The OIG initiated an audit of one of the FBI’s Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories. The audit will assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the laboratory’s performance and the effectiveness of its outreach and partnership with the law enforcement community. In addition, the audit will evaluate the laboratory’s case management system and its efforts to address its service request backlog.
The OIG is continuing its audit of the FBI’s implementation of the Sentinel information technology project, which was made available to all FBI employees on July 1, 2012. The OIG will evaluate Sentinel’s user experience and project costs, and enhancements made to Sentinel.
The OIG is evaluating the FBI’s implementation of its Next Generation Cyber Initiative, which is intended to enhance the FBI’s ability to combat cyber intrusions.
In response to a congressional request, the OIG is reviewing the activities and processes of a task force formed by the Criminal Division in 1996 to address issues arising at the FBI Laboratory. The issues the task force addressed related largely to a review the OIG conducted of allegations of wrongdoing and improper practices within certain units of the FBI Laboratory. The OIG’s findings were described in a 1997 report, “The FBI Laboratory: An Investigation into Laboratory Practices and Alleged Misconduct in Explosives-Related and Other Cases.”
The OIG is again examining the FBI's use of NSLs and Section 215 orders for business records. This review is assessing the FBI's progress in responding to the OIG's recommendations in its first and second reports on the FBI's use of NSLs and its report on the FBI's improper use of exigent letters and other informal means to obtain telephone records. A focus of this review is the NSL subsystem, an automated workflow system for NSLs that all FBI field offices and headquarters divisions have been required to use since January 1, 2008, and the effectiveness of the subsystem in reducing or eliminating noncompliance with applicable authorities. The current review is also examining the number of NSLs issued and Section 215 applications filed by the FBI between 2007 and 2009, and any improper or illegal uses of these authorities. In addition, the review is examining the FBI's use of its pen register and trap-and-trace authority under FISA.
The OIG is reviewing the FBI’s use of information derived from the National Security Agency’s (NSA) collection of telephony metadata obtained from certain telecommunications service providers under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The review will examine the FBI’s procedures for receiving, processing, and disseminating leads the NSA develops from the metadata, and any changes that have been made to these procedures over time. The review will also examine how FBI field offices respond to leads, and the scope and type of information field offices collect as a result of any investigative activity that is initiated. In addition, the review will examine the role the leads have had in FBI counterterrorism efforts.
The OIG is examining the Department’s and five components’ policies, guidance, and training governing the off-duty conduct of employees on official travel or assignment in foreign countries. The five components in the review are ATF, Criminal Division, DEA, FBI, and USMS.
The OIG is examining the nature, frequency, reporting, investigation, and adjudication of sexual misconduct (including the transmission of sexually explicit text messages and images) where the conduct potentially affected the workplace or the security of operations within ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS. The OIG is also reviewing whether these law enforcement components can effectively address allegations of sexual misconduct in a consistent manner.
The OIG is examining the efforts of OJP, BOP, USMS, and FBI to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 since publication of the Department’s National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape.
The Crime Victims Fund (CVF), administered by the Office for Victims of Crimes (OVC), was established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 and is a major funding source for victim services throughout the United States. The current audit objectives are to assess EOUSA’s accounting and financial reporting of the CVF funds for FYs 2009 through 2011, and evaluate the FBI’s, EOUSA’s, and USAOs’ victim services supported by CVF funding.
The OIG is auditing the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, which provides criminal background checks in support of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993. The OIG will evaluate the effectiveness of processes related to the FBI’s referral of denials to ATF; ATF’s initial screening and referral of denials to its field offices for investigation; ATF field offices’ investigation of denials; and the U.S. Attorney Offices’ prosecution of crimes associated with denials.
The OIG is auditing the Department’s Use of Extended Temporary Duty Travel (TDY). The preliminary objectives of the audit are to evaluate whether the Department, specifically the FBI, Criminal Division, United States Attorney’s Offices and Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and National Security Division: (1) are making appropriate use of extended TDY, (2) have sound extended TDY policies and practices that promote cost effectiveness, and (3) have adequate tracking systems and documentation for extended TDY expenditures.
The OIG is reviewing the Department's use of the material witness warrant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, which provides for the arrest and detention of a person if their testimony “is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.” With a particular focus on post-September 11 terrorism cases, the OIG is evaluating whether the statute has been used in an arbitrary, overbroad, or otherwise abusive manner. The OIG is also examining whether the information presented to the courts to justify the detention of particular witnesses fairly reflected the underlying information known to the Department and the FBI at the time; whether procedural safeguards have provided meaningful protections to detained witnesses; and whether the conditions under which selected witnesses were confined were consistent with relevant statutes, regulations, and rules.