VIII. Chapter Eight: OIG Analysis of the Actions of INS Investigators and Intelligence Officers Who Were Involved in the Resendez Case
In this chapter, we analyze the contacts between INS employees and the law enforcement authorities who were seeking to arrest Resendez in 1999. We describe what INS employees did in response to those contacts and the reasons they gave us for why they did not think to use IDENT in connection with the search for Resendez. To put this discussion in context, we first briefly describe the INSs policies on entering lookouts in IDENT and how these policies were disseminated.
A. IDENT Lookout Policy
When IDENT was first implemented along the Southwest Border in 1995, the INS did not develop any formal, written policies on who should be entered into the lookout database. In March 1998, an OIG Inspection report on IDENT noted that the INS had failed to clearly define the criteria for placing individuals into the lookout database. The OIG recommended that the INS establish a clear, specific policy to address who should be entered, when, and by whom. We also recommended that the INS establish appropriate controls to ensure the process was followed. In addition, we recommended that the INS develop and implement a strategy for sufficiently training all INS personnel using IDENT.48
The INS generally agreed with these recommendations and began efforts to establish a clear policy describing who should be enrolled in the IDENT lookout database. On August 10, 1998, the INS Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, Michael Pearson, sent a memorandum to all INS Regional Directors describing the new policy, which was an addition to the INSs service-wide fingerprint policy, and the procedures for entering lookouts and alerts in IDENT. The memorandum stated that the new policies and procedures were effective immediately.
According to Section 1.1 of the policy, when an INS officer determines that an alien meets one of the following criteria, the officer must submit the aliens ten-print fingerprint record to the INS Biometric Support Center (BSC) in Washington, D.C., for enrollment in the IDENT lookout database:
1) Any alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in Section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA);
2) Any alien who the INS officer knows or has reason to believe is an illicit trafficker in a controlled substance and is inadmissible under Section 212(a)(2)(C) of the INA;
3) Any alien who is inadmissible based on a crime of moral turpitude under Section 212(a)(2)(A) or (B) of the INA; and
4) Any alien who is inadmissible on security and related grounds under Section 212(a)(3) of the INA.
Section 1.2 of the policy states that if an alien does not meet one of these criteria but the INS officer determines that the alien has committed other offenses of a serious enough nature that an IDENT lookout is warranted, the officer may submit the aliens fingerprints to the BSC for entry in the lookout database.
In addition, Section 2.1 of the policy states that the alien must be entered into the IDENT recidivist database with an alert activated if the alien has an administrative final order of removal, exclusion, or deportation but the alien does not qualify under the criteria for a lookout to be entered. Section 2.2 states that the officer must enter an alert in the recidivist database if the officer determines that other considerations, such as officer safety, warrant entry.
Pearsons memorandum required that all INS District Directors and Chief Patrol Agents sign compliance certifications stating that all officers responsible for arrests . . . of aliens . . . have been provided and have read the Policy and Procedures for entering Lookouts and Alerts into the IDENT database. By the end of 1998, all District Directors and Chief Patrol Agents had signed the certification. The Acting INS Houston District Director and the Assistant District Director for Investigations signed the compliance certification in November 1998.
According to this policy, Resendez clearly qualified for inclusion in IDENTs lookout database. Although much of Resendezs criminal history was not contained within his A-file, it did contain sufficient information about Resendezs crimes to qualify him for entry into the lookout database under Section 1.1 of the lookout policy. First, Resendez was convicted of burglary in Miami, Florida, in 1980 and sentenced to a prison term of 20 years. This offense by itself qualified Resendez for the lookout database. Second, Resendez was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in 1989, which also qualified him for inclusion in the lookout database. Third, he was convicted of other felonies, including reentry after deportation in 1989, which also qualified him for inclusion in the lookout database. Fourth, Resendez qualified for inclusion in the lookout database under Section 1.13 of the policy.
In addition, Section 1.2 of the lookout policy permitted any INS employee to have a lookout entered in IDENT if the employee determined that the alien had committed other offenses of a serious enough nature that an IDENT lookout was warranted. This applied to Resendez based on his criminal history, and it would surely apply once it was known in early 1999 that he was wanted in connection with the murder of Dr. Benton.49
According to the manager of the BSC, if it had received information on Resendez it would have enrolled a lookout for him in IDENT because he qualified for enrollment under the lookout policy.
We now turn to the actions of various INS employees who were contacted by law enforcement authorities seeking to find Resendez.
B. Houston INS Investigators
1. Special Agent Kelly Dozier
Kelly Dozier, a special agent in the INS Houston District Investigations office, was contacted by the West University Place police about the murder of Dr. Benton in January 1999. Dozier acknowledged to the OIG that Detective Macha called her and wanted a lookout for Resendez placed on the border.
Dozier said she told Macha that at the border, lookouts are utilized via the TECS database and referred him to the Customs Service. However, she never mentioned IDENT to Macha. She told the OIG that she did not think to have a lookout entered in IDENT for Resendez. She said she suggested TECS because she thought Resendez was fleeing from the United States. Her failure to mention IDENT meant that if Resendez was apprehended by the Border Patrol in the United States (before he had left) or if he was apprehended by the Border Patrol attempting to cross the border into the United States later (as actually occurred on June 1, 1999), the Border Patrol agent would not be notified that Resendez was being sought in connection with the murder of Dr. Benton.
Moreover, TECS is mainly designed to alert inspectors at ports of entry about individuals who are attempting to enter the United States. But many illegal aliens do not enter the United States through a port of entry by presenting themselves for inspection. Resendezs pattern was like that of most illegal entrants along the Southwest Border he attempted to cross the border in remote areas, between ports of entry. IDENT would have been useful if he were apprehended in that circumstance; TECS was not.
Dozier told the OIG that she had received informal training in IDENT and formal training on IDENTIX in 1997, but that she never used IDENT. She claimed that she never received any training about how an alien could be enrolled into the IDENT lookout database and that she did not know the difference between the lookout and recidivist databases. She acknowledged, however, that she had received Pearsons August 1998 memorandum describing the policies for entering lookouts and alerts in IDENT. According to Dozier, she read the policy but did not use the information in it because she did not use IDENT. Dozier also told the OIG that it was only recently, after the Resendez case came to light, that she learned that an alien can be enrolled in the lookout database without the alien being present.
2. Special Agent Marco Saltarelli and His Supervisors
Marco Saltarelli, a special agent in the INS Houston Districts Investigations office, was the INS employee assigned to help the police obtain information about Resendez. Saltarelli obtained the A-file for the police and in February 1999 met with police detectives about the Resendez case. Saltarelli told the OIG that during the meeting, he called his friend at the Customs Service to confirm that a lookout on the border had been placed on Resendez in TECS. The friend was unable to confirm this during the call, the friend never called Saltarelli back, and Saltarelli never followed up on the matter. Most important, Saltarelli never mentioned the INSs own database, IDENT, to the detectives.
Saltarelli had enough information to know that Resendez fit the criteria of the lookout policy. For example, Saltarelli told the INSs Houston District Intelligence Officer, Juliano, that Resendez had been convicted for reentry after deportation and had a criminal history. Also, Saltarellis supervisor, Susan Friesenhahn, specifically recalled reviewing Resendezs A-file with Saltarelli early in the investigation, and the A-file contained evidence of Resendezs felony convictions.
Saltarelli also suggested to Houston Intelligence Officer Juliano that the Resendez case should be included in Julianos Weekly Intelligence Report. Saltarelli later learned that when the Central Region received Julianos report, it had suggested that a wanted poster be distributed regarding Resendez. However, Saltarelli never saw one and never followed up.
Through our interviews and document review, it was clear that Saltarelli considered the Resendez case to be his case and that he took an active interest in it. He asserted that he would have assisted in apprehending Resendez if he was located, and he assumed he would be the INS case agent who would work on a prosecution of Resendez. In June 1999 when it appeared that Resendez might be apprehended in San Antonio, Saltarelli even refused to send the A-file to an INS agent there. Saltarelli argued that because the murder of Dr. Benton had occurred in Houston, Resendez would be brought to Houston for trial and his INS paperwork should be done in Houston. Saltarelli also told the OIG that he wanted a tic mark when Resendez was apprehended that is, he wanted credit for the apprehension.
Yet, despite his belief that it was his case, his desire for recognition for his work in the case, and even his initiative in suggesting that Resendez be included in an intelligence report, Saltarelli failed to consider having a lookout for Resendez entered in IDENT. And Saltarelli did not even mention IDENT to the West University Place detectives who met with him, even though Saltarelli knew they were seeking information that might help them locate Resendez. Like Dozier, he only thought about placing a lookout in TECS, not IDENT.
According to Saltarelli, he had never used or been trained on IDENT. We confirmed that he had not been formally trained on IDENT and did not have an IDENT password until July 1999. Saltarelli also asserted to the OIG that he had not received Pearsons August 1998 memorandum describing the IDENT lookout policy until July 1999, after the INSs involvement in the Resendez case surfaced and the lookout policy was reissued. However, Saltarellis supervisor in August 1998 indicated that he distributed the policy to his employees by placing it in their mailboxes.50 When we interviewed Saltarelli in July 1999, even though he had received the memorandum recently and there was significant attention on the Resendez case, he said he still did not know the difference between the lookout and recidivist databases.
It is also important to point out that Saltarellis acting supervisors in the Houston Investigations office also learned about the polices search for Resendez but did not think to suggest that a lookout for him be placed in IDENT. Between December 1998 and April 1999, David Jennings and Susan Friesenhahn rotated as Saltarellis acting supervisors in the Alien Criminal Apprehension Unit (ACAP). In April 1999, Friesenhahn was appointed the permanent ACAP supervisor. Saltarelli talked to both of them about the Resendez case. Neither one suggested to Saltarelli that he should check IDENT in connection with the Resendez matter, that he should tell the detectives about IDENT, or that he should have a lookout entered for Resendez in IDENT.
We determined that Jennings received IDENT training in 1997. He acknowledged to the OIG that he received the August 1998 memorandum about the IDENT lookout policy. He also recalled a compliance sheet about IDENT (the only compliance sheet was the one signed by the Houston Deputy District Director that the IDENT lookout policy had been distributed and was read by INS employees). Jennings also told the OIG that the August 1998 memorandum about the lookout policy was garbage and that no one could understand the procedures in it. He said that if he had seen the August 1998 memorandum, he is sure he would have gotten glassy-eyed and set the memorandum aside.51 He stated that was it not until sometime in July 1999 that he learned that an alien who was not in custody could be enrolled in the lookout database. He told the OIG that he did not use IDENT because the IDENT machine in the Houston Investigations office was not working, and that no one used IDENT.
Friesenhahn similarly said that she did not suggest to Saltarelli to enroll Resendez in IDENTs lookout database because, until July 1999, she did not know that an alien who was not physically present could be enrolled in IDENT. Friesenhahn said she also thought that Resendez could not be enrolled because he was a suspect and had not been convicted of a crime. Friesenhahn said she thought that the Central Region, which had received Julianos intelligence report that included the information about Resendez, would have placed a lookout for Resendez. She said she thought that if the Central Region did not do it, Juliano should.
Friesenhahn said she received training for IDENT in 1997 or 1998 when the system was first introduced in the Houston District. She said that she had used IDENT a number of times while on detail to another INS District in July and August 1998, but she did not use IDENT in Houston. She said that many Houston agents were discouraged because the IDENT system responded too slowly and in some cases did not respond to an entry until the following day. According to Friesenhahn, by September 1998 the IDENT machines were no longer working in the Houston District. She also said she had been on detail away from the Houston District when the August 1998 lookout policy was distributed and had not received it. She did not recall receiving the policy until it was re-distributed in July 1999. However, she did acknowledge receiving in August 1998 the cover memorandum to which the lookout policy had been attached.
3. Special Agent Albert Plasket
On March 4, 1999, Texas Ranger Carter and West University Place detectives met with Albert Plasket, a special agent in the INSs Houston Investigations office, to copy Resendezs A-file. During this meeting in the Houston INS office, neither Plasket nor any of the other INS special agents who were present mentioned IDENT to Carter or to the detectives.
Several days after that meeting, Carter called Plasket and specifically asked Plasket to place an internal hold on Resendez in the INSs system. Although Carter told the OIG that he does not recall Plaskets specific response, Carter understood Plasket would take care of putting the internal hold on Resendez.
Yet, Plasket never placed a lookout for Resendez in IDENT or any other INS system. Plasket said he did not remember the call. He said if he had received the call, he would not have told Carter that he would take care of placing a hold on Resendez, but would have referred Carter to the case agent, Saltarelli. However, Saltarelli told us that he did not hear about such a call, from either Plasket or Carter directly.
Plasket also told the OIG when we questioned him about Carters request for an internal hold that he did not know what that meant, and the only internal hold he was aware of is when the INS places a detainer on an alien in the custody of another law enforcement agency. Plasket may have misunderstood Carters request and believed that he did not need to do anything because Resendez was not in custody and a hold or a detainer was not necessary until he was apprehended. In any event, he never told anyone about Carters request, including Saltarelli.
Plasket also did not think of or mention IDENT to Carter. Plasket told the OIG that he had no knowledge of IDENT, had not been trained on it, and had never used it. One INS document states that Plasket was scheduled to receive IDENT training, but there is no evidence that he was ever trained. Plasket said his understanding from his supervisor in his unit was that it was sufficient for one or two people in the unit to have received IDENT training because they could process any apprehended aliens in IDENT. Plasket thought that although some people in his unit used IDENT, D&D personnel enrolled aliens in IDENT 99 percent of the time.
Plasket told the OIG that he did not know that IDENT contained both a lookout and recidivist database and that he had no knowledge of the August 1998 memorandum regarding the IDENT lookout database. However, his supervisor said it was likely that he gave the memorandum to his employees.
Based on Carters conversation with Plasket, Carter believed that an internal hold had been placed on Resendez in INS databases when there was none. Carter thought that he informed other law enforcement agents, including the FBI, that there was an INS internal hold for Resendez. As a result, those agents believed that if the INS apprehended Resendez, he would be held. But no such hold had in fact been placed on Resendez, and when he was apprehended on June 1, 1999, he was voluntarily returned to Mexico.
C. Information From IDENT Would Have Been Useful to The Law Enforcement Agencies Seeking Resendez
The Houston Police Department, the West University Place police, and the Texas Rangers all contacted the INS investigators and made clear that they were looking for leads as to Resendezs whereabouts. They reviewed the A-file for information about Resendezs life, such as old addresses, the names of family members and friends, and information about his criminal history. The information in the A-file, however, stopped in 1991. By contrast, IDENT contained important and more recent information about Resendez, including when and where he was caught crossing the border. This information would have given the police leads in their search for Resendez and would have allowed them to focus resources on the places where he had been recently apprehended, rather than having to work with old information from Resendezs A-file.
No one from the INSs Houston District Office who was contacted by the police or the Texas Rangers even thought to check IDENT to see if there was information in it about Resendez. No one even mentioned the existence of IDENT. When we asked the law enforcement agents who had contacted the INS employees about Resendez in 1999 whether the information in IDENT would have been useful during their investigation, they responded that it would have been helpful. They said they did not know about the IDENT database at that time and did not learn about it until June 1999. Several police officers said that it would have been extremely helpful to have the information from IDENT about Resendezs border crossings because that would have provided the police additional leads to help find Resendez. An FBI agent told us that the IDENT information would have been useful because it illustrated Resendezs standard operating plan. The FBI agent said this information would have allowed the FBI to concentrate its efforts on the places Resendez had crossed the border before and was likely to cross again. Another police employee said that she was unaware of IDENT and was flabbergasted and annoyed that the police had not been told that the INS had such a system.
D. INS Intelligence Officers from the Houston District Office and Central Region
In addition to the Houston INS investigators who failed to think of IDENT in connection with the Resendez case, Houston and Central Region Intelligence officers also never made the connection. As noted above, Saltarelli spoke with Juliano, the INS Houston Districts Intelligence officer, about the Resendez case and suggested that he include information on Resendez in his Weekly Intelligence Report. Juliano did so in the February 22-28 report that he sent to the Central Region.
Among others, Central Region Senior Intelligence Officer Paul Broderick and his supervisor, Assistant Regional Director for Intelligence James Bailey, received Julianos report. Broderick and Bailey both sent e-mails to Juliano offering to make a wanted poster for Resendez to be distributed via e-mail to Border Patrol agents along the border.
While the suggestion to make a wanted poster of Resendez for distribution along the border showed initiative, it was not coupled with the logical suggestion to place a lookout for Resendez in IDENT. Juliano suggested to the OIG that it was an agents job to enroll aliens in IDENT, not his. He said he did not enroll anyone in IDENT. He said he was not familiar with the lookout database and did not know how to enter a lookout. Juliano said he had not received any formal training in IDENT because he was out of the office when IDENT training was provided. He stated, however, that sometimes the employees in D&D would run someone through IDENT for him when he was working in the Anti-Smuggling Unit. He also said that detention officers would provide him with information about apprehensions from IDENT and he would add that data to his intelligence reports about alien smuggling.
Juliano recalled receiving Pearsons August 1998 lookout policy. Juliano said that when he received the policy he asked a detention officer about it. He said that the detention officer told him that with smuggling cases, IDENT would be the last step in the process and that someone in D&D would take care of it. Juliano said he has not referred to the lookout policy since he received it.
Broderick said he did not suggest that a lookout be entered in IDENT because he had no familiarity with the system. He said he never received any training on IDENT, and the Central Region, where he is located, does not have any IDENT terminals. Broderick said he never received the August 1998 memorandum about the IDENT lookout policy.52 Bailey, Brodericks supervisor, also said he never received the IDENT lookout policy. He said he was familiar with the IDENT recidivist database, but he had never used it.
E. Other INS Employees
Finally, several other INS employees involved with the Resendez investigation also did not know about IDENT or consider using it in the Resendez case.
1. INS Liaisons with the Gulf Coast Task Force
In early 1999, the Gulf Coast Violent Offenders Task Force began seeking to arrest Resendez on the state warrant that had been issued on January 5, 1999 in connection with Dr. Bentons murder. An investigator from the INS Houston District Office, Special Agent Herb Darsee, acted as a liaison to the task force.
According to a Supervisory Deputy United States Marshal (DUSM) who helped supervise the Gulf Coast Task Force, task force agents seeking to execute warrants typically called the INS if it appeared that the INS had contact with the suspect. The DUSM said that, in such cases, the INS can provide a treasure house of information. The DUSM said he specifically suggested to the task force agent assigned to the Resendez case, a detective from the Harris County Sheriffs Department, that he should contact the INS. This agent told the OIG that he did not contact the INS because WUP Detective Macha had said that he was handling the INS part of the case. The agent said that he normally would have contacted the INS, but he did not do so because he thought Macha already took care of it.
Even if the agent had contacted the INS liaison to the task force, Darsee, it is not likely he would have received any information about IDENT. Darsee told the OIG that he did not use IDENT because he thought it was a tool for the D&D, not the Investigations Division. Darsee said he routinely checked other databases for information on fugitive aliens, not IDENT. Although Darsee had received training on IDENT in 1997, he said he was not familiar with its lookout database.53
2. Senior Special Agent Thomas Cason
Thomas Cason was the INS Houston District investigator assigned to assist the FBIs Resendez task force when it was formed in June 1999. At that time, FBI task force agents contacted Cason and asked whether there were INS files on Resendez, in addition to his A-file, that needed to be pulled. Cason said that he decided to replicate the FBIs search of criminal databases for information about Resendez, such as NCIC, the Texas Criminal Information Center, and a Harris County database. Cason also located an INS file on Resendezs sister and provided it to the FBI. On June 9, 1999, he and an FBI agent faxed a lookout notice from the FBI task force to Border Patrol sectors.
While the lookout notice was an important step and eventually resulted in Resendez being placed in IDENT, Cason himself never thought to have Resendez enrolled in IDENT. Nor did he search IDENT for information about Resendez that could have helped the FBI task force locate him. Cason told the OIG that he had no knowledge about IDENT, had never received training on IDENT, and was not aware that the Houston INS District office even had an IDENT workstation. Cason claimed he did not receive the August 1998 memorandum on the IDENT lookout policy when it was issued. However, Casons supervisor told us he believed he had provided a copy of the memorandum to all members of OCDETF, which included Cason, by placing a copy in each of the agents mail boxes. Cason also admitted to the OIG that if he had received the memorandum, he would have ignored it because there were a lot of memoranda floating around the office, and he would not have taken note of that one because he was not familiar with IDENT.
In sum, none of the INS employees who were contacted before June 1999 by law enforcement agents seeking Resendez took the initiative to have a lookout for him entered in IDENT. Nor did anyone query IDENT for information on Resendez. Two investigators, Dozier and Saltarelli, thought to have a lookout placed in a Customs Service database used largely to check travelers who present themselves at ports of entry, but they did not think of IDENT, which would have been more important for identifying aliens crossing the border illegally between ports of entry. None of the INS supervisors or co-workers who learned about the case thought of using IDENT either. Another INS investigator, Plasket, was specifically asked by a Texas Ranger to place a hold on Resendez in the INS internal system, but apparently Plasket did nothing. As a result, the Texas Rangers, the police, and the FBI assumed that a hold had been placed on Resendez in the appropriate INS database when, in fact, no such lookout had been placed.
In addition, while the Intelligence officers in the Houston District Office and the Central Region suggested distributing a wanted poster for Resendez at the border, they never thought to place a lookout in IDENT (and they never followed up on the suggestion to distribute the wanted poster). Also, the Houston Intelligence officer, who knew that IDENT contained information about prior apprehensions of aliens, checked NCIC for information about Resendez but did not check IDENT. Moreover, no one ever told the law enforcement authorities who were seeking Resendez about the IDENT system. As a result, information that would have been useful in their search for Resendez was not provided to them until late June 1999.
This universal lack of awareness and failure to use IDENT is extremely disturbing, particularly since it directly contributed to the Border Patrols voluntary return of Resendez on June 1, 1999. Had anyone placed a lookout for Resendez in IDENT before June 1, it is likely that he would have been detained by the Border Patrol on that date.
We heard various explanations for why these INS agents never used IDENT or mentioned it to the police who were seeking Resendez. Some said they knew about IDENT but thought it was the job of others to place a lookout. Others said they did not understand IDENT or know that a lookout could be placed for an alien who was not in custody. Several said they were not familiar with IDENT at all. Many of them said that they were not trained in IDENT or that their training did not cover the lookout portion of IDENT.
These explanations are troubling. Essentially, most of the INS employees we interviewed attributed their failure to use IDENT to their lack of knowledge of the system. Yet, several of the individuals involved with the Resendez investigation admitted that they had received training on IDENT. Most of the investigators acknowledged that they had received the August 1998 memorandum about the lookout policy or we determined that their supervisor had distributed the policy to them. Despite receiving this important policy memorandum, most investigators either discarded it without reviewing it or reviewed it but did not understand the contents and made little or no effort to do so.
Perhaps most indicative of the cavalier attitude toward IDENT within the Houston Investigations office was the fact that the then Assistant District Director for Investigations who signed the compliance certification admitted to us that he had no idea what IDENT was. Similarly, the acting Deputy Assistant District Director for Investigations who distributed the lookout policy said he had no knowledge of IDENT. This attitude undoubtedly contributed to the investigators not using IDENT or thinking about it when contacted by the law enforcement officers seeking Resendez.
48 We discuss the OIG Inspection report and the INSs response more fully in the next chapter.
49 Under sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the policy, Resendez also met the criteria for an alert in the recidivist database, both because he had been previously deported several times and because he was wanted for murder and could pose a risk to Border Patrol agents who might try to apprehend him. One purpose of the alert function was to allow agents to enter a notice about an alien in IDENT without having to wait to forward fingerprints to the BSC for entry into the lookout database. However, in 1998 and 1999 several INS offices, including the Houston Investigations office, were using versions of IDENT that did not permit agents in the field to put alerts in the recidivist database. The Houston District Office did not update its version of IDENT to version 3.0, the version that allowed agents to enter alerts, until May 1999. In addition, although the lookout policy stated that alerts could be entered by the BSC, we found during our review that the BSC did not have that capability. When we brought this gap to the attention of INS managers, they told us that the INS intends to make a change to allow the BSC to enter alerts.
50 The supervisor did not specifically recall having distributed the memorandum, but it is likely that he did. First, he said that if he had been ordered to do so (which he was), he would have distributed the memorandum in the investigators mailboxes. Second, at least four other investigators in the Houston Investigations office recalled receiving the memorandum.
51 When we asked Jennings whether he thought there might have been someone at the Central Region who could have answered questions regarding the policy, he said he was sure he could have found someone to give straight answers, but he did not do so.
52 Broderick said that after the OIG investigation on the Resendez case began, he taught himself how to use IDENT and how to enroll an alien into the lookout database.
53 Darsee said that after the Resendez case everyone in Investigations has been required to use IDENT. But when the OIG interviewed Darsee in December 1999, he still was not familiar with IDENTs lookout database.