OIG Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2007-001

Follow-up Review of the Critical Incident Response Plans of the United States Attorneys’ Offices

Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2007-001
January 2007
Office of the Inspector General

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW

EOUSA and the CTS developed a revised “model plan” that encompassed prior OIG recommendations.

EOUSA and the CTS provided improved training and guidance to CMCs.

EOUSA and the CTS directed the USAOs to revise their CIRPs based on the “model plan,” and had the CIRPs reviewed by an expert panel.

EOUSA and CTS instructed USAOs to test their revised CIRPs by conducting exercises and to complete after-action reports on the results of the exercises.

EOUSA incorporated questions into its triennial reviews of the USAOs to assess the USAOs’ ability to respond to a critical incident.

EOUSA monitored USAOs’ completion of CIRP activities through approximately June 2005.

Since June 2005, the USAOs have regressed in their critical incident preparation activities, and EOUSA and the CTS have not continued to provide direction and support to the USAOs.

The USAOs have not conducted CIRP exercises on an annual basis.

USAOs have not continued to complete after-action reports.

USAOs are not utilizing the information-sharing capabilities provided by the CTS.

EOUSA no longer assists the CTS with the USAOs’ critical incident response preparation.

EOUSA removed the USAOs’ performance measures assessing the CIRP Program.

Competing responsibilities have diminished the National Coordinator’s effectiveness with the CMC Program.

EOUSA and the CTS have failed to ensure that newly appointed CMCs have received training.

EOUSA and the CTS never ensured that all 93 CIRPs are acceptable.

During the course of our review, we identified two areas that are adversely affecting the CMC Program

Budget shortages and rescissions have limited the ability of AUSAs to complete non-prosecutorial functions.

Turnover among AUSAs serving as CMCs adversely affects USAOs’ critical incident response preparedness.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APPENDICES:

CIRP ACTIVATIONS SINCE OUR 2003 REVIEW

Survey

EOUSA RESPONSE

NSD RESPONSE

OIG ANALYSIS of EOUSA and NSD RESPONSE

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