The Department’s Focus on Terrorism

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Justice (Department) made the prevention of terrorism and promotion of America’s security its primary strategic goal. The Department established the following three objectives to accomplish this goal.

• Prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations before they occur.

• Investigate and prosecute those who have committed, or intend to commit, terrorist acts in the United States.

• Combat espionage against the United States by strengthening counterintelligence capabilities.

An ongoing challenge for the Department is to effectively manage its resources to implement these objectives. To meet this management challenge, the Department must establish controls to ensure that reliable and timely information is obtained, maintained, reported, and used for decision-making.

The Department and its component agencies gather, classify, and report a wide range of terrorism-related statistics. Some examples of terrorism statistics reported by the Department and its components are:

• number of individuals charged as a result of terrorism investigations,

• number of terrorism cases tried,

• number of individuals charged with material support of terrorism or similar crimes,

• number of terrorism convictions,

• number of threats to transportation and facilities,

• number of threats to people and cities, and

• number of Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports produced.¹¹

The Department and its components regularly report such statistics in budgets, annual financial statements and statistical reports, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Performance Assessment Rating Tool, performance plans, congressional testimony, speeches, press releases, publications, and websites.¹²

Counterterrorism Funding and Staffing

Department resources devoted to preventing terrorism and promoting the nation’s security have increased from approximately $737 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 to approximately $3.6 billion in FY 2006, an increase of almost 400 percent. The counterterrorism resource increases have been shared among the Department’s components that combat terrorism, with the FBI receiving the largest share of the increase, as shown in the following chart.

Source: Budget data from the FBI, Criminal Division, and EOUSA. FBI dollars are for the counterterrorism program only. Criminal Division and USAO dollars are for the entire organizations.

Audit Purpose and Scope

In this audit, we examined the FBI’s, the Criminal Division’s, EOUSA’s, and the USAOs’ terrorism-related statistics to determine if they were accurately gathered and reported. We identified the terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department and its components by:

• interviewing officials from the Department, the FBI, the Criminal Division, and EOUSA;

• analyzing budget submissions, congressional testimony, performance plans, and other documents maintained by the Department and its components; and

• viewing the website maintained by the Department at www.lifeandliberty.gov to keep the public informed of the Department’s counterterrorism efforts.

In total, we identified 209 unique terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department and its components from October 1, 2000, through September 30, 2005. To assess whether these statistics were accurate, we examined the internal controls for 192 of the 209 terrorism-related statistics.¹³ The 209 statistics were reported at least 602 times during the period as shown in the following chart.¹⁴

Source: Interviews with Department officials and Department documents

From the 209 terrorism-related statistics, we excluded 150 statistics from detailed review because:

• the statistics were generated by agencies outside the Department (17),

• the source of the statistics could not be identified by Department officials (16),¹⁵

• the OIG previously reviewed the statistics or supporting systems and made recommendations to correct deficiencies identified (48), and

• the statistics were used exclusively for informational as opposed to operational purposes (69).¹⁶

Of the remaining 59 terrorism‑related statistics, we judgmentally selected 26 statistics for detailed testing based on our assessment of the risk associated with reporting the statistic inaccurately and of the significance of the statistic to the Department’s counterterrorism efforts. The statistics selected included 10 from the FBI, 5 from the Criminal Division, and 11 from the USAOs. We then analyzed documentation provided by the components and conducted interviews of component officials to confirm the accuracy of the statistics sampled. We did not test any of the statistics reported by the Department as a whole because the Department reported those statistics for informational purposes, and we decided to focus our efforts on the statistics used for operational purposes.

More details about our methodology for evaluating the accuracy of the terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department and its components are contained in the Objectives, Scope, and Methodology in Appendix I. The results of our audit work and testing are reported in the Finding and Recommendations section of the report.

Prior Audits

Several previous audits and inspections by the OIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have reviewed or touched upon the accuracy of terrorism-related statistics reported by the Department.

As previously stated, the OIG reviewed 48 terrorism-related statistics or supporting systems and made recommendations to correct deficiencies identified. The results of these reviews were included in nine audit and inspection reports issued from September 2003 through September 2005.¹⁷

In a January 2003 report, the GAO reported on the Department’s need for better controls and oversight of terrorism-related statistics.¹⁸ The GAO reported that in FY 2001 the Department switched from using the FBI’s terrorism-related conviction statistics to using those of EOUSA for its annual report because of: (1) concerns raised by a newspaper article’s allegation that the Department had inflated its terrorism numbers in its FY 2000 Performance Report,¹⁹ and (2) an effort to report conviction statistics that would be less likely to be misinterpreted. Prior to FY 2002, the FBI and EOUSA used different criteria to classify cases and resulting convictions as terrorism-related, resulting in differences in how each entity ultimately classified a case. Consequently, the total number of convictions classified by the FBI and EOUSA as terrorism-related differed. Also, because EOUSA prosecutes federal cases, its classification system only includes federal convictions, while the FBI’s classification system also includes convictions in state, local, and international courts obtained with the FBI’s investigative assistance. The GAO reported that the Department did not have sufficient management oversight and internal controls in place to ensure the accuracy and reliability of terrorism-related conviction statistics included in its annual performance reports.

In a March 2004 report, the GAO reported on: (1) the guidance and procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting investigations and arrests, and (2) how investigations and arrests statistics are used.²⁰ The report also discussed whether multiple agencies were counting and reporting the same investigations and arrests. The GAO concluded that law enforcement agencies often count the same investigations and arrests resulting from joint operations and present these statistics in their public documents and budget justifications. The GAO also observed that: (1) none of the law enforcement agencies reviewed have a central repository of joint investigations and arrests, and (2) not all of the agencies distinguish between unilateral and joint arrests and investigations within their databases. The GAO concluded that making this distinction would help Congress when making budget decisions related to these agencies.

Department’s Response to Concerns about Inaccurate Terrorism-Related Statistics

From December 2004 through April 2005, senior Department officials provided written responses to post-hearing questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the accuracy of terrorism-related statistics.²¹ Subsequent to each of these hearings, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legislative Affairs provided the Department’s response to additional questions resulting from the hearings. In response to post-hearing questions from the October 21, 2003, hearing, the Assistant Attorney General said:

I note that the fact that a defendant was not charged with and convicted of a terrorism offense, or publicly linked to terrorism by the FBI, does not mean that law enforcement had no concerns or evidence regarding that individual’s connection with terrorism. Likewise, the fact that an alien was deported rather than prosecuted does not mean that he had no knowledge of, or connection to, terrorism. In certain cases, evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of, or connection to, terrorist activity may not be sufficient to prove a terrorism crime beyond a reasonable doubt, or proving a criminal offense may require the disclosure of sensitive sources or classified information. In situations like these, the best alternative from a national security and law enforcement perspective is to charge the defendant under other applicable criminal statutes, or – if the defendant is an alien eligible for removal – to remove him from the United States and do our best to ensure that he does not return. While these alternatives do not yield sentences as lengthy as those imposed upon defendants convicted of terrorism offenses, they help the Department achieve its top priority: the detection, prevention, and disruption of terrorist activity.

In response to post-hearing questions from the May 5, 2004, and September 22, 2004, hearings, the Assistant Attorney General provided a similar response.

We agree that defendants charged or convicted of non-terrorism offenses may have a link to terrorism. However, defendants should not be reported in terrorism-related statistics unless some support is available for the terrorism link. The initial allegation alone does not necessarily provide such a link.

11. Presidential Terrorist Threat Reports, now known as National Terrorism Bulletins, are produced by the National Counterterrorism Center from intelligence products disseminated by agencies in the United States intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Department of Defense intelligence components.

12. The OMB’s Performance Assessment Rating Tool is used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of federal programs and to develop funding and management decisions aimed at making the programs more effective.

13. Seventeen of the 209 statistics were obtained from agencies outside the Department, such as the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Homeland Security. Because these 17 statistics were not gathered by the Department, we excluded them from our review.

14. While some terrorism-related statistics were reported only once, most were reported multiple times. Many of the statistics identified were reported by more than one agency. The total times the statistic was reported is the number of times (both operational and informational) the statistic was reported by the primary reporting agency and by other agencies.

15. They include the number of: (1) disrupted donors related to terrorist financing, (2) weapons of mass destruction cases initiated by the FBI and supported by the Hazardous Material Response Unit, and (3) subpoenas and search warrants issued to gather and cultivate detailed intelligence on terrorists in the United States. The statistics for which sources could not be determined are listed in Appendix II.

16. Informational purposes included statistics such as those used in speeches, press releases, publications, and websites. Operational purposes included statistics such as those used in Department and component budget requests, performance plans, and annual financial statements and statistical reports.

17. The nine reports are:

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector Genera. Follow-up Audit of the Department of Justice Counterterrorism Fund, Audit Report Number 03-33, September 2003

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Federal Bureau of Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation, Audit Report Number 03-37, September 2003

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign Language Program – Translation of Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Foreign Language Material, Audit Report Number 04-25, July 2004

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General: Audit Report Number 04-39,

    Internal Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization, September 2004

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analyst, Audit Report Number 05-20, May 2005

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Review of the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report Number 05-27, June 2005

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspection Division. The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces, Report Number I-2005-007, June 2005

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Foreign Language Translation Program Follow-Up, Audit Report Number 05-33, July 2005

    Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization Efforts, Audit Report Number 05-37, September 2005

18. General Accounting Office. Justice Department, Better Management Oversight and Internal Controls Needed to Ensure Accuracy of Terrorism-Related Statistics, GAO-03-266, January 2003. On July 7, 2004, the GAO was renamed the Government Accountability Office.

19. Mark Fazlollah and Peter Nicholas, “ U.S. Overstates Arrests in Terrorism,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, December 16, 2001.

20. General Accounting Office, Federal Law Enforcement, Information on the Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics, GAO-04-411, March 2004. The GAO reviewed six federal agencies: the Drug Enforcement Administration; the FBI; the United States Marshals Service; the former U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now part of the Department of Homeland Security; and the United States Postal Inspection Service.

21. The post-hearing questions arose in connection with the: (1) October 21, 2003, hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on “Protecting Our National Security From Terrorist Attacks: A Review of Criminal Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions;”
    (2) May 5, 2004, hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on “Aiding Terrorists: An Examination of the Material Support Statutes;” and (3) September 22, 2004, hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on “A Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Proposals, Including the USA PATRIOT Act and the SAFE Act.”