DEPARTMENT COMPONENTS LACK EFFECTIVE CONTROLS FOR REPORTING ACCURATE TERRORISM STATISTICS

Department components did not accurately report terrorism-related statistics in their annual budgets, financial statements, performance plans, and statistical reports. For most statistics we tested, the component either could not provide support for the numbers reported or could not identify the terrorism link used to classify statistics as terrorism-related. Some of the statistics were significantly overstated and some understated. We concluded that the components lacked effective internal controls to ensure accurate reporting of terrorism-related statistics.

Our Audit Approach

We developed a universe of 209 terrorism-related statistics that were reported by the Department and its components from October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2005. The 209 statistics were reported at least 602 times. Seventeen of the 209 statistics were obtained from agencies outside the Department, such as the Departments of Treasury, State, Defense, and Homeland Security. Because these 17 statistics were not gathered by the Department, we excluded them from our review. The 17 statistics originating outside the Department accounted for 98 of the 602 times that the 209 statistics were reported.

The remaining 192 terrorism-related statistics were reported by and sourced to the FBI, the Criminal Division, the USAOs, and the Department as a whole. We divided the 192 statistics into two groups. The first group consisted of statistics used primarily for operational purposes that were reported in annual budgets, annual financial statements, statistical reports, and performance plans. The second group consisted of statistics used primarily for informational purposes reported in speeches, press releases, and unclassified publications. We classified 123 of the 192 statistics as operational and the remaining 69 as informational.

For our initial testing, we interviewed Department officials from the FBI, EOUSA, the Criminal Division, and other Department agencies to determine whether internal controls were in place and documented to ensure the 192 statistics were accurately gathered, classified, and reported.²² Through the interviews, we learned that the Department’s collection and reporting of terrorism-related statistics is haphazard. Often, the official who reported the statistic gathered the statistic through telephone requests or e-mail to other Department staff. Also, for many statistics reported, Department officials either had not established internal controls to accurately gather, classify, and report the statistics, or did not document the internal controls used.

For the 192 statistics reviewed, 2 were based on survey instruments sent by EOUSA to the 93 United States Attorneys. For these two statistics, we did not assess the extent that internal controls were established over this survey process. Two other statistics simply reported that an annual threat forecast was disseminated or that an anti-terrorism task force was established in each of the 94 USAOs. Therefore we did not assess the extent that internal controls were established over these processes. In addition, we could not determine if internal controls were established and documented for 55 other statistics because the reporting agency officials either could not explain where the statistics originated or could not readily determine the controls established and documented. For the remaining 133 statistics, the status of internal controls is shown in the following table. As noted in the table, controls for some statistics were both established and documented as required. Controls for other statistics were either established but not documented or not established at all.

Summary of Analyses of Internal Controls for Terrorism-Related Statistics
Reported by the Department and its Components

After the initial testing, we focused our detailed testing on the 123 operational statistics that we considered to be most central to the Department’s counterterrorism objectives. For each of the 123 operational statistics, we interviewed Department officials to identify the source of the statistics, the information systems used to gather and report the statistics, and the internal controls established to verify the accuracy of the statistics gathered and reported. We excluded 16 operational statistics for which Department officials could not identify the source.²⁴ Because Department officials could not identify the source of these 16 statistics, we could not determine if the statistics were accurately reported or whether adequate internal controls were established to ensure their accuracy.

Twelve of the 16 statistics were reported in various FBI budget requests or performance plans and the remaining 4 were reported in budget related testimony by the Attorney General. These included the number of: (1) disrupted donors related to terrorist financing, (2) weapons of mass destruction cases initiated by the FBI and supported by the Hazardous Material Response Unit, and (3) subpoenas and search warrants issued to gather and cultivate detailed intelligence on terrorists in the United States. We believe the Department should not report terrorism-related statistics unless it maintains evidence to support the statistics.

For the remaining 107 operational statistics, we eliminated 48 from testing in this audit because the statistics or the systems supporting them had been previously reviewed by the OIG and recommendations for improvement made, where appropriate.

From the remaining 59 operational statistics, we selected 26 statistics for detailed testing based on our assessment of the significance of the statistic to the Department’s counterterrorism efforts and of the risk associated with reporting the statistic inaccurately. The 26 operational statistics included:

• 10 from the FBI that were reported 13 times (see FBI Terrorism Statistics section of this report),

• 11 from the USAOs that were reported 20 times (see EOUSA Terrorism Statistics section of this report), and

• 5 from the Criminal Division that were reported 9 times (see Criminal Division Terrorism Statistics section of this report).

We found that the FBI, EOUSA, and the Criminal Division either: (1) could not provide documentation to support the numbers reported for the statistics, (2) could not provide documentation of the terrorism link used to classify statistics as terrorism-related, or (3) provided documentation to show that the occurrence of the transactions reported did not always agree with the period reported. Some of the statistics were significantly overstated or understated, while others were overstated or understated by minor amounts.

As summarized in the following table, the FBI, EOUSA, and the Criminal Division did not accurately report 24 of the 26 statistics we reviewed.

Summary Results: Review of Selected
Terrorism-Related Statistics Reported by
the Department and its Components

We also concluded that the FBI, EOUSA and the USAOs, and the Criminal Division had not established effective internal controls to ensure the statistics were accurately gathered, classified, and reported. Terrorism-related statistics are considered in budgetary and operational decisions by Department management, the President and Congress. Therefore, it is essential that the Department and its component agencies make every effort to ensure the accuracy of the statistics reported.

Our detailed testing of the accuracy of the 26 statistics reported is discussed in the following sections.

FBI TERRORISM STATISTICS

We tested 10 FBI operational statistics reported 13 times from October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2005. For each of the 10 statistics tested, we reviewed evidence in support of each statistic, as well as the internal controls in place to ensure the statistics were accurately reported. As shown in the following charts, we found that the FBI did not accurately report 8 of the 10 statistics we tested.

OIG Analysis of Terrorism-Related Statistics Reported by the FBI [Image Not Available Electronically]

Source: FBI budget requests and performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff Chart Endnotes The number supported for this statistic is based on a sample of transactions reported. Therefore, the number supported could be less than shown in the table and the difference could be more based on a 100-percent review of transactions reported. The 2,622 reported for FY 2004 was reported twice – once in the classified portion of the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress and once in the FBI’s FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan. Thus the statistic was inaccurately reported twice. According to an FBI official, the reported threats included only threats tracked by the FBI’s Threat Monitoring Unit and accounted for only about 40 percent of the threats actually tracked by the FBI. The FBI official said that the remaining 60 percent of threats were tracked by FBI field offices during FY 2003, and also by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit, and the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Sections during FY 2004. As a result, the number of threats actually tracked by the FBI during FY 2003 and FY 2004 was significantly understated. The threats reported for FY 2004 were for only 9 months, from January through September 2004. An FBI official told us that threat data for all of FY 2004 was not reported because of the timing of the request from the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section. The official said his unit began capturing threats in May or June 2004, and in December 2004 or January 2005 the Administrative Section requested the threat data for FY 2004. The official said that at that time his unit had begun identifying and counting the threats prior to May or June 2004 but had not completed the process. Therefore, he reported the threat data for the 9 months (January through September 2004) that had been completed. Thus, the FBI understated the threats in this category for FY 2004 since data was not reported for 25 percent of the fiscal year.

1. Number of Terrorism-Related Convictions

The FBI’s FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan includes a performance goal to “Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur.” In its FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported that its investigations resulted in 206 convictions during FY 2004 towards the achievement of this performance goal. To determine the accuracy of the reported convictions, we first obtained a listing from the FBI’s Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis System showing details of the 206 convictions reported for FY 2004. We then selected a judgmental sample of 107 of the 206 convictions by selecting all the convictions reported by the 7 FBI field offices with the highest number of reported convictions (El Paso, Texas - 32; Dallas, Texas - 22; Salt Lake City, Utah - 17; Atlanta, Georgia – 12; Richmond, Virginia – 10; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania – 8; and Charlotte, North Carolina - 6). Next, we reviewed the case files and held discussions with the case agents regarding whether the individuals in these 107 cases were convicted of or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related crimes, and how the convictions met the FBI’s performance goal of “Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur.” We found that:

• The case agents could explain and provide documentation to link only 42 of the 107 convictions to the achievement of the FBI’s performance goal. Only 4 of these 42 individuals were actually convicted of or pleaded guilty to a crime under a terrorism statute.

• Seven of the remaining 65 convictions were erroneously entered into the Automated Case Tracking System (ACS) twice.

Some examples of convictions that the FBI reported as helping achieve its performance goal of preventing, disrupting, or defeating terrorist operations before they occur, but for which the FBI could not provide documentation to support a link to terrorism are as follows:

• The subject, an Iranian national, made false statements while being interviewed by an FBI agent. The FBI agent’s summary of the case indicated that no evidence of terrorism was discovered. However, the subject was shown to be a pathological liar who was not able to provide truthful information about anything. The FBI agent said that none of the collateral interviews conducted uncovered any terrorist activity. The subject was convicted of knowingly and willfully making a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.

• The subject was employed by a state Department of Motor Vehicles and was responsible for receiving and approving applications from individuals for the issuance of driver’s licenses. In exchange for money, the subject conspired with others to arrange for driver’s licenses to be issued illegally to individuals who were not legally qualified to obtain the driver’s licenses. The case evidence provided by the FBI contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an FBI official to provide additional evidence to support a terrorism link, the official provided no additional evidence. The subject was convicted of: (1) conspiring to commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, and (2) producing a fraudulent identification document.

• The subject telephoned the local police department and reported that 30 vials of Yersinia Pestis bacteria, the infectious agent of bubonic plague, could not be located. During FBI questioning, the subject admitted that he had accidentally destroyed the vials and made up the story in an effort to account for the vials. The case evidence provided to us by the FBI contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an FBI official to provide additional evidence to support a terrorism link, the official provided no additional evidence and told us that, had the bacteria actually been missing and not destroyed, the potential would have existed for terrorists to get and use the missing bacteria to perform a terrorist act. The subject was convicted of making a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement and misrepresenting that hazardous materials were contained in the missing package.

• A Bosnian subject fraudulently obtained a commercial driver’s license. The case evidence provided to us by the FBI contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. The subject was convicted of knowingly using a false social security number on a commercial driver’s license application. When we asked an FBI official to provide additional evidence to support a terrorism link, the official provided no additional evidence and told us that the resulting conviction stopped the fraudulent activity and could have prevented a terrorist from getting a commercial driver’s license and using it to commit a terrorist act. The official also stated that by opening the case as a domestic terrorism investigation instead of a white-collar crime investigation the case would get a higher priority.

We concluded that the FBI overstated the 206 terrorism-related convictions reported for FY 2004 by at least 65. We believe the reported convictions were overstated because the FBI initially coded the investigative cases as terrorism-related when the cases were opened, but did not recode the cases when no link to terrorism was established.

An FBI official told us that the fact that the individuals were not charged with terrorism offenses and received light sentences does not mean that: (1) the subjects were not linked to terrorism, or (2) the conviction of the subjects did not prevent future terrorist acts from being committed. However, while we accept the FBI’s statement in principle, and did consider a connection to be terrorism-related if there was any evidence of a terrorism link, we found none in many cases. Absent evidence of a terrorism link these convictions should not be considered terrorism-related.

2. Intelligence Information Reports

The FBI’s Intelligence Information Reports are the standard vehicle through which all raw intelligence information is shared with national policy makers and the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The reports disseminate potentially actionable intelligence to staff of the FBI, intelligence community agencies, the White House, the State Department, the military, and other selected federal agencies. The reports detail specific results of classified intelligence collected on internationally based terrorist suspects and activities.  By design, the reports are not analyses or necessarily validated intelligence, and are not broad assessments or estimates. The FBI’s Terrorism Reports and Requirements Section (TRRS) maintains a database called Zeus that contains details of the Intelligence Information Reports issued.²⁵

In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the FBI reported issuing 1,731 Intelligence Information Reports during FY 2003. In the same budget request and in its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported issuing 2,622 Intelligence Information Reports during FY 2004.²⁶ Because budget requests and performance plans are prepared many months before the start of the fiscal year, the FBI usually reports actual data for the fiscal year that is two years prior to the fiscal year for which the budget requests and performance plans are prepared. As shown in the following charts, we found that the Zeus database used by the TRRS to track the number of Intelligence Information Reports did not support the statistics reported for either FY 2003 or FY 2004.

 

Source: FBI budget requests and performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

According to the TRRS officials, draft intelligence reports are submitted through the FBI’s Intelligence Information Reports Dissemination System (FIDS). Once the reports are submitted through FIDS, the report data is recorded in the Automated Case Tracking System (ACS). The Intelligence Information Reports are prepared from the draft intelligence reports, approved by management, and issued to agencies outside the FBI. The intelligence report data is then uploaded from the ACS and logged into the Zeus database. According to TRRS officials, the Intelligence Information Reports are uploaded and verified monthly against information contained in the Zeus database. However, this quality control process for uploading and verifying the information is not documented and does not appear to prevent the inaccurate reporting of Intelligence Information Reports issued.

A TRRS official told us that the differences between the numbers reported in the budget and performance plan and the Zeus database could have resulted from how the database was queried based on how the initial request for the Intelligence Information Reports was worded. However, the official could not provide documentation to show how the initial request was worded or how the database was queried to meet the request. The official also told us that the number of Intelligence Information Reports reissued, corrected, and recalled, or additional information added to the Intelligence Information Reports, could also have affected the accuracy of the number of Intelligence Information Reports tracked in the Zeus database for FY 2003 and FY 2004.

3. Intelligence Assessments

The FBI’s Intelligence Assessments are finished intelligence products resulting from the intelligence analysis process. Intelligence Assessments contain analyses of various types of intelligence data and are disseminated to the FBI, intelligence community agencies, the White House, the State Department, the military, and other selected federal agencies. The FBI’s Global Terrorism Analysis Unit (GTAU) maintains a local database application that contains details of the Intelligence Assessments issued.²⁷

In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported issuing 133 Intelligence Assessments during FY 2004. As shown in the following chart, we found that the database used by the GTAU to track the Intelligence Assessments issued did not match the number reported for FY 2004.

Source: FBI performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

A GTAU official told us that the inaccurate reporting of Intelligence Assessments issued likely occurred because: (1) staff did not enter Intelligence Assessments in the database in a timely manner, and (2) the database was queried by calendar year or other specific time periods instead of by fiscal year. However, the official could not provide documentation to show how the database was queried to derive the number of assessments reported.

According to a GTAU official, the FBI units that issue the Intelligence Assessments enter the details of the assessments issued into a database. The GTAU relies on the originating FBI units to enter all the Intelligence Assessments in the database. T here are no internal controls in place for gathering and verifying the accuracy of Intelligence Assessments tracked in the database. The GTAU official responsible for accumulating the statistic said that when she began her job in February 2004 there were no formalized procedures on how to collect, verify, and report the Intelligence Assessments issued and no formalized procedures have been developed since.

4. Intelligence Bulletins

The FBI Intelligence Bulletin is a finished intelligence product used to disseminate information of interest, such as significant developments and trends, to the intelligence and law enforcement communities in an article format. Intelligence Bulletins do not address threat warning information.

Units within the National Threat Center Section (NTCS)²⁸ and the Counterterrorism Analysis Section (CTAS)²⁹ produced and disseminated Intelligence Bulletins on behalf of the FBI during FY 2004 through FY 2006. Within the NTCS, the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit (TWWU) produced a numbered series of Intelligence Bulletins intended primarily for U.S. law enforcement agencies. The first such Bulletin was disseminated in February 2004, and in August 2004 TWWU began producing the bulletins jointly with the Department of Homeland Security. TWWU tracked the details of its Bulletins in word processing files that captured the title, date of dissemination, and subject matter of each bulletin. Within the CTAS during FY 2004 and continuing through FY 2006, a GTAU staff member used a local database application to track Intelligence Bulletins issued by all of the CTAS units.

In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported issuing 63 Intelligence Bulletins during FY 2004. As shown in the following chart, we found that the word processing file used by the TWWU and the database used by the GTAU to track Intelligence Bulletins issued did not match the number reported in FY 2004.

Source: FBI performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

According to an official of the former TWWU, once Intelligence Bulletins were approved for dissemination during FY 2004 data regarding the Bulletins was entered in the word processing files for tracking. The former TWWU used an internal checklist that guided an analyst through the stages of Bulletin production, review, dissemination, and administrative upkeep. However, the checklist was not accompanied by an explanation of responsibilities and processes for collecting, verifying, and reporting the Intelligence Bulletins issued. During FY 2004, and continuing through July 2005, a TWWU staff member provided monthly to a GTAU Official the number of Bulletins issued.

The problems with tracking Intelligence Bulletins are like those with tracking Intelligence Assessments, according to a GTAU official. The FBI units that issue the bulletins either enter their details into a database or provide the GTAU staff the details and the GTAU staff enters them in the database. The GTAU official relies on the originating FBI units to either enter all the Intelligence Bulletins in the database or notify the GTAU official of the bulletins. T here are no internal controls in place for gathering and verifying the accuracy of Intelligence Bulletins tracked in the database. A GTAU official responsible for accumulating the statistic said that when she began her job in February 2004, there were no formalized procedures on how to collect, verify, and report the Intelligence Bulletins issued and no formalized procedures have been developed since.

According to a Threat Analysis Unit (TAU) official, in June 2006 the CTAS established a new tracking and monitoring intelligence production and dissemination system where all Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, and other intelligence products are logged into a spreadsheet application. As of November 2006, the procedures on how to collect, verify, and report the Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, and other intelligence products issued were formalized in standard operating procedures at the unit level, but had not been formalized at the section level other than a production process checklist.

5. Intelligence Products Produced/Disseminated

The FBI produces and disseminates various intelligence products designed to inform the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities of terrorist-related activities and issues. As previously discussed, these intelligence products include Intelligence Information Reports, Intelligence Assessments, and Intelligence Bulletins. The intelligence products are disseminated to U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities by posting them on various community websites. The FBI’s Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Unit 1 (IRCMU1), which is part of the FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence, maintains a spreadsheet application containing details of all Intelligence Information Reports, Intelligence Assessments, and Intelligence Bulletins disseminated by the FBI for use by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities.

In its FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported that 1,657 intelligence products were produced and disseminated to the intelligence community and other federal entities during FY 2004. As shown in the following chart, we found that the spreadsheet used by the IRCMU1 to track the intelligence products disseminated by the FBI did not match the number reported for FY 2004.

Source: FBI performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by such staff

According to IRCMU1 officials, the accurate number of all intelligence products produced and disseminated by the FBI in FY 2004 was 6,739. However, the officials also said that the description of the statistic included in the Performance Plan did not reflect the statistic the FBI intended to report. The reported number of 1,657 was intended to include only the Intelligence Information Reports produced and disseminated by the Counterintelligence Division rather than all intelligence products from the whole FBI as reflected in the statistic description. The officials said that the accurate number of Intelligence Information Reports for the Counterterrorism Division was 1,667 and that 1,657 were reported as a result of a clerical error. We were unable to verify the 1,667 reports officials said should have been reported, and we found that support was available for the 6,739 products officials said were produced and disseminated during FY 2004. Among the 6,739 were 4,682 Intelligence Information Reports produced and disseminated by the Counterintelligence Division.

Officials of the IRCMU1 told us that the dissemination statistics discussed here are an incomplete measure of FBI intelligence dissemination. The officials said that Intelligence Information Reports are disseminated through the FBI’s Communications Center via the Special Automated Messaging Network, and for Intelligence Assessments and Intelligence Bulletins through the use of distribution lists. As a separate process, the FBI posts intelligence products to various websites that include Law Enforcement On Line and Secure Internet Protocol Routed Network, among others, as part of its ongoing effort to broadly share information that may be of value.

An IRCMU1 official told us that approximately 2,200 Intelligence Information Reports had been produced as of September 30, 2004, but not posted to various websites. While dissemination of the products occurs primarily through other means, posting of the products to the websites is important because it provides the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities with researchable material and common access to intelligence information. The IRCMU1 official told us that the divisions were not timely in posting the Intelligence Information Reports to the websites because of a shortage of personnel to do the posting. She identified 5,745 Intelligence Information Reports that had been produced by the Counterterrorism Division but not posted to the websites as of May 31, 2006. The IRCMU1 official said that as of November 2006 the problem of Intelligence Information Reports not being posted to the websites in a timely manner continued to exist.

In summary, the FBI did not accurately report the number of intelligence products produced and disseminated to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities during FY 2004 because the title of the reported statistic was poorly worded and did not represent the data that the FBI intended to report. Directorate of Intelligence officials told us that after FY 2004 the titles of statistics reported were changed to accurately reflect the data presented. In addition, the officials said that the FBI has improved its statistical reporting system through the use of the FBI Intelligence Dissemination System, which became operational in FY 2005 and helped standardize production and collection of statistical data. The officials said that in FY 2005 the Directorate of Intelligence has instituted a monthly Program Review Process to provide a more mature system for gathering and verifying program data. The officials told us that internal controls are now in place for gathering and verifying the number of Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, and Intelligence Information Reports that have been posted to the websites by the four FBI divisions.

6. Terrorist Threats

The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division oversees FBI counterterrorism initiatives, and the Division’s Threat Monitoring Unit (TMU) supports the FBI's role by receiving, assessing, and disseminating threat information and suspicious activity. The TMU reports threats tracked to the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section.

In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the FBI reported 515 terrorism threats tracked during FY 2003, and 4,499 during FY 2004. However, the number reported for FY 2003 represented only the last 2 months of FY 2003 instead of the entire year. As shown in the following charts, we found that the database used by the TMU to track threats did not support the numbers reported for FY 2003 or FY 2004.

 

Source: FBI budget requests, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

The inaccuracies occurred primarily because the reported statistics included threats that were counted multiple times. According to a TMU official, the TMU reported threats being tracked each month and the subsequent month’s count of threats tracked included threats counted during previous months that were still being investigated and tracked. The threats reported each month of the fiscal year were then added together to come up with the total threats tracked during the year. Consequently, the total threats reported as tracked during FY 2003 and FY 2004 included duplicate threats.

Through further discussions with TMU officials, we also determined the total number of threats reported as tracked during FY 2003 and FY 2004 did not include all of the threats tracked by the FBI. The reported threats included only threats tracked by the TMU and, according to a TMU official, this accounted for only about 40 percent of the threats actually tracked by the FBI. The TMU official said that the remaining 60 percent of threats tracked by the FBI were tracked by FBI field offices during FY 2003, and by the field offices, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit, and the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Sections during FY 2004.³⁰ As a result, the number of threats actually tracked by the FBI during FY 2003 and FY 2004 was significantly understated.

In addition to inaccurately reporting the threats tracked, the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress significantly overstated the change between the number of threats tracked during FY 2003 and FY 2004. As discussed previously, the FBI reported 515 threats tracked for FY 2003 but the number reported represented only the last 2 months of FY 2003. The FBI reported 4,499 threats tracked for FY 2004 and reported an 800 percent increase in threats tracked for FY 2004 (4,499 FY 2004 threats minus 515 FY 2003 threats divided by 515 FY 2003 threats). But since the threats reported for FY 2003 were for 2 months and the threats reported for FY 2004 were for 12 months, the percent change from FY 2003 to FY 2004 was significantly overstated.

According to a TMU official, from September 1, 2003, until August 31, 2004, the TMU tracked threats received by reviewing e-mails, phone calls, and threat matrix reports. Threat matrix reports are daily reports that identify various threats against the United States and are produced by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).³¹ The TMU then manually entered the threats into a local database application. Since September 1, 2004, threats classified up to the Secret level are entered by many FBI components into the FBI's Guardian Threat Tracking System.³² However, because Guardian is only classified up to the Secret level, a small percentage of cases (less than 1 percent according to a TMU official) are still entered in the TMU’s local database application. The Guardian system was pilot tested in 8 FBI field offices beginning on July 8, 2004, and was on-line in all 56 FBI field offices by the end of September 2004. By the end of October 2004, the Guardian system was on-line in all 58 FBI Legal Attaché offices throughout the world.³³ According to the TMU official, the Guardian system now tracks all threats reported to the FBI, except those threats that the field offices choose not to enter into the Guardian system. The use of Guardian to report threat data in the future should significantly improve the accuracy of the number of threats reported. For FY 2005, the Guardian system contained 40,041 threats tracked by the FBI, which is significantly greater than the number of threats reported as tracked in FY 2003 and FY 2004. Guardian tracks these threats until they are mitigated and resolved.

TMU officials told us the inaccuracy of the threats reported in the FY 2006 budget could have resulted from how the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section requested the statistics. Initially, the requests for the statistics were very broad such as “How many threats were entered in the system?” Later, the requests for statistics were narrowed down to “How many threats are you (TMU) tracking?” The TMU officials told us they were not aware of how the requested information was being used by the requestors. Other than how the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section requested the threat data, the officials did not know why the threats were inaccurately reported for FY 2003 and FY 2004.

7. Terrorist Threats to Transportation and Facilities and
8. Terrorist Threats to People and Cities

The FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit (Unit), which is part of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, monitors and tracks suspicious incidents and threats received through e-mails and telephone calls from FBI field offices, FBI Executive staff, Legal Attaché offices, state and local law enforcement, and other sources. The Unit records the suspicious incidents and threats in an electronic file called an Operational Support Log. An Intelligence Analyst in the Unit periodically reviews the Operational Support Log and, using his or her judgment and experience, decides how each threat should be categorized. Two categories of threats are threats to transportation and facilities and threats to people and cities. After the Intelligence Analyst reviews all the entries in the Operational Support Log, the analyst enters the categorization of the threats into a local spreadsheet application. This application is the source of threat data reported in the FBI’s annual performance plans. After the threats are categorized, the Unit disseminates the threats to the appropriate FBI offices for investigation.

We found that the Counterterrorism Watch Unit has not established adequate internal controls to ensure that the threats are properly categorized. The Unit’s Watch Commander reviews the Operational Support Log entries to ensure that all the suspicious incidents and threats are included, but no one reviews the Intelligence Analyst’s decisions on how the threats are categorized. Initially, the Acting Unit Chief told us there are standard operating procedures in place, but we found those procedures do not provide controls for ensuring the accurate categorization of the threats. The Counterterrorism Watch Unit issued additional standard operating procedures in July 2006 for the unit operations. We found that the new standard operating procedures contained no internal controls to ensure the accurate categorization of threats. The procedures provide for the Watch Commander to review the log entries to ensure that all suspicious incidents and threats are included. However, the procedures do not include steps for a supervisor to review the Intelligence Analyst’s decisions on how the threats are categorized.

Threats to Transportation and Facilities. In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported 547 threats were made to transportation and facilities during FY 2004. The spreadsheet used by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit to track the number of threats to transportation and facilities agreed with the number of threats reported in the FBI’s FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan for FY 2004. However, we determined that the 547 threats reported for FY 2004 were for only 9 months of the year, from January through September 2004. A Unit official told us that threat data for all of FY 2004 was not reported because of the timing of the request from the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section. According to the Unit official, the Unit began capturing threats in May or June 2004. In December 2004 or January 2005, the Counterterrorism Division’s Administrative Section requested the threat data for FY 2004. At that time, the Unit had begun identifying, categorizing, and counting the threats prior to May or June 2004 but had not completed the process. Therefore, the Unit reported the threat data for the 9 months (January 2004 through September 2004) that had been completed. As a result, the FBI significantly understated the threats to transportation and facilities reported for FY 2004.

Threats to People and Cities. In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported 820 threats were made to people and cities during FY 2004. The spreadsheet used by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit to track the number of threats to people and cities agreed with the number of threats reported in the FBI’s FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan for FY 2004. However, as was the case for threats to transportation and facilities, the 820 threats to people and cities reported for FY 2004 were for only 9 months of the year. As a result, the FBI significantly understated the threats to people and cities reported for FY 2004.

9. Counterterrorism Threat Assessments

Counterterrorism Threat Assessments are essentially the same as Intelligence Assessments, except for those jointly written with other agencies.³⁴ The FBI’s TWWU maintained a word processing file that contains details of the Counterterrorism Threat Assessments issued.

In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported 63 Counterterrorism Threat Assessments were issued during FY 2004. As shown in the following chart, we found that the word processing file maintained by the TWWU to track the number of Counterterrorism Threat Assessments issued did not support the number reported for FY 2004.

Source: FBI performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

According to an official of the former TWWU, the TWWU inadvertently reported 12 assessments issued during FY 2003 as being issued during FY 2004. The former TWWU official told us that he is responsible for recording and tracking the assessments in the word processing file. The official said that he used an internal checklist to ensure the content of the threat assessments was accurate and properly disseminated. The official also said that he periodically checks the word processing file to ensure it is accurate and up-to-date. However, we determined that the checklist did not formalize the collection, verification, and reporting process for threat assessments. At a minimum, the process should include controls such as documenting: (1) the source of the statistic, (2) the procedures used to track or gather the statistic, and (3) the methodologies and procedures used to verify the accuracy of the statistic.

According to a TAU official, in June 2006, the CTAS established a new tracking and monitoring intelligence production and dissemination system where all Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, and other intelligence products are logged into a spreadsheet application. As of November 2006, the procedures on how to collect, verify, and report the Intelligence Bulletins, Intelligence Assessments, and other intelligence products issued were formalized in standard operating procedures at the unit level, but had not been formalized at the section level other than a production process checklist.

10. Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports

Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports, now known as National Terrorism Bulletins, are produced by the National Counterterrorism Center from intelligence products disseminated by agencies in the United States intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and Department of Defense intelligence components.³⁵ The reports are provided to senior intelligence officials in the White House and U.S. intelligence community agencies. The FBI’s Global Terrorism Analysis Unit (GTAU) maintains a spreadsheet application that contains details of the Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued.

In its FY 2006 - FY 2011 Performance Plan, the FBI reported that 88 Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports were issued during FY 2004. As shown in the following chart, we found that the spreadsheet application maintained by the GTAU to track the Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued did not support the number issued for FY 2004.

Source: FBI performance plans, OIG interviews with FBI staff, and analysis of documents provided by FBI staff

A GTAU official told us the number of Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued was overstated because: (1) the spreadsheet database was probably queried for the statistic by calendar year or for another specific time period instead of by fiscal year, and (2) the request for the statistic was worded in such a way that it could produce different answers. However, the GTAU official did not maintain documentation to show how the request for the FY 2004 data was worded.

According to a GTAU official, the FBI units that issue the Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports enter the reports issued into a database. The GTAU relies on other FBI units to enter all the Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued in the database. We found that no internal controls exist regarding gathering and verifying the accuracy of Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports tracked in the database. A GTAU official said that when she assumed her job in February 2004, there were no formalized procedures for collecting, verifying, and reporting the Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued and no formalized procedures have been developed since.

EOUSA TERRORISM STATISTICS

We tested the following 11 operational statistics that EOUSA reported in either the President’s Budget Requests to Congress for FY 2004, FY 2005, and FY 2006, or the USAOs FY 2004 Annual Statistical Report.

• Number of cases filed – defendants for program activity anti-terrorism in FY 2002, FY 2003, and FY 2004;³⁶

• Number of terrorism convictions in FY 2003 and FY 2004;³⁷

• Number of terrorism-related convictions in FY 2003 and FY 2004;³⁸

• Number prosecuted – defendants for program activity anti-terrorism in FY 2002;

• Number found guilty – defendants for program activity anti-terrorism in FY 2002;

• Number of terrorism cases tried in FY 2001;

• Number sentenced to prison – defendants for program activity anti-terrorism in FY 2003 and FY 2004;

• Number of terrorism and anti-terrorism cases against defendants that were terminated in FY 2003 and FY 2004;

• Number of terrorism and anti-terrorism cases pending at the end of FY 2002, FY 2003, and FY 2004;

• Number of defendants the U.S. Attorneys terminated terrorism and anti-terrorism cases against in FY 2004; and

• Percentage of defendants whose cases were terminated that were convicted in FY 2003.

EOUSA is responsible for tracking and analyzing data related to the work of the 94 USAOs in the development of budget and litigative priorities. EOUSA reports in its annual budgets and statistical reports based on data entered by the USAOs into the L IONS system. The LIONS system is a database with on-line capabilities that permit the USAOs and EOUSA to compile, maintain and track information relating to defendants, crimes, criminal charges, court events, and witnesses.

Inaccuracies in LIONS Data Reported by GAO

In its January 2003 report entitled Justice Department, Better Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics, the GAO addressed the USAOs’ misclassifications of conviction data in LIONS as terrorism-related despite a semiannual effort by EOUSA requiring managers in the USAOs to certify the accuracy of the case data. EOUSA noted that new anti-terrorism codes were not established until August 2002, one month prior to the end of the fiscal year. EOUSA officials attributed discrepancies to limited time for the USAOs to thoroughly reevaluate caseload and investigative data dating back to the beginning of FY 2002 and to reclassify the applicable cases. The GAO recommended that the Attorney General, in accordance with federal internal control standards, implement a formal system to oversee and validate the accuracy of case classification and conviction data entered in LIONS by the USAOs.

As part of this audit, we contacted the GAO to determine the status of this recommendation. According to a GAO staff member, EOUSA was required to provide Congress with a written response within 60 days of the report’s issuance in January 2003. The GAO staff member said that the GAO did not believe that EOUSA’s letter to Congress, dated April 7, 2003, showed adequate actions had been taken by the USAOs to correct the classification problem GAO identified. Specifically, according to the GAO staff member, EOUSA did not show that it had established a formal system to oversee and validate the accuracy of the case classification and conviction data entered in LIONS. In August 2006, we discussed with EOUSA staff corrective actions taken by the USAOs in response to the GAO recommendations.

An EOUSA official told us that EOUSA had taken steps to correct the problem identified by GAO by establishing procedures, effective October 22, 2004, for maintaining accurate and reliable caseload data. The EOUSA official also said that the United States Attorneys were instructed via memoranda from the Director of EOUSA to certify their respective caseload data as far back as 1997. Those procedures were not documented as part of the formal United States Attorneys’ Procedures until October 22, 2004. The formalized procedures include several report tools that the Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) can use to ensure the accuracy of LIONS data before certifying the data. The report tools include the: (1) Alcatraz Case Certification, (2) Case Certification by Event, (3) AUSA Workload Reports, and (4) Alternate District Reporting Methods.³⁹ In September 2006 the GAO noted the actions taken by EOUSA and closed its recommendation.

The EOUSA official also told us that the AUSAs are encouraged to use the report tools to ensure accuracy of the LIONS data, but use of the report tools is not required. The EOUSA official said that regardless of what the AUSAs do to ensure the accuracy of the LIONS data, the United States Attorneys must certify the accuracy of all cases, matters, and appeals in LIONS twice a year. The EOUSA official also commented that the AUSAs realize how important it is for them to properly code cases and they take those responsibilities seriously. The EOUSA official said that in view of the required certifications, they had not required the USAOs to implement additional internal controls to ensure the accuracy of LIONS data. Moreover, the EOUSA official told us that EOUSA conducts internal evaluation reviews of the USAOs every 3 to 4 years using AUSAs from different USAOs than the USAO being reviewed. Part of the review involves verifying whether the USAs completed the semiannual certifications of the LIONS data, but the reviews do not involve testing of the accuracy of LIONS data.

As detailed below, our testing showed that terrorism-related statistics reported by EOUSA and the USAOs were not accurately reported. This indicates that stronger internal controls for verifying the accuracy of the LIONS data are needed. Neither the semiannual certifications by the AUSAs nor the triennial evaluation reviews have proven sufficient to ensure the accuracy of the LIONS data.

OIG Testing of EOUSA and USAO Terrorism-Related Statistics

For each of the 11 statistics tested, we reviewed supporting evidence, as well as the internal controls in place, to examine whether the statistics were accurately reported. For a sample of the transactions reported for each statistic we reviewed, we requested USAO officials provide documentation from the case files to support that the transaction was related to terrorism. If we could not identify a terrorism link from the initial documentation provided, we asked the USAO officials to identify and provide to us evidence of the terrorism link. We also reviewed the evidence provided to determine if the transaction occurred during the period reported. If the USAO officials did not identify the terrorism link or the transaction did not occur in the period reported, we considered the transaction inaccurately reported.

In August 2006, we briefed EOUSA officials on the results of our testing that showed EOUSA did not accurately report the numbers reported for any of the 11 statistics tested. EOUSA officials disagreed with our conclusion that the statistics were inaccurately reported. The officials requested additional time to review the transactions we questioned and provide additional documentation to support the numbers reported. We agreed with the request and EOUSA subsequently provided additional documentation that they believed supported most of the transactions we questioned.

We reviewed the additional documentation and determined that it supported only a minor number of the transactions we tested. We did not accept much of the support provided by EOUSA officials because we disagree with them on cases that can reasonably be counted in the “anti-terrorism” category.

The EOUSA LIONS Manual defines the anti-terrorism program activity as follows.

Any matter or case where the underlying purpose or object of the investigation is anti-terrorism (domestic or international). [Underlined in the original.] This program category is meant to capture United States Attorney Office activity intended to prevent or disrupt potential or actual terrorist threats where the offense conduct is not obviously a federal crime of terrorism. To the extent evidence or information exists, in any form, reasonably relating the case to terrorism or the prevention of terrorism (domestic or international), the matter should be considered “anti-terrorism.” For example, a case involving offenses such as immigration violations, document fraud, or drug trafficking, where the subject or target is reasonably linked to terrorist activity, should be considered an “anti-terrorism” matter or case. Similarly, a case of identity theft and document fraud where the defendant’s motivation is to obtain access to and damage sensitive government facilities should be considered “anti-terrorism.”

EOUSA’s definition indicates the anti-terrorism program activity is meant to capture activity related to prevention or disruption of terrorist threats where the conduct is not obviously a crime of terrorism. However, the two examples cited indicate that the subject, target, or defendant must be “reasonably linked to terrorist activity” to record the case under the anti-terrorism program activity. Taken as whole, we believe this definition establishes that a case or defendant must have some identifiable link to terrorism to be categorized as an “anti-terrorism” case.

EOUSA disagrees with our interpretation of the definition of the anti-terrorism program activity. EOUSA and USAO officials told us they believe they correctly reported defendants under the anti-terrorism program activity because almost all the defendants reported under this program activity were arrested as the result of either operations carried out to prevent terrorism or through JTTF activities.⁴⁰ For example, Operation Tarmac was a worksite enforcement operation launched in November 2001 at the nation’s airports. During this operation, Department and other federal agents went into regional airports and checked the immigration papers of airport workers. The agents then arrested any individuals who used falsified documents, such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents, to gain employment. EOUSA officials told us they believe these defendants are properly coded under the anti-terrorism program activity. However, in response to our question, EOUSA’s Acting Deputy Director told us that EOUSA could also properly code as anti-terrorism all cases arising from any illegal immigrants arrested crossing the southwest border into the United States, but have not done so. We do not agree that law enforcement efforts such as these should be counted as “anti-terrorism,” unless as the LIONS Manual indicates, the subject or target is reasonably linked to terrorist activity.

For many of the transactions we found to be without a link to terrorism, EOUSA staff said the transactions were supported because the related cases were referred to the USAOs by a JTTF. To test the extent to which JTTF-referred cases consistently had a link to terrorism, we judgmentally sampled 21 JTTF-referred transactions and requested additional documentation on the related cases to show a reasonable link to terrorist activity. EOUSA supported a terror link for only 8 of 21 sampled JTTF-referred transactions. Based on this test, some JTTF cases show a link to terrorism, but we do not consider the remaining JTTF-referred transactions supported simply because those cases were referred by a JTTF.

We also acknowledge that operations such as Operation Tarmac and JTTF cases originate in concerns regarding terrorism. However, EOUSA could fairly and accurately report the successes of these operations without implying that all of the resulting cases are terrorism related. We are concerned that EOUSA’s view of the anti-terrorism category permits criminal cases arising from virtually any federal law enforcement effort, including border enforcement activities, to be categorized as anti-terrorism regardless of the actual circumstances. In our review of the statistics reported by EOUSA, we looked for and accepted any evidence of a reasonable terrorism linkage. However, we found many cases involving offenses such as immigration violations, document fraud, or drug trafficking, where the investigation showed that the subject or target had no link at all to terrorist activity, but the case was classified as an anti-terrorism case. In accordance with EOUSA’s anti-terrorism definition, we did not accept those cases as having support for coding in the anti-terrorism category.

After updating our results based on the additional documentation provided by EOUSA and based on our understanding of the anti-terrorism definition, we concluded that EOUSA and the USAOs did not accurately report the 11 statistics we tested as shown in the charts in the following sections of this report. The practice of classifying cases as anti-terrorism related affects the discussion of inaccurately reported statistics on defendants in cases filed (EOUSA Statistic 1 on page 42), terrorism convictions (EOUSA Statistic 2 on page 46), terrorism-related convictions (EOUSA Statistic 3 on page 50), defendants sentenced to prison (EOUSA Statistic 4 on page 53, terminated terrorism and anti-terrorism cases (EOUSA Statistic 8 on page 59), pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases (EOUSA Statistic 9 on page 62), defendants for terminated terrorism and anti-terrorism cases (EOUSA Statistic 10 on page 66), and percentage of defendants whose terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated and who were convicted (EOUSA Statistic 11 on page 69).

OIG Analysis of Terrorism-Related Statistics Reported by EOUSA [Image Not Available Electronically]

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets, annual statistical reports, and Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS) data; OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff; and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff Chart Endnotes 1. The 725 reported for FY 2004 was reported twice – once in the U.S. Attorneys FY 2004 Annual Statistical Report and once in the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress. 2. This statistic includes defendants that either pleaded guilty or who were convicted. We did not find where EOUSA reported this statistic for years after FY 2002.

1. Defendants in Cases Filed

In the FY 2004, FY 2005, and FY 2006 President’s Budget Requests to Congress, EOUSA reported the following number of defendants in cases filed by the USAOs under the anti-terrorism program activity.

• 365 for FY 2002

• 786 for FY 2003

• 725 for FY 2004

We reviewed LIONS reports showing the number of defendants in cases filed under the anti-terrorism program for these three fiscal years. For FY 2002, the LIONS data did not match the number reported in the annual budget request as shown in the following chart.

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

Because EOUSA could not provide a list from LIONS of the 365 defendants against whom cases were filed under the anti-terrorism program activity in FY 2002, we did not perform additional testing of the LIONS data provided. This situation also applies to the following discussions of inaccurately reported statistics on defendants prosecuted (EOUSA Statistic 5 on page 57), defendants found guilty (EOUSA Statistic 6 on page 57), and terrorism cases tried (EOUSA Statistic 7 on page 58).

An EOUSA official provided the following explanation for the statistic being under-reported for FY 2002. In August 2002, EOUSA provided the USAOs new anti-terrorism category codes for categorizing cases entered into LIONS. At that time, EOUSA asked all 94 USAOs to review all FY 2002 cases entered into LIONS and to recode the cases before the close of the fiscal year using the new anti-terrorism category codes, if appropriate. According to the EOUSA official, not all USAOs had finished recoding their cases prior to the close of FY 2002. Therefore, the statistic was understated. This situation also applies to the discussions of inaccurately reported statistics on defendants prosecuted (EOUSA Statistic 5 on page 57), and defendants found guilty (EOUSA Statistic 6 on page 57).

For FY 2003 and FY 2004, the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported by EOUSA in the budget requests for those years. We selected a judgmental sample of the defendants reported and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported numbers. We selected 268 of the 786 defendants in cases reported as filed during FY 2003, and 338 of the 725 defendants in cases reported as filed during FY 2004. We reviewed case file documentation and interviewed USAO officials to determine if the cases were properly reported as anti-terrorism cases based on EOUSA’s definition for this program activity. We found that, in the cases we tested, the USAOs generally reported cases as anti-terrorism cases when the underlying purpose or object of the investigation was intended to prevent terrorism, regardless of whether the subject, target, or defendant was reasonably linked to terrorist activity based upon the results of the investigation. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants charged with an offense not readily identifiable as terrorism-related, and for which the USAOs did not provide information of a terrorism link.⁴¹

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

Below are specific details for examples of unsupported cases. In each case, we reviewed information in the case file provided by the USAOs to determine if it established a link to terrorism. If the case file information did not show a terrorism link, we asked the USAO officials to provide additional evidence of a terrorism link. In each example, the USAOs did not provide information that the subject was linked to terrorist activity.

• The subject, in exchange for money, arranged six marriages between aliens, primarily Tunisian nationals, and U.S. citizens. The subject was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day on each of six counts of aiding and abetting marriage fraud to be served concurrently. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject or the six aliens were linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA commented that the subject aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, and procured fraudulent marriages of Middle Eastern and African males, but the AUSA provided no information to link the subject to terrorism.

• In another case of marriage fraud, a subject entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The subject filed on his own behalf a Petition for Alien Relative requesting lawful permanent alien status based on his fraudulent marriage to a U.S. citizen. The subject pleaded guilty to marriage fraud and was sentenced to time served. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that: (1) the case was categorized as anti-terrorism based on evidence or information which relates to the “prevention of terrorism,” and (2) the evidence or information is identical or similar to the criteria for identifying potential terrorist cases listed in a November 2001 memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division.⁴² However, the AUSA provided no details of the evidence or information to support a link to terrorist activity. Absent information of the subject’s link to terrorism, the reporting of this subject as terrorism-related was unsupported.

• The subject was charged with dealing firearms without a license. The case was pending at the time of our review. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the case should not have been coded as an anti-terrorism case.

• To obtain a passport, a Mexican national falsely identified himself in a passport application as another individual. The subject pleaded guilty to making a false statement in a passport application and was sentenced to time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked an AUSA to provide an explanation of the subject’s link to terrorism, but the AUSA did not provide any additional explanation.

• The subject was charged with: (1) obtaining naturalization unlawfully by making false representations on a naturalization application, and (2) making a false statement in a passport application. At the time of our audit fieldwork, the case against this subject was pending. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked the AUSA to provide additional information to support a link to terrorist activity, the USAO provided no additional information.

We also found that for 34 of the 268 sampled defendants for FY 2003, including 16 of the 180 defendants not linked to terrorism, either the cases were not filed in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the cases were filed in the year reported. This same issue occurred for 68 of the 338 sampled defendants for FY 2004, including 30 of the 222 defendants not linked to terrorism, as either the cases were not filed in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the cases were filed in the year reported.

Overall, considering both the defendants not linked to terrorism and the cases not filed in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of defendants in cases filed under the anti-terrorism program activity for FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.⁴³

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

2. Terrorism Convictions

In the FY 2005 and FY 2006 President’s Budget Requests to Congress, EOUSA reported 103 terrorism convictions for FY 2003 and 118 terrorism convictions for FY 2004. We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of terrorism convictions for FYs 2003 and 2004 and found that the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported in the budget requests for both years.

We then selected a judgmental sample of the terrorism convictions reported for FY 2003 and FY 2004 and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported numbers. We selected 30 of the 103 terrorism convictions reported for FY 2003, and 40 of the 118 terrorism convictions reported for FY 2004. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁴⁴

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

Below are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• The subject was charged with: (1) making a false statement on an airport security badge application by indicating he had not been convicted of a disqualifying crime, when in fact he had; and

(2) possessing with the intent to distribute 34 grams of crack cocaine. The subject pleaded guilty to possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute and was sentenced to 70 months in prison. The charge for making a false statement on an airport security badge application was dismissed. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was arrested as part of Operation Plane View, which was an operation similar to Operation Tarmac where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at airport facilities. The AUSA provided no additional information that linked the subject to terrorist activity.

• The subject was charged with knowingly and unlawfully possessing a Resident Alien card (a document issued by the Department of Homeland Security and used for entry into and as evidence of authorized stay and employment in the United States). The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. The subject pleaded guilty to possession of a false immigration document and was sentenced to time served in federal custody. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that this was a prevention case to restore the integrity of the immigration identification systems and procedures in the United States. The AUSA provided no additional information to link the subject to terrorist activity.

• The subject was charged with making a false statement on an airport security badge application. On the application he asserted that during the 10 years preceding the date of the application he had not been convicted of any disqualifying crimes listed on the application when in fact he had been so convicted. The subject pleaded guilty to making false statements and was sentenced to 4 months in prison with credit for time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was arrested as part of Operation Fly Trap, which was an operation similar to Operation Tarmac and Operation Plane View, where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at the airport facilities. The AUSA provided no additional information that linked the subject to terrorist activity.

• A Mexican national falsely identified himself as a U.S. citizen on an employment eligibility verification form so he could obtain employment in the United States. Subsequently, the subject filed a Petition for Alien Relative using his real identity that would allow him to reside and work legally in the United States. After the petition was approved, the subject voluntarily submitted another employment eligibility verification form to his employer using his real identity and requested his employer change his payroll record to reflect his true name. The subject told his employer that he had been in the United States unlawfully until recently receiving authorization from the U.S. government to reside and work in the United States. The subject pleaded guilty to making a false claim of citizenship and was sentenced to 4 months in prison with credit for time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked an AUSA to provide an explanation of the subject’s link to terrorism, but the AUSA did not provide any additional explanation.

We found that the statistics for terrorism convictions were inaccurately reported primarily because the USAOs categorized the cases against the defendants under the anti-terrorism program activity when the case was filed but did not change the categorization based upon further investigation or based on the actual offenses for which the defendants were convicted. This situation also applies to the following discussions of inaccurately reported statistics on: (1) terrorism-related convictions, (2) sentenced to prison, and (3) defendants for whom terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated.

We also found that 6 of the 30 sampled convictions, including 2 of the 13 convictions that were not linked to terrorism, did not occur in the year reported and should not have been included in the FY 2003 statistic. This same issue occurred for 3 of the 40 sampled convictions in FY 2004, including 1 of the 19 defendants not linked to terrorism, as either the convictions did not occur in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the convictions occurred in the year reported.

Overall, considering both the defendants not linked to terrorism and the defendants not convicted in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of terrorism convictions for FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.⁴⁵

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

3. Terrorism-Related Convictions

In the FY 2005 and FY 2006 President’s Budget Requests to Congress, EOUSA reported 558 terrorism-related convictions for FY 2003 and 379 terrorism-related convictions for FY 2004.⁴⁶ We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of terrorism-related convictions for FYs 2003 and 2004 and found that the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported in the budget requests for both years.

We then selected a judgmental sample of the terrorism-related convictions reported for FY 2003 and FY 2004 and performed additional testing to verify the reported numbers. We selected 301 of the 558 terrorism-related convictions reported for FY 2003, and 166 of the 379 terrorism-related convictions reported for FY 2004. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁴⁷

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

Below are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• During a one-year period, the subject fraudulently opened various credit card accounts under another person’s name. The subject used the fraudulently obtained credit cards to make purchases and obtain cash totaling more than $15,600. The subject pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of access devices (credit cards) and was sentenced to 8 months in prison. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA only commented that this was a case of identity theft and referred us to an affidavit by a United States Secret Service agent for the facts of the case. We reviewed the affidavit and found that it contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity.

• The subject was charged with possessing a pistol while being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States. The subject was found guilty of being an alien unlawfully in the United States in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to time served. The case file information provided by the USAO indicated that the subject was arrested as part of an absconder apprehension initiative for being an alien who was ordered deported from the United States but failed to leave. The case file information contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information of a terrorism link, the AUSA provided no additional information.

• The subject and others were part of a scheme to defraud federally insured financial institutions by operating a check kiting scheme. The subject and others would initially deposit into their own bank accounts checks drawn upon closed accounts at other banks. They would write checks to themselves or to the other participants and then cash the checks. These checks would be cashed before the initially deposited checks were returned because of “insufficient funds.” As part of the scheme, the subject received payment from the other participants for cashing their bad checks. The subject pleaded guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to 3 months with credit for time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was part of an investigation of credit card “bust-out” schemes and financial support to terrorists, but the AUSA provided no information to support that this subject was linked to financial support to terrorists.

• The subject was charged with making false statements by asserting on an application for an airport identification badge that he had not been convicted of a felony when he knew that he had been so convicted. The subject was convicted at trial of making false statements and sentenced to 1 year on probation. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA repeated the charge above and said that the subject was arrested as part of the USAO’s infrastructure/transportation protection initiative. The AUSA provided no additional information to support a terrorism link.

• The subject, a Mexican national who had previously been convicted of attempted theft and deported from the United States, was found to be unlawfully in the United States. The subject pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the United States after being deported and was sentenced to 27 months in prison. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA did not provide such a link and reiterated that the subject had illegally reentered the United States after being deported.

We also found that 33 of the 301 sampled convictions, including 29 of the 273 convictions that were not linked to terrorism, did not occur in the year reported and should not have been included in the FY 2003 statistic. This same issue occurred for 30 of the 166 sampled convictions in FY 2004, including 20 of the 129 convictions that were not linked to terrorism, as either the convictions did not occur in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the convictions occurred in the year reported.

Overall, considering both the defendants not linked to terrorism and the defendants not convicted in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of terrorism-related convictions for FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.⁴⁸

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

4. Defendants Sentenced to Prison

In the FY 2005 and FY 2006 President’s Budget Requests to Congress, EOUSA reported the following numbers of defendants sentenced to prison under its anti-terrorism program activity.

• 264 for FY 2003

• 256 for FY 2004

We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of defendants in cases filed by the USAOs under the anti-terrorism program activity for FYs 2003 and 2004 and found that the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported in the budget requests for both years.

We then selected a judgmental sample of the defendants sentenced to prison under the anti-terrorism program activity for FY 2003 and FY 2004 and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported numbers. We selected 81 of the 264 defendants sentenced to prison in FY 2003, and 91 of the 256 defendants sentenced to prison in FY 2004. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁴⁹

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

Below are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• The subject submitted false employment information to credit card companies when applying for multiple credit cards. As part of a scheme to defraud the credit card companies, the subject provided the fraudulently obtained credit cards to a co-conspirator who began making purchases with the cards to develop a credit history and establish higher credit limits. The subject would pay the credit card companies for the credit card charges to further develop the credit history for the cards. After the credit limits on the cards were maximized, the co-conspirators would take the cards to collusive merchants who, in exchange for a portion of the fraud proceeds, charged the cards through their merchant credit card terminals to make it appear that goods or services were being purchased when no such purchases were made. The merchants would run up the fraudulent charges until the credit card limits were exhausted. Neither the subject nor the co-conspirators would reimburse the credit card companies for the charges. The credit card companies would subsequently pay the merchants, unaware that they were paying for bogus charges. The subject pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit credit card fraud and was sentenced to 60 days in prison. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was part of an investigation of credit card “bust-out” schemes and financial support to terrorists, but the AUSA provided no information to support that this subject was linked to financial support to terrorists.

• The subject was charged with falsely representing a social security number to be his own for the purpose of gaining employment and a security badge at an airport. The subject pleaded guilty to misuse of a social security number and was sentenced to 10 months in prison. The case file information indicated that the subject was arrested as part of an operation similar to Operation Tarmac where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at airport facilities. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA provided no additional information that linked the subject to terrorist activity.

• The subject was charged with: (1) making a false statement by asserting on an application for a social security card that neither he nor anyone acting on his behalf had ever filed for or received a social security number before when he had previously received a social security number; and (2) two counts of using a social security number to obtain payments or benefits to which he was not entitled. The subject pleaded guilty to one count of using a social security number with intent to deceive and was sentenced to 3 years probation. The other two charges against the subject were dismissed. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was arrested as part of Operation Plane View, which was an operation similar to Operation Tarmac where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at airport facilities. The AUSA provided no additional information that linked the subject to terrorist activity.

• The subject submitted a fraudulent application for a driver’s license. The subject pleaded guilty to identification fraud and was sentenced to 3 months in prison. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was arrested as part of Project Facilitator, an operation to identify, arrest, and convict individuals involved in identification fraud. The AUSA provided no additional information to support the subject’s link to terrorist activity.

We also found that 9 of the 81 defendants for FY 2003, including 6 of the 56 defendants not linked to terrorism, were either not sentenced in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the defendants were sentenced in the year reported. This same issue occurred for 19 of the 91 defendants for FY 2004, including 11 of the 55 that were not linked to terrorism, as either the defendants were not sentenced in the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the defendants were sentenced in the year reported.

Overall, considering both the defendants not linked to terrorism and the defendants not sentenced to prison in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of defendants sentenced to prison under program activity anti-terrorism for FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.⁵⁰

 

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

5. Defendants Prosecuted

In the FY 2004 President’s Budget Request to Congress, EOUSA reported that 245 defendants were prosecuted in FY 2002 under its anti-terrorism program activity. However, the LIONS data did not match the number reported in the annual budget request as shown in the following chart.

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

See Statistic 1 in the EOUSA Terrorism Statistics section for a discussion of why we did no further testing of this statistic and why the statistic was inaccurately reported.

6. Defendants Found Guilty

In the FY 2004 President’s Budget Request to Congress, EOUSA reported that 153 defendants were found guilty under its anti-terrorism program activity during FY 2002. However, the LIONS data did not match the number reported in the annual budget request as shown in the following chart.

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

See Statistic 1 in the EOUSA Terrorism Statistics section for a discussion of why we did no further testing of this statistic and why the statistic was inaccurately reported.

7. Terrorism Cases Tried

In the FY 2003 President’s Budget Request to Congress, EOUSA reported that three terrorism cases were tried in FY 2001. However, the LIONS data did not match the number reported in the annual budget request as shown in the following chart.

Source: EOUSA and USAO budgets and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

See Statistic 1 in the EOUSA Terrorism Statistics section for a discussion of why we did no further testing of this statistic. An EOUSA official indicated that one case was not reported due to an oversight.

8. Terminated Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Cases

In the USAOs FY 2003 and FY 2004 Annual Statistical Reports, EOUSA reported the following number of terrorism and anti-terrorism cases that had been terminated against defendants.⁵¹

• 682 during FY 2003

• 504 during FY 2004

We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of terrorism and anti-terrorism cases that had been terminated against defendants for FYs 2003 and 2004 and found that the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported in the annual statistical reports for both years.

We then selected a judgmental sample of the number of terrorism and anti-terrorism cases terminated against defendants for FY 2003 and FY 2004 and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported numbers. We selected 364 of the 682 terrorism and anti-terrorism cases terminated against defendants in FY 2003 and 240 of the 504 terrorism and anti-terrorism cases terminated against defendants in FY 2004. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect cases for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁵²

 

Source: USAO annual statistical reports and LIONS data, OIG’s interviews of EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

The following are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• The subject was charged with making false statements by asserting on an application for an airport identification badge that, during the 10 years preceding the date of application, the subject had not been convicted of any disqualifying crimes listed on the application when the subject knew otherwise. The subject had been convicted and sentenced in January 1998 for the crime of carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle. The subject pleaded guilty to the charges of making a false statement and was sentenced to time served and placed on supervised release for 1 year. The information provided by EOUSA contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked EOUSA to provide an explanation and evidence of the subject’s link to terrorism, but EOUSA did not provide any additional evidence.

• The subject was charged with knowingly and willfully using and providing others a false, forged, counterfeit, mutilated and altered passport. The subject pleaded guilty to forgery and false use of a passport and was sentenced to 10 months in prison with 3 years supervised release. The information provided by EOUSA contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked EOUSA to provide an explanation and evidence of the subject’s link to terrorism, but EOUSA did not provide any additional evidence.

• The subject was charged with: (1) possession of resident alien cards that were forged, counterfeited, altered, and falsely made under the pretense of using the resident alien cards to stay and obtain employment in the United States; (2) forging, counterfeiting, altering, and falsely making resident alien cards for use in residing and obtaining employment in the United States; (3) possession of document making equipment with the intent of making false U.S. identification documents, Social Security Administration cards, and resident alien cards; and (4) possession with the intent to use five or more U.S. identification cards, approximately 1,236 blank Social Security Administration cards, and 1,698 blank resident alien cards. The subject pleaded guilty to making and possessing with the intent to use false U.S. identification documents and was sentenced to 2 years in prison and 3 years supervised released. The information provided by EOUSA contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked EOUSA to provide an explanation and evidence of the subject’s link to terrorism, but EOUSA did not provide any additional evidence.

• During a one-year period, the subject knowingly and with intent to defraud used several unauthorized credit cards to make purchases totaling $1,000 or more using falsely obtained driver’s licenses. The subject pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access device fraud and was sentenced to 37 months in prison and 3 years supervised release. The information provided by EOUSA contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. We asked EOUSA to provide an explanation and evidence of the subject’s link to terrorism, but EOUSA did not provide any additional evidence.

We also found that 42 of the 364 cases sampled for FY 2003, including 34 of the 315 that were not linked to terrorism, were either not terminated at the end of the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the cases were terminated at the end of the year reported. This same issue occurred for 13 of the 240 cases sampled for FY 2004, all of which were included in the 201 cases that were not linked to terrorism.

Overall, considering both the cases not linked to terrorism and the cases not terminated in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the terrorism and anti-terrorism cases terminated against defendants in FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.

 

Source: USAO annual statistical reports and LIONS data, OIG’s interviews of EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

9. Pending Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Cases

In the USAOs FY 2003 and FY 2004 Annual Statistical Reports, EOUSA reported the following number of pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases at the end of each year.

• 737 for FY 2002

• 637 for FY 2003

• 719 for FY 2004

We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases for FYs 2002, 2003, and 2004 and found the LIONS data agreed with the numbers reported in the annual statistical reports for all 3 years.

We selected a judgmental sample of the pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases for FYs 2002, 2003, and 2004 and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported numbers. We selected 487 of the 737 pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases for FY 2002, 335 of the 637 pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases for FY 2003, and 362 of the 719 pending terrorism and anti-terrorism cases for FY 2004. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁵³

 

Source: USAO annual statistical reports and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

The following are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• The subject was charged with: (1) falsely representing a social security account number to be his own for the purpose of gaining employment and a security badge at an airport, (2) using fraudulent social security and immigration cards for the same purpose, and (3) unlawfully entering an airport area. The subject was convicted of unlawful entry into an airport area and was sentenced to time served. The other two charges against the subject were dismissed. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was arrested as part of an operation similar to Operation Tarmac where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at airport facilities. The AUSA provided no additional information that linked the subject to terrorist activity.

• The subject was charged with possessing a handgun while being an alien unlawfully in the United States. The subject was found guilty of being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 18 months in prison. However, the case was appealed and the charge was subsequently dismissed. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information of a terrorism link, the AUSA provided no additional information.

• The subject was charged with making false statements by asserting on an application for an airport identification badge that, during the 10 years preceding the date of application, the subject had not been convicted of any disqualifying crimes listed on the application when the subject knew otherwise. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information of a terrorism link, the AUSA said the subject was arrested as part of Operation Fly Trap, an operation similar to Operation Tarmac where Department and other federal agents went into the local airport and arrested individuals who used falsified documents such as social security numbers, drivers’ licenses, and other identification documents to gain employment at airport facilities. The AUSA provided no additional information or explanation that linked the subject to terrorist activity. The case against the subject was subsequently dismissed.

• The subject was the president of a travel company that was asserted to be a collusive merchant involved in a scheme to defraud credit card companies. Two credit cards in the name of another individual were charged at the travel company 10 times during a 4-week period for a total of $12,500. The credit card issuer eventually closed the accounts for nonpayment and wrote off the balances. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA told us that the subject was part of an investigation of credit card “bust-out” schemes and financial support to terrorists, but the AUSA provided no information to support that this subject was linked to financial support to terrorists. The case against the subject was subsequently dismissed.

• The subject knowingly entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States. The subject pleaded guilty to marriage fraud and was sentenced to 3 years probation with the first 6 months to be served under home confinement. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional information to support a terrorism link, the AUSA did not provide any additional information.

We also found that 127 of the 487 cases sampled for FY 2002, including 117 of the 439 that were not linked to terrorism, were either not pending at the end of the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the cases were pending at the end of the year reported. This same issue occurred for:

• 122 of the 335 cases sampled for FY 2003, including 107 of the 267 that were not linked to terrorism; and

• 191 of the 362 cases sampled for FY 2004, including 161 of the 271 that were not linked to terrorism.

Overall, considering both the defendants not linked to terrorism and the defendants not convicted in the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of terrorism-related convictions for FY 2003 and FY 2004 as shown in the following charts.⁵⁴

 

Source: USAO annual statistical reports and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

10. Defendants for Terminated Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Cases

In the USAOs FY 2004 Annual Statistical Report, EOUSA reported that the USAOs terminated terrorism and anti-terrorism cases against 643 defendants in FY 2004.⁵⁵ We reviewed LIONS reports supporting the number of defendants for which terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated during FY 2004. The LIONS data agreed with the number reported in the Annual Statistical Report for FY 2004.

We then selected a judgmental sample of 294 of the 643 defendants for which terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated during FY 2004 and performed additional testing to determine the accuracy of the reported number. We then requested that USAO officials provide information from the case files to show the subject was linked to terrorist activity. If the case file information provided did not show a terrorism link, we asked USAO officials to provide additional information of a terrorism link. The overstatements in the following charts reflect defendants for which the USAOs did not provide information of the terrorism link.⁵⁶

Source: USAO annual statistical report and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

The following are specific details for examples of unsupported cases.

• The subject was charged with falsely representing a social security number to be his own for the purpose of obtaining employment with a company and receiving an access badge to a stadium for a Super Bowl game. The subject pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of a social security number and was sentenced to time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide an explanation and evidence of the subject’s link to terrorism, the AUSA did not provide any additional explanation or evidence.

• The subject was charged with: (1) fraudulently stating his name on an application for a Department of Motor Vehicles identification card, (2) fraudulently providing a false address and false social security number on the same application, and (3) falsely representing a social security number to be his when he knew it was not. The subject pleaded guilty to the charge of misusing a social security number and was sentenced to 3 years probation. The other two charges against the subject were dismissed. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide additional evidence to support a terrorism link, the AUSA repeated the charges above and provided no additional information of a terrorism link.

• The subject was charged with falsely representing a social security number to be his own for the purpose of obtaining employment and a security badge allowing him access to a secure area of an airport. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide an explanation of the subject’s link to terrorism, the AUSA told us the subject was arrested as part of an operation similar to Operation Tarmac. The AUSA provided no additional explanation of a terrorism link. The charge against the subject was subsequently dismissed.

• The subject was charged with: (1) conspiring with others to produce identification documents affecting interstate commerce, and (2) three counts of causing representatives of a Department of Motor Vehicles to produce false identification documents by using a false address on his application for the documents. The subject pleaded guilty to one count of identification fraud and the other three charges were dismissed. The subject was sentenced to time served. The case file information provided by the USAO contained no indication that the subject was linked to terrorist activity. When we asked an AUSA to provide an explanation of the subject’s link to terrorism, the AUSA told us that that the subject was arrested as part of Project Facilitator, an operation to identify, arrest, and convict individuals involved in identification fraud. The AUSA provided no additional information to support the subject’s link to terrorist activity.

We also found that 33 of the 294 cases, including 20 of the 229 that were not linked to terrorism, either were not terminated during the year reported or the USAOs could not provide documentation to show the cases were terminated during the year reported.

Overall, considering both the defendants in cases that were not linked to terrorism and the defendants in cases that were not terminated during the year reported, EOUSA overstated the number of defendants for which terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated in FY 2004 as shown in the following chart.⁵⁷

Source: USAO annual statistical report and LIONS data, OIG interviews with EOUSA and USAO staff, and analysis of documents provided by EOUSA and USAO staff

11. Percent of Defendants Whose Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Cases Were Terminated and Who Were Convicted

In the USAO FY 2003 Annual Statistical Report, EOUSA reported that 87 percent of the defendants whose terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated in FY 2003 were convicted. EOUSA based this statistic on the number of defendants associated with the 682 terminated cases in FY 2003 (Statistic Number 8). As noted in our analysis of EOUSA Statistic Number 8 on pages 59 through 62, we could only identify EOUSA’s documentation support for 359 terrorism and anti-terrorism cases terminated in FY 2003. We analyzed the 359 cases and found that 388 defendants were associated with the cases, of which 333 had been convicted. Therefore, we calculated that 86 percent of the defendants whose terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated in FY 2003 were convicted. Therefore, EOUSA overstated the percent of the defendants whose terrorism and anti-terrorism cases were terminated in FY 2003 who were convicted by 1 percent in the FY 2003 Annual Statistical Report.

CRIMINAL DIVISION TERRORISM STATISTICS

We tested the following five operational statistics that the Criminal Division reported in the FY 2006, FY 2005, or FY 2004 President’s Budget Request to Congress.

• Number of individuals charged as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005;

• Number of individuals who have been convicted or pleaded guilty as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005;

• Number of individuals charged with material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through August 5, 2004, and from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005;⁵⁸

• Number of individuals convicted of material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005; and

• Number of material support investigations the Criminal Division participated in or coordinated: (1) as of January 31, 2003, (2) as of January 31, 2004, (3) from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003, and (4) from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2004.

The Criminal Division’s Counterterrorism Section (CTS) oversees the investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related offenses. The CTS uses two methods for accumulating data for the five Criminal Division statistics we tested. For the first four statistics tested, the CTS maintains a local database application for tracking and reporting. For the last statistic tested, a CTS official performs a quarterly manual count of data she receives from CTS attorneys and the Deputy for Terrorist Financing regarding the material support to terrorism cases or matters the Criminal Division was working on.⁵⁹

We initially requested information from the database to support the first four operational statistics we tested. The Deputy Chief of CTS responded that the database was not up-to-date and that she could not reconcile the numbers reported for the four operational statistics to the database. We also requested support for the Deputy Chief’s manual count for the last operational statistic we tested. The Deputy Chief provided us with a list of terrorist financing cases that were prosecuted under various U.S. Code sections. As we began to review the list, the Deputy Chief told us that the list could not be used to provide support for the material support to terrorism statistics reported because the cases identified in the list included only cases where individuals had been charged. It did not include material support to terrorism investigations or matters the Criminal Division was currently working on. The Deputy Chief said that cases where no charges were brought were included in the reported statistics but would not be included on the terrorist financing list she provided.

The CTS Chief therefore requested more time to update the database and reconstruct a list of terrorist financing cases, investigations, or matters that the Criminal Division participated in or coordinated that would support statistics reported. In March 2006, the CTS subsequently provided the updated database and a list of terrorist financing cases, investigations, or matters the Criminal Division participated in or coordinated.

For each of the five statistics tested, we reviewed evidence in support of the March 2006 reconstructed data provided for each statistic, as well as the internal controls in place to ensure the statistics were accurately reported. We found that the Criminal Division’s reconstructed data did not support the accuracy of the five statistics we tested in eight of the nine times the statistics were reported. Specifically, our analysis of the reconstructed data and supporting documentation showed that the statistics were overstated six times, understated two times, and reported accurately one time.

When we briefed the Criminal Division in August 2006 on our tests of the March 2006 reconstructed data, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division stated that while the Criminal Division needed to strengthen its controls to gather, report, and document accurate terrorism statistics, he believed the Criminal Division could provide the documentation needed to support all the statistics reported. In August 2006, the Criminal Division provided us another set of reconstructed lists to support the five statistics we tested.

We compared the August 2006 reconstructed lists to the March 2006 reconstructed data provided by the Criminal Division and identified various anomalies between the two lists such as: (1) data was on the March 2006 reconstructed lists and counted as meeting the criteria for the reported statistic but was not on the August 2006 reconstructed lists, (2) data was on the March 2006 reconstructed lists and not counted because it did not meet the criteria for the statistic reported but was counted on the August 2006 reconstructed lists, and (3) data was counted on the August 2006 reconstructed lists but was not on the March 2006 reconstructed lists. We then met with Criminal Division officials and reconciled the differences between the two sets of reconstructed data. As shown in the following table, the reconciliation showed that the August 2006 reconstructed lists still were inaccurate for seven of the nine times that the five statistics were reported, although the data presented indicated the statistics had been understated, not overstated as the previous data suggested.

OIG Reconciliation of the Criminal Division’s
August 2006 Reconstructed Lists

The differences between the final reconciled reconstructed lists and the August 2006 reconstructed lists were either: (1) data that was counted on the March 2006 reconstructed lists and not on the August 2006 reconstructed lists that the Criminal Division officials agreed should be added back to the August 2006 reconstructed lists, or (2) data that was not on the August 2006 or March 2006 reconstructed lists that the Criminal Division officials said should be added to the August 2006 reconstructed lists.

Next, we selected a sample of the transactions included on the final August 2006 reconciled reconstructed lists for each of the nine times the five statistics were reported to test the support documentation. We requested documentation from the Criminal Division to support that the transaction was terrorism-related and that it occurred during the reporting period. The Criminal Division provided documentation to support that all the transactions tested were terrorism-related. However, as shown in the following table, the Criminal Division provided documentation that showed a small number of transactions tested did not occur during the reporting period and therefore should not have been reported.

OIG Analysis of a Sample
Of Transactions Reported

We discussed these inaccuracies with Criminal Division officials and they agreed that the unsupported transactions should not have been included.

Considering the results of our testing of the sample transactions reported, the following chart shows that we found that all five statistics were reported inaccurately by the Criminal Division, although the statistics appear to be inaccurately understated.

OIG Analysis of Terrorism-Related Statistics Reported by the Criminal Division [Image Not Available Electronically]

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff Chart Endnotes For this statistic, the Criminal Division reported the number as “more than 89” instead of an exact number. For this statistic, the Criminal Division reported the number as “over 50” instead of an exact number. For this statistic, the Criminal Division reported the number as “more than 70” instead of an exact number.

As detailed on the following pages, some of the reported statistics were misreported by significant margins and others by minor amounts. The CTS’s Deputy Chief said the statistics were inaccurately reported primarily because the database used to track the statistics was incomplete and not kept up-to-date. We found that CTS had not established formalized procedures to: (1) instruct staff on what data is to be reported in the database, and how and when the data is to be reported; and (2) validate the accuracy of the information reported in the database.

1. Individuals Charged Resulting from Terrorism Investigations

The CTS oversees the investigation and prosecution of domestic and international terrorism cases. In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the Criminal Division reported 375 individuals were charged as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005. As shown in the following chart, we found the Criminal Division’s final reconciled reconstructed list of individuals charged did not match the number reported.

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

As a result, the Criminal Division understated by a minor amount the number of individuals charged as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005.

2. Individuals Convicted or Pleaded Guilty Resulting from Terrorism Investigations

In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the Criminal Division reported 195 individuals were convicted or pleaded guilty as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005. As shown in the following chart, we found the Criminal Division’s final reconciled reconstructed list of individuals convicted or pleading guilty did not match the number reported.

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

As a result, the Criminal Division understated by a significant amount the number of individuals who were convicted or pleaded guilty as a result of terrorism investigations from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005.

3. Individuals Charged with Material Support of Terrorism or Similar Crimes

The CTS also oversees the investigation and prosecution of terrorist financing matters. This includes material support cases such as those that involve funds being provided to support terrorist activities. The CTS collects statistics related to these cases for inclusion in its annual budgets. In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the Criminal Division reported that:

• more than 89 people were charged in material support prosecutions and terrorist financing investigations from September 11, 2001, through August 5, 2004; and

• 113 people were charged with material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005.

As shown in the following charts, the support provided by the CTS regarding these statistics varied over time.

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

As a result, the Criminal Division accurately reported that more than 89 individuals were charged in material support prosecutions and terrorist financing investigations from September 11, 2001, through August 5, 2004. However, the Criminal Division significantly understated the number of people charged with material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005.

4. Individuals Convicted of Material Support of Terrorism or Similar Crimes

In the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress, the Criminal Division reported that 57 people were convicted of providing material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005. As shown in the following chart, we found the updated database maintained by the CTS to track these statistics did not match the number reported.

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

As a result, the Criminal Division significantly understated the number of individuals convicted of material support of terrorism or similar crimes from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005.

5. Material Support to Terrorism Cases and Matters Participated in or Coordinated

In various President’s Budget Requests to Congress, the Criminal Division reported that it:

• was currently working with the USAOs in over 50 material support to terrorism investigations as of January 31, 2003 (FY 2004 President’s Budget Request to Congress);

• was pursuing more than 70 terrorist financing or material support investigations as of January 31, 2004 (FY 2005 President’s Budget Request to Congress);

• participated in or coordinated 70 material support to terrorism cases and matters from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003 (FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress); and

• participated in or coordinated 121 material support to terrorism cases and matters from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2004 (FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress).

As shown in the following charts, the support provided by the CTS regarding these statistics varied over time.

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

Source: Criminal Division budgets, OIG interviews with Criminal Division staff, and analysis of documents provided by Criminal Division staff

As a result, the Criminal Division significantly understated the number of material support to terrorism cases and matters it participated in or coordinated during FY 2003. The Criminal Division overstated by a minor amount the number of material support to terrorism investigations the USAOs were working on as of January 31, 2003. The Criminal Division understated by a minor amount the number of material support to terrorism cases and matters it participated in or coordinated during FY 2004. The Criminal Division accurately reported the number of terrorist financing or material support investigations it was pursuing as of January 31, 2004.

In sum, during our audit the Criminal Division made two attempts to reconstruct support for the terrorism-related statistics we reviewed. We carefully evaluated each attempted reconstruction and found each to be significantly flawed. At the end of this process, we determined that the Criminal Division understated the five statistics we tested eight of the nine times the statistics were reported. The extensive efforts required by the Criminal Division to reconstruct reported statistics demonstrates that the Division had no effective reporting system and could easily and unintentionally misreport in the opposite direction, absent the implementation of effective procedures for gathering and reporting statistics.

OIG Conclusions

Based on our testing, we found that the Department and its components did gather, classify, and report terrorism-related statistics accurately. The statistics were reported inaccurately primarily because Department components lacked internal controls for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.

The FBI, EOUSA, and the Criminal Division did not accurately report 24 of the 26 statistics we reviewed. Some of the statistics reported were overstated, while others were understated. These inaccuracies are important because Department management and Congress need accurate terrorism-related statistics to make informed budgetary and operational decisions.

Recommendations:

To help ensure accurate collection and reporting of terrorism statistics, we recommend that the FBI, EOUSA, and the Criminal Division:

1. Establish and document internal control procedures for gathering, verifying, and reporting terrorism-related statistics.

2. Maintain documentation to identify the source of all terrorism-related statistics reported in official operational documents such as budget requests, performance plans, statistical reports, and others.

3. Maintain documentation of the procedures and systems used to gather or track the statistics reported.

4. Maintain documentation of the methodologies and procedures used to verify the accuracy of the statistics reported.

5. Ensure that terrorism-related statistics are not reported unless evidence is maintained to support the statistics.

We recommend that EOUSA and the USAOs:

6. Establish and implement procedures to recode transactions in the LIONS system when investigations that began as terrorism-related investigations do not link the case defendants to terrorist activity.

22. Internal control is a major part of managing an organization. It comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives and, in doing so, supports performance based management. Internal control and all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. The documentation should appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.

23. For five of the FBI statistics (four operational and one informational), we determined that internal controls had been established but the reporting officials could not readily determine whether the controls were documented. We included these five statistics in the column for internal controls established but not documented.

24. Appendix II contains a description of the 16 statistics and where each statistic was reported.

25. The TRRS was established after the September 11 attacks to facilitate information-sharing in an organized, systematic fashion. The TRRS mission is to support U.S. government efforts to detect, disrupt, and prevent acts of terrorism by managing the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of raw intelligence information on terrorism.

26. Each year a President’s Budget Request to Congress is submitted that identifies the funding needed to carry out the missions of the federal government for the year covered by the budget. Performance plans are submitted each year with an agency's budget request and includes performance goals and indicators for the fiscal year, a description of the resources needed to meet the goals, and a description of how results will be verified and validated. The 2,622 Intelligence Information Reports for FY 2004 was reported twice – once in the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress and once in the FY 2006 – FY 2011 Performance Plan.

27. The GTAU is part of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and performs analyses of information related to international terrorist groups not covered by other analytical units that have bases of operations in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and North America.

28. The NTCS is responsible for producing cross-cutting analysis focusing primarily on early warning of NTCS emerging terrorist threats to the United States. The NTCS is also responsible for identifying long-term, threat-related issues that may affect FBI investigative or operational strategy against terrorist targets. The NTCS is the Counterterrorism Division’s focal point with the intelligence and law enforcement communities relative to the coordination of domestic threats, including monitoring and facilitation of the passage of threat information to federal, state, and local authorities.

29. The CTAS is responsible for tracking Intelligence Bulletins issued by the FBI. In FY 2004, the CTAS was comprised of five units. They included: (1) GTAU,

    (2) Domestic Sunni Extremism Analysis Unit (DSEAU), (3) Shia/Middle East Analysis Unit (SMEAU), (4) Domestic Terrorism Analysis Unit (DTAU), and (5) Weapons of Mass Destruction/Emerging Weapons Threat Analysis Unit (WMD/EWTAU). In August 2005, the analytical component of the Threat Watch and Warning Unit (TWWU) was:

    (1) transferred from NTCS to CTAS, and (2) merged with the WMD/EWTAU to form the Threat Analysis Unit within CTAS.

30. The FBI’s Counterterrorism Watch Unit and International Terrorism Operations Section are part of the FBI Counterterrorism Division and support the FBI’s counterterrorism mission. The Counterterrorism Watch Unit is the FBI’s 24-hour global command center for terrorism prevention operations. The FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS) are split into two sections known as ITOSI and ITOSII. ITOSI supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism operations related to al Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups. ITOSII supports, coordinates, and provides oversight of FBI international counterterrorism operations related to other groups, such as Hezbollah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as the terrorist threats from state sponsors of terrorism.

31. TTIC is a multi-agency center established in 2003 in which personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense, and other agencies attempt to merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad to form a comprehensive picture of threats against the United States.

32. The Guardian system is designed to make immediately available threat and suspicious activity information to all system users, and provide all users with the capability to search all incidents for threat trend analysis.

33. The FBI’s Legal Attaché offices are offices staffed with FBI agents and support staff in U.S. embassies and consulates.

34. A former TWWU official told us that the FBI no longer uses the term Counterterrorism Threat Assessments and these products are now called Intelligence Assessments.

35. While the National Counterterrorism Center is outside the control of the Department of Justice, the FBI participates in the Center and tracks the number of Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports issued by the Center.

36. The number reported for FY 2004 was reported twice – once in the U.S. Attorneys FY 2004 Annual Statistical Report and once in the FY 2006 President’s Budget Request to Congress.

37. EOUSA defines a terrorism conviction as domestic and international incidents that involve acts, including threats or conspiracies to engage in such acts, which are violent or otherwise dangerous to human life and which appear to be motivated by an intent to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population.

38. EOUSA defines a terrorism-related conviction as incidents involving terrorism-related hoaxes, terrorist financing, and a matter or case where the underlying purpose or object of the investigation is anti-terrorism related.

39. The Alcatraz Case Certification report is a case management software application tool available to USAOs to assist in managing their district's caseload in LIONS. The Case Certification by Event report is a LIONS standard report that lists civil or criminal cases that have been certified in LIONS by using the event code CERT. The AUSAs Workload Reports are used to certify the accuracy of matter, cases, and appeals. The Alternate District Reporting Methods allow USAOs to use district generated reports to certify caseloads consistent with local work flow.

40. The JTTFs are squads within the FBI’s field offices that focus primarily on addressing terrorism threats and preventing terrorist incidents.

41. The number supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported. Therefore, the number supported could be less than shown in the table and the difference could be more based on a 100-percent review of transactions reported. This situation is also applicable to our testing of EOUSA statistics on terrorism convictions, terrorism-related convictions, defendants sentenced to prison, terrorism and anti-terrorism cases pending, and defendants for terminated terrorism and anti-terrorism cases.

42. The November 13, 2001, memorandum sent to Anti-terrorism Task Force Coordinators identified categories of actions that past terrorist cases have involved such as using false or multiple identification and travel documents, attending paramilitary and firearms training, photographing and surveillance of landmarks, using the computer and Internet to communicate, and committing immigration fraud. For each category, the memorandum described examples of terrorist-related activity from prior terrorism cases. However, the memorandum emphasized that any one criterion alone would not likely support a reasonable conclusion that terrorist activity or potential terrorist activity was present.

43. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

44. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

45. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

46. EOUSA reports terrorism-related convictions separately from terrorism convictions. EOUSA defines a terrorism conviction as domestic and international incidents that involve acts, including threats or conspiracies to engage in such acts, which are violent or otherwise dangerous to human life and which appear to be motivated by an intent to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government or a civilian population. EOUSA defines a terrorism-related conviction as incidents involving terrorism-related hoaxes, terrorist financing, and a matter or case where the underlying purpose or object of the investigation is anti-terrorism related.

47. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

48. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

49. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

50. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

51. The USAOs Annual Statistical Reports contain: (1) narrative information describing the USAO’s programs and initiatives, (2) summaries of some of the most

    interesting and important cases that were handled by the USAOs during the year, and

    (3) statistical tables displaying both national and district caseload data. The USAOs consider a case terminated primarily when the case is transferred to another USAO district, the case is dismissed, or a judgment is issued in the case.

52. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

53. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

54. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

55. EOUSA reported cases as terminated primarily when: (1) the case was dismissed, (2) a judgment in the case was issued, or (3) the case was transferred to another USAO district.

56. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

57. As noted in footnote 41 on page 43, the numbers supported for these statistics are based on a sample of transactions reported.

58. This statistic was reported twice – once as a cumulative number from

    September 11, 2001, through August 5, 2004; and second as a cumulative number from September 11, 2001, through February 3, 2005. Because the numbers reported were cumulative, the later statistic includes the number reported for the first statistic.

59. The Criminal Division investigations into terrorism-related offenses are referred to as “matters” if no charges have been filed. Once charges have been filed, the investigation is referred to as a “case.”