RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION
We examined whether BOP effectively manages its BI and RI program and whether it complies with federal, Department, and BOP policies. Overall, we found that BOP was fulfilling its responsibility to conduct BIs and RIs and that the personnel security program is detecting suitability issues. However, we found problems with pre-employment and adjudication procedures that could result in BOP hiring and retaining unsuitable employees. We also found that SBIS database management needs improvement and that BOP should consider reexamining its policy for not accepting other agencies' employee BIs.
To assess BOP's BI program, we generated a random sample of 265 employees from 3,993 BOP employees that were hired between October 1, 1995, and October 3, 1997. We reduced the sample to 247 because 18 employees were no longer employed by BOP. To assess the RI process, we reviewed the personnel security data for all employees to determine the status of RIs that should have been completed by 1997. In addition, we further assessed the BI and RI program by examining the personnel security process that was conducted for 36 employees with substantiated allegations of serious misconduct that occurred during their BOP employment.7 This was done to determine whether there were weaknesses in the BI or RI process that may result in unsuitable employees being hired or retained. Lastly, we performed the same assessment on an additional 11 correctional officers who were arrested for bribery at one institution.
PRE-EMPLOYMENT SUITABILITY STEPS SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE EMPLOYEES ENTER ON DUTY
The first step in the BI process occurs at the institutions. After an individual is determined to be qualified for a position, institution personnel specialists are required to complete several pre-employment suitability steps and resolve derogatory issues prior to appointment of the individual. We found that the institutions were hiring employees before the pre-employment suitability steps were completed and were certified by the warden.
According to DOJ Order 2610.2A, if a BI has not been completed before an employee enters on duty, the employee must be granted a waiver of pre-employment suitability requirements, which BOP calls a warden certification. Before a warden certification is granted, institution personnel specialists are responsible for conducting a pre-employment review. This review includes conducting a pre-employment interview, conducting inquiries with the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and local law enforcement agencies, verifying employment and personal references, obtaining a credit report, scheduling a BI, and initiating the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) name and fingerprint checks. The personnel specialists, in accordance with BOP suitability policy and guidelines, resolve derogatory issues revealed by this pre-employment review before preparing a warden certification memorandum. By signing the certification memorandum, the warden is indicating that an applicant is suitable to assume a position of public trust based on the information revealed by the pre-employment review. The warden certification completes the first phase in the BI process and the only one to occur before an employee enters on duty. Therefore, it is especially important that institution personnel specialists complete all pre-employment steps and resolve derogatory issues prior to an employee entering on duty.
We examined personnel security files for the employees in the BI sample to determine whether they received a warden certification before entering on duty. Of the 247 employees in our BI sample, 66, or 27 percent, did not receive a warden certification before entering on duty (see Appendix III for information on the timeliness of warden certifications by region). The timeliness of the late warden certifications is as follows:
In addition to the 66 late warden certifications, 6 employees had no warden certification memoranda in their security files, and we could not determine whether these employees were certified before entering on duty.
We also determined whether institutions were completing all personnel security steps for the employees in our BI sample. Prior to September 30, 1996, institutions were not required to retain credit reports; therefore we could not accurately assess whether all pre-employment steps were completed and whether issues revealed during these steps were resolved. Program Statement (PS) 3000.02, dated September 30, 1996, required institutions to retain credit reports generated on applicants as part of the pre-employment process.
Of the 247 employees in our BI sample, 120 entered on duty after September 30, 1996. We found that for 7 employees hired after September 30, 1996, there was no evidence in the security files that personnel specialists had obtained credit reports or conducted law enforcement inquiries before the employees entered on duty. Without evidence of credit reports or law enforcement inquiries in the security files, the PSUs or SBIS cannot determine whether institutions have completed all pre-employment steps to ensure that employees are suitable to be hired.
We also examined whether derogatory issues revealed during the pre-employment suitability steps were being resolved by personnel specialists at the institution level. Based on available information, we found that personnel specialists resolved derogatory issues for 11 of 19 employees who had issues revealed during the pre-employment screening. However, the personnel specialists did not resolve the derogatory issues for 8 employees who had issues such as financial problems or drug use on the job. BOP PS 3000.02 requires that specific steps be taken to resolve derogatory issues before employees enter on duty. Failure on the part of the personnel specialists to resolve these issues allows potentially unsuitable employees to enter on duty and assume positions of public trust.
The warden certification memorandum includes an employee's social security number, BI schedule date, and projected entry-on-duty date and is sent to the SBIS and included in the employees security file. The memorandum does not indicate whether every pre-employment step was performed, whether derogatory issues revealed by these steps required resolution, and, if so, what actions were taken to resolve the derogatory issues. In addition, employee security files did not always contain the documents obtained during the pre-employment steps or the documents obtained during resolution. We believe the warden certification memorandum should list each pre-employment step and indicate that each step was completed. In addition, the warden certification memorandum should identify the derogatory issues that required resolution and indicate that resolution was completed.
The intent of warden certifications is to prevent unsuitable applicants from beginning employment and assuming a position of public trust. In BOP, wardens are responsible for certifying that required pre-employment reviews have been completed and that derogatory issues revealed by these steps have been resolved before an employee enters on duty. We found that BOP hired over one-fourth of the employees in our sample before the pre-employment reviews were completed. We believe that pre-employment steps should be recorded on the warden certification and that the documentation from these steps should be included in the security file. Also, derogatory issues revealed by the pre-employment reviews should be recorded on the warden certification memorandum and the supporting documentation used to resolve these issues should be included in the security file. These procedures will help ensure that the warden is aware of derogatory issues before allowing an employee to enter on duty and ensure that derogatory issues are resolved by institution personnel specialists before an employee enters on duty. These procedures also will serve as a record of pre-employment actions taken at the institution level.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, require the SBIS to:
PROCEDURES FOR RESOLVING DEROGATORY ISSUES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED
If derogatory information is revealed during the pre-employment process or in the OPM investigative reports, the institutions and PSUs must resolve them by comparing the derogatory issues with the Guidelines of Acceptability,8 which identify the criteria that disqualify new hires from being retained, or the Standards of Employee Conduct, which identify unacceptable behavior and options for disciplinary actions on employees who do not comply with the standards. Derogatory issues that exceed the guidelines or standards require resolution by institutions, PSUs, or SBIS.
An employee is afforded the opportunity to explain or refute derogatory information through a list of questions known as an interrogatory. If an employee's response to the interrogatory results in a satisfactory resolution according to the guidelines or standards, then the employees BI is favorably adjudicated. If the employee's response to the interrogatory does not satisfactorily resolve the derogatory issues, then a warden may remove the employee or recommend to a Regional Director that BOP's Guidelines of Acceptability for BIs be waived if he or she believes an employee is otherwise qualified for employment. The recommendation must provide the reasons for granting the waiver. The SBIS adjudicates the BI only after the Regional Director recommends a waiver to the guidelines. For RIs, a warden may choose to take disciplinary action, including removal, against an employee whose RI reveals serious derogatory issues.
BOP Should Require Waiver Procedures To Be Followed
BOPs personnel security procedures allow Regional Directors to recommend hiring individuals who have issues revealed during the pre-employment interview or the OPM investigative report that exceed the Guidelines of Acceptability. Individuals are given the opportunity to respond to the issues through an interrogatory so that the warden and Regional Director can determine whether they should recommend a waiver. Institution staff, including the warden and the Regional Director, prepare memoranda that contain the reasons they are recommending a waiver. Among the 244 employees in our sample, 7 employees received Regional Director waivers. The files showed that the employees failed to reveal prior issues during the pre-employment integrity interviews. The issues included indebtedness and two or more reprimands and a suspension for unprofessional conduct in prior positions.
In addition, we reviewed the BI and RI process for 36 BOP employees who had substantiated misconduct allegations between FYs 1994 and 1997. The misconduct allegations occurred after these employees were hired by BOP and included such offenses as bribery, sexual misconduct, drug violations, fraud, or aiding in the escape of an inmate issues that are directly related to the reliability and trustworthiness of an employee. For the 36 employees that had substantiated allegations of misconduct, 4 had issues that exceeded the Guidelines of Acceptability at the time they were hired and were granted Regional Director waivers. The following table shows more detailed information on the 4 employees who were granted Regional Director waivers.
Table II: Actions Associated with Regional Director Waivers Granted for Four BOP Employees with Substantiated Allegations
|Employee||Basis for Regional Director Waiver||Date of Waiver||Adjudication Time||Substantiated Allegation||Personnel Action|
|A||Prior drug usage, use of intoxicants, and financial responsibility issues.||11/14/91||20 months||Drug/Narcotic Violation||Terminated (9/6/96)|
|B||Integrity/honesty and fraudulent use of a telephone credit card issues.||8/5/93||2 months||Drug/Narcotic Violation||Resigned (12/20/96)|
|C||Integrity/honesty and financial responsibility issues.||6/13/96||7 months||Sexual Misconduct||Resigned (10/24/97)|
|D||Used marijuana at age 9, financial responsibility, integrity, prior violent behavior, and employment misconduct issues.||3/5/92||28 months||Drug/Narcotic Violation||Resigned (10/24/95)|
Source: SBIS security files.
We also found that waivers to the guidelines were not always requested when issues exceeded the guidelines. Our review of the personnel security files disclosed that 3 other employees in the sample had issues that exceeded the Guidelines of Acceptability and should have received waivers. These employees had issues such as drug use in the last five years and integrity issues involving an arrest for driving under the influence and narcotics possession and previous job misconduct. In one case, SBIS detected the absence of a Regional Director waiver and notified the Regional Human Resources Manager that the employee would not be penalized because the employee had revealed the drug use during the pre-employment integrity interview. SBIS favorably adjudicated the BI.
The BOPs Guidelines of Acceptability represent the minimum level of acceptable conduct for an individual seeking employment with BOP. We found that the Regional Director waivers provided sufficient information pertaining to the decisions regarding the exceptions to the guidelines. Although permitting waivers to the guidelines is an appropriate part of the personnel security process, hiring employees that exceed BOPs personnel security standards can create a potential security risk that may not be apparent at the institution or regional levels. Therefore, we are suggesting that BOP consider revising the process by requiring BOPs Security Program Manager to review SBISs final adjudication recommendations for employees that have issues that required a Regional Director waiver and to concur that the employee is an acceptable security risk. We are recommending that when SBIS finds instances when institutions and regional offices have not followed BOPs procedures for resolving issues that exceed the Guidelines of Acceptability, that SBIS require the institutions and regional offices to follow them. If institution and regional office staff determine that the employee should be retained, the Regional Director should recommend a waiver to the guidelines.
Procedures for Resolving Financial Issues Should be Followed
Financial issues including debts, bankruptcies, past due collections, and back taxes are the most prevalent suitability issues requiring resolution before an adjudication can be completed. Of the 244 employees with adjudicated BIs in our sample, 66 had derogatory issues that required resolution. Of the 66 employees with derogatory issues, 39 had financial issues, 15 had integrity issues, 6 had prior job misconduct issues, 2 had violence issues, and 4 had other issues, i.e., drug use or fraud. Almost 60 percent of the derogatory issues revealed in our BI sample that required resolution involved financial issues.
The Guidelines of Acceptability detail unacceptable derogatory financial issues and the actions that applicants must take to resolve these issues. For debts between $400 and $800 that are 90 days or more past due, an applicant must provide proof that arrangements for payment toward all delinquent debts have been made. For debts over $800 an applicant must provide proof that arrangements for payment toward all delinquent debts have been made and a regional director waiver must be obtained. In both instances, proof of a payment plan must be provided before entry on duty. If an applicant can show proof of a payment plan that existed before the pre-employment interview, no further resolution -- or a Regional Director waiver -- is required.
A March 10, 1998, DOJ memorandum revised the adjudication standards for indebtedness or debt-related issues for BIs. This memorandum eliminated any specific dollar amount threshold as the sole basis for identifying suitability or security concerns. Instead, it stated that BIs would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis for any concerns presented by the indebtedness. The memorandum also detailed steps to be taken to resolve debt issues, including verifying during the BI process that an employee was complying with a payment plan. Once a BI has been completed and an applicant has been found not to be complying with a payment plan, an unfavorable adjudication decision can be made. BOP transmitted the new DOJ indebtedness policy to the regional offices, PSUs, and institutions in a memorandum dated December 2, 1998. This memorandum stated that the debt thresholds identified in the Guidelines of Acceptability would continue to be followed. The BOP memorandum also stated that two current consecutive monthly payments will be required to satisfactorily adjudicate the investigation.
We found that it was difficult to determine whether institutions were resolving financial issues before employees entered on duty. Our review of the security files for the 39 employees with financial issues revealed that for 17 employees these issues were discovered during the pre-employment process by personnel specialists at the institutions. From our file review, we found that the same issues were revealed in the OPM reports for 7 of the 17 employees. In addition, there was no documentation in the security files showing that the personnel specialists resolved these issues: for example, documentation showing that the issues were within the guidelines and that a payment plan or a waiver was not required. Subsequent follow-up on these cases revealed that SBIS determined that the debt owed by the 7 employees was within the BOP guidelines and did not require resolution. We believe that SBIS should require that personnel specialists fully document the steps taken to resolve derogatory financial issues for all applicants. BOPs Program Statement 3000.02 requires that information resolving derogatory issues revealed in an OPM report be included in the security file. We believe that information resolving derogatory issues revealed during the pre-employment process should also be included in the security file.
The BOP has established the Guidelines of Acceptability as criteria for adjudicating employees BIs. Regional Directors, however, can waive the guidelines. Our review of the adjudication actions disclosed that regional office and institution staff were not always following the guidelines. We recommended that SBIS require institutions and regional office staff to comply with BOPs procedures for recommending waivers.
We found that financial issues are the most prevalent suitability issues requiring resolution; almost 60 percent of the derogatory issues revealed in our BI sample involved financial issues that required resolution. According to BOP guidelines, institutions are required to resolve derogatory financial issues disclosed during the pre-employment process before an employee enters on duty. We found that personnel specialists were not clearly and consistently documenting the steps taken to determine that employees derogatory financial issues were within the Guidelines of Acceptability.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, require the SBIS to:
ADJUDICATIONS FOR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS ON PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE MORE TIMELY
A one-year probationary period is required for employees newly hired by the federal government and initially appointed to career or career-conditional status. Untimely adjudications (those completed after the one-year probationary period) can create a problem if issues are disclosed during the BI process that warrant removal of the employee. According to 5 CFR, Part 315, probationary employees:
According to 5 CFR, Part 752, employees who have completed the one-year probationary period have appeal rights for any removal action an agency attempts to impose on the employee. Untimely adjudications for probationary employees who may need to be removed causes an unnecessary workload on the institution human resource managers and their staff that might be avoided if the adjudication process is completed during the probationary period.
In general, the USIS takes 120 days to complete BI investigative reports requested by the BOP. According to 5 CFR, Part 732, and DOJ Order 2610.2A, adjudications of BIs should be completed within 90 days of the completion of the OPM investigative report. Once the report is completed, the BOP has a total of 245 days to adjudicate BIs before employees complete their probationary periods. We found that of the 247 employees in our sample, 22 had been employed for more than one year before the adjudication was completed. A review of the NFC records showed that 20 of these 22 employees had completed the required probationary period before the adjudication process was concluded. It is important that SBIS adjudicate BIs within an employee's probationary period whenever possible because once an employee has completed the probationary period, the requirements and procedures for a removal, if necessary, become much more rigorous.
Adjudicating new employees within their one-year probationary period is important because requirements and procedures for removal become much more stringent after an employee has completed their probationary period.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, require the SBIS to:
WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
The PSUs and the SBIS are exceeding the 90-day adjudication standard for many BOP employees, including employees BI and RI reports coded by the OPM as having no derogatory issues. Overall, BIs for the 244 employees in our sample had been adjudicated but 148, or 61 percent, of these BIs were adjudicated late -- from 1 to 554 days beyond the 90-day standard. See Appendix IV for a summary of adjudication timeliness. We examined the security files for the employees' BIs that were not adjudicated within the 90-day standard to determine why the adjudications were delayed. We discovered that the security files did not identify specific actions in the adjudication process or reasons for the delays.
The order in which the SBIS and the PSUs adjudicate BIs is generally based on whether the report contains derogatory information and the receipt date of OPM investigative reports.9 The PSUs and the SBIS together have 90 days from completion of the OPM report to adjudicate the BI. The Chief, SBIS, stated that the SBIS manages adjudication workload based on the OPM issue codes and OPM report dates. She further stated that the oldest reports coded as having derogatory issues are adjudicated first. The SBIS also trains Security Specialists at the PSUs to identify and resolve issues in reports according to the oldest report date. The Chief stated that SBIS assigns one Security Specialist to adjudicate reports coded as having no issues and she believes that these reports are generally adjudicated within the 90-day standard.
Of the 244 employees with adjudicated BIs in our sample, 52 had OPM reports coded as having no derogatory issues. We found that almost half of these cases with no issues were not adjudicated within the 90-day standard, even though their BIs fell within BOPs Guidelines of Acceptability and did not have derogatory issues requiring resolution.
We examined the security files to determine the reasons for late adjudications and where in the process adjudications were being delayed. Ninety-eight files contained information that identified where delays in the process were occurring.10 In reviewing the available information in these security files, we could not determine the reasons for the delays because some of these files were missing information. We believe the SBIS could improve the timeliness of final adjudications if personnel security files contained a complete record of actions taken to process the BI or RI and support documentation for actions taken. Without this information, SBIS has no assurance that resolution and adjudication actions by the PSUs and institutions were performed. The SBIS staff indicated that during their final adjudication review they sometimes have to contact the PSUs or institutions to locate missing documents and determine what actions were taken. We believe that if the personnel security files are complete and there is a record or chronological list of actions, SBIS could process final adjudications more timely. The BOP should implement procedures to ensure that files fully reflect the actions taken by the PSUs and institutions and contain support documentation for the actions.
Another way the BOP could improve its adjudication timeliness for BIs is by allowing the PSUs to make the final adjudication for BIs that are coded by OPM as having no derogatory issues. These BIs generally do not have issues that require resolution and therefore do not require as much scrutiny as BIs coded by the OPM as having issues. SBIS rarely uncovers new adjudication issues in these BIs that OPM failed to identify. By delegating the adjudication authority to the PSUs, the BOP would remove one level of review, which would help ensure that these BIs are adjudicated within the 90-day standard. In addition, this delegation of authority would allow the SBIS to focus on those BIs that have issues that require resolution and to improve the adjudication timeliness for these BIs. We suggest the BOP consider delegating to PSUs the authority to grant final adjudications on BIs coded by OPM as having no issues.
The PSUs and the SBIS both review BIs for issues before making adjudication decisions. This process verifies that an adjudication decision made at one level is considered appropriate by the next review level. At the time of our inspection, we were informed by the BOP Labor Management Relations and Security Branch that the feasibility of shifting the work performed by the PSUs to SBIS was being studied. Under this proposal, the SBIS would begin assuming workload and tasks currently performed by the PSUs in FY 2000 and the PSUs would be eliminated in FY 2001. This initiative could potentially decrease the average adjudication time by removing the duplication of effort from the BOP personnel security process.
We found that the SBIS has no assurance that adjudication actions at each level of review have occurred because many of the security files were missing necessary information. The SBIS had to contact the PSUs and institutions to verify that all necessary actions had been taken, adding time to the final adjudication period. We believe the BOP should implement procedures to ensure that adjudication activities at each level of review are recorded in each security file. This documentation will help ensure that the SBIS can track whether specific adjudication steps have occurred at each stage of the process and determine where and why adjudications are delayed. In addition, about 60 percent of the employees with adjudicated BIs in our sample were not adjudicated within the 90-day standard. Also, about one-half of the employees in our sample whose BIs were coded by OPM as having no issues had adjudications that exceeded the 90-day standard. We believe that BOP could delegate the final adjudication for employees with BIs or RIs coded as having no issues to the PSUs to improve the adjudication timeliness of BIs and RIs.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, require SBIS to:
MOST REINVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED
The BOP requires that RIs be conducted every five years for its employees. The SBIS enters RI data into its own database, as well as into SETS, the SEPS database. At the beginning of each fiscal year the SBIS extracts data from the SETS and the SBIS database to identify employees who require an RI and sends this information to the institutions for RI scheduling.
We found that the SETS and SBIS databases did not provide accurate information on RIs due so we compared information in these databases with the information in OPM's database,11 which is a repository for personnel security information on federal employees. We found that out of 7,113 RIs that were due in FY 1997 and prior, BOP had completed 6,995 -- only 118 RIs remained to be completed. 12 The SBIS, therefore, has ensured that RIs are completed in a timely manner on the majority of BOP employees. According to the SBIS staff, the delays in scheduling RIs are due to employees who transfer from one institution to another or employees who are detailed from one position to another.
DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE SBIS DATABASE AND PERSONNEL SECURITY FILES SHOULD BE CORRECTED
A more effective database management approach is needed to accurately reflect personnel security information on BOP employees. We compared four databases for our assessment of database accuracy:
During this review, we compared the SBIS hard-copy personnel security files
and the SBIS database for our BI sample of 247 employees and found disparities between the two. The database file should match the information in the personnel security file so that accurate BI and RI information can be easily accessed without resorting to retrieval of hardcopy security files. We noted the following discrepancies between the SBIS database and the hardcopy security files:
The SBIS does not conduct file audits except when a file first arrives in the office from a PSU or activating institution, or when more documentation arrives for filing in the security file. We believe that periodic file audits comparing the personnel security files and the automated record of that file should be conducted more frequently. The information in the SBIS database cannot be relied on if it differs from information in the personnel security files and other databases containing similar information. The accuracy of the SBIS database is especially important because SBIS is relying on its database to identify RI due dates. We believe that SBIS should conduct periodic file audits and compare its database to other personnel security databases to improve its database accuracy.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, instruct the SBIS to:
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS THAT ARE TRANSFERABLE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY BOP
The BOP is conducting background investigations on new employees who may not require another investigation. An SBIS official said that many previous background investigations on employees transferring from outside the Department were not being accepted by BOP. The official also told us that military BIs for military personnel who joined BOP as new employees were not accepted. DOJ Order 2610.2A states previous background investigations will be accepted if the following criteria are met:
According to the DOJ Order, even if the previous investigation does not meet all of the above standards, a supplemental investigation can be conducted instead of a completely new one, provided the usual FBI name and fingerprint checks are also conducted. An SBIS official explained that previous BIs on employees who transfer from other agencies are not accepted because these BIs usually lack the investigative depth BOP requires for its public trust positions. The official did not know why previous BIs on former military personnel were not accepted.
An OPM official told us that the depth of its investigations can be adjusted to accommodate individual customer needs. This could be done for employees who transfer from other agencies and whose previous BIs do not fully conform to BOP requirements for public trust positions. Thus, BOP could ask OPM to perform modified BIs for these employees. Also, BOP should accept previous BIs for former military personnel whose BIs meet the standards of the DOJ Order. The OPM's 1998 billing rate was $1,895 for each BI and $115 for each RI. Accepting previous background investigations, or adjusting investigation requirements for transferring employees, could prove to be a savings in both time and money for BOP.
We found that the BOP is conducting background investigations on new employees who may not require another full investigation. By accepting previous background investigations that meet BOP standards, or adjusting investigation requirements for transferring employees, the BOP could save both time and money on background investigations.
The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, BOP, require the SBIS to:
7 Substantiated allegations are allegations of misconduct that are found to be true. Serious misconduct included bribery, fraud, abetting escape of an inmate, and drug and sex violations.
8 The guidelines excuse issues such as some prior employment actions, and prior military judicial and non-judicial punishments.
9 OPM gives each investigative report an issue code that identifies whether the report contains derogatory issues and the severity of those issues.
10 The 98 files were delayed at the following levels: 14 at the activating institutions, 34 at the PSUs, and 50 at SBIS.
11 The SETS and SBIS database did not provide accurate information on RIs due because information was not entered consistently in either one from FY 1991 to FY 1992.
12 Of the 118 unscheduled RIs, 102 were due in FY 1997 and 16 were due prior to FY 1997 (10 were due in FY 1996, 4 were due in FY 1995, and 2 were due in FY 1993).
13 For FY 1999, SBIS used its own database to determine RI due dates.