahead, since you
|
| 20 | kind of jumped ahead a bit here, and ask this question
|
| 21 | to you, Wayne.
|
| 22 | You talked in your presentation and you just
|
| 23 | talked here that there is certainly a distinction
|
| 24 | between what state regulators do in their laws and their
|
| 25 | duty to protect consumers versus what the MLS is. The |
Page 112
| 1 | issue you posited that we bureaucrats -- I don't include
|
| 2 | myself in that -- we're trying to get to the MLS. I
|
| 3 | have a question.
|
| 4 | When you issue regulations and you're worried
|
| 5 | about the consumer, there's a marketplace out there, and
|
| 6 | there are marketplace realities. Is it necessary to
|
| 7 | take those into account when you are trying to think
|
| 8 | about how my regulation is likely to affect consumers?
|
| 9 | Yes, there's an MLS, yes, state law has no effect on it,
|
| 10 | but it's there, and those rules are there. So, if I
|
| 11 | issue a rule, given the MLS, it's likely to have this
|
| 12 | effect on consumers. Doesn't that need to be taken into
|
| 13 | account?
|
| 14 | DR. THORBURN: Well, yes, I think it does, and I
|
| 15 | think also what has to be taken into account is what the
|
| 16 | individual is representing themselves as doing, and
|
| 17 | that's where I get back to this definition of "agency,"
|
| 18 | the definition of what it means to be a fiduciary, what
|
| 19 | it means to be representation.
|
| 20 | In our state, newspapers don't have to have a
|
| 21 | real estate license. The magazines I showed you don't
|
| 22 | have to have a real estate license. If I went to an
|
| 23 | individual and said, I'll give you a sign, I'll put you
|
| 24 | on my web site, I'll draw up an advertisement and put it
|
| 25 | in the Austin American Statesman, I don't need a license |
Page 113
| 1 | for that, because I'm not claiming to be their agent.
|
| 2 | I'm not saying that I am providing them with
|
| 3 | representation through a transaction. All I'm doing is
|
| 4 | giving them marketing and advertising advice.
|
| 5 | Frankly, I think if, you know, the model that is
|
| 6 | being presented here was presenting itself as an
|
| 7 | advertising, promotional, marketing model and agreement,
|
| 8 | we wouldn't have any problem with it. Frankly, I don't
|
| 9 | even think you'd need a real estate license for that,
|
| 10 | because you are not holding yourself out as a fiduciary,
|
| 11 | as an agent providing representation.
|
| 12 | DR. COOPER: Okay, well -- I'm sorry, Colby.
|
| 13 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Well, I would like to respond,
|
| 14 | because in regard to minimum service requirements,
|
| 15 | there's an enormous demand on the part of the consumers
|
| 16 | to be able to use the MLS. They respect it. There's a
|
| 17 | prestigio marketing power associated with that in the
|
| 18 | mind of the average consumer, so they want to get their
|
| 19 | listing in there.
|
| 20 | If they're unwilling to pay a listing agent 3
|
| 21 | percent, they don't think it's worth 3 percent of the
|
| 22 | equity they have worked so hard to build up in their
|
| 23 | house, we came up with a plan where the listing agent
|
| 24 | gets a flat fee. The listing agent is providing a great
|
| 25 | service. They oftentimes are providing them with advice |
Page 114
| 1 | in regard to how to market that home, how to field
|
| 2 | offers from buyers' agents. The buyers' agents are
|
| 3 | still getting the 3 percent.
|
| 4 | But we don't understand why if you're worried so
|
| 5 | much about the consumer, just make a disclosure law. If
|
| 6 | you're worried about the consumer is signing up for
|
| 7 | something and not getting the services that they thought
|
| 8 | they were getting, it could easily be solved by just
|
| 9 | asking them to sign a piece of paper saying I understand
|
| 10 | what I'm paying for, I understand I'm not getting these
|
| 11 | additional services, but I am getting a price break.
|
| 12 | So, it seems to me that you would have to take
|
| 13 | that into account at some level if you're concerned
|
| 14 | about the consumers of Texas who are trying to sell
|
| 15 | property and keep as much equity as possible in their
|
| 16 | pocket.
|
| 17 | DR. COOPER: Well, let me move into the minimum
|
| 18 | service issue here. I've talked about this at a couple
|
| 19 | of forums, and I have been to forums and I've listened,
|
| 20 | and I have heard minimum service requirements
|
| 21 | alternatively referred to -- the analogy of merely
|
| 22 | requiring the pilot to check the weather and inspect the
|
| 23 | airplane before he takes off, and alternatively I've
|
| 24 | heard kind of along the lines of what Tom Barnett said
|
| 25 | earlier today, is going into a restaurant and being |
Page 115
| 1 | forced to have an appetizer, a salad and a desert when
|
| 2 | all you want is a main course. So, which is it? I open
|
| 3 | it up to all of you.
|
| 4 | MR. FARMER: Well, I think Wayne made an
|
| 5 | important analogy earlier when he talked about lawyers,
|
| 6 | you can't talk with another lawyer's client, but he did
|
| 7 | put the caveat in there, "without consent," and I think
|
| 8 | that that is the simple cure to all these minimum
|
| 9 | service laws, like Colby had said, is let's have some
|
| 10 | consent. Let's have a disclosure form. Instead of
|
| 11 | throwing the baby out with the bath water, there's
|
| 12 | easier ways to do it.
|
| 13 | MR. KUNZ: Well, I think having been around this
|
| 14 | industry for a long time that the consumer has really
|
| 15 | spoken as to what they feel about service, and they will
|
| 16 | go out and talk to their friends, they will talk to
|
| 17 | their neighbors, and they'll talk about if you had a
|
| 18 | real estate transaction, who met your needs and who
|
| 19 | serviced your needs? I don't think we need to have
|
| 20 | legislation that says that, you know, that you have to
|
| 21 | do 15 different things in order to serve a real estate
|
| 22 | transaction.
|
| 23 | I think there are fundamental service ideas that
|
| 24 | are in the marketplace right now, and a consumer
|
| 25 | understands what they're -- hopefully they understand |
Page 116
| 1 | what they're really trying to get at, and that is to
|
| 2 | sell my home, market my property, because I have some
|
| 3 | other thing going on that I have to take care of. In my
|
| 4 | case, it was moving. I had to get out -- I had a job
|
| 5 | change. So, I don't think we need legislation to sit
|
| 6 | down and say what good service is or what a minimum
|
| 7 | service level should be. I think that those are things
|
| 8 | that each company, each agent and the consumer are going
|
| 9 | to make that determination by themselves.
|
| 10 | DR. COOPER: Colby?
|
| 11 | MR. SAMBROTTO: From our standpoint, there seems
|
| 12 | to be no demand on the part of the consumer for those
|
| 13 | types of laws. I don't discern any demand for those
|
| 14 | types of laws coming from our listing agents in our
|
| 15 | network. Certainly the buyers aren't involved in that,
|
| 16 | so they don't care, but I mean for me it's a bundling of
|
| 17 | services. It doesn't make any sense. There's no demand
|
| 18 | for it, and it seems to only kind of pop up this
|
| 19 | antiquated commission structure that no one -- well, no
|
| 20 | one outside of traditional real estate and no one who's
|
| 21 | a consumer really wants.
|
| 22 | DR. COOPER: Wayne?
|
| 23 | DR. THORBURN: Well, I think it goes back to
|
| 24 | terminology and I think what individuals are purporting
|
| 25 | to be providing to their clients or their customers, and |
Page 117
| 1 | that's where I'm really focused, again, on what is the
|
| 2 | meaning of being an agent, what is representation
|
| 3 | throughout a transaction, and does the state, the
|
| 4 | various 50 states and territories -- I know we're in the
|
| 5 | District of Columbia, and I don't want to in any way
|
| 6 | overlook them also -- do they have the ability to define
|
| 7 | what it means to be an agent, what are the obligations,
|
| 8 | the minimum obligations, and what we're talking about
|
| 9 | here really I think has to stress the word "minimum."
|
| 10 | Answering questions, presenting offers,
|
| 11 | providing any information that comes in to their purview
|
| 12 | to their own client. Those are what I would regard as
|
| 13 | simple essentials of what it means to be representing
|
| 14 | someone else. Once again, we don't have any problem
|
| 15 | with a new business model that offers only these limited
|
| 16 | services as long as they're not claiming to be an agent
|
| 17 | of another, claiming to provide representation.
|
| 18 | MR. FARMER: I believe that the consumer should
|
| 19 | have the right to waive these and not have the state
|
| 20 | force these fiduciary duties on them, and if a
|
| 21 | consenting adult, so to speak, you know, says -- an
|
| 22 | informed consenting adult says, "I don't want this
|
| 23 | stuff, I know I have other options, but I don't want
|
| 24 | them," I think that should be legal.
|
| 25 | DR. COOPER: Colby |
Page 118
| 1 | MR. SAMBROTTO: The only thing I would add is
|
| 2 | it's kind of a footnote to our model. We are devoted to
|
| 3 | no agents, no commissions, and we are going to make an
|
| 4 | end run around the entire system, which is our goal in
|
| 5 | the long term, so we are not really concerned with that
|
| 6 | end of the industry, because ultimately it won't move to
|
| 7 | strengthen ForSaleByOwner in our minds.
|
| 8 | DR. COOPER: I have a question from the
|
| 9 | audience, and I swear I didn't make this up, but Wayne,
|
| 10 | doesn't the law of agency in Texas permit the principal
|
| 11 | to define the scope of his agency in the sense that you
|
| 12 | can -- if I'm the principal, I'm the homeowner, I want
|
| 13 | to -- I can define how much my agent is going to do for
|
| 14 | me from the git-go, and if I just want him to do a
|
| 15 | couple things, that shouldn't violate the
|
| 16 | principal/agent duties or the fiduciary duties that go
|
| 17 | along with agency.
|
| 18 | DR. THORBURN: Well, within certain limitations,
|
| 19 | that's true, but there is also a provision in state law
|
| 20 | that says that an individual who is represented by
|
| 21 | another broker, you cannot engage in negotiations
|
| 22 | directly with the principal. So, that I think is one of
|
| 23 | the points that overrides that ability of the principal
|
| 24 | to give directions to his or her agent in a situation.
|
| 25 | MR. FARMER: I know in Texas law, when I've been |
Page 119
| 1 | through this with Wayne at the several commission
|
| 2 | meetings over the last three years, and actually, Texas
|
| 3 | statute defines negotiations, this is Section 535.15, I
|
| 4 | can quote the law by heart, but is simply bringing a
|
| 5 | buyer and seller together is negotiations in Texas.
|
| 6 | That's how it's defined under that section anyway.
|
| 7 | DR. COOPER: I guess keeping on this theme, is
|
| 8 | there a distinction that's being blurred here in these
|
| 9 | minimum service rules between qualifications, core
|
| 10 | fiduciary duties, such as honesty, fair accounting,
|
| 11 | loyalty, that sort of stuff, and then service provision?
|
| 12 | For instance, I'm an attorney, and I know that
|
| 13 | if I engage a client, I have certain duties to them, but
|
| 14 | then that client comes to me and says I just want kind
|
| 15 | of a discrete -- some advice on estate planning. Well,
|
| 16 | I can give him that discrete advice and send him a bill,
|
| 17 | but it also doesn't mean I have to write their will for
|
| 18 | them and set up trusts for their children. And maybe
|
| 19 | that's an extreme analogy, but as long as I do those
|
| 20 | tasks honestly and keep my confidences, I haven't
|
| 21 | violated any of my duties.
|
| 22 | What's the difference between the core fiduciary
|
| 23 | duties that an agent has, but as long as he performs
|
| 24 | those tasks, doing those core -- keeping with those core
|
| 25 | fiduciary duties in mind, where has the agency |
Page 120
| 1 | relationship gone wrong?
|
| 2 | DR. THORBURN: Well, I just think that what the
|
| 3 | state legislatures in a number of jurisdictions have
|
| 4 | decided is that there needs to be further definition of
|
| 5 | what those fiduciary duties are and to clarify, and in
|
| 6 | the clarification, they are not going beyond what I
|
| 7 | believe is the common perceived public perception of
|
| 8 | what is representation in a transaction, and again,
|
| 9 | stressing what it is is answering questions related to
|
| 10 | the transaction, assisting in the developing of offers
|
| 11 | or counter-offers, maybe phrased differently from one
|
| 12 | jurisdiction to another, but normally it also may be
|
| 13 | this presenting all information that's relevant to the
|
| 14 | transaction. All it is is spelling out what are those
|
| 15 | core fiduciary responsibilities.
|
| 16 | MR. KUNZ: You know, in the company I had in San
|
| 17 | Diego, I didn't need a government agency to sit down and
|
| 18 | tell me how my agents need to service the customer, but
|
| 19 | I spent money going out and talking to consumers that we
|
| 20 | had done business with, other companies in our
|
| 21 | marketplace had done business with, and talked about the
|
| 22 | transaction and asked them what they wanted out of that
|
| 23 | transaction, and we had a list of about 22 or 23 things
|
| 24 | that every one of my listing agreements had in them that
|
| 25 | said these are the functions that we are going to |
Page 121
| 1 | provide to you and these are the services that we sat
|
| 2 | down and talked to consumers about and said, if we do
|
| 3 | not provide these kind of services to you, you have the
|
| 4 | right to take back your listing and put it with anybody
|
| 5 | else that you would like to.
|
| 6 | I didn't need a regulatory body to sit down and
|
| 7 | tell me that that's how good business runs. I was an
|
| 8 | entrepreneur. I sat down and decided that if I was
|
| 9 | going to put a business in place in that marketplace and
|
| 10 | within this industry that there were certain things that
|
| 11 | I had to provide the people that I was going to service,
|
| 12 | and so we sat down and did that ourselves, and I don't
|
| 13 | think that I was, you know, the extraordinary office
|
| 14 | that did this. I think every one of the competitors
|
| 15 | that I had in the marketplace in San Diego basically had
|
| 16 | the same kind of things that they went out and talked to
|
| 17 | their prospective sellers with.
|
| 18 | So, I don't think that we need to really have
|
| 19 | regulatory issues that come up and say, "You must do
|
| 20 | this, you must do this or you must do this," or "Here is
|
| 21 | a minimum." Where is the minimum? Where do you draw
|
| 22 | the line? So, I still say that I think that the
|
| 23 | consumer will speak, and they will speak with the
|
| 24 | dollars they have, or in the seller's case, with the
|
| 25 | homes that they're going to put on as inventory for us |
Page 122
| 1 | to go out and work with, and I think that entrepreneurs
|
| 2 | are getting in the business, business people, and
|
| 3 | independent contractors, called agents, know they have
|
| 4 | to provide a certain level of service in order to gain
|
| 5 | the trust that a person's going to have to give them the
|
| 6 | biggest asset that they have and ask them to go sell
|
| 7 | that product for them because they have to go do
|
| 8 | something else with their life.
|
| 9 | MR. FARMER: Again, I agree with Tom, but I also
|
| 10 | want to point out that not providing a service for
|
| 11 | reduced fees for people is a service. By not providing
|
| 12 | a service, I'm providing a service to consumers who are
|
| 13 | coming after me and seeking me out.
|
| 14 | DR. COOPER: Recently, in the last week or so, I
|
| 15 | think, a task force set up in Ohio, set up to look at
|
| 16 | these minimum service requirements or the proposed
|
| 17 | minimum service requirements, a task force that was --
|
| 18 | the Ohio Association of Realtors, I believe, came up
|
| 19 | with a recommendation of sort of a disclosure and waiver
|
| 20 | model. You have these core minimum service duties that
|
| 21 | the real estate agent is supposed to provide, but as
|
| 22 | long as there's disclosure and informed consent, a
|
| 23 | consumer can waive those.
|
| 24 | Is there anything wrong with that, or would that
|
| 25 | work? And I think I know the answer of these three, but |
Page 123
| 1 | I'd ask Dr. Thorburn down there about this kind of a
|
| 2 | disclosure and consent. If we're worried about
|
| 3 | consumers not getting what they think they're paying
|
| 4 | for, which is something that was in your opening
|
| 5 | remarks, would that be something that could solve this?
|
| 6 | DR. THORBURN: It's possible. Certainly given
|
| 7 | our state law, it's not applicable in our particular
|
| 8 | situation in Texas. It's the decision of the
|
| 9 | Legislature has been to spell out what is representation
|
| 10 | involved with an agency agreement, but I have not had an
|
| 11 | opportunity to read the Ohio report, although I did
|
| 12 | receive it. I think probably in a number of
|
| 13 | jurisdictions that may be a way that they may wish to
|
| 14 | approach this question. So, I can't really comment in
|
| 15 | any great detail, although I think it is a viable option
|
| 16 | for consideration in a number of jurisdictions.
|
| 17 | MR. FARMER: I just wish I could have some of
|
| 18 | the money back from my attorney and the hours that I
|
| 19 | spent sitting in TREC board rooms trying to make this
|
| 20 | particular compromise that, hey, let's just have some
|
| 21 | informed consent here, and you can pass your minimum
|
| 22 | service with informed consent. That's all we were
|
| 23 | arguing, and that was a simple compromise that we
|
| 24 | wanted.
|
| 25 | DR. COOPER: I want to switch gears a little bit |
Page 124
| 1 | here away from the minimum service area. We're rapidly
|
| 2 | running out of time. I want to talk a little about sort
|
| 3 | of private conduct that we hear reports about. Aaron
|
| 4 | talked about it in his introductory comments, and I
|
| 5 | think Colby touched on it a little bit, discrimination
|
| 6 | against exclusive agency listings.
|
| 7 | Now, back in the 1980s, the FTC gained a series
|
| 8 | of consent decrees against various local MLS or real
|
| 9 | estate boards and their MLS policies that would exclude
|
| 10 | exclusive agency listings, and here we are 20-some odd
|
| 11 | years later, and we read the reports that exclusive
|
| 12 | agency listings, while they're being accepted now,
|
| 13 | they're not being sent into REALTOR.com or put on the
|
| 14 | web site.
|
| 15 | A recent NAR report shows that 80 percent of
|
| 16 | home buyers check the internet as part of their
|
| 17 | home-buying decision, and the most popular web site is
|
| 18 | REALTOR.com, and then after that is the local MLS web
|
| 19 | site. So, exclusive agency listings are at least
|
| 20 | arguably being excluded from these important marketing
|
| 21 | tools with important exposure.
|
| 22 | You know, I guess I'll ask this question to
|
| 23 | anyone who wants to answer, but number one, how
|
| 24 | prevalent is this? Is this something that's going on?
|
| 25 | Is it widespread? And are there any justifications for |
Page 125
| 1 | this? I mean, I am aware that apparently exclusive
|
| 2 | agency listings, you know, they're different from
|
| 3 | exclusive right to sell, and in some MLS rules, it's
|
| 4 | marked differently in the MLS just because it presents a
|
| 5 | special risk to cooperating brokers, perhaps. So, I'll
|
| 6 | just throw that out there.
|
| 7 | MR. FARMER: The only risk that or the only
|
| 8 | reason that I have been told is that it possibly could
|
| 9 | create confusion among home buyers. That's been the
|
| 10 | only rational explanation that I've been given in
|
| 11 | Austin, and I know there's several other MLSs. I know
|
| 12 | Cleveland, Raleigh-Durham, some other MLSs have enacted
|
| 13 | this as well, but as far as reasoning, it makes no sense
|
| 14 | to me.
|
| 15 | DR. COOPER: Tom, with respect to the exclusive
|
| 16 | agency listing, is there any reason that the exclusive
|
| 17 | agency listing is inherently more risky or more suspect
|
| 18 | for the cooperating broker than the exclusive right to
|
| 19 | sell?
|
| 20 | MR. KUNZ: I don't know. You know, I think that
|
| 21 | when a real estate agent sits down with a prospective
|
| 22 | consumer and talks about how they're going to take a
|
| 23 | listing and what does that really mean, and as I said,
|
| 24 | spells out the services that they're going to provide
|
| 25 | for that, for whatever compensation that the seller is |
Page 126
| 1 | willing to give or pay for the services that they're
|
| 2 | going to get, then I think that that almost becomes a
|
| 3 | mutual negotiating point in terms of letting the
|
| 4 | consumer know what does that mean to them and what's it
|
| 5 | going to mean to their property if they put it out
|
| 6 | there. So, I don't know.
|
| 7 | I don't know that there's enough information
|
| 8 | that I've seen that I could sit down and say that it's
|
| 9 | going to be detrimental one way or the other.
|
| 10 | MR. FARMER: I also want to note that this is
|
| 11 | not something that just -- this exclusive agency
|
| 12 | discrimination, if you want to call it that -- is not
|
| 13 | something that just affects the alternative broker
|
| 14 | model. In Austin, one of the top agents in Austin
|
| 15 | advertises, "If you sell your house yourself, you pay
|
| 16 | nothing." He's actually a RE/MAX agent, and this is how
|
| 17 | he competes to get listings, and he's a traditional
|
| 18 | agent with a traditional company, and you know, it
|
| 19 | affects him as well, because he's technically doing an
|
| 20 | exclusive agency listing. While he may not list it that
|
| 21 | way in MLS, that's what it is.
|
| 22 | DR. COOPER: Do you want to weigh in on that?
|
| 23 | MR. SAMBROTTO: Obviously there's demand for it.
|
| 24 | Consumers want those types of listings because they
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| 25 | retain the right to sell by owner, and that's central |
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| 1 | to the model that we have. It's central to the
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| 2 | package that we include on our web site, which
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| 3 | bundles an MLS listing with for-sale-by-owner.
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| 4 | A sale through MLS, you pay 2-3 percent; otherwise,
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| 5 | you pay no commission.
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| 6 | I understand the agent's concern is the
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| 7 | possibility that you could put a significant amount
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| 8 | of time marketing that property and then not be paid
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| 9 | for that, but I think that's the nature of the beast,
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| 10 | and I think ultimately it's about competition and
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| 11 | choice, and ultimately the winner in that type of a
|
| 12 | fight is the consumer even though real estate
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| 13 | professionals may be forced to sometimes work a little
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| 14 | harder for less. That's just the nature of what the
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| 15 | consumer's demanding.
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| 16 | DR. COOPER: Okay, I'll finish off this last
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| 17 | question here I got from the audience, and this is
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| 18 | directly to Tom, and I think I would be remiss if I
|
| 19 | didn't ask it.
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| 20 | It has to do with who owns the listing. It
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| 21 | says, if I list with Century 21, why do you consider
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| 22 | the listing to be your inventory? If I were to go
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| 23 | to The Washington Post and put a home in their
|
| 24 | classified ads, that home listing doesn't become The
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| 25 | Washington Post's inventory. So, why do you consider |
Page 128
| 1 | my listing your property and not the homeowner's
|
| 2 | property?
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| 3 | MR. KUNZ: Well, first of all, I don't consider
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| 4 | it mine as Century 21. I consider it the broker's who
|
| 5 | signed the agreement. The reason I consider that is
|
| 6 | because the consumer has sat down with that individual
|
| 7 | and they have worked out an agreement. It's a contract,
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| 8 | it's signed, and it states the facts that are pertinent
|
| 9 | to that particular contract, and therefore, they've
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| 10 | contracted with us. If that doesn't in any way, shape
|
| 11 | or form say that that product now is mine to go out and
|
| 12 | market because the consumer who owns that product has
|
| 13 | decided that based on their exposure to me and other
|
| 14 | competitors in the marketplace, they feel I might do a
|
| 15 | better job of making that happen. So, therefore, I
|
| 16 | would look at it as my product.
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| 17 | DR. COOPER: Okay.
|
| 18 | Well, we're about five minutes over, but I think
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| 19 | that leaves everyone plenty of time to get lunch and get
|
| 20 | back here for the afternoon panel. I want to thank
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| 21 | everyone for their hard work.
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| 22 | (Applause.)
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| 23 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: I just wanted to remind
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| 24 | everyone, the packet has a list of local eateries. If
|
| 25 | you need more information, it's outside. We'll |
Page 129
| 1 | reconvene at 1:30, and you will need to go through
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| 2 | security again. Thanks.
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| 3 | (Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., a lunch recess was
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| 4 | taken.)
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| 5 |
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| 6 |
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| 7 |
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| 8 |
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| 9 |
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| 10 |
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| 11 |
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Page 130
| 1 | AFTERNOON SESSION
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| 2 | (1:30 p.m.)
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| 3 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Well, thank you very much to
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| 4 | everyone for returning so promptly. I just want to
|
| 5 | remind you, please turn off your cell phones. Lee
|
| 6 | mentioned it, and I am just going to reiterate. Some of
|
| 7 | the feedback we are getting on the microphones is from
|
| 8 | the cell phones. So, if everyone would please turn them
|
| 9 | off, I think it would be kind of an easier listening
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| 10 | experience for everyone this afternoon.
|
| 11 | To start our afternoon session, I'm pleased to
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| 12 | introduce Commissioner Jonathan Leibowitz of the Federal
|
| 13 | Trade Commission, without further adieu.
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| 14 | (Applause.)
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| 15 | COMMISSIONER LEIBOWITZ: And thank you, Maureen,
|
| 16 | and if any of you didn't get a chance, there's a
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| 17 | terrific little handy two-pager here called "Where to
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| 18 | Eat in the Vicinity of the FTC Building," and it rates
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| 19 | restaurants according to price.
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| 20 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: We're all about the consumer.
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| 21 | COMMISSIONER LEIBOWITZ: And I like the Capitol
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| 22 | City Brewing Company and Corner Bakery.
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| 23 | Anyway, good afternoon. I am Jon Leibowitz, a
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| 24 | member of the Federal Trade Commission -- thank you,
|
| 25 | Maureen -- and I would like to begin with the usual |
Page 131
| 1 | disclaimer, that the views expressed here today are my
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| 2 | own and they don't reflect the views of the Commission
|
| 3 | or any other Commissioner.
|
| 4 | T. S. Elliott once wrote, "Home is where one
|
| 5 | starts from," no doubt realizing the complexities of
|
| 6 | buying a home in the United States and wanting to spend
|
| 7 | his time penning poetry rather than signing disclosure
|
| 8 | forms, he immediately moved to England, where things are
|
| 9 | apparently simpler. As Elliott would no doubt agree,
|
| 10 | owning a home makes people feel connected to and
|
| 11 | invested in their communities at a very fundamental
|
| 12 | level, and the purchase or sale of a home, as Tom
|
| 13 | Barnett said this morning, Debbie Majoras said this
|
| 14 | morning, is really one of the most important decisions a
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| 15 | family can make. But buying a home is a complicated
|
| 16 | task, and the purchasing process can be somewhat, well,
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| 17 | opaque.
|
| 18 | Take, for example, the recent house-hunting
|
| 19 | experiences of four of my staffers. Their names have
|
| 20 | been changed to protect the innocent. Dorothy, who is
|
| 21 | the buyer in her transaction, retained a broker and
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| 22 | blithely proceeded with her purchase without inquiry as
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| 23 | to what the total commission cost might be, because she
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| 24 | knew in this instance that the fees, although embedded
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| 25 | in the purchase price, would not come directly out of |
Page 132
| 1 | her pocket.
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| 2 | Lion retained a -- you see where this is going,
|
| 3 | don't you? -- who retained an agent to assist in both
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| 4 | the sale of his old house and the purchase of his new
|
| 5 | one, negotiated such a favorable commission rate from
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| 6 | his broker that he had to sign a confidentiality
|
| 7 | agreement. This is absolutely true. He is prohibited
|
| 8 | from talking about the terms of the deal, but we can
|
| 9 | imagine that they were pretty good for him.
|
| 10 | Tinman, who is the purchaser in his transaction,
|
| 11 | ended up agreeing to compensate his realtor and we'll
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| 12 | call her an "uber-realtor," for an extra one-half
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| 13 | percent in the event that her share of the seller's
|
| 14 | commission didn't exceed two and a half percent.
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| 15 | And Scarecrow and her buyer both dispensed with
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| 16 | agents altogether when she sold her house, and they
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| 17 | bypassed commissions entirely.
|
| 18 | Now, what does this tell us about the
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| 19 | residential real estate industry today, or
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| 20 | alternatively, what does it tell you about my staffers?
|
| 21 | That was a joke, although it is revealing. Is this
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| 22 | indicative of a market where consumers can get better
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| 23 | deals or superior representation based upon informed
|
| 24 | evaluation of their options, or is it reflective of a
|
| 25 | market where consumers lack even the most medieval evil |
Page 133
| 1 | level of information upon which to make a decision?
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| 2 | And, no matter how you ultimately answer this question,
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| 3 | the stakes are enormous.
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| 4 | The median price of a single-family home in
|
| 5 | America is now approximately $180,000, and of course, it
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| 6 | soars much higher in sought-after areas like Los
|
| 7 | Angeles, New York and D.C. Indeed, the median purchase
|
| 8 | price of residential real estate in San Diego, which is
|
| 9 | I think the seventh largest city in the country, is
|
| 10 | nearly a half million dollars, and that doesn't include
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| 11 | Tom Leary's lavish condominium in Coronado. Tom Leary
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| 12 | is one of the Commissioners here at the FTC.
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| 13 | An estimated $60 billion, roughly one-half of
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| 14 | 1 percent of the GEP for 2004, changed hands last year
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| 15 | in real estate commissions, much of it coming from the
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| 16 | traditional full-service brokerage fee. However, the
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| 17 | real estate industry, as you know, and its traditional
|
| 18 | model is beginning to undergo a sea change.
|
| 19 | Increasingly savvy customers, empowered by the internet
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| 20 | and the information age, are demanding more at lower
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| 21 | cost.
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| 22 | Consequently, a new category of service provider
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| 23 | is surfacing that seems attuned to consumers' clamoring
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| 24 | for more autonomy and a greater range of service and
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| 25 | price options. These providers, who range from mortgage |
Page 134
| 1 | lenders with brokerage licenses to flat-fee limited
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| 2 | service brokers to full-service discounters, have
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| 3 | deployed internet technology to drive sales. In the
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| 4 | process, they are re-allocating home sale commissions
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| 5 | that have traditionally gone to the full-service
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| 6 | realtors.
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| 7 | The agents, understandably, are feeling as
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| 8 | though they're unfairly under siege. They cite to
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| 9 | vigorous intra-industry competition, including among the
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| 10 | 1.2 million agents who are members of the National
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| 11 | Association of Realtors, and they're quick to claim that
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| 12 | average commissions have fallen from about 6 percent to
|
| 13 | 5.1 percent over the past decade. Realtors also worry
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| 14 | about internet loan companies who provide limited
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| 15 | reality services in addition to mortgage financing. The
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| 16 | full-service realtors protest that these competitors
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| 17 | are, in effect, wearing two hats and free riding on
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| 18 | listings.
|
| 19 | Additionally, realtors are concerned about the
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| 20 | integrity of their respective MLSs, many of which are
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| 21 | owned and operated with realtor boards affiliated with
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| 22 | the national association. The realtors assert that the
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| 23 | security and accuracy of the system will be compromised
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| 24 | unless local and national NAR affiliates continue to
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| 25 | screen participants and control distribution. To that |
Page 135
| 1 | end, local boards have set parameters in certain
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| 2 | jurisdictions governing who may enter or view the MLS
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| 3 | and how entries will be treated. Some boards have
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| 4 | downgraded the prominence of certain listings entered by
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| 5 | discount limited service brokers. Often they involve
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| 6 | the houses that we would commonly call
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| 7 | for-sale-by-owner. Others have removed these listings
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| 8 | entirely.
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| 9 | Now, the NAR and its allies argue that their
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| 10 | ultimate concern in these instances is for the consumer,
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| 11 | more specifically, eliminating potential confusion among
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| 12 | agents, sellers and buyers regarding whether a seller is
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| 13 | represented by an agent, and protecting the unweary
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| 14 | consumer by being compromised by service that falls
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| 15 | below expectations. The realtors cite failed
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| 16 | transactions and recall having to clean up messes left
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| 17 | by limited service brokers. No doubt in certain
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| 18 | circumstances this is probably true.
|
| 19 | Critics of the traditional full-service
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| 20 | brokerage model make several arguments in response.
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| 21 | Those seeking to offer fee-for-service options argue
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| 22 | that a la carte pricing can potentially save individual
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| 23 | consumers thousands of dollars per transaction. Online
|
| 24 | lending services such as LendingTree assert that they,
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| 25 | in fact, bring in more business for brokers -- who do, |
Page 136
| 1 | by the way, participate willingly with them -- while at
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| 2 | the same time offering customer friendly discounts
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| 3 | generated by technological efficiencies and economies of
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| 4 | scale.
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| 5 | Discount brokers argue that efforts to block
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| 6 | their access to the MLS on the same terms as
|
| 7 | full-service realtors is unfair, geared solely towards
|
| 8 | protecting the traditional full-service, high-commission
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| 9 | model. The Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington
|
| 10 | think tank, has estimated that these newer
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| 11 | internet-based business models could save consumers
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| 12 | close to half of that $60 billion currently spent on
|
| 13 | real estate commissions. If that's true, or if it's
|
| 14 | even partially true, that would represent a huge savings
|
| 15 | obviously to consumers.
|
| 16 | Further complicating matters are various state
|
| 17 | legislative proposals, heavily backed by full-service
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| 18 | providers, which require that real estate agents provide
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| 19 | a minimum level of service to clients purchasing or
|
| 20 | selling property. Despite discouragement from the
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| 21 | federal antitrust agencies, these proposals have
|
| 22 | recently become law in several states.
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| 23 | Now, restrictions of this sort erect entry
|
| 24 | barriers for new business models that provide consumers
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| 25 | with the ability to purchase only those services that |
Page 137
| 1 | they want or need, and they lock in a business model
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| 2 | that bundles together high-end services. The Commission
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| 3 | generally has argued that these minimum service
|
| 4 | requirements can harm consumers by eliminating choices
|
| 5 | and causing higher prices, and certainly from my
|
| 6 | perspective the threatened proliferation of similar laws
|
| 7 | is troubling, because once these laws are enacted, there
|
| 8 | is no going back, and there is little anyone can do to
|
| 9 | address potential anti-competitive effects absent
|
| 10 | repealing the laws.
|
| 11 | Having said that, I am very interested to see
|
| 12 | what empirical evidence reveals about the economic
|
| 13 | impact of these laws and the impact they may have on
|
| 14 | consumers, and hopefully some of that evidence has been
|
| 15 | unveiled today and will be unveiled this afternoon.
|
| 16 | Here's why this is so important.
|
| 17 | The reported price increases to date from at
|
| 18 | least one recently enacted state law -- and I note that
|
| 19 | they are anecdotal -- have not been exorbitant from a
|
| 20 | monetary standpoint. For example, a discount broker in
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| 21 | Texas reported to the New York Times that his increases
|
| 22 | have increased from $600 to only $700 per home.
|
| 23 | To be sure, the type of debate that's pervading
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| 24 | the real estate industry where high-technology
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| 25 | competition challenges a traditional business model is |
Page 138
| 1 | nothing novel. Indeed, we've witnessed resistance to
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| 2 | internet-based competition with respect to wine, contact
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| 3 | lenses and toy sales, to name just a few, and we have
|
| 4 | seen, I think to the great benefit of consumers, a
|
| 5 | quasi-revolution in the travel industry, another
|
| 6 | business in which agencies are compensated largely
|
| 7 | through commissions.
|
| 8 | Travel agents, by the way, have largely adapted
|
| 9 | to the challenges of high-tech rivalry by concentrating
|
| 10 | efforts in a few sectors, like business travel, cruises
|
| 11 | and tours, where consumers tend to prefer full-service
|
| 12 | assistance, and the results have been telling. Although
|
| 13 | internet sites like Orbitz, Travelocity and Expedia are
|
| 14 | among the top competitors in sales, traditional agencies
|
| 15 | like American Express Travel still claim the top spots.
|
| 16 | Indeed, the vast majority of travel agents have opted to
|
| 17 | stay in the business, and they just raised the level of
|
| 18 | their game to meet internet competition.
|
| 19 | So, where does this leave us? For now, I think
|
| 20 | we are squarely at the crossroads between investment in
|
| 21 | and comfort with the traditional real estate model and
|
| 22 | the promise of new, innovative alternatives. My own
|
| 23 | sense is that there's a way to create more competition
|
| 24 | for the consumer clearly and without confusion, because
|
| 25 | like my staffer Tinman, there will always be consumers |
Page 139
| 1 | who prefer a full-service broker and are willing to pay
|
| 2 | the price, and these people surely should be able to do
|
| 3 | so. Conversely, though, consumers may prefer to choose
|
| 4 | among a disaggregated selection of services and receive
|
| 5 | adjusted pricing, sort of closer to my staffer Lion, and
|
| 6 | should likewise have that option, too.
|
| 7 | Now, I am very empathetic to concerns regarding
|
| 8 | free riding and certainly to protecting consumers from
|
| 9 | confusion. I mean, this is, after all, at the heart of
|
| 10 | the second hat that the FTC wears -- and our consumer
|
| 11 | protection staff would, of course, argue that that's the
|
| 12 | first hat that the FTC wears -- but I have yet to see
|
| 13 | any real indication that either of these phenomena is
|
| 14 | likely to compromise the efficient operation of the MLS
|
| 15 | database.
|
| 16 | Put differently, a relaxation of the realtor
|
| 17 | rules of engagement rather than a tightening of the MLS
|
| 18 | screw might be in consumers' best interests, and it
|
| 19 | might not result in the sky falling down on top of a
|
| 20 | full-service brokerage model either.
|
| 21 | However, we are still learning about this
|
| 22 | rapidly changing industry, and everybody here today is
|
| 23 | listening. Workshops like these are a good start
|
| 24 | towards understanding the marketplace and I think also
|
| 25 | towards understanding each other. |
Page 140
| 1 | In that regard, we are most fortunate to have
|
| 2 | two distinguished panels here this afternoon, which
|
| 3 | include an array of knowledgeable and competent people,
|
| 4 | ranging from federal enforcement officials to professors
|
| 5 | of economics to industry experts, and I am particularly
|
| 6 | appreciative of the realtor presence here today, and not
|
| 7 | just the realtor presence from across the street, but
|
| 8 | also the realtor presence from around the country.
|
| 9 | No matter what our differences are, some of
|
| 10 | which we hope to bridge this afternoon, I am sure that
|
| 11 | we all agree with Dorothy's statement, which is "there's
|
| 12 | no place like home." Thank you very much.
|
| 13 | I'm happy to take a couple questions, then we
|
| 14 | have a Commission meeting, and then I will turn it over
|
| 15 | to the panels, if anyone has a question. If anyone
|
| 16 | doesn't have a question, I will immediately leave. Any
|
| 17 | questions?
|
| 18 | (No response).
|
| 19 | COMMISSIONER LEIBOWITZ: No questions. I will
|
| 20 | adjourn to the panel. Thank you so much.
|
| 21 | MS. QUINN: Thank you so much, Commissioner
|
| 22 | Leibowitz.
|
| 23 | (Applause.)
|
| 24 | MS. QUINN: My name is Lee Quinn, and I'm an
|
| 25 | attorney with the Antitrust Division, Department of |
Page 141
| 1 | Justice, in one of the litigation sections.
|
| 2 | This afternoon, we will turn our attention to
|
| 3 | buyer side issues, things that will affect, in
|
| 4 | particular, buyers when they go into the market.
|
| 5 | Certainly one of the major issues that I know one of our
|
| 6 | panelists will discuss will be anti-rebate legislation.
|
| 7 | Additionally, while some of the issues that were
|
| 8 | discussed this morning you may feel have been covered,
|
| 9 | they actually take a different cast when they're looked
|
| 10 | at from the buyer's side. For example, take the MLS
|
| 11 | issue that we talked about this morning. One recent
|
| 12 | commentator said over 70 percent of all buyers use the
|
| 13 | internet to search for homes, and so maybe that might
|
| 14 | cast a different light on how we might look at the MLS
|
| 15 | or any of the internet services in terms of their
|
| 16 | usefulness to the buyer consumer.
|
| 17 | To start our discussion, we have assembled a
|
| 18 | knowledgeable and diverse panel to help us explore the
|
| 19 | issues. Let me introduce those panelists, as I know you
|
| 20 | want to hear from them, not from me.
|
| 21 | On my right is Alex Perriello. Mr. Perriello is
|
| 22 | President and Chief Executive Officer of Cendant Real
|
| 23 | Estate Franchise Group of Cendant Corporation. With the
|
| 24 | recent announcement -- I wrote this yesterday and it's
|
| 25 | already out of date -- but Cendant is the largest |
Page 142
| 1 | franchisor of residential/commercial real estate
|
| 2 | brokerage offices in the world, and in this capacity,
|
| 3 | Mr. Perriello oversees Century 21, Coldwell Banker,
|
| 4 | Coldwell Banker Commercial, ERA and Sotheby's
|
| 5 | International Realty. These brands have more than
|
| 6 | 14,400 franchise and company-owned offices and 303,000
|
| 7 | brokers and agents worldwide.
|
| 8 | In addition, Mr. Perriello is responsible for
|
| 9 | the franchise group's shared support services, which
|
| 10 | include franchise sales, operation, technology, learning
|
| 11 | and the preferred client group.
|
| 12 | Our next speaker will be Philip Henderson.
|
| 13 | Mr. Henderson is Vice President of LendingTree, LLC. He
|
| 14 | joined LendingTree in 1999 as legal counsel where he
|
| 15 | helped to build the company's mortgage services
|
| 16 | business. As LendingTree expanded to include real
|
| 17 | estate services, Mr. Henderson has held positions in
|
| 18 | both the legal and business strategy groups.
|
| 19 | LendingTree operates RealEstate.com, which is a one-stop
|
| 20 | shop to simplify the often complex real estate
|
| 21 | transaction and help consumers save time and money.
|
| 22 | Mr. Henderson was an associate with Kirkpatrick &
|
| 23 | Lockhart here in Washington on mortgage banking matters
|
| 24 | and received his law degree from the University of
|
| 25 | Virginia. |
Page 143
| 1 | The next speaker will be Cathy Whatley. You
|
| 2 | were introduced to Cathy this morning. I think her
|
| 3 | resume is very impressive. She was the 2003 President
|
| 4 | of the National Association of Realtors and is a member
|
| 5 | of the family firm that was founded in 1907. So, we
|
| 6 | welcome Cathy back to our panel and thank her for doing
|
| 7 | double duty for us today. Cathy resides in
|
| 8 | Jacksonville, and she is also on the Florida Commission
|
| 9 | on Ethics and a member of the state's Impact Fee Task
|
| 10 | Force.
|
| 11 | Next, and to my left, is Tom Early, President of
|
| 12 | the National Association of Exclusive Buyer Agents. Tom
|
| 13 | has been in the real estate business for 24 years
|
| 14 | starting as a salesperson and then becoming a broker in
|
| 15 | 1987. He opened one of the first exclusive buyer
|
| 16 | representation real estate brokerages in 1989, making
|
| 17 | him a pioneer in the field of buyer representation. He
|
| 18 | helped found the National Association of Exclusive Buyer
|
| 19 | Agents in 1995 and served as President of that
|
| 20 | organization in '97 and '98. Tom is considered to be an
|
| 21 | expert in the area of common law of agency as it relates
|
| 22 | to the real estate industry and speaks on the subject to
|
| 23 | many organizations, including the REVAC, at the NAR
|
| 24 | convention on several occasions. Tom served in Vietnam,
|
| 25 | with honor, as a member of the Special Forces, Green |
Page 144
| 1 | Berets. He notes that some say this is the reason he is
|
| 2 | so hard-headed; some say it is the reason he is so
|
| 3 | dedicated to the causes he supports. Either way, I
|
| 4 | think he will be a force to be dealt with today.
|
| 5 | Our second to the last speaker will be Geoff
|
| 6 | Lewis. Geoff has a very varied business background, and
|
| 7 | he now is a member of the RE/MAX Network, serving as
|
| 8 | Senior Vice President and Chief Legal Officer of RE/MAX
|
| 9 | International. He previously served as vice president,
|
| 10 | corporate development, and general counsel for
|
| 11 | Hyster/Yale Materials Handling in Portland, and before
|
| 12 | that as Vice President and General Counsel for American
|
| 13 | Health Properties in Greenwood Village, Colorado from
|
| 14 | '91 to '95. He also practiced law with the firm of
|
| 15 | Jones Day in Los Angeles, received his Bachelor of Arts
|
| 16 | from Brigham Young and a JD from the University of
|
| 17 | Virginia and an MBA from the University of Colorado.
|
| 18 | Our last speaker will be Steve DelBianco. Steve
|
| 19 | is an experienced business leader and policy expert in
|
| 20 | internet and information technology. He ran an IT
|
| 21 | consulting firm before helping to start two tech policy
|
| 22 | groups, the Association for Competitive Technology and
|
| 23 | NetChoice, a coalition of Ecommerce, business and
|
| 24 | consumers, and at the present time, he is the Executive
|
| 25 | Director, NetChoice Coalition, Washington, D.C. In |
Page 145
| 1 | addition, Steve was an investor and board member of
|
| 2 | eRealty.com, a startup brokerage that empowered realtors
|
| 3 | with internet technology to better serve home buyers who
|
| 4 | want the convenience of online search and
|
| 5 | communications.
|
| 6 | I think you'll agree with me that we have an
|
| 7 | excellent panel to help lead our discussions today.
|
| 8 | So, shall we begin, Alex?
|
| 9 | MR. PERRIELLO: Thank you, Lee, and good
|
| 10 | afternoon.
|
| 11 | I'm here, as Lee said, representing the more
|
| 12 | than 300,000 sales professionals, managers and brokers
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| 13 | of the four real estate brands, Century 21, Coldwell
|
| 14 | Banker, ERA and Sotheby's International Realty.
|
| 15 | First, I would like to thank our hosts today,
|
| 16 | the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
|
| 17 | Justice. I'm pleased to be able to present my comments
|
| 18 | in this forum, and I am doing so with the intention of
|
| 19 | helping foster a greater understanding of the topic of
|
| 20 | competition in the residential real estate industry.
|
| 21 | First, let me begin by saying and addressing the
|
| 22 | heart of the matter, which is competition. The
|
| 23 | residential real estate business is a very, very
|
| 24 | competitive business. As we have heard earlier, there's
|
| 25 | 1.1 million licensed realtor members of the National |
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| 1 | Association of Realtors in the U.S. This figure is at
|
| 2 | an all-time high and speaks volumes to the competition
|
| 3 | levels that are in the business.
|
| 4 | Moreover, there are no significant barriers to
|
| 5 | entry or expansion in the residential real estate
|
| 6 | industry. As a result, there has been a dramatic number
|
| 7 | of new agents and new entrants into the industry in
|
| 8 | recent years. Even in areas where a new entrant faces
|
| 9 | one or more long-established competitors, there is a
|
| 10 | proven ability of such dedicated, hard-working
|
| 11 | professionals that they can attract listings on both the
|
| 12 | buy side and the sell side, and that ensures to the
|
| 13 | extent that if there is local demand for alternative
|
| 14 | pricing or service models, that this demand will be
|
| 15 | filled either by the incumbent firm that is willing to
|
| 16 | adapt their business model or the new firms will fill
|
| 17 | that void.
|
| 18 | Just last week, I was talking to one of our
|
| 19 | brokers, Brad Holter of Coldwell Banker Caine Halter in
|
| 20 | Greenville, South Carolina. During our conversation, I
|
| 21 | mentioned to Brad that I was going to be down here
|
| 22 | speaking on a panel about competition in the real estate
|
| 23 | industry, and I'd like to share with you what he said to
|
| 24 | me. This was his exact quote. "Alex, are you kidding?
|
| 25 | Have they come to Greenville if they want to see |
Page 147
| 1 | competition? My family has been in this business for
|
| 2 | over 75 years, and during three generations we have
|
| 3 | never seen or experienced more competition than we're
|
| 4 | seeing today, not only from traditional real estate
|
| 5 | companies, but also from a host of discounters and
|
| 6 | limited service providers." He said, "It seems as
|
| 7 | though there is one opening up every month in our
|
| 8 | market."
|
| 9 | Accordingly, based on Mr. Halter's remarks and
|
| 10 | similar stories that are conveyed to me by brokers all
|
| 11 | across the country, I must admit to being puzzled as to
|
| 12 | statements that the residential real estate industry
|
| 13 | lacks competition, shuns technology or operates in some
|
| 14 | sort of anti-competitive manner. The U.S. real estate
|
| 15 | market thrives today because buyers and sellers have
|
| 16 | choices, and choices mean more competition.
|
| 17 | Let's take a look just for a second at the many
|
| 18 | options a home buyer has when purchasing a home.
|
| 19 | There's a number of ways that they can begin their home
|
| 20 | search process, continue and complete their home search
|
| 21 | process. They can buy directly from the homeowner or
|
| 22 | for-sale-by-owner. They can enter into an exclusive
|
| 23 | buyer agency agreement and deal with that particular
|
| 24 | agent to find a home. They can deal with any number of
|
| 25 | listing agents and buy directly from them. They can |
Page 148
| 1 | work with a number of agents and say this is what I'm
|
| 2 | looking for, go find it, and when you do, I'll do
|
| 3 | business with you. They can shop the internet and look
|
| 4 | for agents online and review resumes and send emails and
|
| 5 | interview people electronically, or they can go through
|
| 6 | an intermediary who will refer them to a sales
|
| 7 | professional perhaps so that that buyer may receive some
|
| 8 | sort of a rebate on the commission. As you can see,
|
| 9 | there's a myriad of choices for buyers to choose
|
| 10 | representation or not as they seek to purchase a home.
|
| 11 | From personal experience, what I can tell you,
|
| 12 | though, is home buyers usually end up selecting someone
|
| 13 | that they like, that they respect, and someone who is
|
| 14 | willing to do what it takes to bring the transaction to
|
| 15 | a successful close. Real estate, by its very nature, is
|
| 16 | a local business. Sales associates are predominantly
|
| 17 | independent contractors, and they only make a commission
|
| 18 | when the transaction closes, and they only make a living
|
| 19 | in the business by having satisfied customers time and
|
| 20 | time again. This requires them to be very competitive
|
| 21 | and use all the tools at their disposal, including the
|
| 22 | willingness to negotiate price and other terms on which
|
| 23 | their services will be offered.
|
| 24 | I'd now like to address the impact of
|
| 25 | technology, and more specifically the internet, on the |
Page 149
| 1 | home-buying process. Today, the true value of the
|
| 2 | internet to the residential real estate industry and
|
| 3 | consumers alike is that it's a very highly effective
|
| 4 | marketing tool as well as a tremendous information
|
| 5 | resource and communication tool. Unlike some
|
| 6 | industries, the residential real estate industry was
|
| 7 | among the first industries to really embrace technology
|
| 8 | and the internet to help their consumers. Real estate
|
| 9 | companies began posting listings on web sites back in
|
| 10 | the 1990s, and today, those web sites are amazing.
|
| 11 | Property photos, virtual tours, rich text, mapping
|
| 12 | functionality, neighborhood information, and on and on
|
| 13 | and on.
|
| 14 | In doing so, real estate brokers and agents have
|
| 15 | incurred a variety of new costs associated with
|
| 16 | technology in an already low-margin business. For
|
| 17 | example, online advertising and marketing costs, those
|
| 18 | are significant, and this is in addition to the more
|
| 19 | traditional print media and advertising that their
|
| 20 | buyers and sellers expect. Hardware, PCs, laptops,
|
| 21 | servers, software, digital cameras, virtual tour
|
| 22 | equipment, professional services, personal and office
|
| 23 | technology products, on and on and on.
|
| 24 | Now, these costs have been absorbed virtually in
|
| 25 | their entirety by the industry itself. Consumers have |
Page 150
| 1 | not realized increased transaction costs due to the
|
| 2 | adoption of new technology in marketing real estate. In
|
| 3 | fact, online searchs are a definite time-saver in the
|
| 4 | way they empower the customer to select a buyer or
|
| 5 | seller's agent and narrow their home search process from
|
| 6 | the comfort of their own home. What the internet does
|
| 7 | very well is to act as a marketing tool to promote
|
| 8 | transactions. It's a search tool for customers and an
|
| 9 | advertising and communication tool for sales associates.
|
| 10 | Now, looking to the future, there are numerous
|
| 11 | potential benefits to the increased use of technology in
|
| 12 | real estate transactions, primarily revolving around the
|
| 13 | speed of the transaction process, and we believe that
|
| 14 | those efficiencies and cost savings will come as
|
| 15 | transaction management platforms become more
|
| 16 | sophisticated and more widely used, but with that said,
|
| 17 | real estate is not a commodity. Unlike an airline
|
| 18 | ticket from Orbitz or a book that you buy on Amazon, a
|
| 19 | house is a unique item that requires in-person
|
| 20 | investigation and evaluation.
|
| 21 | The ultimate cost of a wrong decision on a real
|
| 22 | estate purchase is significant. The role of technology
|
| 23 | in our business, accordingly, is pretty difficult to
|
| 24 | predict. Undoubtedly, because of the competitive nature
|
| 25 | of the business, there will be winners and losers just |
Page 151
| 1 | like there have been over the past many decades.
|
| 2 | Respectfully, I would suggest that there is really no
|
| 3 | need for the Federal Government to intervene to fix what
|
| 4 | really isn't broken.
|
| 5 | Let me now turn to the issue of rebates and
|
| 6 | inducement, my final point, just for a moment. In
|
| 7 | today's marketplace, consumers expect discounts, rewards
|
| 8 | and other benefits when shopping for everything from a
|
| 9 | car to a hotel room to a meal in a restaurant. Still,
|
| 10 | some states prohibit all forms of inducement by real
|
| 11 | estate licensees. This deprives those consumers of
|
| 12 | potential advantages and benefits available to consumers
|
| 13 | in other states and may limit the competitiveness of
|
| 14 | real estate offices in the state where those
|
| 15 | prohibitions exist.
|
| 16 | Our parent company, Cendant, has been working
|
| 17 | with many of the real estate commissions to repeal rules
|
| 18 | that would prohibit the use of incentives, discounts,
|
| 19 | sweepstakes and other consumer benefits in a real estate
|
| 20 | transaction. Simply put, we feel that those
|
| 21 | prohibitions on inducements are not necessary. The
|
| 22 | remaining anti-inducement states should remove those
|
| 23 | antiquated laws, as just occurred in West Virginia, and
|
| 24 | stop denying businesses the opportunity to offer rebates
|
| 25 | or inducements. |
Page 152
| 1 | With that said, though, I feel it's incumbent on
|
| 2 | me to raise one concern as it relates to rebates and
|
| 3 | inducements. Choosing someone to represent you in a
|
| 4 | real estate transaction is a very important decision.
|
| 5 | Making that decision based solely on who will give you a
|
| 6 | rebate at the closing is akin to buying a car that you
|
| 7 | don't like just to get the manufacturer's rebate. My
|
| 8 | advice to home buyers and sellers is to do their
|
| 9 | homework, interview several agents from competing firms,
|
| 10 | ask tough questions, and then decide who you feel is the
|
| 11 | most qualified person to represent you in the
|
| 12 | transaction.
|
| 13 | In closing, choice is important. We believe
|
| 14 | that consumers, home buyers and sellers, should be able
|
| 15 | to choose their service models as well as the provider
|
| 16 | of those services, whether they be limited service or
|
| 17 | full service. We encourage free and open competition in
|
| 18 | the marketplace. Discount brokerages, referral
|
| 19 | businesses, lead generation companies have a role to
|
| 20 | play in the real estate industry. Discounters have been
|
| 21 | in our business for decades. Some of our brand
|
| 22 | affiliate brokers participate in referral networks or
|
| 23 | purchase leads from third-party marketing companies.
|
| 24 | However, with all that said, we believe that
|
| 25 | property listings are the work product of the brokers. |
Page 153
| 1 | The MLS is a B2B relationship that was never intended to
|
| 2 | be a consumer-direct resource. If an independently
|
| 3 | owned and operated broker wants to make a business
|
| 4 | decision to share their work product, that's their
|
| 5 | decision, and they have that right, and we respect that
|
| 6 | right for them to do that.
|
| 7 | But last and certainly not least, let me
|
| 8 | conclude by saying that competition is alive and well in
|
| 9 | the real estate industry. I hear it every day from our
|
| 10 | brokers, and as Mr. Halter said to me, just come to
|
| 11 | Greenville if you would like to see it in action. There
|
| 12 | is simply no need for government involvement at this
|
| 13 | point in time to interfere with the competitive ebb and
|
| 14 | flow of the free market for residential real estate
|
| 15 | services.
|
| 16 | Thank you.
|
| 17 | MS. QUINN: Thank you, Alex.
|
| 18 | (Applause.)
|
| 19 | MS. QUINN: Philip?
|
| 20 | MR. HENDERSON: Thank you, Lee.
|
| 21 | Good afternoon. My name is Philip Henderson,
|
| 22 | and I'm with LendingTree, and as has been mentioned
|
| 23 | several times, we operate RealEstate.com, and I'm going
|
| 24 | to tell you a little bit more about that business.
|
| 25 | I first want to thank the Federal Trade |
Page 154
| 1 | Commission and the Department of Justice, the leadership
|
| 2 | of it and the staff, for putting on this excellent
|
| 3 | event. As Commissioner Leibowitz said, the industry and
|
| 4 | the structure of the policy are often opaque, and events
|
| 5 | like this and others will help bring some light to it I
|
| 6 | think that will benefit both the industry and consumers
|
| 7 | and the market.
|
| 8 | Several commentators recently, the Government
|
| 9 | Accountability Office's report, the American Enterprise
|
| 10 | Institute-Brookings, the Department of Justice, the
|
| 11 | Federal Trade Commission, have identified significant
|
| 12 | barriers to competition in the industry. I'd like to
|
| 13 | touch upon one of them and ask you to think more about
|
| 14 | one of the barriers to competition, and it's one that
|
| 15 | Alex just mentioned, the states that prohibit brokers
|
| 16 | from giving consumers a rebate.
|
| 17 | Before I do that, I want to tell you a little
|
| 18 | bit about RealEstate.com so you can understand why we
|
| 19 | use that practice and what our business is about.
|
| 20 | RealEstate.com has built a network of local brokers and
|
| 21 | agents. These are brokers and agents who have joined
|
| 22 | our network because we deliver value to them. We can do
|
| 23 | for them things that they could do for themselves, but
|
| 24 | they opt to have us cooperate with them in a partnership
|
| 25 | relationship. Many of the things that Alex mentioned |
Page 155
| 1 | that are costly and difficult to do for an individual
|
| 2 | broker, those individuals can become more efficient by
|
| 3 | partnering with other entities. It's not true for every
|
| 4 | brokerage, but some use it and find value in it.
|
| 5 | We deliver consumers to those brokers after
|
| 6 | having cultivated that consumer with online tools and
|
| 7 | information so that those brokers do realize value.
|
| 8 | They become more efficient. Those brokers pay us a
|
| 9 | cooperative brokerage fee, and in many cases, where
|
| 10 | we're permitted, we deliver some of that value back to
|
| 11 | the consumer in the form of a rebate.
|
| 12 | So, why do we use rebates? Why do many brokers
|
| 13 | use them? They have been around for a long time. Well,
|
| 14 | the first concept is the mechanics of the transaction
|
| 15 | work against a broker who's working with a buyer from
|
| 16 | reducing the cost of its services. If a broker wishes
|
| 17 | to use price competition, a common practice in most
|
| 18 | industries, to gain market share, to obtain new
|
| 19 | consumers, it's very difficult for the buyer side to do
|
| 20 | that, because the custom in the industry, which a number
|
| 21 | of people have touched upon, is for the seller's broker
|
| 22 | to split its commission with the buyer's broker. So,
|
| 23 | the buyer's in a difficult negotiation position, but a
|
| 24 | rebate helps to facilitate that price competition and
|
| 25 | deliver value back to the consumer. |
Page 156
| 1 | One of the things we've seen is that although
|
| 2 | rebates have been around for many years, the internet
|
| 3 | and the increased role of the internet has really
|
| 4 | turbo-charged the need for them, the demand for them,
|
| 5 | and brokers' desire to use them. Why is that? Well,
|
| 6 | one of the great powers of the internet is the ability
|
| 7 | to build a network like we've done, have a network that
|
| 8 | local agents and brokers, rather than having to build
|
| 9 | branchs around the country or franchise, the internet
|
| 10 | enables this sort of networking. So, a number of groups
|
| 11 | that are built on membership rules, such as Costco's a
|
| 12 | membership entity, USAA, a group that serves the
|
| 13 | military community, will team up with a company like us
|
| 14 | that's built a network to deliver value back to its
|
| 15 | members, to say use this network and you receive a
|
| 16 | rebate. So, the demand for these rebates has increased.
|
| 17 | It's often cast as a consumer issue, right? The
|
| 18 | consumer should have the ability to get value back. But
|
| 19 | what I'd like to stress today is it's a brokerage. It's
|
| 20 | good for brokers to have the ability to compete, to use
|
| 21 | tools to increase its market share and to gain
|
| 22 | consumers, and I think that's a theme throughout many of
|
| 23 | the subjects that we've talked about today, is that it's
|
| 24 | about unleashing brokers to have the ability to use new
|
| 25 | methods and tools to expand, to succeed, and to succeed |
Page 157
| 1 | in this market that is competitive in many ways. There
|
| 2 | are many brokers and agents out there. Giving them new
|
| 3 | tools to compete will help the industry.
|
| 4 | So, what's the argument against rebates? Why do
|
| 5 | states, many of them, have statutes and regulations,
|
| 6 | rules, that say brokers cannot give rebates? Well, the
|
| 7 | truth is, it's hard to find a good articulated defense
|
| 8 | of them. In many cases the statutes are quite old and
|
| 9 | there is no sort of regular debate about the issue, but
|
| 10 | the things we hear periodically fall into three groups,
|
| 11 | arguments for laws that prohibit rebates.
|
| 12 | The first is what I call the truth is stranger
|
| 13 | than fiction concept, because the logic used is quite
|
| 14 | unusual. In some cases, the real estate commissions
|
| 15 | say, well, we have a licensing statute that requires
|
| 16 | persons who are acting as an agent or broker to be
|
| 17 | licensed. So, if the consumer's receiving money back
|
| 18 | out of the commission, that means they're acting as an
|
| 19 | agent, and they're not licensed. So, it's okay for
|
| 20 | consumers to get a rebate as long as they go become
|
| 21 | licensed as an agent. It's Alice in Wonderland logic,
|
| 22 | but that's what's used.
|
| 23 | The other is different, and I think it had a
|
| 24 | more legitimate genesis, and it's the anti-inducement
|
| 25 | statutes, laws that said -- I think they were originally |
Page 158
| 1 | designed and aimed at third parties from receiving fees
|
| 2 | to induce a transaction, but they've been interpreted
|
| 3 | and used to say brokers can't give a rebate because it's
|
| 4 | an inducement to do a deal. I think it falls into the
|
| 5 | category that Alex touched on about whether consumers
|
| 6 | should be persuaded by the rebate to hire a specific
|
| 7 | broker.
|
| 8 | In the third category of states that limit --
|
| 9 | don't prohibit -- limit here the ability of a brokerage
|
| 10 | to give rebates, they require the broker to do it at the
|
| 11 | closing table. You can't do it after the commissions
|
| 12 | have been received and netted out in delivering rebates
|
| 13 | back to the consumer, and that's very difficult as a
|
| 14 | practical matter. It requires the seller receiving a
|
| 15 | lower price for their home and a lower fee going to
|
| 16 | seller's broker and the seller's broker passing that
|
| 17 | discount back to the buyer's broker. It's confusing to
|
| 18 | the seller, it's difficult to do, and it's a practical
|
| 19 | significant limitation on using rebates.
|
| 20 | So, to sum up, what we see, I think, on a number
|
| 21 | of fronts, and in particular with rebates, is brokers
|
| 22 | and agents in the industry seeking to use new methods
|
| 23 | and models and practices to compete and to succeed, and
|
| 24 | I think our message to the leadership of the industry
|
| 25 | and to policy makers is that these barriers deserve |
Page 159
| 1 | significant scrutiny, and we have to ask, is there a
|
| 2 | real pro-consumer, pro-industry argument for them? I
|
| 3 | think in many cases, barriers don't stand up to that
|
| 4 | scrutiny.
|
| 5 | So, again, thank you for being here today.
|
| 6 | Thank you to the Federal Trade Commission and the
|
| 7 | Department of Justice for hosting this, and I look
|
| 8 | forward to good questions from this group.
|
| 9 | MS. QUINN: Thank you, Philip.
|
| 10 | (Applause.)
|
| 11 | MS. QUINN: Before Cathy speaks, in order to get
|
| 12 | her to do double duty today, we have to respect the fact
|
| 13 | that she has to leave exactly at 3:30. So, if you want
|
| 14 | to ask Cathy some questions on your little index cards,
|
| 15 | get them up first.
|
| 16 | MS. WHATLEY: Thank you very much, Lee, and I,
|
| 17 | too, want to echo the appreciation of being able to
|
| 18 | participate, and although I have had the privilege of
|
| 19 | serving as President of the National Association of
|
| 20 | Realtors, I think I come today as a practitioner, and I
|
| 21 | think that's what I bring to the discussion, because
|
| 22 | when I'm in my marketplace, I am every day working with
|
| 23 | buyers and sellers, seven days a week, 12 to 14 hours a
|
| 24 | day.
|
| 25 | People used to talk about our real estate |
Page 160
| 1 | campaign, and one little boy said, "Oh, I understand
|
| 2 | you're in real estate. You have no life." And
|
| 3 | sometimes that -- you know, it is a very highly
|
| 4 | intensive activity that you do when you are representing
|
| 5 | your customers and clients.
|
| 6 | So, I want to talk about -- because this morning
|
| 7 | I started by saying it's like a play, that there were
|
| 8 | actors in the play and there was a director who kind of
|
| 9 | orchestrated things, and if it didn't go well, the end
|
| 10 | result wasn't the experience that the audience expected,
|
| 11 | and I want to state unequivocally in my mind that the
|
| 12 | buyer's single most important objective is to get to
|
| 13 | closing. They want to make sure that they are sitting
|
| 14 | at a closing table with an attorney or a title company
|
| 15 | or an escrow agent getting the keys to the home. So, if
|
| 16 | that's the end of the story, if that's the end of the
|
| 17 | play, what takes place to get there and what's happened
|
| 18 | over the course of time that actually has amplified,
|
| 19 | streamlined, moved things forward?
|
| 20 | Certainly the first thing that the buyer needs
|
| 21 | to have information about are properties that are
|
| 22 | available, and over the last ten years, we have seen so
|
| 23 | much expansion in the capability of the consumer to have
|
| 24 | information online that they may do research, not only
|
| 25 | about what properties are available, but about the |
Page 161
| 1 | process of buying and selling real estate. In the
|
| 2 | Multiple Listing Service, which has been touched on
|
| 3 | today, that is a very valuable tool for me as a real
|
| 4 | estate professional. What it brings to me is
|
| 5 | information about listings that have been provided by
|
| 6 | all brokerages. Anyone who is a member of the realtor
|
| 7 | organization, whether they are a discount broker, a
|
| 8 | limited service broker or a full-service broker, have
|
| 9 | their listings in the Multiple Listing Service, and in
|
| 10 | that broker-to-broker cooperative compensation
|
| 11 | environment, that is real time information for me to be
|
| 12 | able to deliver to my customer or client, the buyer, and
|
| 13 | real time is important, especially if you happen to be
|
| 14 | in a seller's market, because the advertising vehicles
|
| 15 | that are out there on the internet are not real time,
|
| 16 | and by the time even that a consumer might be able to
|
| 17 | see something online, it could be gone.
|
| 18 | So, being able to have a real estate
|
| 19 | professional who can tell them the minute something is
|
| 20 | listed, "Let me tell you, there was a new listing that
|
| 21 | just popped up, it's matched your criteria, I think we
|
| 22 | ought to go out and look at it," that is extremely
|
| 23 | valuable, and that's part of the strength that I bring
|
| 24 | to the transaction.
|
| 25 | Actually, writing the offer, the offer itself |
Page 162
| 1 | has been streamlined. It used to be 45 to 60 days from
|
| 2 | the time you wrote the contract until the time you
|
| 3 | closed, because it took a longer time for the mortgage
|
| 4 | process to take place. It took more time for all the
|
| 5 | steps to be ready to close. Now, most closings that I
|
| 6 | do are within 30 days. So, if you think about that
|
| 7 | shortened time frame, that's been caused by technology,
|
| 8 | because most of that is in the lender community. They
|
| 9 | now have automated underwriting, they have capabilities
|
| 10 | that they were unable to achieve before. Technology has
|
| 11 | driven that.
|
| 12 | So, what does that mean to my buyer? To my
|
| 13 | buyer it means we better be able to enact every part of
|
| 14 | that process. We better be able, not only from the time
|
| 15 | we sign the contract, to be able to make the mortgage
|
| 16 | loan application, to be able to get the appraiser out
|
| 17 | there, to be able to do our home inspections and to be
|
| 18 | able to respond with those concerns or issues back to
|
| 19 | the seller, be able to have the termite inspection done,
|
| 20 | to be able to have the survey done, and in some markets,
|
| 21 | the buyer is not in control of each and every one of
|
| 22 | those steps. So, you'll have some markets where the
|
| 23 | seller is responsible for securing the title insurance
|
| 24 | and the survey, and in others, the buyer does it, but
|
| 25 | all of this is in an abbreviated time frame. |
Page 163
| 1 | Again, if the ultimate goal of my buyer is to
|
| 2 | get to closing, it is really essential that there is the
|
| 3 | capability to have all of those players understand that
|
| 4 | they have a timely role to play. In the event we don't
|
| 5 | have the right ending, what are the potential downsides
|
| 6 | to my buyer? Number one, their binder deposit can be at
|
| 7 | risk. You're talking about competition and savings.
|
| 8 | There are really some potential challenges that the
|
| 9 | buyer faces if they don't close in a timely fashion.
|
| 10 | They could have their loan approved, but if everything
|
| 11 | else isn't done, because most contracts are just subject
|
| 12 | to loan approval, so their loan's approved, but they
|
| 13 | can't close for another reason, their binder's at risk.
|
| 14 | Secondly, their interest rate lock-in is
|
| 15 | generally for 30 days now. If you don't close within
|
| 16 | that time frame, your interest rate could be at risk
|
| 17 | and/or the costs that they would have.
|
| 18 | Third, the actual capability of where are they
|
| 19 | going to live, because most of them have given notice
|
| 20 | that their apartment or they have sold their home, and
|
| 21 | everything is dictated upon this wonderful closing
|
| 22 | that's going to happen, when they're going to get the
|
| 23 | keys to their house.
|
| 24 | So, in the world of competition, there are
|
| 25 | multiple players in this story, and the buyer's ultimate |
Page 164
| 1 | objective is to make sure that he or she is sitting at
|
| 2 | the closing table, signing the mortgage documents,
|
| 3 | seeing everything necessary to be able to close, and the
|
| 4 | rest of it is just the beginning and the middle, but the
|
| 5 | most critically important factor to them is actually
|
| 6 | closing.
|
| 7 | (Applause.)
|
| 8 | MS. QUINN: Thank you very much.
|
| 9 | Tom?
|
| 10 | MR. EARLY: In the short time I have, I'm going
|
| 11 | to try to touch on four subjects, minimum service
|
| 12 | requirements, non-disclosure, designated agency and
|
| 13 | realtor procuring cause if I have the time.
|
| 14 | I want to thank the DOJ, I want to thank the FTC
|
| 15 | for holding these meetings. I've picked up an awful lot
|
| 16 | of information, and I've met some great people here
|
| 17 | today and last night.
|
| 18 | Minimum service requirements, it seems
|
| 19 | everything I've read or hear from realtors today about
|
| 20 | the level of service being recommended by NAR for its
|
| 21 | state associations -- and ladies and gentlemen, NAR is
|
| 22 | not neutral in these matters where the state legislation
|
| 23 | is being passed. Please, don't swallow that one.
|
| 24 | Everything I hear about these minimum services
|
| 25 | says it's a good thing for the consumer. The problem is |
Page 165
| 1 | the only person they're talking about when they're
|
| 2 | talking about the consumer, they're talking about the
|
| 3 | sellers. When 90 to 95 percent of the complaints that
|
| 4 | are filed by consumers are filed by buyers, why are we
|
| 5 | looking at these minimum level services for sellers?
|
| 6 | We're looking at them because the real estate industry,
|
| 7 | the organized real estate industry, is losing listings.
|
| 8 | They're losing sellers. They're not losing buyers.
|
| 9 | They're trying to find a way to stop the bleeding.
|
| 10 | They're trying to find a way to stop the loss of the
|
| 11 | listings to the traditional setting of brokerage.
|
| 12 | For roughly 80 years, NAR embraced a minimum
|
| 13 | standard in real estate transactions. That minimum
|
| 14 | standard was called the common sense common law of
|
| 15 | agency; agency, which mandated the firm and its
|
| 16 | licensees to put the interests of the client ahead of
|
| 17 | all others, including their own. This level of service
|
| 18 | obligated the brokerage to loyalty, confidentiality,
|
| 19 | obedience, reasonable care, accounting and disclosure.
|
| 20 | This was the industry's only way of delivering service
|
| 21 | to the one client we had at the time, the seller.
|
| 22 | The introduction and the growing awareness of
|
| 23 | buyer agency turned everything upside down within the
|
| 24 | industry. We in the industry now found ourselves with
|
| 25 | the potential of having two clients as buyers began to |
Page 166
| 1 | expect full representation, too. How can one firm,
|
| 2 | which has a major incentive to bring a transaction
|
| 3 | together, fully represent adversaries? Attorney firms
|
| 4 | don't represent adversaries because they recognize the
|
| 5 | inherent conflicts of interest. Who would agree that a
|
| 6 | buyer and seller aren't in an adversarial situation?
|
| 7 | One wants the highest possible price on the best
|
| 8 | possible terms; the other one wants the lowest possible
|
| 9 | price on the best possible terms. Adversarial, by the
|
| 10 | way, does not mean hostile. How, then, can one real
|
| 11 | estate brokerage faithfully represent these opposing
|
| 12 | parties?
|
| 13 | In its search for the resolution, some of us
|
| 14 | have fully embraced the common law of agency and decided
|
| 15 | to open up companies that represented one party to the
|
| 16 | transaction and one party only. In my case, it was the
|
| 17 | buyer. Agents who do such are called EBAs or exclusive
|
| 18 | buyer agents. Many of these brokers came together to
|
| 19 | form an association called NAEBA, the National
|
| 20 | Association of Exclusive Buyer Agents, the organization
|
| 21 | I am proud to represent.
|
| 22 | The majority of the industry made other choices.
|
| 23 | These choices ranged from facilitation, commonly known
|
| 24 | as transaction brokerage, which provided no higher level
|
| 25 | duties -- and by the way, no fiduciary duties -- to |
Page 167
| 1 | designated agency. Designated agency allows licensees
|
| 2 | from the same firm to purport to offer full
|
| 3 | representation as a fiduciary to opposing parties in the
|
| 4 | same transaction from the same brokerage with no
|
| 5 | conflicts of the -- just no disclosure of the conflicts
|
| 6 | of interest that are inherent in dual agency.
|
| 7 | Designated agency is dual agency. Designated
|
| 8 | agency is a product of legislation being passed on a
|
| 9 | state-by-state basis, with NAR guidance, advised by
|
| 10 | state associations of realtors. It is dual agency. The
|
| 11 | definition of dual agency under full disclosure and
|
| 12 | informed consent, two parties at the same brokerage
|
| 13 | representing opposing parties in a real estate
|
| 14 | transaction. The definition of designated agency, two
|
| 15 | parties from the same brokerage representing opposing
|
| 16 | parties in the same transaction. One, dual agency under
|
| 17 | the common law, required informed consent. Designated
|
| 18 | agency does not require informed consent.
|
| 19 | The common law of agency has now been replaced
|
| 20 | in roughly 26 states by designated agency legislation,
|
| 21 | making legal that which was previously unethical and
|
| 22 | illegal under the common law. Now, agents from the same
|
| 23 | brokerage can represent opposing sides without the
|
| 24 | cumbersome informed consent disclosure required under
|
| 25 | dual agency. In every instance, it has been the state |
Page 168
| 1 | realtor associations which have called for, written and
|
| 2 | paid for with PAC dollars, passed this legislation, just
|
| 3 | as we are seeing done today with minimum level services.
|
| 4 | NAR is not neutral. The latest example of
|
| 5 | designated agency legislation being passed was passed in
|
| 6 | Massachusetts after failing to pass on a committee on
|
| 7 | two separate occasions. It was passed by attaching it
|
| 8 | to a midnight piece of legislation, the State Budget
|
| 9 | Bill. In Connecticut, it was attached to another
|
| 10 | midnight piece of legislation, in this case Megan's Law.
|
| 11 | The consumer should have no problems with firms serving
|
| 12 | them as customers, clients or as dual agents, as long as
|
| 13 | there has been full advanced disclosure of what each
|
| 14 | relationship entails and informed consent has been given
|
| 15 | by the consumer.
|
| 16 | In other words, tell the consumer of her options
|
| 17 | and get their permission to proceed under one of those
|
| 18 | options. Consumers should, though, have a real problem
|
| 19 | with designated agency, as it encourages dual agency
|
| 20 | without full advanced disclosure of the conflicts, nor
|
| 21 | does it seek informed consent.
|
| 22 | The mandatory minimum level services being
|
| 23 | passed state by state do nothing more than bring back
|
| 24 | what was thrown out with the bath water, aspects of the
|
| 25 | agency representation and fiduciary duties. The |
Page 169
| 1 | Massachusetts Office of Consumer Affairs and Business
|
| 2 | Regulation conducted a sting operation, visiting 45
|
| 3 | offices to find out how many were in compliance with
|
| 4 | their two-year-old law requiring agency disclosure at
|
| 5 | first meeting with a contact. The results were both
|
| 6 | dismal and predictable. Zero compliance.
|
| 7 | Many states, including my home state, Ohio, has
|
| 8 | moved disclosure from first meaningful contact to as
|
| 9 | soon as practical but no later than the writing of an
|
| 10 | offer. Practicable for whom? How good is it for a
|
| 11 | buyer to be getting to a table, getting ready to write
|
| 12 | an offer on a home, to find out that the agents who are
|
| 13 | sitting in front of them represent the seller, or if
|
| 14 | they want to write that offer and continue with the
|
| 15 | process of putting an offer in on that home, they are
|
| 16 | dealing with a dual agency? How practical is it to do
|
| 17 | disclosure of your agency relationship at the table when
|
| 18 | you're writing an offer?
|
| 19 | This brings us to the last issue that I
|
| 20 | mentioned I would be addressing, and that's realtor
|
| 21 | procuring cause. I'm going to be real short on this,
|
| 22 | because it's considered by the industry to be an insider
|
| 23 | thing, and it really doesn't involve the consumers and
|
| 24 | so on and so forth. Nothing could be further from the
|
| 25 | truth. Do buyers know that working with a realtor, in |
Page 170
| 1 | most cases the listing agent, that they jeopardize their
|
| 2 | ability to be fully represented? This is never
|
| 3 | discussed, it is never disclosed, it is never mentioned,
|
| 4 | and if that buyer decides they don't want to work with
|
| 5 | the seller's agent and they don't want to accept the
|
| 6 | conflicts of interest that come with working with the
|
| 7 | buyer's agent from the same firm that is represented by
|
| 8 | the seller, what good does that do?
|
| 9 | This buyer could choose not to use the dual
|
| 10 | agent or their brokerage and hire a true buyer's agent.
|
| 11 | The buyer's agent is the only person involved with the
|
| 12 | buyer who has a contract for representation. This
|
| 13 | brokerage provides all of the services required to
|
| 14 | purchase the property, and yet his income is in jeopardy
|
| 15 | by an agent who may have introduced them to the property
|
| 16 | and maintained contact even though the buyer decided he
|
| 17 | didn't want to use that agent anymore. The buyer moved
|
| 18 | on and found other representation.
|
| 19 | I'm going to close it right there. I've got
|
| 20 | some other things to say on that subject, but I won't.
|
| 21 | We have a white paper that we've put out, and I'd be
|
| 22 | more than happy to answer any of your questions later.
|
| 23 | (Applause.)
|
| 24 | MR. LEWIS: I'd like to begin by thanking the
|
| 25 | FTC and the Department of Justice for including RE/MAX |
Page 171
| 1 | in this workshop, but more importantly, I'd like to
|
| 2 | thank the DOJ for not including us in your lawsuit.
|
| 3 | UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's still time.
|
| 4 | MR. LEWIS: And I was going to add that I hope
|
| 5 | you don't change your mind after you hear my remarks.
|
| 6 | Those who decry the lack of competition in the
|
| 7 | real estate industry would be prudent to follow the
|
| 8 | common sense advice applicable to every weather man.
|
| 9 | Before you broadcast current weather conditions, stick
|
| 10 | your head out the window to make sure you know what's
|
| 11 | really going on.
|
| 12 | In today's real estate market, consumers are
|
| 13 | bombarded with choices via the internet and in the
|
| 14 | physical world, discount commissions, flat fees, low
|
| 15 | commissions, rebates, credit cards, home warranties and
|
| 16 | the like. RE/MAX International knows about competition
|
| 17 | in the industry. The day when Gail Liniger started
|
| 18 | RE/MAX 33 years ago, they had a revolutionary new
|
| 19 | business model: Let the agent keep all of his or her
|
| 20 | commissions and give them the freedom to run their
|
| 21 | business as they see fit. This came at a time when the
|
| 22 | traditional industry kept up to 50 percent of the
|
| 23 | agent's commissions and exercised tight control over how
|
| 24 | they operated.
|
| 25 | To Mr. Farmer who spoke this morning, RE/MAX |
Page 172
| 1 | knows about competition. We know about breaking into an
|
| 2 | industry. We know about lies and misrepresentations.
|
| 3 | But today, more real estate is sold under the RE/MAX
|
| 4 | brand than any other brand. How did RE/MAX overcome our
|
| 5 | competition and reach the pinnacle of our industry?
|
| 6 | Well, one thing is for sure. We did it without the
|
| 7 | intervention of the Federal Government. We did it
|
| 8 | because we had a better model, and we made it successful
|
| 9 | the old-fashioned way, through hard work and customer
|
| 10 | service. The marketplace recognized the value of the
|
| 11 | RE/MAX business model and rewarded it.
|
| 12 | Today, as always, RE/MAX welcomes competition
|
| 13 | from any legitimate business that can stand on its own
|
| 14 | merits and its own resources. RE/MAX believes there's
|
| 15 | no need for Federal Government legal or regulatory
|
| 16 | intervention in the residential real estate brokerage
|
| 17 | industry. There are no barriers to entry in our
|
| 18 | industry, and there is no evidence that free market
|
| 19 | forces are being impeded in any way.
|
| 20 | Let me speak about commission rates. Commission
|
| 21 | rates have been trending down over the past two decades.
|
| 22 | They've gone from 7 percent to the current average rate
|
| 23 | of 5.1 percent. That is a 40 percent decrease. How
|
| 24 | many other industries have experienced that level of
|
| 25 | decrease in pricing over the same period of time? |
Page 173
| 1 | RE/MAX believes that the RE/MAX system has been
|
| 2 | a significant factor in the decrease in commission
|
| 3 | rates. Because a RE/MAX agent does not split his
|
| 4 | commission with his broker, he's empowered to negotiate
|
| 5 | the commission directly with the customer.
|
| 6 | Many have questioned how, with the rapid rise in
|
| 7 | housing prices recently, the commission rates have not
|
| 8 | come down further than they have. Well, notwithstanding
|
| 9 | the rapid rise in housing prices, agent income has not
|
| 10 | increased correspondingly. The median gross income for
|
| 11 | real estate professionals in 2004, as reported by NAR,
|
| 12 | was -- prior to business expenses, which are not
|
| 13 | insignificant -- was $49,000. That's without
|
| 14 | healthcare, that's without retirement, that's all paid
|
| 15 | for by the agent. On a net basis, average income is
|
| 16 | lower than average school teachers' salaries, and over
|
| 17 | the past two years, income is down 6 percent.
|
| 18 | How do you explain the lack of increase in agent
|
| 19 | income given the rising housing prices? Well, I think
|
| 20 | the explanation is due to the large increase in the
|
| 21 | number of agents entering the industry. NAR's reported
|
| 22 | a 26 percent increase in membership over the past two
|
| 23 | years and a 40 percent increase over the past five
|
| 24 | years. These agents are being drawn in by the increase
|
| 25 | in housing prices. I think also a lot of these agents |
Page 174
| 1 | are coming from the downsizing that has occurred in
|
| 2 | corporate America.
|
| 3 | As a result of the increase in number of agents
|
| 4 | searching for transactions, the average number of
|
| 5 | transactions per agent is decreasing, and that is
|
| 6 | putting a little bit of a limit on the ability of
|
| 7 | commissions to continue to come down further, although
|
| 8 | the trend is increasing, and as you stick your head out
|
| 9 | the window, any agent will tell you that there is
|
| 10 | tremendous pressure and tremendous pricing pressure in
|
| 11 | our industry.
|
| 12 | Let me speak for a minute about internet
|
| 13 | companies and new business models. There's little
|
| 14 | difference between traditional companies and online
|
| 15 | companies because traditional companies all embraced
|
| 16 | internet years ago and have a significant online
|
| 17 | presence. Virtually every broker and most agents have a
|
| 18 | web site that allows consumers to search all MLS
|
| 19 | listings in their market. It's easy to say the internet
|
| 20 | has brought down costs in other industries, so it should
|
| 21 | do the same for real estate, but not all industries are
|
| 22 | the same.
|
| 23 | The internet has not affected prices for doctors
|
| 24 | or attorney services, newspaper advertising or
|
| 25 | subscription rates, landscaping or a myriad of other |
Page 175
| 1 | industries, including, I might add, government services.
|
| 2 | Not every industry is going to be impacted by the
|
| 3 | internet the same as airline ticket vendors,
|
| 4 | stockbrokers or book sellers. After all, these
|
| 5 | industries are selling commodities. Real estate agents
|
| 6 | are selling unique properties and providing
|
| 7 | individualized services. An experienced real estate
|
| 8 | professional provides a value-added service that assists
|
| 9 | sellers to obtain the best price for their homes and for
|
| 10 | buyers to find the best home at the lowest price.
|
| 11 | I'd like to take a few minutes and venture into
|
| 12 | the area of internet listing display. Since we're not a
|
| 13 | part of the litigation, I'm going to exercise my First
|
| 14 | Amendment rights to speak about this.
|
| 15 | Despite misrepresentations to the contrary, the
|
| 16 | new internet listing display policy adopted by NAR does
|
| 17 | not allow a broker to withhold his listings from the
|
| 18 | MLS. Every broker in the MLS has the right to receive
|
| 19 | the listings of all other brokers. The Multiple Listing
|
| 20 | Service, as has been explained today, was designed as a
|
| 21 | B2B vehicle, not a business-to-consumer vehicle. It was
|
| 22 | designed as a mutual sharing of information by industry
|
| 23 | peers to facilitate the sale of and search for
|
| 24 | properties by customers. The idea was that brokers and
|
| 25 | agents would work to earn their own customers using |
Page 176
| 1 | their own assets. The concept is simple. You earn a
|
| 2 | customer, you get to use the MLS with the customer. The
|
| 3 | concept is not you get free access to the MLS, and then
|
| 4 | you use it to advertise the properties on it in order to
|
| 5 | attract a customer.
|
| 6 | The starting point of the internet listing
|
| 7 | display policy is that each broker will provide all
|
| 8 | listings to all other brokers for display on the
|
| 9 | internet. Although the policy does contain a blanket
|
| 10 | opt-out provision, the ILD policy imposes severe
|
| 11 | consequences on a broker who opts out such that it is
|
| 12 | extremely unlikely that any broker will do so. RE/MAX
|
| 13 | encourages all of its brokers to share their listings
|
| 14 | and is not aware of any broker who has opted out.
|
| 15 | Brokers and other third parties do not have an absolute
|
| 16 | right to display the listings of other brokers in order
|
| 17 | to advertise them in an effort to attract customers.
|
| 18 | The MLS is not a public utility.
|
| 19 | If I can make an analogy to the sale of an
|
| 20 | automobile, you have a number of options when you sell
|
| 21 | an automobile. One is to simply take it and trade it in
|
| 22 | when you buy a new car. Another is to sell it yourself,
|
| 23 | using the papers, other vehicles that you have to
|
| 24 | advertise it. Many of you have probably seen, and I
|
| 25 | have used this tactic myself, take a vehicle and park it |
Page 177
| 1 | in a high-traffic area with a for sale sign in the
|
| 2 | window. I don't think any of us would presume that we
|
| 3 | would have the right to drive our vehicle onto the lot
|
| 4 | of one of the largest brokers on auto row and park it
|
| 5 | right next to the street and put a for sale sign in the
|
| 6 | window. That lot is proprietary to the broker, just as
|
| 7 | the MLS is a system that brokers have agreed to use with
|
| 8 | each other. It is not a system that's a public utility
|
| 9 | that's open to third parties who are not engaged in the
|
| 10 | real estate brokerage business.
|
| 11 | As such, the provision in the internet listing
|
| 12 | display policy that prevents non-brokers from internet
|
| 13 | display of listings is lawful and is consistent with
|
| 14 | state laws and the purpose of the Multiple Listing
|
| 15 | Service. To open up the MLS for internet display
|
| 16 | listings by parties who do not actually engage in
|
| 17 | brokerage would risk causing genuine brokers to withdraw
|
| 18 | from the MLS. This could jeopardize the viability of
|
| 19 | the system that has and continues to serve consumers
|
| 20 | well.
|
| 21 | On the subject of state law restrictions on
|
| 22 | limited service providers, if I were looking for someone
|
| 23 | in support of these, after hearing all of our panelists
|
| 24 | today, I think I'd feel a little bit like I believe it
|
| 25 | was Diogenes in Greek mythology, searched with a lantern |
Page 178
| 1 | looking for an honest man. There doesn't seem to be
|
| 2 | anybody today willing to stand up and support these
|
| 3 | laws. RE/MAX believes this is a determination left to
|
| 4 | the individual state legislatures.
|
| 5 | All 50 states require real estate professionals
|
| 6 | to be licensed. In order to obtain a license, would-be
|
| 7 | professionals must become knowledgeable about the
|
| 8 | intricacies of real estate transactions, including
|
| 9 | agency, fiduciary obligations, sales contracts, escrow,
|
| 10 | title, appraisal, survey, property disclosure,
|
| 11 | environmental hazards, Megan's Law, mortgages, deeds of
|
| 12 | trust and a number of other factors.
|
| 13 | Given that for most people the purchase or sale
|
| 14 | of a home is a transaction involving their most valuable
|
| 15 | asset, a state legislature may legitimately determine
|
| 16 | that the fiduciary duty and agency responsibility of a
|
| 17 | broker or agent requires full representation of a
|
| 18 | client; however, if a state legislature determines to
|
| 19 | allow limited service providers, RE/MAX believes that
|
| 20 | the state should require that such providers make a
|
| 21 | thorough disclosure to their client of all the steps
|
| 22 | involved in a real estate transaction and identify the
|
| 23 | aspects of the transaction where the client will be left
|
| 24 | on their own. Mr. Farmer alluded to this this morning,
|
| 25 | to full disclosure being an acceptable compromise. We |
Page 179
| 1 | agree with that.
|
| 2 | While some consumers may be sophisticated enough
|
| 3 | to represent themselves in some or all of the steps of a
|
| 4 | transaction, most are not. Interestingly, Mr. Farmer
|
| 5 | defined his market this morning as only about 10 to 15
|
| 6 | percent of consumers selling homes that he felt should
|
| 7 | use his services. A consumer who does not receive full
|
| 8 | disclosure may believe he will receive more
|
| 9 | representation than he has contracted for from a limited
|
| 10 | service provider. He may not be aware of the risks.
|
| 11 | Full disclosure is the answer.
|
| 12 | If a state legislature determines to allow
|
| 13 | limited service providers, RE/MAX believes that the
|
| 14 | state should not allow such providers to disclaim their
|
| 15 | agency relationship and fiduciary duties. To do so, as
|
| 16 | Mr. Thorburn pointed out this morning, has simply
|
| 17 | reduced them to a marketing relationship. If that's the
|
| 18 | role they play, that's fine, but then they should
|
| 19 | remember that the Multiple Listing Service is a
|
| 20 | business-to-business vehicle for brokers, not for
|
| 21 | marketing agencies.
|
| 22 | Another area state legislators should address,
|
| 23 | if it determines to allow limited service providers, is
|
| 24 | proper protection of and compensation to a full-service
|
| 25 | agent involved in one side of the transaction. RE/MAX |
Page 180
| 1 | is increasingly hearing complaints from its agents who
|
| 2 | encounter parties in a transaction who expect the RE/MAX
|
| 3 | agent to pick up the responsibility of the other side
|
| 4 | who has contracted for limited service. In addition to
|
| 5 | this being economically unfair for the full-service
|
| 6 | agent, it also puts them in a difficult position with
|
| 7 | respect to their fiduciary responsibilities and their
|
| 8 | agency relationship with their own client.
|
| 9 | On the subject of state law restrictions on
|
| 10 | rebates, RE/MAX believes that brokers and agents should
|
| 11 | be allowed the ability to freely negotiate transaction
|
| 12 | servicing pricing with their clients in any way they see
|
| 13 | appropriate. The RE/MAX business model empowers the
|
| 14 | agent to do this.
|
| 15 | I would like to conclude by noting that I have a
|
| 16 | much more expanded white paper that addresses my
|
| 17 | comments that's available on RE/MAX.com, on the
|
| 18 | residential homepage, and I would refer you there, and
|
| 19 | I'd be happy to answer any questions later.
|
| 20 | Thank you very much.
|
| 21 | (Applause.)
|
| 22 | MS. QUINN: Before Steve speaks, I want it noted
|
| 23 | that I said while we had a topic, panelists could say
|
| 24 | anything they wanted, so...
|
| 25 | MR. DelBIANCO: Thank you, Lee. |
Page 181
| 1 | Batting last in this distinguished line-up
|
| 2 | during World Series season has a couple of implications.
|
| 3 | In a National League city like Houston tonight, the
|
| 4 | bottom of the order, last batter's up -- well, it's a
|
| 5 | weak batter, the pitcher is likely to lay down a bunt.
|
| 6 | But in an American League city it is going to be
|
| 7 | something altogether different. I'd like to be thought
|
| 8 | more of as the designated hitter.
|
| 9 | NetChoice members includes some Ecommerce giants
|
| 10 | like America Online, eBay and Oracle, but also our
|
| 11 | founding members included some Ecommerce pioneers,
|
| 12 | 1-800-CONTACTS, Orbitz and eRealty. Do you know who the
|
| 13 | pioneers are? They are the ones with all the arrows
|
| 14 | sticking in them.
|
| 15 | Starting with Orbitz, which was the online
|
| 16 | travel, search and booking service that was vehemently
|
| 17 | opposed by travel agents who had their own powerful
|
| 18 | national trade association. Orbitz fought through those
|
| 19 | barriers and became immensely popular with consumers and
|
| 20 | even profitable before being acquired by Cendant -- no.
|
| 21 | Now, eRealty.com is a startup company that I
|
| 22 | became involved with in 1998 as an angel investor --
|
| 23 | don't try that at home -- and as a director of the
|
| 24 | company for six years. ERealty was a licensed
|
| 25 | brokerage. They were part of the club, Bob Hahn called |
Page 182
| 1 | it, right, a licensed brokerage that's in the club,
|
| 2 | playing by the rules. They had licensed agents, also
|
| 3 | club members, and they used innovative technology.
|
| 4 | Their mission was to better serve internet-savvy home
|
| 5 | buyers with the convenience of online search, something
|
| 6 | we called incubation, which was to monitor and then
|
| 7 | quickly report the instant any listing came up that fit
|
| 8 | a profile that you pre-established with eRealty, and
|
| 9 | then communicate instantly through email or any device
|
| 10 | you needed and assist you through the scheduling of
|
| 11 | appointments and the whole scheduling of the transaction
|
| 12 | all the way through to close, as Ms. Whatley has talked
|
| 13 | about.
|
| 14 | So, while the MLS, as I've learned today, was
|
| 15 | really designed for cooperation and compensation, as a
|
| 16 | business-to-business exchange, a member of the club, a
|
| 17 | duly admitted member of the club, like eRealty, used it
|
| 18 | for even more, took it a step beyond that and used the
|
| 19 | power of the information in there to better serve
|
| 20 | consumers. Now, eRealty also took listings before and
|
| 21 | after, and eRealty was giving a 1 percent rebate back to
|
| 22 | the buyer, trying to realize the efficiencies that they
|
| 23 | could on technology and to attract customers to the
|
| 24 | model.
|
| 25 | Now, eRealty built their systems from the ground |
Page 183
| 1 | up according to a proven MLS market exchange. They were
|
| 2 | very careful to grant data access to only bona fide
|
| 3 | buyers who got into the site via password, and in the
|
| 4 | heady "dot com" days of 1998, I'll tell you, eRealty
|
| 5 | looked like a slam dunk success, but the doors started
|
| 6 | slamming shut on eRealty because established brokerages
|
| 7 | and NAR used their local associations to block, exclude
|
| 8 | and to punish eRealty. They kicked them out of the
|
| 9 | club, as it were.
|
| 10 | Now, everyone has heard enough today on laws
|
| 11 | prohibiting rebates, and that immediately slammed the
|
| 12 | door on certain states for eRealty, but in 2000, the
|
| 13 | Austin, Texas Board of Realtors try to cut off eRealty's
|
| 14 | access to MLS data, and they sued eRealty for what they
|
| 15 | called copyright infringement, which was based on a
|
| 16 | local rule passed there in Austin less than 30 days
|
| 17 | prior to the lawsuit, the eRealty rule. eRealty
|
| 18 | countersued for antitrust violations, as I think Geoff
|
| 19 | just mentioned, tells the government to stay away. If
|
| 20 | you're a real player, you will pony up, hire your own
|
| 21 | lawyers and go to court, and at eRealty, we did that.
|
| 22 | Now, Judge Nowlin, thankfully, he concluded
|
| 23 | right away that the way that eRealty happened to deliver
|
| 24 | listings to its bona fide buyers could not be treated
|
| 25 | any differently than the way other brokers delivered |
Page 184
| 1 | their listings, whether by fax, hand, hard copy paper or
|
| 2 | by email, and that made it very expedient that the
|
| 3 | Austin Board of Realtors would settle that case, because
|
| 4 | the Judge painted clearly that they could not
|
| 5 | discriminate just based on the way that eRealty was
|
| 6 | delivering information.
|
| 7 | Now, Winston Churchill once said, "There's
|
| 8 | nothing quite so exhilarating as to be shot at without
|
| 9 | effect," and initially, we felt pretty exhilarated at
|
| 10 | eRealty, but now five years later, five years after the
|
| 11 | Austin case, MLSers are still discriminating against
|
| 12 | brokers who serve their customers through innovative or
|
| 13 | browser-based technologies. Geoff and Alex both said
|
| 14 | that they are perplexed about the anti-competitive
|
| 15 | concerns that have been talked about today. I would
|
| 16 | counsel you to read the lawsuit.
|
| 17 | The lawsuit itself is very clear, shows the
|
| 18 | circular arguments that are being employed today. The
|
| 19 | circular argument says that there's so much competition
|
| 20 | and alternative business models that we don't need a
|
| 21 | lawsuit, but at the same time, the lawsuit seeks to stop
|
| 22 | brand new NAR rules which would stop some of those new
|
| 23 | business models from even coming into existence. You
|
| 24 | see, the circular argument there just doesn't make any
|
| 25 | sense, but all this is probably getting too much into |
Page 185
| 1 | the weeds. Let's see if I can step it up a level.
|
| 2 | There's plenty of real estate experts and legal
|
| 3 | experts in the room today, but even regular people know
|
| 4 | something about buying and selling homes. By
|
| 5 | definition, and as Tom Early described, you have your
|
| 6 | first experience in real estate as a buyer, not a
|
| 7 | seller, and you don't even understand at that point as a
|
| 8 | buyer where this commission money flow is going, and
|
| 9 | when you sold your first home, did you really compare
|
| 10 | listings from multiple listing agents? Not likely.
|
| 11 | You were anxious to get rid of that starter home
|
| 12 | or condominium and move up, and the dollars involved in
|
| 13 | a starter home, first-time seller, are unlikely to
|
| 14 | justify a broker beauty contest or haggling over a
|
| 15 | commission rate. But I will say to you that there are
|
| 16 | some important and unstoppable changes that have
|
| 17 | occurred since you bought and then sold that first home,
|
| 18 | changes in two ways, the demographics and the dollars
|
| 19 | involved.
|
| 20 | The demographics, pretty obvious, a generation
|
| 21 | of Americans are now comfortably and constantly
|
| 22 | connected to the internet and to Ecommerce. They
|
| 23 | instinctively start with the internet before they search
|
| 24 | to buy anything. They do extensive research online. It
|
| 25 | makes them easier to serve even if they did the search |
Page 186
| 1 | and went into a traditional real estate agent.
|
| 2 | Now, they expect systems, servers, to do the
|
| 3 | grunt work of searching for homes, gathering data on
|
| 4 | schools and neighborhoods, monitoring new listings, and
|
| 5 | then reporting whenever a listing fits their profile;
|
| 6 | scheduling appointments, as I said earlier, to help them
|
| 7 | see the home.
|
| 8 | Now, let me turn to the dollars involved. As
|
| 9 | sellers and buyers move up the price ladder, we become
|
| 10 | acutely aware of what commissions are costing. Around
|
| 11 | here in Washington, a townhouse, a $500,000 townhouse,
|
| 12 | is $30,000 worth of commission. That's real money,
|
| 13 | especially when you are trying to use whatever you can
|
| 14 | to move up to the next home.
|
| 15 | Now, consumers around here especially know that
|
| 16 | home prices have doubled in the last five years, and
|
| 17 | we're all pretty sure that the level of effort needed to
|
| 18 | sell that home has not doubled. So, sellers will expect
|
| 19 | greater competition among listing agents, including
|
| 20 | discounting a commission at times and new business
|
| 21 | models.
|
| 22 | Now, this rising generation of buyers and
|
| 23 | sellers, they're going to expect internet technology to
|
| 24 | both improve service and to drive efficiencies that
|
| 25 | eventually, we're told by the economists, driving |
Page 187
| 1 | efficiencies eventually leads to lower prices, but the
|
| 2 | court will have to be the one to determine whether NAR
|
| 3 | is guilty of antitrust violations, but the court of
|
| 4 | consumer expectations with this rising generation is
|
| 5 | starting to pay attention, and here's what they see.
|
| 6 | When consumers see Geoff's white paper, and I
|
| 7 | encourage them to do so, they will be absolutely
|
| 8 | insulted by the argument that prices have come down.
|
| 9 | It's the same thing we hear with property taxes. The
|
| 10 | property tax rate has declined, but every year you're
|
| 11 | paying more. I don't think we're so gullible that we
|
| 12 | believe that that is a price cut of any kind.
|
| 13 | I think consumers will think that it's
|
| 14 | inexcusable that their own listing agent won't show
|
| 15 | their home to buyers who go to real estate web sites. I
|
| 16 | think the rising generation of home buyers would be
|
| 17 | perplexed to learn that they can't receive commission
|
| 18 | rebates from buyer brokers who have figured out how to
|
| 19 | serve them more efficiently, and again, because realtors
|
| 20 | have tremendous power in the state legislatures.
|
| 21 | Now, brokers running these virtual broker web
|
| 22 | sites, brokers like eRealty, had their club keys taken
|
| 23 | away and their data feeds downgraded, which made it
|
| 24 | impossible to maintain portfolios of homes in order to
|
| 25 | serve their buyers better. And then web-savvy home |
Page 188
| 1 | shoppers on the buy side will be suspicious that big
|
| 2 | franchise brokers want to restrict the co-branding
|
| 3 | relationships with favorite internet destinations, like
|
| 4 | a Yahoo, an MSN, an eBay or a LendingTree.
|
| 5 | Now, I think that will consumers really buy,
|
| 6 | will they really buy what the realtors are saying as
|
| 7 | justification for all of these barriers, justification
|
| 8 | of consumer protection? Are consumers harmed by limited
|
| 9 | service and discount brokers? There's no more
|
| 10 | credibility to that than when stockbrokers told us all
|
| 11 | that investors shouldn't be allowed to use discount
|
| 12 | stock trades.
|
| 13 | Will consumers really believe realtors when they
|
| 14 | give us rhetoric about personal security fears, when
|
| 15 | home listings can be viewed online by people everywhere,
|
| 16 | that that's really a serious security risk, to have your
|
| 17 | home on the market and to have others know about it?
|
| 18 | You better take down those yard signs and cancel those
|
| 19 | ads.
|
| 20 | The court of public opinion, regardless of what
|
| 21 | this court does, but the court of public opinion is
|
| 22 | smart enough to know when consumer protection is really
|
| 23 | being used to justify competition prevention, and it's
|
| 24 | true that some big brokers are actually gearing up to
|
| 25 | serve information-driven consumers with better tools for |
Page 189
| 1 | search, monitoring and scheduling, but we've heard today
|
| 2 | that the biggest franchisors will allow the use of the
|
| 3 | MLS only on their own terms, that B2B club of theirs,
|
| 4 | that says it's really only about -- what, everyone? --
|
| 5 | cooperation and compensation if and when they're ready.
|
| 6 | After all, they have paid a lot, a lot of these
|
| 7 | franchisors, they have paid a lot to acquire brokerages
|
| 8 | around the country, traditional brokerages with gold
|
| 9 | plated Rolodexes of relationships with traditional
|
| 10 | customers, and they want to preserve the profitability
|
| 11 | of that traditional business model against pressures
|
| 12 | that might come from new competitors, but the tactics
|
| 13 | that the large franchisors are employing to restrict
|
| 14 | competition are truly doomed to fail.
|
| 15 | The Department of Justice, the FTC, competition
|
| 16 | advocates and new business model businesses and
|
| 17 | consumers are all sending a very clear signal to the
|
| 18 | realtors. When it comes to information technology, we
|
| 19 | expect more services, a broader range of information and
|
| 20 | choices, and we expect to pay less, not more.
|
| 21 | So, nobody expected Cendant and NAR to be so
|
| 22 | bold, actually, in their response to the Justice
|
| 23 | Department's two-year investigation. I don't think they
|
| 24 | were all paying attention ten years ago in this town to
|
| 25 | what happened in the antitrust trial against Microsoft, |
Page 190
| 1 | because one of the tactics you would not want to do is
|
| 2 | you wouldn't want to moon the giant like that by
|
| 3 | releasing new rules despite a two-year investigation
|
| 4 | cautioning you against the new rules.
|
| 5 | So, I probably would just close with a quote
|
| 6 | from W. C. Fields that I think seems targeted at NAR and
|
| 7 | the big franchises with respect to both looking at a
|
| 8 | lawsuit and looking at what's coming in the marketplace
|
| 9 | with the new generation. W. C. Fields said that, "There
|
| 10 | comes a time in the affairs of man when he must take
|
| 11 | that bull by the tail and see what's coming."
|
| 12 | Thank you.
|
| 13 | (Applause.)
|
| 14 | MS. QUINN: Well, I think our speakers have
|
| 15 | certainly laid the groundwork for some good questions,
|
| 16 | but before we begin, Cathy, I know you're not
|
| 17 | representing NAR here today, but many of the comments
|
| 18 | were directed toward NAR and Cendant, and I wanted to
|
| 19 | know if either one of you wanted to lead off with any
|
| 20 | comments or responses.
|
| 21 | MR. PERRIELLO: Cathy, do you want to --
|
| 22 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, certainly from the extent
|
| 23 | that the National Association of Realtors is very much
|
| 24 | into cooperation, and we are in the representation of
|
| 25 | consumer business, I would say that I think that a |
Page 191
| 1 | number of the comments that were stated by Steve were
|
| 2 | unfounded in my mind. I'll allow, you know, more of
|
| 3 | that to come as conversations come out, but I think he
|
| 4 | is totally off base in a number of his comments.
|
| 5 | MR. PERRIELLO: I would have to agree, Lee. I
|
| 6 | appreciate a lot of what Steve said, but our beliefs and
|
| 7 | my remarks were all about choice. We welcome the
|
| 8 | competition in the market. We encourage the competition
|
| 9 | in the market. And I believe that at the end of the
|
| 10 | day, the results will speak for themselves. This is all
|
| 11 | about the broker, the agent who gets results, who
|
| 12 | provides good service, offers it at a fair and
|
| 13 | reasonable price. Those are the people that will stay
|
| 14 | in business.
|
| 15 | I don't see where limiting consumer choice,
|
| 16 | that's never been our position. Our position has been
|
| 17 | the opposite, to give consumers as much choice as
|
| 18 | possible and let the chips fall where they may.
|
| 19 | MS. QUINN: Anyone else want to join the debate?
|
| 20 | Tom?
|
| 21 | MR. EARLY: Opening my brokerage in 1989 as an
|
| 22 | exclusive buyer broker, being one of the first people in
|
| 23 | the country, I have to take exception with those who say
|
| 24 | that NAR is looking for choice and is open to choice and
|
| 25 | is open to competition. I got my brains beat out for |
Page 192
| 1 | the first three years as an exclusive buyer's agent. We
|
| 2 | were introducing a brand new concept to the industry,
|
| 3 | the representation of a buyer into an industry that had
|
| 4 | represented sellers 100 percent of the time at all
|
| 5 | times. We were not welcomed.
|
| 6 | We were -- I can't put it any better way -- we
|
| 7 | were beat up. We were beat up by the local
|
| 8 | associations, we were beat up by our state associations,
|
| 9 | we were beat up by NAR, and it took a fight, and I mean
|
| 10 | a fight, to survive within my industry that I'd been a
|
| 11 | member of for 24 years.
|
| 12 | I am a realtor. I deserve the same respect for
|
| 13 | my business model, the same disclosure of my business
|
| 14 | model, as every other business model that is now
|
| 15 | acceptable within the real estate industry. Today, we
|
| 16 | have in the State of Ohio, the first state after 11
|
| 17 | years of hard work, have been recognized as an agency
|
| 18 | option as an exclusive buyer broker in the State of
|
| 19 | Ohio. Two months after we were recognized as an agency
|
| 20 | option, Ohio came out with its new agency disclosure
|
| 21 | form, and we're not listed on it as an agency option.
|
| 22 | I'm sorry, but you know, it's nice to say we're
|
| 23 | all playing nice, but the facts are we're not all
|
| 24 | playing nice.
|
| 25 | MS. QUINN: Anyone else? Steve? |
Page 193
| 1 | MR. DelBIANCO: With respect to choice, it's
|
| 2 | true, you can have your data any way you want unless NAR
|
| 3 | says you can't have it that way, and the choice about
|
| 4 | business models, I read Geoff's white paper, it's
|
| 5 | excellent. The choice about business models is that
|
| 6 | RE/MAX chose a different business model. They really
|
| 7 | did. No more splits with the agents. They were going
|
| 8 | to charge a fixed fee. And Geoff's own paper talks
|
| 9 | about the fact that he was discriminated against, and
|
| 10 | the other realtors punished him for that.
|
| 11 | And what did he do? They sued. They sued the
|
| 12 | other realtors and were able to stop the
|
| 13 | anti-competitive practices so that RE/MAX is a
|
| 14 | phenomenally successful brokerage to this day. So,
|
| 15 | choices, perhaps they're there, but to exercise the
|
| 16 | choice that one has to endure the arrows of any pioneer
|
| 17 | and perhaps endure what it takes to bring lawsuits
|
| 18 | against anti-competitive tactics.
|
| 19 | MS. QUINN: Well, I've gotten several questions
|
| 20 | that we can move on from here just a little bit, which
|
| 21 | is we recognize some of the problems with the system,
|
| 22 | and the questioners are concerned about what should come
|
| 23 | next, and does it still make sense for the buyer and
|
| 24 | seller's agents to be paid through the seller rather
|
| 25 | than separately arranged or negotiated by the buyer and |
Page 194
| 1 | the seller? In other words, the buyer hires his agent
|
| 2 | and pays it, the seller hires her agent and pays it.
|
| 3 | MR. HENDERSON: Sure, I can speak to that, and
|
| 4 | perhaps Tom, I think, would have some ideas on that.
|
| 5 | MS. QUINN: Okay.
|
| 6 | MR. HENDERSON: That might make sense. Some
|
| 7 | consumers might wish to do that, and we should free them
|
| 8 | up and free brokers to serve that demand without
|
| 9 | restrictions through state law, state regulation or MLS
|
| 10 | rules that might say, no, in order to join the MLS, you
|
| 11 | have to do business this way, which is what we see in
|
| 12 | other areas of business. So, I mean, I think the
|
| 13 | concept is let the market work. Let consumers demand
|
| 14 | that and allow brokers to provide it.
|
| 15 | MS. QUINN: Anyone else?
|
| 16 | MR. PERRIELLO: Lee, if I could add to that, I
|
| 17 | think we also need to take a look at, in the
|
| 18 | circumstance we just described, is there's competition
|
| 19 | out there between brokers, but there's also competition
|
| 20 | that no one ever talks about, which is competition
|
| 21 | between sellers, and if I have my house on the market, I
|
| 22 | may be willing to pay a good portion of my equity to a
|
| 23 | buyer's broker to come in to attract more traffic to my
|
| 24 | property, where someone else won't. So, in many cases,
|
| 25 | it's really the owner of the property that's really |
Page 195
| 1 | making the decisions in many cases, not just the broker.
|
| 2 | When I listed my house a year ago to move, I
|
| 3 | talked to my listing agent about the strategy of what
|
| 4 | she would retain and what we would offer to a buyer's
|
| 5 | broker in the market. She didn't say, "Here's what I'm
|
| 6 | going to give." We talked about that as a strategy.
|
| 7 | Now, I may have said -- the market was very active at
|
| 8 | that point. I may have said, if there were a lot of
|
| 9 | properties on the market, "Heck, I'll offer 4 percent or
|
| 10 | 5 percent to the buyer's broker to make my property
|
| 11 | stand out," and that's how I think this business works.
|
| 12 | We need to have that flexibility in there. It's not
|
| 13 | just the brokers who are competing or the agents. It's
|
| 14 | many times the seller having to make decisions about
|
| 15 | what will make my house more attractive.
|
| 16 | MR. EARLY: Well, you have the opposite that
|
| 17 | takes place, that hurts people more than the scenario
|
| 18 | you just gave of offering more of a carrot to the
|
| 19 | buyer's agent. You have the opposite taking place in
|
| 20 | hot seller markets where there is no offer of
|
| 21 | compensation being made, there's a reduced offer of
|
| 22 | compensation being made, and basically we have a listing
|
| 23 | agent telling us what we're worth.
|
| 24 | Keep your co-op. We don't want it. Set your
|
| 25 | fee with your client for the services you provide to |
Page 196
| 1 | your client. Leave my fee alone. I will work that out
|
| 2 | with my client. I can't stress that strongly enough. I
|
| 3 | don't need your co-op. I don't need you telling me I'm
|
| 4 | worth 2 and a half percent. I don't need you to telling
|
| 5 | me I'm worth 3 percent. I don't need you telling me
|
| 6 | what I'm worth at all. That's between me and my client.
|
| 7 | If NAR were to put the power of NAR behind that
|
| 8 | it has and go to the banking industry and ask for a
|
| 9 | separation of the fees on the closing statement, on the
|
| 10 | HUD-1, it would happen tomorrow, not a doubt in my mind
|
| 11 | about that. It would happen tomorrow.
|
| 12 | MS. QUINN: Cathy, do you want to respond?
|
| 13 | MS. WHATLEY: Yes, I would. In all honesty, in
|
| 14 | my day-to-day activities, Tom, you can have that
|
| 15 | discussion with your buyer, and you do, and if the
|
| 16 | compensation that's offered in the MLS is not to your
|
| 17 | liking, you structure something differently with your
|
| 18 | customer and your client. I have the capability to do
|
| 19 | that every day in my marketplace, but there are a lot of
|
| 20 | buyers who do not have excess cash. The customers that
|
| 21 | you're working with have limited down payment, they have
|
| 22 | limited cash with which to then turn around and also
|
| 23 | compensate in a cash format their real estate
|
| 24 | professional who's assisting them. So, any way that you
|
| 25 | want to structure it, it's there today. |
Page 197
| 1 | What the MLS does is at least tells me from the
|
| 2 | business activity side of what compensation is available
|
| 3 | to me, and if that's acceptable to me before I ever go
|
| 4 | out and show the property, then fine, that's what I
|
| 5 | presume to accept. If that is not acceptable to me, if
|
| 6 | it's too high, I can give some of it back to the buyer.
|
| 7 | If it's too low and I've already set some arrangement
|
| 8 | with the buyer, the buyer knows what the expectations
|
| 9 | are in their environment. So, you know, I have that
|
| 10 | ability today, and I'm really challenged to find out
|
| 11 | what you believe is not necessarily available to
|
| 12 | everyone to negotiate in that world.
|
| 13 | MR. EARLY: That's a direct question to me and
|
| 14 | I'll answer it. You said the buyer has to come up with
|
| 15 | the cash to pay the difference. If I'm only being
|
| 16 | offered 2 percent in a normal 3 percent co-op market,
|
| 17 | I'm 1 percent short if I'm charging my client in my
|
| 18 | contract 3. My buyer has to come up with cash. If NAR
|
| 19 | were to put, as I said, if NAR were to put the power of
|
| 20 | NAR behind the banking industry and work with the
|
| 21 | industry and separate the fees, we wouldn't have that
|
| 22 | problem. My buyer would be able to finance 100 percent
|
| 23 | of his fees due to my brokerage in his contract, just as
|
| 24 | he's always done.
|
| 25 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, and he can do that today as |
Page 198
| 1 | long as it will meet the appraisal issue.
|
| 2 | MR. EARLY: He cannot do it today -- well, he
|
| 3 | can do it today, but you've got a problem in putting it
|
| 4 | on the buyer's side of the transaction when it's a buyer
|
| 5 | brokerage fee.
|
| 6 | MS. QUINN: Another issue came up that I thought
|
| 7 | was very interesting, Alex, it was something that you
|
| 8 | brought up. I've bought and sold about four houses
|
| 9 | during my lifetime, and I can never remember either my
|
| 10 | agent telling me what the other agent was getting or the
|
| 11 | other agent telling me, you know, as the buyer what the
|
| 12 | seller's agent was getting, and the last one was five
|
| 13 | years ago, but now it seems to be an important issue.
|
| 14 | What is the benefit to the buyer, for instance,
|
| 15 | to know what the seller's getting or the seller to know
|
| 16 | what the buyer's agent's getting?
|
| 17 | MR. PERRIELLO: Now, what I was saying was at
|
| 18 | the time of the listing, to have the discussion with the
|
| 19 | owner of the property, with the seller, as to the fees
|
| 20 | that you're going to charge for your services and what
|
| 21 | percentage of the total fee will be given to a buyer's
|
| 22 | agent that brings a buyer to the transaction.
|
| 23 | Earlier today, it sounded as though that was an
|
| 24 | automatic decision made solely by the broker with no
|
| 25 | client input, and from what I hear from agents, I know |
Page 199
| 1 | when I was an agent back in the seventies and eighties,
|
| 2 | I always had that conversation with my client, just to
|
| 3 | say here's what I charge, here's what I think we should
|
| 4 | charge or what you should allot for a buyer's agent
|
| 5 | coming to the property.
|
| 6 | In many markets, when I was in a market that was
|
| 7 | very, very slow, it was not uncommon to actually have a
|
| 8 | disproportionate share go to the buyer, because you may
|
| 9 | have 50 or 60 listings in a portfolio and no one to buy
|
| 10 | them. So, at that point, if it was say a 6 percent
|
| 11 | commission, I might take 2 percent and offer 4 percent
|
| 12 | to the buyer's agent to make that house more attractive.
|
| 13 | Well, that's all marketing. That's all
|
| 14 | strategizing with the seller who you're being hired by
|
| 15 | to market your house effectively, and that conversation
|
| 16 | should take place.
|
| 17 | MS. QUINN: Anyone else?
|
| 18 | Steve?
|
| 19 | MR. DelBIANCO: Yes, Lee, you did ask the
|
| 20 | question just before that, what should come next, right?
|
| 21 | MS. QUINN: Yes.
|
| 22 | MR. DelBIANCO: If you don't mind, I'd like to
|
| 23 | try to address that. I really believe that NAR should
|
| 24 | simply rescind the new rules that were proposed, the
|
| 25 | rules that are the subject of the case, just tear them |
Page 200
| 1 | up, settle the case, and it will all be over, and we can
|
| 2 | all get back to work, back to work on innovation,
|
| 3 | efficiency and competition within the MLS.
|
| 4 | Let's keep it a club for licensed members. I
|
| 5 | think it's a great innovation. It's a superb tool for
|
| 6 | broker-to-broker cooperation, compensation, and it can
|
| 7 | be an incredible tool for consumers. So, we need to
|
| 8 | allow new equipment and new wardrobes to be worn on the
|
| 9 | club's golf course, and I think the consumers, they will
|
| 10 | choose professional realtors who are empowered with new
|
| 11 | technology, and if we let innovation increase, I believe
|
| 12 | we'll see commissions come down.
|
| 13 | MS. WHATLEY: Lee, if I could also add something
|
| 14 | that hasn't been at all addressed today which is an area
|
| 15 | of additional competition options for the buyer. If
|
| 16 | you're in a seller's market, you probably don't have
|
| 17 | much leverage, but in a buyer's market, oftentimes
|
| 18 | you'll have the seller paying some buyer closing costs
|
| 19 | or you will have the seller who is doing some type of
|
| 20 | compensation toward allowances of things that need to be
|
| 21 | done on the home. Those are all, again, types of
|
| 22 | opportunities where the buyer is being engaged and is
|
| 23 | receiving a benefit of the competition that's driven by
|
| 24 | supply and demand.
|
| 25 | You're focusing a lot on the brokerage world, |
Page 201
| 1 | but there are a lot of things within the transaction
|
| 2 | itself that bring capabilities for the buyer to have a
|
| 3 | strength in a buyer's market, but in a seller's market,
|
| 4 | when you have no inventory and you have one house
|
| 5 | available and 40 customers who are wanting it, I mean,
|
| 6 | your capabilities of negotiating are extremely limited,
|
| 7 | and so it's a function of supply and demand.
|
| 8 | A lot of what's being raised here now are
|
| 9 | honestly, in my mind, based upon the fact that we have
|
| 10 | had an extremely limited supply of inventory, and that's
|
| 11 | going to be sustained. I don't see that changing over a
|
| 12 | period of time. While the market may have somewhat
|
| 13 | leveled out in some areas, in other areas, it is still a
|
| 14 | very strong seller's market, and in those types of
|
| 15 | dynamics, there are huge opportunities for competition
|
| 16 | to play out in the marketplace.
|
| 17 | Whether that's through the exclusive buyer
|
| 18 | agency relationships where you are bringing that
|
| 19 | strength to the buyer, to say, you know, your best
|
| 20 | opportunity to be able to secure that one home when
|
| 21 | you're one of 40 is to have my representation, because I
|
| 22 | know exactly what it is I'm doing, or whether that's
|
| 23 | through an online environment where they have the
|
| 24 | capability to capture that, it's still there. It's
|
| 25 | still a work in progress, and you know, I'm just not |
Page 202
| 1 | being tasked by my customer buyers or my customer
|
| 2 | sellers to say this is a huge issue to them. They know
|
| 3 | that they've got options out there, and they are looking
|
| 4 | at them, and then they're making the decision that they
|
| 5 | think is in the right interests for their personal
|
| 6 | situation.
|
| 7 | MS. QUINN: Tom?
|
| 8 | MR. EARLY: When you're in a hot seller's market
|
| 9 | like New England, and I'll just take northern New
|
| 10 | Jersey, and you've got the three major brokers in that
|
| 11 | market taking what they're calling exclusive listings,
|
| 12 | they're advising their sellers not to put the home into
|
| 13 | the MLS, it's not necessary to put your home into the
|
| 14 | MLS, we have 40 buyers lined up at our back door of our
|
| 15 | brokerage, and we don't need the cooperation of other
|
| 16 | brokers in order to get your home sold.
|
| 17 | What happened to the sharing of the MLS
|
| 18 | information from broker to broker? It's not convenient
|
| 19 | today. We've got our own buyers today. Now, next
|
| 20 | month, when things cool off a little bit and the buyer
|
| 21 | market comes back in and the inventory's up and
|
| 22 | everybody's happy, then we'll start putting our listings
|
| 23 | back into the MLS again. We'll start letting you,
|
| 24 | fellow brokers of ours, our brothers in arms, start
|
| 25 | showing our properties again and start selling our |
Page 203
| 1 | properties again.
|
| 2 | These are the kinds of things that we write
|
| 3 | letters to NAR, and we get back responses that say,
|
| 4 | "They're operating within the rules of the MLS. There's
|
| 5 | nothing we can do about it." That's not good enough,
|
| 6 | folks. I mean, that's just not good enough. No one can
|
| 7 | say that a seller is not better off with full exposure
|
| 8 | of their property. You just can't make that statement
|
| 9 | and make it stick. The more buyers that know the home's
|
| 10 | for sale, the better off the seller is going to be when
|
| 11 | it comes to the offer he finally gets.
|
| 12 | MR. PERRIELLO: Lee, can I respond?
|
| 13 | MS. QUINN: Alex.
|
| 14 | MR. PERRIELLO: You mentioned northern New
|
| 15 | Jersey, which is near and dear to my heart since I live
|
| 16 | there, but I did do some research on The Garden State
|
| 17 | MLS, and I found some very interesting things. You
|
| 18 | know, all of the conversation is about what an agent
|
| 19 | gets paid and not how an agent gets paid, and I think
|
| 20 | that part of the conversation needs to come forward.
|
| 21 | You know, when a person lists their house, the
|
| 22 | agent, the listing agent, the listing broker, then
|
| 23 | assumes all of the costs, all of the responsibility to
|
| 24 | market that house with the expectation that at some
|
| 25 | point in the future, that house is going to sell, and |
Page 204
| 1 | what you hear about all the time is the house that sells
|
| 2 | in one day for an exorbitant price and the agent didn't
|
| 3 | work real hard.
|
| 4 | So, what I did, I just looked at some Garden
|
| 5 | State MLS statistics for the last four years, and I
|
| 6 | think it's very interesting. 2004 was a record year for
|
| 7 | home sales in New Jersey. They had a record amount of
|
| 8 | listings put in the MLS, over 52,000. What's really
|
| 9 | interesting is that the market time was 82 days. During
|
| 10 | the hottest real estate market in New Jersey, it was 82
|
| 11 | days, and that's just from the time the property was
|
| 12 | listed until the time there was a contract on it, and as
|
| 13 | Cathy said, you need to add another 30, maybe 45 days to
|
| 14 | that. So, we're talking about a third of the year.
|
| 15 | What's interesting is although 2004 was a record
|
| 16 | year, only 66 percent of the listings that went into
|
| 17 | that MLS actually sold. So, I think that just
|
| 18 | demonstrates that the agent and the broker take all the
|
| 19 | risks with the hope of a payday down the road. It's
|
| 20 | almost a third of a year process, and there's a
|
| 21 | one-third likelihood that you are never going to see a
|
| 22 | payday, the house won't sell, it will either expire or
|
| 23 | the person will take it off the market. So, I think
|
| 24 | there's that risk/reward factor that people have to take
|
| 25 | into consideration as to how this business is conducted. |
Page 205
| 1 | MR. LEWIS: Yeah, Lee, I would like to agree
|
| 2 | with Cathy's point that I think we need an historical
|
| 3 | perspective, and we are an incredibly buoyant seller's
|
| 4 | market with particularly hot spots around the country,
|
| 5 | be it, you know, Florida, Southern California, Phoenix,
|
| 6 | Las Vegas, and some of the issues that we're talking
|
| 7 | about are really a result of it being a seller's market
|
| 8 | and buyers not having a lot of power.
|
| 9 | Five years from now, we can be sitting here
|
| 10 | looking at the opposite situation, and a lot of the
|
| 11 | business models that I think are arising, it remains to
|
| 12 | be seen whether those are going to survive long-term.
|
| 13 | If you think back to the "dot com" boom, it seems like
|
| 14 | there were internet stockbrokers popping up left and
|
| 15 | right, and everybody was on the internet day trading,
|
| 16 | and you don't see that today. I mean, that came to a
|
| 17 | crash in 2000, and now there's more equilibrium.
|
| 18 | Some of the stronger, better new business models
|
| 19 | have survived; many have not. In looking at solutions
|
| 20 | and in looking at choices, I think we need to be looking
|
| 21 | at it from more of a market equilibrium perspective and
|
| 22 | not be too much influenced by what's happening in some
|
| 23 | parts of the country today.
|
| 24 | MS. QUINN: Thank you.
|
| 25 | Steve? |
Page 206
| 1 | MR. DelBIANCO: From what Cathy and Alex were
|
| 2 | saying, I had to check the name of this conference, and
|
| 3 | I had to check the panel title again. This isn't about
|
| 4 | competition between home buyers to buy a home. It's
|
| 5 | about competition amongst real estate agents
|
| 6 | representing buyers and sellers and what they charge and
|
| 7 | what they do to provide the services. Thankfully, Geoff
|
| 8 | brought us back home again.
|
| 9 | Let's focus harder on the market. The market in
|
| 10 | definition here is not the market of home buyers and
|
| 11 | sellers. It's the market of realtors and real estate
|
| 12 | professionals providing services to home sellers and
|
| 13 | buyers, and you know, it's almost as if, like she said,
|
| 14 | it's a chicken and egg problem between do we allow the
|
| 15 | innovation and will that generate competition or do we
|
| 16 | need to have competition first that will generate the
|
| 17 | "dot com" style innovation?
|
| 18 | I'm an IT guy, I'm a huge believer in what IT
|
| 19 | can do, and so it's really not a chicken and egg
|
| 20 | problem. It's more like don't be chicken, give us the
|
| 21 | eggs, and we will bring home the bacon. Let us
|
| 22 | innovate, and within the club, within the MLS, we will
|
| 23 | make it more productive, more competitive, and five
|
| 24 | years from today, you'll be glad that you went that way.
|
| 25 | MR. HENDERSON: Is there another question? |
Page 207
| 1 | MS. QUINN: Yes, actually, I am getting a lot of
|
| 2 | questions about the MLS, and basically I am going to
|
| 3 | paraphrase a little bit.
|
| 4 | Why does it matter if the listing agent owns the
|
| 5 | listing once the agent chooses to contribute the listing
|
| 6 | to the MLS? Doesn't that listing fall under the rules
|
| 7 | for what a joint venture of competitors can control
|
| 8 | about members' business?
|
| 9 | And the other one is pretty much on the same
|
| 10 | theme, after saying that there's an NAR rule that
|
| 11 | brokers should not discourage exclusive agency listings,
|
| 12 | yet many MLSs do not send EA listings to REALTOR.com,
|
| 13 | thereby pressuring sellers indirectly to list only in an
|
| 14 | exclusive right to sell capacity.
|
| 15 | So, what are some of the approaches that we
|
| 16 | should take toward the MLS?
|
| 17 | MR. HENDERSON: I'd like to take a stab at that.
|
| 18 | MS. QUINN: Not "we" as a government; just "we"
|
| 19 | as consumers.
|
| 20 | MR. HENDERSON: You know, one of the interesting
|
| 21 | things, you know, earlier in the day, we heard a lot
|
| 22 | about fiduciary duty, particularly with regard to
|
| 23 | minimum service brokerages and the need to emphasize
|
| 24 | that the agent is, in fact, an agent and is working on
|
| 25 | behalf of the consumer. One question is, with regard to |
Page 208
| 1 | both opting out, you know, letting brokers prevent
|
| 2 | listings from being displayed on internet sites as
|
| 3 | opposed to being printed out, and with regard to
|
| 4 | preventing new kinds of brokers from joining the MLS, I
|
| 5 | would ask the brokerages who are fighting for those
|
| 6 | policies, how does that help your seller?
|
| 7 | I mean, if the purpose of putting the listing
|
| 8 | into the MLS is to recruit other brokers who represent
|
| 9 | buyers so the home sells, whose interests are being
|
| 10 | served by opting out and whose interests are being
|
| 11 | served by erecting barriers so that new kinds of brokers
|
| 12 | can't play?
|
| 13 | MS. QUINN: I have one on the other side, too.
|
| 14 | MR. HENDERSON: I guess you would call that a
|
| 15 | rhetorical question if no one answers. I thought there
|
| 16 | might be an answer by somebody fighting for those rules,
|
| 17 | and clearly there is not.
|
| 18 | MR. EARLY: Well, Phil, I'll say something to
|
| 19 | that. It has to do with the in-house transaction; it
|
| 20 | has to do with doubling your income on the sale of a
|
| 21 | property. I mean, we've skirted around this all day
|
| 22 | long. We've never talked about the double-dip or the
|
| 23 | dual agency or the double income. I haven't heard it
|
| 24 | mentioned once in the entire day. Take the in-house
|
| 25 | transaction, double-dip transaction off of the table as |
Page 209
| 1 | a problem in our industry, and we have no problems. We
|
| 2 | have no problems.
|
| 3 | We start providing fiduciary level services to
|
| 4 | both buyers and sellers if we take that in-house
|
| 5 | double-dip transaction off the table as a problem.
|
| 6 | We're not going to do that.
|
| 7 | MS. WHATLEY: I would like to at least try to
|
| 8 | respond to the question. Again, the Multiple Listing
|
| 9 | Service is open to every realtor member. You have
|
| 10 | access to that information today. The minute you join,
|
| 11 | you have access to that information. It is yours to
|
| 12 | use, it is yours to then communicate to your buyer or
|
| 13 | your seller in the best avenue that you find helpful to
|
| 14 | you.
|
| 15 | It is different when you have other avenues that
|
| 16 | you are providing that information in terms of
|
| 17 | advertising or marketing, and there are some limitations
|
| 18 | on those uses that are different, but today, you could
|
| 19 | sit right here, if we had our laptop computer and we
|
| 20 | opened it up and we had a wireless, we could go right
|
| 21 | into the MLS. You could have access to every bit.
|
| 22 | If you and I were competing brokers in the same
|
| 23 | marketplace where we both belonged to the same MLS, we'd
|
| 24 | open up the same thing and we'd see the same thing. We
|
| 25 | would see exactly the same information, and you could on |
Page 210
| 1 | the internet communicate that then to your customer, and
|
| 2 | I could either do that online, I could fax it to my
|
| 3 | customer, or I could pick up the phone and call them.
|
| 4 | We have the same information available to us.
|
| 5 | MR. HENDERSON: Maybe I don't understand how
|
| 6 | opt-out works then. I thought if I'm using the internet
|
| 7 | that not all listings would be available if some brokers
|
| 8 | had opted out.
|
| 9 | MS. WHATLEY: Well, in the IDX world, the
|
| 10 | internet data exchange world, which has been operating
|
| 11 | now for four or five years and has been hugely
|
| 12 | successful, the rules of engagement of IDX have been
|
| 13 | that it was a blanket opt-out and a reciprocal response
|
| 14 | to you. So, in the event that I didn't want my listings
|
| 15 | being able to be shown by other brokers, they couldn't
|
| 16 | be shown by any other brokers, but vice versa, then I
|
| 17 | couldn't show any of theirs. So, there was a huge
|
| 18 | penalty to me if I felt like that was where I had to go,
|
| 19 | and it has been highly successful.
|
| 20 | Most real estate companies, most real estate
|
| 21 | agents, have access to IDX sites right on their own web
|
| 22 | sites, and so, you know, to say that that's somehow
|
| 23 | limiting your ability to share information with the
|
| 24 | consumer, what you see in the MLS is more detailed
|
| 25 | information, but again, you have access to that, and you |
Page 211
| 1 | can provide that to the consumer just like I can in
|
| 2 | whatever avenue or vein you might elect to do that.
|
| 3 | MR. PERRIELLO: Yeah, I would agree, Cathy. We
|
| 4 | opened up our national web sites to our brokers where
|
| 5 | IDX was available, and we would link to their local web
|
| 6 | sites so the consumer could see all of the listings in
|
| 7 | the market from one of the brand web sites. The brokers
|
| 8 | were standing in line to sign up for that, because they
|
| 9 | had all of the brokers' listings in their market, it was
|
| 10 | on their local site, and now they had the option to put
|
| 11 | it on their national site.
|
| 12 | I think the issue of the opt-out is we believe
|
| 13 | the listing is the work product of the broker, and there
|
| 14 | should be some protection. We believe that if a listing
|
| 15 | shows up someplace that you really find objectionable,
|
| 16 | that you would have the right to say, "You know, I think
|
| 17 | I'll just keep my listings to myself." Would you ever
|
| 18 | do it? Probably not, because your competitors would eat
|
| 19 | you alive if you made that decision, because they would
|
| 20 | use that against you. They'd say, "Well, you don't want
|
| 21 | to list with them because they don't share their
|
| 22 | listings with anyone."
|
| 23 | So, the competitive pressure will keep everyone
|
| 24 | sharing listings, but it's giving that broker that
|
| 25 | failsafe, if you will, if they wanted to use it, and I |
Page 212
| 1 | think that with the new policy, the ILD policy, adding
|
| 2 | that feature where the customer makes the final choice I
|
| 3 | think is an excellent feature, because then it takes it
|
| 4 | out of the broker's hands into the customer's, and to
|
| 5 | say to the seller, "Do you agree with this? If you do,
|
| 6 | fine. If not, you can opt in." I think that's a good
|
| 7 | feature and a good resolution to it.
|
| 8 | MS. QUINN: Go ahead, Steve.
|
| 9 | MR. DelBIANCO: Just hit reverse on the tape to
|
| 10 | about 45 minutes ago when Cathy told us that the
|
| 11 | advertising data that she just finished bragging about
|
| 12 | is really stale. Real time data is much better, and you
|
| 13 | can only get that from your broker. Only your broker
|
| 14 | can get it to you. The advertising data isn't really
|
| 15 | the right data. That's the same thing.
|
| 16 | Now, hit the reverse button again, go back six
|
| 17 | weeks. Six weeks ago, NAR was putting forth a policy of
|
| 18 | selective opt-out under pressure from the largest
|
| 19 | franchises to do selective opt-out, which was
|
| 20 | deliberately aimed to be able to punish a broker who has
|
| 21 | somehow gone outside the rules by not only using it for
|
| 22 | cooperation and compensation, but maybe even showing
|
| 23 | those listings as a way to attract customers.
|
| 24 | So, selective opt-out is something that's -- is
|
| 25 | it really off the table? It's certainly not out of the |
Page 213
| 1 | minds of NAR, but it's off the table now because --
|
| 2 | because of what? Not because of competitive pressure
|
| 3 | that Alex just described. It's off the table now
|
| 4 | because the Justice Department for two years has been
|
| 5 | saying it's against the law. So, we need the kind of
|
| 6 | antitrust enforcement that we have in this case to keep
|
| 7 | the MLS system from running afoul of antitrust laws.
|
| 8 | MR. EARLY: Well, not to say that it's not
|
| 9 | forgotten, but part of the new ILD rules stipulate that
|
| 10 | you must make an offer of compensation and accept offers
|
| 11 | of compensation. EBAs, exclusive buyer agents, do not
|
| 12 | list properties. We do not put homes in MLSs. We do
|
| 13 | not make offers of compensation. Who's that rule aimed
|
| 14 | at? I wonder.
|
| 15 | I mean, that's a very serious question. I do
|
| 16 | wonder, did somebody just happen to write those words
|
| 17 | down, or did somebody think about them before they were
|
| 18 | written down? My organization, the National Association
|
| 19 | of Exclusive Buyer Agents, does not make offers of
|
| 20 | compensation, but according to the new ILD rules, you
|
| 21 | have to make offers of compensation in order to be a
|
| 22 | member of your MLS, to participate.
|
| 23 | MS. QUINN: Anything else?
|
| 24 | Well, we have a question from the audience that
|
| 25 | says what, if anything, precludes proponents of new |
Page 214
| 1 | business models from cooperating to form their own
|
| 2 | accumulation of listings? Isn't that competition? How
|
| 3 | would you respond to that audience member?
|
| 4 | MR. HENDERSON: I can take a quick stab at it.
|
| 5 | The marketplace, which is, you know, in the securities
|
| 6 | world, it's NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange, in the
|
| 7 | real estate world, it's the MLSs, is useful for brokers
|
| 8 | who represent buyers because it is a cooperative entity.
|
| 9 | It can see what's for sale. It's useful for sellers
|
| 10 | because they know buyers are using it. And there's a
|
| 11 | critical mass concept that's very important to allowing
|
| 12 | marketplaces to work.
|
| 13 | If a new entrant, you know, if I go start
|
| 14 | Henderson Brokerage here in Washington, D.C., I could
|
| 15 | join the MLS and, you know, touching on Alex's comment,
|
| 16 | ownership of listings, no broker objects to me printing
|
| 17 | out their listings all day long, and they don't invoke
|
| 18 | ownership rights to say I can't give a piece of paper
|
| 19 | with a listing to a potential buyer, nor do they invoke
|
| 20 | advertising rights, say, "No, you can't give that piece
|
| 21 | of paper to a potential buyer."
|
| 22 | The objection is that it's on the internet. And
|
| 23 | so our position is that competition is good, just like
|
| 24 | with the rebates, you want to allow brokers to use
|
| 25 | different tools, to use available technology, to serve |
Page 215
| 1 | buyers, to serve sellers. The same concept applies in
|
| 2 | other areas of the industry. Let's allow brokers to use
|
| 3 | technology and available tools to compete.
|
| 4 | MS. QUINN: Steve?
|
| 5 | MR. DelBIANCO: I think the question was does
|
| 6 | anything preclude competition other than, you know,
|
| 7 | outside of the MLS, and I think we just heard a good
|
| 8 | answer from Philip that it's hard because of network
|
| 9 | effects, but there's also a catch in that if alternative
|
| 10 | business model like FSBO, FSBO.com, well, they were
|
| 11 | hauled into court in California because that alternative
|
| 12 | model was treated as what? It was treated as
|
| 13 | advertising if you believe the California Board of
|
| 14 | Realtors, and they wanted them shut down because they
|
| 15 | weren't acting like a realtor.
|
| 16 | So, the alternative business models often find
|
| 17 | themselves getting trapped and captured by the laws
|
| 18 | designed to govern the conduct of realtors, and another
|
| 19 | alternative, say eBay for instance, if eBay is listing
|
| 20 | homes for sale as an alternative, then they shouldn't be
|
| 21 | forced to become licensed brokers in certain states, and
|
| 22 | yet you see complaints all the time from realtors
|
| 23 | telling the state licensing board, "You guys have homes
|
| 24 | for sale online. They need to be licensed."
|
| 25 | So, again, it's all about don't preclude |
Page 216
| 1 | competition, but by golly, the first time it shows up,
|
| 2 | regulate it.
|
| 3 | MS. QUINN: Anyone else?
|
| 4 | (No response.)
|
| 5 | MS. QUINN: Well, I think we're almost out of
|
| 6 | time. I would like to thank the panel for being so good
|
| 7 | to come and spend their time with us today and for all
|
| 8 | the work and effort that they've put into their talks
|
| 9 | and their responses. So, let's give them a hand.
|
| 10 | (Applause.)
|
| 11 | (A brief recess was taken.)
|
| 12 | DR. SALINGER: Well, good afternoon. My name is
|
| 13 | Michael Salinger. I'm Director of the Bureau of
|
| 14 | Economics here at the FTC.
|
| 15 | Although it may not be a sound economic
|
| 16 | proposition, I am a strong believer in saving the best
|
| 17 | until last, and from my perspective, which I realize may
|
| 18 | not be shared by everyone in the room, our session this
|
| 19 | afternoon, because it focuses on economic analysis, is
|
| 20 | the one that I've been looking forward to most. Now,
|
| 21 | whether or not you share my enjoyment of economic
|
| 22 | analysis, sound public policy must ultimately rest on
|
| 23 | it. Particularly in an industry where most people have
|
| 24 | some experience but only a few episodes of it, we cannot
|
| 25 | let anecdotes win the day. Policy must be based on a |
Page 217
| 1 | systematic review of the evidence based on a coherent
|
| 2 | analytical framework.
|
| 3 | We're fortunate today to have two outstanding
|
| 4 | economists as panelists to help us in that effort.
|
| 5 | Dr. Lawrence Yun is the Managing Director of
|
| 6 | Quantitative Research at the National Association of
|
| 7 | Realtors, where he manages the Statistics and
|
| 8 | Forecasting Groups of the Research Division. He writes
|
| 9 | regular columns on real estate market trends, creates
|
| 10 | NAR's forecasts, and participates in many economic
|
| 11 | forecasting panels, including Blue Chip and the Harvard
|
| 12 | University Industrial Economist Council.
|
| 13 | Dr. Yun has been quoted on the real estate
|
| 14 | market and the economy in the media, including The Wall
|
| 15 | Street Journal, The New York Times, and The Washington
|
| 16 | Post. He has also appeared on CNBC and Bloomberg TV.
|
| 17 | Dr. Yun received his undergraduate degree from Purdue
|
| 18 | University and his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland
|
| 19 | at College Park.
|
| 20 | Chang-Tai Hsieh is Associate Professor of
|
| 21 | Economics at the University of California, Berkeley.
|
| 22 | Previously he was Assistant Professor in the Department
|
| 23 | of Economics at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton.
|
| 24 | Professor Hsieh has published many papers in major
|
| 25 | economic journals, including, "Can Free Entry Be |
Page 218
| 1 | Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the
|
| 2 | Real Estate Industry," in the October 2003 Journal of
|
| 3 | Political Economy.
|
| 4 | He is currently a Faculty Research Fellow for
|
| 5 | the National Bureau of Economic Research, Co-chair for
|
| 6 | The World Bank Research Department Advisory Committee,
|
| 7 | and a Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of
|
| 8 | San Francisco. Professor Hsieh graduated from the
|
| 9 | University of California, Berkeley, with a Ph.D. in
|
| 10 | Economics in 1998.
|
| 11 | As Dr. Yun works for the National Association of
|
| 12 | Realtors and Dr. Hsieh's article refers to social waste
|
| 13 | in the real estate industry, I have no doubt that we are
|
| 14 | in for a lively session.
|
| 15 | I will ask Dr. Yun to start us off.
|
| 16 | DR. YUN: Thank you very much.
|
| 17 | As the introduction made it clear, my day-to-day
|
| 18 | activity usually centers around sort of forecasts of the
|
| 19 | economy in the housing market, Friday's release of the
|
| 20 | PD will show some growth rate of close to 4 percent, but
|
| 21 | today's discussion is not about that but about a topic
|
| 22 | that I studied intensively while in graduate school.
|
| 23 | My graduate school specialty was in industrial
|
| 24 | organization, which is the study of the competitiveness
|
| 25 | of the industry, and I am very happy to have taken on |
Page 219
| 1 | this topic to sort of refresh some of the things that I
|
| 2 | learned at graduate school and sort of apply it.
|
| 3 | The traditional graduate school study examining
|
| 4 | the industry will look at the structure of the industry,
|
| 5 | that is to say, is it a monopoly, oligopoly, perfectly
|
| 6 | competitive industry? Based upon the structure, then we
|
| 7 | will look for some conduct activity. Is there a lot of
|
| 8 | collusion involved, or is it fairly -- are prices
|
| 9 | determined through competitive pressures? And then
|
| 10 | finally, we will look at the performance. What is the
|
| 11 | bottom line? Is it good for society? Is it good for
|
| 12 | consumers? Is it good for workers? So, all these
|
| 13 | aspects I will be covering.
|
| 14 | Some of the data, because we're the last panel,
|
| 15 | has been earlier discussed, and I will quickly go over
|
| 16 | it, but I will try to frame it from more of an
|
| 17 | economist's perspective.
|
| 18 | From the consumer's point of view, they have a
|
| 19 | wide choice. Not only can they think about
|
| 20 | for-sale-by-owner, which one million home sellers do
|
| 21 | each year, but they can choose a discount brokerage, or
|
| 22 | some people call them more of a minimum service
|
| 23 | brokerage, a traditional brokerage. There's a wide
|
| 24 | availability of information available. So, from the
|
| 25 | consumer side, it appears fairly competitive, a wide |
Page 220
| 1 | range of choices.
|
| 2 | From the supplier point of view, let's look at
|
| 3 | the figures. Currently, 1.25 million realtor members;
|
| 4 | 2.53 million service providers who have licenses; 98,000
|
| 5 | active firms in over 200,000 local offices; and again,
|
| 6 | choice available for consumer is for-sale-by-owner,
|
| 7 | which is over one million per year.
|
| 8 | There's very low entry barrier. Last year, we
|
| 9 | had an increase in membership, but the increase was not
|
| 10 | due to just straight increase. There were many people
|
| 11 | who dropped out. In fact, 253,000 entered the market,
|
| 12 | became realtor members, and 127,000 dropped out,
|
| 13 | indicating that the market is fairly dynamic, that
|
| 14 | there's free entry, free exit. Just as the perfectly
|
| 15 | competitive model would predict in Economics 101,
|
| 16 | through this process, one would get a sort of
|
| 17 | economically efficient outcome that maximizes consumer
|
| 18 | surcharge. And also again, on the information side,
|
| 19 | information is everywhere.
|
| 20 | Let's look at the past housing cycles. There
|
| 21 | was a recession back in the early 1980s. Paul Volcker,
|
| 22 | Chairman of the Federal Reserve, his goal, cut back on
|
| 23 | inflation. The way to do that, drastically increase
|
| 24 | interest rates. Average interest rates, mortgage rates,
|
| 25 | at 18 percent at one point. During that time, home |
Page 221
| 1 | sales declined by 50 percent. So, if you were a realtor
|
| 2 | in the business, you lost half of your business.
|
| 3 | Similarly, in the recession of the 1990s, less
|
| 4 | severe, but nonetheless, a housing cycle. Now, this
|
| 5 | time around, thanks to the generation of low mortgage
|
| 6 | rates, we have record home sales, record home price
|
| 7 | growth, and not surprisingly, record increase in
|
| 8 | membership. The realtor membership is following the
|
| 9 | market trends.
|
| 10 | This is the sales activity, again, one can see
|
| 11 | back in the early 1980s, a drastic decline in sales,
|
| 12 | some decline in 1990s. The real price growth, so this
|
| 13 | would be the home price growth after subtracting away
|
| 14 | the Consumer Price Inflation, a few years were negative.
|
| 15 | Those years that are negative one can correlate with the
|
| 16 | next chart that shows that when the real home price
|
| 17 | growth was negative, that membership generally declined.
|
| 18 | There was no enthusiasm for people to want to become a
|
| 19 | realtor. But given the current record home price
|
| 20 | growth, not surprisingly, we are having a record
|
| 21 | increase in membership.
|
| 22 | In studying the industry structure, economists
|
| 23 | here at FTC, as well as in DOJ, they would generally
|
| 24 | look towards the concentration ratio to see whether the
|
| 25 | industry is concentrated and can exert some market |
Page 222
| 1 | power, if they can collude. This is the concentration
|
| 2 | ratio among the firms in the real estate industry, real
|
| 3 | estate brokerage firms.
|
| 4 | This is the hard data, but I would caution that
|
| 5 | this data may not be as meaningful for the real estate
|
| 6 | brokerage compared to other industries. The key reason
|
| 7 | is that agents are independent contractors. An agent
|
| 8 | working at Century 21 would be competing with another
|
| 9 | agent working at Century 21. Cendant, they have
|
| 10 | different branches, Coldwell Banker, Century 21. It's
|
| 11 | my understanding that these two brands will be competing
|
| 12 | within the Cendant branch. So, even though by overall
|
| 13 | company this is the market share, I would say from the
|
| 14 | market outcome point of view, consumer choice point of
|
| 15 | view, the real concentration is the 2.5 million real
|
| 16 | estate licensees.
|
| 17 | So, in other words, one can think of how many
|
| 18 | businesses are out there? There are 2.5 million
|
| 19 | independent real estate agents having their own business
|
| 20 | model, how much effort to put into advertising, how much
|
| 21 | effort to place a phone call, and so many, many
|
| 22 | different business model that each real estate agent
|
| 23 | would be conducting.
|
| 24 | This is the market structural size, so this is
|
| 25 | the number of sales force, one to five or six to ten. |
Page 223
| 1 | So, back in 1983, 51 percent of the offices had one to
|
| 2 | five agents. By 1999, one to five agents, small
|
| 3 | companies, 60 percent were of small companies. So, very
|
| 4 | large, 50-plus agent office is a very rare situation in
|
| 5 | the real estate brokerage industry. In 2004, we don't
|
| 6 | have the exact comparable data, but nonetheless, we
|
| 7 | slice it differently, we find that 96 percent of the
|
| 8 | offices have ten or fewer agents.
|
| 9 | Now, the question is raised, how can a small
|
| 10 | size firm survive over time? Well, there's a study by
|
| 11 | Zumpano, a professor at University of Alabama, he did
|
| 12 | some cost measurements, and from this cost measurement,
|
| 13 | he found that the industry is of constant economies of
|
| 14 | scale. That, in plain language, is there's no benefit
|
| 15 | of being big. Big or small, you are on equal footing
|
| 16 | from the cost point of view.
|
| 17 | One can also turn to Stigler's Survival Test.
|
| 18 | Stigler is named after George Stigler, a Nobel Prize
|
| 19 | winner in economics, which he said basically the firms
|
| 20 | are able to survive best by systemic demonstration that
|
| 21 | the market is efficient based upon how the results are
|
| 22 | shown. So, the results are showing that small firms can
|
| 23 | survive, which means that there is really no economies
|
| 24 | of scale.
|
| 25 | Now we have seen that small firms are able to |
Page 224
| 1 | survive. How is that? Well, the Multiple Listing
|
| 2 | Service, the great Multiple Listing Service, is putting
|
| 3 | everyone on equal footing. If you want to start a
|
| 4 | business and assume that you don't have any access to
|
| 5 | Multiple Listing Service, it's very difficult to obtain
|
| 6 | clients, but Multiple Listing Service allows, whether
|
| 7 | large or small firms, on equal footing, equal
|
| 8 | information, and small firms can survive over time.
|
| 9 | Furthermore, agents, as mentioned, are
|
| 10 | independent contractors, and they are providing
|
| 11 | person-to-person, case-by-case service that requires
|
| 12 | highest level of trust. Just think of legal advice. Is
|
| 13 | a legal advice a commodity or a service? Estate
|
| 14 | planning advice, tax advice. And what are the fees
|
| 15 | associated with that? Has the internet impacted their
|
| 16 | fees? And are the real estate brokers, real estate
|
| 17 | agents, when they are providing service, is it a
|
| 18 | one-second transaction, or is it a three-month
|
| 19 | home-buying process or home-selling process?
|
| 20 | I would contend that it is a professional
|
| 21 | service that requires a lengthy amount of time, and not
|
| 22 | only that, requires many, many paperwork. I was a
|
| 23 | first-time home buyer several years back, and I have a
|
| 24 | Ph.D. in economics. I didn't realize how daunting the
|
| 25 | home-buying process could be. But we believe that, you |
Page 225
| 1 | know, real estate service is not a commodity, and hence,
|
| 2 | we really don't see why the internet would necessarily
|
| 3 | bring a drastic decline in prices as one would purchase
|
| 4 | an airline ticket or purchasing an item in stock.
|
| 5 | Are we producing a perfectly competitive
|
| 6 | outcome? In Econ 101, perfectly competitive market
|
| 7 | structure would say that there is no excessive economic
|
| 8 | profit. Any abnormal profit will induce new entry, and
|
| 9 | the profit will be eaten away. The realtor income,
|
| 10 | $52,000 in 2002, that's the median, and again, as
|
| 11 | someone alluded to earlier, that is before business
|
| 12 | costs, before health insurance costs and other fees.
|
| 13 | The real median income has fallen. That's not
|
| 14 | surprising. The number of new agents entering the
|
| 15 | market in the past couple of years has outpaced the home
|
| 16 | sales growth and even the home price growth. So, given
|
| 17 | the fact that the realtor membership has increased far
|
| 18 | more than actual home sales, it's not surprising that
|
| 19 | the median income has fallen.
|
| 20 | Also, the commission rates, often mentioned
|
| 21 | source REALTrends, 5.5 percent to 5.1 percent decline.
|
| 22 | I would question the reliability of the data. Now, I'm
|
| 23 | not really questioning the reliability, but at the same
|
| 24 | time, because NAR has been -- well, when I first came to
|
| 25 | NAR, they said, "One thing you should never do is study |
Page 226
| 1 | commissions," and I think the reason for that is in
|
| 2 | honor of the latest Nobel Prize winner in economics,
|
| 3 | Thomas Schelling, which say basically in large
|
| 4 | organizations, coming out with some kind of figure
|
| 5 | represent a focal point for others to collude. So,
|
| 6 | whatever figure NAR come out with, maybe other people
|
| 7 | will sort of use that as a collusion point.
|
| 8 | So, we cannot study commissions, but I'm not
|
| 9 | sure how the commission studies are conducted. Does it
|
| 10 | include the costs that realtors provide in terms of free
|
| 11 | moving trucks, closing cost assistance, commission
|
| 12 | rebates? We are hearing, particularly in hot markets,
|
| 13 | California, South Florida and elsewhere, that realtors
|
| 14 | are going to extra lengths, extra financial inducement
|
| 15 | to provide service to their clients, whether buyer or
|
| 16 | seller.
|
| 17 | Let's look at some other desirable performance
|
| 18 | measures. Now, I have developed these performance
|
| 19 | measures in light of the fact that we have been hearing,
|
| 20 | by some well-renowned economist which I respect
|
| 21 | personally, have even suggested that possibly banks
|
| 22 | entering into the real estate brokerage industry will
|
| 23 | better provide the performance measures.
|
| 24 | One, economic mobility. While home sales is
|
| 25 | very dynamic, one of the most dynamic in the world in |
Page 227
| 1 | the U.S., I think that's a good proxy to represent that
|
| 2 | there is a lot of economic mobility in the United
|
| 3 | States, and I think that's a good thing. In Japan,
|
| 4 | there's very, very little mobility. In fact, most of
|
| 5 | the home sales are new home sales, not existing home
|
| 6 | sales.
|
| 7 | Historical experience of seeking a government
|
| 8 | bailout. In the real estate business, none. Bad times,
|
| 9 | as the chart earlier illustrated, were self-correcting
|
| 10 | through realtors exiting the market.
|
| 11 | Taxpayer risk, none. Let me just quote you one
|
| 12 | recent study by the FDIC concerning the concentration of
|
| 13 | the banks. Again, this relates to some people noting
|
| 14 | that perhaps banks entering into the real estate
|
| 15 | business would be good.
|
| 16 | "FDIC research economists stated that because of
|
| 17 | mega-mergers that had been occurring in the financial
|
| 18 | services industry, a failure of a single mega-bank could
|
| 19 | overwhelm the insurance system at the expense of
|
| 20 | taxpayers and expose taxpayers to huge potential
|
| 21 | liability." The top five bank financial service
|
| 22 | companies own more than 50 percent of the market
|
| 23 | control, and I'm not sure we want to move a real estate
|
| 24 | industry which currently is highly, fiercely
|
| 25 | competitive, into a very concentrated industry. |
Page 228
| 1 | What about other measures? Social promotion of
|
| 2 | self-reliance and entrepreneurship, I think most
|
| 3 | Americans would agree that self-reliance and
|
| 4 | entrepreneurship is a good thing. Every single agent
|
| 5 | pretty much are independent contractors.
|
| 6 | Fifty-five percent of the realtor members are
|
| 7 | women. Some people -- I mean, people may disagree, but
|
| 8 | some people consider some more participation among sort
|
| 9 | of more diverse populations as a good thing.
|
| 10 | Flexible hours. Work stoppage through labor
|
| 11 | strikes, none. They're all independent contractors.
|
| 12 | Data mining, what is data mining? Well, Oracle,
|
| 13 | SEBOL (phonetic) systems and other very sophisticated
|
| 14 | artificial intelligence designs, things of that nature,
|
| 15 | they sell their software to banking companies and credit
|
| 16 | card companies. What is the purpose of that? They data
|
| 17 | mine, which is to say they want to see the consumer
|
| 18 | buying habits. Based upon that, they can price
|
| 19 | discriminate. They know that certain people are willing
|
| 20 | to pay slightly higher price for the same service and so
|
| 21 | on. So, providing home transaction over to the banking
|
| 22 | industry would expose even more potential for data
|
| 23 | mining and price discrimination and extraction of
|
| 24 | consumer surplus.
|
| 25 | And also, currently, real estate is all local, |
Page 229
| 1 | local, local, local. If we move it into the banking
|
| 2 | industry, there's a potential that certainly there could
|
| 3 | be some international regulatory jurisdiction. Then we
|
| 4 | would have I guess an even stronger regulatory power
|
| 5 | than FTC or DOJ.
|
| 6 | Now, just the issue of Multiple Listing Service,
|
| 7 | again, economist's point of view, what is the purpose?
|
| 8 | Why was it designed? It helps with home sales
|
| 9 | transactions, facilitates home sales transactions, easy
|
| 10 | information availability. It was designed through a
|
| 11 | cooperative arrangement by the brokers to, again,
|
| 12 | facilitate transactions.
|
| 13 | It's available to all realtor members and many
|
| 14 | non-realtor members. I forgot to insert that other
|
| 15 | word, "non-realtor members," many non-realtor members.
|
| 16 | It depends upon the ownership structure of the MLS.
|
| 17 | Every MLS is slightly different in terms of ownership
|
| 18 | structure, but it is pretty much available to many, many
|
| 19 | real estate licensees, whether realtors or non-realtors.
|
| 20 | Over half a million dollars have been invested,
|
| 21 | at least only strictly on REALTY.com. Who paid for
|
| 22 | that? Actually, I don't know. Maybe realtors, they are
|
| 23 | paying fee to advertise their space, but irrespective of
|
| 24 | who paid the half million dollars, the industry is
|
| 25 | proactive in bringing consumer friendly results. |
Page 230
| 1 | Government did not dictate, "Hey, realtor organization,
|
| 2 | you should have some kind of computer web site that's
|
| 3 | consumer friendly." No one dictated that to us. It was
|
| 4 | the market response. It was a proactive response to
|
| 5 | bring consumer friendly results.
|
| 6 | MLS was never set up to solicit clients. So, if
|
| 7 | the brokers who are using Multiple Listing Service to
|
| 8 | facilitate home transactions, but they see another
|
| 9 | entity entering the system, in a sense, not directly
|
| 10 | sell the homes but in a sense to solicit clients, and if
|
| 11 | that is permitted, you can just anticipate just normal
|
| 12 | human business reaction, "I don't want to participate in
|
| 13 | that system."
|
| 14 | Well, is it a public utility? Well, let's
|
| 15 | consider it, as one person alluded to earlier about the
|
| 16 | used car and putting it in front of a used car sales
|
| 17 | parking lot. Getting a beer at a stadium, $5, you know,
|
| 18 | just down the street one can get it for $1 or $2. Why
|
| 19 | don't we make it consumer friendly for stadium
|
| 20 | participants? Let's open the stadium as a public
|
| 21 | utility and allow all the street vendors to come in to
|
| 22 | the stadium and sell their beer for $1. That's consumer
|
| 23 | friendly.
|
| 24 | Shopping malls, heck, got a lot of flea market
|
| 25 | vendors out there who can sell it for lower price. Open |
Page 231
| 1 | up the shopping mall, hopefully all these flea market
|
| 2 | vendors will enter and let the consumers benefit. I
|
| 3 | hear that the pharmaceutical drugs from Canada and
|
| 4 | Mexico are a little cheaper. What would CVS, Walgreen's
|
| 5 | react to that if they allow that to be a public utility
|
| 6 | so that consumers would benefit?
|
| 7 | Sure, consumers can benefit over the short term,
|
| 8 | but we know the long-term consequences of allowing as a
|
| 9 | public utility. The providers of the system, whether
|
| 10 | Multiple Listing Service, stadium, shopping malls, they
|
| 11 | would have no incentive to provide that.
|
| 12 | I would say just economic principles, we have
|
| 13 | heard very good arguments back and forth among many
|
| 14 | panelists, but when in doubt, I would say we would trust
|
| 15 | market outcomes based upon massive free entry and exit.
|
| 16 | Market not subjected to profit in the long run,
|
| 17 | and I just inserted that because Dennis Mueller was my
|
| 18 | dissertation advisor, and that's the topic that I
|
| 19 | studied, which basically states that large companies,
|
| 20 | like the banks, they can be inefficient but yet survive
|
| 21 | because they have market power, despite the economies of
|
| 22 | scale, they are able to survive by setting up barriers
|
| 23 | to entry. And certainly the real estate profession is
|
| 24 | not subjected to that.
|
| 25 | Private ownership. Private ownership always |
Page 232
| 1 | seems to work. Any time there is a little interference
|
| 2 | in the private ownership, unintended consequences
|
| 3 | sometimes occur. As one Swedish economist mentioned,
|
| 4 | "There's two ways to destroy a city: One is through a
|
| 5 | bombing; one is to just set a rent control and just wait
|
| 6 | 30 years." The same thing.
|
| 7 | MLS participants, they are private
|
| 8 | organizations. They are making business decisions on
|
| 9 | private matters. We open up to the public, perhaps in
|
| 10 | the short run, it benefits the consumers, but perhaps
|
| 11 | over the long run, there may be some unintended
|
| 12 | consequences.
|
| 13 | And also, regarding minimum level service and
|
| 14 | commission rebates, economists can debate all the pros
|
| 15 | and cons related to it, but we would just, as the NAR,
|
| 16 | just defer to the democratic process. We enjoy the
|
| 17 | discussion, and I think sort of through the discussion,
|
| 18 | persuasion of consumers, perhaps through that process,
|
| 19 | that democratic process works in terms of whether it is
|
| 20 | consumer friendly or puts the consumer more at risk.
|
| 21 | That's the end of my presentation. Thank you.
|
| 22 | (Applause.)
|
| 23 | DR. HSIEH: Well, as you can all see, I don't
|
| 24 | believe in using new technologies, and in my field, we
|
| 25 | take pride in using slides. |
Page 233
| 1 | So, let me talk about what we think or what I
|
| 2 | see as being the consequences or the nature of
|
| 3 | competition in the real estate industry, and what you
|
| 4 | are going to see at the end of my talk is that the
|
| 5 | argument that I am going to make is basically the same
|
| 6 | argument that Mr. Lewis of RE/MAX in the previous panel
|
| 7 | made, but I'm going to give it a very different spin.
|
| 8 | So, what do we mean by the "Tragedy of the
|
| 9 | Commission," and for those of you who have taken an Econ
|
| 10 | 101 class, I'm basically making an allusion to the
|
| 11 | tragedy of economics. So, what is it that is puzzling?
|
| 12 | What was it that got us started in this, because if you
|
| 13 | note, I am not a person who specializes in real estate,
|
| 14 | but what got me really interested in this is that the
|
| 15 | real puzzle in the real estate business is why does
|
| 16 | there seem to be this relatively fixed commission
|
| 17 | structure?
|
| 18 | Now, we don't have a very good story for why
|
| 19 | this commission structure looks like it's relatively
|
| 20 | fixed, or at least it doesn't seem to vary that much. I
|
| 21 | mean, it could be the case that, you know, it could be
|
| 22 | the stories that were told in the previous panels about
|
| 23 | actions by the local real estate boards against firms
|
| 24 | like eRealty.com or in the place where I live, in the
|
| 25 | San Francisco Bay area, the major internet broker is |
Page 234
| 1 | ZipRealty, but what's puzzling about this is what this
|
| 2 | means is that as long as this commission rate is
|
| 3 | relatively fixed, or it doesn't vary that much, what
|
| 4 | this means is that the amount that a consumer pays rises
|
| 5 | one to one, it rises proportionately, with the value of
|
| 6 | the house.
|
| 7 | I mean, it may go down a little bit because of
|
| 8 | higher rebates if you're selling a more expensive house
|
| 9 | or you may get a free moving truck, but you know, all of
|
| 10 | that is minor compared to, you know, how much additional
|
| 11 | money you are going to pay. In the neighborhood where I
|
| 12 | live, the median price of a home is $1.2 million, and as
|
| 13 | far as I can tell, the commission rate is still at 6
|
| 14 | percent. Some brokers might offer you 5, but 5 or 6
|
| 15 | percent of 1.2 mill is a chunk of change. It's a lot of
|
| 16 | money.
|
| 17 | The point is that, and this is something that a
|
| 18 | lot of people have alluded to already, it's highly
|
| 19 | unlikely that the amount of time, that the amount of
|
| 20 | effort that a broker has to put into selling a house or
|
| 21 | in trying to incentivise a buyer to buy a house is going
|
| 22 | to rise linearly with the amount of the cost of these
|
| 23 | services.
|
| 24 | Now, you know, this might seem like a great deal
|
| 25 | for brokers. It might seem the case that brokers who |
Page 235
| 1 | operate in my area are going to earn extraordinary
|
| 2 | profits, because in one given transaction, they can walk
|
| 3 | away with $35,000, right? But that's actually not the
|
| 4 | right way to think about it, and this is something,
|
| 5 | again, that a lot of other people have alluded to,
|
| 6 | because there's relatively free entry into the
|
| 7 | profession and into the real estate brokerage business,
|
| 8 | and basically what that does is that it basically
|
| 9 | dilutes the profits for everybody, and at the end of the
|
| 10 | day, realtors don't make any more money in the San
|
| 11 | Francisco Bay area than in a city like Pittsburgh, but
|
| 12 | people like me, we're paying much, much more for these
|
| 13 | services than somebody that lives in the City of
|
| 14 | Pittsburgh.
|
| 15 | So, let me illustrate the story that I'm telling
|
| 16 | by just telling you a tale of two cities. So, let me
|
| 17 | tell you, and I guess I'll say a little bit more about
|
| 18 | this, but the data that we use is basically the data
|
| 19 | from the Centennial Housing and Population Census. We
|
| 20 | did this work in 1998 and '99, so we had access to the
|
| 21 | data from the 1980 and 1990 population censuses.
|
| 22 | But let's think about two cities, and we picked
|
| 23 | these two cities, Boston and Minneapolis, because they
|
| 24 | look quite similar among a bunch of dimensions. They
|
| 25 | are cities of roughly similar size, cities have similar |
Page 236
| 1 | demographics, cities have similar racial composition,
|
| 2 | they -- but the thing that strikes out, that really
|
| 3 | jumps out at you when you want to think about Boston
|
| 4 | versus Minneapolis, and this is data for 1990, is that
|
| 5 | housing in Boston is a lot more expensive than what it
|
| 6 | is in Minneapolis. It costs twice as much, and
|
| 7 | obviously if you look an analysis, my guess is that it's
|
| 8 | going to be much, much higher, because there's been a
|
| 9 | real housing boom in the Boston area.
|
| 10 | Now, this would seem to imply that as long as
|
| 11 | the commission structure is relatively fixed, what this
|
| 12 | would seem to imply is that a realtor in Boston is going
|
| 13 | to make much more, is going to make twice as much as a
|
| 14 | realtor in Minneapolis, because if you sell a house in
|
| 15 | Boston, you get twice as much than a realtor that sells
|
| 16 | a similar house in Minneapolis, but you know, again, but
|
| 17 | that's not the end of the story.
|
| 18 | I mean, if that were the end of the story, then
|
| 19 | it would be like a story that you see in a lot of other
|
| 20 | industries. Some people pay more for a service, and
|
| 21 | other people gain from the service. So, you know, so
|
| 22 | then the commission structure would just be a transfer
|
| 23 | from consumers to the realtors, some people are worse
|
| 24 | off, some people are better off, but at least some
|
| 25 | people are happier as a result of the higher commission, |
Page 237
| 1 | but the tragedy of this business is that that's actually
|
| 2 | not the right story, because what happens, and again,
|
| 3 | for those of you who are in this field, there are many,
|
| 4 | many more realtors in Boston than there are in
|
| 5 | Minneapolis.
|
| 6 | So, at the end of the day, what happens, an
|
| 7 | average realtor in Boston just sells less. An average
|
| 8 | realtor in Boston sells 3.3 houses per year, which is
|
| 9 | about one-half of what an average realtor in
|
| 10 | Minneapolis sells. Again, all of this data comes from
|
| 11 | the U.S. Housing and Population Census.
|
| 12 | Now, one can argue that, well, this is not
|
| 13 | really the right comparison, because Boston is
|
| 14 | different. Houses are different in Boston. It just
|
| 15 | takes a lot more work to match buyers and sellers in
|
| 16 | Boston than it does in Minneapolis. It could be the
|
| 17 | case that, you know, people whose predecessors came from
|
| 18 | Ireland are just more difficult to deal with than those
|
| 19 | who came from Sweden, that could be the story, but you
|
| 20 | know, this has not always been the case, because if you
|
| 21 | just look back ten years, if you look at Boston versus
|
| 22 | Minneapolis in 1980, the productivity, houses sold per
|
| 23 | agent, in Boston was almost exactly the same as that in
|
| 24 | Minneapolis. They were almost exactly the same, and
|
| 25 | clearly we know what happened, you know, what happened. |
Page 238
| 1 | There was a housing boom in Boston, but there
|
| 2 | was not a housing boom in Minneapolis. So, what
|
| 3 | happened over the ten-year period from 1980 to 1990 is
|
| 4 | that you saw massive entry of realtors into the real
|
| 5 | estate brokerage business, which made it much more
|
| 6 | difficult for everybody else to find a business, and
|
| 7 | what that did is that it just drove down profits for
|
| 8 | everybody, so that at the end of the day, the average
|
| 9 | income of a broker in Boston in 1990 is exactly the same
|
| 10 | as what it was in 1980, and it's exactly the same as
|
| 11 | what an average broker earns in the City of Minneapolis,
|
| 12 | despite the fact that a homeowner in Boston pays twice
|
| 13 | as much, and this is what we call the tragedy of the
|
| 14 | commission, that basically this is a case in which
|
| 15 | somebody is paying more, us consumers, yet nobody is
|
| 16 | better off. The money is just waste. The amount of
|
| 17 | additional profits, the amount of the higher cost, is
|
| 18 | not benefiting anyone, and I'll try to document that
|
| 19 | more precisely in the few minutes that I have left.
|
| 20 | So, basically what we've documented is that this
|
| 21 | is exactly the pattern, when you look across all of the
|
| 22 | cities in the U.S., that if you look across the
|
| 23 | approximately 300 metropolitan areas of the U.S. and if
|
| 24 | you look at changes from 1980 to 1990 and you look at
|
| 25 | cities where housing prices have gone up relative to the |
Page 239
| 1 | cities where housing prices have gone up by less, what
|
| 2 | you're going to see is that in places where housing
|
| 3 | prices have gone up by more, what you see are three
|
| 4 | things.
|
| 5 | What you see are more real estate agents, and
|
| 6 | let me just show you what the data looks like. So, this
|
| 7 | is just a scatter plot. It's a scatter plot, and what's
|
| 8 | on the Y axis is basically the change from 1980 to 1990
|
| 9 | in the number of realtors relative to the number of
|
| 10 | workers in the city, and what's on the X axis is the
|
| 11 | change in the average price of housing, and we normalize
|
| 12 | the price of housing by the average wage in the city, so
|
| 13 | to try to account for differences in the costs of doing
|
| 14 | business, and basically the slope looks very -- the
|
| 15 | scales are somewhat different, but the slope is very
|
| 16 | close to one.
|
| 17 | What does that mean? It means that every one
|
| 18 | percentage point increase in the housing prices
|
| 19 | increases the number of realtors by about almost one
|
| 20 | percentage point. Now, if you think that the demand for
|
| 21 | these services, the amount of buying and selling that
|
| 22 | homeowners want to do in a city, is not going to rise
|
| 23 | that much with an increase in the price of housing in
|
| 24 | the city, it's clear what this is going to mean, right?
|
| 25 | It's clear what this is going to mean. |
Page 240
| 1 | It's going to mean that the number of
|
| 2 | transactions, the number of sales by a typical agent, is
|
| 3 | going to fall. It is going to fall. So, the second
|
| 4 | thing that you're going to see is that as housing prices
|
| 5 | go up, number of sales per agent falls. In other words,
|
| 6 | think about it as over-capacity, over-capacity of
|
| 7 | industry. So, let me show you the evidence of lower
|
| 8 | productivity.
|
| 9 | So, what's on the Y axis this time is a number
|
| 10 | of -- is a change -- again, all this is is the 1980 and
|
| 11 | 1990 -- anyway, it's the number of houses sold in a city
|
| 12 | relative to the number of hours worked by a realtor.
|
| 13 | You could also do it relative to the number of realtors,
|
| 14 | but it's not going to make that much difference. We did
|
| 15 | hours worked to try to account for the fact that there
|
| 16 | may be changes in the amount of hours worked by
|
| 17 | realtors.
|
| 18 | And again, the slope looks like this. It's very
|
| 19 | close to one. So, a 1 percent increase in price would
|
| 20 | translate into a fall in sales per hour's work or sales
|
| 21 | by almost one percentage point. So, the bottom line is
|
| 22 | that in places where housing prices have gone up,
|
| 23 | nothing happens to wages. So, basically what's here,
|
| 24 | what's on the Y axis, is the wage of the realtor or the
|
| 25 | income of the realtor as reported in the Census, |
Page 241
| 1 | relative to what we constructed as the alternative wage
|
| 2 | of the broker, where basically we look at the
|
| 3 | demographic characteristics of brokers, and we make an
|
| 4 | estimate of how much they could earn if they did
|
| 5 | something else with their time, and it looks incredibly
|
| 6 | flat. And again, this is something that a lot of the
|
| 7 | people here have already alluded to. Wages are no
|
| 8 | higher in places where housing prices have gone up. So,
|
| 9 | realtors are no better off despite the fact that
|
| 10 | consumers are paying a lot more for those services.
|
| 11 | Now, what could be some of the problems with
|
| 12 | this analysis? Well, the natural problem with this
|
| 13 | analysis is that, well, it could be the case that, you
|
| 14 | know, a broker in Boston just has to work a lot more to
|
| 15 | try to match buyers and sellers. It just takes a lot
|
| 16 | more time to, you know, to show the houses, or after an
|
| 17 | offer has been made, to get to closing, as a former
|
| 18 | panelist talked of, but you know, there are a couple of
|
| 19 | things to remember.
|
| 20 | One is that remember that what we're doing is
|
| 21 | that we're comparing the same city, that is, we are not
|
| 22 | comparing Boston with Pittsburgh. What we are doing is
|
| 23 | we're comparing changes in Pittsburgh with changes in
|
| 24 | Boston. So, we're talking about the same city, the same
|
| 25 | houses, the same houses. |
Page 242
| 1 | Another way in which you could try to get at
|
| 2 | this is you could try to get direct measures of the
|
| 3 | amount of time that realtors actually have to put in to
|
| 4 | actually try to sell houses. So, we tried to put
|
| 5 | together a little bit of that data, so we looked at
|
| 6 | three measures, and so what's in this top panel is
|
| 7 | basically time on the market, time on the market against
|
| 8 | the price of housing, and this is something that I guess
|
| 9 | we all know, that in places where housing prices have
|
| 10 | gone up, time on the market falls. So, it's not the
|
| 11 | case that the listings stay on the market for a longer
|
| 12 | period of time.
|
| 13 | Again, the unit of observation here is a city.
|
| 14 | So, each circle represents a city, and then the size
|
| 15 | of -- I guess I should have said the size of the circle
|
| 16 | relates to the size of city. If you look at data on the
|
| 17 | point of view of buyers, so this is data from the
|
| 18 | buyer's side, this is the average number of houses that
|
| 19 | buyers look at in different cities, and the line looks
|
| 20 | roughly flat, so that's this panel here. Now, it
|
| 21 | doesn't seem to be the case that in higher cost cities
|
| 22 | that buyers look at more houses in the process of
|
| 23 | searching for a house.
|
| 24 | Lastly, this last part -- I think the last thing
|
| 25 | is actually data from the National Association of |
Page 243
| 1 | Realtors, but this is the number of months that home
|
| 2 | buyers search for a house in different cities, and
|
| 3 | again, the line looks flat, the line does. So, it's not
|
| 4 | the case that in higher cost cities that home buyers are
|
| 5 | actually spending more time trying to find a house.
|
| 6 | So, the question then is, what is it that
|
| 7 | realtors are doing? You know, what is it that realtors
|
| 8 | are doing differently in Boston than in Minneapolis or
|
| 9 | what is it that realtors in Boston in 1990 were doing
|
| 10 | differently than they were doing back in 1980? And here
|
| 11 | I guess our story is that, well, you know, why don't we
|
| 12 | think about two things that realtors do.
|
| 13 | The first thing that they do, and it's an
|
| 14 | incredibly valuable service, is that they match buyers
|
| 15 | and sellers. That's an incredible value. But the other
|
| 16 | thing, which I'm sure that all of you know, is that they
|
| 17 | spend a lot of their time doing prospecting. They spend
|
| 18 | a lot of their time prospecting. You know, they go from
|
| 19 | door to door, they leave notepads with their pictures on
|
| 20 | them. In the neighborhood where I live, I have a lot of
|
| 21 | realtors living free pumpkins on my door step. You
|
| 22 | know, they call on FSBOs. They service their farm. I'm
|
| 23 | sure you all know what I mean.
|
| 24 | I guess our claim is that the second type of
|
| 25 | activities, prospecting, is really of little value to us |
Page 244
| 1 | consumers. What we value is the services that a realtor
|
| 2 | usually provides in getting the right price for the
|
| 3 | house and in negotiating the offer and in getting to
|
| 4 | closing, all of the things that the previous panelists
|
| 5 | talked about. That's of real value to us.
|
| 6 | But these things, the prospecting, is of little
|
| 7 | value, are things of little value to us, and our claim
|
| 8 | is that the amount of time and the amount of money that
|
| 9 | a realtor spends on the second type of activity
|
| 10 | increases when housing prices go up. So, the answer to
|
| 11 | the question I asked a minute ago, what are realtors
|
| 12 | doing with their time? They are doing most of the time,
|
| 13 | doing this, the prospecting part, and less of the time
|
| 14 | doing this, the actual matching of buyers and sellers.
|
| 15 | So, to end the story, what is the bottom line?
|
| 16 | What is the bottom line of the story? Well, let me ask
|
| 17 | you, how much is the waste? How much is the social
|
| 18 | waste? Well, here it's hard to give a precise answer,
|
| 19 | because it depends on what you take as your benchmark;
|
| 20 | that is, you know, how much time should it take for a
|
| 21 | realtor to do things that are of value to us, to us as
|
| 22 | consumers?
|
| 23 | So, if you take your benchmark city as Athens,
|
| 24 | Georgia, that is, you know, what do I mean by a
|
| 25 | benchmark city? If you make the assumption that all the |
Page 245
| 1 | all of the time that realtors in Athens, Georgia are
|
| 2 | putting in is actually of real use to us, that it's of
|
| 3 | real social value to us, and brokers in all of the other
|
| 4 | cities in the U.S. aren't as productive as brokers in
|
| 5 | Athens, Georgia, if you were to take that, the waste,
|
| 6 | the amount of time and effort that is put into
|
| 7 | prospecting, that amounts to $8.2 billion in 1990, which
|
| 8 | are half of the revenues of the real estate brokerage
|
| 9 | business in that year.
|
| 10 | Our data from the Census suggests that earnings
|
| 11 | of brokers in 1990 are about $16 billion, and this
|
| 12 | figure, I think if you sort of look at it more recently
|
| 13 | for 2000, which we have not done, my guess is that it
|
| 14 | probably would be higher then. So, you know, $8 billion
|
| 15 | is, you know, is a lot of money.
|
| 16 | So, in a sense, again, this is what we call the
|
| 17 | tragedy of the commission. It's basically efforts to
|
| 18 | protect the price, you know, efforts to try to deal with
|
| 19 | discount brokers such as eRealty.com, efforts to deal
|
| 20 | with, you know, again, in my area, with ZipRealty. All
|
| 21 | of those efforts are ultimately self-defeating, because
|
| 22 | they don't benefit from it. I mean, that is the tragedy
|
| 23 | of the business.
|
| 24 | If I want to take the analogy that Mr. Yun gave
|
| 25 | about the baseball vendors in the stadium, Mr. Yun just |
Page 246
| 1 | gave one part of the story, and it's the first step in
|
| 2 | the analysis, but the right way to try to think about
|
| 3 | what's going on in the real estate brokerage business is
|
| 4 | that basically there is free entry into becoming a
|
| 5 | vendor in a baseball stadium. So, therefore, price is
|
| 6 | still -- essentially, if you want to think of it an
|
| 7 | analogy, what's going on in the real estate business is
|
| 8 | that prices of hotdogs in the stadium are still fixed
|
| 9 | at, you know, 10 bucks, beer is still fixed at 20 bucks,
|
| 10 | but instead what you have is for every person who's
|
| 11 | watching a game in the stadium, there are two vendors,
|
| 12 | and that's, of course, an exaggeration, but that's one
|
| 13 | way to look at it, because there basically is free
|
| 14 | entry, and basically the people who are watching the
|
| 15 | game and buying hotdogs and beer, they are paying more,
|
| 16 | and it's not clear what they are getting out of it.
|
| 17 | So, I think that what we should be trying to do
|
| 18 | is to think about ways where we could try to create
|
| 19 | structures or laws that would try to channel competition
|
| 20 | in the real estate brokerage business, because it's
|
| 21 | clear there's an enormous amount of competition in the
|
| 22 | real estate brokerage business, but what we should try
|
| 23 | to do is think of ways in which competition translates
|
| 24 | into lower prices, higher quality of service, not into
|
| 25 | this kind of waste. |
Page 247
| 1 | Thank you.
|
| 2 | (Applause.)
|
| 3 | DR. SALINGER: We originally had three speakers
|
| 4 | scheduled for today, and one of them had to drop out. I
|
| 5 | was originally on tap just as the moderator, for which
|
| 6 | the two requirements are that you have a suit and a
|
| 7 | watch, but since the one speaker dropped out, I'm going
|
| 8 | to take a somewhat more active role and discuss a little
|
| 9 | bit what we just heard.
|
| 10 | I'm going to try to stir up the pot a bit, as if
|
| 11 | these gentlemen haven't done enough already to stir up
|
| 12 | the pot, but given that I'm going to try to do that, I
|
| 13 | should issue our standard disclaimer, which is that
|
| 14 | anything I say today reflects my views and doesn't
|
| 15 | reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any
|
| 16 | of the Commissioners.
|
| 17 | When I was a staff economist at the FTC 20 years
|
| 18 | ago, literally my first assignment was to analyze the
|
| 19 | persistence of 6 percent commission rates on residential
|
| 20 | real estate transactions in the wake of what at the time
|
| 21 | seemed like dramatically increased prices of real
|
| 22 | estate. Unlike Rip Van Winkle, I am finding the world
|
| 23 | peculiarly unchanged after 20 years. But of course, the
|
| 24 | world has changed quite a bit.
|
| 25 | Technology has developed so that it should be |
Page 248
| 1 | easier and less expensive to make information about
|
| 2 | properties for sale available to would-be buyers. Many
|
| 3 | types of transactions are done differently and at less
|
| 4 | expense than used to be the case, and prices of real
|
| 5 | estate, particularly in some urban areas, have continued
|
| 6 | to increase. So, as Dr. Hsieh and I'm sure many people
|
| 7 | today have pointed out, the puzzle is why the percentage
|
| 8 | commission has been so stubbornly persistent.
|
| 9 | We've seen this pattern in industries before.
|
| 10 | This is not a unique case. I thought I'd talk a little
|
| 11 | bit about where else we've seen this pattern. One of
|
| 12 | them is airlines.
|
| 13 | Prior to airline deregulation, the Civil
|
| 14 | Aeronautics Board regulated the price of airline
|
| 15 | service, and it regulated entry. Even though it
|
| 16 | regulated entry, it didn't regulate the quantity of
|
| 17 | service. So, if you had the authority to fly a
|
| 18 | particular route, then you could put as many planes on
|
| 19 | that route as you wanted. So, what happened?
|
| 20 | Well, one thing that happened was that prices
|
| 21 | were really high, and they were particularly high on
|
| 22 | long distance routes. Just to take one example, in
|
| 23 | 1977, which is at the end of the regulatory period, the
|
| 24 | average discounted round-trip fare from Los Angeles to
|
| 25 | Washington was $333 in 1977 dollars; that would be $779 |
Page 249
| 1 | in today's dollars. Last week on Travelocity, you could
|
| 2 | buy a ticket for $183. Now, that's not quite a fair
|
| 3 | comparison, because that was the best price we could
|
| 4 | find, so it's not the average, but still, the average
|
| 5 | price on that route has surely come down dramatically.
|
| 6 | Now, even though prices were high and
|
| 7 | particularly high on these long routes, it didn't help
|
| 8 | the airlines any. A striking feature of that experience
|
| 9 | was that even though we were regulating minimum prices,
|
| 10 | the airlines weren't making any money. Why was that?
|
| 11 | Well, the airlines learned that when passengers
|
| 12 | called up an airline to make a reservation, they would
|
| 13 | call up the airline that had the most frequent flights.
|
| 14 | That created an incentive to fly as many planes as you
|
| 15 | could on that route, and what we saw was that load
|
| 16 | factors were lower than they had to be.
|
| 17 | I have fond memories of flying in that era when
|
| 18 | you would get on a plane, and you would find that you
|
| 19 | could stretch out across three empty seats. That hasn't
|
| 20 | happened to me in a while, and I suspect it hasn't
|
| 21 | happened to you.
|
| 22 | Now, airlines aren't the only example of this
|
| 23 | phenomena. Another is stock brokerage. We used to
|
| 24 | regulate the minimum price per share that would be
|
| 25 | charged for stock brokerage, and the consequence of that |
Page 250
| 1 | was that there was a lot of service competition to try
|
| 2 | to get those rents that were built into the regulated
|
| 3 | prices.
|
| 4 | The results that Professor Hsieh has reported to
|
| 5 | us today fit those patterns quite closely. Prices
|
| 6 | apparently above competitive levels and free entry
|
| 7 | combine to cause excessive entry and excess capacity.
|
| 8 | Remarkably, in the real estate industry, productivity
|
| 9 | seems to have declined.
|
| 10 | There was an article in The Times on Saturday
|
| 11 | about the steel industry. It made the point that it
|
| 12 | used to take nine hours of time to produce a ton of
|
| 13 | steel, and now that's down to two or three hours, and if
|
| 14 | you just look across the economy, we've seen dramatic
|
| 15 | improvements in productivity, but apparently not in the
|
| 16 | real estate industry.
|
| 17 | Now, the most striking, I think, features of
|
| 18 | Professor Hsieh's results are the comparison across
|
| 19 | urban areas and the comparison of the productivity of
|
| 20 | real estate agents in areas depending on whether there
|
| 21 | are high real estate prices or low real estate prices
|
| 22 | and whether or not the prices have gone up.
|
| 23 | Another feature of Professor Hsieh's results
|
| 24 | that are reminiscent of the airline industry are that
|
| 25 | the productivity is particularly low in those areas |
Page 251
| 1 | where the prices seem to be high. In the airlines, we
|
| 2 | would see lower load factors on the long distance
|
| 3 | routes, where with the real estate industry, we're
|
| 4 | seeing less productivity in the high price areas.
|
| 5 | Dr. Yun has been very kind to be on our panel
|
| 6 | today, and I don't want to appear to be an ungracious
|
| 7 | host, but it would be naive for an NAR economist to come
|
| 8 | to this conference and not expect to get some tough
|
| 9 | questions, and indeed, I would expect that he or I would
|
| 10 | welcome the opportunity to answer the questions. So,
|
| 11 | I'll put it to you directly.
|
| 12 | In the airlines, we deregulated the prices and
|
| 13 | eliminated restrictions on entry, and prices came down
|
| 14 | dramatically. Now, true, some aspects of quality have
|
| 15 | dropped. Airline food is not as good as it used to be,
|
| 16 | but even accounting for that, the economists who have
|
| 17 | looked at this have concluded that we are by far better
|
| 18 | off with the lower prices than we were with the higher
|
| 19 | service levels designed to attract people to pay the
|
| 20 | higher prices.
|
| 21 | If we were to figure out a way to bring more
|
| 22 | price competition to the current commission structure --
|
| 23 | and I should hasten to add that I'm having my un-Rip Van
|
| 24 | Winkle type feelings, because it has not proven so
|
| 25 | simple to do so -- why wouldn't we expect to see a |
Page 252
| 1 | similar phenomenon with real estate brokerage? Why
|
| 2 | wouldn't we expect prices in general to come down? Why
|
| 3 | wouldn't we expect them particularly to come down in
|
| 4 | areas with high real estate prices? And why wouldn't
|
| 5 | those developments, on balance, be beneficial?
|
| 6 | DR. YUN: Thank you for the question.
|
| 7 | First, I think the question is premised on the
|
| 8 | fact or the belief that somehow the prices, commission,
|
| 9 | is regulated. As everyone was saying, it is perfectly
|
| 10 | negotiable.
|
| 11 | Also, I would recommend to Professor Hsieh, he
|
| 12 | talked about 5 or 6 percent in California. Put up a
|
| 13 | sign saying "I am only willing to pay 4 percent" and see
|
| 14 | how many realtors you get. Prices are negotiable
|
| 15 | currently.
|
| 16 | Also, I would say that industry has
|
| 17 | fundamentally shifted. In prior years where the
|
| 18 | Multiple Service Listing information was held more by
|
| 19 | brokers and less on the consumer side, where the brokers
|
| 20 | had more leverage -- we are talking about 1990 data on
|
| 21 | Census -- currently, the Multiple Listing Service data
|
| 22 | is available to all consumers. It was brought out
|
| 23 | through the system that we currently have. It is a
|
| 24 | private market system. There was an incentive by some
|
| 25 | entrepreneurs to create certain internet friendly |
Page 253
| 1 | system, so the information is widely available.
|
| 2 | I would say that the real estate section of the
|
| 3 | advertisements in The Washington Post, living here, ten
|
| 4 | years ago, I would not have seen any prominent ad of 4
|
| 5 | and a half percent commission. We see that currently
|
| 6 | widespread. Others say they are not a discounter, but
|
| 7 | nonetheless, they offer a much higher level of service.
|
| 8 | So, commission ranges all over the place, and
|
| 9 | also, again, questioning the 5.1 percent, again, all the
|
| 10 | realtors, number one complaint that I hear from
|
| 11 | realtors, is there's too much competition -- sort of
|
| 12 | following Professor Hsieh's story -- too much
|
| 13 | competition, but at the same time, you know, one can say
|
| 14 | there's too much excessive waste of resources.
|
| 15 | In tournament games, people want to be sports
|
| 16 | stars, but only few people can become sports stars, yet
|
| 17 | millions of youngsters spend a lot of time and resources
|
| 18 | in the process. So, one can say that's a wasted energy,
|
| 19 | so that all those youngsters should stop playing sports.
|
| 20 | You know, we don't do that.
|
| 21 | In the little document written by Thomas
|
| 22 | Jefferson which says that every person has the right to
|
| 23 | life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, he did not
|
| 24 | say happiness, he said pursuit of happiness. Sure, some
|
| 25 | realtors go into the market, face bad business decisions |
Page 254
| 1 | and exit, but that's their right, that's their decision
|
| 2 | to enter and exit.
|
| 3 | Again, I would say the market has changed
|
| 4 | fundamentally, and I think there's more room for
|
| 5 | negotiation today than before, and certainly information
|
| 6 | is widely available. It's certainly not regulated.
|
| 7 | DR. SALINGER: Okay, well, we have gotten a
|
| 8 | number of questions from the audience, and one of them
|
| 9 | relates to your point when you say that this isn't a
|
| 10 | regulated price, it's a market price, and that's
|
| 11 | certainly the case. So, this is a question for
|
| 12 | Dr. Hsieh.
|
| 13 | Do you have any theory for if the commission
|
| 14 | rate that we're observing is not a competitive rate,
|
| 15 | given how structurally competitive the market appears to
|
| 16 | be, do you have an explanation for why the rate
|
| 17 | persists?
|
| 18 | DR. HSIEH: That's a great question, and I
|
| 19 | really don't have the answer. I don't have the answer
|
| 20 | for that question. I mean, as Dr. Yun said, it could
|
| 21 | very well be the case that if you look at the data now,
|
| 22 | commission rates have fallen a little bit, but still, I
|
| 23 | think it's a little bit disingenuous to say that
|
| 24 | commissions have fallen in a place like Bethesda, where
|
| 25 | housing prices have tripled in the last 15 years. So, |
Page 255
| 1 | commission rates falling from 6 to 5.1, you know, you
|
| 2 | are still paying more than twice as much for selling
|
| 3 | exactly the same house, and again, it's not clear what
|
| 4 | you are getting for the service.
|
| 5 | Now, the direct answer to your question, I mean,
|
| 6 | I really don't have an answer to the question. I mean,
|
| 7 | it's something that has puzzled me a lot, and I'm sure
|
| 8 | that it's puzzled Michael as well, because I recommend
|
| 9 | that all of you go read the two volumes of the FTC
|
| 10 | Report on the Real Estate Industry that was published in
|
| 11 | 1982, because a lot of the same issues are there, are
|
| 12 | there in that 1982 staff report.
|
| 13 | I guess if you were to push me to try to give
|
| 14 | some guesses on why it's the case, I mean, I think it's
|
| 15 | basically a story of about principals, the homeowners,
|
| 16 | who are weak, who are weak and that, you know, that
|
| 17 | basically it's the most important financial transaction
|
| 18 | of their life. They don't have any experience or most
|
| 19 | people don't have a whole lot of experience in doing
|
| 20 | this.
|
| 21 | So, it's a case that's just ripe for the typical
|
| 22 | principal/agent problems, and if you want to think about
|
| 23 | other features of the real estate business, it seems
|
| 24 | that a lot of other things seem to be consistent with
|
| 25 | this story. For example, something that I haven't |
Page 256
| 1 | talked about, forget about the debate about whether
|
| 2 | commissions should be 6 percent or 2 percent, which is
|
| 3 | what it is in the U.K., but one interesting thing to
|
| 4 | think about is why is the commission rate a fixed
|
| 5 | percent of the total value of the house.
|
| 6 | The reason I ask this question is suppose that
|
| 7 | you have a house that will sell for approximately half a
|
| 8 | million dollars, give or take $30,000 either way. You
|
| 9 | could list the house for $400,000, and you could give
|
| 10 | the house away. If the house was worth about $500,000,
|
| 11 | if you list the house, you would be willing to sell it
|
| 12 | for $400,000, you know, you have got buyers flocking to
|
| 13 | you. You don't need an agent for that.
|
| 14 | But then the question is, so, basically, what is
|
| 15 | the marginal value of the agent? The marginal value of
|
| 16 | the agent is basically gets you prices that are higher
|
| 17 | than $500,000. So, in other words, the point of this is
|
| 18 | that the optimal commission structure, if the interest
|
| 19 | of the seller is really the interest that you have in
|
| 20 | mind, should be one in which you get nothing if you sell
|
| 21 | the house for under $450,000, but for every dollar that
|
| 22 | you sell above that amount, you get 50 cents on that, so
|
| 23 | that this would more closely align the incentives of the
|
| 24 | broker with that of the seller, yet this is not the
|
| 25 | case. |
Page 257
| 1 | But this is the case if you want to look at
|
| 2 | other things, because this is roughly the way in which
|
| 3 | car salesmen are compensated, that, you know, that if
|
| 4 | you sell a car at a very low price, you get nothing from
|
| 5 | the owner of the car dealership, and it seems that the
|
| 6 | difference is that the agent that the car salesman is
|
| 7 | dealing with sells hundreds of cars every month. So, he
|
| 8 | has an interest or she has an interest to set the
|
| 9 | optimal structure, the optimal compensation structure
|
| 10 | for the agent, but that's not the case with the
|
| 11 | homeowner, because they are doing this for the first
|
| 12 | time or they are doing this two or three times. It's
|
| 13 | just not worth their time to try to negotiate the
|
| 14 | optimal commission. I think it's really a story about
|
| 15 | agents which are weak.
|
| 16 | DR. SALINGER: Well, I was about to ask a
|
| 17 | question that was appropriate for both panelists, but it
|
| 18 | turns out you have just posed the question, so I'm going
|
| 19 | to turn it to Dr. Yun, but I'll elaborate on it a little
|
| 20 | bit.
|
| 21 | Why do we see the commission structure that we
|
| 22 | see? Professor Hsieh has suggested that maybe we should
|
| 23 | expect to see contracts with higher powered incentives.
|
| 24 | The question here is what if we had salaried agents, and
|
| 25 | in your comments, you said, well, the real estate |
Page 258
| 1 | transaction is different from, say, selling stocks or
|
| 2 | airline tickets because it's not a homogeneous
|
| 3 | transaction, but the typical real estate transaction has
|
| 4 | a lawyer doing some work on it, and that piece of it is
|
| 5 | not necessarily as homogeneous as stock brokerage or the
|
| 6 | sorts of things that you see done on the internet, and
|
| 7 | those are typically compensated by the hour. So, how do
|
| 8 | you explain the percentage rate?
|
| 9 | DR. YUN: I think the percentage rate occur due
|
| 10 | to sort of the historical patterns. I mean, in the
|
| 11 | prior years, when brokers had a lot of power and more
|
| 12 | information, in fact, they actually told agents, our
|
| 13 | companies charge this percent, or perhaps sort of the
|
| 14 | wiggle room of the commission negotiation is only this,
|
| 15 | but now, I am hearing from so-called full-time brokerage
|
| 16 | services, Long & Foster, Weichert, I asked the agent,
|
| 17 | "Is the commission negotiable or how much does the
|
| 18 | broker influence your commission?" And they said, "It's
|
| 19 | pretty much my decision, and if I want to set it for
|
| 20 | $2,000, $20,000, it's, again, mostly my decision."
|
| 21 | Of course, they have to get the approval from
|
| 22 | the brokers, but it's not necessarily the percent now.
|
| 23 | I think in today's market, people can actually talk
|
| 24 | about the actual fixed dollars, and one thing that has
|
| 25 | not been really discussed is that people are unhappy |
Page 259
| 1 | with 5 percent, 6 percent? Who are these people?
|
| 2 | According to our survey, it's the people who want to do
|
| 3 | for-sale-by-owner. That market is available, it has
|
| 4 | always been available, yet people continue to seek the
|
| 5 | professional service of the realtor agents.
|
| 6 | DR. SALINGER: Well, when you talk about there
|
| 7 | are negotiations going on, and maybe the 6 percent isn't
|
| 8 | like the gravitational constant. It would be really
|
| 9 | helpful to know exactly what the distribution of the
|
| 10 | commissions are, and I know you mentioned in your talk
|
| 11 | that NAR is reluctant to do this because, I mean, the
|
| 12 | explanation was you can sometimes get into antitrust
|
| 13 | problems if you do that, and yet there are standards by
|
| 14 | which trade associations collect data on the market, and
|
| 15 | given that it seems like perhaps there are some
|
| 16 | antitrust problems already that are being driven by this
|
| 17 | presumption that the percentage rate is sticky, why
|
| 18 | haven't you done and why haven't you made public the
|
| 19 | results of a sufficiently systematic survey that would
|
| 20 | tell us what the distribution is?
|
| 21 | DR. YUN: If there is a research within our
|
| 22 | department on the commission, I would like to know. I
|
| 23 | don't know. We have not conducted internal surveys.
|
| 24 | Some brokers have actually asked us, well, why don't you
|
| 25 | conduct possibly -- not even the actual percent |
Page 260
| 1 | distribution, but just the question, has the commission
|
| 2 | increased, commission declined? And the people that I
|
| 3 | report to say, "No, don't touch commissions. We could
|
| 4 | get into trouble with antitrust." So, I really don't
|
| 5 | know the answer to it.
|
| 6 | And just from the market experience, you know,
|
| 7 | one can see the advertisements in the newspapers,
|
| 8 | there's an opportunity for for-sale-by-owner,
|
| 9 | commission, talk to your realtors, ask them, "Is it
|
| 10 | negotiable? Are you willing to do it for 5 and a half
|
| 11 | percent instead of 6 percent?" See what his answer is.
|
| 12 | DR. SALINGER: I think we have time for one more
|
| 13 | question, because I want to give you equal time.
|
| 14 | You mentioned that commissions were 2 percent in
|
| 15 | England. What do you know about any differences in how
|
| 16 | the market works there, how is it that somehow the
|
| 17 | industry works with such a much lower commission
|
| 18 | structure?
|
| 19 | DR. HSIEH: The only thing that I know about the
|
| 20 | U.K. case, I haven't spent much time looking at this,
|
| 21 | but the only thing that seems to be different from the
|
| 22 | U.K. and the U.S. is that the legal work seems to be
|
| 23 | separate in the U.K., whereas some of the legal work
|
| 24 | might be done by realtors in the U.S., although when I
|
| 25 | bought a house, I had to hire a lawyer to do a lot of |
Page 261
| 1 | the legal work, or in some places, you can use a title
|
| 2 | company to do a lot of the legal work.
|
| 3 | But I guess let me just try to not answer your
|
| 4 | question, but I think that it seems clear, I mean, it
|
| 5 | seems clear, and especially from thinking about what
|
| 6 | we're discussing today, and if you go back to the FTC
|
| 7 | report from more than 20 years ago, things really have
|
| 8 | not changed that much. So, it just seems to me that we
|
| 9 | have to stop thinking about other things, other things.
|
| 10 | I'm reminded of the case of discount brokerage
|
| 11 | where the mergers in the internet might do it, might do
|
| 12 | it eventually, but you might get a case where you start
|
| 13 | to think about things like, you know, why not think
|
| 14 | about separating the MLS part of the business from the
|
| 15 | brokerage part of the business, because it seems that a
|
| 16 | lot of this is really just the access to data, the
|
| 17 | access to information, and there's no reason why they
|
| 18 | have to be part of the same thing.
|
| 19 | Now, I'm sure that some people are going to kick
|
| 20 | and scream, but that seems like, you know, if we could
|
| 21 | think about radical solutions for IBM back in the 1970s,
|
| 22 | then it seems that we could start to think outside the
|
| 23 | box to try to think about ways to bring more value to
|
| 24 | consumers.
|
| 25 | DR. SALINGER: All right. Well, thank you to |
Page 262
| 1 | everyone who has stuck it out for this long and also
|
| 2 | thank you to our panelists for a very lively discussion.
|
| 3 | (Applause.)
|
| 4 | MS. OHLHAUSEN: Before I introduce our closing
|
| 5 | speakers, I just wanted to reiterate what I mentioned
|
| 6 | this morning, which is that the record for the workshop
|
| 7 | will be open another month, until November 25th, so as
|
| 8 | you can see, there are a lot of issues that were raised
|
| 9 | today, and if people want to follow up on them or if you
|
| 10 | feel there were issues that were not raised that you
|
| 11 | want to bring to our attention, I definitely urge you to
|
| 12 | file comments on the FTC web site and the USDOJ web
|
| 13 | site.
|
| 14 | Now, it's my pleasure to introduce our two
|
| 15 | closing speakers. First, we are going to hear from
|
| 16 | Susan Creighton, who's the Director of the Bureau of
|
| 17 | Competition at the Federal Trade Commission, and she
|
| 18 | will be followed by J. Robert Kramer, Junior, Director
|
| 19 | of Operations from the Antitrust Division at the
|
| 20 | Department of Justice.
|
| 21 | Susan?
|
| 22 | MS. CREIGHTON: Good afternoon. On behalf of
|
| 23 | the FTC, I wanted to thank you for joining us today. As
|
| 24 | you heard from Professor Hsieh, the FTC has been very
|
| 25 | active in this area for a number of years now, and this |
Page 263
| 1 | workshop is one manifestation of our long-term interest.
|
| 2 | I want to thank you for contributing to the panels
|
| 3 | today, as well as for all of your comments, both those
|
| 4 | that have already been submitted and those that may be
|
| 5 | submitted in the future. I am sure they will contribute
|
| 6 | considerably to our understanding going forward of the
|
| 7 | many important issues in this policy debate.
|
| 8 | Coming from an enforcer's perspective, I believe
|
| 9 | that the single overarching story line of our program
|
| 10 | for many years probably has been this: From time to
|
| 11 | time conventional, full-price brokers have taken
|
| 12 | collective action to disadvantage innovative,
|
| 13 | reduced-service, lower-priced brokers. The particular
|
| 14 | actions that they have taken have changed over time, but
|
| 15 | the same intent resurfaces. And we've engaged in an
|
| 16 | ongoing process of identifying and preventing those
|
| 17 | actions.
|
| 18 | Dating back to the late 1980s and early 1990s,
|
| 19 | we brought cases involving local MLSs that were refusing
|
| 20 | to list houses that were being sold under "exclusive
|
| 21 | agency" contracts, or were treating such listings on
|
| 22 | disadvantageous terms. The underlying MLS rules were a
|
| 23 | form of private agreement, and we thought the agreements
|
| 24 | were anti-competitive on that particular point. We
|
| 25 | obtained a number of consents against that |
Page 264
| 1 | discriminatory treatment.
|
| 2 | Since that time, the FTC has continued to be
|
| 3 | active in enforcement in the real estate area, in the
|
| 4 | area of enforcement. In the last ten years, between
|
| 5 | 1995 and 2005, we have conducted a total of 22 real
|
| 6 | estate related matters. These include a mix of
|
| 7 | investigations, cases, advisory opinions and advocacies,
|
| 8 | but most were investigations. Not all investigations
|
| 9 | led to filed cases, of course, but some did.
|
| 10 | In 1995, for example, we obtained a consent
|
| 11 | order from the Port Washington Real Estate Board. That
|
| 12 | order prohibited restrictions on the use of exclusive
|
| 13 | agency listings, restrictions on holding open houses or
|
| 14 | using "for sale" signs, restrictions on advertising free
|
| 15 | services such as free appraisals, and similar matters.
|
| 16 | So, we've maintained a continuous monitoring presence in
|
| 17 | the industry.
|
| 18 | More recently, efforts to burden reduced-service
|
| 19 | brokers have broadened from MLS rules to state
|
| 20 | governmental action. There's nothing improper about an
|
| 21 | industry advocating restrictive policies to the
|
| 22 | government, of course. However, such policies aren't
|
| 23 | always in the public interest either. When asked for
|
| 24 | their views, the antitrust agencies have sometimes
|
| 25 | pointed out what we see as the public cost of these |
Page 265
| 1 | constraints.
|
| 2 | Earlier this year, for example, the FTC and the
|
| 3 | DOJ jointly sent advocacy letters to the governors or
|
| 4 | real estate commissions of three states, Texas, Missouri
|
| 5 | and Alabama. The letters urged those jurisdictions not
|
| 6 | to adopt proposed "minimum service" rules. State
|
| 7 | authorities haven't been as responsive to our advocacy
|
| 8 | letters as we might wish, but that's another story.
|
| 9 | Just last week, we sent a fourth letter to Michigan, and
|
| 10 | perhaps now our fortunes will turn.
|
| 11 | Our current law enforcement investigations,
|
| 12 | unlike our advocacy letters, are, of course, not public;
|
| 13 | however, I think it's safe to say that we are continuing
|
| 14 | to look for possible anti-competitive agreements. In
|
| 15 | particular, we're looking for agreements that are
|
| 16 | intended to exclude new entry by brokerage firms that
|
| 17 | use new, more responsive, lower-cost business models.
|
| 18 | Problematic agreements could take any of several
|
| 19 | forms, but two clear areas of focus include MLS rules
|
| 20 | that put cut-rate brokers at some unwarranted
|
| 21 | disadvantage in their listings, and conduct aimed at
|
| 22 | improperly punishing or deterring advertisements that
|
| 23 | inform the public of the availability of reduced-cost
|
| 24 | services.
|
| 25 | Now, let me end these short remarks by |
Page 266
| 1 | emphasizing that we recognize that most real estate
|
| 2 | brokers are not engaged in illegal agreements, and we
|
| 3 | applaud the essential and highly valuable services that
|
| 4 | they provide. We offer our own services in helping them
|
| 5 | devise new means of selling houses that respond to
|
| 6 | consumer demands and also avoid antitrust entanglements.
|
| 7 | That seems to be one of the benefits of exercises such
|
| 8 | as this workshop, and we will continue to look forward
|
| 9 | towards working with you on this.
|
| 10 | Let me invite my colleague, Bob Kramer, who's
|
| 11 | the Director of Operations at the Antitrust Division of
|
| 12 | the Department of Justice, to the podium.
|
| 13 | MR. KRAMER: Thank you, Susan.
|
| 14 | I can be brief, in part because Susan really
|
| 15 | fully and adequately covered the collective advocacy
|
| 16 | that our agencies do in the real estate industry, and I
|
| 17 | would like to emphasize that it is a collective activity
|
| 18 | that we cooperate with each other on, and I'll shy away
|
| 19 | from discussion of cases, because we are in litigation
|
| 20 | right now, and that wouldn't really be appropriate.
|
| 21 | So, on the Department's behalf, I would like to
|
| 22 | thank the industry participants, the scholars, the
|
| 23 | consumer representatives and the regulators who took the
|
| 24 | time to be here today on the panels and to share their
|
| 25 | perspectives with us. Their ideas about and analyses of |
Page 267
| 1 | competition in the real estate industry sparked vigorous
|
| 2 | discussions that we've heard today. I had a great time
|
| 3 | sitting here today and listening to the panels. I found
|
| 4 | it highly instructive.
|
| 5 | I'd also like to thank you in the audience for
|
| 6 | your active participation. I'd like to thank the FTC
|
| 7 | for helping in sponsoring this event and for the use of
|
| 8 | this conference facility. As the Acting Assistant
|
| 9 | Attorney General stated this morning, although the
|
| 10 | Department of Justice and the FTC have taken positions
|
| 11 | on some of the issues discussed today, the purpose of
|
| 12 | this workshop is to involve others in the debate by
|
| 13 | providing a forum in which interested parties can
|
| 14 | discuss these issues with differing points of view. As
|
| 15 | the large turnout and the lively audience participation
|
| 16 | have demonstrated, I think we have succeeded in
|
| 17 | promoting dialogue about competition in an industry so
|
| 18 | very important to American consumers.
|
| 19 | Thank you for coming. Have a safe trip back.
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| 20 | (Applause.)
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| 21 | (Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the workshop was
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| 22 | concluded.)
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| 23 |
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| 24 |
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| 25 | |
Page 268
| 1 | C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F R E P O R T E R
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| 2 | DOCKET/FILE NUMBER: V050015
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| 3 | CASE TITLE: COMPETITION POLICY AND THE REAL ESTATE
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| 4 | INDUSTRY
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| 5 | DATE: OCTOBER 25, 2005
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| 6 | I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained
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| 7 | herein is a full and accurate transcript of the notes
|
| 8 | taken by me at the hearing on the above cause before the
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| 9 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my knowledge and
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| 10 | belief.
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| 11 |
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| 12 | DATED: 11/8/05
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| 13 |
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| 14 |
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| 15 |
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| 16 | SUSANNE BERGLING, RMR
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| 17 |
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| 18 | C E R T I F I C A T I O N O F P R O O F R E A D E R
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| 19 | I HEREBY CERTIFY that I proofread the transcript
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| 20 | for accuracy in spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and
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| 21 | format.
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| 22 |
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| 23 |
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| 24 | DIANE QUADE
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| 25 | |
|