The Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization

Audit Report 04-39
September 2004
Office of the Inspector General


Redacted and Unclassified
Appendix X

Federal Bureau of Investigation Response


  U. S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

September 10, 2004



Ms. Carol S. Taraszka, Regional Audit Manager
Chicago Regional Office
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
500 W. Madison Street, Suite 3510A
Chicago, IL 60661-2590

Dear Ms. Taraszka:

In connection with the audit, The Internal Effects of the FBI's Reprioritization Efforts, attached is the FBI's response to the audit report. The FBI has conducted classification and sensitivity reviews. Attached is the audit report with portion markings.

In addition, the Criminal Investigation Division provided the following comments:

First page (i):
The second paragraph is not fairly stated considering the number of proactive investigations being pursued against organized criminal enterprises, white collar crime, and public corruption. The paragraph, as written, would be fine if we were only engaged in violent crimes and civil rights.

Page 12:
The chart is missing data for the Organized Crime/Drug Program.

Page 37:
Exhibit 3-11 reflects an AOB change for 196C cases with numbers reflected as 73 and 54. CID could not determine the significance of these numbers. AOB for 196C cases were as follows: 159 in 2000, 177 in 2001, 182 in 2002, and 250 in 2003. Overall, the purpose of the last column of numbers is suspect.

Pages 40 and 46:
Case classifications and names are not readable.

Page 49:
Exhibit 4-2 should reflect 491 agents for the Drug Program in FY 2002.

Page 50:
Exhibit 4-3 should reflect 1677 for the 2002 FSL (not considering the FSL for CEI).

Page 55:
Exhibit 4-6 is incomplete.

Page 55:
"According to FBI officials, little written direction was given to the field with regard to the reprioritization and the specific impact it would have on violent crime investigations. Rather, FBI incorporated aspects of this reprioritization and the program plans it issues annually to the field . Although we observed slight changes in the priority list between the two fiscal years, as shown in Exhibit 4-7, the FBI's national priorities for violent crime matters have essentially remained the same since FY 2001."

This paragraph seems to implicitly criticize that our priorities within the program have not changed as a result of 9-11, and that we should have reprioritized based on their resource utilization analysis. This is incorrect. Priorities are based on the crime problem and not resource utilization. All of our intelligence and latest crime survey indicates that the crime problems identified as priorities have not changed and, thus, the priorities should not be changed.

The paragraph also seems to imply criticism about the lack of written direction given to the field based on input from (unnamed) FBI officials. The program plan contains specific direction and courses of action for the field in the SAC Guidance section for each goal and objective. In addition to the program plan and the field guidance ECs on the list previously provided, CID also issued guidance regarding priorities in EC dated 10/21/2003, 66F-HQ-A1246974-A, Serial 582. In addition to previous guidance VCS recently issued updated guidance on appropriate response to bank robberies in same file, Serial 963. There are other specific ECs regarding on specific initiatives such as the Child Prostitution Initiative, Retail Theft Initiative, Violent Cities Initiative, as well as guidance ECs related to dealing with FAMS and TSA.

Page 56:
"As was the case with other criminal investigative programs, FBI officials stated that the FBI's violent crime efforts would focus primarily on the "big players". However, SACs were advised to use their discretion in allocating limited violent crime resources to matters that were most problematic within their jurisdiction."

This is also misleading. First of all, CID did not issue guidance of this kind to SACs, as stated. SACs are supposed to establish priorities based on the national priorities and the crime problem identified in their divisions, and allocate resources accordingly. This guidance is also contained in the program plan.

The final recommendation:
"Consider developing evaluation models similar to the ones presented in this report to assist in managing FBI programs."

The CID already does this in a variety of ways. That said, the CID concurs with the recommendation.

We appreciate the efforts of the OIG to assist the FBI in adapting to the post 9/11 environment and the significant changes the organization has undergone. Should you have any further questions please contact me at (202) 324 2901 or Ms. Robin Dinerman at (202) 324-6389.

Sincerely,


Donald W. Thompson, Jr.
Acting Assistant Director
Inspection Division

Redacted and Unclassified