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Volume 20

DURAN, 20 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 1989)

ID 3101 (PDF)

(1) An immigration judge in deportation proceedings properly denied the respondent's motion to subpoena government records where the respondent failed to comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 287.4(a)(2) (1984) by not specifically stating what he expected to prove by such documentary evidence and by not affirmatively showing a diligent effort to obtain the records.

(2) While a subpoenais not required in the instant proceedings and access should generallybe given to a person in immigration proceedings concerning records maintained about himself, the respondent failed to show compliance with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 103.21 (1984) which permit such access.


DERIS, 20 I&N Dec. 5 (BIA 1989)

ID 3102 (PDF)

For immigration purposes,the Maryland first offender statute, Article 27, section 292 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which offers favorable treatment to anyone committingh is first drug violation regardless of the nature and severity of the offense, is not a counterpart to the federal first offender statute, which is limited in its application to simple possession of a controlled substance; hence, the respondent in deportation proceedings may properly be founddeportable for having been convicted by a Maryland state court of a drug violation.


GRULLON, 20 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1989)

ID 3103 (PDF)

(1) A conviction doesnot exist for immigration purposes where an alien's criminal charges were dismissed without prejudice following his successful completion of a pretrialintervention program prescribed by section 944.025 of the Florida Statutes.

(2) In the absence ofa conviction, a respondent in deportation proceedings is not barred from establishing good moral character under section 101(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (1982), for the purpose of applying for suspension of deportation under section 244(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).


CHEN, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989)

ID 3104 (PDF)

(1) An applicant for asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1158 (1982), may establish his claim by presenting evidence of past persecution in lieu of evidence of a well-founded fear of persecution.

(2) Where an alien has shown that he has been persecuted in the past on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, the likelihood of present persecution then becomes relevant as to the exercise of discretion, and asylum may be denied as a matter of discretion if there is little likelihood of present persecution.

(3) Where past persecution has been established by an applicant for asylum, the Service ordinarily will be obliged to present, as a factor militating against a favorable exercise of administrative discretion, evidence that little likelihood of present persecution exists, or the presiding official(s) may take administrative notice of changed circumstances in a country.

(4) A favorable exercise of administrative discretion in an asylum application may be warranted for humanitarian reasons notwithstanding the fact that there is littlelikelihood of future persecution.


ANSELMO, 20 I&N Dec. 25 (BIA 1989)

ID 3105 (PDF)

(1) The United StatesCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the Equal Accessto Justice Act ("EAJA") "covers deportation proceedingsbefore the administrative agency as well as court proceedings reviewingdeportation decisions." Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc).

(2) Although the Boardof Immigration Appeals disagrees with the court's holding, the decisionof the Ninth Circuit that the EAJA applies to deportation proceedingsmust be followed in deportation proceedings arising within the jurisdictionof the Ninth Circuit.

(3) The Department ofJustice regulations implementing the EAJA should be applied to EAJA attorney fee requests filed in conjunction with deportation proceedings arising within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.


FEDE, 20 I&N Dec. 35 (BIA 1989)

ID 3106 (PDF)

(1) A regulation promulgatedby the Attorney General has the force and effect of law as to immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(2) As the Attorney General has determined by regulation that immigration proceedings do not come within the scope of the Equal Access to Justice Act, absent a regulatory change or controlling court order, neither an immigration judge nor the Board has authority to consider an application for attorney fees and costs under that Act.


CHANG, 20 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1989)

ID 3107 (PDF)

(1) Implementation of the one couple, one child policy of the Chinese Government is not on its face persecutive and does not create a well-founded fear of persecutionon account of one of the five reasons enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1982), even to the extent that involuntary sterilizations may occur.

(2) An individual claiming asylum for reasons related to the one couple, one child policy must establish that the application of the policy to him was in fact persecutive or that he had a well-founded fear that it would be persecutive because the policy was being selectively applied against members of a particular religious group or was being used to punish individuals for their political opinions or for other reasons enumerated under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act.

(3) A person who shows that he opposed the one couple, one child policy but was subjected to it nevertheless has not demonstrated that he was being punished for his opinion as a member of a particular social group (persons opposed to thepolicy), but rather, there must be evidence that the governmental action arose for a reason other than general population control (for instance, evidence of disparate, more severe treatment for those who publicly opposethe policy).

(4) If the applicantclaims that action occurred at the hands of local officials, he must normally show that redress from higher officials was unavailable or that he hasa well-founded fear that it would be unavailable.

(5) The policy guidelines announced by Attorney General Meese on August 5, 1988, regarding the one couple, one child policy do not apply to decisions by immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals.


SAFETRAN, 20 I&N Dec. 49 (Comm.1989)

ID 3108 (PDF)

(1) Although not specifically addressed in the regulations, the 5- or 6-year limit of stay imposed on"H-1" and "L-1" nonimmigrant aliens is cumulative; it includes both the time spent in the United States as an "H-1"and as an "L-1" in the same 5- or 6-year period of time.

(2) In order to establishthe existence of extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension oftemporary stay for a sixth and final year, the petitioner bears the burden of submitting evidence clearly detailing the extreme hardship it will encounter as a result of the termination of the beneficiary's services.


GORDON, 20 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1989)

ID 3109 (PDF)

(1) An alien in deportation proceedings who was found deportable but was granted a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(c) (1982), returns to the same lawful permanent resident status that he previously held.

(2) Notwithstanding the respondent's conviction for a crime committed after a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility, his grant may not be subsequently withdrawn for that reason in a reopened deportation proceeding; the Immigration and Naturalization Service must initiate new deportation proceedings in order to have the immigration judge consider evidence of subsequent criminal activity by the respondent.

(3) While section 212(c) of the Act does not expressly or implicitly provide for revocation orrescission of a grant of a waiver of inadmissibility or a condition algrant of a waiver, an immigration judge may nevertheless reopen proceedings and reconsider his own decision to grant a waiver if he believes that the waiver was erroneously granted in the first instance.


EEASTERN AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT #798, 20 I&N Dec. 57 (BIA 1989)

ID 3110 (PDF)

(1) In fine proceedings under section 273 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1323 (1982), liability cannot be avoided by proof that the alien passengerhas lawful permanent resident status if he did not have proper entry documentsin his possession at the time of his arrival.

(2) Fine liability cannot be avoided even if the alien was subsequently admitted as a returning lawful permanent resident alien where the alien did not have proper entry documents at the time of his arrival.

(3) Remission of a fine is not warranted where the carrier was correct in believing that the alien passenger had lawful permanent resident status if the alien did not have documents in his possession at the time of his arrival which entitled him to admission on the basis of such status.


WALSH AND POLLARD, 20 I&N Dec. 60 (BIA 1989)

ID 3111 (PDF)

(1) A foreign corporationmust have invested or be actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of capital in order to qualify as a treaty investor under section101(a)(15)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(E) (1982).

(2) Under the treaty investor criteria, no particular dollar amount is required for an investment to be deemed substantial; however, the investment must be in a bona fidebusiness and, in the case of a new business, the investment must not be in a marginal enterprise solely for earning a living but must be of an amount normally considered necessary to establish a viable enterprise of the nature contemplated.

(3) The applicants, who are employed as automotive design engineers by a foreign corporation, do not have supervisory or managerial duties; however, they are highly trained, specially qualified, and essential to the corporation's efficient operation and thus qualify for an "E-2" visa classification even though they are not engaged in developing and directing the qualifying investment.


PINEDA, 20 I&N Dec. 70 (BIA 1989)

ID 3112 (PDF)

(1) A visa petition filed by a father on behalf of his child who was born out of wedlock was properly denied when the father failed to establish the existence of a bona fide parent-child relationship and thereby failed to establish that the beneficiary was his "child" within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (Supp.IV 1986).

(2) In order for an illegitimate child to qualify within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(D) of the Act,a bona fide parent-child relationship need only exist at the time the visa petition is filed or at some prior point during the life of the child, provided the child is unmarried and less than 21 years of age when the relationship is established.

(3) Congress has provided no guidance on the intended meaning of the phrase "bona fide parent-childrelationship," but at minimum there should be some showing of emotional and/or financial ties or an active concern by the father for the child'ssupport, instruction, and general welfare.

(4) Evidence relevant to establishing a bona fide parent-child relationship is varied and widespread in nature and may include money order receipts or cancelled checks showing the petitioner's financial support of the beneficiary; income tax returns; medical or insurance records; school records for the beneficiary; correspondence between the parties; and notarized affidavits of friends, neighbors, school officials, or other knowledgeable associates.

(5) The most persuasive evidence for establishing a bona fide parent-child relationship is documentary evidence which was contemporaneous with the events in question.

(6) Evidence showing that the parent-child relationship was established only after the petitioning father gained lawful permanent resident status and, by extension, the legal right to seek preference status for the beneficiary may be sufficient proof of a bona fide relationship.


E-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 77 (Comm. 1989)

ID 3113 (PDF)

(1) An applicant seeking temporary resident status under section 245A of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (Supp. IV 1986), has the burden to prove his eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence.

(2) There is no catch-alldefinition of the term "preponderance of the evidence." Whether an applicant has submitted sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof under section 245A of the Act will depend upon the factual circumstancesof each case. Generally, however, when something is to be established by a preponderance of evidence it is sufficient that the proof only establish that it is probably true.

(3) An applicant who submitted an Arrival-Departure Record (Form I-94) and his passport to prove he entered the United States prior to 1982, affidavits from acquaintances and employers to prove his continuous residence in the United States since such a date, and an affidavit explaining why he was unable to submit other documentation has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since prior to January 1, 1982.


FUEYO, 20 I&N Dec. 84 (BIA 1989)

ID 3114 (PDF)

(1) Evidence that the respondent was taken into custody and deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service establishes that she was "arrested and deported" within the meaning of section 212(a)(17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(17) (1982).

(2) The burden is on the respondent to prove that, following her deportation, she applied forand received consent to reapply for admission to the United States from the Attorney General or his designate.

(3) A nonimmigrant waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(d)(3)(B) of the Act may not be granted nunc pro tunc in deportation proceedings. Matter of P-, 8 I&N Dec.302 (Asst. Comm. 1959); and Matter of M-, 8 I&N Dec. 285 (R.C., Asst.Comm. 1959), superseded.


RODRIGUEZ-ESTEBAN, 20 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1989)

ID 3115 (PDF)

The immigration judge and this Board lack jurisdiction in deportation proceedings to reconsider the order of the district director made in rescission proceedings. Matter of Saunders, 16 I&N Dec. 326 (BIA 1977), modified.


RUIZ, 20 I&N Dec. 91 (BIA 1989)

ID 3116 (PDF)

(1) Following an in absentia hearing, the underlying relief being sought by way of a motion to reopen is the opportunity to present the applications for relief at a full evidentiary hearing.

(2) Where an alien establish esreasonable cause for his failure to appear at his exclusion hearing, amotion to reopen the proceedings following an in absentia hearing will be granted without requiring that the alien establish prima facie eligibility for asylum or withholding of exclusion and deportation.


CUELLO, 20 I&N Dec. 94 (BIA 1989)

ID 3117 (PDF)

(1) Where an adoption has been effected, be it intrafamily or otherwise, and the adopted child continues to reside in the same household with the natural parent or parents during the period in which the adoptive parent seeks to establish his or her compliance with the statutory residence requirement of section101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(E)(1982), the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the adoptive parent exercised primary parental control during that period of residence.

(2) Evidence of parental control may take many forms, including competent objective evidence that the adoptive parent owns or maintains the property where the child resides, provides financial support and day-to-day care, and assumes responsibility for important decisions in the child's life.

(3) The evidence must clearly establish the physical living arrangements of the adopted child, adoptive parents, and the child's natural parents during the period of time in which the adoptive parent seeks to establish compliance with the residence requirement of the statute and, where a fraudulent or ad hocadoption is suspected, during any period following the adoption which the adjudicating officer deems appropriate.

(4) Where a petitioner establishes compliance with the statutory requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, demonstrating, where necessary, primary parental control during the parties' residence with one another, the relationship will be presumed bona fide in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise. Matter of Yuen,14 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1972); and Matter of Tang, 14 I&N Dec. 180(BIA 1972), distinguished.


SOLEIMANI, 20 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 1989)

ID 3118 (PDF)

(1) A finding that an alien was firmly resettled in another country does not render him ineligible for a grant of asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982), by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49 (1971), distinguished. Matter of Portales, 18 I&N Dec. 239 (BIA 1982); and Matter of Lam, 18 I&N Dec. 15 (BIA 1981), modified.

(2) The Board and immigration judges are not bound by the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §208.8(f)(1)(ii)(1988), which precludes district directors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service from granting asylum under section 208 of the Act to aliens who are firmly resettled in a third country.

(3) An alien's firm resettlement in another country is a factor to be evaluated in determining whether asylum should be granted as a matter of discretion under the standards set forth in Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987).

(4) A finding that an alien has been firmly resettled in a third country would normally preclude a grant of asylum as a matter of discretion, unless the alien can demonstrate counter vailing equities in his favor that are compelling in nature.

(5) Whether or not an outstanding offer of permanent residence or citizenship to all Jews who arrive in Israel constitutes a specific offer of permanent resettlement to the respondent, the pertinent regulations and the Board's prior decisions cannot be read so restrictively that the respondent's circumstances in Israel become irrelevant.

(6) An alien will not be found to be firmly resettled elsewhere if it is shown that his physical presence in the United States is a consequence of his flight in search of refuge, and that his physical presence is reasonably proximate to the flight and not one following a flight remote in point of time or interruptedby an intervening residence in a third country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight in search of refuge.

(7) The question of firm resettlement is not always limited solely to the inquiry of how much time has elapsed between the alien's flight and the asylum application, where other factors germane to the question of whether the alien has firmly resettled include family ties, intent, business or property connections, and other matters.

(8) A determination that the respondent was not firmly resettled in Israel does not end the Board's inquiry as to whether the respondent should be granted asylum as a matter of discretion, where the respondent did have some ties to Israel, and such ties are a factor to be evaluated in the exercise of discretion.


DEL RISCO, 20 I&N Dec. 109 (BIA1989)

ID 3119 (PDF)

A conviction in the Superior Court of Arizona for facilitation of the unlawful sale of cocaine renders an alien deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (Supp. IV 1986), as an alien convicted of a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance.


LIGIDAKIS, 20 I&N Dec. 112 (BIA 1989)

ID 3120 (PDF)

Due notice to the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding a judicial recommendation against deportation pursuant to section 241(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1982), shall be regarded as having been made where the Service has actual notice prior to the recommendation and does not interpose an objection based on insufficient preparation time under 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (1984) but instead prepares and presents its representations.


FEFE, 20 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1989)

ID 3121 (PDF)

(1) An applicant for asylum cannot meet his burden of proof unless he testifies under oath regarding his application; and, therefore, an immigration judge should not proceed to adjudicate a written application for asylum if no oral testimony has been offered in support of that application.

(2) At a minimum, the regulations require that an asylum applicant take the stand, be placedunder oath, and be questioned as to whether the information in his written application is complete and correct; the examination of an applicant will ordinarily be this brief only where the parties have stipulated that the applicant's oral testimony would be consistent with his written application and that his testimony would be believably presented.


DASS, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989)

ID 3122 (PDF)

(1) As an asylum applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proof and persuasion, where there aresignificant, meaningful evidentiary gaps, the applications ordinarily will be denied for failure of proof.

(2) While we adhere to the holding in Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), that the lack of corroboration for an asylum applicant's testimony will not necessarily be fatal to his application, this does not mean that the introduction of supporting evidence is purely an option with an asylum applicant in the ordinary case; the general rule is that such evidence should be presented if it is available.

(3) Background evidence may be needed to evaluate the credibility of an asylum applicant's testimony;as the basis for an asylum claim becomes less focused on specific events involving the alien personally and instead is more directed to broad allegations regarding general conditions in the alien's country of origin, corroborative background evidence to establish a plausible context for the claim may become essential, or alternatively an acceptable explanation for the absenceof such evidence may become necessary.

(4) It was proper to conclude that the asylum applicant failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution where his persecution claim was based on sweeping claims about persecution by the Government of India, as well as on the alien's testimony regarding his own circumstances, and he did not provide background evidence to corroborate the claims about the Government of India.


RUSIN, 20 I&N Dec. 128 (BIA1989)

ID 3123 (PDF)

A respondent in deportation proceedings who seeks to adjust her status to that of a lawful permanent resident is not statutorily precluded from doing so by virtue of her former membership in a Communist organization where she can establish that her association in that organization was not meaningful or that her membership was involuntary or that she otherwise comes within one of the specified exceptions set forth in section 212(a)(28)(I)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(I)(i) (1982).


ULUOCHA, 20 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA 1989)

ID 3124 (PDF)

(1) The bond regulations (8 C.F.R. §§ 3.18(a) and 242.2(d) (1989)), which establish unique and informal proceedings, do not specifically address motions to reopen and do not expressly limit a detained alien to one application for modification of the amount or terms of a bond.

(2) Immigration judges can further consider requests to modify bonds by detained aliens without a formal motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1989).

(3) Further requests to modify bonds should be considered on the merits and if there are no changed circumstances shown, the immigration judge can decline to change the prior bond decision. Matter of Chew, 18 I&N Dec. 262 (BIA 1982),followed.


SHORT, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989)

ID 3125 (PDF)

(1) If the underlying or substantive crime involves moral turpitude, then a conviction for aiding in the commission of the crime or for otherwise acting as an accessory before the fact is also a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of F-, 6 I&N Dec. 783 (BIA 1955), followed.

(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals withdraws from Matter of Baker, 15 I&N Dec. 50 (BIA 1974),to the extent that it holds that an assault with intent to commit a felony is per se a crime involving moral turpitude without regard to whether the underlying felony involves moral turpitude; there must be a finding that the felony intended as a result of the assault involves moral turpitude.

(3) For purposes of determining whether the respondent's conviction for aiding and abetting in the assault with intent to commit a felony upon the person of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 113(b) (Supp. IV 1986) was for a crime involving moral turpitude, the conviction record of the respondent's husband, whom she was convicted of aiding and abetting, may not be properly be admitted as evidence where the respondent's record of conviction no where related her crime of aiding and abetting to the specific sexual offense of which her husband was convicted, the respondent's prior conviction for engaging in deviate sexual intercourse with a 3-year-old female was overturned on appeal, and the statute under which she was subsequently convicted specifically excluded felonies under Chapter 109A of Title 18(18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-45 (Supp. IV 1986)), which concerns sexual abuse offenses.


VILLALTA, 20 I&N Dec. 142 (BIA 1990)

ID 3126 (PDF)

(1) Alien who established through his direct and uncontradicted testimony that he and his immediate family members were singled out and threatened with death by a "DeathSquad," and whose brother was subsequently slain in a noncombat situation, demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in El Salvador pursuant to section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1158(a) (1982).

(2) Alien's testimony that he and his immediate family members had been threatened with harm due to his activities in a student organization in El Salvador established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.


IZATULA, 20 I&N Dec. 149 (BIA 1990)

ID 3127 (PDF)

(1) The general rule that prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a lawfully constituted government does not constitute persecution is inapplicable in countries where a coup is the only means of effectuating political change. Dwomoh v. Sava, 696F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), followed.

(2) Alien who actively assisted the mujahed in in Afghanistan, and who was sought out by the Afghan regime because of that activity, established a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act since there was no basis in the record to conclude that any punishment imposed on the alien would be an example of prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a lawfully constituted government.


KEYTE, 20 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA1990)

ID 3128 (PDF)

Departure from the United States by an applicant for admission in exclusion proceedings after the taking of an appeal from the immigration judge's order denying admission does not constitute withdrawal of the appeal.


MARQUEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 160 (BIA1990)

ID 3129 (PDF)

(1) The Board of Immigration Appeals rejects a strict statutory interpretation of section 101(b)(1)(E)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(1982), thereby relying upon the legislative history of the statute which indicates that Congress did not intend to recognize ad hoc adoptions designed to circumvent the immigration laws.

(2) The Board finds the adoptive relationship is more  a kin to marital relationships than to steprelationships, and thus, in certain cases, the bona fides of adoptions will be determined.

(3) Visa petitions involving the specter of sham adoptions which generally arise in adoptions by aclose relative where the relationship between the natural parent and the adopted child does not appear to change subsequent to the adoption will be analyzed under the standards set forth in Matter of Cuello, 20 I&NDec. 3117 (BIA 1989).


TAWFIK, 20 I&N Dec. 166 (BIA 1990)

ID 3130 (PDF)

(1) In making a determination that a beneficiary's prior marriage comes within the purview of section204(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(1988), as a marriage entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, the district director should not give conclusive effect to determinations made in prior proceedings, but, rather, should reach an independent conclusion based on the evidence of record, although any relevant evidence may be relied upon, including evidence having its origin in prior Service proceedings involving the beneficiary or in court proceedings involving the prior marriage.

(2) A decision to revokeapproval of a visa petition because the beneficiary entered into a priormarriage for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits can only be sustained if there is substantial and probative evidence in the alien's file to the effect that the prior marriage was entered into for such purpose, and, where the district director concluded that there was evidence in the record from which it could "reasonably be inferred" that a marriage had been entered into for the primary purpose of obtaining immigration benefits, the substantial and probative evidence, requisite to the revocation of a subsequently approved visa petition, was not presented.


BARRETT, 20 I&N Dec. 171 (BIA 1990)

ID 3131 (PDF)

The definition of "drugtrafficking crime" in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1988) for purposesof determining a drug-related "aggravated felony" within themeaning of section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988), includes state convictions for crimesanalogous to offenses under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq. (1988), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21U.S.C. § 951 et seq. (1988), or the Maritime Drug Law EnforcementAct, 46 U.S.C. App. § 1901 et seq. (1988).


LUTHERAN MINISTRIESOF FLORIDA, 20 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 1990)

ID 3132 (PDF)

The application of anonprofit organization seeking recognition under 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a)(1989) should include detailed information as to how the organizationwill operate and by whom it will be staffed, as well as other evidenceregarding the organization's qualifications such as resumes for the staffmembers and information as to the availability of legal resource materials,training programs in immigration law and procedure, and supervised employmentfor the staff.


DOBERE, 20 I&N Dec. 188 (BIA 1990)

ID 3133 (PDF)

Under the Rules of Procedurefor Proceedings before Immigration Judges, immigration judges have theauthority to change venue in exclusion proceedings even in cases where the applicant is being held in custody. Matter of Alphonse, 18 I&NDec. 178 (BIA 1981), superseded.


EDWARDS, 20 I&N Dec. 191 (BIA 1990)

ID 3134 (PDF)

(1) A clear showing ofreformation is not an absolute prerequisite to a favorable exercise ofdiscretion in every section 212(c) application involving an alien with a criminal record; therefore, section 212(c) applications involving convictedaliens must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with rehabilitationa factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Buscemi,19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988); and Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581(BIA 1978), clarified.

(2) A proper determinationas to whether an alien has demonstrat ed unusual or outstanding equitiesin a section 212(c) application can only be made after a complete reviewof the favorable factors in his case, and, therefore, the use of the term"threshold test" is deemed to be inappropriate in this context,as it might be interpreted to imply that a full examination of an alien'sequities can somehow be pretermitted. Matter of Buscemi, supra, clarified.


LOPEZ-BARRIOS, 20 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA1990)

ID 3135 (PDF)

(1) The administrativeclosing procedure may not be used if it is opposed by either party to the proceedings.

(2) If an immigrationjudge is satisfied that the notice provided to a respondent who failedto appear for a scheduled hearing was sufficient, then a hearing in absentiamay be held, but if the notice was not sufficient, then termination ofproceedings, not administrative closing, is appropriate.


MUNOZ-SANTOS, 20 I&N Dec. 205 (BIA 1990)

ID 3136 (PDF)

(1) Where the Order to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and arrant for Arrest of Alien (Form I-221S)reflects that the respondent signed various portions of the form, thatvarious rights forms and advisories had been served on the respondent,and that an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service signedthe portion of the document certifying service, it may be assumed thatthe Order to Show Cause was served personally on the respondent, in compliancewith 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1990).

(2) Personal serviceof a notice of a hearing date is not required for the immigration judgeto conduct a deportation hearing in absentia where the respondent failsto appear for a scheduled hearing.

(3) Where the immigrationjudge concludes that notice of a hearing date has been sufficiently providedto a respondent, and the respondent without reasonable cause fails to appear, the immigration judge may conduct an in absentia deportation hearing.


EDEN, 20 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 1990)

ID 3137 (PDF)

An alien convicted ofan aggravated felony is subject to detention under section 242(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1988),upon completion of the incarceration or confinement ordered by the courtfor such conviction.


MEDRANO, 20 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 1990)

ID 3138 (PDF)

(1) The status of a lawfultemporary resident alien who commits a deportable offense must be terminatedpursuant to section 245A(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(2) (1988), as a condition precedent to the commencementof deportation proceedings.

(2) A motion to reconsiderwhich is based on a legal argument that could have been raised earlierin the proceedings will be denied.


SANCHEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA1990)

ID 3139 (PDF)

(1) The immigration judgeerred in holding that he had jurisdiction to conduct a hearing in bondproceedings for a criminal alien who was still incarcerated in a MarylandState penal institution.

(2) The Immigration andNaturalization Service did not have actual physical custody of the criminalalien, and therefore there was no authority for the commencement of bondproceedings before an immigration judge under the regulations.

(3) The filing of a Servicedetainer with the Maryland penal authorities does not constitute actualphysical custody.

(4) Section 242(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1988), which indicates that the Attorney General should begin any deportation proceedingas expeditiously as possible after the date of the conviction, is nota vehicle for incarcerated aliens to demand immediate deportation hearings.


FUENTES, 20 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 1991)

ID 3140 (PDF)

(1) Issuance of an Orderto Show Cause is sufficient to commence proceedings against an alien forpurposes of section 204(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1154(h) (1988). Matter of Enriquez, 19 I&N Dec. 554 (BIA 1988),superseded.

(2) A visa petition basedon a marriage which occurred after proceedings have commenced againstthe beneficiary may be approved if he can show by clear and convincingevidence that his marriage to the petitioner was entered into in goodfaith.


R-P-, 20 I&N Dec. 230 (BIA 1990)

ID 3141 (PDF)

(1) Where an immigrationjudge in deportation proceedings issues a decision granting an alien voluntary departure, the sole relief requested, the Board of Immigration Appealsmay summarily dismiss the alien's appeal from that decision pursuant to8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1-a)(iii) (1990).

(2) The Board will notgrant a further period of voluntary departure to an alien who files afrivolous appeal from a decision which does not adversely affect him.


PEUGNET, 20 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 1991)

ID 3142 (PDF)

(1) The definition of the terms "routine service" and "personal service"provided by 8 C.F.R. §103.5a(a) (1990) only applies to administrativeproceedings before Immigration and Naturalization Service officers andconsequently is not directly or formally applicable to defining the terms"routine" and "personal" service as used in 8 C.F.R.§ 242.1(c) (1990) regarding the proper service on an alien of anOrder to Show Cause, Notice of Hearing, and Warrant for Arrest of Alien(Form I-221S) as a means of instituting deportation proceedings.

(2) In interpreting the terms "routine" and "personal" service as used in8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1990), the Board of Immigration Appeals will use the definition provided in 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a) (1990) as guidanceand adopt that definition in total, given that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(1990) previously applied in defining "routine" versus "personal"service of an Order to Show Cause and there exists no currently applicableregulation defining these terms for purposes of 8 C.F.R. §242.1(c)(1990).

(3) For purposes of defining"routine" and "personal" service within the meaningof 8 C.F.R. §242.1(c) (1990), routine service consists of mailinga copy of a document by ordinary mailaddressed to a person at his lastknown address, while personal service, which shall be performed by a governmentemployee, consists of any of the following, without priority or preference:delivery of a copy personally; delivery of a copy at a person's dwellinghouse or usual place of abode by leaving it with some person of suitableage and discretion; delivery of a copy at the office of an attorney orother person, including a corporation, by leaving it with a person incharge; mailing a copy by certified or registered mail, return receiptrequested, addressed to a person at his last known address.

(4) An alien's deportationhearing may not proceed in absentia where the Order to Show Cause is sentto the alien's address by regular mail and is not reserved by personalservice as required by 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) (1990) after the alienfails to appear for the hearing or acknowledge that he has received theOrder to Show Cause.


GUEVARA, 20 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 1991)

ID 3143 (PDF)

(1) A respondent in deportationproceedings who remains silent when confronted with evidence of his alienage,the circumstances of his entry, or his deportability, may leave himselfopen to adverse inferences, which may properly lead in turn to a findingof deportability against him.

(2) In deportation proceedings,the respondent's silence alone, in the absence of any other evidence ofrecord, is insufficient to constitute prima facie evidence of the respondent'salienage and is therefore also insufficient to establish the respondent'sdeportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.

(3) Whether or not theGovernment's purported grant of immunity from prosecution is actuallyvalid, the Immigration and Naturalization Service may not rely on the respondent's silence alone to establish a prima facie case of alienageand deportability.

(4) The immigration judge'sfinding that the Service had established the respondent's alienage anddeportability on the basis of the respondent's silence alone was foundto be erroneous, and the Board of Immigration Appeals terminated the deportationproceedings.

(5) Where the Servicedid not seek to modify its case against the respondent, but merely requestedan additional opportunity to make a second effort at proving the sameallegations and charge which had already been advanced unsuccessfully,regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.28 and 242.16(d) (1990) did notapply, and the Board dismissed the Service's motion to reconsider.


HUETE, 20 I&N Dec. 250 (BIA 1991)

ID 3144 (PDF)

(1) In order to effectpersonal service of an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (FormI-221) sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, the receipt mustbe signed by the addressee or a responsible person at his or her addressand returned.

(2) The respondent didnot have a reasonable opportunity to be present at his deportation hearingwhere he was not personally served with the Order to Show Cause.

(3) The immigration judgedid not err in terminating deportation proceedings based on his findingthat the Order to Show Cause was not properly served where the certifiedmail return receipt was not signed and returned.


TIWARI, 20 I&N Dec. 254 (BIA 1991)

ID 3145 (PDF)

In denying the Immigrationand Naturalization Service's motion to reconsider Matter of Tiwari, 19I&N Dec. 875 (BIA 1989), the Board of Immigration Appeals clarifiedits previous decision and explained that the trier of fact is not prohibitedfrom making inferences from evidence introduced in deportation proceedings,but that under the circumstances of this case, the inference suggestedby the Service was inadequate to establish the respondent's deportabilityby clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.


MEZA, 20 I&N Dec. 257 (BIA 1991)

ID 3146 (PDF)

(1) Pursuant to priorprecedent decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, a waiver under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) (1988), is available in deportation proceedings only to those aliens who have been found deportable under a ground of deportabilityfor which there is a comparable ground of excludability.

(2) Section 212(c) of the Act as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,§ 511, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052, implies that some aliens who have beenconvicted of an aggravated felony are eligible for a section 212(c) waiver, although clearly no alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felonyand has served a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years is eligible for a waiver under section 212(c) as amended.

(3) An alien deportableunder section 241(a)(4)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B) (1988),for a drug-related aggravated felony which could also form the basis forexcludability under section 212(a)(23) is not precluded from establishingeligibility for a section 212(c) waiver.


HERNANDEZ-CASILLAS, 20 I&N Dec. 262(BIA 1991)

ID 3147 (PDF)

(1) In a case referredto him for review under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1990), the Attorney Generaldisapproves the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals holding thata waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988), should be available to aliens deportable under any ground of deportation except those where there is a comparable ground of exclusion which has been specifically exemptedfrom section 212(c).

(2) The Attorney Generalconcludes that a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who hasbeen found deportable under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2) (1988), for entry without inspection, is ineligible for a waiver under section 212(c) of the Act because there is no ground of exclusionwhich is comparable to the entry without inspection ground of deportation.


ROBERTS, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991)

ID 3148 (PDF)

(1) An applicant fora waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988), who is an aggravatedfelon is not required to meet a heightened discretionary test beyond the requirements set forth in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581 (BIA 1978),Matter of Buscemi, 19 I&N Dec. 628 (BIA 1988), and Matter of Edwards,20 I&N Dec. 3134 (BIA 1990).

(2) A sole convictionfor the felony sale of a controlled substance is sufficient to supporta determination that the respondent is a drug trafficker within the meaningof section 101(a)(43) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988).

(3) The immigration judge,in exercising his discretion to grant section 212(c) relief, may not considerevidence on a theory of entrapment after the introduction of the respondent'sconviction record because such theory directly relates to the issue of the respondent's ultimate guilt or innocence.


SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT #SK 911, 20 I&N Dec. 306 (BIA 1991)

ID 3149 (PDF)

(1) Any bringing to the United States of an alien who does not meet the visa requirements of theImmigration and Nationality Act when he is presented for inspection incursfine liability under section 273 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988),even in cases where it is established that the alien had a visa in hispossession when he boarded the carrier's airplane abroad for the flightto the United States.

(2) While the fact thatan alien had a visa in his possession when he boarded the carrier's airplaneabroad may entitle the carrier to remission (forgiveness in full) under section 273(c) of the Act, the carrier has the burden of establishingthat fact, and that burden of proof has not been met in this case.


STOCKWELL, 20 I&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1991)

ID 3150 (PDF)

(1) An alien holdingconditional permanent resident status is prohibited by section 245(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (1988), from adjusting his status under section 245(a).

(2) Section 245(d) of the Act does not prohibit an alien whose conditional permanent residentstatus has been terminated from adjusting his status under section 245(a).


LEMHAMMAD, 20 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1991)

ID 3151 (PDF)

(1) In a deportationproceeding where the alien is charged with deportability pursuant to section241(a)(9)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9)(B)(1988), as an alien whose status as a conditional permanent resident hasbeen terminated under section 216(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1988), the burden is on the Immigration and Naturalization Service to show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that one of the conditionsfor termination of status described in section 216(b)(1)(A) of the Acthas been met.

(2) Original jurisdictionto rule on the merits of an Applicatio n for Waiver of Requirement to File Joint Petition for Removal of Conditions (Form I-752) rests onlywith the appropriate regional service center director, and not the immigrationjudge.


U-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 327 (BIA 1991)

ID 3152 (PDF)

(1) By federal statute,aggravated felonies and, correspondingly, drug trafficking crimes, areper se particularly serious crimes.

(2) The respondent indeportation proceedings has been convicted of particularly serious crimes,i.e., convictions for the sale of marihuana and lysergic acid diethylamide(LSD) and, therefore, by operation of law, he is ineligible for asylumpursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (1991) and for withholding ofdeportation under section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1991), and 8 C.F.R. §208.16(c)(2)(ii)(1991).

(3) The asylum regulationsfound at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1-.24 (1991) are applicable to the respondent's applications for asylum and withholding of deportation receivedby the Office of the Immigration Judge on November 14, 1990, since these regulations apply to applications filed on or after October 1, 1990, asprovided by 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (1991).

(4) The statutory barto asylum for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, set forth in section 515(a)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649,104 Stat. 4978, 5053 (enacted November 29, 1990), amending section 208of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988), does not apply to the respondent'sasylum application, where section 515(b)(1) of the 1990 Act, 104 Stat.at 5053, provides that this statutory bar "shall apply to applicationsfor asylum made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,"and the respondent made his application for asylum with the immigrationjudge on November 14, 1990, approximately 2 weeks before the enactmentdate.

(5) The amendment to section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Act, providing that an alien convicted ofan aggravated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularlyserious crime, is effective on the date of enactment of the ImmigrationAct of 1990, 104 Stat. at 4978 (enacted November 29, 1990), where the1990 Act is silent as to the effective date of the amendment, and in theabsence of an express provision to the contrary, an act of Congress takeseffect on its date of enactment.

(6) Where new statutoryprovisions affecting eligibility for relief from deportation come intoeffect during the pendency of a deportation hearing or an administrativeappeal to this Board, and there exists no statutory directive to the contrary,the new statutory provisions shall be applied to the application for reliefbefore us, and the application may be denied on the basis of the statutoryamendment.


HERNANDEZ-PUENTE, 20 I&N Dec. 335 (BIA 1991)

ID 3153 (PDF)

(1) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals and the immigration judges are without authority to apply thedoctrine of equitable estoppel against the Immigration and NaturalizationService so as to preclude it from undertaking a lawful course of actionthat it is empowered to pursue by statute and regulation.

(2) The Service has noauthority to grant an application for adjustment of status nunc pro tunc under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1255 (1988).

(3) As the Board hasno jurisdiction, according to 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5) (1991), to reviewa district director's decision to deny adjustment of status, it followsthat the Board also lacks jurisdiction to review or remedy a failure of the Service to act on the application.


JUAREZ, 20 I&N Dec. 340 (BIA 1991)

ID 3154 (PDF)

(1) The status of a lawfultemporary resident alien under the special agricultural worker programwho subsequently commits a deportable offense is not required to be terminatedas a condition precedent to the commencement of deportation proceedings.Matter of Medrano, 20 I&N Dec. 3138 (BIA 1990, 1991), distinguished.

(2) The protection againstthe execution of an order of deportation afforded by section 210(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1160(d) (1988), doesnot apply to an alien who has been granted temporary resident status, who commits a deportable offense after acquiring such status, and whois subject to a final order of deportation by an immigration judge basedon a determination that the alien is deportable for such offense under section 241(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).


DE LA CRUZ, 20 I&N Dec. 346 (BIA1991)

ID 3155 (PDF)

(1) Section 242(a)(2)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (1988),as amended by section 504 of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5049, creates a rebuttable presumption againstthe release of any alien convicted of an aggravated felony from Immigrationand Naturalization Service custody unless the alien demonstrates thathe is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, is not a threat to the community, and is likely to appear for any scheduled hearings.

(2) Unlawful distributionof a controlled substance involves unlawful trade or dealing, i.e., "trafficking,"in a controlled substance under the definition of "aggravated felony"at section 101(a)(43) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988), as amended by section 501 of the Immigration Act of 1990, 104 Stat. at5048.

(3) "Illicit trafficking" in a controlled substance within the meaning of section 101(a)(43) of the Act, as amended, includes "any drug trafficking crime" asdefined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1988).


SANCHEZ-LINN, 20 I&N Dec. 362 (BIA 1991)

ID 3156 (PDF)

(1) An applicant forregistry under section 249 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§1259 (1988), must establish that he (a) entered the United Statesprior to January 1, 1972; (b) has had his residence in the United Statescontinuously since such entry; (c) is a person of good moral character;and (d) is not ineligible to citizenship.

(2) In order for an applicantfor registry to meet his burden of proving that he is at present a personof good moral character, he must show that he has been such for a reasonableperiod of time preceding the application.

(3) The greater the gravityof an alien's past misconduct, the longer the period of intervening goodconduct must be before an applicant for registry may be able to meet hisburden of establishing that he is now a person of good moral character.

(4) Applicants who haveengaged in conduct within the scope of any of the provisions of section101(f) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1988), may be required to present compelling evidence that their character has changed.

(5) An applicant forregistry can also be denied such relief in the exercise of discretion.


PATEL, 20 I&N Dec. 368 (BIA 1991)

ID 3157 (PDF)

(1) Aliens seeking admissionto the United States who do not appear to an immigration inspector tobe clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to enter are placed in exclusionproceedings under section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1988).

(2) Aliens who have effectedan entry into the United States may only be removed in deportation proceedingsunder section 242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988).

(3) "Entry"is defined at section 101(a)(13) of the Act, 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a)(13)(1988), as "any coming of an alien into the United States, from aforeign port or place or from an outlying possession."

(4) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals has formulated a more precise definition of "entry"which requires (1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physical presence; (2)(a) inspection and admission by animmigration officer, or (b) actual and intentional evasion of inspectionat the nearest inspection point; and (3) freedom from official restraint.

(5) An applicant foradmission to the United States, whose passport is stamped "Admitted"by an immigration inspector but who is prevented from entering the mainterminal of an airport by a customs officer who suspects the passportto be fraudulent, is properly placed in exclusion proceedings becausethe applicant is not "free from official restraint," as requiredby Matter of Pierre, 14 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1973). Matter of V-Q-, 9I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 1960), clarified.


GOLDESHTEIN, 20 I&N Dec. 382 (BIA 1991)

ID 3158 (PDF)

(1) Structuring any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions for the purpose of evadingthe reporting requirements of the financial institution(s) in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5324(3) (1988) entails a deliberate deception and impairmentof governmental functions; thus, it is inherently fraudulent and is acrime involving moral turpitude.

(2) A conspiracy to commitan offense involves moral turpitude when the underlying substantive offenseis a crime involving moral turpitude.

(3) An application fordiscretionary relief, including a waiver of inadmissibility under section212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1988), may be denied in the exercise of discretion without express rulingson the question of statutory eligibility.


BALDERAS, 20 I&N Dec. 389 (BIA 1991)

ID 3159 (PDF)

(1) A conviction which has previously been relied upon in a charge of deportability may be allegedas one of the "two crimes involving moral turpitude" in a secondproceeding, even though the first proceeding was terminated by a grantof relief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988), where the second crime alleged is a subsequentconviction or a conviction that was not disclosed in the prior proceeding.

(2) A grant of reliefunder section 212(c) of the Act is not akin to a pardon or expungementof theconviction underlying the ground of excludability or charge of deportability.

(3) The convictions allegedto be grounds for excludability or deportability do not disappear froman alien's record for immigration purposes upon a grant of relief under section 212(c) of the Act.


MA, 20 I&N Dec. 394 (BIA 1991)

ID 3160 (PDF)

(1) Because of the potentialfor fraud in visa petition proceedings where Chinese notarial birth certificatesare issued a period of time after the subject's birth, any and all supportingevidence should accompany such certificates as evidence of the claimedrelationship.

(2) Where a petitionerfiles a visa petition on behalf of a claimed relative whom she has previouslyfailed to identify as such on documents that require the identificationof such relatives, the visa petition will be approved only if it is supportedby clear and convincing evidence of the bona fide nature of the relationship.


CERNA, 20 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1991)

ID 3161 (PDF)

(1) An applicant forrelief under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1182(c) (1988), must be a lawful permanent resident of theUnited States and must have a lawful unrelinquished domicile of 7 consecutiveyears.

(2) Barring a subsequentreversal of a respondent's deportability finding by an appellate courtor administratively, an alien's status as a lawful permanent alien endsupon the entry of an administratively final order of deportation.

(3) A respondent whois subject to an administratively final order of deportation cannot successfullymove to reopen deportation proceedings to again apply for relief under section 212(c) of the Act as such a respondent is no longer a lawful permanentresident of this country.

(4) Authority from onecircuit is not binding in another and the Board declines to follow theholding in Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1991), outside the jurisdictionof the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

(5) Motions to reopenand motions to reconsider are separate and distinct motions with differentrequirements -- a motion to reconsider requests that the original decisionbe reexamined in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law,or an argument or aspect of the case that was overlooked, while a motionto reopen seeks to reopen proceedings so that new evidence can be presentedand a new decision entered on a different factual record, normally aftera further evidentiary hearing.

(6) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals has not held that a respondent who has been denied relief under section 212(c) of the Act is precluded from having the original decisionreconsidered.

(7) The Board is notfavorably disposed to the practice of waiting until the conclusion of the administrative appeal process to file a motion that seeks to offeradditional evidence regarding the matter previously in issue.

(8) The Board has notheld that the existence of outstanding equities creates a right to havethe consequences resulting from particularly serious criminal misconductwaived or that such equities compel a grant of discretionary relief; rather,the Board has noted just the opposite (i.e., that the nature of the adversefactor or factors may ultimately be determinative of whether relief under section 212(c) of the Act is granted).


D-L- & A-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 409 (BIA 1991)

ID 3162 (PDF)

Applicants for admissionto the United States, who were not traveling in transit without visa status,are not excludable under section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1988), where the applicants did notpresent or intend to present fraudulent visas or travel documents or documentscontaining willful misrepresentations to an authorized official of theUnited States Government at the time of their attempted entry. Matterof Shirdel, 19 I&N Dec. 33 (BIA 1984), distinguished.


K-, 20 I&N Dec. 418 (BIA 1991)

ID 3163 (PDF)

The language of section515(a)(2) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.4978, 5053 (enacted Nov. 29, 1990), amending section 243(h)(2) of theImmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988), expresslystates that an alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be consideredto have committed a "particularly serious crime" for purposesof section 243(h)(2)(B), thereby obviating the need for a case-by-casedetermination of this question, but does not alter the conclusion in Matterof Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986), modified on other grounds,Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988), that under section243(h)(2)(B)all aliens convicted of "particularly serious crimes" necessarilyconstitute a "danger to the community." Matter of U-M-, 20 I&NDec. 3152 (BIA 1991), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter ofGonzalez, supra; Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 1986),modified on other grounds, Matter of Gonzalez, supra; and Matter of Carballe,supra, clarified.


B-, 20 I&N Dec. 427 (BIA 1991)

ID 3164 (PDF)

(1) The filing with animmigration judge of an application for asylum in exclusion or deportationproceedings is not a continuation or a mere updating of an applicationpreviously filed with the Immigration and Naturalization Service but is,in effect, a new application.

(2) Although the applicantin exclusion proceedings had previously filed an asylum application with the Service in 1980 under the interim asylum regulations, the filing of the application with the immigration judge on April 22, 1991, brings itwithin the purview of the present asylum regulations at 8 C.F.R. §208 (1991).

(3) The applicant inexclusion proceedings has been convicted of a particularly serious crime,i.e., aggravated battery, and, therefore, by operation of law, he is ineligiblefor asylum pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (1991) and for withholding of exclusion and deportation under section 243(h)(2)(B) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1990).


P-C-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 432 (BIA 1991)

ID 3165 (PDF)

(1) An immigration judgemay not redetermine custody status on his own motion and shall do so onlyupon application from the respondent or his representative.

(2) The potential difficultiesthat the Immigration and Naturalization Service may face in executinga final order of deportation because of the conditions existing in thecountry of deportation are not a proper consideration for an immigrationjudge in redetermining an alien's custody status.


BART, 20 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 1992)

ID 3166 (PDF)

Issuance of a bad checkin violation of section 16-9-20(a) of the Georgia Code is a crime involvingmoral turpitude because Georgia case law clearly establishes that guiltyknowledge, as evidenced by an intent to defraud, is an essential elementof the offense.


BALAO, 20 I&N Dec. 440 (BIA 1992)

ID 3167 (PDF)

Intent to defraud isnot an essential element of the crime of passing bad checks under title18, section 4105(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes and,therefore, a conviction under this law is not for a crime involving moralturpitude.


SILVA-RODRIGUEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 1992)

ID 3168 (PDF)

An immigration judgein deportation proceedings did not act with good cause by granting a 1-yearcontinuance so that the respondent would have more time to establish rehabilitationin furtherance of his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(c) (Supp. II 1990). Matter of Garcia-Reyes, 19 I&N Dec. 830 (BIA1988), followed.


CORREA-GARCES, 20 I&N Dec. 451 (BIA 1992)

ID 3169 (PDF)

(1) The immigration judgehas no authority to extend the appeal period provided for by federal regulationsat 8 C.F.R. § 242.21(a) (1991).

(2) The authority to grant a stay of deportation once an order of deportation is entered againstan alien is generally vested in the district director under federal regulationsat 8 C.F.R. § 243.4 (1991), and the immigration judge's authorityis limited to granting a stay in connection with a motion to reopen ora motion to reconsider, or in connection with an appeal from a decisionon such a motion.

(3) A conviction which forms the basis of a finding that an alien lacks good moral characterunder section 101(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(f) (1988), need not be the basis upon which the alien is founddeportable.

(4) A conviction formaking false statements on an application for a United States passportin another person's name, and for willfully, knowingly, and with intentto deceive, falsely representing a social security account number as one'sown, for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining a passport in another person'sname, is for a crime involving moral turpitude.


R-O-, 20 I&N Dec. 455 (BIA 1992)

ID 3170 (PDF)

(1) A guerrilla organization'sattempt to coerce a person into performing military service does not,without more, constitute persecution on account of political opinion.INS v. Elias Zacarias, U.S. 502, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), followed.

(2) A victim of forcedrecruitment must show that he is being persecuted on account of his politicalopinion, and that his persecution is not solely the result of the guerrillas'aim in seeking to fill their ranks in order to carry out their war with the government and pursue their political goal, their political motivebeing irrelevant. INS v. Zacarias, supra, followed.

(3) The respondent hasnot established a well-founded fear of persecution by the Government ofEl Salvador on account of political opinion due to his involvement with the guerrillas, where the Government does have the legitimate right to investigate the respondent regarding his suspected activities on behalfof the guerrillas and to criminally prosecute and punish him under itslaws for any activities found to be illegal, and there is no evidencethat the respondent has received any threats from the Government on thegrounds of political opinion, or otherwise. Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d531 (9th Cir. 1988), distinguished.


CARBAJAL, 20 I&N Dec. 461 (BIA 1992)

ID 3171 (PDF)

(1) A visa petition isconsidered filed on the date on which the petition and the appropriatefee are submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and thepetition is stamped with the time and date pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§103.2(a) and 204.1(a) (1991).

(2) When the Servicereturns a visa petition to the petitioner because at the time she filedthe visa petition she was not qualified to accord preference classificationto the beneficiary, the petitioner may refile the previously submittedvisa petition with the Service once she becomes qualified.

(3) When a previouslyfiled visa petition is resubmitted to the Service, stamped with the time and date, and accompanied by the appropriate fee, it is a new petitionand a new filing date has been effected which, if the petition is approved,establishes the priority date for the beneficiary pursuant to 8 C.F.R.§ 245.1(f)(2) (1991).


COELHO, 20 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 1992)

ID 3172 (PDF)

(1) The Board of Immigration Appeals may deny a motion to remand or motion to reopen proceedings where a prima facie case for the relief sought has not been established or in the absence of previously unavailable, material evidence or where the ultimate relief is discretionary, if the relief would not be granted in the exercise of discretion.

(2) A party who seeksa remand or to reopen proceedings to pursue relief bears a "heavyburden" of proving that if proceedings before the immigration judgewere reopened, with all the attendant delays, the new evidence would likelychange the result in the case.


ARTHUR, 20 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 1992), modified, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002)

ID 3173 (PDF)

(1) Under the rule ofMatter of Garcia, 16 I&N Dec. 653 (BIA 1978), a motion to reopen shouldgenerally be granted in cases involving an application for adjustmentof status filed simultaneously with a visa petition, notwithstanding thefact that the visa petition has not yet been adjudicated, unless the applicantfor adjustment appears clearly ineligible for the preference classificationclaimed in the underlying petition.

(2) Subsequent to ourdecision in Matter of Garcia, supra, Congress amended sections 204(g)and 245(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§1154(g) and 1255(e) (Supp. II 1990), to preclude an alien from adjustinghis status based on a marriage that was entered into after the commencementof proceedings to determine his right to enter or remain in the United States and to bar the approval of a visa petition to accord immediaterelative or preference status based upon such marriage until after thebeneficiary of the petition has resided outside the United States fora 2-year period following the marriage, unless the alien establishes "byclear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the Attorney Generalthat the marriage was entered into in good faith and . . . was not enteredinto for the purpose of procuring the alien's entry as an immigrant."

(3) The presumption establishedin Matter of Garcia, supra, that for purposes of reopening, the relationshipclaimed on an unadjudicated visa petition filed simultaneously with anapplication for adjustment of status is bona fide unless clear ineligibilityis apparent in the record is inconsistent and incompatible with the congressionallymandated presumption that marriages entered into after the institutionof proceedings are fraudulent.

(4) Given the petitioner'sburden of establishing the bona fides of a marriage described in section245(e) of the Act by clear and convincing evidence, an inquiry by an immigrationjudge or this Board into whether the evidence submitted in support ofa visa petition based upon such marriage is sufficient to demonstrateprima facie eligibility for the preference classification sought would necessarily involve an in-depth examination into the merits of the petition,constituting a substantial and unwarranted intrusion into the districtdirector's authority over the adjudication of visa petitions.

(5) Motions to reopenfor consideration of applications for adjustment of status based upon unadjudicated visa petitions which fall within the ambit of sections 204(g)and 245(e) of the Act will not be granted. Matter of Garcia, supra, modified.


RAHMAN, 20 I&N Dec. 480 (BIA 1992)

ID 3174 (PDF)

(1) An immigration judge'sdiscretion to change venue in exclusion and deportation proceedings issubject to the existence of good cause for such a change, and good causeis determined by balancing the relevant factors, including administrativeconvenience, expeditious treatment of the case, location of witnesses,cost of transporting witnesses or evidence to a new location, and factorscommonly associated with the alien's place of residence.

(2) While factors commonlyassociated with an applicant's place of residence are relevant to thequestion of proper venue, the mere fact that an applicant in exclusionproceedings allegedly resides or wishes to reside in another city, without a showing of other significant factors associated with such residence,is insufficient cause to outweigh the Immigration and Naturalization Service'sopposition to a motion for change of venue, particularly where the Servicehas demonstrated that it would be prejudiced by such a change.

(3) The Government isnot required to accommodate the applicant's choice of a distant attorneyand his acquisition of an interpreter by changing venue at considerableexpense, especially where there is no showing that local counsel is unavailable or that an interpreter cannot otherwise be obtained.

(4) An immigration judge'sorder changing the venue of the hearing does not necessarily affect theplace where the alien may be detained, because an immigration judge hasno authority over the place of detention.

(5) An immigration judgemay grant a change of venue only upon motion by one of the parties andonly after the other party has been given notice and an opportunity to respond.


BALSILLIE, 20 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1992)

ID 3175 (PDF)

(1) The Immigration and Nationality Act provides two means by which the conditional basis of aconditional permanent resident's status may be removed: the alien and the United States citizen spouse may file a Joint Petition to Remove theConditional Basis of Alien's Permanent Resident Status (Form I-751) under section 216(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186(c)(1)(Supp. II 1990),or the alien may file an Application for Waiver of Requirement to FileJoint Petition for Removal of Conditions (Form I-752) under section 216(c)(4).

(2) Section 216(c)(4)of the Act, as amended, and the corresponding regulations at 8 C.F.R.§216.5 (1992) provide three separate waivers of the requirement tofile a joint petition for removal of the conditional basis of a conditionalpermanent resident's status.


A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 492 (BIA 1992)

ID 3176 (PDF)

(1) The term "aggravatedfelony," as defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. II 1990), encompassesall convictions described therein whether conviction occurred on, before,or after the date of enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (enacted Nov. 18, 1988), with the exceptionof the crimes that were introduced into the aggravated felony definitionby the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (effectiveNov. 29, 1990), which are defined as aggravated felonies only if committedon or after November 29, 1990, and unless otherwise limited in its applicationunder a separate provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(2) The statutory barto relief found in section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. II 1990), added by the Immigration Actof 1990, and further amended by the Miscellaneous and Technical Immigrationand Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat.1733 (enacted Dec. 12, 1991), barring relief to an alien convicted ofone or more aggravated felonies who served for such felony or feloniesa term of imprisonment of at least 5 years, applies to all aggravated felony convictions, as definedin section 101(a)(43) of the Act, regardless of when conviction occurred,with the exception of the crimes added to the aggravated felony definitionby the Immigration Act of 1990, which are aggravated felonies only ifcommitted on or after November 29, 1990.

(3) The Attorney Generalhas determined that the effective date language of section 511(b) of theImmigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5052, statingthat the statutory bar of section 212(c) of the Act "shall applyto admissions occurring after the date of the enactment of [the 1990]Act," refers to applications for such relief submitted after November29, 1990, whether at a port of entry before a district director or insubsequent proceedings before an immigration judge.

(4) Both the statutorybar of section 208(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d) (Supp. II 1990), barringan alien convicted of an aggravated felony from applying for or beinggranted asylum, and the amendment to section 243 (h) (2) of the Act, 8U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (Supp. II 1990), providing that an alien convictedof an aggravated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularlyserious crime, attach to all aggravated felony convictions, whether enteredbefore, on, or after November 29, 1990--except as that term relates to the crimes added to the aggravated felony definition by the ImmigrationAct of 1990, which are aggravated felonies only if committed on or afterNovember 29, 1990--and apply to all applications for asylum and withholding of deportation made on or after November 29, 1990. Matter of U-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 3152 (BIA 1991), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded.


ADETIBA, 20 I&N Dec. 506 (BIA 1992)

ID 3177 (PDF)

(1) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals follows its historical approach as to what constitutes a "singlescheme of criminal misconduct" within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii)(Supp. II 1990), by interpreting the statutory language to mean that when an alien has performed an act, which, in and of itself constitutes a complete,individual, and distinct crime, he is deportable when he again commitssuch an act, even though one may closely follow the other, be similarin character, and even be part of an overall plan of criminal misconduct;such an approach recognizes that the statutory language was meant to distinguishcases where there are separate and distinct crimes, but they are performedin furtherance of a single criminal episode, such as where one crime constitutesa lesser offense of another or where two crimes flow from and are thenatural consequence of a single act of criminal misconduct. Pacheco v.INS, 546 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977),followed.

(2) Outside their respectivecircuits, the Board will not follow the more expansive interpretationof the statutory language in question as set forth in Gonzalez-Sandovalv. INS, 910 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990); Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.),cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); and Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34 (3dCir. 1963).

(3) The separate crimesof which the respondent was convicted, namely using credit cards in thenames of different people, with intent to defraud, and from which he obtainedthings of value for each card during a period of time, did not arise outof a "single scheme of criminal misconduct" within the meaningof section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, notwithstanding that the crimeswere committed pursuant to an elaborate plan and the modus operandi was the same in each instance.


HOU, 20 I&N Dec. 513 (BIA 1992)

ID 3178 (PDF)

A conviction for an attemptedfirearms offense will not support a charge of deportability under section241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C)(Supp. II 1990).


BELTRAN, 20 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA1992)

ID 3179 (PDF)

A conviction for solicitationto commit a crime relating to a controlled substance renders an aliendeportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(11) (1988), as an alien convicted of a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance.


C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA1992)

ID 3180 (PDF)

(1) The analysis presentedin Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), and followed inBeltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1990), among other cases,for determining whether a conviction is for a "particularly seriouscrime" has been superseded in part by Congress through amendmentof section 243(h)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1253(h)(2) (1988), by section 515(a)(2) of the Immigration Actof 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053 (effective Nov. 29,1990).

(2) With respect to anyapplication for withholding of deportation made on or after November 29,1990, where the conviction in question is for an aggravated felony within the meaning of the Act, the conviction must be deemed to be for a particularlyserious crime without regard to the analysis set forth in Matter of Frentescu,supra. Matter of U-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 3152 (BIA 1991), aff'd, 989 F.2d1085 (9th Cir. 1993); Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988);Matter of Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 1986), modified, Matterof Gonzalez, supra; Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986),modified, Matter of Gonzalez, supra; and Matter of Frentescu, supra, modified,Matter of Gonzalez, supra, modified.


DAVIS, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), modified, Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N 390 (BIA 2002)

ID 3181 (PDF)

(1) The phrase "anyillicit trafficking in any controlled substance," as used to specifya drug-related "aggravated felony" in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp.II 1990), may be commonly defined as any unlawful trading or dealing inany controlled substance.

(2) Any felony drug-relatedstate, federal, or qualified foreign offense described by the words "illicittrafficking in any controlled substance," i.e., any unlawful trading or dealing in any controlled substance, is an aggravated felony without regard to the analysis set forth in Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec.3131 (BIA 1990).

(3) In addition, becausethe phrase "any illicit trafficking in any controlled substance"in section 101(a)(43) of the Act includes any "drug trafficking crime"as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1988), an offense involvinga controlled substance which is not designated as a felony under the lawof the rendering jurisdiction, and/or which does not constitute "illicittrafficking" as commonly defined, might nonetheless be a "drugtrafficking crime" (and therefore qualify as "illicit trafficking" and an "aggravated felony") if it is analogous to a felony offenseunder the statutes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) as addressedin Matter of Barrett, supra. Matter of Barrett, supra, clarified.

(4) The determinationwhether a conviction for "any attempt or conspiracy" to commita drug-related crime constitutes "any illicit trafficking in anycontrolled substance" within the meaning of section 101(a)(43) of the Act must be based on the drug-related substantive offense under lying the attempt or conspiracy.


R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547 (BIA 1992)

ID 3182 (PDF)

(1) An alien seekingreopening of proceedings based on his failure to request asylum beforethe completion of deportation proceedings must meet the general motionrequirements, as well as reasonably explain the failure to timely filean asylum application.

(2) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals withdraws from Matter of Jean, 17 I&N Dec. 100 (BIA 1979),to the extent that it suggests that an alien who has failed to timely file an application for asylum need only demonstrate excusable neglectfor the failure to file in order to obtain the reopening of proceedings.Matter of Jean, supra, modified.

(3) The respondent failedto demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum based on his refusalto serve in the Nicaraguan military.

(4) The Board takes administrativenotice that the Sandinista Party no longer controls the Nicaraguan Government.


L-, 20 I&N Dec. 553 (BIA 1992)

ID 3183 (PDF)

(1) Under the Visa WaiverPilot Program of section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1187 (1988), visitors to the United States from specifiedcountries may stay for up to 90 days without a visa, provided they waive any right to (1) review or appeal an immigration officer's determinationas to the admissibility of the alien at the port of entry into the United States, or (2) contest, other than on the basis of an application forasylum, any action for deportation against the alien.

(2) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R.§§ 217.4(c) and 242.1(a) and (d) (1992), the regulatory provisionsregarding deportability determinations under section 217 of the Act, proceedingsagainst an alien admitted under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program who hasapplied for asylum in the United States must be commenced with an Orderto Show Cause.

(3) The regulations which the Immigration and Naturalization Service promulgates have the forceand effect of law and are binding on the Service.


ALARCON, 20 I&N Dec. 557 (BIA 1992)

ID 3184 (PDF)

(1) A respondent who has been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arisingfrom a single scheme of criminal misconduct is inadmissible into the United States under section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. II 1990), and is thus ineligible for adjustmentof status under section 245 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (Supp. II1990), unless he is eligible for and should be granted a waiver of inadmissibilityunder section 212(h) of the Act.

(2) At the time the respondentfiled his application for a section 212(h) waiver, section 601(d)(4) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5076-77(effective June 1, 1991), required the passage of 15 years from the dateof the deportable offense before an alien could be eligible for a waiver;therefore, the respondent's offenses, committed within the 15 years priorto his application, statutorily barred him from qualifying for a section212(h) waiver.

(3) The amendments madeto section 212(h) of the Act during the pendency of the respondent's appealto the Board of Immigration Appeals by section 307(f) of the Miscellaneousand Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-232, 105 Stat. 1733 (enacted Dec. 12, 1991) ("1991 Amendments"),are applicable to his application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h).

(4) The version of section212(h) of the Act under the 1991 Amendments created two categories ofimmigrants eligible for relief; therefore, although the respondent isbarred from establishing eligibility as a result of his convictions within the past 15 years, he may be eligible for a waiver if he establishes thathe has the requisite relationship to a United States citizen or lawfulpermanent resident and that his exclusion would result in extreme hardshipto that family member.


RAMERIZ-SOMERA, 20 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 1992)

ID 3185 (PDF)

(1) The plain languageof section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1182(c)(West Supp. 1992), bars relief under that section to any alien who hasbeen convicted of an aggravated felony or felonies and who "has served,"not merely been sentenced to, a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years for his aggravated felony or felonies.

(2) Although the respondentwas sentenced to a 15-year term of imprisonment on his aggravated felonyconviction, he is not at this time statutorily ineligible for section212(c) relief because he has not yet actually served 5 years of this sentence.


PAPAZYAN, 20 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 1992)

ID 3186 (PDF)

(1) The Immigration Actof 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, amended and redesignatedthe exclusion grounds found at section 212(a) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988); these amendments apply to individualswho entered the United States on or after June 1, 1991.

(2) The Immigration Actof 1990 amended and redesignated the deportation grounds found at section241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1988); these amendments apply to aliens to whom notice of deportationproceedings has been provided on or after March 1, 1991.

(3) In light of the effectivedates for the revised and redesignated exclusion and deportation groundsmade by the Immigration Act of 1990, an alien in deportation proceedingswho was provided with notice on or after March 1, 1991, is properly chargedwith deportability under the redesignated section 241(a)(1)(A) of theAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1990), as an alien excludableat time of his last entry in 1987 under the appropriate exclusion groundsin their form prior to redesignation by the Immigration Act of 1990.


T-, 20 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1992)

ID 3187 (PDF)

(1) The Government ofSri Lanka does not persecute ethnic Sri Lankan Tamils on the basis oftheir ethnicity or "on account of" their championing of Tamilinterests or political rights.

(2) Neither the reliefof asylum nor of withholding of deportation provides for refuge "onaccount of" human rights abuses unconnected to the grounds enumeratedin the Immigration and Nationality Act, i.e., race, religion, nationality,membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

(3) An ethnic Tamil alienfrom Sri Lanka who was forced to assist the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam ("LTTE"), a separatist Tamil terrorist group, under threat of harm, did not establish that the LTTE was motivated to punish him becauseof his political views or persecute him on account of any of the othergrounds enumerated in the Act.

(4) In light of the historicalcontext of the Sri Lankan civil war, an ethnic Tamil alien suspected ofhaving ties to the terrorist group LTTE failed to demonstrate that thehuman rights abuses he suffered at the hands of the Sri Lankan securityforces, Indian Peacekeeping Force, and allied Tamil organizations in reactionto LTTE terrorism amounted to persecution on account of any of the grounds enumerated in the Act.


SERNA, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992)

ID 3188 (PDF)

(1) Neither the seriousnessof a criminal offense nor the severity of the sentence imposed thereforis determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude.

(2) A conviction under18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1982) for possession of an altered immigrationdocument with knowledge that it was altered, but without its use or proofof any intent to use it unlawfully, is not a conviction for a crime involvingmoral turpitude.


RODRIGUEZ-CORTES, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992)

ID 3189 (PDF)

(1) The sentence enhancementprovision of section 12022(a) of the California Penal Code, which allows for the imposition of an additional and consecutive term of imprisonmentupon a person convicted of a felony where any one of the principals of the felony was armed with a firearm, does not create a separate offense, but rather imposes additional punishment, and therefore does not constitutea conviction under California law.

(2) An alien, who was convicted of five counts of attempted murder in the second degree andwhose sentence under one count was enhanced pursuant to section 12022(a) of the California Penal Code because a codefendant was armed with a firearmin the attempted commission of the felony, has not been convicted of afirearm offense under California law and is not deportable under section241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C)(Supp. III 1991), as an alien convicted at any time after entry of a firearmviolation.

(3) An alien whose sentenceenhancement pursuant to section 12022(a) of the California Penal Codeis not a conviction under California law and who is not deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, as an alien convicted at any time afterentry of a firearm violation, is eligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibilityunder section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. III 1991).


M/V SARU MERU, 20 I&N Dec. 592 (BIA 1992)

ID 3190 (PDF)

(1) Fine liability under section 273(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1323(d) (1988), is absolute for bringing a stowaway to the United Statesand failing to detain him until he has been inspected by an immigrationofficer, even when the carrier did not know about the stowaway until afterhe was apprehended ashore.

(2) There is no provisionfor mitigation of fines imposed under section 273(d) of the Act.

(3) The Immigration andNaturalization Service can refrain from instituting fine proceedings,but that is a matter of prosecutorial discretion over which the Boardof Immigration Appeals has no jurisdiction.

(4) The Service's OperationsInstructions are not binding on the Board, but the Board can adopt thepolicies that are manifested in the Operations Instructions, which ithas done with respect to Operations Instructions 273.1 requiring the Serviceto secure affidavits to support the record for fine proceedings under section 273(d) of the Act.

(5) In cases where there is doubt about whether a carrier has brought stowaways to the United Statesand permitted them to land illegally, the Service has the burden of proofto establish those facts with persuasive evidence.


RAINFORD, 20 I&N Dec. 598 (BIA 1992)

ID 3191 (PDF)

A respondent who is convictedof criminal possession of a weapon is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C)(Supp. II 1990); however, such a conviction does not preclude a findingof admissibility in connection with an application for adjustment of statusunder section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (1988), and itmay not serve as a ground of deportability if the respondent's statusis adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. Matter of Rafipour,16 I&N Dec. 470 (BIA 1978), followed. Matter of V-, 1 I&N Dec.293 (BIA 1942), distinguished.


MONTENEGRO, 20 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 1992)

ID 3192 (PDF)

(1) Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. III1991), is ineffective to remove deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C)of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1991), for convictionof a firearms violation, even where the firearmsviolation is also a crimeinvolving moral turpitude within the scope of section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)of the Act. Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 3147 (BIA 1990;A.G. 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); and Matter of Granados,16 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 1979), aff'd, 624 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1980), followed.

(2) Matter of Meza, 20 I&N Dec. 3146 (BIA 1991), is limited to the question of eligibilityfor section 212(c) relief in the case of a conviction for a drug-traffickingaggravated felony and is based on the specific amendment to section 212(c)regarding aggravated felonies; it does not alter the general rule representedin Matter of Wadud, 19 I&N Dec. 182 (BIA 1984), and Matter of Granados,supra, and reaffirmed in Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, supra, that section212(c) relief is available in deportation proceedings only to those alienswho have been found deportable under a ground of deportability for which there is a comparable ground of excludability.


H-, 20 I&N Dec. 611 (BIA 1992)

ID 3193 (PDF)

Proceedings against analien who has been refused admission under the Visa Waiver Pilot Programand who has applied for asylum in the United States must be commencedwith a Notice to Applicant for Admission Detained for Hearing before ImmigrationJudge (Form I-122).


PEREZ-CONTRERAS, 20 I&N Dec. 615 (BIA 1992)

ID 3194 (PDF)

(1) A conviction forassault in the third degree under section 9A.36.031(1)(f) of the RevisedCode of Washington is not a firearm offense where use of a firearm isnot an element of the offense.

(2) A conviction forassault in the third degree under section 9A.36.031(1)(f) of the RevisedCode of Washington is not a crime involving moral turpitude where intentionalor reckless conduct is excluded from the statutory definition of the crime.

(3) The Board withdraws from Matter of Baker, 15 I&N Dec. 50 (BIA 1974), to the extent itholds that assault in the third degree resulting in great bodily harmis a crime involving moral turpitude without regard to the existence ofintentional or reckless conduct.


R-, 20 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 1992)

ID 3195 (PDF)

(1) The fact that a Sikhfrom the state of Punjab in India was beaten and threatened by Sikh militantsbecause he resisted their recruitment efforts did not establish persecutionon account of political opinion or any of the other grounds enumeratedin the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(2) The mistreatmentof a Sikh in Punjab by Indian police in the course of an investigationdoes not establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of exclusionand deportation where the purpose of the mistreatment was to obtain informationabout Sikh militants who sought the violent overthrow of the Indian Governmentrather than to punish him because of his political opinions or merelybecause he was a Sikh.

(3) While the Sikh applicantfor asylum may fear returning to Punjab because of the mistreatment heexperienced there at the hands of the Indian police, he has not demonstratedcountry- wide persecution or mistreatment of Sikhs by the central governmentor other Indian groups, and therefore he has not established a well-founded fear of persecution in India.

(4) Absent a threat ofpersecution on a country-wide basis in India and in light of the factualcircumstances of his case, a Sikh applicant does not merit a grant ofasylum in the exercise of discretion even if it were assumed that he sufferedpast persecution in Punjab.


FLORIDA RURAL LEGAL SERVICES, INC., 20 I&N Dec. 639 (BIA 1993)

ID 3196 (PDF)

An organization requestingrecognition or accreditation of its representatives, which has physicallyseparate offices, must demonstrate by individual application that eachoffice independently has at its disposal adequate knowledge, information,and experience in immigration law and procedure and that it makes onlynominal charges and assesses no excessive membership dues for personsgiven assistance.


ELIS, 20 I&N Dec. 641 (BIA 1993)

ID 3197 (PDF)

In bond proceedings governedby section 242(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1991), the alien bears the burden of showingthat he is lawfully admitted to the United States, not a threat to the community, and likely to appear before any scheduled hearings. Matterof De La Cruz, 20 I&N Dec. 3155 (BIA 1991), modified.


GONZALEZ-LOPEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 1993)

ID 3198 (PDF)

(1) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals is without authority to consider an appeal from an in absentiaorder made under the deportation procedures specified under section 242(b)(1)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (Supp.II 1990), and section 242B(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(1)(Supp. III 1991), where section 242B(c)(3) of the Act clearly shows thatany in absentia order made under these new deportation procedures mayonly be rescinded by filing a motion to reopen with the immigration judge.

(2) An alien may takean appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals from an immigration judge'sdenial of a motion to reopen filed for purposes of seeking the rescissionof the immigration judge's in absentia order pursuant to section 242B(c)(3)of the Act.

(3) An alien may properlyappeal an immigration judge's in absentia order to the Board of ImmigrationAppeals, or file a motion to reopen with the immigration judge in thecircumstances set forth in Matter of Haim, 19 I&N Dec. 641 (BIA 1988),if the in absentia order was rendered in exclusion proceedings or in deportationproceedings where service or attempted service of the notice of the hearingfor which the alien failed to appear was made prior to June 13, 1992,the effective date for the new deportation procedures specified in section242B of the Act.


CHOW, 20 I&N Dec. 647 (BIA 1993)

ID 3199 (PDF)

(1) Section 241(a)(2)(C)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C)(Supp. II 1990), relating to convictions for certain firearms offenses,represents the enactment of a new statutory provision that completelysupersedes all former versions of that deportation ground and is not limitedregarding its applicability to convictions which predated its enactment,there being no restrictions regarding the dates in which a convictionmust occur in order to be included within the scope of the new statute.

(2) An alien deportableunder section 241(a)(2)of the Act on the basis of his conviction for afirearms offense is ineligible for relief from deportation under section212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. III 1991), because there is no exclusion ground corresponding to the deportation ground for convictionof a firearms offense. Matter of Montenegro, 20 I&N Dec. 3192 (BIA1992); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I&N Dec. 3147 (BIA 1990; A.G.1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993); Matter of Granados, 16 I&NDec. 726 (BIA 1979), aff'd, 624 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1980), followed.


K-L-, 20 I&N Dec. 654 (BIA 1993)

ID 3200 (PDF)

(1) A conviction under18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. II 1990) for use of a firearm duringa drug trafficking crime or crime of violence is a conviction for immigrationpurposes because this statute creates distinct offenses separate fromthe underlying offenses, rather than merely enabling penalty enhancement.Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 3189 (BIA 1992), distinguished.

(2) An alien convictedof use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1991), as an alien convicted at any time after entry of a firearm violation, and under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii)of the Act, as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.


P-F-, 20 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 1993)

ID 3201 (PDF)

An alien convicted of the first degree felonies of armed burglary and robbery with a firearmunder sections 810.02 and 812.13 of the Florida Statutes was convictedof firearm offenses for the purpose of applying section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp.III 1991), where the use of a firearm was an essential element of thecrimes, i.e., the use of a firearm elevated the crimes to first degreefelonies and triggered a mandatory minimum sentence as distinguished froma statutory sentence enhancement.


LOPEZ-AMARO, 20 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 1993)

ID 3202 (PDF)

(1) Although section775.087 of the Florida Statutes is, on its face, a penalty enhancementprovision designed to raise the penalty for conviction of a felony where the felony is committed with the use of a weapon or firearm, under Floridacaselaw, use of a firearm becomes an element of the substantive offenseof first degree murder with a firearm where the elements of murder under section 782.04 of the Florida Statutes and of use of a firearm under section775.087 of the Florida Statutes are charged and proven.

(2) A conviction forfirst degree murder with a firearm in violation of sections 782.04 and775.087 of the Florida Statutes constitutes a firearms offense within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1991), where the use of a firearm is deemed to be an element of the defendant's substantive offense.  Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 3189 (BIA 1992), distinguished.


ISBER, 20 I&N Dec. 676 (BIA 1993)

ID 3203 (PDF)

Section 204(c) of theImmigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1988), doesnot preclude approval of a second marital visa petition filed by a petitioneron behalf of the same beneficiary.


H-M-, 20 I&N Dec. 683 (BIA 1993)

ID 3204 (PDF)

(1) Comparing Acewiczv. United States INS, 984 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1993), with Castillo-Villagrav. INS, 972 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1992), the Board concluded that it maytake administrative notice of the change in conditions of a country inthose cases arising within the jurisdiction of the United States Courtof Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when an alien acknowledges this Board'sauthority to do so and discusses the changed circumstances on appeal.

(2) Where an asylum applicantfocuses his application on past persecution, the requirement to show thatthere is little likelihood of future persecution can be satisfied by takingadministrative notice of the change in circumstances in the country atissue.

(3) Where an asylum applicantviolates currency laws which a government has a legitimate right to enforce,and he suffers harsh treatment as a result, the applicant must show thatthe government in question has punished him "on account of"his political opinion and not for the violation of the currency laws.INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992), followed.


H-, 20 I&N Dec. 693 (Assoc. Comm. 1993)

ID 3205 (PDF)

(1) An applicant fortemporary resident status under section 245A of the Immigration andNationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988), has the burden to establish eligibilityfor the benefit sought by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 C.F.R. §245a.2(d)(5) (1993). The sufficiency of all evidence produced by the applicantwill be judged according to its probative value and credibility. 8 C.F.R.§ 245a.2(d)(6) (1993).

(2) Prior to 1982, section265 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976), required any alien in theUnited States in a lawful temporary status to notify the Attorney Generalin writing of his address annually and at the expiration of each 3-monthperiod, regardless of whether the address had changed.

(3) An alien who failedto comply with the reporting requirements under section 265 was amenableto deportation proceedings, unless he was able to establish that the failurewas reasonably excusable or not willful. Section 266(b) of the Act, 8U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1976).

(4) An applicant fortemporary resident status pursuant to section 245A of the Act has establisheda credible claim to willfully violating the reporting requirements under section 265 of the Act when he has consistently advanced this claim notonly on his initial Application for Status as a Temporary Resident (FormI-687), but also in an affidavit submitted to the Immigration and NaturalizationService, and at his adjustment of status interview.

(5) A nonimmigrant studentwho willfully failed to comply with the reporting requirements of section265 of the Act is deemed to have violated his status and thereby to bein an unlawful status for purposes of adjustment under section 245A of the Act.

(6) The absence of mandatoryannual and quarterly registration reports from Government files in violation of section 265 of the Act does not warrant a finding that the applicant'sunlawful status was "known to the Government" as of January1, 1982.


SHIH, 20 I&N Dec. 697 (BIA 1993)

ID 3206 (PDF)

(1) The decision of animmigration judge becomes final immediately upon the waiver of an alien'sright to appeal.

(2) The Board of ImmigrationAppeals is without jurisdiction to adjudicate a case in which the alienhas waived the right to appeal.


LI, 20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993)

ID 3207 (PDF)

(1) An adopted child,as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988), may not confer immigrationbenefits upon a natural parent without regard to whether the adopted childhas been accorded or could be accorded immigration benefits by virtue of his or her adoptive status. Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421(BIA 1967); and Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964), overruled.Matter of Kirby, 13 I&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969), modified.

(2) The petitioner, who was an adopted child under the immigration laws, may not confer immigrationbenefits upon the beneficiary, his natural sibling, because their commonnatural parent no longer has the status of parent of the adopted childfor immigration purposes.


Z-, 20 I&N Dec. 707 (BIA 1993)

ID 3208 (PDF)

(1) Under the precedentdecisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, an "entry" into the United States under section 101(a)(13) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988), requires: (1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physical presence;(2) (a) inspection and admission by an immigration officer, or (b) actualand intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point;and (3) freedom from official restraint.

(2) In exclusion proceedingswhere the alien has no colorable claim to lawful permanent resident status,the burden of proof is upon the alien to show that he has effected anentry and that exclusion proceedings are therefore improper.

(3) The Board found thatthe alien had made an entry into the United States when he debarked fromhis vessel at a place not designated as a port of entry and fled into the interior undetected, with every apparent intention of evading immigrationinspection.

(4) The mere fact thatthe applicant entered an area which was under federal jurisdiction forreasons unrelated to immigration processing does not establish that hewas under "official restraint" and does not render his movementsomething less than an entry.


K-S-, 20 I&N Dec. 715 (BIA 1993)

ID 3209 (PDF)

In contrast to the precedentialauthority of the case law of a United States circuit court, the Boardof Immigration Appeals is not bound to follow the published decision ofa United States district court in cases arising within the same district.Matter of Fakalata, 18 I&N Dec. 213, 217-18 (BIA 1982); Matter ofMelendez, 16 I&N Dec. 54, 55 (BIA 1976); Matter of Harris, 15 I&NDec. 39, 43 (BIA 1970); and Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13 I&N Dec.179, 181 (BIA 1969), modified in part.


BAPTIST EDUCATION CENTER, 20 I&N Dec. 723 (BIA 1993)

ID 3210 (PDF)

(1) In a proceeding under8 C.F.R. § 292.2(c) (1993) to withdraw recognition of an organizationauthorized to practice before the Immigration and Naturalization Serviceand the Board of Immigration Appeals, an organization seeking to retainits status as a recognized organization must demonstrate by clear, unequivocal,and convincing evidence that it continues to satisfy the requirementsfor recognition under 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(a) (1993).

(2) The Board terminatedthe respondent's status as a recognized organization under 8 C.F.R. §292.2(c) (1993), having found that the respondent had not establishedby clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that it was a non-profitorganization, independent of and separate and apart from its founder andrepresentative, Reverend Marc Azard, a non-lawyer who used the respondent'srecognition as a means of continuing his immigration counseling practiceto receive income for himself.


JIMENEZ-LOPEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 738 (BIA 1993)

ID 3211 (PDF)

An alien admitted forlawful temporary residence under section 210 of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), who is paroled into the United States for criminal prosecution under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(3)(1990) does not subsequently make an "entry" as that term isdefined under the immigration laws when the Immigration and NaturalizationService adjusts his status to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 210(a)(2)(B) of the Act, and 8 C.F.R. § 210.5(a)(2) (1990).


CHAVEZ-CALDERON, 20 I&N Dec. 744 (BIA1993)

ID 3212 (PDF)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), holdingthat a lawful permanent resident's "brief, casual, and innocent"departure from the United States did not meaningfully interrupt his residencein this country, is inapplicable to aliens who are admitted as lawfultemporary residents pursuant to section 210 of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).


GABRYELSKY, 20 I&N Dec. 750 (BIA 1993)

ID 3213 (PDF)

(1) A waiver under section212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(Supp. IV 1992), may be used in conjunction with an application for adjustmentof status by an alien who is deportable for both drug and weapons offenses;thus a lawful permanent resident alien who has been convicted of a weapons violation is not ineligible to apply for adjustment of status and mayconcurrently apply for section 212(c) relief to waive his deportabilityarising from his drug conviction.

(2) Under the regulationsat 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(e) (1993), an alien may concurrently apply foradjustment of status and section 212(c) relief.

(3) An applicant foradjustment of status is not precluded from concurrently applying for awaiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Act to waive anotherdeportable offense, even though section 212(c) of the Act would not separatelyand independently waive all grounds of deportability.


SOSA-HERNANDEZ, 20 I&N Dec. 758 (BIA 1993)

ID 3214 (PDF)

(1) A waiver of deportabilityunder section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(f) (1988), waives not only the alien's deportability but alsothe underlying fraud or misrepresentation and renders the waiver recipienta lawful permanent resident from the time of his initial entry.

(2) The beneficiary ofa waiver of deportability under section 241(f) of the Act may use the time accrued since the initial granting of lawful permanent residenceto establish eligibility for relief under section 212(c) of the Act, 8U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988).


G-, 20 I&N Dec. 764 (BIA 1993)

ID 3215 (PDF)

(1) An alien with nocolorable claim to lawful permanent resident status is properly in exclusionproceedings where he fails to satisfy his burden of proof that he haseffected an "entry" into the United States. Matter of Z-, 20 I&N Dec. 3208 (BIA 1993), followed.

(2) The determinationof whether an alien has effected an entry into the United States is amatter appropriately litigated in exclusion proceedings.

(3) For purposes of section101(a)(13) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(1988), an "entry" into the United States requires: (1) a crossinginto the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physical presence;(2) (a) inspection and admission by an immigration officer, or (b) actualand intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection point;and (3) freedom from official restraint. Matter of Z-, supra, followed.

(4) The mere crossinginto the territorial waters of the United States, whether detected orundetected, has never been held to constitute "physical presence"in this country "free from official restraint."

(5) The grounding ofa vessel 100 or more yards off shore with its passengers facing a hazardousjourney to land does not of itself constitute an entry into the United States.

(6) In the case of theGolden Venture, an alien will be found to have been "free from officialrestraint" if he establishes that he was among the first of the ship'soccupants to reach the shore, that he landed on a deserted beach, or thathe managed to flee into a neighboring community.

(7) In contrast, an alienwho was escorted off the Golden Venture, pulled from the water by rescuepersonnel, or who landed in the cordoned-off area of the beach after itwas secured will not be found to have been "free from official restraint,"as his movements were restricted to the immediate vicinity of the beachthat was cordoned-off and controlled by the enforcement officers of the various governmental organizations present at the site to prevent the ship's occupants from absconding.

(8) In a case where there is no clear evidence of the facts determinative of the entry issue, thecase ultimately must be resolved on where the burden of proof lies.

(9) Where there is noevidence that an alien, who arrives at other than the nearest inspectionpoint, deliberately surrenders himself to the authorities for immigrationprocessing, or that, once ashore, he seeks them out, voluntarily awaitstheir arrival, or otherwise acts consistently with a desire to submithimself for immigration inspection, actual and intentional evasion ofinspection at the nearest inspection point may be found.

(10) Pending a decisionof the Attorney General on asylum and withholding of deportation claimspremised on coercive family planning policies of another country, theBoard will continue to follow Matter of Chang, 20 I&N Dec. 3107 (BIA1989), as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issues.

(11) To prevail on aclaim that "extrajudicial" sources compromised the impartialand unbiased nature of an exclusion proceeding, an alien must show howthe immigration judge's decision was affected or how he was prejudicedby these "outside influences."


GOORAHOO, 20 I&N Dec. 782 (BIA 1994)

ID 3216 (PDF)

(1) In order to obtainpreference status for the beneficiary as his son pursuant to section 203(a)(2)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (1988),a petitioner must establish that the beneficiary qualifies or once qualifiedas his "child" within the meaning of section 101(b)(1) of theAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (1988).

(2) When the countrywhere a child is born eliminates all legal distinctions between illegitimateand legitimate children, all natural children are deemed to be the legitimateoffspring of their natural parents from the time that country's laws arechanged.

(3) By virtue of theChildren Born Out of Wedlock (Removal of Discrimination) Act, effectiveMay 18, 1983, Guyana has eliminated all legal distinctions between legitimateand illegitimate children.

(4) Children born outof wedlock in Guyana after May 18, 1983, and children who are under theage of 18 prior to that date are deemed legitimate and legitimated children,respectively, pursuant to sections 101(b)(1)(A) and (C) of the Act. Matterof Gouveia, 13 I&N Dec. 604 (BIA 1970), modified.


M-P-, 20 I&N Dec. 786 (BIA 1994)

ID 3217 (PDF)

When a motion to reopendeportation proceedings is denied, the immigration judge must identifyand fully explain the reasons for such decision; otherwise, the partiesare deprived of a fair opportunity to contest the immigration judge'sdetermination on appeal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals is unable to meaningfully exercise its responsibility of reviewing the decision in light of the arguments advanced on appeal.


REYES, 20 I&N Dec. 789 (BIA 1994)

ID 3218 (PDF)

(1) Although an alienconvicted of an aggravated felony is not precluded from applying for suspensionof deportation, he must still satisfy each of the statutory requirementsfor such relief, including a showing of good moral character.

(2) Section 101(f)(8)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (1988),previously barred a finding of good moral character in the case of analien who at any time had been convicted of the crime of murder; however,section 101(f)(8) of the Act was recently amended and now bars a findingof good moral character in the case of an alien "who at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined in section 101(a)(43))."

(3) If an alien is convictedof murder, regardless of the date of the conviction, he is forever precluded from establishing his good moral character under section 101(f)(8) of the Act.

(4) If an alien is convictedof an aggravated felony other than murder, as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, he is now forever barred from establishinghis good moral character under section 101(f)(8) of the Act if the aggravatedfelony conviction occurred on or after November 29, 1990.

(5) Section 244(e)(2)of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(2) (1988), expressly and forever barsvoluntary departure to an alien who is deportable because of a convictionfor an aggravated felony if the aggravated felony conviction occurredon or after November 18, 1988.


Y-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 794 (BIA 1994)

ID 3219 (PDF)

(1) In Matter of Shirdel,19 I&N Dec. 33, 35 (BIA 1984), the Board of Immigration Appeals statedthat the factual basis for a possible finding of excludability under thefirst clause of section 212(a)(19) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1982), relating to fraud or misrepresentationin the procurement of documents, will be closely scrutinized since sucha finding may perpetually bar an alien from admission.

(2) Following its amendmentby section 6(a) of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986,Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537, 3543-44 (effective Nov. 10, 1986),and later by section 601(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5073-74 (effective Nov. 29, 1990), the exclusionprovision currently at section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1992), relating to fraud or misrepresentationin seeking entry into the United States, like the provision relating to fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of documents, is now bothprospective and retrospective; therefore, the factual basis for a possiblefinding of excludability under this provision will be closely scrutinized,since such a finding may perpetually bar an alien from admission.

(3) Applicant for admissionto the United States is not excludable under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act as an alien who seeks or has sought to procure entry into theUnited States by fraud or the willful misrepresentation of a materialfact where there is inadequate evidence that applicant presented or intendedto present fraudulent documents to a United States Government officialin an attempt to enter on those documents.


ALCANTAR, 20 I&N Dec. 801 (BIA 1994)

ID 3220 (PDF)

(1) An offense meetsthe definition of a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. §16(a) (1988), for purposes of determining whether it is an "aggravatedfelony" as defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. IV 1992), if the offense has asan element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical forceagainst the person or property of another.

(2) An offense meetsthe definition of a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. §16(b), for purposes of determining whether it is an "aggravated felony"under section 101(a)(43) of the Act, if the offense is a felony and ifthe "nature of the crime -- as elucidated by the generic elementsof the offense -- is such that its commission would ordinarily presenta risk that physical force would be used against the person or propertyof another" irrespective of whether the risk develops or harm actuallyoccurs.

(3) The respondent'sconviction for involuntary manslaughter under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38,para. 9-3(a) (1992), for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison,constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b),and an "aggravated felony" as defined in section 101(a)(43)of the Act.


DRYSDALE, 20 I&N Dec. 815 (BIA 1994)

ID 3221 (PDF)

(1) In bond proceedingsunder section 242(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992), there is a presumption against the release from the Immigration and Naturalization Service's custody of anyalien convicted of an aggravated felony unless the alien demonstratesthat he was lawfully admitted to the United States, is not a threat to the community, and is likely to appear for any scheduled hearings.

(2) If a lawfully admittedalien convicted of an aggravated felony cannot rebut the statutory presumptionthat he is a danger to the community, he should be detained in the custodyof the Service.

(3) Once a lawfully admittedalien convicted of an aggravated felony rebuts the presumption that heis a danger to the community, the likelihood that he will appear for futureproceedings becomes relevant in assessing the amount of bond needed to motivate the respondent to appear.


TOBOSO-ALFONSO, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1994)

ID 3222 (PDF)

An applicant, who hadthe status of being a homosexual, both established his membership in aparticular social group in Cuba and demonstrated that his freedom was threatened within the meaning of section 243(h)(1) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1990), on account ofhis membership in that group.


D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827 (BIA 1994)

ID 3223 (PDF)

(1) Under Massachusettslaw, an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment is considered to be a sentencefor the maximum term imposed, so that convictions for armed robbery, assaultand battery with a dangerous weapon, and assault with a dangerous weapon were for aggravated felonies under section 101(a)(43) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. V 1993), as eachwas a crime of violence for which the alien had a sentence imposed of5 years or more.

(2) As aggravated felonies,such convictions rendered the alien statutorily ineligible for asylumunder section 208(d) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (Supp. V 1993)and further for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of theAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and 8 C.F.R. §208.16 (1994), since they also constituted convictions for particularlyserious crimes.


MENDES, 20 I&N Dec. 833 (BIA 1994)

ID 3224 (PDF)

(1) Although the Immigrationand Nationality Act provides one ground of deportability where conditionalpermanent resident status has been terminated, it sets forth three meanswhereby such termination may take place, each reviewable in deportationproceedings.

(2) Different proceduraland substantive consequences follow from which section of law the Immigrationand Naturalization Service applies in terminating an alien's conditionalpermanent resident status, including the allocation of the burdens ofproof in subsequent deportation proceedings.

(3) Where the partiesto a marriage have jointly filed a Petition to Remove the Conditions onResidence (Form I-751) under section 216(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1186a(c)(1) (1988), but one of the parties withdraws support from thepetition before its adjudication, the joint petition shall be consideredwithdrawn and shall be adjudicated under section 216(c)(2)(A) of the Act.

(4) When a respondentin deportation proceedings has not filed an application for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act and is prima facie eligible for such relief,the proceedings should be continued in order to grant the respondent areasonable opportunity to file the application before the regional servicecenter director and for the center director to decide the application.


PENA-DIAZ, 20 I&N Dec. 841 (BIA 1994)

ID 3225 (PDF)

(1) When an alien becomeseligible for a new form of relief from deportation due to the Immigrationand Naturalization Service's intentional lack of enforcement of a finalorder of deportation, it is appropriate to consider this factor in decidingwhether or not the proceedings should be reopened in the exercise of discretionand whether the alien has established statutory eligibility for the reliefsought upon reopening.

(2) In granting the respondent'smotion to reopen deportation proceedings, consideration and weight were accorded to the Service's affirmative permission for the respondent to remain in the United States, its failure to show any intent to effecthis deportation if the motion were denied, and its inconsistent actionsin granting the respondent's request for deferred action status and subsequentlyopposing his motion to reopen proceedings.


ESQUEDA, 20 I&N Dec. 850 (BIA 1994)

ID 3226 (PDF)

(1) Section 241(a)(11)of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1988),which provides for the deportability of any alien "convicted of aviolation of . . . any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlledsubstance," encompasses laws proscribing the use or being under theinfluence of a controlled substance. Matter of Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I&NDec. 613 (BIA 1988), reaffirmed.

(2) The element of guiltyknowledge, or mens rea, is not irrelevant to a conviction pursuant to section 11550 of the California Health and Safety Code for use or beingunder the influence of a controlled substance.

(3) Since the languageof the exclusion and deportation grounds of the Act relating to drug convictionswas significantly broadened by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, immigration consequences may now result froma conviction under a law relating to a controlled substance that containsno element of mens rea. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975), distinguished.Matter of Davis, 16 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 1979); Matter of Wolf, 16 I&NDec. 125 (BIA 1977); and Matter of Lennon, 15 I&N Dec. 9 (BIA 1974),vacated, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975), overruled. Matter of Poon, 17 I&NDec. 350 (BIA 1980), aff'd, 707 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1983); Matter of Pritchard,16 I&N Dec. 340 (BIA 1977); Matter of Awadh, 15 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA1976); and Matter of Pasquini, 15 I&N Dec. 683 (BIA 1976), aff'd,557 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1977), modified.


OKOH, 20 I&N Dec. 864 (BIA 1994)

ID 3227 (PDF)

The Board of ImmigrationAppeals has no jurisdiction over an alien's motion to reconsider its priordecision in exclusion proceedings after the order is executed and thealien has been excluded and deported from the United States. Matter ofKeyte, 20 I&N Dec. 3128 (BIA 1990), distinguished.


FRANKLIN, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994)

ID 3228 (PDF)

A conviction for involuntarymanslaughter pursuant to sections 562.016(4) and 565.024(1) of the MissouriRevised Statutes constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993), where Missouri lawrequires that the convicted person must have consciously disregarded asubstantial and unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard constituteda gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269 (BIA1975); Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1971); Matter of Sanchez-Marin,11 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1965); and Matter of B-, 4 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA1951), modified. Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1962), overruled.


BURBANO, 20 I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 1994)

ID 3229 (PDF)

(1) When the Board ofImmigration Appeals reviews a discretionary determination of an immigrationjudge, it relies upon its own independent judgment in deciding the ultimate disposition of the case.

(2) The Board does nothave a de facto policy of denying relief under section 212(c) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. V 1993), to all aliensconvicted of a serious drug offense; however, a serious drug crime will be accorded due weight, as is consistent with the evolution of the immigrationlaw in this area, and may ultimately be the determinative factor in agiven case.


IGE, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994)

ID 3230 (PDF)

(1) Where an alien allegesin a motion that extreme hardship will be suffered by his United Statescitizen child were the child to remain in the United States upon his parent'sdeportation, the claim will not be given significant weight absent anaffidavit from the parent stating that it is his intention that the childremain in this country, accompanied by evidence demonstrating that reasonableprovisions will be made for the child's care and support.

(2) Assuming a United States citizen child would not suffer extreme hardship if he accompanieshis parent abroad, any hardship the child might face if left in the United States is the result of parental choice, not of the parent's deportation.


ANDERSON, 20 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 1994)

ID 3231 (PDF)

(1) A conditional permanentresident alien who seeks to remove the conditional basis of that statusby means of a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (1988), should apply for any applicablewaiver provided under that section.

(2) An alien whose applicationfor a specific waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act has been deniedby the Immigration and Naturalization Service may not seek considerationof an alternative waiver under that section in deportation proceedingsbefore the immigration judge.

(3) Where an alien becomeseligible for an additional waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act dueto changed circumstances, the proceedings may be continued in order to give the alien a reasonable opportunity to submit an application to the Service.

(4) Inasmuch as the Boardof Immigration Appeals only has authority to review a waiver applicationafter the Service and the immigration judge have considered it, an alienmay not apply for a waiver under section 216(c)(4) of the Act on appeal.


POLANCO, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994)

ID 3232 (PDF)

(1) An alien who haswaived or exhausted the right to a direct appeal of a conviction is subjectto deportation, and the potential for discretionary review on direct appealwill not prevent the conviction from being considered final for immigrationpurposes.

(2) Where an alien failedto file a timely appeal from his conviction and did not show that hisrequest for a nunc pro tunc appeal pursuant to Rule 2:4-4(a) of the NewJersey Rules of Court had been granted, his conviction is final for immigrationpurposes.


NWOKOMA, 20 I&N Dec. 899 (BIA 1994)

ID 3233 (PDF)

The Immigration and NaturalizationService retains authority to deny a Joint Petition to Remove the ConditionalBasis of Alien's Permanent Resident Status (Form I-751) pursuant to section216(c)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(3)(A)(Supp. IV 1986), notwithstanding the Service's failure to adjudicate thejoint petition within 90 days of the interview of the alien and his orher spouse.


L-G-, 20 I&N Dec. 905 (BIA 1994)

ID 3234 (PDF)

(1) A single convictionunder 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Supp. V 1993) for simple possession ofmore than 5 grams of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine baseis a conviction for an aggravated felony within the meaning of section101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Supp. V 1993), as is a state conviction analogous to such federal conviction.

(2) A single convictionfor possession of a controlled substance under section 40:967F(2) of theLouisiana Revised Statutes is not analogous to a conviction under the single offense felony provision of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) relating to possession of "cocaine base" where the Louisiana convictioninvolved possession of "cocaine," not cocaine base.


GRINBERG, 20 I&N Dec. 911 (BIA 1994)

ID 3235 (PDF)

Notwithstanding a clericalerror in the redundant designation of "section 245(i)" of theImmigration and Nationality Act, to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i),immigration judges have jurisdiction to entertain applications for reliefbased on both the section 245(i) that was created through section 506(b)of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Actfor 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1765, and the separatesection 245(i) that was created through section 130003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108Stat. 1796, 2024.


D-, 20 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1994)

ID 3236 (PDF)

Evidence of general conditionsin an alien's homeland may be weighed as a factor in evaluating an applicationunder section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(c) (Supp. V 1993), but since Congress has provided asylumand withholding of deportation under sections 208 and 243(h) of the Act,8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as theappropriate avenues for requesting relief from deportation on the basisof a fear of persecution, allegations and evidence regarding a well-founded fear or clear probability of persecution have no place in a section 212(c)application or adjudication.


SPARROW, 20 I&N Dec. 920 (BIA 1994)

ID 3237 (PDF)

(1) Because the Noticeof Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative (Form G-28) is designedto determine whether an individual is an attorney within the meaning of8 C.F.R. § 1.1(f) (1994), an attorney filing this form has a dutyto disclose disciplinary actions or other restrictions on his practiceof law in the bars of courts in jurisdictions other than those in which he claims to be in good standing.

(2) Where an attorneyin disciplinary proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(10) (1994)is charged with willfully making false and material statements or representationswith respect to his qualifications or authority to represent others inany case, his false statement or representation is deemed material ifit has a tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decisionof the decision-making body to which it was addressed.

(3) A 10-year suspensionfrom the practice of law before the Immigration and Naturalization Serviceand the Executive Office for Immigration Review is appropriate where the respondent has a conviction which involved a conspiracy to violate immigrationlaws through a sham marriage scheme, making false statements to the Service,suborning perjury, and stealing government property; the respondent isunder suspension from the practice of law in three states; the respondentmisrepresented his qualifications or authority to represent others inimmigration proceedings on Notices of Entry of Appearance; and the respondentdid not report his conviction to the Executive Office for ImmigrationReview or state bar authorities.


GAWARAN, 20 I&N Dec. 938 (BIA 1995)

ID 3238 (PDF)

(1) The provisions offormer section 241(f) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(f)(1) (1988), do not waive an alien's deportability under former section 241 (a) (9) (B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9)(B)(1988), because termination of the alien's conditional permanent residentstatus constitutes a basis for deportability which is separate and distinctfrom the charge that the alien is "excludable at the time of entry"within the meaning of former section 241(f)(1).

(2) In order to preservean application for relief under section 216(c)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1186a(c)(4) (1988), an alien must request before the immigrationjudge a review of the Service's denial of such application.


ROCHA, 20 I&N Dec. 944 (BIA 1995)

ID 3239 (PDF)

An alien is not deportableunder section 241(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1251(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993), as an alien who was excludable atthe time of entry pursuant to section 212(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993), where the examining immigration officerdid not know or have reason to believe at the time the alien was inspectedand admitted into the United States that he was an illicit trafficking any controlled substance.


TEE, 20 I&N Dec. 949 (BIA 1995)

ID 3240 (PDF)

An alien becomes statutorilyineligible for approval of a joint petition under section 216(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1) (1988),where the marriage has been terminated prior to adjudication of the petitionby the immigration judge.


PRICE, 20 I&N Dec. 953 (Acting Assoc. Comm. 1994)

ID 3241 (PDF)

An alien seeking immigrantclassification under section 203(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and NationalityAct, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993), has clearly establishedthat he is an alien with extraordinary ability in athletics when he haswon such internationally recognized competitions as the 1983 World Seriesof Golf and the 1991 Canadian Open, ranked 10th on the Professional Golfers'Association Tour in 1989, collected earnings in 1991 totalling $714,389,provided numerous affidavits and letters of support from well-known andcelebrated golfers and other experts in the field, and received widespread major media coverage for his ability on the golf course.


GOMEZ-GIRALDO, 20 I&N Dec. 957 (BIA 1995)

ID 3242 (PDF)

As Congress manifestedits intent that the aggravated felony bar of section 212(c) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (Supp. V 1993), be appliedretroactively to all convictions for offenses described in the originalaggravated felony definition of section 101(a)(43) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(a)(43) (1988), regardless of when the conviction was entered,and as the retroactive application of the bar does not offend any of theconcerns underlying the presumption against the retroactive operationof new statutes, the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matterof A-A-, 20 I&N Dec. 3176 (BIA 1992), is consistent with the SupremeCourt's holdings in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1483(1994), and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994),and is accordingly reaffirmed.


Updated March 28, 2023