





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
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I have to head out a little early this evening, so feel free to reach out to Brad directly on the question.
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Thank you for all your work thoughtfully going through these documents at a record pace. I wanted to share the final, consolidated documents with the entire group. I will send the other documents under separate cover so you have a complete set. For those keeping score, here is a key to the reductions boxes:

Red = FBI's first round of redactions

Green = FBi's second round of reductions

Blue = Special Counsel's office reductions

Purple = ODNI redactions (mainly some clean-up redactions)

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There was some overlap between the reductions and we did our best to mark them is multiple colors if technology allowed without throwing our computers out the window. It did not always allow. At this point, ODNI views these documents as looked down for purposes of our discussions with WHCO.

Thank you.



(b)(3), (b)(6)

Principal Deputy General Counsel


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There was some overlap between the redactions and we did our best to mark them in multiple colors if technology allowed without throwing our computers out the window. It did not always allow. At this point, ODNI views these documents as locked down for purposes of our discussions with WHCC.

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Thank you,

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Principal Deputy General Counsel

Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel

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Not only do foreign powers engage in spying in the United States to obtain information, they also engage in activities which are intended to harm the Nation's security by affecting the course of our Government, the course of public opinion, or the activities of individuals. Such activities may include political action (recruiting, bribery or influencing of public officials to act in favor of the foreign power), disguised propaganda (including the planting of false or misleading articles or stories), and harassment, intimidation, or even assassination of individuals who oppose the foreign power. Such activity can undermine our democratic institutions as well as directly threaten the peace and safety of our citizens.

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

B. (S/NF) The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(S//NF) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the


target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her

foreign policy team	b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7D-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI
the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the	
2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other	
individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign.	
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
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III. (8) Carter Page.

A. (S) Page's Connections to Russia and the RIS.


-(S//NF)- Page, a U.S. citizen, is the founder and managing partner of Global

Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an investment management and advisory firm that

focuses on the energy sector primarily in emerging markets.

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
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B. (S//NF) Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(S/NF) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two

Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1), reported that Page had a both 107D-1, per FBI both 107D-1, per FB



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Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(TS//NF) Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

-(TS//NF) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite

information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

| CTS//NF| Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible.


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


12 (S//NF) In or about April 2014, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

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that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7D-1, per FBI sanctions against Russia. b7E-3,-4, per FBI (S//NF) b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b6-6, per FBI b7C-6, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI (S//NF b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI -(S//NE b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI

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
had met secretly with Page

and that their agenda for the meeting included Divyekin raising a dossier or


"kompromat" that the Kremlin possessed on Candidate #2 and the possibility of it


being released to Candidate #1's campaign. 16

15 (S) Kompromat is a Russian term for compromising material about a politician or political figure, which is typically used to create negative publicity or blackmail.



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
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
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
Candidate #1's campaign worked behind the scenes to make sure Political Party #1's platform would not call for giving weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces, contradicting the view of almost all Political Party #1's foreign policy leaders in Washington. The article stated that Candidate #1's campaign sought "to make sure that [Political Party #1] would not pledge to give Ukraine the weapons it has been asking for from the United States." Further, an August 2016 article published by an identified news organization, which characterized Candidate #1 as sounding like a supporter of Ukraine's territorial integrity in September [2015], noted that Candidate #1 had recently adopted a "milder" tone regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea. The August 2016 article further reported that Candidate #1 said Candidate #1 might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and lift punitive U.S. sanctions against Russia. The article opined that while the reason for Candidate #1's shift was not clear, Candidate #1's more conciliatory words, which contradict Political Party #1's official platform, follow Candidate #1's recent association with several people

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sympathetic to Russian influence in Ukraine, including foreign policy advisor Carter



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
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(S/NF) Page's Denial of Cooperation with the Russian Government to IV. Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(S//NF) On or about September 23, 2016, an identified news organization published an article (September 23rd News Article), which was written by the news organization's Chief Investigative Correspondent, alleging that U.S. intelligence officials are investigating Page with respect to suspected efforts by the Russian Government to influence the U.S. Presidential election. According to the September 23rd News Article, U.S. officials received intelligence reports that when Page was in Moscow in July 2016 to deliver the above-noted commencement address at the New Economic School, he met with two senior Russian officials. The September 23rd News Article stated that a "well-placed Western intelligence source" told the news organization that Page met with Igor Sechin, a longtime Putin associate and former

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Russian deputy minister who is now the executive chairman of Rosneft. At their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions with Page.

According to the September 23rd News Article, the Western intelligence source also reported that U.S. intelligence agencies received reports that Page met with another top Putin aide - Igor Divyekin, a former Russian security official who now serves as deputy chief for internal policy and is believed by U.S. officials to have responsibility for intelligence collected by Russian agencies about the U.S. election.²²

²² (8) As discussed above, Source #1 was hired by a business associate to conduct research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. Source #1 provided the results of his research to the business associate, and the FBI assesses that the business associate likely provided this information to the law firm that hired the business associate in the first place. Source #1 told the FBI that he/she only provided this information to the business associate and the FBI.

b3-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI

The FBI does not believe that Source #1 directly provided this information to the identified news organization that published the September 23rd News Article.

(TS//NF) In or about late October 2016, however, after the FBI Director sent a letter to the U.S. Congress, which stated that the FBI had learned of new information that might be pertinent to an investigation that the FBI was conducting of Candidate #2, Source #1 told the FBI that he/she was frustrated with this action and believed it would likely influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. In response to Source #1's concerns, Source #1 independently, and against the prior admonishment from the FBI to speak only with the FBI on this matter, released the reporting discussed

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Congress were "taken aback" after being briefed on the alleged meetings between Page and Russian officials and viewed the meetings as a possible back channel to the Russians that could undercut U.S. foreign policy. The September 23rd News Article also stated that, following the briefing, the Senate Minority Leader wrote to the FBI Director, and citing the reports of meetings between an advisor to Candidate #1 [the advisor was unnamed in the letter, but the article indicated that the advisor is Page] and "high ranking sanctioned individuals" [in context, likely a reference to Sechin] in Moscow over the summer as evidence of "significant and disturbing ties" between Candidate #1's campaign and the Kremlin that needed to be investigated by the FBI.

(S//NF) Based on statements in the September 23rd News Article, as well as in other articles published by identified news organizations, Candidate #1's campaign repeatedly made public statements in an attempt to distance Candidate #1's campaign from Page. For example, the September 23rd News Article noted that Page's precise role in Candidate #1's campaign is unclear. According to the article, a spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign called Page an "informal foreign

herein to an identified news organization. Although the FBI continues to assess Source #1's reporting is reliable, as noted above, the FBI closed Source #1 as an active source.

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advisor" who "does not speak for [Candidate #1] or the campaign." In addition, another spokesperson for Candidate #1's campaign said that Page "has no role" and added "[w]e are not aware of any of his activities, past or present." However, the article stated that the campaign spokesperson did not respond when asked why Candidate #1 had previously described Page as an advisor. In addition, on or about September 25, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based primarily on an interview with Candidate #1's then campaign manager. During the interview, the campaign manager stated, "[Page is] not part of the campaign I'm running." The campaign manager added that Page has not been part of Candidate #1's national security or foreign policy briefings since he/she became campaign manager. In response to a question from the interviewer regarding reports that Page was meeting with Russian officials to essentially attempt to conduct diplomatic negotiations with the Russian Government, the campaign manager responded, "If [Page is] doing that, he's certainly not doing it with the permission or knowledge of the campaign . . .



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(S//NF) On or about September 25, 2016, Page sent a letter to the FBI Director.

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In this letter, Page made reference to the accusations in the September 23rd News

Article and denied them. Page stated that the source of the accusations was nothing
more than completely false media reports and that he did not meet with any
sanctioned official in Russia. Page also stated that he would be willing to discuss
any "final" questions the FBI may have.²³


(S/NF) Additionally, on or about September 26, 2016, an identified news organization published an article that was based on an interview with Page (September 26th News Article). In the September 26th News Article, Page stated that all of the accusations were complete "garbage" and that he did not meet with Sechin or Divyekin. Page also stated that he was taking a leave of absence from his work with Candidate #1's campaign because the accusations were a "distraction."



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From:	Jason Klitenic-DNI- (b)(3)					
Sent:	Wednesday, September 19, 2018 7:10 PM	b3 -1, per FBI				
To:	Weinsheimer, Gerard B	b6 -3, per FBI				
Subject:	FW: (U) Reducted Versions with Markings CE/NF3	b7C -3, per FBI				
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То:	Weinsheimer, Gerard B (b) (6)
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Per your reque	est, from ^{(D)(3), (D)(6)}
From:	(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Wednesday, September 26, 2018 8:11 AM To: Gauhar, Tashina (b) (6) Subject: Redacted documents

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
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As requested.

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Principal Deputy General Counsel

Office of the Director of National Intelligence Office of General Counsel



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Jason Klitenic-DNI-

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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June 2017 White House Declassification Directive

H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 41 (1978).

B. (S//NF) The Russian Government's Coordinated Efforts to Influence the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.

(S//NF) In or about March 2016, George Papadopoulos³ and Carter Page (the

target of this application) were publicly identified by Candidate #1 as part of his/her foreign policy team

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the FBI believes that the Russian Government's efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. Presidential election were being coordinated with Page and perhaps other


individuals associated with Candidate #1's campaign.

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
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
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B. (S//NF) Page's Coordination with Russian Government Officials on 2016 U.S. Presidential Election Influence Activities.

(S//NF) According to open source information, in July 2016, Page traveled to Russia and delivered the commencement address at the New Economic School.⁹ In addition to giving this address, the FBI learned that Page met with at least two Russian officials during this trip. First, according to information provided by an FBI confidential human source (Source #1),¹⁹ reported that Page had a

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and was opened as an FBI source
Source #1 has been compensated

by the FBI. As

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discussed below in footnote 22, in or about October 2016, the FBI suspended its relationship with Source #1 due to Source #1's unauthorized disclosure of information to the press. Subsequently, the FBI closed Source #1 as an FBI source. Nevertheless, the FBI assesses Source #1 to be reliable as previous reporting from Source #1 has been corroborated and used in criminal proceedings. Moreover, the

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FBI notes that the incident that led the FBI to terminate its relationship with Source #1 occurred after Source #1 provided the reporting that is described herein.

(TS//NF) Source #1, who now owns a foreign business/financial intelligence firm, was approached by an identified U.S. person, who indicated to Source #1 that a U.S.-based law firm had hired the identified U.S. person to conduct research regarding Candidate #1's ties to Russia (the identified U.S. person and Source #1 have a long-standing business relationship). The identified U.S. person hired Source #1 to conduct this research. The identified U.S. person never advised Source #1 as to the motivation behind the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia. The FBI speculates that the identified U.S. person was likely looking for information that could be used to discredit Candidate #1's campaign.

(TS//NF) Source #1 tasked his sub-source(s) to collect the requisite information. After Source #1 received information from the sub-source(s) described herein, Source #1 provided the information to the identified U.S. person who had hired Source #1 and to the FBI.

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(TS//NF) Notwithstanding Source #1's reason for conducting the research into Candidate #1's ties to Russia, based on Source #1's previous reporting history with the FBI, whereby Source #1 provided reliable information to the FBI, the FBI believes Source #1's reporting herein to be credible.

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
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(USDOT) announced sanctions that would be taken against Russian Government officials and entities as a result of Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine. Sechin was identified as an official of the Russian Government, and further identified as the President and Chairman of the Management Board for Rosneft, a position he continues to hold. The USDOT announcement also stated Sechin was formerly the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation from 2008 until 2012, and from 2004 until 2008, Sechin was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Russian President Putin. The USDOT sanctions announcement identified Sechin as someone who has "shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin – a key component to his current standing."

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that, during the meeting, Page and Sechin discussed future bilateral energy

cooperation and the prospects for an associated move to lift Ukraine-related Western sanctions against Russia. (S//NF) b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b6-6, per FBI b7C-6, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI b1-1, per FBI b3-1, per FBI b7E-3,-4, per FBI

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