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| **U.S. Department of Justice** |
| Federal Bureau of Investigation |

**FY 2013**

**Authorization and Budget**

**Request to Congress**



**February 2012**

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**I. OVERVIEW FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

**A. Introduction**

***Budget Summary:*** The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 budget request proposes a total of $8,232,003,000 in direct budget authority, including 34,083 permanent positions (13,018 Special Agents (SAs), 3,025 Intelligence Analysts (IAs), and 18,040 professional staff (PS)) and 33,461 full time equivalents (FTE). The request includes a total of $8,151,021,000 for Salaries and Expenses (S&E) and $80,982,000 for Construction to address the FBI’s highest priorities.

The request includes a program increase of $15,000,000 and 44 positions (40 SAs and 4 PS) and 22 FTE to address financial crimes and support the Administration’s financial fraud initiative. In addition, the request includes $63,023,000 in program reductions and rescinds $162,226,000 in prior-year unobligated balances.

The FBI continues to strategically assess current and prospective operations to ensure that mission requirements are met at the lowest possible cost to the U.S. taxpayer. The FY 2013 budget request is a product of these assessments and provides the resources to continue the FBI’s strategic vision into the future.

Electronic copies of the Department of Justice’s Congressional Budget Justifications and Capital Asset Plan and Business Case exhibits can be viewed or downloaded from the Internet using the Internet address: <http://www.justice.gov/02organizations/bpp.htm>.

***The FBI’s Mission and Strategic Goals:*** The mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the U.S. against terrorism and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the U.S., and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.

***Organization of the FBI:*** The FBI operates field offices in 56 major U.S. cities and over 370 “resident agencies” throughout the country. Resident agencies are satellite offices that support the larger field offices and allow the FBI to maintain a presence in and serve communities. FBI employees assigned to field offices and resident agencies perform the majority of the investigative and intelligence work for the FBI. Special Agents in Charge of FBI Field Offices report to the Deputy Director and Director. The FBI also operates over 60 Legal Attaché (Legat) offices and 14 sub-offices in 67 foreign countries around the world.

Other major FBI facilities include the FBI Academy, the Engineering Research Facility (ERF), and the FBI Laboratory, all at Quantico, Virginia; a fingerprint identification complex in Clarksburg, West Virginia that includes the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division and the Biometrics Technology Center; and the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

FBI Headquarters, located in Washington, D.C., provides centralized operational, policy, and administrative support to FBI investigations and programs conducted throughout the U.S. and in foreign countries. Under the direction of the FBI Director and Deputy Director, this support is provided by:

* The National Security Branch, which includes the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, the Directorate of Intelligence, Terrorist Screening Center, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate.
* The Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch, which includes the Criminal Investigative Division, the Cyber Division, the Critical Incident Response Group, the International Operations Division, and the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination.
* The Science and Technology Branch, which includes the Criminal Justice Information Services Division, the Laboratory Division, and the Operational Technology Division.

A number of other Headquarters offices also provide FBI-wide mission support:

* The Information and Technology Branch oversees the IT Management Division, IT Engineering Division, and the IT Services Division.
* The Human Resources Branch includes the Human Resources Division and the Training Division.
* Administrative and financial management support is provided by the Facilities and Logistics Services Division, the Finance Division, the Records Management Division, the Security Division, the Resource Planning Office, and the Inspection Division.
* Specialized support is provided directly to the Director and Deputy Director through a number of staff offices, including the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of Congressional Affairs, the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, the Office of Professional Responsibility, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of Integrity and Compliance.

**B.** **Threats to the U.S. and its Interests**

In an effort to better address all aspects of the FBI’s requirements, the FBI’s Budget is formulated and structured according to the threats that the FBI works to deter. These threats have been identified by the Director as the FBI’s priorities and, as such are resourced accordingly.

***Terrorism Threat:*** Terrorism, in general, and al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in particular, continues to represent the most significant threat to the country’s national security. Al-Qa’ida remains committed to its goal of conducting attacks inside the U.S. and continues to adjust its tactics and tradecraft in response to U.S. security countermeasures.

Al-Qa’ida seeks to infiltrate overseas operatives who have no known nexus to terrorism into the U.S. using both legal and illegal methods of entry. Further, al-Qa’ida’s access to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material poses a serious threat to the U.S. Finally, al-Qa’ida’s choice of targets and attack methods will likely continue to focus on economic targets, such as aviation, the energy sector, and mass transit; soft targets such as large public gatherings; and symbolic targets, such as monuments and government buildings.

Religious extremists are using increasingly-diverse methods of member recruitment and development, which pose a very serious threat. One of the bigger issues materializing is the threat of Homegrown Violent Extremists. The extremists are those who reside or operate in the U.S. and become inspired by al-Qa’ida or similar group through English-language propaganda, but do not have any ties to al-Qa’ida or any other foreign terrorist organization. In February 2011, Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari was arrested for planning to build bombs and attack U.S. targets like the home of former President George W. Bush, hydroelectric dams, nuclear power plants, night clubs and homes of soldiers who were stationed at Abu Ghraib prison. A journal Aldawsari kept, found during the investigation, indicated he had become inspired by Usama bin Laden’s speeches.

The internet is an effective terrorist recruitment tool. Through chat rooms, websites, and social media pages, one can obtain data on and make contact with radical groups without the risk of alerting authorities through overseas travel. In July 2011, Emerson Begolly was indicted for solicitation to commit a crime of violence and distribution of information relating to explosives, destructive devices and weapons of mass destruction. He was a known moderator on the Islamic Extremist web forum, Ansar al-Mujahideen English Forum, which is used to promote and distribute jihadist propaganda.

Although the internet may provide a “below-the-radar” introduction to the radical side of Islam, it appears that many would-be terrorists still meet with their sponsors and trainers in person. U.S. citizens have increasingly traveled overseas to countries or camps with terrorist ties and then returned to the U.S. to do harm. Wa’ad Ramadan Alwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi were arrested and indicted in May 2011 for attempting to provide material support to al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). Both men had previously been in Iraq, under the direction of AQI, and conducted improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Alwan was encouraged to come to the U.S., but not to conduct attacks in the U.S.; however they were still supporting AQI.

While much of the national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed by radicalized religious terrorists who target the Homeland, the U.S. must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists based and operating strictly within the U.S. Domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of political or social issues, continue to use violence and criminal activity to further their agendas. In December 2011, Kevin William Harpham was sentenced to 32 years in jail for attempting bomb the Martin Luther King, Jr. Unity March in Spokane, Washington. Harpham intended to harm participants, which included racial minorities, along the path of the march. Harpham had previously had tie to a white supremacist organization.

***Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat:*** “Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons pose an increasing global risk despite international non-proliferation treaties. In an increasingly fragmented world, the chief threats are no longer rival superpowers but unstable states and terrorists.”

*- Global Risks 2011 Sixth Edition, An initiative of the Risk Response Network, 2011 World Economic Forums.*

The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat continues to grow and pose significant danger to the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. Government has taken decisive and strategic actions to address this threat, however the threat continues to evolve at a rapid pace as the capabilities and agility of those who would do harm to the U.S. and its international allies increase. In an effort to provide effective risk response to the WMD threat, the FBI has identified four threat areas that constitute the greatest vulnerabilities:

* **Development and Use of Biological Weapons**, including synthetic and advanced biotechnology;
* **Domestic Acquisition of Chemical Agents**, including the vulnerability of chemical facilities in the U.S.;
* **Proliferation of WMD Materials,** including dual-use materials that have a wide range of non-nefarious and legitimate uses but could be utilized to develop a WMD capability; and
* **Smuggling and Proliferation of WMD Technology**, including foreign government interest in acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) materials and reduced controls over nuclear materials.

As cited in the Director of National Intelligence January 2011 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) report, “terrorism and the proliferation of WMD remain the greatest threats to the U.S. The U.S. no longer faces one dominant threat. Rather, it is the multiplicity and interconnectedness of potential threats-and the actors behind them-that constitute our biggest challenge.”

USIC agencies assess that, in the next five years, at least one terrorist group will conduct an attack against U.S. interests overseas and possibly against the U.S. Homeland using a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon, potentially resulting in mass casualties. The USIC must increase strategic and tactical intelligence and enhance partnerships to minimize WMD vulnerabilities.

***Foreign Intelligence Threat:*** The foreign intelligence threat to the U.S. continues to increase as foreign powers seek to establish economic, military, and political preeminence and to position themselves to compete with the U.S. in economic and diplomatic arenas. The most desirable U.S. targets are political and military plans and intentions; technology; and economic institutions, both governmental and non-governmental. Foreign intelligence services continue to target and recruit U.S. travelers abroad to acquire intelligence and information. Foreign adversaries are increasingly employing non-traditional collectors – e.g., students and visiting scientists, scholars, and businessmen – as well as cyber-based tools to target and penetrate U.S. institutions. Examples of this type of threat include Dongfan “Greg” Chung. On 16 July 2009, Chung was found guilty of six counts of Economic Espionage, one count of conspiracy to commit Economic Espionage, one count of agent of a Foreign Government, and one count of false statements. On 9 February 2010, he was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison. This was the first economic espionage case to go to trial and the first to get a conviction.

***Cyber Threat:*** Cyber threats come from a vast array of groups and individuals with varying skills, motives, and targets. Terrorists increasingly use the Internet to communicate, conduct operational planning, propagandize, recruit and train operatives, and obtain logistical and financial support. Foreign governments have the technical and financial resources to support advanced network exploitation, and launch attacks on the U.S. information and physical infrastructure. Criminal hackers can also pose a national security threat, as the scale and severity of their activities can have a material impact on the nation’s economy and critical infrastructure. Additionally, their tools, techniques, and procedures can be adopted by nation-state actors and worthy criminals may be recruited, knowingly or unknowingly, by foreign intelligence or terrorist organizations. The FBI Computer Intrusions Program continues its efforts to counter increasingly sophisticated and expanding cyber threats in collaboration with its government, private sector, and international partners. The FBI has observed a steady increase in cybersecurity incidents with an international nexus. In FY 2011, the FBI worked aggressively with our international partners to disrupt an international cyber crime ring that caused more than $74 million in total loses to more than one million computer users through the sale of fraudulent computer security software known as scareware. The FBI also disrupted a large-scale international organized crime scheme that attempted the theft of $220 million, with actual losses of $70 million, from victims’ bank accounts.

Regardless of the group or individuals involved, a successful cyber attack can have devastating effects. Stealing or altering military or intelligence data can affect national security. Attacks against national infrastructure can interrupt critical emergency response services, government and military operations, financial services, transportation, and water and power supply. In addition, cyber fraud activities pose a growing threat to our economy, a fundamental underpinning of U.S. national security.

***White Collar Crime Threat:*** The White Collar Crime (WCC) program addresses the following principle threats: public corruption including government fraud, economic stimulus fraud, and border corruption; corporate and securities fraud; mortgage fraud and other financial institution fraud; health care fraud; money laundering; and other complex financial crimes.

* Public Corruption:
* Public Corruption involves the corruption of local, state, and federally elected, appointed, or contracted officials which undermines our democratic institutions and threatens public safety and national security. Government fraud affects how well U.S. borders are secured and neighborhoods protected, how verdicts are handed down in court, and the quality of public infrastructure such as schools and roads. Many taxpayer dollars are wasted or lost as a result of corrupt acts by public officials.
* Economic Stimulus Fraud:
* The FBI has already seen examples of how the influx of $787 billion in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) stimulus funding has resulted in a myriad of fraudulent schemes. FBI intelligence analysts were quick to identify potential vulnerabilities related to the rapid implementation of the programs, the distribution of funds, and the inadequate oversight of spending. Vulnerabilities have included insufficient staffing levels and oversight in the government acquisition system, distribution requirements mandating swift spending by state and local government, and special interest groups earmarking monies for pet projects. Of particular vulnerability to corruption and fraud was money provided to localities for “shovel-ready” projects. Given historical precedent and preliminary open-source reports alleging lack of oversight, accountability, and transparency within the ARRA, the potential for increased levels of public corruption is high.
* The FBI is prepared for corruption, government fraud, and corporate fraud during the administration of approximately $700 billion by the U.S. Department of the Treasury through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA).
* The FBI is also prepared to respond to an increase in fraud and public corruption related to the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA). HERA authorized the establishment of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), which will appropriate $3.92 billion to states and local governments for the management and redevelopment of abandoned and foreclosed homes. Additionally, the ARRA provides an additional $2 billion in competitive grants for NSP use. Through the NSP, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) will manage the distribution of funds through community development block grants (CDBG). Based on a study of foreclosed properties, 308 state and local governments (grantees) were chosen to receive CDBGs.
* Border Corruption:
* The Federal Government is responsible for protecting approximately 7,000 miles of the U.S. border and 95,000 miles of shoreline. Each day, approximately 1.1 million persons visit the U.S. and enter through one of the 327 official Ports of Entry (POEs) located along the southwestern and northern land borders of the U.S., as well as at seaports and international airports. The documented presence of corrupt border officials facilitates a wide range of illegal activities along the northern and southern borders. Resource-rich cartels and criminal enterprises employ a variety of methods in order to target and recruit U.S. Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection Officers, and local police officers who can facilitate criminal activity. Corrupt officials assist these entities by providing intelligence and contraband across these borders. To help address this threat, the Border Corruption Initiative (BCI) was established in 2009. The BCI has developed a threat tiering methodology, targeting border corruption in all land, air, and sea ports of entry to mitigate the threat posed to national security. The FBI has established the National Border Corruption Task Force (NBCTF) and 21 Border Corruption Task Forces (BCTFs) in high risk cities along the northern and southern borders.
* Corporate Fraud:
* As the lead agency investigating corporate fraud, the FBI focuses on cases that involve accounting schemes, self-dealing corporate executives, and obstruction of justice. In these cases, investors, auditors, and analysts are deceived about the true condition of a corporation. Through the manipulation of financial data, the share price of a corporation remains artificially inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public. In addition to significant financial losses to investors, corporate fraud has the potential to cause immeasurable damage to the U.S. economy and investor confidence.
* Examples of Corporate Fraud include:
  1. Falsification of financial information, including:
     + False accounting entries
     + Bogus trades designed to inflate profit or hide losses
     + False transactions designed to evade regulatory oversight
  2. Self-dealing by corporate insiders, including:
     + Insider Trading
     + Kickbacks
     + Backdating of Executive Stock Option
     + Misuse of corporate property for personal gain
     + Individual tax violations related to self-dealing
  3. Fraud in connection with an otherwise legitimately-operated mutual or hedge fund, including:
     + Late Trading
     + Certain market timing schemes
     + Falsification of net asset values
     + Other fraudulent or abusive trading practices by, within, or involving a mutual or hedge fund
  4. Obstruction of justice designed to conceal any of the above-noted types of criminal conduct, particularly when the obstruction impedes the inquiries of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), other regulatory agencies, and/or law enforcement agencies.

Securities Fraud:

* The FBI focuses its efforts in the securities fraud arena to schemes involving high yield investment fraud (to include Ponzi schemes), market manipulation, and commodities fraud. Due to the recent financial crisis, the FBI saw an unprecedented rise in the identification of Ponzi and other high yield investment fraud schemes, many of which involve thousands of victims and staggering losses. Indeed, the FBI continues to open new Ponzi scheme cases on a weekly basis. With this trend, and the development of new schemes, such as stock market manipulation via cyber intrusion, securities fraud is on the rise. Over the last five years, securities fraud investigations have increased by 47 percent.
* The FBI has adopted an intelligence-led approach to identifying and targeting the most egregious perpetrators of securities fraud, utilizing undercover operations to identify and stop perpetrators before they are able to victimize individuals and damage the financial markets. Securities and Futures Industries Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) contain some of the best intelligence available to criminal and regulatory law enforcement personnel. In 2009, CID established a process to better exploit this intelligence to identify new securities fraud schemes and perpetrators. With the coordinated effort of special agents and intelligence analysts, these SARs are analyzed on a national level, leading to the creation of targeting packages which are presented to relevant field offices to open investigations. Among the schemes that were identified through this process is a significant insider trading scheme that is now under investigation.
* Corporate fraud, along with securities and commodities fraud, remain the highest priorities of the FBI Financial Crimes Section and the FBI is committed to the dealing with the significant crime problem. Since 2001, FBI special agent resources dedicated to corporate and securities/commodities fraud has increased 97 percent (177 to 350 agents) while the caseload has increased at roughly the same pace (1,263 to 2,572 cases) during that time period. The return on investment for these resources is significant: since 2001, the FBI averages 277 arrests, 568 information and indictments, and 483 convictions per year. These cases have resulted in billions of dollars in restitutions, recoveries, fines, and asset forfeitures. From FY 2008 through FY 2011, the FBI realized restitutions, recoveries, fines and forfeitures of $18.8 billion from corporate fraud matters, and $17.6 billion for securities/commodities fraud matters. These resulted in an average of $47.9 million per corporate fraud agent utilized, and $21.8 million per securities/commodities fraud agent utilized.
* Mortgage Fraud, and Other Financial Institution Fraud:
* Mortgage fraud, a subset of financial institution fraud, continues to absorb considerable FBI resources while showing no signs of subsidence. At the start of 2nd Quarter FY 2012, approximately 72 percent of the FBI’s 2,590 mortgage fraud cases involved losses exceeding $1 million per case. The FBI received over 93,000 SARs in FY 2011, the highest number ever. FBI intelligence predicts mortgage fraud will remain at elevated levels during FY 2012, due in significant part to an increase in fraud targeting distressed homeowners. Foreclosure actions, which are the best predictor of distressed homeowner fraud, are predicted by industry analyst RealtyTrac to remain at elevated levels for the foreseeable future.
* The majority of FBI Mortgage Fraud cases are broken into three types of schemes:
  + Loan Origination Schemes. Borrowers and real estate insiders provide false financial information and documentation as part of the loan application package and false appraisals.
  + Illegal property-flipping occurs when a property is resold for a profit at an artificially inflated price shortly after being acquired by the seller. The key to this scheme is the fraudulent appraisal.
  + Builders employ bailout schemes to offset losses and circumvent excessive debt and potential bankruptcy as home sales suffer from escalating foreclosures, rising inventory, and declining demand. One type of Builder Bail-Out Scheme is the Condo Conversion. Builders entice individuals into purchasing the excess inventory by offering excessive incentives to buyers, including cash back at close, prepayment of homeowner association dues and other fees, and significant upgrades, all of which are undisclosed to the lender. The perpetrators artificially inflate the value of the condo to offset the cost of these incentives.
* Commercial Real Estate (CRE) fraud is another emerging threat:
  + All economic indicators point to a CRE crisis which would cause billions of dollars in losses to financial institutions, and result in or contribute to the failure of numerous financial institutions.
* The FBI is using an intelligence-driven approach to combat mortgage fraud, including:
  + Establishment of the Financial Intelligence Center (FIC), which is issuing targeting packages that focus on the most egregious offenders.
  + Formation of 23 Mortgage Fraud Task Forces in high-risk areas.
  + Proactive Undercover Operations and human source penetration.
  + “Fast Track” approach to identify targets, approach quickly, and obtain cooperation.
  + Analytical tools such as the Property Flip database and an enhanced SAR review process.
* Since 2007, the FBI has tripled Special Agent and Intelligence Analyst resources investigating mortgage fraud. The average mortgage fraud case time prior to sentencing was more than three years in FY 2011, indicating that these cases are highly complex and resource intensive. Over 85 percent of all FBI mortgage fraud cases target industry insiders, indicating the FBI is working quality cases and targeting the most egregious offenders. The return on investment (ROI) for each Special Agent utilized in FY 2011 was $4.3 million (based on recoveries & restitutions per agent). This figure doesn’t include asset forfeitures and seizures or fines, which account for millions more in aggregate each year.
* Health Care Fraud:
* Total health care expenditures in the U.S. are expected to surpass the $4 trillion mark by 2015, representing a 139 percent increase or more than double the $1.67 trillion in expenditures for 2003. This creates an environment prevalent to fraud, as the National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) estimates conservatively that 3 to 5 percent of total health care expenses are fraudulent, resulting in an estimated $60-$100 billion in health care losses. The independent National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB) estimates that health care fraud currently exceeds $130 billion annually.
* Today, the FBI seeks to infiltrate illicit operation and terminate scams involving staged auto accidents, online pharmacies, Durable Medical Equipment, outpatient surgery centers, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, nursing homes, hospital chains, and transportation services. Besides the federal health benefit programs of Medicare and Medicaid, private insurance programs lose billions of dollars each year to blatant fraud schemes in every sector of the industry.
* Despite a drop of 6 percent in health care fraud cases since 2001 (FY 2001: 2,870 / FY 2011: 2,690), the average jail sentence has significantly increased during that timeframe, from 16 to 27 months, illustrating that the FBI is targeting the worst offenders. Meanwhile, health care fraud cases prove to be extremely resource intensive as the average time from case initiation to sentencing was 31 months per health care fraud case in FY 2011.
* Money Laundering:
* Money laundering allows criminals to infuse illegal money into the stream of commerce, thus corrupting financial institutions and the money supply; this provides the criminals with unwarranted economic power. The FBI investigates money laundering cases by identifying the process by which criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and services. The major threats in this area stem from emerging technologies, such as stored value devices, pre-paid gift cards, and reloadable debit cards, which are used to move criminal proceeds. Shell corporations are used as well to conceal the ownership of funds being moved through financial institutions and international commerce. This has created a “shadow” banking system, allowing criminals to exploit existing vulnerabilities in the reporting requirements that are imposed on financial institutions and international travelers.

At the end of FY 2011, the FBI had 307 open money laundering investigations, yet money laundering violations occur across all programs – from counterterrorism to organized crime to gangs – and are contained as pieces of higher priority investigations.

* Other Complex Financial Crimes (Insurance, Bankruptcy, and Mass Marketing Fraud):
* The FBI anticipates insurance fraud to continue to increase, contributing to increases in insurance premiums as well as threatening the financial viability of insurance companies.
* Since 2006, the year after bankruptcy laws were changed to make it more difficult for an individual to discharge all debts, bankruptcy filings have significantly increased each year. The potential for fraud within bankruptcy is large. According to the most recent data, there will be over 1.5 million bankruptcy filings in 2012.

***Gang Violence:*** Across the country, violent street gangs operate with impunity in communities of all sizes: urban, suburban and rural areas. According to law enforcement officials throughout the nation, criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of the crime in our communities. FBI Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces (VGSSTFs) report that violent street gangs, whether they are neighborhood based or national gangs, are a top threat to our communities followed by prison gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Gangs continue to proliferate and commit violent crime and are expanding to suburban and rural areas. This migration is believed to be a result of better organized urban gangs expanding their criminal networks into new market areas in suburban and rural locations, where they can absorb local unaffiliated gangs or use violence to intimidate them. As these expanding gangs encounter resistance from local gangs or other drug distributors in these communities violent crimes such as assaults, drive-by shootings, and murders can be expected to increase. The direct economic impact of gang activity in the U.S. is estimated at $5 billion and the indirect impact as much greater.

***Transnational Criminal Organizations and Enterprises:*** Transnational organized crime (TOC) is an immediate and increasing concern of the domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence communities. Geopolitical, economic, social, and technological changes within the last two decades have allowed these criminal enterprises to become increasingly active worldwide, and includes the following distinct groups: Eurasian Organizations that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union; Asian Criminal Enterprises; traditional organizations such as the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and Italian Organized Crime; Balkan Organized Crime; Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises, and African Criminal Enterprises.

In response to this growing threat, the FBI’s Organized Crime Program established a Eurasian Threat Focus Unit (ETFU) to develop a comprehensive understanding of existing and emerging Eurasian organized crime threats both domestically and internationally. The ETFU is staffed by tactical and strategic Intelligence Analysts, Forensic Accountants, and Supervisory Special Agents who are focused exclusively on obtaining and synthesizing intelligence from various sources. These sources include, but are not limited to, FBI field offices, Legal Attaches (LEGATS), international law enforcement and intelligence partners, and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC).

The ETFU targets Eurasian criminal organizations to include the Semion Mogilevich Organization, the Brothers’ Circle Organization, and the Izmailovo and Solntsevo criminal groups. All of these organizations/groups are very powerful, and with varying degrees of success, have compromised and/or manipulated the domestic and international banking industry, energy industry, and strategic resources. In addition, due to the immense wealth of some of the members of these organizations, political influence on all levels has been identified, corroborated, and documented.

In an effort to further promote and leverage the ETFU’s efforts, the FBI recently forward deployed several Supervisory Special Agents internationally to work hand-in-hand with international law enforcement agencies and intelligence services who are committed to addressing and combating Eurasian organized crime.

The threat of significant monetary losses to U.S. persons and U.S. financial institutions associated with Balkan criminal enterprises is ever-increasing due to the following: closer and more frequent cooperation between traditional Balkan TOC figures and young, technically sophisticated cyber criminals; the emergence of traditional TOC hierarchy and structure amongst young, computer savvy cyber criminals; and the diversification by traditional Balkan OC figures of their methods to make and launder money by utilizing the latest technology advancements.

The potential for terrorism-related events associated with criminal enterprises is ever-increasing due to the following: Alien smuggling across the southwest border by drug and gang criminal enterprises; Columbian based narco-terrorism groups influencing or associating with traditional drug trafficking organizations; prison gangs being recruited by religious, political, or social extremist groups; and major theft criminal enterprises conducting criminal activities in association with terrorist related groups or to facilitate funding of terrorist-related groups. There also remains the ever present concern that criminal enterprises are, or can, facilitate the smuggling of chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons and materials.

***Civil Rights:*** The FBI has primary responsibility for investigating all alleged violations of federal civil rights laws. These laws protect the civil rights of all citizens and persons within the U.S., and include the four major areas described below:

* Hate Crimes: Hate crimes are the top investigative priority of the Civil Rights Program because they impact not only the victims, but also the entire community. In October 2009, President Obama signed into law the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009. For the first time in the history of the nation, the Federal Government will have the authority to investigate and prosecute violent hate crimes perpetrated against the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities. This is the first significant expansion of federal criminal civil rights laws in over a decade. With the additional investigative jurisdiction, the FBI anticipates that hate crime complaints and predicated investigations will increase throughout the U.S. Of note, there are five states (i.e., Arkansas, Georgia, Michigan, South Carolina, and Wyoming) that do not have hate crime laws and fifteen states (i.e., Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia) that have hate crime laws that do not address sexual orientation/gender identity as a protected class. In these jurisdictions, the FBI will be the sole law enforcement agency with the authority to investigate a violent act as a hate crime.
* Color of Law (COL): COL violations are the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution by someone in his/her official, governmental capacity. The FBI has investigative responsibility for federal COL matters involving local and state law enforcement and concurrent responsibility with the Offices of Inspectors General for other federal agencies.
* Human Trafficking: Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery and, although not commonly known, is a significant and persistent problem both domestically and internationally. Victims are often lured with false promises of good jobs and better lives and then forced to work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Many trafficking victims are forced to work in the sex industry, but trafficking can also take place in labor settings involving domestic servitude, prison-like factories, and migrant agricultural work. Human trafficking cases require extensive outreach and cooperation with local, state, and federal agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, to properly address the problem.
* Freedom of Access: Under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act, the FBI has the sole investigative responsibility for conducting investigations of potential FACE Act violations. Incidents include murder, death threats, invasions, burglaries, harassing telephone calls, hate mail, assaults, arsons, and other acts of intimidation. The number of FACE Act violations remains relatively low, with occasional spikes during dates which mark significant events in the pro-choice and pro-life movements.

***Violent Crimes:***

* Crimes Against Children: The Crimes Against Children Sub-Program has developed a nationwide capacity to provide a rapid and effective investigative response to reported federal crimes involving the victimization of children; reduce the vulnerability of children to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse; reduce the negative impacts of international parental rights disputes; and strengthen the capabilities of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies through training programs and investigative assistance.
* Child Abductions: In FY 2011, the FBI investigated 188 pending child abduction cases. In an effort to enhance the FBI's response to abductions and the mysterious disappearance of children, the FBI’s Violent Crimes Section in coordination with the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)/Behavior Analysis Unit III (BAU III) created regional Child Abduction Rapid Deployment (CARD) Teams. The Nation-wide CARD Team cadre consists of sixty field agents. Teams are geographically distributed throughout the five regions of the U.S., consistent with the FBI Corporate Management Structure. Each region has two teams comprised of Supervisory Special Agents and Special Agents representing 35 field divisions. To date, the CARD Teams have deployed on 76 occasions resulting in the successful recovery of thirty one children.

* Innocence Lost investigations address the commercial sexual exploitation of children. Investigations have identified national criminal organizations responsible for the sex trafficking of hundreds of children, some as young as nine years old. As of January 2012, the Innocence Lost National Initiative (ILNI) has resulted in 664 pending cases, 715 informations/indictments, and 905 convictions. Furthermore, subjects of these investigations are regularly sentenced to terms of 25 years or more, while seven have received life sentences. Since its inception, 1,921 children have been recovered and removed from the cycle of abuse. In FY 2011 alone, 493 children were recovered, a 35 percent increase from the 364 children located in FY 2010. Between FY 2008 and 1st Quarter FY 2012, the ILNI increased from 25 to 46 task forces and working groups.
* Child Sex Tourism (CST) initiative targets U.S. citizens who travel to foreign countries and engage in sexual activity with children under the age of 18. The initiative currently focuses on countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America where, since its inception, ten threat assessments have been conducted to identify predicated venues where CST is occurring. The initiative has also organized and participated in capacity building for foreign law enforcement, prosecutors, and non-government organizations in these countries. As of January 2012 the CST initiative has 37 open investigations, and has led to the conviction of 8 offenders and the arrest and indictment of 3 additional individuals.
* Indian Country: As of FY 2012, the FBI has over 2,900 pending Indian Country (IC) investigations on approximately 200 reservations and 400 Indian gaming facilities throughout 28 states. Approximately 75 percent of these investigations are in the Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Albuquerque Field Offices and approximately 80 percent of the investigations involve death, sexual/physical assault of children, adult rapes, and felony assaults. Statistics indicate more than one-third of all Native American women will be raped at least once during their lifetime and nearly two-thirds will be victims of violent assaults, and the Department of Justice recently reported 25 percent of all violent crimes prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney Offices are related to IC. Due to the demands of the high volume of reactive violent crimes in IC, long-term investigations such as gang, drug, public corruption, and other white collar crimes go largely unaddressed. Emerging threats in IC include cross-programmatic crimes related to Indian Gaming, Recovery Act funds, and public corruption matters.
* Due to jurisdictional issues, the FBI is the primary law enforcement entity in IC. The Bureau of Indian Affairs has a limited number of investigators who are not present on every reservation; Tribal authorities do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians; and state/local law enforcement do not have jurisdiction within the boundaries of the reservations, except for Public Law 280 states and tribes. Currently, 115 Special Agents work in IC, and 15 Safe Trails Task Forces address drug/gang and violent crimes in IC.
* Fugitives remain a concern to law enforcement with approximately 1.5 million active warrants within the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system. The FBI is conducting investigations on more than 8,000 violent fugitives under the Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution violation. Further, the FBI has more than 6,500 substantive case file fugitives outstanding and approximately 2,143 fugitives from the U.S. are believed to be in foreign countries.
* Within the Transportation Crimes area, there were more than 500 crimes that occurred aboard an aircraft and another 100 incidents were reported regarding the destruction of aircraft. Personal and property crimes continue to be a concern within Special Jurisdiction Crimes areas such as within federal penal institutions, on other federal government properties, and in special jurisdictional areas, such as on the high seas.

***Southwest Border:*** The volatility among Transnational Criminal Enterprises (TCEs) and violent gangs (e.g., Mexican Mafia, Barrio Azteca, Los Zetas, MS-13, and 18th Street) along the Southwest Border has resulted in historic levels of drug-related violence. As rival TCEs and gangs battle for control over the lucrative drug markets, significant spikes in kidnappings, homicides and a myriad of other violent acts envelop the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, these transnational groups are utilizing several “tools” to aid in their objectives, such as public corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, and threats to law enforcement.

* + In 2011, approximately 18,600 narcotics-related homicides occurred, averaging over 50 per day, an increase of almost 25 percent over 2010.
  + 80 percent of these murders occurred in six Mexican states, two of which border the U.S. – Chihuahua and Baja California

To address the Southwest Border threat, the FBI has developed an intelligence-driven, cross-programmatic strategy to penetrate, disrupt and dismantle the most dangerous organizations as well as identify and target individuals in leadership roles.This strategy includes the deployment of hybrid squads in areas assessed to be particularly vulnerable to violence and criminality associated with TCEs, regardless of their physical proximity to the border. The primary goal of the hybrid squad model is to bring a “Threat-Based” domain view of these dynamic, multi-faceted enterprises, thus fusing strategic and tactical intelligence with investigative operations to increase the likelihood that Divisions are aware of every facet of illicit activity within the organization at all levels and can link them back to priority targets outside the U.S. To that end, hybrid squads consist of multi-disciplinary teams of Special Agents, IAs, Staff Operations Specialists (SOS), and other professionals who approach TCEs holistically. The agent composition on the squads provides different backgrounds and functional expertise, ranging from violent gangs, public corruption, and violent crimes.

**C. FBI’s 2013 Budget Strategy**

***Required Capabilities to Address National Security and Criminal Threats:*** The FBI’s budget strategy is based on the FBI’s knowledge of current and future national security and criminal investigative threats. Based on this information, the FBI has identified critical, enterprise-wide capabilities needed to perform its mission. This capabilities-based approach to planning the FBI’s future resource requirements is necessary since it is not possible to project with certainty who will be the future adversary (e.g., nation, combination of nations, non-state actor, gangs, criminal enterprises, or individuals). In other words, future capabilities are designed to enable the FBI to address the range of expected national security threats and crime problems regardless of who actually perpetrates the acts.

The FBI’s FY 2013 budget supports key mission areas, including national security, computer intrusions, and violent crime, and provides a modest increase for financial fraud investigations, while striving for cost savings and efficiencies.

***Foundation for Achieving the Desired Capabilities:*** The foundation of the FBI’s budget is supported by four objectives: (1) the application of a Strategy Management System (SMS) to FBI planning; (2) accelerated improvements in program management through intelligence-driven operations; (3) continuation of a multi-year planning process; and (4) a directed-growth strategy aligned to our most critical requirements.

**FBI Strategy Management System:**

The FBI uses the Strategy Management System (SMS) to guide its strategy development and decision-making. The SMS is a strategic planning and execution process that is maintained throughout the Bureau. Strategies and priorities are developed at the Enterprise, Branch, and Division levels; those entities then measure, track, and review performance against achieving their priorities on a quarterly basis.

Through the SMS, the FBI aims to strike the appropriate balance between its national security and criminal missions, and between short-term tactical efforts and longer-term strategic initiatives. Strategic management of the FBI’s two greatest assets, its employees and information, helps address the current mission and positions the FBI to meet future challenges.


Led by the Director and facilitated by the Resource Planning Office (RPO), SMS is based on the Balanced Scorecard framework and has a twofold purpose: to implement the FBI’s strategic plan, and to unify strategic planning efforts throughout the Bureau. SMS accomplishes this by aligning each Division’s resources and activities to the FBI’s top ten priorities and delineating how the priorities will be achieved.

The FBI’s SMS consists of several major, interrelated components:

* Strategic Shifts
* Strategy Map
* Balanced Scorecard/SMS Profile
* Strategic Initiatives

Strategic Shifts

The FBI’s strategic shifts, shown below, consist of a set of focus areas selected by FBI leadership, along with the perceived present state (on the left) and intended future state (on the right) for each area. While the focus areas are not designed to be all-encompassing, they represent the key dimensions in which the organization needs to change in order to achieve its mission. The areas are often a combination of organizational, cultural, and technological changes that FBI leadership has identified as necessary to address over the next five years in order to realize the Bureau’s vision. The strategic shifts were initially identified and defined in 2006. Five years later, in 2011, FBI management assessed the Bureau’s progress on each shift and re-defined the strategic shifts, as shown below.



Strategy Map

The FBI Strategy Map is a visual representation of the organization’s strategic objectives. These objectives are organized by four broad themes: American Public Expectations, Internal Processes, Talent and Technology, and Resources.  The FBI is guided by a Strategy Map consisting of 25 strategic objectives, falling under 7 different themes, as shown below.  The Strategy Map describes the “story of the strategy” through a one-page, concise visual representation.



The Strategy Map provides the ability to portray the FBI’s strategy. The story can be told from the “top down:” the FBI will achieve its mission and meet the expectations of the American public by utilizing intelligence and investigations to deter, detect, and disrupt national security threats and criminal activity. It will support these critical operational processes by excelling at managing the organization and by maximizing partnerships with federal, state, local, and international partners. The organization’s people and technology provide the capabilities to operate these critical internal processes. Therefore, the FBI must optimize and align its resources in order to maximize workforce success and leverage technology and science.

Alternatively, the story can be told from the “bottom up:” the FBI will optimize its resources in order to hire, train and retain the right people, and implement the necessary technology to support its operations. The Bureau will manage the business effectively and leverage partnerships in order to help deter, detect, and disrupt national security threats and criminal activity. By integrating intelligence with law enforcement, and maintaining traditional standards in other operations, the FBI will execute its mission and meet the expectations of the American people.

SMS Profile and Initiatives

The SMS profile serves as the framework to translate strategy into a list of operational objectives, measures, and initiatives that drive behavior and performance. Each of the objectives identified on the Strategy Map is linked to one or more measures and each measure has a target that defines success. In addition, key strategic initiatives are identified and tracked to ensure that any performance gaps are closed.

The FBI’s leadership team uses SMS to manage organizational performance by conducting regular strategy review meetings.  At these meetings, leadership reviews SMS profiles, along with information and data on SMS objectives, measures, and initiatives.  During these meetings, the leadership team discusses performance and makes decisions on resolving critical performance issues.

Ultimately, the FBI’s field offices are central to implementing the organization’s strategy.  Accordingly, in addition to these strategy review meetings, the FBI uses Strategic Performance Sessions (SPS) to obtain perspectives on key strategic issues from the field offices’ perspective. These sessions are led by the Deputy Director and typically focus on discussions with field managers on a key area of the FBI’s strategy.

The SMS is a continuous process for driving evolutionary improvements. Reviews not only track strategic progress; they also examine what is working and not working and what needs to be adjusted. Over time, the Strategy Map and the 25 objectives may change. Initiatives that are not succeeding are provided with the support they need to succeed or will be eliminated, and other initiatives are added to address identified gaps. The SMS provides the flexibility the FBI needs to stay ahead of changing threats and demographic and other trends that impact its mission.

**Intelligence-Driven Operations:**

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the FBI has transformed from a law enforcement agency to a *national security and law enforcement* agency. The FBI uses intelligence to understand national security threats, and to conduct operations to dismantle or disrupt those threats. Some examples of how the FBI uses intelligence to drive its operations include:

* Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs): The FBI developed a standardized model for field intelligence that can be adjusted to the size and complexity of small, medium, and large offices. There are now 56 FIGs throughout the nation.
* Central Strategic Coordinating Components (CSCCs): These intelligence components are embedded into the Headquarters’ operational divisions in order to ensure intelligence-driven operational strategies and provide a view of national threats.
* The Collection Operations Requirements Environment (CORE): CORE is a technology solution that makes FBI and national intelligence requirements easily accessible to all field office personnel and improves information flow between operational squads and the FIGs.

**Multi-year Planning:**

An increasing number of the FBI's programs and initiatives are multi-year in nature, and require phased development, deployment, and operations/maintenance funding. A multi-year planning approach allows FBI management to better understand the implications of proposed initiatives.

A newer aspect of the multi-year planning effort is the Corporate Capital Planning Office, which is currently examining the long-term needs of and certain large-scale capital projects.

**D. Environmental Accountability**

The FBI has begun developing an Organizational Environmental Management System (EMS) that will provide corporate-wide environmental protection standards to deploy to the field offices and major facilities (to include CJIS, Quantico, and HQ). The organizational EMS will be developed and implemented through Environmental Protection Programs (EPPs) that establish policy and procedure in major environmental programmatic areas (e.g., hazardous waste management, energy management). The first three EPPs are being developed and will be fully implemented at the end of FY 2012. Individual facility and field office EMSs will follow. An overarching environmental policy is currently being reviewed by FBI top management to serve as the guiding framework for developing, implementing, and continually improving the EMS.

The FBI is revising its safety committee policy and procedures to expand the jurisdiction of our safety committees to include environmental issues. In essence, these safety committees – which are in place within all Bureau Divisions and major facilities – will become “green teams” as well and will provide a forum for discussion of environmental issues and a mechanism for EMS implementation.

The FBI actively participates in DOJ’s overall efforts to implement Executive Order 13514. FBI provided data and input into the Department’s Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan (SSPP) and routinely corresponds with DOJ and the other Bureaus to determine the most efficient, effective methods to protect the environment. The FBI completed its second greenhouse gas inventory for FY 2011 and the results of this inventory will provide additional input to decision makers as they determine where to target efficiency measures.

The FBI has developed a sustainable building policy that addresses requirements of Executive Orders 13423 and 13514, the Federal Leadership in High Performance and Sustainable Buildings Memorandum of Understanding of 2006, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The FBI's policy requires that new FBI-owned facilities over $25 million be designed and constructed to meet the minimum of a Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Certified Silver Rating in the New Construction category. In addition, the policy - which was signed and implemented in 2008 - requires the installation of advanced metering devices and the use of recycled content or environmentally preferable products in construction of new facilities. FBI is currently pursuing LEED Silver certification for the new Biometrics Technology Center at the CJIS Complex.

The FBI's Fleet Management Program integrates environmental accountability into its operations in various ways. The FBI is in the process of incorporating hybrid vehicles, alternative fuel vehicles (E85), and more fuel efficient vehicles (4 cylinders) into the fleet. Additionally, the FBI's Automotive Maintenance and Repair Facilities incorporate environmental accountability through various programs. These facilities use re-refined motor oil for a majority of the vehicles serviced and recycle all used oil. Automotive facilities also use air conditioning and coolant recycling machines in connection with the servicing of vehicles. A battery exchange program is in place to ensure used batteries are returned to the vendor for proper recycling. In addition, many facilities are reviewing the use of environmentally friendly chemicals: degreasers, hand cleaners, and general purpose cleaners, in day to day operations. Finally, some facilities have eliminated hazardous waste entirely through pollution prevention and recycling programs.

**II. Summary of Program Changes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Description** | **Pos.** | **FTE** | **Dollars**  **($000)** | **Page** |
| **Salaries and Expenses Enhancements** | | | | | |
| Financial Fraud | To address high priority and high loss corporate, securities and commodities, and mortgage fraud investigations. | 44 | 22 | $15,000 | 5-1 |
| **Total, Salaries and Expenses Enhancements** | | **44** | **22** | **$15,000** |  |
|  | |  |  |  |  |
| **Salaries and Expenses Offsets** | | | | | |
| Administrative Efficiencies | To reduce funding for administrative areas, including: printing, publications, travel, conferences, supplies, and general equipment. | … | … | (11,158) | 6-1 |
| Contractor Reductions | To reduce non-personnel funding for national security programs. | … | … | (7,113) | 6-3 |
| Critical Incident Response Group | To reduce funding for training and equipment. | … | … | (3,417) | 6-5 |
| Facilities Reduction | To right-size several programs that support facilities and logistics services. | … | … | (22,562) | 6-7 |
| Information Technology (IT) Savings | To continue IT efficiency efforts begun in the FY 2012 budget. | … | … | (5,947) | 6-9 |
| National Gang Intelligence Center | To close the National Gang Intelligence Center. | (15) | (15) | (7,826) | 6-11 |
| Relocation Program | To reduce funding supporting employee relocations. | … | … | (5,000) | 6-13 |
| **Total, Salaries and Expenses Offsets** | | **(15)** | **(15)** | **($63,023)** |  |

**III. Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language**

**Appropriations Language for Salaries and Expenses**

For necessary expenses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for detection, investigation, and prosecution of crimes against the United States, [$8,036,991,000, of which not to exceed $150,000,000 shall remain available until expended] $8,151,021,000: *Provided, That not to exceed $216,900,000 shall remain available until expended: Provided further,* That not to exceed $184,500 shall be available for official reception and representation expenses.

*(cancellation)*

*Of the unobligated balances from prior year appropriations under this heading, $162,226,000 are hereby permanently cancelled: Provided, That no amounts may be cancelled from amounts that were designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget or the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended. (Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2012.)*

**Analysis of Appropriations Language**

The language proposed above differs from the language included in the Budget Appendix regarding the types of balances proposed for cancellation. The difference is due only to timing restrictions during production of these separate documents as it is the intent of both the language proposed in the Budget Appendix and the language proposed here to cancel expired balances or balances currently available.

**IV. Decision Unit Justification**

**A. Intelligence Decision Unit**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| INTELLIGENCE DECISION UNIT TOTAL | Perm. Pos. | FTE | Amount ($000) |
| 2011 Enacted | 6,839 | 6,684 | $1,556,434 |
| 2012 Enacted | 7,211 | 7,055 | 1,683,508 |
| Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments | 3 | 16 | 18,989 |
| 2013 Current Services | 7,214 | 7,071 | 1,702,497 |
| 2013 Program Increases | … | … | 1,656 |
| 2013 Program Offsets | (15) | (15) | (20,547) |
| 2013 Request | 7,199 | 7,056 | 1,683,606 |
| Total Change 2012-2013 | (12) | 1 | $98 |

1. Program Description

The FBI’s Intelligence Decision Unit (IDU) is comprised of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), including embedded intelligence functions within the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, Criminal Investigative, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Divisions; Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs); Special Technologies and Applications Section (STAS); Terrorist Screening Center (TSC);Infrastructure and Technology; Intelligence Training; Critical Incident Response Group; Laboratory Division and International Operations Division. Additionally, to capture all resources that support these programs, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Facilities and Logistics Services, Information Technology (IT), and Human Resources) are calculated and scored to the decision unit.

***Directorate of Intelligence***

The FBI established the DI as a dedicated and integrated intelligence service. This action responds to executive and legislative direction as the logical next step in the evolution of the FBI’s intelligence capability. The DI is the FBI’s core intelligence element and one of the four major organizations that comprise the National Security Branch (NSB).

The DI is the FBI's dedicated national intelligence workforce with delegated authorities and responsibilities for all FBI intelligence functions, including information sharing policies, from three Executive and Legislative documents: a Presidential Memorandum to the Attorney General dated November 16, 2004; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004; and the FY 2005 Omnibus Appropriation Bill. The Directorate carries out its functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) and in each Field Office.

***Intelligence Analysts***

The work performed by Intelligence Analysts (IAs) is essential to the FBI's ability to understand today's threats to national security and to develop a deeper understanding of tomorrow’s potential threats. To safeguard national security, the FBI must focus significant analytic resources to analyze the threat, potential courses of action, and to then place analysis in the context of ongoing intelligence and investigative operations.

The FBI’s intelligence analytic cadre covers three career paths (Tactical, Collection/Reporting and Strategic) and performs functions which include: understanding emerging threat streams to enhance domain knowledge and exploit collection opportunities; enhancing collection capabilities through the deployment of collection strategies; reporting raw intelligence in a timely manner; identifying human and technical source collection opportunities; performing domain analysis in the field to articulate the existence of a threat in the Field Offices’ area of responsibility; performing strategic analysis at FBIHQ to ascertain the ability to collect against a national threat; serving as a bridge between intelligence and operations; performing confidential human source validation; and recommending collection exploitation opportunities at all levels. The products generated by intelligence analysis drive FBI investigative and operational strategies by ensuring they are based on an enterprise-wide understanding of the current and future threat environments.

***Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs)***

FIGs are the centralized intelligence components in the field that are crucial to the integration of the intelligence cycle (requirements, collection, analysis and dissemination) into field operations. In accordance with FBI policy and guidance to the field, it is the responsibility of the FIG to coordinate, guide, and support the Field Office’s operational activities through the five core intelligence functions. These functions are: domain management; collection management; requirements-based (sometimes non-case) collection – including human intelligence (HUMINT); tactical intelligence; and intelligence production and dissemination. All five of the core intelligence functions require the FIG to work seamlessly with the operational squads in order to be successful.

***FIG Special Agents***

FIG Special Agents (SAs) are required to perform one or more of the following primary functions: intelligence collection, collection management, Confidential Human Source (CHS) coordination, focused source recruitment, source development and validation, and intelligence and partner relations. FIG SAs’ intelligence collection activities include maintaining a CHS base and conducting threat assessments.

All SAs assigned to the FIG work closely with IAs to report observations indicating new trends in the local environment, collect key intelligence based upon the FBI’s priority threat or vulnerabilities, and to spot areas and targets for source recruitment. FIG SAs serve to facilitate the handling of cross-programmatic intelligence information obtained from CHS debriefings. To do this effectively, HUMINT collectors (or Special Agents) on the FIG must maintain close and constant communication with other collectors (Special Agents) and embedded IAs on investigative squads in order to augment their collection abilities beyond reporting on the squad’s investigations.

***Foreign Language Program (FLP)***

The mission of the FLP is to provide quality language solutions, analysis, and cultural expertise to the FBI and its partners. The FBI’s success at protecting the U.S. from future terrorist attacks, countering foreign intelligence operations and espionage, and dismantling transnational organized criminal enterprises is increasingly dependent upon maximizing the usage and deployment of its linguist workforce, language tools, and technology in line with critical intelligence, investigative, and management priorities. As of December 2011, the FBI workforce has certified capabilities in 114 languages and dialects in a distributed environment spanning 107 FBI domestic and overseas locations. The FLP promulgates policies and compliance requirements to ensure true fidelity of the finished English-language intelligence product. Further, the FLP develops the foreign language skills of the FBI employees through on-going language testing, assessments and multi-tiered training strategies designed to build and sustain a high performance intelligence workforce.

***Language Analysis***

Nearly every major FBI investigation now has a foreign language component and the demand for highly qualified linguists and foreign language and culture training continues to increase. Language analysis is a critical process in the FBI’s effort to acquire and accurately process real-time, actionable intelligence to detect and prevent foreign-originated terrorist attacks against the U.S. The FBI’s language analysis capabilities promptly address all of its highest priority counterterrorism intelligence translation requirements, often within 24 hours. Language Analysts also play a significant role in the FBI’s counterintelligence and criminal investigative missions.

***National Virtual Translation Center***

The National Virtual Translation Center (NVTC) was established under the authority of Section 907 of the USA Patriot Act to provide accurate and timely translations for the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) in support of national security. On February 11, 2003, the Director of Central Intelligence awarded executive agency authority of the NVTC to the FBI. The NVTC is one of the Offices of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) multi-agency centers, and receives its operational guidance and oversight from the ODNI. The NVTC’s mission (unique within the U.S. Government) is to provide translation services to all IC agencies and Department of Defense intelligence elements, using a translation workflow management system that virtually connects NVTC program staff, translators, and customers. NVTC translators also support law enforcement organizations, but cannot appear in court in connection with any case. NVTC actively researches and tests advanced translation technologies to insert into its translation workflow so that NVTC translators can work more rapidly and efficiently, and collaborate with IC partners to capture and share knowledge and data obtained through the application of these technologies.

***Intelligence Training***

The FBI strives to ensure that its training programs leverage intelligence training expertise not only within the FBI, but also within the IC, academia, and industry to ensure the best intelligence training and educational opportunities are available to the FBI workforce. The FBI’s training program also facilitates the identification of adjunct faculty, communicates relevant training and educational opportunities available outside the FBI and permits opportunities for research related to intelligence analysis. The FBI “Dual Mission from Day One” initiative was established in FY 2012 by DI and Training Division to provide clear expectations within the workforce that the responsibilities of the intelligence mission assume the same stature as that of the law enforcement mission. This will be developed by ensuring New Agent Trainees, IAs, Linguists, and Surveillance Personnel are introduced to these responsibilities from “Day One” in the FBI and continuously reinforced throughout the organization. FBI Agents, IAs and Linguists receive specialized training designed to better equip them with doctrine and tradecraft necessary to conduct the intelligence-driven mission of the FBI. Improving and expanding the FBI’s training capacity will allow the FBI to conduct its intelligence-driven mission and to make a greater contribution to the USIC.

In an effort to train the intelligence workforce and to build a cadre of highly skilled intelligence professionals, the FBI has developed, in addition to the Intelligence Career Path for Special Agents, three distinct career paths (Strategic, Tactical, Collection/Reporting) for IAs. These career paths will ensure the FBI National Intelligence Workforce (NIW) personnel receive the training, experiences, and opportunities for joint duty assignments appropriate for their position and stage of development. The FBI is re-designing its intelligence training curriculum to align with career paths to ensure all NIW personnel have the training necessary to analyze and mitigate current and future threats to the U.S. Homeland.

***Communications Exploitation Section (CXS)***

CXS leads law enforcement and intelligence efforts in the U.S. to detect, penetrate, and dismantle existing and emerging terrorists and their activities by exploiting their communications. Efforts include targeting terrorists’ use of the Internet and On-line forums, as well as exploiting terrorists’ use of digital media.

***Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)***

The FTTTF assists in locating, tracking, and removing foreign terrorists and their supporters from the U.S. FTTTF utilizes specialized analytical techniques, technologies, and data analysis to enhance terrorist identification, tracking, and risk assessments.

***Domestic Communications Assistance Center (DCAC)***

The Domestic Communications Assistance Center (DCAC) is a federal, state, and local partnership seeking to enhance electronic surveillance capabilities for the entire law enforcement community while also protecting privacy and civil liberties. Electronic surveillance not only provides otherwise unobtainable evidence of criminal activity, but also helps law enforcement authorities to prevent crimes and save lives. However, due to changes in the volume and complexity of today’s communications services and technologies, a growing number of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies face increasing challenges to their ability to access, intercept, collect, and process wire or electronic communications to which they are lawfully authorized. The DCAC will serve as a hub for the management of knowledge and technical expertise regarding lawful electronic surveillance, facilitate the sharing of solutions and know-how among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, improve relations with industry, and strengthen compliance with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). A primary impetus for the DCAC is state and local law enforcement’s lack of resources to address their respective needs. Substantial technological, operational, and cost-saving efficiencies for state and local law enforcement can be obtained through a unified DCAC approach to closely interrelated electronic surveillance endeavors, such as distribution of processing tools, training, and industry liaison. In addition, such a uniform approach would be welcomed by service providers who prefer to standardize and centralize electronic surveillance technical, operational, and administrative interactions with law enforcement to the greatest extent possible.

***Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)***

The TSC consolidates and coordinates the U.S. Government’s approach to terrorist screening and facilitates the sharing of terrorism information to protect our Nation and foreign partners. In order to identify, prevent, deter, and disrupt potential terrorist activity, the TSC’s main objective is to maintain a thorough, accurate, and current database of known and suspected terrorists (KST) and to share this information with law enforcement, intelligence, screening, and regulatory agencies at the Federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, and international levels. This effort includes direct support for the FBI, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, the ODNI, the Intelligence Community, and other major Federal law enforcement, screening, and regulatory agencies. The TSC accomplishes this mission through a unique, interagency business model that incorporates information technology and information sharing, as well as operational and analytical expertise from its interagency specialists. In FY 2011, the TSC assisted its partners in positively identifying 20,126 known or suspected terrorists.

***Special Technologies and Applications Office Section (STAS)***

The mission of STAS is to provide the FBI's investigative and intelligence priorities with technical analysis capability through innovative techniques, tools, and systems. STAS develops and maintains systems that store electronic data lawfully obtained or developed by the FBI and provides Agents, IAs, and linguists access to that data for the purpose of developing actionable information through the aid of analytic software applications.

***Infrastructure and Technology***

The IDU includes funding for several efforts that are critical enablers for FBI Intelligence Career Service (ICS) Agents, IAs, Language Analysts, and Physical Surveillance Specialists (PSSs). These efforts help to manage, process, share, and protect classified and unclassified information critical to national security. Taken together, these efforts form a comprehensive system of security and efficiency. The secure, or classified, side of the comprehensive system includes secure workspaces, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs); a secure information sharing capability through the Sensitive Compartmented Information Operations Network (SCION), the FBI’s TOP SECRET (TS)/Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)-certified data network; and Intelligence IT, which are the tools used by FBI intelligence personnel to perform their duties. The unclassified side of the comprehensive system includes the FBI’s ability to share unclassified information with other federal, state, and local governments and other partners through the Criminal Justice Information Services’ Law Enforcement Online (LEO) system and UNet, the FBI’s unclassified connection to the Internet.

***Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF)***

A SCIF is an accredited room, group of rooms, floors, or buildings where National Security Professionals (NSPs) collect, process, exploit, analyze, disseminate, and/or store Sensitive Compartmented Information. SCIFs are outfitted with Information Technology, telecommunications, general office machines, and requisite infrastructure to process unclassified through Top Secret information. SCIFs are afforded intrusion detection and access control systems to prevent the entry of unauthorized personnel.

***Sensitive Compartmented Information Operations Network (SCION)***

SCION is a compartmented network for Top Secret information which is administered by employing increased security measures, enforcing user accountability, and enhancing information assurance methodology.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Decision Unit:** Intelligence | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective:** Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s Security Consistent with the Rule of Law (Objectives 1.1 and 1.3) , Goal 2: Prevent Crime, Protect the Rights of the American People, and Enforce Federal Law (Objectives 2.1-2.5), and Goal 3: Ensure and Support the Fair, Impartial, Efficient, and Transparent Administration of Justice at the Federal, State, Local, Tribal and International Levels (Objective 3.1). | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES** | | **Final Target** | | **Actual** | | **Projected** | | **Changes** | | **Requested (Total)** | |
| **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| **Total Costs and FTE** | | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| 6,684 | 1,556,434 | 6,473 | 1,231,000 | 7,055 | 1,683,508 | 1 | 98 | 7,056 | 1,683,606 |
| **TYPE /**  **STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** |  | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012 Current Rate** | | **Current Services Adjustments & FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| **Performance Measure** | % of Counterterrorism FISA collection reviewed by the Language Program:   * Audio * Text * Electronic File | 100%  100%  100% | | 83%  138%  39% | | 100%  100%  50% | | -  -  - | | 100%  100%  50% | |
| **Performance Measure: Responsiveness** | % of IIRs citing U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) Priority 1 or 2 requirements [New measure] | N/A | | N/A | | Pending determination of baseline | | - | | Pending determination of baseline | |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI *Headquarters* finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Internally disseminated) [Discontinued measure] | 95% | | 97% | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI *Field Office* finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Internally disseminated) [Discontinued measure] | 95% | | 100% | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community) [Discontinued measure] | 95% | | 96% | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Performance Measure: *Accuracy*** | Number of high priority sources put through an enhanced validation process. | This information is classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of datasets incorporated into DIVS **[New measure]** | N/A | | 51 | | 71 | | 30 | | 101 | |
| **Efficiency Measure** | % of FBI Confidential Human Sources (CHS) validated | 22% | | 48% | | 29% | | - | | 29% | |
| **Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:**   * All data are provided by records maintained and verified by the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence. No known limitations exist with the available data as currently reported. | | | | | | | | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets** | | **FY 2003** | **FY 2004** | **FY 2005** | **FY 2006** | **FY 2007** | **FY 2008** | **FY 2009** | **FY 2010** | **FY 2011** | **FY 2012** | **FY 2013** |
| **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Target** | **Target** |
| **Performance Measure** | % of Counterterrorism FISA collection reviewed by the Language Program:   * Audio * Text * Electronic File | N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A | 94%  100%  99% | 88%  99%  94% | 97%  102%  95% | 91%  114%  57% | 85%  100%  87% | 95% 98% 39% | 83%  138%  39% | 100%  100%  50% | 100%  100%  50% |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of IIRs citing U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) Priority 1 or 2 requirements | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Pending | Pending |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI *Headquarters* finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Internally disseminated) | N/A | N/A | 57% | 86% | 94% | 100% | 97% | 98% | 97% | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI *Field Office* finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Internally disseminated) | N/A | N/A | 58% | 73% | 90% | 95% | 100% | 98% | 100% | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure: *Responsiveness*** | % of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community) | N/A | N/A | 79% | 86% | 92% | 100% | 96% | 99% | 96% | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure: *Accuracy*** | Number of high priority sources put through an enhanced validation process. | This information is classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of datasets incorporated into DIVS | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 51 | 71 | 101 |
| **Efficiency Measure** | % of FBI Confidential Human Sources (CHS) validated | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 14% | 23% | 48% | 29% | 29% |

**2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies**

The resources within the Intelligence Decision Unit contribute to all three of the DOJ strategic goals. In addition, these resources are critical to the intelligence cycle at the heart of the FBI’s strategy map in objectives P4 through P7, “Collection/Investigation,” “Intelligence Dissemination and Integration,” “Analysis,” and “Action and/or Requirements.”

The mission of the FBI’s Intelligence Program is to collect, produce, and disseminate actionable intelligence that enables the FBI to identify and counter current and emerging threats. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is responsible for managing the FBI Intelligence Program and ensuring that the prioritization of its functions comports with the formulation of budgetary requirements. DI carries out these functions through embedded intelligence elements at FBI Headquarters and in each field office.

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

***Performance Measure:*** % of Counterterrorism (CT) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) collection reviewed by the language program.

***FY 2011 Target:***

Audio: 100%

Text: 100%

Electronic: 100%

***FY 2011 Actual:***

Audio: 83%

Text: 138%

Electronic: 39%

***Discussion:*** FY 2012 and FY 2013 targets for electronic collection have been revised upward to account for technological improvements allowing for identification of collected data that requires review and translation by the FBI’s Language Program. The new targets are based on improvements already seen in the first quarter of FY 2012 and on future expectations. Data will be baselined internally throughout FY 2012 and the FY 2013 target may be further updated based on actual results. This review rate reflects cases that have a Foreign Language component and have been marked "for translation." While the FBI has established an ultimate goal of a review rate of 100 percent for all CT FISA collection, CT Electronic Data File (EDF) is unlikely to reach that goal in the immediate future due to increased collection, technical limitations, and stagnant resources. For audio and text collection, resources are expected to remain consistent and the FBI expects to maintain or slightly improve current performance in FY 2012 and FY 2013. It should be noted that the FY 2011 actual exceeds 100 percent because some material collected prior to FY 2011 was reviewed in that year.

***FY 2012 Target:***

Audio: 100%

Text: 100%

Electronic: 50%

***FY 2013 Target:***

Audio: 100%

Text: 100%

Electronic: 50%

***Performance Measure – Responsiveness:*** % of Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) citing U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) Priority 1 or 2 requirements [New measure]

***FY 2013 Target:*** This is a new measure first being monitored and reported in FY 2012. Once baseline data has been collected for FY 2012, a target will be set for FY 2013.

***Discussion:*** This is a new measure designed to determine whether the FBI is collecting and meeting the needs of the USIC by reporting against the highest priority requirements, as identified externally. To link reporting to collection requirements is a foundational intelligence capability, and one which should drive collection behavior toward higher priority needs. The current measures relating to “Finished Intel reporting on NIPF topics” do not provide as much value as the results always approach 100 percent due to the nature of the product and process. The measure will determine the FBI’s responsiveness in meeting externally identified priority requirements and serving the needs of the USIC. This measure replaces the three measures listed below, which are really sub-components of the same measure. Results on this new measure will provide a better understanding of the FBI’s capability to meet the given requirements and drive future collection efforts.

***Performance Measure - Responsiveness****:* % of FBI Headquarters finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics (Discontinue)

***Discussion:***  As noted above, the FBI proposes discontinuing this measure and replacing it with the measure above.

### *Performance Measure - Responsiveness:* % of FBI Field Office finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Discontinue)

***Discussion:***  As noted above, the FBI proposes discontinuing this measure and replacing it with the measure above.

### *Performance Measure - Responsiveness:* % of FBI finished intelligence reports that are responsive to National Intelligence Priority Framework topics. (Disseminated to Intelligence Community) (Discontinue)

***Discussion:***  As noted above, the FBI proposes discontinuing this measure and replacing it with the measure above.

***Performance Measure:***Number of datasets incorporated into DIVS

***FY 2011 Target:*** N/A

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 51

***Discussion:*** The FBI’s Special Technologies and Applications Section (STAS) continues to expand

on the initial operating capability for the DIVS application. The application initially went live

in October 2010, with 24 data sets that were based

on prioritization from the Data Exploitation and Aggregation Group. Throughout FY 2011, the team continued to deliver additional data sets, infrastructure improvements, and application enhancements that have improved end user accessibility to data across the FBI and job efficiencies through advanced search and discovery capabilities. Many challenges remain, however, for the incorporation of more data sets into DIVS, including: increased complexity for data transfer, ingest, indexing and access privileges; legal issues with types of data that are accessible for cross-correlation; and external dependencies related to the collaborative requirements for sharing data. Targets for FY 2012 and FY 2013 were set based on historical productivity with existing resources and general timing requirements for acquiring the necessary legal reviews and approvals prior to ingesting new data into the DIVS environment. STAS expects to continue meeting its targets for the number of data sets incorporated into DIVS for the remainder of FY 2012 and through FY 2013.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 20 (101 cumulatively)

***FY 2013 Target:*** 30 (101 cumulatively)

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**The FBI’s Intelligence Program strives to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by: aiming core investigative work proactively against threats to U.S. interests; building and sustaining enterprise-wide intelligence policies and capabilities; and providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement communities. The FBI is committed to fulfilling its responsibility to safeguard national security. As such, it continues to proactively adapt and improve upon collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities while also protecting the civil liberties and rights of all Americans.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the National Security Priority Goal 1, which aims to better inform the Intelligence Community, thereby increasing the ability to protect Americans from terrorism and other threats to national security – both at home and abroad. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase by 6 percent the number of counterterrorism intelligence products shared with the U.S. Intelligence Community, state and local Law Enforcement Community partners, and foreign government agencies.  The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**B. Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Decision Unit**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| COUNTERTERRORISM/ COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DECISION UNIT TOTAL | Perm. Pos. | FTE | Amount ($000) |
| 2011 Enacted w/Rescissions | 12,693 | 12,484 | $3,225,897 |
| 2012 Enacted | 12,757 | 12,474 | 3,229,096 |
| Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments | 26 | 72 | 91,007 |
| 2013 Current Services | 12,783 | 12,546 | 3,320,103 |
| 2013 Program Increases | … | … | 4,239 |
| 2013 Program Offsets | … | … | (24,328) |
| 2013 Request | 12,783 | 12,546 | 3,300,014 |
| Total Change 2012-2013 | 26 | 72 | $70,918 |

1. Program Description

The FBI’s Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence (CT/CI) Decision Unit is comprised of the Counterterrorism (CT) Program, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), the Counterintelligence (CI) Program, a portion of the Cyber Computer Intrusions Program, a portion of the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and the portion of the Legal Attaché (LEGAT) Program that supports the FBI’s CT and CI missions. Additionally, to capture all resources that support these programs, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Security, Information Technology Divisions, administrative divisions, and staff offices) is calculated and scored to the decision unit.

***Counterterrorism Program***

The mission of the FBI’s CT program is to prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur; to pursue the appropriate sanctions for those who have conducted, aided, and abetted those engaged in terrorist acts; and to provide crisis management following acts of terrorism against the U.S. and U.S. interests. This mission is accomplished by gathering intelligence from all sources and using intelligence and analysis to enhance preventive efforts and exploit links between terrorist groups and their support networks. Threat information is shared with all affected agencies and personnel to create and maintain efficient threat mitigation response procedures and provide timely and accurate analysis to the Intelligence Community (IC) and senior policy makers.

The FBI is committed to stopping terrorism at any stage, from thwarting those intending to conduct an act of terrorism to investigating the financiers of terrorist operations. All CT investigations are managed at FBI Headquarters, thereby employing and enhancing a national perspective that focuses on the CT strategy of creating an inhospitable terrorist environment.

The FBI aims to protect the U.S. from terrorist attacks by disrupting terrorists’ ability to perpetrate harm. Training, finances, recruiting, logistical support, pre-attack planning, and preparation are all required components of terrorist operations. These requirements create vulnerabilities, and the FBI focuses on creating a comprehensive intelligence base to exploit these vulnerabilities.

To develop a comprehensive intelligence base, the FBI employs its Model Counterterrorism Investigative Strategy, focusing each terrorist case on intelligence, specifically on identification of terrorist training, fundraising, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack planning.

Under the leadership of Director Mueller, the FBI has moved aggressively to implement a comprehensive plan that has fundamentally transformed the FBI. The Bureau has overhauled its counterterrorism operations, expanded its intelligence capabilities, modernized its business practices and technology, and improved coordination with its partners. The FBI is no longer content to concentrate on investigating terrorist crimes after they occur; it is dedicated to disrupting terrorist plots before they are executed. The FBI’s CT Program has five priorities:

* To detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist sleeper cells in the U.S. before they act;
* To identify and prevent acts of terrorism by individuals with a terrorist agenda acting alone;
* To detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist support networks, including financial support networks;
* To enhance its capability to quickly ascertain the reliability, implications and details of terrorist threats and to improve the capacity to disseminate threat-related information to local, state, and federal agencies, and to the private sector as needed; and
* To enhance its overall contribution to the IC and senior policy makers in government by providing timely and accurate in-depth analysis of the terrorist threat and other information of value on an on-going basis.

To implement these priorities, the FBI has increased the number of Special Agents (SAs) assigned to terrorism matters. The FBI has also established a number of operational units and entities that provide new or improved capabilities to address the terrorist threat. The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) and the around-the-clock Counterterrorism Watch manage and share threat information. The Terrorism Financing Operations Section centralizes efforts to stop terrorist financing. The FBI also utilizes document/media exploitation squads to exploit material found both domestically and overseas for its intelligence value. Deployable “Fly Teams” lend counterterrorism expertise wherever it is needed. The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)[[1]](#footnote-1) help identify terrorists and keep them out of the U.S. Finally, the Counterterrorism Analysis Section1 “connects the dots” and assesses the indicators of terrorist activity against the U.S. from a strategic perspective.

Re-engineering efforts are making the FBI more efficient and more responsive to operational needs. The FBI has revised its approach to strategic planning and refocused recruiting and hiring efforts to attract individuals with skills critical to its counterterrorism and intelligence missions. The FBI has also developed a comprehensive training program and instituted new leadership initiatives to keep its workforce flexible.

The FBI has divided its CT operations into branches, each of which focuses on a different aspect of the current terrorism threat facing the U.S. These components are staffed with SAs, Intelligence Analysts (IAs), and subject matter experts who work closely with investigators in the field and integrate intelligence across component lines. This integration allows for real-time responses to threat information and quick communication with decision-makers and the field.

The FBI has also established strong working relationships with other members of the IC. Through the Director’s daily meetings with other IC executives, the regular exchange of personnel among agencies, joint efforts in specific investigations and in the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the TSC, and other multi-agency entities, and the co-location of personnel at Liberty Crossing, it is clear that the FBI and its partners in the IC are now integrated at virtually every level of operations.

With terrorists traveling, communicating, and planning attacks all around the world, coordination with foreign partners has become more critical than ever before. The FBI has steadily increased its overseas presence and now routinely deploys SAs and crime scene experts to assist in the investigation of overseas attacks. Their efforts have played a critical role in successful international operations.

***Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Directorate***

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD) was established to create a unique combination of law enforcement authorities, intelligence analysis capabilities, and technical subject matter expertise that exists nowhere else in the U.S. Government (USG). Creation of the WMDD enabled the FBI to bring its WMD preparedness, prevention, and response capabilities into a single, focused organization, which builds a cohesive and coordinated FBI approach to WMD.

The WMDD’s mission is to lead the FBI’s efforts to deny state and non-state sponsored adversaries’ access to WMD materials and technologies, to detect and disrupt the use of WMDs, and to respond to WMD threats and incidents. WMDD is responsible for preventing, countering, and investigating threats of terrorism or proliferation involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons.

The WMDD coordinates the FBI’s WMD program through a multifaceted approach that addresses all areas of the WMD incident spectrum from prevention through response. This approach includes:

* Preparedness - This perspective incorporates the development of comprehensive plans and policies. It also implements planning, training, and practice exercises to ensure that the FBI and its USG partners are ready to respond to WMD threats.
* Countermeasures – Countermeasures are actions taken to counter, eliminate, or offset the WMD threat. This includes outreach activities, tripwires, and more specialized countermeasures.
* Investigations and Operations – The WMDD investigates the threatened, attempted, and actual use of a WMD, as well as the attempted or actual transfer of materials, knowledge, and technology needed to create a WMD. WMDD coordinates the FBI’s efforts to ensure a robust capability that can collect evidence in contaminated areas, disarm hazardous devices, and provide direct command and control support in on-scene situations.
* Intelligence – The WMDD proactively leverages timely and relevant intelligence to drive preparedness, countermeasures, and investigative programs; each designed to prevent a threat from becoming a reality. The FBI utilizes this intelligence to combat WMD threats and events and also shares the intelligence products with the intelligence community to globally improve awareness of the WMD threat.

WMDD’s case management responsibilities fall into two primary categories: WMD terrorism and WMD proliferation. The WMD terrorism cases include non-attributed instances involving the threat, attempt, or use of a WMD. Cases fall into the proliferation category, however, when an organization or nation state attempts to acquire material and expertise relevant to a WMD program.

In July 2011, the FBI combined the operational activities of the Counterintelligence Division's counterproliferation program with the subject matter expertise of the WMDD and the analytical capabilities of the Directorate of Intelligence to create a Counterproliferation Center (CPC) in order to detect, deter, and defeat the threat posed by state-sponsored groups, individuals, and/or organizations as they attempt to obtain WMD or other sensitive technologies. The CPC is a team initiative with a multi-tiered management system. All investigations concerning counterproliferation will be managed by the CPC, including all investigations directed to prevent the acquisition of information and technologies which would enhance a foreign government’s abilities to create, use, share, or sell WMDs, including: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive, missile delivery system, space or advanced conventional weapons or components.

***Counterintelligence Program***

Please refer to classified addendum for additional information.

***Dedicated Technical Program***

The FBI’s Dedicated Technical Program (DTP) administers resources to provide technical support as well as research and development activities through which the FBI ensures that investigative tools keep pace with evolving investigative requirements and private sector technologies. In compliance with Executive Order 12333 and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) requests/guidance, the DTP deploys technical systems in support of foreign intelligence requirements of other IC entities. The DTP provides support enabling achievement of the following strategic goals:

* Identify, prevent, and defeat intelligence operations conducted by any foreign power within the U.S. or against certain U.S. interests abroad that constitute a threat to U.S. national security; and
* Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations.

***Cyber Program***

The FBI’s Cyber Program integrates Headquarters and field resources dedicated to combating national security computer intrusions. This enables the Cyber Program to coordinate, supervise, and facilitate the FBI's investigation of those federal violations in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of terrorist organizations, foreign government-sponsored intelligence operations, or criminal activity. Included under the purview of the Cyber Program within the CT/CI DU are counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and national security computer intrusion investigations.

Also within the FBI Cyber Program is the FBI-led National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF). The NCIJTF is congressionally authorized, and presidentially mandated to serve as the multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information relating to cybersecurity threat investigations. The NCIJTF maximizes the government’s impact under a unified strategy that identifies, mitigates and neutralizes cyber threats through the combined counterintelligence, counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement authorities and capabilities of its member agencies.

***Critical Incident Response Program***

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI's rapid response to, and management of, crisis incidents. CIRG was established to integrate tactical and investigative resources and expertise for incidents requiring an immediate law enforcement response. CIRG furnishes distinctive operational assistance and training to FBI field personnel as well as state, local, federal, tribal and international law enforcement partners. CIRG personnel are on call around the clock to respond to crisis incidents.

CIRG’s continual readiness posture provides the U.S. Government with the ability to counter a myriad of CT/CI threats—from incidents involving WMDs to a mass hostage taking. The FBI's crisis response protocols are built upon lessons learned from past incidents. They include a tiered response, streamlined command and control, standardized training, equipment, and operating procedures, and coordination with other partners. To counter the range of potential crises, an integrated response package that brings command and control, aviation, and technical and tactical assets under a unified structure is essential; CIRG encompasses all of these elements.

CIRG also manages the FBI’s mobile surveillance programs – the Mobile Surveillance Teams - Armed (MSTA) (formerly known as the Special Operations Groups (SOGs) and the Mobile Surveillance Teams (MST) (formerly known as the Special Surveillance Groups (SSGs)) – and its Aviation Surveillance program. MSTAs are comprised of armed agents who perform surveillances of targets that might have the propensity for violence; MSTs are comprised of unarmed investigative specialists who are unlikely to be violent. MSTAs, MSTs, and Aviation Surveillance provide critical support to CT and CI investigations.

***Legal Attaché (LEGAT) Program***

LEGATs are the forward element of the FBI's international law enforcement effort and often provide the first response to crimes against the U.S. and its citizens that have an international nexus. The counterterrorism component of the LEGAT Program is comprised of SAs stationed overseas who work closely with their foreign counterparts to prevent terrorism from reaching into the U.S., help solve crimes, and assist with the apprehension of international terrorists who violate U.S. laws.

| **PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Decision Unit:** Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective** Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s Security Consistent with the Rule of Law (Objectives 1.1 and 1.3) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES** | | **Final Target** | | **Actual** | | **Projected** | | **Changes** | | **Requested (Total)** | |
| **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| Number of Cases: Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, & Computer Intrusions | | † | | 30,806 | | † | | † | | † | |
| Positive encounters with subjects through screening process | | N/A | | 20,806 | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Total Costs and FTE** | | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| 12,484 | 3,225,897 | 12,311 | 3,383,000 | 12,474 | 3,229,096 | 72 | 70,918 | 12,546 | 3,300,014 |
| **TYPE/**  **STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** | **PERFORMANCE** | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| **Program Activity/ 1.1; 1.2** | **1. Counterterrorism (CT)** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| 7,241 | 1,871,020 | 6,988 | 1,935,843 | 7,235 | 1,872,876 | 41 | 40,423 | 7,125 | 1,887,932 |
| **Workload -- # of cases investigated (pending and received)** | | † | | 13,653 | | † | | † | | † | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of participants in the JTTF **[Priority Goal Indicator]** | 4,545 | | 4,492 | | 4,570 | | - | | 4,570 | |
| **Performance Measure (Renamed Measure)** | Percentage of Counterterrorism Career Path Agents Completing Specialized CT Training **[Priority Goal Indicator]** | 30% | | 41% | | 30% | | - | | 30% | |
| **Efficiency Measure**  **(Renamed Measure)** | Percentage of Counterterrorism Cases targeting Top Priority Groups **[DOJ Priority Goal]** | 65.1% | | 62.7% | | 65.1% | | - | | 65.1% | |
| **Program Activity/ 1.4** | **2. Counterintelligence** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| 4,618 | 1,161,323 | 4,599 | 1,224,278 | 4,615 | 1,162,475 | 27 | 25,531 | 4,687 | 1,193,979 |
| **Workload -- # of cases investigated (pending and received)** | | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of known intelligence officers from priority countries who are covered through the use of sophisticated techniques **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of intelligence officers from priority countries who have been disrupted or defeated **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of successful prevention activities used by domain entities as a result of CI outreach **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of vulnerable entities which have been protected through aggressive CI posture **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of offices that have sufficiently identified Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) activities **[Discontinued Measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices with adequate coverage of known or suspected intelligence officers **[Discontinued Measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices satisfactorily engaged in strategic partnerships with other USIC entities **[Discontinued Measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices that have satisfactorily demonstrated knowledge of and liaison with vulnerable entities within their domain **[Discontinued Measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices that have identified and documented priority threat country operations**[Discontinued Measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Efficiency Measure** | Cost savings/ efficiencies through the Lookout Program **[New measure]** | $319,730 | | $373,530 | | $170,732 | | ($36,732) | | $134,000 | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of surveillance targets the FBI can cover on a 24/7 basis **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Program Activity/ 1.1** | **3. Cyber Program (Intrusions)** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| **625** | **193,554** | **724** | **222,879** | **624** | **193,745** | **4** | **4,964** | **734** | **218,103** |
| **Workload -- # of cases investigated (pending and received)** | | † | | 4,115 | | † | | † | | † | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of CI or CT Pillar I (facilities) under surveillance **[New measure]** | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Priority Criminal Computer Intrusion Investigations Successfully Satisfied **[Discontinued measure]** | 35 | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Efficiency Measure** | Cost avoidance from online Cyber training ($000) | 625 | | 4,987 | | 1,156 | | 1,344 | | 2,500 | |
| **Performance Measure** | Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-trial diversions | †† | | 148 | | †† | | †† | | †† | |
| **Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:**  - Counterterrorism measures are provided through records kept by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Program, including the Terrorist Screening Center. The count of JTTF participants erroneously did not include part-time participants until FY 2008, but will henceforth include them. No other known data limitations exist.  - Counterintelligence measures are based on records kept by the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program. Percentages are updated based upon the most recent field review. Cost avoidance data are based upon estimates of cost savings per student taking an online course, compared with an in-service training.  - The data source for cases and conviction/pre-trial diversion data is the FBI's Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA) database. The database tracks statistical accomplishments from inception to closure. Before data are entered into the system, they are reviewed and approved by an FBI field manager. They are subsequently verified through FBI’s inspection process. FBI field personnel are required to enter accomplishment data within 30 days of the accomplishment or a change in the status of an accomplishment, such as those resulting from appeals. Data for this report are compiled less than 30 days after the end of the fiscal year, and thus may not fully represent the accomplishments during the reporting period.  † Due to the large number of external and uncontrollable factors influencing these data, the FBI does not project numbers of cases.  †† FBI does not set targets for investigative output data. | | | | | | | | | | | |

| **Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets** | | **FY 2003** | **FY 2004** | **FY 2005** | **FY 2006** | **FY 2007** | **FY 2008** | **FY 2009** | **FY 2010** | **FY 2011** | **FY 2012** | **FY 2013** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Target** | **Target** |
| **Performance Measure** | Positive encounters with subjects through screening process | N/A | 5,396 | 15,730 | 19,967 | 20,500 | 19,306 | 19,043 | 20,944 | 20,806 | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of participants in the JTTF | 2,394 | 3,163 | 3,714 | 3,540 | 3,600 | 4,163 | 4,597 | 4,404 | 4,492 | 4,570 | 4,570 |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of Counterterrorism Career Path Agents Completing Specialized CT Training | 3% | 10% | 15% | 74% | 77% | 80% | 92% | 47% | 41% | 30% | 30% |
| **Efficiency Measure** | Percentage of Counterterrorism Cases targeting Top Priority Groups | 15% | 35% | 34% | 33% | 34% | 44% | 60.1% | 62.3% | 62.7% | 65.1% | 65.1% |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of known intelligence officers from priority countries who are covered through the use of sophisticated techniques | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of intelligence officers from priority countries who have been disrupted or defeated | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of successful prevention activities used by domain entities as a result of CI outreach | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of vulnerable entities which have been protected through aggressive CI posture | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of offices that have sufficiently identified Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) activities | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices with adequate coverage of known or suspected intelligence officers | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices satisfactorily engaged in strategic partnerships with other USIC entities | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices that have satisfactorily demonstrated knowledge of and liaison with vulnerable entities within their domain | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Percentage of field offices that have identified and documented priority threat country operations | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Efficiency Measure** | Cost savings/efficiencies through the Lookout Program | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | $373,530 | $170,732 | $134,000 |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of surveillance targets the FBI can cover of an 24/7 basis | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of CI or CT Pillar I (facilities) under surveillance | This information is Classified. | | | | | | | | | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Priority Criminal Computer Intrusion Investigations Successfully Satisfied | N/A | N/A | 34 | 24 | 27 | 31 | 24 | 34 | 35 | N/A | N/A |
| **Efficiency Measure** | Cost avoidance from online Cyber training ($000) | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 331 | 511 | 809 | 819 | 4,987 | 1,156 | 2,500 |
| **Performance Measure** | Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-trial diversions | 95 | 88 | 104 | 120 | 102 | 126 | 142 | 134 | 148 | N/A | N/A |

**2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies**

The resources within the Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence decision unit contribute to the Department’s Strategic Goal 1: Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation’s Security Consistent with the Rule of Law, Objectives 1.1 and 1.3. This decision unit also ties directly to the top three FBI priorities: Priority 1 – Protect the United States from terrorist attacks; Priority 2 – Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; and Priority 3 – Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.

**Counterterrorism**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

The FBI must understand all dimensions of the threats facing the Nation and address them with new and innovative investigative and operational strategies. The FBI must be able to effectively respond to the challenges posed by unconventional terrorist methods, such as the use of chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and nuclear materials. When terrorist acts do occur, the FBI must rapidly identify, locate, and apprehend the perpetrators and their affiliates. As part of its CT mission, the FBI will continue to combat terrorism by investigating those persons and countries that finance terrorist acts.

The FBI has also established strong working relationships with other members of the Intelligence Community (IC). From the FBI Director’s daily meetings with other IC executives, regular exchange of personnel among agencies, to joint efforts in specific investigations. Additionally, with the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, the co-location of personnel at Liberty Crossing, and other multi-agency entities, the FBI and its partners in the IC are now integrated at virtually every level of operations.

***Performance Measure:*** Number of participants in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces

***FY 2011 Target:*** 4,545

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 4,492

***Discussion:*** The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces serve as the "operational arm" of the U.S. Government's domestic counterterrorism strategy. The partnership between FBI SAs and intelligence analysts and hundreds of investigators from federal, state, and local agencies across the country creates an important force multiplier in the fight against terrorism. The JTTFs consist of full- and part-time task force officers, operating in concert with intelligence community assets, with the goal of maximizing cooperation between all agencies involved.

During FY 2011, the FBI did not meet its target of 4,545; at the end of FY 2011 there were 4,492 federal, state, and local part-time and full-time members.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 4,570

***FY 2013 Target:*** 4,570

***Performance Measure:*** Percentage of Counterterrorism (CT) Career Path Agents completing specialized CT training

***FY 2011 Target:*** 30%

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 41%

***Discussion:*** Education remains a high priority focus of the CT program and is essential to understanding and mitigating the threats facing the U.S. The FBI seeks to maintain priority in providing specialized training to Counterterrorism SAs

to combat the current threat and tradecraft use by CT threats. Approximately 2,200 SAs are currently in the counterterrorism career path. This includes all non-managerial SAs who joined the career path upon FBI Academy graduation, or who transferred from another career path. Until these SAs advance into a managerial role, are transferred to another career path, or leave the FBI, they remain on the CT career path.

The CT career path is comprised of stages, which denote each Special Agent’s approximate tenure and level of experience. Stage 2 is defined as the period from a Special Agent’s FBI Academy graduation until his/her three-year service anniversary. During stage 2, the Counterterrorism Investigation and Operations (CTIOPS) course is mandatory for all CT agents, and is the basis for this measure.

During FY 2011, 41 percent of agents in stage 2 received CTIOPS training, exceeding the target of 30 percent. The FBI is currently on track to meet its target for FY 2012.

The number of CT career path agents used to calculate this metric is not a static number, as new SAs are added to the CT career path population with each FBI Academy graduation. Additionally, these numbers are affected by the ebb and flow of CT-competent and non-CT-competent SAs who transfer between career paths. Career path competency is expected to increase yearly with the continuation of mandatory CT career path training.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 30%

***FY 2013 Target:*** 30%

***Efficiency Measure:*** Percentage of Counterterrorism investigations targeting Top Priority Threats

***FY 2011 Target:*** 65.1%

***FY 2012 Actual:*** 62.7%

***Discussion:*** The FBI investigates all counterterrorism leads it receives to the fullest extent possible. These leads encompass a broad spectrum of actors, from known national threats, emerging threats, to false alarms; all of which receive the utmost attention until they have been disproven and closed. To maximize the impact of the FBI’s counterterrorism agents, the Counterterrorism Division has committed to increasing the share of investigations against the highest-risk terrorist groups and threats.

For this measure, the “Top Priority Threats” encompass all priority one international terrorist groups from the National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) as well as the top priority domestic terrorist groups identified by the FBI’s domestic terrorism program; both lists are classified. (The NIPF standardizes international priorities across the intelligence community; no such list is available for domestic threats). For the purpose of this measure, “investigations” are defined as preliminary or full substantive investigations.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 65.1%

***FY 2013 Target:*** 65.1%

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

The FBI must be able to effectively respond to the challenges posed by unconventional terrorist methods, such as the use of chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and nuclear materials. When terrorist acts do occur, the FBI must rapidly identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute those responsible. As part of its counterterrorism mission, the FBI will continue to combat terrorism by investigating those persons and countries that finance terrorist acts. The FBI will aggressively use the money laundering and asset forfeiture statutes to locate and disrupt the financial sources of terrorist organizations. The FBI will also work to effectively and efficiently utilize the tools authorized by Congress. While the ultimate goal is to prevent a terrorist act before it occurs, the FBI must be able to respond should an act occur. The FBI’s efforts in this area include improved intelligence gathering and sharing, improved analytical capabilities, and enhanced training and liaison.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the National Security Priority Goal 1, which aims to better inform the Intelligence Community, thereby increasing the ability to protect Americans from terrorism and other threats to national security – both at home and abroad. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase by 6 percent the number of counterterrorism intelligence products shared with the U.S. Intelligence Community, state and local Law Enforcement Community partners, and foreign government agencies.  The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**Counterintelligence**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

Please refer to the classified addendum.

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

The FBI’s Counterintelligence (CI) Program continues to execute a comprehensive National Strategy for Counterintelligence. This strategy is predicated on the need for centralized national direction that facilitates a focus on common priorities and specific objectives in all areas of the country. It also recognizes the need for collaboration and strategic partnerships, both within the U.S. Intelligence Community, as well as within the Business and Academic sectors. This strategy enables the program to combat effectively the intelligence threats facing the U.S.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the National Security Priority Goal 1, which aims to better inform the Intelligence Community, thereby increasing the ability to protect Americans from terrorism and other threats to national security – both at home and abroad. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase by 6 percent the number of counterterrorism intelligence products shared with the U.S. Intelligence Community, state and local Law Enforcement Community partners, and foreign government agencies.  The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**Computer Intrusions**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

The Computer Intrusion Program (CIP) is the top priority of the FBI’s Cyber Division. The mission of the CIP is to identify, assess and neutralize computer intrusion threats emanating from terrorist organizations, state sponsored threat actors, and criminal groups targeting the national information infrastructure.

***Efficiency Measure:*** Cost Avoidance

from Online Cyber Training

***FY 2011 Target:*** $625,000

***FY 2011 Actual: $***4,987,000

***Discussion:*** The FBI’s Cyber Program provides online training for its introductory level courses, intermediate

and advanced courses for SAs in the Cyber Career Path, and online proficiency tests (“Test out”) for all levels of its core curriculum. The FBI will implement multiple distance learning modalities in FY 2012 for use in FY 2013. The student population for the introductory classes is quite broad, including FBI SAs, support employees, and state and local law enforcement or intelligence partners. These classes are primarily introductory-level training classes that provide students with basic cyber concepts and investigative strategies. Introductory-level classes do not involve significant hands-on interaction with hardware, software or networking devices. The population for the intermediate and advanced core courses is primarily SAs in the Cyber Career Path. Intermediate and advanced courses require significant hands-on exercises with intrusion investigation software tools. For SAs in the Cyber Career Path, core classes which are required before continuing on to take more technically advanced courses. Knowledge of cyber basics, and the mission and priorities of the Cyber Division throughout the FBI, are integrated in the program.

In addition to offering introductory level online training via the FBI Virtual Academy (the FBI's closed system intranet training system), the FBI offers training over the Internet. The Cyber Division is also implementing an updated distance learning system which will go online in FY 2012 and will deliver sophisticated online training in FY 2013. This new system will have advanced functionality to support the online delivery of intermediate and advanced level courses with hands-on exercises. The system will use virtual machines and virtual networks to mimic what the Cyber Agent will encounter in the field, and will support a number of training modalities to include teleconferenced lectures and labs, archived lectures, online live tutoring, and self-paced training and exercises. Taken together, these existing and new online training options will allow the FBI to offer improved courses to all employees, including those in remote locations, as well as state and local investigators and FBI employees who might not have been able to have access to previous training opportunities.

The abnormally high results in FY 2011 result from an increase in online classes in the 4th quarter. This was due in part to the increased technical proficiency of the student population, as well as the Cyber Incentive Program. The expected return to more normal levels in FY 2012 and FY 2013 reflect an increase in the number of agents who have completed the cyber core training and are therefore no longer eligible for the available online training.

***FY 2012 Target:*** $1,156,000

***FY 2013 Target:*** $2,500,000

***Performance Measure:*** Computer Intrusion Program Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 148

In accordance with DOJ guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.

***Discussion:*** Computer intrusion convictions

are expected to rise as a result of increased investigations and level of agent expertise. The

FBI anticipates addressing an ever-increasing caseload and therefore expects changes in the amount of subsequent convictions/pre-trial diversions. The strategies to accomplish these outcomes include: continuing and enhancing

the alliances with cybersecurity community members, the coordination of intelligence—

both criminal and national security in nature,

and increased international liaison and partnerships. This key factor includes initiatives to develop cyber crime law enforcement strategy that leverages international cooperation between governments, law enforcement, and private industry, share information and training, share and develop new tools, and educate the public. Given the transnational nature of cyber crime, it is imperative to establish effective international cooperation and develop appropriate and consistent legislation. As cyber crimes cross national boundaries, international law enforcement cooperation is crucial. Because most laws and agencies operate within national borders, gaps exist in international legal coverage and harmonization of offenses, and agencies seek (or provide) international assistance only when a crime impacts their interests.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the National Security Priority Goal 1, which aims to better inform the Intelligence Community, thereby increasing the ability to protect Americans from terrorism and other threats to national security – both at home and abroad. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase by 6 percent the number of counterterrorism intelligence products shared with the U.S. Intelligence Community, state and local Law Enforcement Community partners, and foreign government agencies.  The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**C. Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes Decision Unit**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES AND FEDERAL CRIMES DECISION UNIT TOTAL | Perm. Pos. | FTE | Amount ($000) |
| 2011 Enacted with Rescissions | 11,608 | 11,403 | $2,546,852 |
| 2012 Enacted | 11,948 | 11,741 | 2,624,371 |
| Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments | 6 | 38 | 47,861 |
| 2013 Current Services | 11,954 | 11,779 | 2,672,232 |
| 2013 Program Increases | 44 | 22 | 8,793 |
| 2013 Program Offsets | … | … | (15,608) |
| 2013 Request | 11,998 | 11,801 | 2,665,417 |
| Total Change 2012-2013 | 50 | 60 | $41,046 |

1. Program Description

The Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes (CEFC) decision unit (DU) comprises all headquarters and field programs that support the FBI's criminal investigative missions. The DU includes:

* The FBI’s Organized Crime, the Gang/Criminal Enterprise (G/CE), and the Criminal Intelligence programs;
* The Financial Crime, Integrity in Government/Civil Rights, and Violent Crime programs;
* The Public Corruption and Government Fraud programs, part of the Financial Crime program, which investigate state, local and federal government acts of impropriety, including the rising level of federal and state legislative corruption;
* The criminal investigative components of the Cyber Division's programs to include, Criminal Computer Intrusions, Intellectual Property Rights violations, the Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI), and the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3); and
* A share of the FBI's Legal Attaché (Legat) program.

Additionally, the decision unit includes a prorata share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (including Training, Laboratory, Security, Information Technology, and the administrative divisions and offices).

The structure of the FBI’s Criminal Intelligence Program maximizes the effectiveness of resources, improves investigation and intelligence gathering processes, focuses on threats from criminal enterprises, and promotes the collection, exchange and dissemination of intelligence throughout the FBI and other authorized agencies.

**Financial Crime**

***White Collar Crime*: The White Collar Crime (WCC) program addresses the following principal threats: public corruption (including government fraud, economic stimulus fraud, and border corruption); corporate fraud; securities and commodities fraud; mortgage fraud and other financial institution fraud; health care fraud; money laundering; and other complex financial crimes.**

* **Public Corruption: Corruption undermines our democratic institutions and threatens public safety and national security. Public corruption involves the corruption of local, state, and federally-elected, appointed, or contracted officials. Government fraud can affect everything ranging from how well U.S. borders are secured and neighborhoods protected; to court verdicts and the quality of public infrastructure. Many taxpayer dollars are wasted or lost as a result of corrupt acts by public officials.**
* **Border Corruption: The federal government is responsible for protecting approximately 7,000 miles of the U.S. border and 95,000 miles of shoreline. Each day, approximately 1.1 million persons visit the U.S. and enter through one of the 327 official Ports of Entry (POEs) located along the southwestern and northern land borders of the U.S., as well as at seaports and international airports. The documented presence of corrupt border officials facilitates a wide range of illegal activities along the northern and southern borders. Resource-rich cartels and criminal enterprises employ a variety of methods in order to target and recruit U.S. Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection Officers, and local police officers who can facilitate criminal activity. Corrupt officials assist these entities by providing intelligence and contraband across these borders. To help address this threat, the Border Corruption Initiative (BCI) was established in 2009. The BCI has developed a threat-tiered methodology, targeting border corruption in all land, air and sea ports of entry in order to mitigate the threat posed to national security. The FBI has established the National Border Corruption Task Force (NBCTF) and established 21 Border Corruption Task Forces (BCTFs) in high-risk cities along the northern and southern borders.**
* **Corporate Fraud: As the lead agency investigating corporate fraud, the FBI focuses on cases involving complex accounting schemes, self-dealing corporate executives (e.g. insider trading), and obstruction of justice. The majority of cases pursued by the Bureau involve accounting schemes—deceiving investors, auditors and analysts about the true condition of a corporation. Through the manipulation of financial data, the share price of a corporation remains artificially inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public. In addition to significant financial losses to investors, corporate fraud has the potential to cause immeasurable damage to the U.S. economy and investor confidence.**

**Another high priority component of the Corporate Fraud program is insider trading. Insider trading continues to pose a serious threat to the U.S. financial markets. The FBI in recent years has broken the veil of secrecy on the hedge fund industry. The use of sophisticated techniques has exposed a vast network of corrupt participants trafficking in material non-public information. As part of the insider trading-focused Fair Markets Initiative, the FBI strives to protect the fair and orderly operation of the U.S. financial markets. FBI investigative efforts have led to more than a 36 percent increase in insider trading cases in FY 2011.**

* **Securities/Commodities Fraud: Several years removed from the recent financial crisis, the FBI continues to see a significant threat from Ponzi and other securities and commodities fraud schemes, many of which involve thousands of victims and staggering losses – some in the billions of dollars. The FBI focuses its efforts in the securities and commodities fraud arena to schemes involving investment frauds (e.g. Ponzi schemes), and market manipulation schemes, also referred to as “Pump & Dump” schemes. The FBI continues to open new Ponzi scheme cases on a weekly basis. With this trend, and the development of new schemes, such as stock market manipulation via foreign companies utilizing reverse mergers, securities and commodities fraud is on the rise. The FBI is continuing to address the large volume of investment fraud cases and micro-cap stock manipulation schemes, while also assessing the new threats from foreign based stock issuers, precious metals investment frauds, and cyber related stock manipulation schemes. The FBI’s goal is to develop new strategies to disrupt and dismantle the groups of corrupt market participants conducting these frauds.**
* **Health Care Fraud: Total health care expenditures in the U.S. will surpass the $4 trillion mark by 2015, representing a 139 percent increase or more than double the 2003 $1.67 trillion expenditures. As t**he primary investigative agency involved in the fight against health care fraud with jurisdiction over both the federal and private insurance programs, the FBI receives reimbursable funding from the Department of Health and Human Services, as well as seeks to leverage its own resources through investigative partnerships with various federal, State, and local agencies. The FBI proactively addresses significant health care fraud threats through coordinated initiatives, task forces, working groups, and undercover operations. Many schemes target both public and private insurance programs, and individual schemes may have considerable impact on the health care system. In response, the FBI has enhanced its focus on threats associated with large scale conspiracies and major providers, in addition to combating traditional provider fraud.

Large scale conspiracies include criminal enterprises and other crime groups creating significant losses, or potential losses, to health care benefit programs. The criminal activity of these groups can cross multiple federal districts. It is not unusual for more complex large scale conspiracies to conduct other criminal activity in addition to health care fraud. The related schemes are frequently complex and challenging to identify. A principal source of referrals on these schemes has been *qui tam* (whistleblower) filings. In addition to the work completed at the field office level to combat this crime problem, the FBI has established a centralized squad to provide investigative assistance on these types of cases nationwide in coordination with the DOJ, HHS/OIG, and the FDA.

The FBI also continues to support Medicare Fraud Strike Force operations worked in conjunction with DOJ Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, local USAOs, HHS/OIG, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The Strike Forces, currently in nine cities, have effectively investigated and prosecuted individuals and entities that do not provide legitimate health care services, but exist solely for the purpose of defrauding Medicare and other government health care programs.

* **Mortgage Fraud:** Combating mortgage fraud is a priority for the FBI due to the impact of mortgage lending on the Nation’s economy, and the impact of foreclosures on the communities. The priority targets of this type of fraud are industry insiders, such as real estate agents, loan brokers, appraisers, escrow and title officers, and lenders. Mortgage fraud perpetrators are resilient, and adapt their schemes to changes in the economy and changes in lending practices. In a thriving economy, loan origination fraud schemes are the most prevalent, and in a sluggish economy, schemes targeting distressed homeowners prevail. Over 70 percent of all mortgage fraud investigations involve losses in excess of $1 million. To combat this threat, the FBI has partnered with other federal agencies and state and local law enforcement to form mortgage fraud working groups and task forces throughout the Nation. The FBI also serves as co-chair on the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, which pro-actively addresses mortgage fraud through community outreach and enforcement actions.
* **Money Laundering: Money laundering allows criminals to infuse illegal money into the stream of commerce, thus corrupting financial institutions and the money supply; this provides the criminals with unwarranted economic power. The FBI investigates money laundering cases by identifying the process by which criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes or convert those proceeds into goods and services. The major threats in this area stem from emerging technologies, such as stored value devices, pre-paid gift cards and reloadable debit cards, in order to move criminal proceeds; as well as shell corporations, which are used to conceal the beneficial ownership of funds being moved through financial institutions and international commerce. In FY 2010, the FBI initiated the Priority International Money Laundering Threat (PIMLAT) initiative. Through this program, FBI Headquarters applies a variety of intelligence and investigative resources to address money laundering schemes which are international, occur across multiple FBI field offices, or support significant threats to the U.S..**
* **Other Complex Financial Crimes (Insurance, Bankruptcy, and Mass Marketing Fraud): The FBI anticipates insurance fraud to continue to increase, contributing to increases in insurance premiums as well as threatening the financial viability of insurance companies. Since 2006, the year after bankruptcy laws were changed to make it more difficult for an individual to discharge all debts, bankruptcy filings have significantly increased each year. The potential for fraud within bankruptcy is large. According to the Federal Trade Commission, complaints concerning mass marketing fraud have also increased.**

***Civil Rights:*** The FBI has primary responsibility for investigating all alleged violations of federal civil rights laws. These laws protect the civil rights of all citizens and persons within the U.S., and include the four major areas described below:

* Hate Crimes: Hate crimes are the top investigative priority of the Civil Rights Program as they impact not only the victims, but also the entire community. In October 2009, President Obama signed into law the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009. For the first time in the history of the nation, the federal government has the authority to prosecute violent hate crimes, including violence directed at the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender community, to the fullest extent of its jurisdiction.
* Color of Law (COL): COL violations are the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution by someone in his/her official, governmental capacity. The FBI has investigative responsibility for federal COL matters involving local and state law enforcement and concurrent responsibility with the Office of Inspectors General for other federal agencies.

* Human Trafficking: Human trafficking is a form of modern-day slavery and, although not commonly known, is a significant and persistent problem in America and internationally. Victims are often lured with false promises of good jobs and better lives and then forced to work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Many trafficking victims are forced to work in the sex industry; however, trafficking can also take place in labor settings involving domestic servitude, prison-like factories, and migrant agricultural work. Human trafficking cases require extensive outreach and cooperation with local, state, and federal agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, to properly address the problem.
* Freedom of Access: Under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act, the FBI has the sole investigative responsibility for conducting investigations of potential FACE Act violations. Incidents include murder, death threats, invasions, burglaries, harassing telephone calls, hate mail, assaults, arsons, and other acts of intimidation. The number of FACE Act violations remains relatively low, with occasional spikes during dates which mark significant events in the pro-choice and pro-life movements.

***Organized Crime:* T**ransnational organized crime is an immediate and increasing concern of the domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence communities. Geopolitical, economic, social, and technological changes within the last two decades have allowed these criminal enterprises to become increasingly active worldwide. The criminal enterprises include the following distinct groups: Eurasian Organizations that have emerged since the fall of the Soviet Union; Asian Criminal Enterprises; traditional organizations such as the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) and Italian Organized Crime; Balkan Organized Crime; Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises, and African Criminal Enterprises.

In FY 2010, two Threat Fusion Cells (TFC) were created in order to meet the number one goal of the Organized Crime Program (OCP): to target, dismantle, disrupt, neutralize, and render impotent transnational criminal organizations and enterprises that pose a threat to national security. The TFCs are specifically focused on two criminal enterprises, Brothers’ Circle and Semion Mogilevich Organization, and is staffed with personnel from various intelligence and law enforcement communities, including the National Security Agency.

The potential for terrorism-related events associated with criminal enterprises is ever-increasing due to alien smuggling across the southwest border by drug and gang criminal enterprises; Colombian-based narco-terrorism groups influencing or associating with traditional drug trafficking organizations; prison gangs being recruited by religious, political, or social extremist groups; and major theft criminal enterprises conducting criminal activities in association with terrorist related groups or to facilitate funding of terrorist-related groups. There also remains the ever present concern that criminal enterprises are, or can, facilitate the smuggling of chemical, biological, radioactive, or nuclear weapons and materials.

Major Theft as Organized Crime including Organized Retail, Cargo, and Art Theft.

* **Major Theft crimes caused by transnational, national and regionally based criminal enterprises have a devastating effect on the U.S. economy, not only contributing to the rise of consumer prices, but also to the loss of tax revenues to states and communities. More than 60 percent of the crimes reported to the police are theft/fraud related crimes according to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system. Major Theft crimes are directly related to organized crime groups, drug trafficking organizations, gang criminal enterprises and illegal alien groups. Major Theft groups actively engage in other criminal activities such as violent crimes, fraud, money laundering, wire and mail fraud, and public corruption matters. Estimates from certain Major Theft crimes, such as cargo theft and organized retail crime, are nearly impossible to calculate, but industry experts estimate losses in the tens of billions of dollars. Monetary and product losses from vehicle thefts are estimated at more than $8 billion per year. The Jewelry and Gem Industry estimates losses in excess of $135 million annually and the Art/Cultural Property Community estimate thefts to be about $500 million annually.**

**Violent Criminal Threats**

The mission of the Violent Criminal Threat Section (VCTS) is to combat violent criminal threats throughout the U.S. and to disrupt and dismantle local, regional, national, and transnational cells of criminal enterprises that pose the greatest threat to the economic and national security of the U.S.. This is accomplished through initiatives established in the VCTS subprograms of Violent Gangs, Violent Crimes, Crimes Against Children, and Indian Country Crimes.

***Gang Violence:*** The FBI's Violent Gang Sub-Program is designed to reduce gang related violence by identifying, prioritizing, and targeting the most violent gangs whose activities constitute criminal enterprises. This is accomplished through the administration of 168 Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces (VGSSTFs). The FBI has prioritized Neighborhood-Based Gangs, Prison Gangs, and Transnational and/or National Based Gangs as the most significant gang threats.

Gangs are becoming more violent and are establishing strong alliances with drug trafficking organizations. In addition, they are also partaking in less typical gang-related crime, such as human trafficking, white-collar, and cyber crime. Gang members are also migrating from urban areas to suburban and rural communities in order to expand the gang’s influence. In most instances, this allows the gang to expand drug distribution territories, increase illicit revenue, recruit new members, hide from law enforcement, and escape other gangs. Many suburban and rural communities are experiencing an increase in gang-related crime and violence due to gang expansion.

***Violent Crime:*** The Violent Crime (VC) Sub-Program combats the most significant violent crime threats falling within the FBI's investigative jurisdiction. Violent crime continues to threaten communities within the U.S. and its citizens. Major violent crime incidents such as mass killings, sniper murders, serial killings, and violent fugitives can paralyze whole communities and stretch state and local law enforcement resources to their limits. Particular emphasis is directed toward matters involving significant violence to include bank robberies, armored car robberies, fugitives, kidnappings for ransom, extortions, police killings, and assault on federal officers.

* + Fugitives remain a concern to law enforcement with approximately 1.5 million active warrants within the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system. The FBI is conducting investigations on violent fugitives under the Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution violation. The FBI cooperates with the U.S. Marshals Service to investigate and apprehend domestic fugitives.
  + Transportation Crimes include crimes reported that occurred aboard an aircraft and incidents regarding the destruction of aircraft. Personal and property crimes continue to be a concern within Special Jurisdiction Crimes areas such as within federal penal institutions, on other federal government properties and in special jurisdictional areas, such as on the high seas.

***Crimes Against Children:*** The Crimes Against Children (CACU) Sub-Program has developed a nationwide capacity to provide a rapid and effective investigative response to reported federal crimes involving the victimization of children; reduce the vulnerability of children to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse; reduce the negative impacts of international parental rights disputes; and strengthen the capabilities of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies through training programs and investigative assistance. The FBI is the only federal agency with sole jurisdiction to investigate child abductions, as legislated in Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1201. The FBI Crimes Against Children Unit supports the Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team (CARD Team), Innocence Lost National Initiative and the Child Sex Tourism (CST) Initiative.

* + Child Abductions: In FY 2011, the FBI investigated 188 pending child abduction cases. In an effort to enhance the FBI's response to abductions and the mysterious disappearance of children, the FBI’s Violent Crimes Section in coordination with the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)/Behavior Analysis Unit III (BAU III) created regional CARD Teams. The nationwide CARD Team cadre consists of 60 field agents. Teams are geographically distributed throughout the five regions of the U.S., consistent with the FBI corporate management structure. Each region has two teams comprised of Supervisory Special Agents and Special Agents representing 35 field divisions. As of January 2012, the CARD Teams have deployed on 76 occasions resulting in the successful recovery of 31 children.
  + Innocence Lost National Initiative: Everyday, children are being recruited and forced into the world of prostitution. Unlike the portrayal of prostitution in popular media, the reality is that child victims are not voluntary participants. Rather, they are modern-day slaves – forced into participating in prostitution and often brutally beaten. Teen runaways – who are often trying to escape abusive homes – frequently fall prey to domestic sex traffickers or "pimps" who lure them in with an offer of food and a seemingly safe place to sleep. In an effort to address this significant crime problem, the FBI has assisted in the establishment of 27 task forces and 19 working groups with our state and local law enforcement partners. In addition, the FBI has developed a national targeted enforcement action entitled Operation Cross Country, which is conducted on a regular basis and has resulted in the recovery of 1,916 juveniles and the arrest of 4,893 pimps and adult prostitutes.
  + Child Sex Tourism (CST) initiative targets U.S. citizens who travel to foreign countries and engage in sexual activity with children under the age of 18. The initiative currently focuses on countries in Southeast Asia and Latin America where ten threat assessments have been conducted as of January 2012, in order to identify predicated venues where CST is occurring. The initiative has also organized and participated in capacity building for foreign law enforcement, prosecutors, and non-government organizations in these countries. As of January 2012, the CST initiative has initiated 38 investigations which have led to the conviction of 7 offenders and the arrest and indictment of 3 additional individuals.

***Indian Country:***  The Indian Country Crimes (ICC) Sub-Program has developed and implemented strategies to address the most egregious crime problems in Indian Country (IC) where the FBI has responsibility. ICC supports joint investigative efforts with the Bureau of Indian Affairs-Office of Justice Services, tribal law enforcement, and manages 17 Safe Trails Task Forces. ICC cases are mostly reactive; however, many are cross-programmatic in nature and include public corruption and complex financial fraud.

As of FY 2012, the FBI has over 2,900 pending Indian Country (IC) investigations on approximately 200 reservations and 400 Indian gaming facilities throughout 28 states. Approximately 75 percent of these investigations are in the Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Albuquerque Field Offices and the majority of the investigations involve death, sexual/physical assault of children, and felony assaults. Statistics indicate more than one-third of all Native American women will be raped at least once during their lifetime and nearly two-thirds will be victims of violent assaults. In addition to the violence, a significant emerging threat for the FBI is white collar crimes associated with Recovery Act funds and the Indian Gaming industry.

Due to jurisdictional issues, the FBI is the primary law enforcement entity in the IC. Furthermore, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has a limited number of investigators, who are not present on every reservation. Additionally, Tribal authorities can only prosecute misdemeanors of Indians, and state/local law enforcement does not have jurisdiction within the boundaries of the reservation, with the exception of Public Law 280 states and tribes. DOJ reported 25 percent of all violent crimes prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney Offices are related to IC. There are 15 Safe Trails Task Forces that are addressing drug/gang and violent crimes in IC. The gang threat on Indian Reservations has become evident to the tribal community leaders, and gang-related violent crime is reported to be increasing. Tribal communities have reported tribal members are bringing back gang ideology from major cities and Drug Trafficking Organizations are recruiting tribal members.

**Latin America/Southwest Border**

**Latin America/SouthwestBorder:** The volatility among internationally-networked criminal organizations and violent gangs along the Southwest border has resulted in a dramatic increase in violence. As rival cartels and gangs battle for control over the lucrative drug markets, significant spikes in kidnappings, homicides and a myriad of other violent acts envelop the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, these transnational groups are utilizing several “tools” to aid in their objectives, such as public corruption, money laundering, human trafficking, and threats to law enforcement.

The FBI recently realigned its resources to address the Southwest Border threats and vulnerabilities, and has developed an intelligence-led, cross-programmatic strategy to penetrate, disrupt and dismantle the most dangerous organizations and individuals.This strategy utilizes hybrid squads, increase partnerships with the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) and OGA, and examining the enterprises as a business to identify center of gravity in which to exploit/attack. The primary goal of the hybrid squad model is to bring a cross-programmatic domain view of these dynamic, multi-faceted threats – then target, disrupt, and dismantle these organizations. Hybrid squads consist of multi-disciplinary teams of special agents, intelligence analysts, Staff Operations Specialists (SOS), and other professionals. The agent composition on the squads will reflect different backgrounds and functional expertise, ranging from violent gangs, public corruption, and violent crimes.

***Cyber Program***

The FBI’s Cyber Program consolidates Headquarters and field resources dedicated to combating cyber crime under a single entity. This allows the Cyber Program to coordinate, supervise and facilitate the FBI’s investigation of those federal violations in which the Internet, computer systems, or networks are exploited as the principal instruments or targets of criminal activity. Included under the purview of the Cyber Program within the CEFC DU are criminal computer intrusion investigations; intellectual property rights-related investigations involving theft of trade secrets and signals; copyright infringement investigations involving computer software; credit/debit card fraud where there is substantial Internet and online involvement; online fraud and related identity theft investigations; and the Innocent Images National Initiative.

***Legal Attaché Program***

Crime-fighting in an era of increasing globalization and interconnectivity has become a truly international effort, and the people who make up the FBI’s International Operations Division (IOD) and Legal Attaché (Legat) Program work together to lead and direct the FBI’s growing number of operations around the globe.

IOD’s Legal Attaché officers - or Legats – and their staffs work hard to combat crime, even as they partner with, and strengthen the bonds between law enforcement personnel throughout the world. Special Agents and professional staff working in IOD use their unique skill sets and knowledge to coordinate investigations large and small, by partnering with the FBI’s criminal and intelligence divisions, foreign law enforcement, and U.S. and foreign intelligence and security services.

The IOD and Legat program work also includes a major training component, whether it is the support of the International Law Enforcement Academies in Budapest or Botswana, or teaching their law enforcement partners about conducting proper investigations at crime scenes or crisis management.

***Management and Support Services***

In addition to the Criminal Investigative, Cyber, and Legat programs that make up the core elements of the CEFC DU, the FBI's various administrative and other security programs provide essential support services.

**Program Objectives**

***White Collar Crime:***

* Initiate undercover operations and employ sophisticated investigative techniques to address fraud related to Federal stimulus funding.
* Facilitate the intelligence and administrative requirements related to complex public corruption investigations to reduce the incidence of government fraud within targeted sectors of local, state, and federal government.
* Reduce the amount of reported economic loss due to fraud and abuse in federally funded procurement, contracts, Electronic Benefits Transfer, and entitlement programs.
* Expand the Border Corruption Initiative (BCI) and threat methodology to better target border corruption in all land, air, and sea ports of entry to mitigate the threat posted to national security.
* Continue Border Corruption Task Force (BCTFs) coordination with other field divisions and agencies on cross-program strategies regarding the threats associated with counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and counter intelligence matters.
* Deploy FBI resources to combat significant complex financial crimes in order to:
  + Minimize the economic loss due to mortgage fraud by identifying, investigating, and disrupting fraudulent activity.
  + Reduce the economic loss associated with the theft of U.S. intellectual property by criminals.
  + Reduce the amount of economic loss and market instability resulting from corporate fraud committed by both individuals and enterprises.
  + Identify, disrupt, and dismantle money laundering industries and confiscate criminal assets associated with said industries.
  + Reduce the economic loss attributable to fraudulent billing practices affecting private and public health care insurers.
  + Minimize economic loss due to crimes such as check fraud, loan fraud, and cyber-banking fraud in federally-insured financial institutions.
  + Reduce the amount of economic loss to the insurance industry due to fraud, both internal and external.
  + Reduce economic loss to investors due to fraud in the investment marketplace, bogus securities, and Internet fraud.
  + Reduce the amount of economic loss caused by fraudulent bankruptcy filings throughout the U.S.

***Cyber:***

* Investigate and prevent criminal computer intrusions, intellectual property rights violations and theft of trade secrets, internet fraud, etc.
* Reduce the amount of economic loss associated with the theft of U.S. intellectual property by criminals.
* Investigate and prevent acts of sexual exploitation and abuse of children which are facilitated through the use of computers.
* Develop partnerships between the FBI and private sector, academia, and other public entities to support the FBI’s mission.
* Serve as a vehicle to receive, develop, and refer criminal complaints regarding the cyber crime arena.
* Identify, develop and deliver core and continuing education for Cyber investigators across all levels of the law enforcement, both domestic and international.

***Civil Rights:***

* Deter civil rights violations through aggressive investigation of those crimes wherein the motivation appears to have been based on race, sexuality, color, religion, or ethnic/national origin; reports of abuse of authority under color of law; reports of slavery and involuntary servitude; and reports of the use of force or the threat of force for the purpose of injuring, intimidating, or interfering with a person seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services and through proactive measures such as the training of local law enforcement in civil rights matters.

***Gang Violence:***

* Infiltrate, disrupt and dismantle violent gang activities by targeting groups of gangs using sensitive investigative and intelligence techniques to initiate long term proactive investigations.

***Organized Crime*:**

* Combat transnational organizations and enterprises and collect resources supporting intelligence and investigation actions to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal activities worldwide.
* Continually assess the international organized crime threat in the country by outlining current state of FBI resources and better position the FBI to strategically direct investigatory resources to the highest threat areas.
* Execute a comprehensive strategy to disrupt and dismantle Semion Mogilevich Organization and Brothers’ Circle through two planned Threat Fusion Cells (TFCs).

***Violent Crime:***

* Investigate the most egregious and violent criminal acts across Indian Country to include homicide, child sexual/physical assault, violent assault, drugs/gangs, gaming violations, and property crimes.
* Promote and encourage a level of self-sufficiency for tribal law enforcement on Indian Reservations and allotment territory, thereby allowing the FBI to improve the response and efficiency of Special Agent and support resources in IC; improve the overall quality of law enforcement service in IC through increased coordination with BIA and tribal police, joint training efforts, and joint investigative efforts; establish Safe Trails Task Forces, with objectives focused on specific priority crime problem(s) not effectively addressed by the FBI or other law enforcement agencies in IC; provide training to IC Special Agents, support personnel, and BIA/tribal police; and assist and support DOJ efforts to professionalize law enforcement operations in IC, to include crime statistics reporting, records management, automation, and case management.
* Provide a rapid and effective investigative response to reported federal crimes involving the victimization of children; reduce the vulnerability of children to acts of sexual exploitation and abuse; reduce the negative impact of domestic/international parental rights disputes; and strengthen the capabilities of federal, state and local law enforcement through training programs and investigative assistance.

***Latin America/Southwest Border:***

* Infiltrate, disrupt and dismantle Mexican, South and Central Criminal Enterprises by targeting their center of gravity utilizing sensitive investigative and intelligence techniques to initiate long term proactive investigations.
* Expand and create new partnerships with the USIC and OGA in order to better coordinate and facilitate the flow and utilization of intelligence against the threat posed by Mexican, South, and Central Criminal Enterprises.
* Continually assess the Mexican, South and Central Criminal Enterprises threat in the country by outlining current state of FBI resources and better position the FBI to strategically direct investigatory and intelligence resources to the highest threat areas.

| **PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Decision Unit:** Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective Goal 2:** Prevent Crime, Protect the Rights of the American People, and Enforce Federal Law. Objectives 2.1-2.5. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES** | | | **Final Target** | | | **Actual** | | | **Projected** | | | **Changes** | | | **Requested (Total)** | | |
| **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | | **FY 2013 Request** | | |
| **Workload --** # of cases investigated (pending and received) | | | † | | | 80,041 | | | † | | | † | | | † | | |
| **Total Costs and FTE** | | | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | |
| 11,403 | | 2,546,852 | 11,213 | | 2,607,000 | 11,741 | | 2,624,371 | 60 | | 41,046 | 11,801 | 2,665,417 | |
| **TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** | **PERFORMANCE** | | **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | | **FY 2013 Request** | | |
| **Program Activity/ 2.3, 2.5** | **1. White-Collar Crime/Cybercrime** | | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | |
| 5,722 | | 1,280,082 | 5,636 | | 1,310,313 | 5,947 | | 1,323,202 | 33 | | 23,481 | 5,980 | 1,346,683 | |
| **Workload --** # of cases investigated (pending and received) | | | † | | | 32,060 | | | † | | | † | | | † | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Restitutions & Recoveries / Fines ($000)   * Intellectual Property Rights Violations * Public Corruption * White-Collar Crimes (all other) | | †† | | | 4,628 1,178,976 14,028,958 | | | †† | | | †† | | | †† | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions (total)   * Intellectual Property Rights Violations **[Discontinued measure]** * Public Corruption * White-Collar Crimes (all other) | | †† | | | 81 969 2,353 | | | †† | | | †† | | | †† | | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Criminal Organizations Engaging in White-Collar Crimes Dismantled | | 250 | | | 366 | | | 360 | | | - | | | 360 | | |
| Efficiency Measure | % of Major Mortgage Fraud Investigations to all pending Mortgage Fraud Investigations | | 70% | | | 71% | | | 71% | | | - | | | 71% | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | Number of Children Depicted in Child Pornography Identified by the FBI | 140 | | | 240 | | | 155 | | | 45 | | | 200 | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | Number of convictions for Internet fraud **[New measure]** | †† | | | 27 | | | †† | | | †† | | | †† | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets neutralized **[Discontinued measure]** | 10 | | | 11 | | | 13 | | | N/A | | | N/A | | |
| **TYPE/ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** | | **PERFORMANCE** | **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2011** | | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | | **FY 2013 Request** | | |
| **Program Activity/ 2.2, 2.4, 2.6** | | **2. Criminal Enterprises/Civil Rights/Violent Crimes** | **FTE** | **$000** | | **FTE** | **$000** | | **FTE** | **$000** | | **FTE** | **$000** | | **FTE** | | **$000** |
| 5,681 | 1,266,770 | | 5,577 | 1,296,687 | | 5,794 | 1,301,169 | | 27 | 17,565 | | 5,821 | | 1,318,734 |
| **Workload --** # of cases investigated (pending and received) | | | † | | | 47,981 | | | † | | | † | | | † | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | Convictions/Pre-trial Diversions   * Organized Criminal Enterprises * Gang/Criminal Enterprises * Crimes Against Children * Civil Rights | †† | | | 812 N/A 338  245 | | | †† | | | †† | | | †† | | |
| Efficiency Measure | | % of FBI OCDETF Investigations with links to CPOT-linked DTOs | 12% | | | 16.35% | | | 12% | | | - | | | 12% | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | CPOT-Linked DTOs   * Disruptions * Dismantlements | 30  15 | | | 54 22 | | | 30  15 | | | -  - | | | 30  15 | | |
| **Performance Measure** | | Number of Organized Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements | 37 | | | 39 | | | 37 | | | 1 | | | 38 | | |
| Performance Measure | | Number of Gang/Criminal Enterprises Dismantlements | 99 | | | 165 | | | 99 | | | 0 | | | 99 | | |
| Performance Measure | | Number of Agents serving on Violent Crime Task Forces **[New measure]** | N/A | | | 1,050 | | | 1,012 | | | 30 | | | 1,042 | | |
| Performance Measure | | Average length of sentence in months: Violent Crime **[New measure]** | N/A | | | 72 | | | 100 | | | - | | | 100 | | |
| **Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:**   * Disruption means impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of operation, including, for example, financing, trafficking patterns, communications or drug production. Dismantlement means destroying the organization’s leadership, financial base, and supply network such that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. * The Executive Office of OCDETF may sometimes edit CPOT disruptions/dismantlements data after the end of the reporting period. Such changes are reflected in later reports. * Accomplishment and caseload data are obtained from the FBI’s Resource Management Information System (RMIS), which houses the Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA) and Monthly Administrative Report (MAR) applications that report these data. Data are verified by an FBI field manager before being entered into that system and are subsequently verified through the FBI’s Inspection process. Other non-standardized data are maintained in files by their respective FBIHQ programs. FBI field personnel are required to enter accomplishment data within 30 days of the accomplishment or a change in the status of an accomplishment, such as those resulting from appeals. * The data source for IINI program data is a database maintained by FBI personnel detailed to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as well as statistics derived by the FBI’s Cyber Division’s program personnel. Limitations on these data are explained in the Discussion of the measure. * Internet Fraud data come from a record system maintained by the IC3. The list of targets is updated each year. Targets are determined by subject matter expert teams at the IC3 and approved by the Unit Chief. IC3 staff maintains the list and determine when a target has been the subject of a take-down. There is some possibility of underreporting of accomplishments resulting from referrals to state, local, and other federal law enforcement organizations. This underreporting is possible where investigations resulting from IC3 referrals do not involve the FBI.   † FBI does not project targets for case workload data.  †† FBI does not set targets for investigative output data. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | **FY 2003** | **FY 2004** | **FY 2005** | **FY 2006** | **FY 2007** | **FY 2008** | **FY 2009** | **FY 2010** | **FY 2011** | **FY 2012** | **FY 2013** |
| **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Target** | **Target** |
| **Performance Measure** | Restitutions/Recoveries/Fines ($000)   * Intellectual Property Fraud * Public Corruption * White-Collar Crimes (all other) | 205,120 1,631,692  8,433,421 | 115,967 101,647  7,881,151 | 432,316 1,116,266  13,056,937 | 111,877  321,815 7,799,218 | 238,832  157,440  19,516,406 | 260,219  676,889  18,502,635 | 5,389  220,787  15,956,528 | 17,100  6,559,531  8,383,458 | 4,628  1,178,976  14,028,958 | N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions (total)   * Intellectual Property Fraud * Public Corruption * White-Collar Crimes (all other) | 110 579  5,022 | 116  661  4,368 | 121  812  3,976 | 194  929  3,707 | 136  943  3,347 | 116  987  3,834 | 88  981  2,910 | 84  954  3,357 | 81  969  2353 | N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Criminal Organizations Engaging in White-Collar Crimes Dismantled | 73 | 137 | 163 | 231 | 277 | 211 | 250 | 236 | 366 | 360 | 360 |
| **Efficiency Measure** | % of Major Mortgage Fraud Investigations to all pending Mortgage Fraud investigations | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 56% | 63% | 66% | 71% | 71% | 71% | 71% |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Children Depicted in Child Pornography Identified by the FBI (*\*only partial year data available for FY06)* | N/A | N/A | N/A | 37\* | 73 | 187 | 118 | 246 | 240 | 155 | 200 |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of convictions for Internet fraud | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 27 | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets neutralized | 5 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 13 | N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | Convictions/Pre-Trial Diversions:   * Organized Criminal Enterprises * Gang/Criminal Enterprises * Crimes Against Children * Civil Rights | 824  4,089  154  163 | 572  2,923  145  155 | 897  4,292  164  139 | 674  2,070  170  195 | 693  2,218  207  207 | 595  2,242  246  208 | 395  2,136  270  222 | 424  2,163  245  248 | 812  N/A  338  245 | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A |
| **Efficiency Measure** | % of FBI OCDETF Investigations with links to CPOT-linked DTOs | N/A | N/A | 11% | 13% | 14% | 15.47% | 14% | 15.89% | 16.35% | 12% | 12% |
| **Performance Measure** | CPOT-Linked DTOs   * Disruptions * Dismantlements | 41  15 | 27  12 | 25  18 | 36  17 | 45  15 | 50  18 | 35  20 | 40  12 | 50  22 | 30  15 | 30  15 |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Organized Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements | 17 | 29 | 34 | 36 | 43 | 38 | 43 | 39 | 39 | 37 | 38 |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Gang/Criminal Enterprise Dismantlements | 138 | 112 | 138 | 119 | 144 | 114 | 135 | 124 | 165 | 99 | 74 |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of Agents serving on Violent Crime Task Forces [Priority Goal indicator] | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 1050 | 1,012 | 1,042 |
| **Performance Measure** | Average length of sentence in months: Violent Crime [Priority Goal indicator] | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 72 | 100 | 100 |

**White-Collar Crime**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

The White-Collar Crime (WCC) program uses a suite of performance measures that concentrate on priority programs such as Mortgage Fraud, as well as traditional accomplishment data such as convictions and pre-trial diversions and the level of recoveries, restitutions, and fines generated by the WCC program.

***Performance Measure:***Number of Criminal Organizations Engaging in White-Collar Crimes Dismantled.

***FY 2011 Target:*** 250

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 366

***Discussion:*** The FBI established the FY 2013 target based on past performance and the increased activity of WCC enterprises, particularly in Health Care Fraud and Mortgage Fraud. Securities, corporate and mortgage fraud investigations are frequently long-term and resource-intensive. The impacts of resources received in one year are often not realized until several years later. Further, accomplishments in WCC can reach peaks at times when long-term cases initiated in prior years come to conclusion.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 360

***FY 2013 Target:*** 360

***Efficiency Measure:***Percentage of Major Mortgage Fraud Investigations to all Pending Mortgage Fraud Investigations

***FY 2011 Target:*** 70%

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 71%

***Discussion:*** The nature of the mortgage fraud threat and recent trends indicate that high loss schemes, schemes involving industry insiders and the sophisticated criminal enterprises will persist into FY 2013. The FBI’s long-term objective is to lower the incidence of mortgage fraud through detection, deterrence, and investigation so that the FBI can concentrate on neutralizing current and emerging financial threats, as well as financial industry fraud schemes that target our Nation’s financial institutions.

***FY 2012 Target*** 71%

***FY 2013 Target:*** 71%

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

In FY 2013, the FBI will continue to pursue corporate fraud, securities fraud, mortgage fraud, other types of financial institution fraud, health care fraud, money laundering, and insurance fraud, which all threaten to undermine our Nation's financial infratructure. The FBI will aggressively leverage the money laundering and asset forfeiture statutes to ensure that fraudulently obtained funds are located and proper restitution is made to the victims of fraud. The enforcement strategy is a coordinated approach whereby the FBI will continue to work with other federal agencies to identify and target fraud schemes by successfully investigating, prosecuting, and obtaining judgments and settlements.

**Innocent Images National Initiative**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

The Innocent Images National Initiative uses the following performance measure to track its progress in combating the exploitation of children through the Internet. The FBI will continue to make efforts to apprehend those who commit sexual exploitation offenses against children, including those who traffic in child pornography.

***Performance Measure:***  Number of children depicted in child pornography that are identified by the FBI.

*Note: FY 2006 data in chart are incomplete: data were only collected for part of that year.*

***FY 2011 Target:*** 140

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 240

***Discussion:*** The FBI exceeded its FY 2011 target for this measure. Even as data limitations, such as the FBI’s inability to directly control the number of children identified at any given time through investigative techniques, still exist and continue to have an effect on this performance measure, the FBI was able to significantly surpass its target. The FBI continues to take definitive action to negate any of the aforementioned limitations through its continued collaboration with the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children’s (NCMEC) Child Victim Identification Program (CVIP), and CyberTipline, as well as successful FBI initiatives such as, the Innocent Images International Task Force (IIITF) and the Endangered Child Alert Program (ECAP).

***FY 2012 Target:*** 155

***FY 2013 Target:*** 200

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

In its effort to thwart the online exploitation of children, the FBI’s first priority is those investigations involving organizations, e-groups, or enterprises that exploit children for profit. The second priority is cases involving travelers; the third priority is the producers, distributors, and possessors of child pornography. These priorities will be addressed by expanding current Undercover Operations (UCOs) and undercover techniques to target and identify sexual predators and enterprises. The FBI also will develop and implement proactive initiatives designed to identify child victims and prevent exploitation before it can occur.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the Vulnerable People Priority Goal 4, which aims to protect those most in need of help - with special emphasis on child exploitation and civil rights. By September 30, 2013, working with state and local law enforcement agencies, the FBI will increase protection of potential victims from abuse and exploitation by achieving a 5 percent increase in investigations concerning non-compliant sex offenders, sexual exploitation of children, human trafficking; investigations concerning sexual exploitation of children and human trafficking; and a 5 percent increase in the number of children depicted in child pornography that are identified by the FBI. The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**Internet Fraud**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

The FBI and National White Collar Crime Center partnered in May 2000 to create the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), a national repository for receipt and exchange of consumer, federal, and industry Internet crimes data. The IC3 allows for an enhanced capability for intelligence development to assist in these multi-divisional investigations. The FBI uses the IC3 data to develop law enforcement referrals focusing on Internet crimes with significant financial impact, large numbers of victims and/or social impact on Internet users. Periodically, the FBI synchronizes nationwide takedowns (i.e., arrests, seizures, search warrants, indictments) to target the most significant perpetrators of on-line schemes and draw attention to identified crime problems.

***Performance Measure:***  Number of convictions for Internet fraud [New measure]

In accordance with DOJ guidance, targeted levels of performance are not projected for this indicator.

***Discussion:*** As this is a new measure, quarterly data will begin to be collected and reported in FY 2012.

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

The FBI will continue to aggressively pursue criminals that pose a threat to the national information infrastructure and, in the course of such endeavors, commit fraud. In cases that the Internet is but an instrumentality of a traditional fraud scheme, the FBI’s Cyber Program will continue to pursue the most egregious, high-impact, and sophisticated non-intrusion schemes with an international nexus.

**Gang/Criminal Enterprises - Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT)**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

DOJ maintains a single national list of major drug trafficking and money laundering organizations. This list of targets, known as the CPOT list, reflects the most significant international narcotic supply and related money laundering organizations, poly-drug traffickers, clandestine drug manufacturers and producers, and major drug transporters supplying the U.S.

***Performance Measure:*** Percentage of FBI OCDETF Investigations with Links to CPOT-linked Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)

***FY 2011 Target:*** 12%

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 16.35%

***Discussion:*** CPOT-linked DTOs are identified through involved complex and coordinated intelligence, as well as analyzing drug investigative data and related financial data. Resources are focused on CPOT-linked organizations that traffic in narcotics and launder illicit proceeds. Resources, expertise and unique investigative capabilities are utilized to target their infrastructure.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 12%

***FY 2013 Target:***  12%

***Performance Measure:*** CPOT-linked DTOs Disrupted

***FY 2011 Target:*** 30

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 50

***Discussion:*** CPOT-linked DTOs are disrupted through complex and coordinated intelligence-driven investigations, and through analysis of drug investigative data and related financial data. These efforts effectively alter the operations of major trafficking organizations.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 30

***FY 2013 Target:*** 30

***Performance Measure:*** CPOT-linked DTOs Dismantled

***FY 2011 Target:*** 15

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 22

***Discussion:*** The previous target for this measure was not met for several reasons. First, investigations of CPOT-level organizations are complex and time-consuming, and the impact of dismantling such a network may not be apparent immediately. DTOs are typically assessed in the months that follow law enforcement actions to determine if they were truly dismantled and this assessment causes a reporting lag time. Second, law enforcement actions that would dismantle a criminal organization cannot be rushed but must reach a logical juncture at which point a dismantling law enforcement action is appropriate and warranted. Third, it is labor intensive to perform the research and analysis associated with validating the CPOT linkage status of a criminal organization, and delays in CPOT linkage verification impact the statistical reporting.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 15

***FY 2013 Target:*** 15

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**

Asian criminal enterprises (ACEs) are involved in criminal violations that include organized crime activities, such as murder, alien smuggling, extortion, loan sharking, illegal gambling, counterfeit currency and credit cards, prostitution, money laundering, drug distribution, and various acts of violence. Loosely knit, flexible, and highly mobile, ACEs have become more sophisticated, diverse, and aggressive in directing their activities, and profiting through legitimate and illegitimate businesses to avoid law enforcement attention and scrutiny. Russian/Eastern European/Eurasian criminal enterprise groups (ECEs) in the U.S. are engaged in traditional racketeering activity such as extortion, murder, prostitution, and drugs. Both Russian/Eastern European/Eurasian Criminal Enterprises (ECEs) and Middle Eastern criminal enterprise organizations are also deeply involved in large-scale white-collar crimes, such as gasoline excise tax scams, fraudulent insurance claims, stock fraud, and bank fraud. The FBI’s strategy for criminal organization investigations emphasizes the development and focusing of resources on national targets, the use of the Enterprise Theory of Investigations (which focuses investigations on the overall organization in question), the enhanced use of intelligence, and the exploitation and development of FBI technical capabilities.

To address the threat that violent urban gangs pose on a local, regional, national and even international level, the FBI first established a National Gang Strategy in the 1990s to identify the gangs posing the greatest danger to American communities, to combine and coordinate the efforts of the local, state, and federal law enforcement in Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces throughout the U.S., and to utilize the same techniques previously used against organized criminal enterprises. The increasingly violent activity of MS-13, has prompted an FBI initiative that will assure extensive coordination between all Field Offices involved in the investigation of MS-13 matters. Additionally, due to a significant number of MS-13 gang members residing in Central America and Mexico, liaison with international law enforcement partners abroad will be a key part of the FBI’s strategy against this gang threat. In FY 2006, DOJ and DHS established the National Gang Tracking Enforcement Coordination Center (GangTECC), now known as Special Operations Division/Operational Section: Gangs (SOD/OSG), a multi-agencyinitiativeanti-gang enforcement, deconfliction, coordination and targeting center headed by a Director from the DEA and a Deputy Director from the FBI, and staffed with representatives from ATF, BOP, DEA, FBI, ICE and the USMS.

DOJ defines gangs as associations of three or more individuals whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity which they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand sign or graffiti. The association's purpose, in part, is to engage in criminal activity and the association uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives. Its members engage in criminal activity, or acts of juvenile delinquency that if committed by an adult would be crimes with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation, or economic resources. The association may also possess some of the following characteristics: (a) the members employ rules for joining and operating within the association; (b) the members meet on a recurring basis; (c) the association provides physical protection of its members from other criminals and gangs; (d) the association seeks to exercise control over a particular location or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; or (e) the association has an identifiable structure. This definition is not intended to include traditional organized crime groups such as La Cosa Nostra, groups that fall within the Department's definition of "international organized crime," drug trafficking organizations or terrorist organizations.

The FBI concentrates counter-narcotics resources against DTOs with the most extensive drug networks in the U.S. As entire drug trafficking networks, from sources of supply through the transporters/distributors are disrupted or dismantled, the availability of drugs within the U.S. will be reduced. To assess its performance in combating criminal enterprises that engage in drug trafficking, the Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program works in tandem with DEA and the Executive Office for OCDETF to track the number of organizations linked to targets on DOJ’s CPOT list.

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the Violent Crime Priority Goal 2, which aims to reduce gang violence. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase coordination on gang investigations among Federal, State, and local law enforcement and increase intelligence products produced in support of Federal, State, and local investigations that are focused on gangs posing a significant threat to communities by 5 percent. The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**Organized Criminal Enterprises & Gangs/Criminal Enterprises**

**a. Performance Plan and Report for Outcomes**

Organized Criminal Enterprises

FBI investigations of criminal enterprises involved in sustained racketeering activities that are focused on those enterprises with ethnic ties to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Organized criminal enterprise investigations, through the use of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization statute, target the entire entity responsible for the crime problem. Each of these groups is engaged in a myriad of criminal activities.

***Performance Measure:***Organized Criminal Enterprises Dismantled

***FY 2011 Target:*** 37

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 39

***Discussion:*** Based on National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other factors that gauge threats posed to U.S. national security by organize crime, the FBI targets high-priority organizations related to such threats.

The OCP anticipates additional collection, the establishment of additional cases, the development of additional confidential human sources, and an increase in IIR production. FBI efforts also include the initial targeting and operational activities against criminal bosses that support the associated thieves and members of high priority organizations, and target the financial and communications avenues of the criminal enterprises already identified as potential vulnerabilities.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 37

***FY 2013 Target:*** 38

Gang/Criminal Enterprises

The mission of the FBI’s Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program is to disrupt and dismantle the domestic cells (local, regional, national, and transnational) of criminal enterprises, which pose the greatest threat to the economic and national security of the U.S. Many of these criminal enterprises have ties to North, Central and South America. This will be accomplished through the FBI’s criminal investigations, involvement in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program (OCDETF), and support and leadership of HIDTA initiatives. The majority of the FBI’s anti-gang efforts are directed towards the gangs that the Bureau has identified as presenting priority threats. The FBI works closely with local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies to accomplish this mission.

The Gang Targeting and Coordination Center (GangTECC) focuses on enhancing gang investigations of all federal agencies by acting as a deconfliction and case coordination center. GangTECC facilitates operations across agency lines and seeks to dismantle national and trans-national violent gangs.

***Performance Measure:*** Gang/ Criminal Enterprises Dismantled

Note: This measure does not include CPOT-linked dismantlements.

***FY 2011 Target:*** 99

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 165

***Discussion:*** DTOs are dismantled through complex and coordinated intelligence driven investigations, analysis of drug investigative data and related financial data. These efforts effectively disrupt the operations of major trafficking organizations and ultimately destroy them. Resources are focused on coordinated, nationwide investigations targeting the entire infrastructure of major DTOs. DTO members who traffic in narcotics and launder illicit proceeds are targeted. Strategic initiatives are developed to effectively exploit the DTO’s most vulnerable points, thus attacking their infrastructure. FBI enforcement actions have resulted in keeping multi-ton quantities of illegal drugs such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine from ever entering the U.S. The targets reflect an expected reduction of OCDETF personnel resources available to the FBI.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 99

***FY 2013 Target***: 99

***Performance Measure:*** Number of agents serving on Violent Crime Task Forces [New measure]

***Discussion:*** This new measure serves as an indication of the FBI’s contribution to DOJ’s overall goal of targeting reduction of crime in areas particularly prone to violent crime.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 1,042

***FY 2013 Target:*** 1,042

***Performance Measure:*** Average length of sentence in months: Violent Crime [New measure]

***Discussion:*** This new measure serves as an indication of results, in terms of sentence length, of the efforts of the FBI, and other DOJ components, to reduce the prevalence of crime in areas particularly prone to violent crime.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 100 months

***FY 2013 Target:*** 100 months

**c. Priority Goals**

The FBI contributes to the Violent Crime Priority Goal 2, which aims to reduce gang violence. By September 30, 2013, the FBI will increase coordination on gang investigations among Federal, State, and local law enforcement and increase intelligence products produced in support of Federal, State, and local investigations that are focused on gangs posing a significant threat to communities by 5 percent. The FBI’s progress will be reported quarterly.

**D. Criminal Justice Services Decision Unit**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES DECISION UNIT TOTAL** | **Perm. Pos.** | **FTE** | **Amount ($000)** |
| 2011 Enacted | 2,092 | 2,049 | $489,770 |
| 2012 Enacted | 2,103 | 2,058 | 500,016 |
| Adjustments to Base and Technical Adjustments | … | … | 4,196 |
| 2013 Current Services | 2,103 | 2,058 | 504,212 |
| 2013 Program Increases | … | … | 312 |
| 2013 Program Offsets | … | … | (2,540) |
| 2013 Request | 2,103 | 2,058 | 501,984 |
| **Total Change 2012-2013** | **…** | **…** | **$2,228** |

**1. Program Description**

The Criminal Justice Services (CJS) Decision Unit is comprised of all programs of the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, the portion of the Laboratory Division that provides criminal justice information and forensic services to the FBI's state and local law enforcement partners, and the state and local training programs of the Training Division. Additionally, to capture all resources that support the CJS program, a prorated share of resources from the FBI's support divisions (Security, Information Technology, and the administrative divisions and offices) are calculated and scored to this decision unit.

***CJIS Division***

The mission of the CJIS Division is to equip our law enforcement, national security, and intelligence community partners with the criminal justice information they need to protect the U.S. while preserving civil liberties. The CJIS Division includes several major program activities that support this mission, all of which are described below.

Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)/Next Generation Identification (NGI): IAFIS provides timely and accurate identification services in a paperless environment 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The system identifies individuals through name, date-of-birth, other descriptors, and/or fingerprint image comparisons, and provides criminal history records on individuals for law enforcement and civil purposes. IAFIS is designed to process criminal fingerprint submissions in two hours or less and civil submissions in 24 hours or less. In FY 2010, the FBI conducted over 61.2 million fingerprint background checks. In FY 2011, the FBI conducted over 50.7 million fingerprint background checks. The number of fingerprint background checks between FY 2010 and FY 2011 decreased due to the surge in the request for checks during the Census in 2010.

In FY 2008, the CJIS Division awarded a contract for the development and integration of the NGI system. NGI is a major upgrade and replacement to the current IAFIS. The FBI initiated the NGI Program in response to advances in technology, FBI customer requirements, growing demand for IAFIS services, and growing obsolescence of the IAFIS information technology infrastructure. NGI advances the FBI’s biometric identification and investigation services, providing an incremental replacement of current IAFIS technical capabilities, while introducing new biometric functionality. If fully deployed, the NGI system would offer state-of-the-art biometric services and capabilities that will serve as a platform for multiple modes of biometric functionality.

NGI would serve as the cornerstone to enables the FBI to meet its criminal justice service mission and support the intelligence community. The FBI anticipates dramatically improving the major features of the current IAFIS including system flexibility, storage capacity, accuracy and timeliness of responses, and interoperability with other systems - including DHS and DOD biometric matching systems. NGI is comprised of six overlapping increments. Increment 1 (Advanced Fingerprint Identification Technology [AFIT]) was achieved more than one month ahead of schedule in February 2011. Increment 2 (Repository for Individuals of Special Concern [RISC]) was deployed on schedule in August 2011. All 4 remaining NGI increments are on schedule, with Full Operating Capability planned for June 2014.

National Crime Information Center (NCIC): The NCIC is a nationwide information system that supports local, state, tribal, federal, and international law enforcement agencies in their mission to uphold the law and protect the public. The NCIC allows for the compilation, dissemination, and exchange of timely and critical criminal justice and law enforcement information, such as wanted person information, stolen property information, sex offenders, immigration violators, terrorists, and other data. On July 29, 2011, NCIC replaced its previous record of 9.1 million transactions by processing more than 9.7 million transactions in one day. As of December 2011, the system averages 8.2 million transactions per day.

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS): The NICS is a national system established to enforce the provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. The NICS allows Federal Firearms Licensees to determine whether receipt of a firearm by a prospective purchaser would violate state or federal law. The system ensures the timely transfer of firearms to individuals who are not specifically prohibited and denies transfer to prohibited persons. For FY 2010, the NICS processed 14.1 million inquiries. The FBI conducted approximately 5.9 million of these checks, resulting in 70,972 denials to prohibited persons. The remaining 8.2 million checks were conducted by individual states. In FY 2011, the NICS processed over 15.9 million inquiries. The FBI conducted approximately 6.6 million of these checks, resulting in 76,862 denials to prohibited persons. The remaining 9.3 million checks were conducted by individual states.

Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR): The FBI’s UCR Program has served as the national

clearinghouse for the collection of crimes reported to law enforcement since 1930. It is the CJIS Division of the FBI that collects, analyzes, reviews, and publishes the data collected from participating local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies. Recognizing the need for improved statistics, law enforcement called for a thorough evaluative study to modernize the UCR Program, resulting in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).  In the NIBRS, more detailed data are collected on each single crime occurrence made up of 49 specific offenses.  Based on 2010 submissions, approximately 43 percent of the program's law enforcement agencies are certified for NIBRS participation.  Information derived from the data collected within the UCR Program is the basis for the annual publications *Crime in the United States*, *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted* (LEOKA), and *Hate Crime Statistics* that fulfill the FBI’s obligations under Title 28 United States Code Section 534. The publications provide statistical compilations of crimes such as murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson; officers killed and assaulted in the line of duty; and hate crime statistics. The UCR Program also conducts officer safety awareness training for the Nation’s law enforcement community based on the statistics and research collected in the UCR LEOKA Program.

Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx): N-DEx provides a secure, online national information sharing system to the criminal justice community for their data, including incident, arrest, booking, incarceration, probation, and parole reports. By automatically creating linkages across submitted information to identity correlations and relationships among people, places, and things that were previously unknown, N-DEx forges collaboration and partnerships on a national scale to more effectively solve and prevent crimes and acts of terrorism. N-DEx complements existing state and regional systems and is positioned to fill-in gaps in the many areas of the country where no information sharing system or program currently exists. N-DEx is unique to other systems in scale, scope, and sustainability.

N-DEx Increment 1 became available in March 2008, and provided the ability to search nationwide incident and case reports. Deployed in July 2009, Increment 2 provided N-DEx users with the additional capabilities of subscription, notification, collaboration, geographic search, and automated processing. The N-DEx Program Office released the final increment (Increment 3) of the N-DEx system on March 17, 2011. The updated system provides users with results in a format similar to what they would see when using a leading edge and more intuitive commercial search engine. The basic N-DEx functionality achieved in the first two increments was improved upon with regards to speed and relevancy. All improvements incorporated a significant amount of subject matter expert input and advances in technology. Search times have decreased significantly. Improvements have been made in collaboration section making it easier for users to share files, work on documents, and discuss issues. In addition to the incident/case reports, arrest, incarceration and booking data contained in the previous increments, N-DEx can now accept probation and parole data and can handle more than 200 million records.

N-DEx establishes an information sharing network containing over 127 million searchable records with more than 800 million entities (persons, places, things, and events) from over 4,300 agencies available to more than 38,000 users. It is projected that by the end of FY 2012, 50 percent of the U.S. population will be represented by the data submitted to N-DEx via state and local law enforcement agencies The percent of population covered by N-DEx participation is measured by mapping contributing agencies to the specific county and state. Population data for each county is collected from the U.S. census information. Participation is measured by data contributions from local and state law enforcement agencies.

Law Enforcement On-line (LEO): LEO is a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week, on-line (real time), information-sharing system that is accredited and approved by the FBI for the transmission of sensitive but unclassified information throughout the world to the local, state, tribal, federal, and international law enforcement, criminal justice, and public safety communities. The LEO system provides a vehicle for these communities to exchange information, conduct online education programs, and participate in professional special interest and topically focused dialog. LEO gives these communities simplified and increased one-stop access to information sharing systems, such as NCIC, N-DEx, Operational Response and Investigative Online Network, Violent Crime Apprehension Program, Joint Automated Booking System, Internet Crime complaint Center, National Gang Intelligence Center and the Regional Information Sharing Systems, as well as many other systems in order to eliminate such information being isolated within a single agency’s system. LEO provides law enforcement and criminal justice communities a secure “anytime and anywhere” national and international method to support antiterrorism, intelligence, investigative operations; sends notifications and alerts; and provides an avenue to remotely access other law enforcement and intelligence systems and resources. LEO also offers an incident management system, the Virtual Command Center (VCC), which allows all levels of law enforcement to securely share critically needed information in real time across any Internet connection in order to provide safety and security at all major events and natural disaster areas. LEO currently supports a user base of over 55,000 active members.

In FY 2011, LEO continued to work on transitioning to an e-Portal technology, which will add increased future system functionality and customization and is scheduled for deployment in mid FY 2012. In addition, LEO completed several major accomplishments to include: established a search connection which allows users access to an Intelink search portal hosted by DOJ; connected to the CJIS portal link and established five identity providers; connected six service providers; and shared user and service directories with the Homeland Security Information Network, Regional Information Sharing System, and Intelink, providing a foundation for an integrated, cross-network set of directories to help users easily locate individuals from these agencies.

***Laboratory Division***

A portion of the Laboratory Division programs that provide forensic services to the FBI's state and local law enforcement partners is scored in the CJS Decision Unit.

The successful investigation and prosecution of crimes require the collection, examination, and scientific analysis of evidence recovered at the scene of the incident and obtained during the course of the investigation. Without such evidence, many crimes would go unsolved and unpunished. At the same time, forensic examination of evidence exonerates individuals wrongly accused of crimes.

The FBI Laboratory, established in 1932, is the only full-service civilian federal forensic

laboratory in the U.S. The FBI Laboratory was accredited in August 2008 by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors – Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD-LAB) for meeting or exceeding the requirements for *international* accreditation (ISO/IEC 17025). Examinations support investigations that cross all FBI investigative programs, international, federal, state, and local boundaries. Examinations of evidence for duly constituted U.S. law enforcement agencies, whether federal, state or local, and foreign law enforcement unable to perform the examinations at their own facilities are performed, free of charge. The FBI Laboratory also provides comprehensive technical reports, training, and expert testimony to federal, state, and local agencies.

In addition to providing forensic analysis services, the FBI Laboratory also provides operational response capabilities with respect to chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological and explosive devices/incidents and evidence collection. Biometric identification services are provided through the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the Federal Convicted Offender Program (FCOP). The FBI Laboratory is the executive agent for the Terrorist Explosive Devices Analytic Center (TEDAC), a multi-agency center that forensically and technically exploits terrorist improvised explosive devices and related materials and generates actionable investigative and intelligence information for use by the U.S. law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, the

U.S. military, and other partners.

In FY 2011, the FBI conducted approximately 638,000 forensic examinations (FBI, other

Federal, state, and local). The Laboratory estimates it will conduct approximately 635,000 forensic examinations each year in FY 2012 and in FY 2013.

***Training Division***

The FBI provides instruction for state and locals at minimal cost, both at the FBI Academy and throughout the U.S. at state, regional, and local training facilities. The principal course for state and local law enforcement officers is the FBI National Academy, a 10-week multi-disciplinary program for officers who are considered to have potential for further advancement in their careers. In FY 2011, there were 1,026 state and local law enforcement officers that participated in the National Academy program at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The FY 2012 estimate for National Academy participants is 1,040.

In addition to sessions offered at the FBI Academy, the FBI conducts and participates in courses and seminars at state, regional, and local training facilities. These training sessions cover the full range of law enforcement training topics such as hostage negotiation, computer-related crimes, death investigations, violent crimes, criminal psychology, forensic science, and arson. In FY 2011, an estimated 97,000 criminal justice personnel received training from FBI instructors at state, regional, and local training facilities. The FBI estimates that it will train 97,000 criminal justice personnel in FY 2012.

Due to the increasingly global nature of many of the FBI's investigative initiatives, the FBI has in recent years emphasized the need to train its foreign law enforcement partners through the International Training and Assistance Program, for which the FBI is partially reimbursed by the State Department. In FY 2011, the FBI provided training to 4,300 international police officers and executives representing 95 countries. It is expected there will be 4,500 international police officers trained in FY 2012.

**Program Objectives**

* Reduce criminal activity by providing timely and quality criminal justice information to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
* Provide new technologies and address critical shortfalls in forensic investigative capabilities including latent fingerprint, firearms/toolmark, explosive, trace evidence, DNA, and training of personnel.
* Lead and inspire, through excellence in training and research, the education and development of the criminal justice community.

| **PERFORMANCE/RESOURCES TABLE** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Decision Unit:** Criminal Justice Services | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **DOJ Strategic Goal/Objective** Goal 3: Ensure and Support the Fair, Impartial, Efficient, and Transparent Administration of Justice at the Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and International Levels. (Objective 3.1) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **WORKLOAD/ RESOURCES** | | **Final Target** | | **Actual** | | **Projected** | | **Changes** | | **Requested (Total)** | |
| **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012** | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| IAFIS fingerprint background checks | | 56,389,214 | | 50,780,502 | | 68,512,598 | | 4,570,946 | | 73,084,544 | |
| NCIC transactions | | 2,920,280,283 | | 2,918,139,032 | | 3,177,000,000 | | 282,753,000 | | 3,459,753,000 | |
| Total number of federal, state, and local investigations aided by the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) | | † | | 30,641 | | † | | † | | † | |
| Total number of forensic and offender matches identified at CODIS | | † | | 27,459 | | † | | † | | † | |
| **Total Costs and FTE** | | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** | **FTE** | **$000** |
| 2,049 | 489,770 | 1,991 | 669,000 | 2,058 | 500,016 |  | 1,968 | 2,058 | 501,984 |
| **TYPE/**  **STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE** | **PERFORMANCE** | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2011** | | **FY 2012 Projected** | | **Current Services Adjustments &**  **FY 2013 Program Changes** | | **FY 2013 Request** | |
| **Efficiency Measures** | **IAFIS: [Discontinued measures]**  % of electronically submitted fingerprint identification requests:  Criminal:   * General checks completed w/in 2 hours * DHS checks completed w/in 72 hours   Civil:   * General checks completed w/in 24 hours * DOS checks completed w/in 15 minutes | 95.0%  95.0%  99.0%  97.0% | | 99.3%  100%  99.8%  99.9% | | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | | -  -  -  - | | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | |
| **Performance Measure** | **IAFIS/NGI: [New measures]**   * Average daily identification searches * Average daily latent searches * Response time for routine criminal submissions * Response time for routine civil submissions | 159,970  624  2 hours  24 hours | | 139,125  597  10 minutes  1 hour, 5 minutes | | 187,706  686  1 hour  12 hours | | 12,526  67  30 minutes  6 hours | | 200,232  753  30 minutes  6 hours | |
| **Performance Measure** | **NCIC:**   * System availability * Downtime in minutes | 99.7%  1,440 | | 99.76%  1,273 | | 99.5%  1,440 | | -  - | | 99.5%  1,440 | |
| **Performance Measure** | **NICS:**  % of NICS checks with an Immediate Determination | 90.0% | | 91.4% | | 90.0% | | - | | 90.0% | |
| **Performance Measure** | Average turnaround time for Federal DNA Sample entry in the National DNA Index System (NDIS) of submissions fulfilling the processing and upload requirements **[New measure]** | N/A | | N/A | | 30 days | | - | | 30 days | |
| **Performance Measure** | Student-weeks of Instruction at the Hazardous Devices School (HDS) | 2,668 | | 2,295 | | 2,668 | | - | | 2,668 | |
| **Performance Measure** | **N-DEx: [New measure]**  Percent of population covered by N-DEx via state and local law enforcement participation | 43% | | 35.3% | | 50% | | 8% | | 58% | |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of products and services deployed in support of customers **[New measure]** | N/A | | 299 | | 260 | | 5 | | 265 | |
| **Performance Measure** | LEO: [New measure]Number of active members | 62,980 | | 55,147 | | 64,980 | | 124,000 | | 188,980 | |
| **Performance Measure: *Customer Satisfaction*** | LEO: [Discontinued measure]% of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year. | 44% | | 41% | | N/A | | N/A | | N/A | |
| **Data Definition, Validation, Verification, and Limitations:**   * IAFIS Response Times are captured automatically from in-house developed software code residing on the Electronic Fingerprint Transaction Standard (EFTS) Fingerprint Conversion (EFCON) System. The software that captures this information, time stamps all incoming and out-going transactions and produces a report that calculates transaction response times. The developed code for this requirement was rigorously tested through System Integration and Test (SIT) prior to being put into operations. The information produced by EFCON was validated using Transaction Status (TS), a contractor developed statistical capture program that runs on the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The data collected from EFCON is imported into a spreadsheet to calculate the average response time and percentage for electronic criminal and electronic civil responses. CJIS Division staff review this information prior to release. * NCIC Transaction Volumes are captured similarly to the IAFIS Response Time statistics in that they are also capture automatically from developed code. This program was developed as a requirement by a contractor during the development of the NCIC 2000 system. The developed code for this requirement was also rigorously tested through System Integration and Test (SIT) prior to being put into operations. The information produced in the NCIC reports is also validated by CJIS Division staff prior to release. * System Availability data are collected manually from System Management Center (SMC) logs. System Availability is based on the time a system is out of service until it is returned to service as recorded by SMC personnel. CJIS Division staff input the information into spreadsheets that calculate percent averages. The algorithms used within the spreadsheets were validated prior to being used by in-house personnel. The System Availability figures are tracked closely on a weekly basis by Systems Managers and the Section Chief in charge of the operations and maintenance of the CJIS Division's systems. * HDS data are maintained in central files and databases located at the HDS. The HDS Program Administrator reviews and approves all statistical accomplishment data for dissemination. * N-DEx targets are estimated based upon limited historical data. Marketing results are dependent upon executive advocacy, state policy and technical readiness for participation. | | | | | | | | | | | |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Report and Performance Plan Targets** | | **FY 2003** | **FY 2004** | **FY 2005** | **FY 2006** | **FY 2007** | **FY 2008** | **FY 2009** | **FY 2010** | **FY 2011** | **FY 2012** | **FY 2013** |
| **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Actual** | **Target** | **Target** |
| **Efficiency Measures** | **IAFIS: [Discontinued measures]**  % of electronically submitted fingerprint identification requests:  Criminal:   * General checks completed w/in 2 hours * DHS checks completed w/in 72 hours   Civil:   * General checks completed w/in 24 hours * DOS checks completed w/in 15 minutes | 91.6%  N/A  97.5%  N/A | 94.8%  N/A  99.2%  N/A | 96.5%  N/A  99.2%  N/A | 97%  N/A  98%  N/A | 98.0%  N/A  98.8%  N/A | 97.9%  N/A  98.5%  N/A | 98.2%  100%  98.8%  99.7% | 99.32%  99.51%  99.70%  99.11% | 99.3%  100%  99.8%  99.9% | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | **IAFIS/NGI: [New measures]**   * Average daily identification searches * Average daily latent searches * Response time for routine criminal submissions * Response time for routine civil submissions | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A | 132,064  682  8m 42s  55m24s | 139,125  597  10 min  1 hr 5 m | 187,706  686  1 hour  12 hours | 200,232  753  30 min  6 hours |
| **Performance Measure** | **NICS:**  % of NICS checks with an Immediate Determination | 91.23% | 91.85% | 91.45% | 91.46% | 91.63% | 91.66% | 91.9% | 91.36% | 91.4% | 90% | 90% |
| **Performance Measure** | **NCIC:**   * System availability * Downtime in minutes | 99.7%  1,788 | 99.7%  1,606 | 99.7%  1,602 | 99.8%  1,277 | 99.8%  1,267 | 99.8%  1,138 | 99.8%  1,028 | 99.79%  1,152 | 99.76%  1,273 | 99.5%  1,440 | 99.5%  1,440 |
| **Performance Measure** | Average turnaround time for Federal DNA Sample entry in the National DNA Index System (NDIS) of submissions fulfilling the processing and upload requirements | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 30 days | 30 days |
| **Performance Measure** | **N-DEx: [New measure]**  Percent of population covered by N-DEx via state and local law enforcement participation | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 27% | 35.3% | 50% | 58% |
| **Performance Measure** | Number of products and services deployed in support of customers | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 299 | 260 | 265 |
| **Performance Measure: *Customer Satisfaction*** | LEO: [Discontinued measure]% of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year. | N/A | N/A | 45% | 39% | 26% | 41% | 42% | 45% | 41% | N/A | N/A |
| **Performance Measure** | **LEO: [New measure]**  Number of Active Members | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 55,147 | 64,980 | 188,980 |
| **Performance Measure** | Student-weeks of Instruction at the Hazardous Devices School (HDS) | 2,245 | 2,304 | 2,593 | 2,614 | 2,159 | 2,605 | 2,437 | 2,326 | 2,295 | 2,668 | 2,668 |

**2. Performance, Resources, and Strategies**The Criminal Justice Services decision unit contributes to the Department of Justice’s Strategic Goal 3, “Ensure and Support the Fair, Impartial, Efficient, and Transparent Administration of Justice at the Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and International Levels.” Within this goal, the resources specifically support Strategic Objective 3.1, “Promote and strengthen relationships and strategies for the administration of justice with state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement.” This decision unit ties directly to the FBI’s ninth priority: Support federal, state, local, and international partners; and to the “Maximize Partnerships” theme and its related objectives on the FBI’s strategy map.

**a. Performance Plan and Report for OutcomesIntegrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System/Next Generation Identification**Fingerprint identification, which includes the processing of fingerprint submissions and criminal history records, has been a responsibility of the FBI since 1924. With an ever-increasing demand for fingerprint services, July 28, 1999, the FBI launched the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which is managed by the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia. The IAFIS is a national fingerprint and criminal history system that provides automated fingerprint search capabilities, latent searching capability, electronic image storage, and electronic exchange of fingerprints and responses, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

***Performance Measure:*** Average daily identification searches

***FY 2011 Target:*** *159,970*

***FY 2011 Actual:*** *139,125*

***Discussion:*** This measure reports the number of identification searches being conducted by the CJIS Division. The FY 2012 and FY 2013 targets were derived from a 15 percent yearly growth rate and new IAFIS initiatives. The target projections increase due to the incremental deployment of new functionality and the anticipated increase in usage.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 187,706

***FY 2013 Target:*** 200,232

***Performance Measure:*** Average daily latent searches

***FY 2011 Target:*** *624*

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 597

***Discussion:***  This measure reports the average daily number of latent investigative searches processed by the CJIS Division. The targets are based on historical data. All IAFIS segments will be replaced by NGI in 2014. Until that time, IAFIS data is used for these performance measures. This data and targets shown account for some improvement in response times which could be attributed to efficiencies gained by NGI’s implementation of the new fingerprint matching segment of IAFIS. NGI performance measures will not be implemented until all IAFIS segments have been replaced at NGI Full Operating Capability.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 686

***FY 2013 Target:*** 753

***Performance Measure:*** Response time for routine criminal submissions

***FY 2011 Target:*** 2 hours

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 10 minutes

***Discussion:*** This measure reports the timeliness of CJIS’ response to routine criminal submissions from state, local, and federal criminal justice entities. The targets are based on historical data. All IAFIS segments will be replaced by NGI in 2014. Until that time, IAFIS is reporting performance measures for routine criminal and civil response times. This reporting accounts for some improvement in response times which could be attributed to efficiencies gained by NGI’s implementation of the new fingerprint matching segment of IAFIS. The NGI response times, and subsequent performance measures, for routine criminal and civil submissions will not be implemented until all IAFIS segments have been replaced at NGI Full Operating Capability.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 1 hour

***FY 2013 Target:*** 30 minutes

***Performance Measure:*** Response time for routine civil submissions

***FY 2011 Target:*** 24 hours

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 1 hour, 5 minutes

***Discussion:*** This measure reports the timeliness of CJIS’ response to routine civil submissions for positions of trust, employment, and licensing purposes. The targets are based on historical data. All IAFIS segments will be replaced by NGI in 2014. Until that time, IAFIS is reporting performance measures for routine criminal and civil response times. This reporting accounts for some improvement in response times which could be attributed to efficiencies gained by NGI’s implementation of the new fingerprint matching segment of IAFIS. The NGI response times, and subsequent performance measures, for routine criminal and civil submissions will not be implemented until all IAFIS segments have been replaced at NGI Full Operating Capability.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 12 hours

***FY 2013 Target:*** 6 hours

**Law Enforcement Online**

### *Performance Measure -- Customer Satisfaction:* DISCONTINUED MEASURE

### Percent of users who visit the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) service (which provides intelligence dissemination) more than one month out of each year out of the total user base of over 177,000 vetted members.

***Discussion:***  This measure served as a proxy for customer satisfaction. It is being replaced by the measure below (number of active LEO members).

***Performance Measure:*** Number of active LEO members: [New measure]

***FY 2011 Target:*** 62,980

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 55,147

***Discussion:*** The measure reports the number of total active members brought onto the LEO system from state, local and federal law enforcement and criminal justice entities. The target projections are based on historical system data with planned current system enhancements. With the implementation of the LEO Enterprise Portal, LEO will have the ability to on-board entire law enforcement organizations as LEO users. The FY 2011 and FY 2012 Q1 actuals have been lower than anticipated due to the LEO Rehost schedule slippage, which also caused a diversion of the LEO outreach support. However, in mid FY 2012, LEO will transition to an e-Portal technology, which will add increased functionality and allow for single sign-on to many services. It is anticipated that FY 2013 membership will increase significantly.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 64,980

***FY 2013 Target:*** 188,980

**National DNA Index System (NDIS)**

### *Performance Measure:* Average turnaround time for Federal DNA Sample entry in the National DNA Index System (NDIS) of submissions fulfilling the processing and upload requirements. [New measure]

***Discussion:*** The FBI Laboratory has established a 30-day turn-around time for processing and uploading samples based upon community expectations to receive, process, analyze and upload samples. To reduce the turnaround time for the samples requiring re-analysis, the Federal DNA Database Program is (1) implementing process improvements in how samples are re-analyzed/reworked to increase efficiency, and (2) specifically monitoring the turnaround time of samples that require re-analysis.

### *FY 2013 Target:* 30 days

### Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx)

N-DEx provides criminal justice agencies the ability to share data and detect, deter and disrupt criminal activity and national security threats. N-DEx is the result of collaboration among local, county, state, tribal and federal criminal justice communities to establish a secure, national, criminal justice information sharing capability at the sensitive but unclassified level. The application of N-DEx capabilities provides the missing links and creates partnerships that lead to more effective investigations that will help disrupt and apprehend individuals and organizations responsible for criminal activities and national security threats.

***Performance Measure****:* Percent of population covered by N-DEx via state and local law enforcement participation [New measure]

***FY 2011 Target:*** 43%

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 35.3%

***Discussion:*** This measure is intended to demonstrate the law enforcement agencies' desire to share their data on a national scale through participation with N-DEx. This measure also validates that N-DEx has been accepted by the law enforcement community as the national criminal justice information sharing vehicle. Participation with N-DEx is voluntary for local, state, regional, tribal and federal agencies. The data for this measure is defined as the portion of the U.S. population living in jurisdictions where the state or local law enforcement entities participate in N-DEx. While federal data from throughout the U.S. is contained in N-DEx, it is not included in calculating this percentage. The effectiveness of N-DEx is dependent upon widespread participation of organizations sharing their data. The target of 43 percent was not met in FY 2011 and targets were reassessed for future years. Targets are set based on historical information and planned agency participation. Marketing results are dependent upon executive advocacy, state policy, and technical readiness for participations. Continuing challenges include insufficient state and local resources, legal and policy constraints, and cultural challenges. N-DEx outreach and marketing efforts remain focused on the criminal justice community's adoption of N-DEx as the national information sharing tool.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 50%

***FY 2013 Target:*** 58%

**STB Product Deployment**

***Performance Measure:***Number of products and services deployed in support of customers

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 299

***Discussion:*** The FBI’s Science and Technology Branch (STB) oversees the application of innovative scientific, engineering, and technical solutions in support of intelligence and investigative requirements. To that end, STB is constantly searching for opportunities to discover, develop, and deliver new capabilities to partners throughout the FBI, law enforcement and the IC. STB’s products and services assist partners with the prevention of crime and enforcement of federal laws. The targets for this measure reflect STB’s commitment to the continued development of new products and services while also focusing on enhancement and consolidation of previously deployed products and services. The target for the number of products/services to be deployed does not reflect products or services that have been specifically identified this far in the future. STB aims to develop and deploy those products and services that will be of the greatest benefit to stakeholders and will most help the FBI in addressing its investigative and operational needs.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 260

***FY 2013 Target:*** 265

**Hazardous Devices School (HDS)**Two key elements of domestic preparedness are expertise in hazardous devices and emergency response capabilities to address threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The HDS is the only formal domestic training school for state and local law enforcement to learn safe and effective bomb disposal operations. The HDS prepares bomb technicians to locate, identify, render safe, and dispose of improvised hazardous devices, including those containing explosives, incendiary materials, and materials classified as WMD.

***Performance Measure:*** State and Local Bomb Technicians Trained (# of student-weeks) at the HDS

***FY 2011 Target:*** 2,668

***FY 2011 Actual:*** 2,295

***Discussion:*** FY 2011 target was not met. The HDS program is a reimbursable inter-service support agreement between the FBI and the U.S. Army.

The target number was based on the assumption that the Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and other advanced courses would be conducted. During FY 2011; these courses were not conducted due to lower than expected reimbursable funding. The amount of projected training is based upon the amount of reimbursable funding received, which drives the frequency of training courses available, duration of training courses, and the number of courses that can be offered per FY. The FBI expects that the FY 2012 and FY 2013 will increase due to inclusion of some advanced training courses at HDS.

***FY 2012 Target:*** 2,668

***FY 2013 Target:*** 2,668

**b. Strategies to Accomplish Outcomes**The FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) provides law enforcement and civil identification and information services with timely and critical information that matches individuals with their criminal history records, criminal activity (e.g., stolen property, gang or terrorist affiliation, fugitive status, etc.), and latent fingerprints, and provides information used for employment, licensing, or gun purchase consideration. Automation and computer technology inherently require constant upgrading and enhancement if such systems are to remain viable and flexible to accommodate changing customer requirements.

The FBI’s HDS provides state-of-the-art technical intelligence to state, local, and federal first responders in courses regarding the criminal and terrorist use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the tactics, techniques, and procedures to render these hazardous devices safe. HDS provides training on emerging threats targeting the U.S. and its interests. This training includes countermeasures targeting suicide bombers, vehicle borne IEDs, stand-off weapons, WMD devices, and radio-controlled IEDs. To meet future demand for the training of first responders, HDS needs to add additional courses and increase student capacity to significantly impact the preparedness of our first-responder public safety bomb squads throughout the country.

**V. Program Increase by Item**

**Threat Name: Financial and Mortgage Fraud**

Budget Decision Unit(s): Criminal Enterprises and Federal Crimes

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 2.5

Organizational Program: Criminal Investigative

Program Increase: Positions 44 Agt 40 FTE 22 Dollars $15,000,000 ($3,952,000 non-personnel)

Description of Item

The FBI requests 44 positions (40 Agents and 4 Forensic Accountants) and $15,000,000 ($3,952,000 non-personnel) to combat Corporate Fraud, Securities and Commodities Fraud, and Mortgage Fraud. The requested enhancement will increase resources for investigating the highest impact Complex Financial Crime cases.

Justification

*Threat Summary*

The housing and financial system collapse revealed a myriad of mortgage, corporate, and securities and commodities fraud schemes, costing Americans and world financial markets trillions of dollars.

*Corporate Fraud*

As the lead agency investigating corporate fraud, the FBI focuses on cases that involve accounting schemes designed to deceive investors, auditors, and analysts about the true financial condition of a corporation, self-dealing corporate executives, and obstruction of justice. Through the manipulation of financial data, the share price of a corporation remains artificially inflated based on fictitious performance indicators provided to the investing public. In addition to significant financial losses to investors, corporate fraud has the potential to cause immeasurable damage to the U.S. economy and investor confidence. As of December 2011, FBI Field Offices had 761 investigations pending in some form of corporate fraud.

Examples of corporate fraud include:

1. Falsification of financial information, including:

* False accounting entries
* Bogus trades designed to inflate profit or hide losses
* False transactions designed to evade regulatory oversight

2. Self-dealing by corporate insiders, including:

* Insider trading
* Kickbacks
* Backdating of executive stock options
* Misuse of corporate property for personal gain
* Individual tax violations related to self-dealing

3. Fraud in connection with an otherwise legitimately-operated mutual or hedge fund, including:

* Late trading
* Market timing schemes
* Falsification of net asset values
* Other fraudulent or abusive trading practices by, within, or involving a mutual or hedge fund

4. Obstruction of justice designed to conceal any of the above-noted types of criminal conduct, particularly when the obstruction impedes the inquiries of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), other regulatory agencies, and/or law enforcement agencies.

Insider trading continues to pose a serious threat to the U.S. financial markets. Through national-level coordination, the FBI strives to protect the fair and orderly operation of the U.S. financial markets and help maintain public trust in the financial markets and the financial system as a whole. These efforts have led to more than a 54 percent increase in insider trading cases from October 2010 to December 2011, and a historic success with the recent ongoing insider trading probe.

The following charts represent the rise in corporate fraud matters and the corresponding increase in success against the crime problem. The requested resources will be used to address this corporate fraud case requirement.



Note: The above chart shows the caseload as a snapshot in time for each fiscal year. FY 2012 Caseload data is as of 12/31/2011.



Note: FY 2012 accomplishment data is as of 2/1/2012.

*Securities and Commodities Fraud*

Estimated losses due to securities and commodities fraud are measured in the tens of billions of dollars per year, and are associated with decreased market value of businesses, reduced or non-existent return on investments, and legal and investigative costs. The victims of securities and commodities frauds include individual investors, financial institutions, public and private companies, government entities, and retirement funds.

The FBI has adopted an intelligence-led proactive approach to identify and target the most egregious perpetrators of securities fraud, utilizing sophisticated techniques such as undercover operations to identify and stop perpetrators before they are able to victimize individuals and damage U.S. financial markets. In furtherance of this threat-focused approach, it is imperative to have timely access to actionable information and intelligence. This information and intelligence is often held by other partner regulatory and law enforcement agencies. It is crucial to the FBI’s mission to place agents and analysts with strategic partners to improve the speed of intelligence received so the FBI can move pro-actively against these threats. As such, the FBI has successfully detailed an agent to the SEC and the Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) and is working to detail agents and analysts to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Based on current trends, the FBI anticipates an increase in the volume of fraud investigations pertaining to high-yield investment frauds, or “Ponzi schemes.” High-yield investment frauds survive by utilizing new investment money from new investors to pay returns to previous investors. As markets fluctuate and economic conditions adjust, investors limit or stop investing and often request pay outs from their investment portfolio. As a result, Ponzi schemes are exposed when the perpetrators do not have the funds available to pay the investors. The collapse of Ponzi schemes can have a dramatic impact on investors and financial markets.

Securities fraud continues to spread globally as markets widen and barriers to international business are surpassed. With the globalization of markets, the FBI has seen the use of reverse mergers by foreign entities to gain access to trading markets and subsequent “pump and dump” manipulation schemes that victimize U.S. investors. Given the nature of the criminal actors and their location, investigations are increasingly complex and resource intensive. The FBI has already noted that fraudulent foreign firms entering U.S. markets are using reverse mergers to avoid regulatory and auditor scrutiny. The SEC has already halted trading of several China-based issuers. The SEC assesses the market cap exposure to be in the billions of dollars with a significant amount of these companies currently traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Over the last five years, FBI securities fraud investigations have increased by 55 percent and show an increasing threat.



Note: The above chart shows the caseload as a snapshot in time for each fiscal year. FY 2012 Caseload data is as of 12/31/2011.



Note: FY 2012 accomplishment data is as of 2/1/2012.

*Mortgage Fraud*

Mortgage fraud and the associated sub-prime corporate fraud in particular have been on the rise since 2005. With the stagnant economic climate in the U.S., it is anticipated that white collar criminal activity will continue to require FBI investigation.

At the start of 2nd Quarter FY 2012, approximately 72 percent of the FBI’s 2,590 mortgage fraud cases involved losses exceeding $1 million per case. The FBI received over 93,000 Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) in FY 2011, the highest number ever. FBI intelligence predicts mortgage fraud will remain at elevated levels during FY 2012, due in significant part to an increase in fraud targeting distressed homeowners; foreclosure actions, which are the best predictor of distressed homeowner fraud, are predicted by industry analyst RealtyTrac to remain at elevated levels for the foreseeable future.

Mortgage Fraud schemes remain an escalating problem in the U.S. and have led to billions of dollars in losses in the mortgage industry. Loan modification schemes and foreclosure rescue scams are particularly egregious in that fraudsters take advantage and illegally profit from the misfortune of others. As foreclosures continue to rise across the country, so too have the number of foreclosure rescue scams that target unsuspecting victims. In many of these cases, victims ultimately lose their home to foreclosure. The FBI will use the additional resources to work with law enforcement, regulatory, and industry partners to target, disrupt, and dismantle the individuals and/or companies engaging in these fraud schemes.



Note: The above chart shows the caseload as a snapshot in time for each fiscal year. FY 2012 Caseload data is as of 12/31/2011.



Note: FY 2012 accomplishment data is as of 2/1/2012.

*Justification for Program Increases*

The FBI requests 40 additional Agents and four Forensic Accountants to combat significant complex financial crimes. An increase in personnel and non-personnel resources is necessary to address the increase in not only the quantity of corporate and securities fraud, but also the increasing complexity of fraud schemes. As markets continue to adapt and grow, individuals with the intent to commit fraud continue to adopt new means to perpetrate their schemes and circumvent legal and regulatory requirements. The FBI has likewise continued to evolve, but requires additional funding to fully address these financial crimes.

In a continuing effort to address this threat, the FBI will establish hybrid squads to target the most significant complex financial crimes. These hybrid squads will be composed of Corporate/Securities and Mortgage Fraud resources. These squads will include six to eight agents and maintain a cross-programmatic approach to address this threat. These squads will utilize the highly-successful hybrid squad model developed by the FBI to address crime in the Southwest Border region and to combat the multiple threats emanating from Mexico. Additionally, Forensic Accountants will be allocated in support of this mission to provide expertise in analyzing and cross-referencing complex financial documents. This team approach will expedite the investigative process, ultimately increasing case production and the FBI’s footprint in addressing complex financial crimes. The remaining resources will be allocated to FBI field offices identified using enhanced threat matrices. Using the average cases per Agent ratio, the FBI estimates increased capability by approximately 240 cases with the additional resources to address high priority, complex financial crime investigations.

In order to maximize the investigative impact of these investigations, the enhancement includes $2,252,000 to increase the use of sophisticated investigative techniques, including the use and development of confidential sources, technical and physical surveillance, and undercover and sensitive operations.

The request also includes $1,700,000 in non-personnel funding for the Bureau Investigative Document Management and Analysis System (BIDMAS). The FBI, along with the Department of Justice and other law enforcement partners, will be able to utilize this system to conduct targeted searches and increase the efficiency of document intensive investigations. This system will allow the FBI to accelerate those cases affecting our financial markets and ensure that white collar criminals are held accountable for their actions. This system provides a modern technology solution and fills a current void in the FBI’s investigative toolkit, which currently lacks an investigative and litigation information management system. The capabilities will allow investigators to quickly review and categorize large amounts of data. This data is then immediately available for use in lead exploitation, prosecutorial decision making, court filings and discovery requests. The electronic storage also ensures that the evidence is available to all FBI investigators worldwide which has led to case spin-offs and new investigations.

Impact on Performance

Since 2003, FBI Agent resources dedicated to corporate and securities fraud have increased 42 percent (250 to 354 agents) while the caseload has increased 118 percent (1,216 to 2,651 cases) during that time period. From FY 2008 through FY 2011, the FBI realized restitutions, recoveries, fines and forfeitures of $18.8 billion from corporate fraud matters, and $17.6 billion for securities/commodities fraud matters. The requested increase will allow continued success against these criminal threats with significant return on investment.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Program | Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) |
| Corporate Fraud | 151 | 121 | 151 | $23,690 | 151 | 112 | 151 | $24,257 | 151 | 112 | 151 | $24,257 |
| Securities and Commodities Fraud | 335 | 249 | 335 | 52,585 | 335 | 249 | 335 | 53,798 | 335 | 249 | 335 | 53,798 |
| Mortgage Fraud | 436 | 332 | 436 | $70,131 | 436 | 332 | 436 | $69,048 | 436 | 332 | 436 | $69,048 |

Personnel Increase Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Position | Modular Cost  per Position ($000) | Number of  Positions  Requested | FY 2013  Request ($000) | FY 2014  Net Annualization  (change from 2013)  ($000) |
| Special Agent | $264 | 40 | $10,560 | $(3,880) |
| Forensic Accountant | 122 | 4 | 488 | 68 |
| Total Personnel |  | 44 | $11,048 | $(3,812) |

Non-Personnel Increase Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization  (Change from 2013)  ($000) |
| Case Funds | n/a | n/a | $3,952 | $... |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization  (Change from 2013)  ($000) |
| Current Services | 922 | 693 | 922 | $140,889 | $6,214 | $147,103 | $... |
| Increases | 44 | 40 | 22 | 11,048 | 3,952 | 15,000 | (3,812) |
| Grand Total | 966 | 733 | 944 | $151,937 | $10,166 | $162,103 | $(3,812) |

**VI. Program Offsets by Item**

**Item Name: Administrative Efficiencies**

Budget Decision Unit(s): All

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1

Organizational Program: Administrative

Program Reduction: Positions 0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($11,158,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

The Budget proposes several administrative reductions. This proposal would reduce funding for administrative areas such as travel, conferences, supplies, and foreign expenses by $11,158,000. Additionally, the FBI and DOJ are working with the State Department to reduce costs related to positions stationed in foreign posts.

Impact on Performance

This offset reflects anticipated savings that will be achieved by reducing spending in administrative areas. The FBI will prioritize its travel and supply funding to mission critical areas in order to limit the impact on operational capabilities

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| … | … | … | $370,638 | … | … | … | $390,603 | … | … | … | $381,581 |

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Administrative Services | n/a | n/a | ($11,158) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($11,158) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | … | … | … | $… | $381,581 | $381,581 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (11,158) | (11,158) | … | … |
| Grand Total | … | … | … | $… | $370,423 | $370,423 | $… | $… |

**Item Name: Contractor Reduction**

Budget Decision Unit(s): Intelligence, Counterintelligence/Counterterrorism

Strategic Goals & Objectives(s): 1.1, 1.3

Organizational Program: Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, Directorate of

Intelligence, Terrorist Screening Center

Program Reduction: Positions ­0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($7,113,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

This proposal reduces national security non-personnel funding for the Counterintelligence Strategic Partnership Coordination (CI SPC) Program, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Validation Program, National Security Analysis Center (NSAC), and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).

Summary Justification

The proposal proportionally reduces non-personnel funding associated with the programs and activities described below.

The CI SPC Program, located in each Field Office, is responsible for engaging, coordinating, and collaborating with all U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC), academic and private industry partners in a Field Office’s area of responsibility at the investigative level. The HUMINT Validation Program supports the FBI’s corporate requirements, including contract subject matter experts who perform validations of the FBI’s Confidential Human Sources supporting national security and criminal investigations. NSAC assesses threats that continuously evolve while its operating capabilities focus across the spectrum of national security threats. TSC receives raw terrorist identities and intelligence data from the USIC and is responsible for the final phase and quality assurance of known or suspected terrorist identities being placed onto the Federal Terrorist Watchlist.

Impact on Performance

The proposed offset, will result in the loss of contract subject matter experts for the CI SPC, NSAC, HUMINT, and TSC programs. However, the FBI will work to sustain the coordination with CI SPC partners, continue to monitor Domestic Terrorist actors and engage with IC counterparts to identify national security threats, and ensure that the CHS validation process and nomination process to the Terrorist Watchlist is not significantly hindered.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| 13,080 | 5,546 | 12,515 | $407,290 | 13,451 | 5,540 | 13,212 | $375,233 | 13,451 | 5,540 | 13,220 | $372,172 |

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| National Security Contracts | n/a | n/a | ($7,113) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($7,113) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | 13,451 | 5,540 | 13,220 | $… | $372,172 | $372,172 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (7,113) | (7,113) | … | … |
| Grand Total | 13,451 | 5,540 | 13,220 | $… | $365,059 | $365,059 | $… | $… |

**Item Name: Critical Incident Response**

Budget Decision Unit(s): All

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4

Organizational Program: Critical Incident Response Group

Program Reduction: Positions 0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($3,417,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

The Budget proposes to reduce funding supporting the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) response capability. CIRG deploys to a crisis site and establishes sophisticated command and control networks needed for crisis response. The reduction will target the Hazardous Devices School (HDS) training for federal, state, and local law enforcement; stabilization training for Special Agent Bomb Technicians (SABTs); SWAT training; and Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) capabilities.

Impact on Performance

This offset reflects anticipated savings that will be achieved by reducing spending on training and equipment. As the lead agency for responding to critical incidents and major investigations as mandated through the National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, the FBI will work to minimize the impact of these reductions.

**Funding**

Base Funding\*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| … | … | … | $148,329 | … | … | … | $184,698 | … | … | … | $183,246 |

\* Includes all non-personnel funding for the Critical Incident Response Group.

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2015)  ($000) |
| Critical Incident Response | n/a | n/a | ($3,417) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($3,417) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | … | … | … | $… | $183,246 | $183,246 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (3,417) | (3,417) | … | … |
| Grand Total | … | … | … | $… | $179,829 | $179,829 | $… | $… |

**Item Name: Facilities Reductions**

Budget Decision Unit(s): All

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1

Organizational Program: Facilities & Logistics Services Division

Program Reduction: Positions 0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($22,562,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

This offset will right-size several programs that support facilities and logistics services. The FBI will achieve this through several cost saving measures such as space densification, reducing rentable square foot ratios, and decreasing services.

Impact on Performance

This offset reflects anticipated savings that will be achieved by reducing spending in facilities and logistics services areas and the FBI will work to minimize the impact from these reductions.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| … | … | … | $633,545 | … | … | … | $684,002 | … | … | … | $684,002 |

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2015)  ($000) |
| Facilities and Logistics Services Division | n/a | n/a | ($22,562) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($22,562) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | … | … | … | $… | $684,002 | $684,002 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (22,562) | (22,562) | … | … |
| Grand Total | … | … | … | $… | $661,440 | $661,440 | $… | $… |

**Item Name: Information Technology (IT) Savings**

Budget Decision Unit(s): All

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1

Organizational Program: Information Technology

Program Reduction: Positions 0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($5,947,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

This proposal reduces the FBI’s budget supporting its information technology infrastructure.

Impact on Performance

The FBI continues to identify and implement information technology cost savings through measures such as extending hardware refresh cycles, and software license renewals. These savings will not only support greater management efficiency but will also support OMB’s IT Reform plan by providing resources to support major initiatives in cybersecurity, data center consolidation, and enterprise e-mail systems.  The savings will also support other Department priorities in the FY 2013 request.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| … | … | … | $299,794 | … | … | … | $273,282 | … | … | … | $272,358 |

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Information Technology | n/a | n/a | ($5,947) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($5,947) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | … | … | … | $… | $272,358 | $272,358 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (5,947) | (5,947) | … | … |
| Grand Total | … | … | … | $… | $266,411 | $266,411 | $… | $… |

**Item Name: National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC)**

Budget Decision Unit(s): Intelligence

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 2.1

Organizational Program: Criminal

Program Reduction: Positions (15) Agt (1) IAs (13) FTE (15) Dollars ($7,826,000)

($6,300,000 non-personnel)

Description of Item

The Budget proposes the elimination of the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), which includes 15 positions (1 Agent, 13 Intelligence Analysts) and $7,826,000. The NGIC collects, analyzes, produces, and disseminates gang intelligence and intelligence products to support federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement as well as correctional agencies throughout the U.S.

Impact on Performance

The proposed elimination of the NGIC will not hinder the ability to examine the threat posed to the U.S. by criminal gangs; rather it will focus the sharing of intelligence at the field level, where intelligence sharing and coordination between DOJ agencies and state and local partners already exist. The FBI will continue to produce intelligence products in support of Federal, State, and local investigations focused on gangs posing a significant threat to communities.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | $(000) |
| 15 | 1 | 15 | $7,825 | 15 | 1 | 15 | $7,825 | 15 | 1 | 15 | $7,825 |

Personnel Reduction Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Type of Position | Cost  per Position  ($000) | Number of  Positions  Reduced | FY 2013  Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Special Agent | 117 | 1 | ($117) | $… | $… |
| Intelligence Analyst | 102 | 13 | (1,326) | … | … |
| Professional Support | 83 | 1 | (83) | … | … |
| Total Personnel |  |  | ($1,526) | $… | $… |

Non-Personnel Reduction Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit | Quantity | FY 2013  Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| NGIC | n/a | n/a | ($6,300) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($6,300) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | 15 | 1 | 15 | $1,526 | $6,300 | $7,826 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | (15) | (1) | (15) | (1,526) | (6,300) | (7,826) | … | … |
| Grand Total | … | … | … | $… | $… | $… | $… | $… |

**Item Name: Relocation Program**

Budget Decision Unit(s): All

Strategic Goal(s) & Objective(s): 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6

Organizational Program: Human Resources

Program Reduction: Positions 0 Agt 0 FTE 0 Dollars ($5,000,000) (all non-personnel)

Description of Item

The Budget proposes to reduce $5,000,000 (all non-personnel) to the FBI’s Employee Relocation Program. The Employee Relocation Program strategically relocates staff to meet the organizational needs of the FBI by ensuring FBI field offices and programs are optimally staffed to carry out the FBI’s mission requirements.

Impact on Performance

The FBI will attempt to minimize the impact by prioritizing agent relocations for mission critical programs.

**Funding**

Base Funding

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| FY 2011 Enacted | | | | FY 2012 Enacted | | | | FY 2013 Current Services | | | |
| Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) | Pos | Agt | FTE | ($000) |
| 18 | 2 | 18 | $126,024 | 26 | 5 | 26 | $121,981 | 26 | 5 | 26 | $118,520 |

Non-Personnel Decrease Cost Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Personnel Item | Unit Cost | Quantity | FY 2013 Request  ($000) | FY 2014 Net Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Relocation Program | n/a | n/a | ($5,000) | $… | $… |
| Total Non-Personnel |  |  | ($5,000) | $… | $… |

Total Request for this Item

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Pos | Agt | FTE | Personnel  ($000) | Non-Personnel  ($000) | Total  ($000) | FY 2014 Net  Annualization (change from 2013)  ($000) | FY 2015 Net  Annualization (change from 2014)  ($000) |
| Current Services | 26 | 5 | 26 | $30,043 | $88,477 | $118,520 | $… | $… |
| Decreases | … | … | … | … | (5,000) | (5,000) | … | … |
| Grand Total | 26 | 5 | 26 | $30,043 | $83,477 | $113,520 | $… | $… |

**VIII. Construction**

**A: Appropriations Language and Analysis of Appropriations Language**

**Appropriations Language for Construction**

For necessary expenses, to include the cost of equipment, furniture, and information technology requirements, related to construction or acquisition of buildings, facilities and sites by purchase, or as otherwise authorized by law; conversion, modification and extension of Federally-owned buildings; preliminary planning and design of projects; and operation and maintenance of secure work environment facilities and secure networking capabilities; [$80,982,000] *$80,982,000*, to remain available until expended. *(Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 2012.)*

**Analysis of Appropriations Language**

No substantive changes proposed.

1. Please note that while the TSC and the FTTTF are part of the FBI’s CT Program, their resources are scored to the Intelligence Decision Unit (IDU). Similarly, the Counterterrorism Analysis Section is embedded within CTD but is scored to the IDU. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)