

# VERSION 1

**A F F I D A V I T**

I, FARRELL A. BINDER, being duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say:

I.

**INTRODUCTION**

1. I am a Special Agent ("SA") for the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and have served in that capacity for more than ten years. I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Office, White Collar Division, Public Corruption Squad. My current chief responsibility involves the investigation of public corruption matters including violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). During my employment with the FBI, I have participated in investigations involving public corruption, bribery, fraud against the government, bank and loan fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, social security fraud, and money laundering. Many of these investigations have involved the use of informants and cooperating witnesses, and have required financial analysis. I have also participated in the execution of numerous search and arrests warrants. I have conducted physical surveillance and have monitored electronic surveillance. In addition, I have attended numerous training sessions on the investigation of white collar crimes, including specialized training for FCPA investigations. The opinions I have formed and set forth in this affidavit are based on my experience and training, as well as my

consultation with other experienced investigators and agents of the FBI.

2. This affidavit is made in support of an application for a warrant to search the Azusa business office (described with particularity below) of a manufacturing company and associated entities, which are believed to have been involved in bribery and money laundering in relation to payments to a senior official of the government of Mexico for the award and renewal of a contracts to \_\_\_\_.

3. There is probable cause, which is presented below in Part V, Probable Cause, to believe that 760 N. Georgia Avenue, Azusa, California 91702 ("**SUBJECT PREMISES**") contains evidence of violations of federal law committed by Keith LINDSEY (LINDSEY), doing business as ("dba") LINDSEY MANUFACTURING CO. ("LMC") and others, specifically, evidence of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 (Conspiracy), Title 15, United States Code, 78dd-1, et seq. (Corrupt Payments to Foreign Officials), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering).

4. I make this affidavit based on personal knowledge, my training and experience, and information that I have received from other agents and other law enforcement officers in the course of my participation in this investigation as a case agent. This affidavit is intended to establish probable cause for the

requested search warrants, and does not include all information known to me relating to this investigation.

**II.**

**SUBJECT PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED**

5. The **SUBJECT PREMISES** to be searched, the business address and/or offices of LMC, business entities associated with LINDSEY, at 760 N. Georgia Avenue, Azusa, California 91702, is further described as follows:

- a. The building is a
- b. On the first floor,

**III.**

**SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE FEDERAL STATUTES**

6. The anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), codified at Title 15, United States Code, 78dd-1, et seq., among other things, make it unlawful for any United States "domestic concern," or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of such domestic concern, to make use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any "foreign official" for purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his (or her) official capacity, in order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining

or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.

7. The definition of a "domestic concern" under the FCPA includes: (a) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and (b) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.

8. The definition of a "foreign official" under the FCPA includes: any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.

9. Under the federal money laundering statutes, which prohibit certain financial transfers or transactions with the proceeds of "specified unlawful activity," a violation of the FCPA is within the definition of specified unlawful activity pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(c)(7)(D).

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IV.

OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATION AND PROBABLE CAUSE

10. The instant investigation began in May 2007 after ABB, a company based in Switzerland who voluntarily self-reported to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) that their Sugarland, Texas subsidiary, ABB Network Management (ABB-NM), had provided bribe payments to public officials in Mexico in order to obtain contracts with Mexican state owned facility Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE). ABB reported that the bribe payments were made through an intermediary, Grupo International S.A. (Grupo). An investigation was initiated by the SEC. Through the SEC investigation, Grupo's bank and investment records were subpoenaed. A review of the bank and investment records showed that ABB paid Grupo \_\_\_\_\_, which were then passed on to \_\_\_\_\_. A review of the bank records also revealed that LINDSEY had also paid Grupo \_\_\_\_\_. The money paid to Grupo appeared to be turned into payments for a Ferrari, Yacht and American Express credit card bill for NESTOR MORENO, a Mexican public official who was, at the time, Deputy Director of \_\_\_\_\_ of CFE. NESTOR MORENO, was later promoted to Director of Operations of CFE. LINDSEY was awarded contracts by CFE for \$\_\_\_\_\_. The FBI took over the investigation of LINDSEY, a privately-held company, and therefore not within the SEC's jurisdiction.

11. As set forth below, the FBI has developed substantial corroboration of the allegations through documentary evidence establishing, among other things, the transfer of approximately \$\_\_\_\_\_ from LINDSEY through Grupo to the government official, through payments to credit cards, the purchase of a yacht, Dream Seeker, and the purchase of a Ferrari.

12. Also, as set forth below, the **SUBJECT PREMISES** is headquarters to LINDSEY and related entities that manufacture Emergency Restoration Systems (ERS), Current and Voltage Monitoring Devices (CVMD), and Transmission and Distribution Lines Hardware (TDLH), among other things. Accordingly, the **SUBJECT PREMISES** is believed to contain the business documentation that would constitute evidence of FCPA violations and money laundering.

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IV.

**PROBABLE CAUSE**

A. Initial Allegations and Background Investigation

13. On May \_\_, 2008 myself and Special Agent Susan Guernsey (SA Guernsey) spoke with Tonia J. Tornatore, Special Agent, SEC Division of Enforcement (DOE) and learned the following:

a. ABB voluntarily disclosed to the SEC and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) that there were bribes paid to foreign officials from ABB's Sugarland office. b.

The bribes centered around CFE Mexico, which handles all of the electricity in Mexico, other than Mexico City.

c. CFE Mexico is a federal company, owned by the Mexican government.

d. In the course of gathering evidence regarding ABB-NM and CFE, Tornatore learned of intermediaries that ABB used in MX. The intermediaries were intended to facilitate contract negotiations, shipment of equipment, facilitation of communications, and contract interpretations. In addition, the intermediaries facilitated bribe payments to CFE officials.

e. The intermediaries were:

1. Equipos Systemos Mexicanos (Esimex)



2. Obraf Maritimas (Obraf)

3. Sorvill International (Sorvill).

f. Sorvill was a company owned and run by a husband and wife, Enrique Aguilar (Enrique) and Angela Cepeda Aguilar (Angela). Enrique and Angela also control Grupo and Electrica Energia Economica (EEE).

g. Enrique and Angela live in Cuernavaca, Mexico, but may have property in Houston, Texas.

h. Enrique and Angela have an account for Grupo at a brokerage firm, Global Financial (Global) in Houston, Texas, that the use like a checking account.

i. SA Tornatore's review of Global's records showed several million dollars deposited into Grupo's account from LINDSEY.

j. The deposits corresponded with the purchases of a Ferrari and a yacht. The deposits also corresponded tot he payment of an American Express bill in the name of NESTOR MORENO.

14. I then reviewed search results from a database commonly used by law enforcement, and learned the following about business filings for LINDSEY Manufacturing:

a. On July 5, 1962, LINDSEY Manufacturing Co. was incorporated in the state of California.

b. The President of LINDSEY is Keith E.

LINDSEY (Keith).

c. The principal business address and mailing address for LINDSEY Manufacturing is 760 N. Georgia Avenue, Azusa, CA 91702, i.e., the **SUBJECT PREMISES**;

15. On July 11, 2008, I performed an internet search and located a website entitled LINDSEY-usa.com. A review of the website revealed the following:

a. The address for LINDSEY Manufacturing Co., listed on the website, is 760 N. Georgia Ave. Azusa, CA 91702 USA.

b. L.E. LINDSEY founded LINDSEY in 1947. His son, Dr. Keith E. LINDSEY, is the current president of LINDSEY.

c. Keith is "recognized worldwide as an expert in transmission and distribution."

d. LINDSEY provided an email address of Email.mail@LINDSEY-usa.com.

e. Persons can request information and a request for a quotation, through the website, by filling in a form on the website and "clicking" the "send" button.

B. Money Trail From LINDSEY through Grupo to Mexican subject

15. Financial records appear to substantially corroborate the SEC's investigation that showed the payment of bribes to a Mexican official funded from the bank account of Grupo, through the Los Angeles-area company of KEITH E. LINDSEY

and STEVE K. LEE, and paid out as a Ferrari, a yacht and credit card payments.

16. From my review of LINDSEY's Bank of the West (BOW) checking account, Account #677-010480, for the period January 2003 to June 2 2004, LINDSEY's Preferred Bank's checking account, Account #9600132, for the period January 2005 to February 2007, LINDSEY's United California Bank checking account, Account #\_\_\_\_\_, for the period \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, I learned the following:

a. Between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, the BOW bank records for LINDSEY reflect that the addresses for LINDSEY is 970 N. Georgia Avenue Azusa, California 90\_\_\_\_, i.e., the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

b. There were seven signatories on the BOW LINDSEY account. They were Keith, Lela S. LINDSEY, STEVE K. LEE, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_;

c. From September 9, 2003 to December 30, 2003, LINDSEY made nine (9) wire transfers to Grupo's Global investment account, totaling \$\_\_\_\_\_, from LINDSEY's BOW account number 677-010480.

d. Between \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_, the Preferred bank records for LINDSEY reflect that the addresses for LINDSEY is 970 N. Georgia Avenue Azusa, California 90712, i.e., the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

e. From January 19, 2005 to February 14, 2007, LINDSEY made ten wire transfers to Grupo's Global investment account, totaling \$\_\_\_\_\_, from LINDSEY's Preferred, account number 9600132.

f. From \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_, LINDSEY made \_\_\_\_\_ wire transfers to Grupo's Global investment account, totaling \$\_\_\_\_\_, from LINDSEY's United California, account number \_\_\_\_\_.

B. Money Trail From Grupo to Mexican subject

FERRARI:

17. On July 10, 2008, myself and FBI Special Agent Susan Guernsey interviewed Bryant \_\_\_\_\_ (Bryant), Sales Manager of Ferrari of Beverly Hills, 9372 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, CA 90212. Berman provided the following information:

a. Bryant sold Enrique a Ferrari in 2007.

b. Enrique came into the Ferrari dealership several times before purchasing the Ferrari. Once, he came in with a friend.

c. There was nothing unusual about the transaction for the Ferrari.

d. The friend of Enrique's may have been the one who picked up the car for Enrique.

18. On July 10, 2008, myself and FBI Special Agent Susan Guernsey interviewed Sharon Berman (Berman), Office Manager of Ferrari of Beverly Hills, 9372 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills,

CA 90212. Berman provided, among other documents, the following:

a. A sales contract showing that on February 16, 2007, Enrique Aguilar purchased a 2005 Ferrari F430 F1 Spider for \$297,500.

b. An undated "Statement of Facts" re:  
Vehicle I.D. Number ZFFEWS9A150144629 that stated "I/WE ANGELA MARIA GOMEZ CEPEDA THE UNDERSIGNED, HEREBY STATE THAT THE VEHICLE/VESSEL DESCRIBED ABOVE HAVE PAID IN FULL THE AMOUNT OF USD \$297,500.00 (TWO HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 00/100 USD) AND WITH THE PAYMENT TO BE APPLIED TO THE ABOVE-MENTIONED VEHICLE AND TITLED IN THE NAME OF ENRIQUE AGUILAR. I AUTHORIZE MR. NESTOR MORENO TO PICK UP THE CAR AT YOUR FACILITIES.  
I FURTHER AGREE TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE HARMLESS THE DIRECTOR OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS OF SAID VEHICLE OR VESSEL IN CALIFORNIA, FROM ISSUANCE OF A CALIFORNIA CERTIFICATE OF OWNERSHIP COVERING THE SAME, OR TRANSFER TO:  
I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THAT THE INFORMATION ENTERED BY ME ON THIS DOCUMENT IS TRUE AND CORRECT.  
SIGNATURE ANGELA M GOMEZ DE AGUILAR (Signature)  
ADDRESS RIO SENA 441

CITY CUERNAVACA STATE MORELOS MEXICO

DAYTIME TELEPHONE NUMBER (777)3221492"

The document was notarized by Laura Garza

c. A Mexican passport in the name Angela Maria Gomez de Aguilar.

d. An insurance paper from Robert Moreno Insurance Services for the Ferrari, listing the car drivers as Enrique Aguilar and NESTOR MORENO. Both Aguilar and Nestor are listed as having been employees of Global Financial Services for twenty years.

e. A Texas Department of Public Safety Identification Card in the name Enrique Faustino Aguilar.

f. Check number 240 from Angela Maria Gomez Cepeda written from "The Reserve Funds payable through JP Morgan Chase Bank, dated February 16, 2007, payable to Ferrari of Beverly Hills, for \$297,500 for the Ferrari. The check was signed "Angela Aguilar."

18. On July 11, 2008, I reviewed Grupo's Global bank records for February 1 through February 28, 2007, and observed the following:

a. Under the Global "Transaction Detail" report, "Reserve Fund Checking" section, check number 240 dated 02/16/07 to "payee illegible" for \$297,500 posted to Grupo's Global account on 02/23/07.

b. Under the Global "Transaction Detail" report, "Deposits And Withdrawals" section, funds were wired to Grupo from Preferred Bank, account F05704500BB701, on 02/14/2007 in the amount of \$115,879.56.

19. On July 11, 2008, I reviewed LINDSEY's Preferred Bank bank records, which showed the following:

YACHT

a. On \_\_\_\_\_, myself and SA Guernsey interviewed \_\_\_\_\_ at South Shore Yacht Sales, 550 Marina Parkway D-3, Chula Vista, CA 92154, who provided the following information:

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.

b. On July 12, 2008, I reviewed the following documents received from SA Tornatore:

1. One "Membership Interest to Purchase Agreement" between David D. Connor and Christine K. Connor and Baja Horizon, Inc. for the purchase price of 1,810,000 and a closing date of September 29, 2006. Cesar Moreno is listed as President of Baja Horizon, Inc.

2. Photos of Cesar Moreno driving the yacht. 18.

On July 12, 2008, I reviewed Grupo's Global bank records for September 1 through September 29, 2006, and September 30 through

October 31, 2006 and November 1 through November 30, 2006 and observed the following:

a. Under the Global "Transaction Detail" report, "Reserve Fund Checking" section, check number 195 dated 08/28/06 to "South Shore Yacht Saks" for \$540,000 posted to Grupo's Global account on 9/6/06.

b. Under the Global "Transaction Detail" report, "Deposits And Withdrawals" section, funds were wired to Grupo from Preferred Bank, account F05704500BB701, on October 2, 2006 in the amount of \$109,879.38, on October 10, 2006 in the amount of 42,104.40, on November 1, 2006 in the amount of 92,116.74, on November 20, 2006 in the amount of \$1,567,416, and on November 28, 2006 in the amount of \$1,567,416.

c. During these months, there was only one other deposit to Grupo's account. That was a wire from HSBC Bank USA for \$118,573.60.

19. On July 12, 2008, I reviewed LINDSEY's Preferred Bank bank records for account number 9600132, which showed the following:

Wire transfers were made from LINDSEY's Preferred bank account to Bear Sterns in amounts that corresponded to those listed in paragraph \_\_, above.

AMERICAN EXPRESS

20. On February 5, 2008, Global's Chief Compliance



Officer, Jane E. Bates (Bates), via letter, provided the following information:

1. NESTOR MORENO did not have a brokerage account with Global.
2. NESTOR MORENO had a Corporate American Express Card (AmEx) affiliated with Grupo.
3. The payments on NESTOR MORENO's AmEx are paid by Grupo per written instruction's from Grupo's account owner.

21. On July 12, 2008, I reviewed NESTOR MORENO's AmEx statements and payment supporting documentation, which was provided by Bates, dated from 9/5/06 through 1/5/08 which revealed the following:

- a. Over the time period reviewed, NESTOR MORENO had AmEx charges totaling \$\_\_\_\_\_.
- b. Over the time period reviewed, all payments made on NESTOR MORENO's AmEx account were paid from Grupo's Global account.
- c. For each payment, Angela signed a form authorizing the transfer of funds to AmEx to pay NESTOR MORENO's AmEx bills. On each form, under the "must provide detailed explanation" section, Angela wrote "brother-in-law of company owner" presumably referring to NESTOR MORENO.

D. NESTOR MORENO's Position at CFE

19. On July 13, 2008, I performed various internet

searches and learned the following:

a. I searched the Business News America's website, www.bnamericas.com, and reviewed the company profile for CFE. NESTOR MORENO Diaz is listed as CFE's Operation Director, email address nestor.moreno@cfe.gob.mx.

b. Various articles posted to the internet listed NESTOR MORENO as CFE's Operations Director and/or list his previous job at CFE as Deputy Director of \_\_\_\_\_.

E. Evidence Relating Subjects and Scheme to the SUBJECT PREMISES

19. Various sources of evidence link the alleged bribery conspiracy, and its subjects, to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, as follows.

20. *FBI investigation of 970 N. Georgia Avenue, Azusa, California 90\_\_\_\_, i.e., the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, during the period \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_ disclosed that mail was received at this address for the following subject individuals and entities:*

- a. *KEITH E. LINDSEY (on behalf of LINDSEY);*
- b. *STEVE K. LEE (on behalf of LINDSEY);*
- c. *LINDSEY*

21. Surveillance of the office located at 970 N. Georgia Avenue, Azusa (i.e., the **SUBJECT PREMISES**) was conducted on June \_\_, 2008 by FBI SA Guernsey. She observed that the \_\_\_\_\_ on the building \_\_\_\_\_ reflects \_\_\_\_\_.

22. As referenced above, the addresses on the bank

account statements and/or checks for LINDSEY were all the **SUBJECT PREMISES** from January 2003 to \_\_\_\_ 200\_.

23. On July 11, 2008, I conducted an internet search and identified a website, LINDSEY-usa.com, an examination of which disclosed the following:

a. The address for "LINDSEY Manufacturing" is the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

E. Types of Documents Likely To Evidence the Bribery Scheme

24. During the course of my training and experience as a Special Agent and my conversations with other law enforcement agents, I am familiar with the practices and methods of persons committing acts of business fraud, and I believe that actors in such conduct routinely maintain records reflecting or attempting to disguise the fraudulent activity. The records are necessary for the owner to operate a business, know if the business is profitable, and give the appearance of complying with other laws, such as federal statutes relating to taxation. These records reflect, among other things, the business's income, expenses and acquisition of assets. These records may expressly reflect fraudulent activity or, more often, may attempt to disguise the fraudulent activity as legitimate business conduct. I believe the owners of such businesses generally maintain the following records with regard to such conduct:

a. Business records: Financial records,

address lists, personal diaries, ledgers, general ledgers, logs, telephone records, correspondence, and other papers relating to or reflecting the operation of a business involved in contracting with foreign governmental entities;

b. Bank records: Bank statements, cancelled checks, deposit slips, withdrawal transactions, wire transfers;

c. Records of income: Sales invoices, receipts, cash register tapes, and sales journals;

d. Records of expenses: Receipts, invoices, cancelled checks, and journals and ledgers of expenditures;

e. Financial statements: Income statements, statements of cash flow, balance sheets, and income and expense projections;

f. Inventory records: Purchase receipts and inventory journals;

g. Travel records: Expense reports, airline receipts, hotel receipts and entertainment records; and

h. Board minutes.

25. In addition, the aforementioned fact that business mail has been delivered to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, including pieces addressed to "\_\_\_\_\_" for LINDSEY, further supports that the above kinds of financial and business information would be found there.

V.

COMPUTER DATA

26. Based upon my training, experience and information related to me by agents and others involved in the forensic examination of computers, I know that computer data can be stored on a variety of systems and storage devices including hard disk drives, floppy disks, compact disks, magnetic tapes and memory chips. I also know that during the search of the premises it is not always possible to search computer equipment and storage devices for data for a number of reasons, including the following:

a. Searching computer systems is a highly technical process which requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of computer hardware and software in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may also be necessary to consult with computer personnel who have specific expertise in the type of computer, software application or operating system that is being searched.

b. Searching computer systems requires the use of precise, scientific procedures which are designed to maintain the integrity of the evidence and to recover "hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted or password-protected data.

Computer hardware and storage devices may contain "booby traps" that destroy or alter data if certain procedures are not scrupulously followed. Since computer data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, is essential to conducting a complete and accurate analysis of the equipment and storage devices from which the data will be extracted.

c. The volume of data stored on many computer systems and storage devices will typically be so large that it will be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the physical search of the premises. A single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000 double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 160 gigabytes of data are now commonplace in desktop computers. Consequently, each non-networked, desktop computer found during a search can easily contain the equivalent of 80 million pages of data, which, if printed out, would completely fill a 35' x 35' x 10' room to the ceiling. Further, the 160 GB drive could contain as many as approximately 150 full run movies or 150,000 songs.

d. Computer users can attempt to conceal data within computer equipment and storage devices through a number of

methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ".jpg" often are image files; however, a user can easily change the extension to ".txt" to conceal the image and make it appear that the file contains text. Computer users can also attempt to conceal data by using encryption, which means that a password or device, such as a "dongle" or "keycard," is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. In addition, computer users can conceal data within another seemingly unrelated and innocuous file in a process called "steganography." For example, by using steganography a computer user can conceal text in an image file which cannot be viewed when the image file is opened. Therefore, a substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether it is evidence, contraband or instrumentalities of a crime.

VI.

**ITEMS TO BE SEIZED**

27. Based on the foregoing, I respectfully submit that there is probable cause to believe that the following items, which constitute evidence of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 (Conspiracy), Title 15, United States Code, 78dd-1, et seq. (Corrupt Payments to Foreign Officials), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering), will be found at the **SUBJECT PREMISES:**

a. Contracts, agreements, correspondence, memoranda, facsimiles, email messages, notes or any other written communication, board minutes, business journals, incorporation and business license papers, and notes of meetings, reasonably appearing to be related to any of the persons or entities listed below (hereinafter "Subject Persons and Entities"), for the years 2003 through the present:

- i. GRUPO, or any agent or employee thereof;
- ii. CFE, or any agent or employee thereof;
- iii. AGUILAR, ENRIQUE;
- iv. Aguilar, ANGELA CEPEDA;
- v. MAQUINARIA UNIDA, or any agent or employee thereof;
- vi. EEE, INC., or any agent or employee thereof;
- vii. SORVILL, or any agent or employee thereof;
- viii. MORENO, NESTOR;
- ix. MORENO, CESAR;

b. Budgets and budget preparation materials, financial projections, revenue estimates, cost estimates, requests for proposals, bidding documents, and laws, regulations,



and rules applying to bidding, in connection with the CFE for years 2003 through the present;

c. Brochures, literature, and published documents related to the CFE for years 2003 through the present;

d. Logs, notebooks, account books of entry including general ledgers, journals, financial statements including expense reports, profit and loss statements, balance sheets, invoices, receipts, and other means of keeping track of money, checks, travel and expense records, payroll tax information, bank account activity and payments from or payments to employees, contractors, investors, and others, reasonably appearing related to the CFE, and involving the Subject Persons and Entities from 2003 through the present;

e. Telephone bills, telephone logs, and records of telephone calls or facsimiles involving the Subject Persons and Entities for the years 2003 through the present;

f. Bank records and statements involving the Subject Persons and Entities to include canceled checks, records of deposits, applications to open bank accounts, correspondence, records of the purchase or transmittal of wire transactions, wire instructions, cashier's checks, certificates of deposit, or other financial instruments and commercial paper, for the years 2003 through the present;

g. Documents showing ownership of companies

owned and controlled, in whole or in part, by KEITH E. LINDSEY and STEVE K. LEE including all fictitious business filings, and corporation paperwork, including dbas;

- h. Shredders and shredded paper;
- i. Electronic organizer and/or address book for KEITH E. LINDSEY and STEVE K. LEE for the years 2003 to the present;
- j. Tax returns and tax preparation materials for the years 2003-2007, including Forms W-2, 1040, 1120, and 1099 for Subject Persons and Entities showing ownership and control interests, revenues, income, and expenditures;
- k. Travel documents including passports, visas, visa applications, and travel itineraries and tickets, for Subject Persons and Entities related to international travel;
- l. Photographs, videotapes, and audio recordings, reasonably appearing related to the CFE and NESTOR MORENO, and depicting Subject Persons and Entities;
- m. Media reports, reasonably appearing related to the CFE and NESTOR MORENO, and mentioning Subject Persons and Entities; and
- n. Lists of client companies, credit references, business cards, and Rolodexes belonging to or referencing Subject Persons and Entities.

28. As used above, the terms records, documents,

programs, applications or materials includes records, documents, programs, applications or materials created, modified or stored in any form.

29. In searching for data capable of being read, stored or interpreted by a computer, law enforcement personnel executing this search warrant will employ the following procedure:

a. Upon securing the premises, law enforcement personnel trained in searching and seizing computer data (the "computer personnel") will make an initial review of any computer equipment and storage devices to determine whether these items can be searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data.

b. If the computer equipment and storage devices cannot be searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is practical to copy the data during the execution of the search in a reasonable amount of time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve the data.

c. If the computer personnel determine it is not practical to perform an on-site search or make an on-site copy of the data within a reasonable amount of time, then the computer equipment and storage devices will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for

review. The computer equipment and storage devices will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized set forth herein.

d. In searching the data, the computer personnel may examine all of the data contained in the computer equipment and storage devices to view their precise contents and determine whether the data falls within the items to be seized as set forth herein. In addition, the computer personnel may search for and attempt to recover "deleted," "hidden" or encrypted data to determine whether the data falls within the list of items to be seized as set forth herein.

e. If the computer personnel do not determine that the data falls within any of the items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will return the original data storage devices within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 60 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If the government needs additional time to determine whether the data falls within any of the items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, it may seek an extension of the time period from the Court within the original sixty day period.

30. In order to search for data that is capable of being read or interpreted by a computer, law enforcement personnel will need to seize and search the following items,

subject to the procedures set forth above:

a. Any computer equipment and storage device capable of being used to commit, further or store evidence of the offense listed above;

b. Any computer equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems, docking stations, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption devices, and optical scanners;

c. Any magnetic, electronic or optical storage device capable of storing data, such as floppy disks, hard disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks, printer or memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory calculators, electronic dialers, electronic notebooks, cellular telephones, and personal digital assistants;

d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding the operation of the computer equipment, storage devices or software.

e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the computer hardware, storage devices or data to be searched;

f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical items that are necessary to gain

access to the computer equipment, storage devices or data; and

g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other information necessary to access the computer equipment, storage devices or data.

VII.

CONCLUSION

31. Based on the facts set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that the **SUBJECT PREMISES** contains evidence of violations of the following federal statutes: Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 (Conspiracy), Title 15, United States Code, 78dd-1, et seq. (Corrupt Payments to Foreign Officials), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956 (Money Laundering).

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Farrell A. Binder  
Special Agent  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn and subscribed to before me  
on this \_\_\_\_ day of July, 2008.

United States Magistrate Judge