FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 7(C)

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Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004


Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) provides protection for personal information in law
enforcement records. This exemption is the law enforcement counterpart to
Exemption 6, which is the FOIA's fundamental privacy exemption. (See the
discussions of the primary privacy-protection principles that apply to both
exemptions under Exemption 6, above.) Exemption 7(C) provides protection for law
enforcement information the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (1) Despite their similarities in
language, though, the sweep of the two exemptions can be significantly different.

Whereas Exemption 6 routinely requires an identification and balancing of the
relevant privacy and public interests, Exemption 7(C) can be even more
"categorized" in its application. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held in SafeCard Services v. SEC (2) that based upon the traditional
recognition of the strong privacy interests inherent in law enforcement records, (3) and
the logical ramifications of United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press
, (4) the "categorical withholding" of information
that identifies third parties in law enforcement records will ordinarily be appropriate
under Exemption 7(C). (5) (See the discussion of the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee decision under
Exemption 6, The Reporters Committee Decision, above.)

Certain other distinctions between Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) are
apparent: in contrast with Exemption 6, Exemption 7(C)'s language establishes a
lesser burden of proof to justify withholding in two distinct respects. (6) First, it is well
established that the omission of the word "clearly" from the language of Exemption
7(C) eases the burden of the agency and stems from the recognition that law
enforcement records are inherently more invasive of privacy than "personnel and
medical files and similar files." (7) Indeed, the "'strong interest' of individuals, whether
they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated
unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity'" has been repeatedly recognized. (8)

Second, the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 further broadened the
protection afforded by Exemption 7(C) by lowering the risk-of-harm standard from
"would" to "could reasonably be expected to." (9) This amendment to the Act eased
the standard for evaluating a threatened privacy invasion through disclosure of law
enforcement records. (10) One court, in interpreting the amended language, pointedly
observed that it affords the agency "greater latitude in protecting privacy interests"
in the law enforcement context. (11) Such information "is now evaluated by the agency
under a more elastic standard; exemption 7(C) is now more comprehensive." (12)

Under the balancing test that traditionally has been applied to both
Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), the agency must first identify and evaluate the
privacy interest(s), if any, implicated in the requested records. (13) But in the case of
records related to investigations by criminal law enforcement agencies, the case law
has long recognized, either expressly or implicitly, that "'the mention of an
individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation
and carries a stigmatizing connotation.'" (14) Accordingly, Exemption 7(C) has been regularly applied to withhold references to
persons who are not targets of investigations and who were merely mentioned in
law enforcement files, (15) as well as to persons of "investigatory interest" to a criminal
law enforcement agency. (16) Indeed, the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee
placed strong emphasis on the propriety of broadly protecting the interests of
private citizens whose names or identifying information is in a record that the
government "happens to be storing." (17) More recently, in NARA v. Favish, the
Supreme Court likewise recognized that law enforcement files often contain
information on individuals by "mere happenstance," and it strongly reinforced the
protection available under Exemption 7(C). (18) Hence, the small minority of older
district court decisions that failed to appreciate the strong privacy interests inherent
in the association of an individual with a law enforcement investigation should no
longer be regarded as authoritative. (19)

The identities of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel
referenced in investigatory files are also routinely withheld, usually for reasons
similar to those described quite aptly by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:


(20)

It should be noted that prior to the Reporters Committee and SafeCard
decisions, courts ordinarily held that because Exemption 7(C) involves a balancing of
the private and public interests on a case-by-case basis, there existed no "blanket
exemption for the names of all [law enforcement] personnel in all documents." (21)
Nonetheless, absent a demonstration of significant misconduct on the part of law
enforcement personnel or other government officials, (22) the overwhelming majority of
courts have declared their identities exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption
7(C). (23) Those few decisions ordering disclosure of the names of government
investigators -- other than when demonstrated misconduct has been involved --
either predate Reporters Committee (24) (not to mention Favish) or else find an
unusually significant public interest in disclosure. (25)

The history of one case in the District Court for the District of Columbia
illustrates the impact of the Reporters Committee decision in this area of law. In
Southam News, (26) the district court initially held that the identities of FBI clerical
personnel who performed administrative tasks with respect to requested records
could not be withheld under Exemption 7(C). Even then, this position was
inconsistent with other, contemporaneous decisions. (27) Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Reporters Committee, the government sought reconsideration of
the Southam News decision. Agreeing that revelation of identities and activities of
low-level agency personnel ordinarily will shed no light on government operations,
as required by Reporters Committee, the district court reversed its earlier disclosure
order and held the names to be properly protected. (28) Significantly, the court also
recognized that "the only imaginable contribution that this information could make
would be to enable the public to seek out individuals who had been tangentially
involved in investigations and to question them for unauthorized access to
information as to what the investigation entailed and what other FBI personnel were
involved." (29) More recently, after undertaking a post-Reporters Committee analysis,
the same district court strongly reaffirmed that identities of both FBI clerical
personnel and low-level special agents are properly withheld as a routine matter
under Exemption 7(C), even when they take part in a highly publicized
investigation. (30)

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has exhibited a
persistent lack of obeisance to the Reporters Committee decision. (31) In two of its
most recent decisions, Lissner v. United States Customs Service (32) and Favish v.
Office of Independent Counsel
, (33) the Ninth Circuit inexplicably ignored well-recognized privacy interests and refused to adhere to the narrow definition of public
interest set forth in Reporters Committee. (34) In Lissner, the Ninth Circuit ordered
disclosure of the "general physical description" of two state law enforcement officers
who were involved in smuggling steroids. (35) In so doing, it neglected to consider the
fact that the physical descriptions of these persons would shed no light on the
activities of the United States Customs Service. (36)

Likewise, in Favish v. Office of Independent Counsel, in attempting to
balance the interests involved in ten photographs of the scene of Deputy White
House Counsel Vincent Foster's suicide, the Ninth Circuit sent the case to the district
court for it to view the photographs in camera and inevitably order disclosure under
highly flawed standards (37) -- doing so even though those very photographs had been
held to be protected by Exemption 7(C) in a previous case. (38) Further, in analyzing
the public interest in disclosure, the Ninth Circuit purported to follow Reporters
Committee
yet based its finding of public interest in disclosure of the photographs
merely upon plaintiff's "doubts" regarding the adequacy of the government's
investigation into the suicide (39) -- leading to an order from the district court to
disclose five of the death-scene photographs. (40)

This past year the Supreme Court very soundly rejected the Ninth Circuit's
crabbed views of privacy protection, and its acceptance of spurious public interest
arguments, in NARA v. Favish. (41) It ruled that while the Ninth Circuit had recognized
the family's privacy interest and the nature of the asserted public interest, it had
utterly failed to properly balance the two when it required no credible evidence
showing actual government wrongdoing. (42) Such a reading of the Reporters
Committee
public interest standard in this context, the Supreme Court said, "leaves
Exemption 7(C) with little force or content." (43) So under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Favish, and its decision to protect the photographs at issue, a FOIA requester's
assertion of a public interest based on "government wrongdoing" now must meet a
distinctly higher standard. (44) Indeed, the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Favish is sweeping enough to discredit (or effectively overrule)
that circuit court's previous aberrational privacy jurisprudence. (45) (See also the
further discussions of Favish's fundamental privacy-protection principles under
Exemption 6, above.)

Furthermore, Favish now seriously calls into question the continued vitality of
the Sixth Circuit's singular view of an individual's privacy interest as enunciated by a
divided panel in Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of Justice, a case involving
the disclosure of "mug shots." (46) The Supreme Court reiterated in Favish that privacy
rights are not a "cramped notion" (47) and that Exemption 7(C)'s privacy protection must
be construed broadly in light of its specific language and "comparative breadth" to
the language of Exemption 6. (48) The fact that photographs taken of a private citizen
in a public place become available to the public at large does not lessen the privacy
interest in those photographs, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Sixth
Circuit. (49) In fact, affirmatively making such photographs available to the public can
go beyond merely violating privacy to inviting harassment, stigmatization, and
overwhelming media scrutiny. (50) One court has logically distinguished "mug shots"
from standard photographs, noting that a "mug shot" carries with it a unique
"stigmatizing effect," even for a defendant who already has been convicted and
sentenced. (51) Thus, in light of the Favish decision, atop the overwhelming weight of
case law broadly interpreting Exemption 7(C)'s privacy protection, Detroit Free Press
should no longer be regarded as authoritative even within the Sixth Circuit.

In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court found that substantial privacy
interests can exist in personal information such as is contained in "rap sheets," even
though the information has been made available to the general public at some place
and point in time. Applying a "practical obscurity" standard, (52) the Court observed
that if such items of information actually "were 'freely available,' there would be no
reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to [them]." (53) (See Exemption 7(D), below,
for a discussion of the status of open-court testimony under that exemption.)

All but one court of appeals to have addressed the issue have found
protectible privacy interests in conjunction with or in lieu of protection under
Exemption 7(D) -- in the identities of individuals who provide information to law
enforcement agencies. (54) Consequently, the names of witnesses and their home and
business addresses have been held properly protectible under Exemption 7(C). (55)
Additionally, Exemption 7(C) protection has been afforded to the identities of
informants, (56) even when it was shown that "the information provided to law
enforcement authorities was knowingly false." (57)

Although on occasion a pre-Reporters Committee decision found that an
individual's testimony at trial precluded Exemption 7(C) protection, (58) under the
Reporters Committee "practical obscurity" standard trial testimony should not
diminish Exemption 7(C) protection. (59) Plainly, if a person who actually testifies
retains a substantial privacy interest, the privacy of someone who is identified only
as a potential witness likewise should be preserved. (60)

Moreover, courts have repeatedly recognized that the passage of time will
not ordinarily diminish the applicability of Exemption 7(C). (61) This may be especially
true in instances in which the information was obtained through questionable law
enforcement investigations. (62) In fact, the "practical obscurity" concept expressly
recognizes that the passage of time may actually increase the privacy interest at
stake when disclosure would revive information that was once public knowledge
but has long since faded from memory. (63)

An individual's Exemption 7(C) privacy interest likewise is not extinguished
merely because a requester might on his own be able to "piece together" the
identities of third parties whose names have been deleted. (64) Nor do persons
mentioned in law enforcement records lose all their rights to privacy merely because
their names have been disclosed. (65) Similarly, "[t]he fact that one document does
disclose some names . . . does not mean that the privacy rights of these or others are
waived; it has been held that [requesters] do not have the right to learn more about
the activities and statements of persons merely because they are mentioned once in
a public document about the investigation." (66)

Under the traditional Exemption 7(C) analysis, once a privacy interest has
been identified and its magnitude has been assessed, it is balanced against the
magnitude of any recognized public interest that would be served by disclosure. (67)
And under Reporters Committee, the standard of public interest to consider is one
specifically limited to the FOIA's "core purpose" of "shed[ding] light on an agency's
performance of its statutory duties." (68) Accordingly, for example, the courts have
consistently refused to recognize any public interest, as defined by Reporters
Committee
, in disclosure of information to assist a convict in challenging his
conviction. (69) Indeed, a FOIA requester's private need for information in connection
with litigation plays no part whatsoever in determining whether disclosure is
warranted. (70) In NARA v. Favish, the Supreme Court further reinforced the FOIA
principle that a requester's identity generally is irrelevant in the processing of a
FOIA request, (71) but it at the same time made clear that a requester's reason for
making a FOIA request, insofar as an evidentiary showing on an asserted "public
interest" is required, can of course affect Exemption 7(C) decisionmaking. (72)

Unsubstantiated allegations of official misconduct are simply insufficient to
establish a public interest in disclosure: The Supreme Court in NARA v. Favish has
now made it very clear that "bare suspicion" is completely inadequate and that a
requester must produce evidence that would be credible in the eyes of a reasonable
person. (73) Now, one who asserts government misconduct as the public interest is
held to a higher standard: Such a FOIA requester must make a "meaningful
evidentiary showing" in order to provide even a public interest "counterweight" to
the privacy interest and require a balancing of the two. (74) Additionally, the requester
must establish some "nexus" between the requested documents and the asserted
"significant" public interest in disclosure. (75)

It also has been held that no public interest exists in federal records that
pertains to alleged misconduct by state officials; (76) such an attenuated interest "falls
outside the ambit of the public interest the FOIA was enacted to serve." (77) Moreover,
it should be remembered that any special expertise claimed by the requester is
irrelevant in assessing any public interest in disclosure. (78)

It also is important to remember that a requester must do more than identify
a public interest that qualifies for consideration under Reporters Committee: The
requester must demonstrate that the public interest in disclosure is sufficiently
compelling to, on balance, outweigh legitimate privacy interests. (79) Of course,
"[w]here the requester fails to assert a public interest purpose for disclosure, even a
less-than- substantial invasion of another's privacy is unwarranted." (80) In the wake of
Reporters Committee, the public interest standard ordinarily will not be satisfied
when FOIA requesters seek law enforcement information pertaining to living
persons. (81)

In order to protect the privacy interest of any individual who may be living,
agencies may use many different kinds of tests or research methods to determine
whether that person is still living or has died. The D.C. Circuit very recently
approved the Federal Bureau of Investigation's methods for doing this in Schrecker
v. United States Dep't of Justice
. (82) The FBI uses several steps to determine whether
an individual mentioned in a record is alive or dead, including looking up the
individual's name in Who Was Who, employing its "100-year rule" (which presumes
that an individual is dead if his or her birthdate appears in the responsive
documents and he or she would be over 100 years old), and using previous FOIA
requests (institutional knowledge), a search of the Social Security Death Index (when
the Social Security number appears in the responsive documents), and other
"internal" sources. (83) Other agencies may now do likewise.

In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court also emphasized the desirability
of establishing "categorical balancing" under Exemption 7(C) as a means of achieving
"workable rules" for processing FOIA requests. (84) In so doing, it recognized that
entire categories of cases can properly receive uniform disposition "without regard
to individual circumstances; the standard virtues of bright-line rules are thus
present, and the difficulties attendant to ad hoc adjudication may be avoided." (85)
This approach, in conjunction with other elements of Reporters Committee and
traditional Exemption 7(C) principles, subsequently led the D.C. Circuit to largely
eliminate the need for case-by-case balancing in favor of "categorical" withholding of
individuals' identities in law enforcement records. (86)

In SafeCard, the plaintiff sought information pertaining to an SEC
investigation of manipulation of SafeCard stock, including "names and addresses of
third parties mentioned in witness interviews, of customers listed in stock
transaction records obtained from investment companies, and of persons in
correspondence with the SEC." (87) Recognizing the fundamentally inherent privacy
interest of individuals mentioned in any way in law enforcement files, (88) the D.C.
Circuit found that the plaintiff's asserted public interest -- providing the public "with
insight into the SEC's conduct with respect to SafeCard" -- was "not just less
substantial [but] insubstantial." (89) Based upon the Supreme Court's endorsement of
categorical rules in Reporters Committee, it then further determined that the
identities of individuals who appear in law enforcement files would virtually never be
"very probative of an agency's behavior or performance." (90) It observed that such
information would serve a "significant" public interest only if "there is compelling
evidence that the agency . . . is engaged in illegal activity." (91) Consequently, the D.C.
Circuit held that "unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals
appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm
or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such
information is [categorically] exempt from disclosure." (92) This all now should be
viewed, though, together with the standard applied by the Supreme Court in NARA
v. Favish
regarding any specific evaluation of an asserted "agency wrongdoing
public interest." (93) In any event, of course, agencies should be sure to redact their
law enforcement records so that only identifying information is withheld under
Exemption 7(C). (94) (See the further discussion of privacy redaction under Exemption
6, The Balancing Process, above.)

Protecting the privacy interests of individuals who are the targets of FOIA
requests and are named in investigatory records requires special procedures. Most
agencies with criminal law enforcement responsibilities follow the approach of the
FBI, which is generally to respond to FOIA requests for records concerning other
individuals by refusing to confirm or deny whether such records exist. Such a
response is necessary because, as previously discussed, members of the public may
draw adverse inferences from the mere fact that an individual is mentioned in the
files of a criminal law enforcement agency. (95) Except when the third-party subject is
deceased or provides a written waiver of his privacy rights, law enforcement
agencies ordinarily "Glomarize" such third-party requests -- refusing either to confirm
or deny the existence of responsive records -- in order to protect the privacy of those
who are in fact the subject of or mentioned in investigatory files. (96)

In employing privacy "Glomarization," however, agencies must be careful to
use it only to the extent that is warranted by the terms of the particular FOIA
request at hand. (97) For a request that involves more than just a law enforcement file,
the agency must take a "bifurcated" approach to it, distinguishing between the
exceptionally sensitive law enforcement part of the request and any part that is not
so sensitive as to require "Glomarization." (98) In so doing, agencies apply the following
general rules: (1) FOIA requests that merely seek law enforcement records
pertaining to a named individual, without any elaboration, can be given a standard
"Glomarization" response; (2) any request that is specifically and exclusively directed
to an agency's non-law enforcement files (e.g., one aimed at personnel files only)
should receive purely conventional treatment, without "Glomarization"; and (3) FOIA
requests that do more than simply seek law enforcement records on a named
individual (e.g., ones that encompass personnel or possible administrative files as
well) must be bifurcated for conventional as well as "Glomarization" treatment. (99)
The "Glomar" response also is appropriate when one government agency has
officially acknowledged the existence of an investigation but the agency that
received the third-party request has never officially acknowledged undertaking an
investigation into that matter. (100)

Prior to Reporters Committee, before an agency could give a "Glomarization"
response, it was required to check the requested records, if any existed, for any
official acknowledgment of the investigation (e.g., as a result of prosecution) or for
any overriding public interest in disclosure that would render "Glomarization"
inapplicable. However, in Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court eliminated the
need to consider whether there has been a prior acknowledgment when it expressly
"recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information
even when the information may have been at one time public." (101) Further, as the very
fact of an arrest and conviction of a person, as reflected in his FBI "rap sheet,"
creates a cognizable privacy interest, any underlying investigative file, containing a
far more detailed account of the subject's activities, gives rise to an even greater
privacy interest. (102)

At the litigation stage, the agency must demonstrate to the court, either
through a Vaughn affidavit or an in camera submission, that its refusal to confirm or
deny the existence of responsive records is appropriate. (103) Although this "refusal to
confirm or deny" approach is now widely accepted in the case law, (104) several cases
have illustrated the procedural difficulties involved in defending a "Glomar" response
when the requester's "speculation" as to the contents of the records (if any exist)
raises a qualifying public interest. (105)

The significantly lessened certainty of harm now required under Exemption
7(C) and the approval of "categorical" withholding of privacy-related law
enforcement information in most instances should permit agencies to afford full
protection to the personal privacy interests of those mentioned in law enforcement
files (106) whenever those interests are threatened by a contemplated FOIA
disclosure. (107)

    1. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2000).

    2. 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

    3. See Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and
    Agencies Regarding the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
    Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum], reprinted in FOIA Post (posted
    10/15/01) (evincing government commitment to enhancing effectiveness of law
    enforcement agencies).

    4. 489 U.S. 749 (1989); see also Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum,
    reprinted in FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (emphasizing the importance of protecting
    personal privacy among the other interests that are protected by the FOIA's
    exemptions); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 3-7 (discussing mechanics of privacy-protection decisionmaking process employed under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).

    5. 926 F.2d at 1206; see, e.g., Blanton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 64 Fed. Appx.
    787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (protecting identities of third parties contained in FBI files
    categorically, including those assumed to be deceased); Fiduccia v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 185 F.3d 1035, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting records concerning
    FBI searches of house of two named individuals categorically); Nation Magazine v.
    United States Customs Serv.
    , 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (restating that those
    portions of records in investigatory files which would reveal subjects, witnesses, and
    informants in law enforcement investigations are categorically exempt (citing
    SafeCard)); Mack v. Dep't of the Navy, 259 F. Supp. 2d 99, 106 (D.D.C. 2003) (protecting
    identities of law enforcement agents, victims, witnesses, subjects of investigative
    interest, and third parties contained in investigative records categorically); Carp v.
    IRS
    , No. 00-5992, 2002 WL 373448, at **4-5 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2002) (holding that all
    information that identifies third parties is categorically exempt); Pusa v. FBI, No. CV-00-12384, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2001) (finding certain information pertaining to
    third parties to be categorically exempt), aff'd, 31 Fed. Appx. 567 (9th Cir. 2002);
    Coolman v. IRS, No. 98-6149, 1999 WL 675319, at *5 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 1999) (finding
    categorical withholding of third-party information in law enforcement records to be
    proper), summary affirmance granted, 1999 WL 1419039 (8th Cir. 1999); Ctr. to Prevent
    Handgun Violence v. United States Dep't of the Treasury
    , 981 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D.D.C.
    1997) (stating that "categorical exclusion from release of names in law enforcement
    reports applies only to subjects, witnesses, or informants in law enforcement
    investigations"); McNamera v. United States Dep't of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 946, 957-60
    (W.D. Tex. 1997) (allowing categorical withholding of information concerning criminal
    investigation of private citizens); Tanks v. Huff, No. 95-568, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266,
    at **12-13 (D.D.C. May 28, 1996) (holding that absent compelling evidence of agency
    wrongdoing, criminal histories and other personal information about informants are
    categorically exempt), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 96-5180 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13,
    1996); Straughter v. HHS, No. 94-0567, slip op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 1995)
    (magistrate's recommendation) (affording per se protection under Exemption 7(C)
    for witnesses and third parties when requester has identified no public interest),
    adopted (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 1995); cf. AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 (D.D.C.
    2001) (applying "this Circuit['s]" categorical rule that requires withholding under
    Exemption 7(C) of names of, and identifying information about, private individuals
    appearing in law enforcement files, even though action was brought under
    Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000), and despite questionable
    standing of plaintiff organization to assert any such privacy interest), aff'd on other
    grounds
    , 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Alexander & Alexander Servs. v. SEC, No. 92-1112, 1993 WL 439799, at *10 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1993) (requiring categorical withholding
    of personal information, even when records concern only professional activity of
    subjects, when no compelling evidence of illegal agency activity exists) ("reverse"
    FOIA case), appeal dismissed, No. 93-5398 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1996). But see Kimberlin
    v. United States Dep't of Justice
    , 139 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (eschewing the
    categorical rule of nondisclosure for Office of Professional Responsibility files, and
    suggesting the use of a case-by-case balancing test involving consideration of the
    "rank of public official involved and the seriousness of misconduct alleged"); Davin v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 60 F.3d 1043, 1060 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that the
    "government must conduct a document by document fact-specific balancing");
    Konigsberg v. FBI, No. 02-2428, slip op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. May 27, 2003) (refusing to apply
    categorical rule to records on informant who allegedly was protected from
    prosecution by FBI, based upon exceptional circumstances presented); Baltimore
    Sun v. United States Marshals Serv.
    , 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 n.5 (D. Md. 2001)
    (declining to accord categorical protection to third parties who purchased federally
    forfeited property), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 01-1537 (4th Cir. June 25, 2001).

    6. See NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570, 1576-77 (2004) (distinguishing between
    Exemption 6's and Exemption 7(C)'s language), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004 WL
    108633 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

    7. See Cong. News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 541
    (D.D.C. 1977) ("[A]n individual whose name surfaces in connection with an
    investigation may, without more, become the subject of rumor and innuendo."); see
    also, e.g.
    , Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 562 (D.D.C. 1981).

    8. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d
    84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2000)
    (finding that FBI Special Agents and third-party suspects have "substantial
    interest[s] in nondisclosure of their identities and their connection[s] to particular
    investigations"); Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that
    "'[p]ersons involved in FBI investigations -- even if they are not the subject of the
    investigation -- "have a substantial interest in seeing that their participation remains
    secret"'" (quoting Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (quoting, in turn, King v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 830 F.2d 210, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1987)))); Schiffer v. FBI, 78 F.3d 1405, 1410
    (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that persons named in FBI files have "strong interest in 'not
    being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity'" (quoting Fitzgibbon,
    911 F.2d at 767)); Computer Prof'ls for Soc. Responsibility v. United States Secret
    Serv.
    , 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that release of names of individuals,
    including nonsuspects, who attended public meeting that attracted attention of law
    enforcement officials would impinge upon their privacy); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286,
    288 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that association of FBI "agent's name with allegations of
    sexual and professional misconduct could cause the agent great personal and
    professional embarrassment"); Dunkelberger v. Dep't of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781
    (D.C. Cir. 1990) (refusing to confirm or deny existence of letter of reprimand or
    suspension of named FBI agent); Bast v. United States Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251,
    1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ruling that government officials do not surrender all rights to
    personal privacy by virtue of public appointment); Leveto v. IRS, No. 98-285 E, 2001
    U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5791, at **17-18 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2001) (recognizing privacy interests
    of suspects, witnesses, interviewees, and investigators); Morales Cozier v. FBI, No.
    1:99 CV 0312, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (protecting identities of FBI
    support personnel and individuals who provided information to FBI; citing 'well-recognized and substantial privacy interest' in nondisclosure (quoting Neely, 208
    F.3d at 464)); Franklin v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 10 (S.D.
    Fla. June 15, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (stating law enforcement officers,
    suspects, witnesses, innocent third parties, and individuals named in investigative
    files have substantial privacy interests in nondisclosure (citing Wichlacz v. United
    States Dep't of Interior
    , 938 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Va. 1996))), adopted (S.D. Fla. June
    26, 1998), aff'd per curiam, 189 F.3d 485 (11th Cir. 1999); Buros v. HHS, No. 93-571, slip
    op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994) (refusing to confirm or deny existence of criminal
    investigatory records concerning county official, even though subject's alleged
    mishandling of funds already known to public; "confirming . . . federal criminal
    investigation brushes the subject with an independent and indelible taint of
    wrongdoing"). But see Davin v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 92-1122, slip op. at
    9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1998) (concluding that individuals' privacy interests became
    diluted during more than twenty years that had passed since investigation was
    conducted), aff'd, 176 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).

    9. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48; see Attorney General's
    Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act
    9-12 (Dec.
    1987) [hereinafter Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum]; see also
    Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 (evincing the Supreme Court's reliance on "the Attorney
    General's consistent interpretation of" the FOIA in successive such Attorney General
    memoranda).

    10. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756 n.9; Stone v. FBI, 727 F. Supp. 662, 665
    (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that the 1986 FOIA amendments have "eased the burden of an
    agency claiming that exemption"), aff'd, No. 90-5065 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1990).

    11. Wash. Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 84-3581, 1987 U.S. Dist.
    LEXIS 14936, at *32 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1987) (magistrate's recommendation), adopted
    (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1987), rev'd on other grounds & remanded, 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

    12. Id.; see also Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir.
    1987) (finding that the "government need not 'prove to a certainty that release will
    lead to an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,'" at least not after the 1986
    FOIA amendments (quoting Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d 730, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1987)));
    Nishnic v. Dep't of Justice, 671 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding phrase "could
    reasonably be expected to" to be more easily satisfied standard than phrase "likely
    to materialize").

    13. See e.g., Straughter, No. 94-0567, slip op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 1995) (
    observing that agency must first identify and evaluate particular privacy interest
    implicated); Albuquerque Publ'g Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 726 F. Supp.
    851, 855 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Our preliminary inquiry is whether a personal privacy interest
    is involved."); see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7 (advising that there first must
    be a viable privacy interest of an identifiable, living person in the requested
    information for any further consideration of privacy-exemption protection to be
    appropriate).

    14. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C.
    1987)); see also Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Miller v. Bell, 661
    F.2d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1981) ("real potential for harassment"); Lesar v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 636 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("'It is difficult if not impossible, to
    anticipate all respects in which disclosure might damage reputation or lead to
    personal embarrassment and discomfort.'" (quoting Lesar v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 455 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D.D.C. 1978))); Palacio v. United States Dep't of Justice,
    No. 00-1564, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2198, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2002) (finding that
    release of individual's name in connection with criminal investigation may carry
    stigma and subject him to unnecessary public attention or harassment), summary
    affirmance granted
    , No. 02-5247, 2003 WL 242751 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2003); Brady-Lunny
    v. Massey
    , 185 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding that release of names of
    federal inmates, some of whom had not been charged with or convicted of crimes,
    would "stigmatize these individuals and cause what could be irreparable damage to
    their reputations"); Perlman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00 Civ. 5842, 2001
    WL 910406, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (finding that release of names of individuals
    who provided information during investigation would subject them to
    "embarrassment, harassment or threats of reprisal"), aff'd in pertinent part, 312 F.3d
    100, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that witnesses and third parties have "strong
    privacy interests" in not being identified as having been part of law enforcement
    investigation), vacated & remanded, 124 S. Ct. 1872 (2004); Times Picayune Publ'g
    Corp. v. United States Dep't of Justice
    , 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999)
    (recognizing that a "mug shot's stigmatizing effect can last well beyond the actual
    criminal proceeding"); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 955,
    957 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (noting that filing of tax lien against individual could cause
    "comment, speculation and stigma"); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, No.
    96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (finding that release of third-party names
    could invite harassment, embarrassment, or annoyance); Anderson v. USPS, 7 F.
    Supp. 2d 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (disclosing identities of interviewees and witnesses
    may result in embarrassment and harassment), aff'd, 187 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 1999)
    (unpublished table decision); Cujas v. IRS, No. 1:97-00741, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466,
    at *9 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1998) (finding that "third parties named in these law
    enforcement records have a very strong privacy interest in avoiding the stigma and
    embarrassment resulting from their identification as a person that is or was under
    investigation"), summary affirmance granted, No. 98-1641, 1998 WL 539686 (4th Cir.
    Aug. 25, 1998); Hamilton v. Weise, No. 95-1161, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18900, at *20
    (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1997) (protecting third-party names to avoid harassment,
    embarrassment, and unwanted public attention); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958
    (rejecting argument that individual already investigated by one agency cannot be
    stigmatized by acknowledgment of investigation by another agency); Dayton
    Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy
    , No. C-3-95-328, slip op. at 51
    (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 1996) (withholding records concerning acquitted criminal
    defendants because disclosure "can cause not only extreme embarrassment and
    humiliation, but also severe professional and economic hardship"); Southam News v.
    INS
    , 674 F. Supp. 881, 887 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding disclosure of identities of individuals
    excludable from U.S. "would result in derogatory inferences about and possible
    embarrassment to those individuals"); cf. Cerveny v. CIA, 445 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D.
    Colo. 1978) (finding mere mention of individual's name as subject of CIA file could be
    damaging to his or her reputation) (Exemption 6). But see Blanton v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , No. 93-2398, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21444, at **8-12 (W.D. Tenn. July 14,
    1993) (holding that there is no privacy interest in mere mention of defense attorney's
    name in criminal file or in validity of law license when attorney represented
    requester at criminal trial) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).

    15. See SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206 (protecting names of third parties); Rugiero v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 257 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (protecting identifying
    information about third parties), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1134 (2002); Shafizadeh v. ATF,
    No. 99-5727, 2000 WL 1175586, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (protecting names of, and
    identifying information about, private individuals); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464
    (withholding names of third parties mentioned or interviewed in course of
    investigation); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Johnston v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 97-2173, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18557, at *2 (8th Cir.
    Aug. 10, 1998) (same); Gabel v. IRS, 134 F.3d 377, 377 (9th Cir. 1998) (protecting third-party names in Department of Motor Vehicles computer printout included in
    plaintiff's IRS file); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904 (finding that release of names of
    any individuals who attended public meeting that attracted attention of law
    enforcement officials would impinge upon their privacy); Chourre v. IRS, No. C01-5171, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2925, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2002) (holding that
    redaction of third-party taxpayer information was proper); Amro v. United States
    Customs Serv.
    , 128 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (withholding names of "non-suspects arising during investigations"); Morales Cozier, No. 99-CV-0312, slip op. at
    17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (protecting identities of third parties mentioned in law
    enforcement documents); Comer v. IRS, No. 97-CV-76329, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
    17, 2000) (approving withholding of third party's driver's license information);
    Bartolotta v. FBI, No. 99-1145, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. July 13, 2000) (withholding personal
    information regarding potential visitors to inmate-plaintiff); W. Ctr. for Journalism v.
    IRS
    , 116 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting address of complainant and
    "unrelated, incidental medical information about a third party"), aff'd, 22 Fed. Appx.
    14 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Murphy v. IRS, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (D. Haw. 1999) (protecting
    identities of third parties); Franklin, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1998)
    (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting names, addresses, and other information
    that would identify individuals associated with plaintiff), adopted (S.D. Fla. June 26,
    1998); Crump v. EEOC, No. 97-0275, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 1997)
    (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting personal information of third parties who
    filed charges with EEOC), adopted (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 1997); Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F.
    Supp. 2d 774, 785 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (withholding identities of third parties against
    whom SEC did not take action); Ajluni v. FBI, 947 F. Supp. 599, 604-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
    (protecting identities of third parties merely mentioned in FBI files); Perrone v. FBI,
    908 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that release of names of persons
    mentioned in law enforcement files could lead to "stigmatizing public attention and
    even harassment"); Fritz v. IRS, 862 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (protecting
    name and address of person who purchased requester's seized car). But see City of
    Chicago v. United States Dep't of the Treasury
    , 287 F.3d 628, 636 (7th Cir. 2002)
    (declining to find "any legitimate privacy concerns" in names and addresses of
    firearm purchasers), vacated & remanded, 537 U.S. 1229 (2003); Baltimore Sun, 131 F.
    Supp. 2d at 729 (rejecting protection of names and addresses of purchasers of
    forfeited property); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Vacates and Remands in
    ATF Database Case" (posted 3/25/03) (discussing impact of vacatur in City of
    Chicago
    case).

    16. See, e.g., Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding names and identifying information
    of third-party suspects); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 (finding strong privacy interest in
    material that suggests person has at one time been subject to criminal
    investigation); O'Kane v. United States Customs Serv., 169 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir.
    1999) (protecting home addresses of individuals whose possessions were seized by
    government); Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (protecting suspects'
    palm- and fingerprints, their interviews and discussions with law enforcement
    officers, and photographs of former suspects and their criminal histories); Computer
    Prof'ls
    , 72 F.3d at 904 (holding potential suspects would have their privacy impinged
    if names disclosed); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624 (finding third parties' privacy interests in
    nondisclosure "potentially greater" than those of law enforcement officers);
    McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding suspects have
    "obvious privacy interest in not having their identities revealed"); Maynard v. CIA, 986
    F.2d 547, 566 (1st Cir. 1993) (reiterating "potential for harassment, reprisal or
    embarrassment" if names of individuals investigated by FBI disclosed); Davis v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (deciding that
    "embarrassment and reputational harm" would result from disclosure of taped
    conversations of individuals with boss of New Orleans organized crime family); Silets
    v. United States Dep't of Justice
    , 945 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (protecting
    associates of Jimmy Hoffa who were subjects of electronic surveillance); Fund for
    Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv.
    , 656 F.2d 856, 861-66 (D.C. Cir.
    1981) (withholding identities of persons investigated but not charged, unless
    "exceptional interests militate in favor of disclosure"); Garcia v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (protecting names, identities,
    addresses, and information pertaining to third parties who were of investigatory
    interest); Amro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (finding that disclosure of names of third
    parties of investigatory interest to Customs Service would "undermine the privacy
    interests of these individuals"); Willis v. FBI, No. 99-CV-73481, slip op. at 18 (E.D. Mich.
    July 11, 2000) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting identifying information
    concerning subject of FBI investigation), adopted (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2000); Phila.
    Newspapers, Inc. v. HHS
    , 69 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 1999) (protecting names of
    doctors "investigated for -- but not charged with -- Medicare fraud"); Thompson, No.
    96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (withholding names of complainant,
    information provided by third-party subject, and names of individuals interviewed);
    Tawalbeh v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, No. 96-6241, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal.
    Aug. 8, 1997) (protecting names of third parties who were potential targets of
    criminal investigation); Buros, No. 93-571, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994)
    (finding that even though subject's alleged mishandling of funds already known to
    public, confirming federal criminal investigation "brushes the subject with an
    independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing").

    17. See 489 U.S. at 774-75, 780 (declaring with no small emphasis that "it should
    come as no surprise that in none of our cases construing the FOIA have we found it
    appropriate to order a Government agency to honor a FOIA request for information
    about a particular private citizen").

    18. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577 (explicating in full that "law enforcement documents
    obtained by Government investigators often contain information about persons
    interviewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may
    be the result of mere happenstance"); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for
    'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (emphasizing breadth of privacy
    protection enunciated by Supreme Court in Favish).

    19. See, e.g., Silets v. FBI, 591 F. Supp. 490, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Cunningham v. FBI,
    540 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd & remanded with order to vacate, No. 84-3367
    (6th Cir. May 9, 1985); Lamont v. Dep't of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

    20. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOIA Update, Vol. V,
    No. 2, at 5; see, e.g., Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580 (finding privacy interests to be
    undiminished by deceased's status as high-level public official); Rugiero, 257 F.3d at
    552 (upholding nondisclosure of identifying information about DEA agents and
    personnel); Robert v. Nat'l Archives, 1 Fed. Appx. 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (protecting
    government employee's name); Shafizadeh, No. 99-5727, 2000 WL 1175586, at *2
    (withholding names of, and identifying information about, federal law enforcement
    personnel); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding FBI Special Agents' names); Fiduccia,
    185 F.3d at 1043-45 (withholding DEA and INS agents' names); Halpern, 181 F.3d at
    296 (protecting identities of nonfederal law enforcement officers); Johnston, 1998 U.S.
    App. LEXIS 18557, at *2 (protecting names of DEA agents and personnel and local
    law enforcement personnel); Manna v. United States Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158,
    1166 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding law enforcement officers have substantial privacy interest
    in nondisclosure of names, particularly when requester held high position in La Cosa
    Nostra); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1994) (protecting names of FBI Special
    Agents and federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel); Becker v. IRS, 34
    F.3d 398, 405 n.23 (7th Cir. 1994) (protecting initials, names, and phone numbers of
    IRS employees); Church of Scientology Int'l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1993)
    (deciding privacy interest exists in handwriting of IRS agents in official documents);
    Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 (protecting names and initials of low-level FBI Special
    Agents and support personnel); Hale v. United States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894,
    902 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding FBI employees have substantial privacy interest in
    concealing their identities), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918
    (1993); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1281 (holding that "undercover agents" have protectible
    privacy interests); New England Apple Council v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 142-44 (1st
    Cir. 1984) (inspector general investigator has "interest in retaining the capability to
    perform his tasks effectively by avoiding untoward annoyance or harassment");
    Miller, 661 F.2d at 630 ("It is not necessary that harassment rise to the level of
    endangering physical safety before the protections of 7(C) can be invoked."); Lesar,
    636 F.2d at 487-88 (annoyance or harassment); Summers v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , No. 98-1837, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2003) (approving FBI's decision to
    distinguish between low-level (or first-line) supervisors and high-level supervisors
    who may be more knowledgeable about investigation); Aldridge v. United States
    Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    , No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.
    23, 2001) (withholding IRS employees' social security numbers, home addresses,
    phone numbers, birthdates, and direct dial telephone number of acting chief of IRS's
    Examinations Division), appeal dismissed sub nom. Aldridge v. Rossotti, 2001 WL
    456239 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2001); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (noting that
    one's status "as a 'public figure' does not eviscerate" one's privacy interest under the
    FOIA); Ortiz v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-140, slip op. at 5 (M.D. La. Aug.
    25, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting names and identifying
    information pertaining to local and foreign law enforcement officers), adopted (M.D.
    La. Oct. 1, 1998); see also Sosa v. FBI, No. 93-1126, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 1998)
    (protecting murdered law enforcement officer's autopsy reports). But see Lissner v.
    United States Customs Serv.
    , 241 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering release of
    physical description of state law enforcement officers involved in smuggling
    incident); Trentadue v. President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency, No. 03-339, slip
    op. at 4 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2004) (refusing to find any privacy interest and therefore
    ordering release of names of mid-level government employees involved in
    investigation of Department of Justice IG despite failure of requester to
    demonstrate any public interest); Darby v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, No.
    CV-S-00-0661, slip op. at 11-12 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2002) (ordering release of names of
    DOD IG investigators and other government employees involved in investigation),
    aff'd sub nom. Darby v. DOD, 74 Fed. Appx. 813 (9th Cir. 2003); Hardy v. FBI, No. 95-883, slip op. at 21, 28 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1997) (ordering release of names of ATF
    supervisory agents involved in raid at Waco); Williams v. FBI, No. 91-1054, slip op. at 5
    (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 1997) (ordering release of names of arresting officers and officers
    who participated in search and seizure); Butler v. United States Dep't of Justice, No.
    86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at **5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (ordering release of names of
    supervisory FBI personnel involved in requester's case), appeal dismissed
    voluntarily
    , No. 94-5078 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 1994); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court
    Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing privacy expectations
    of individual identified as "public figure").

    21. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487.

    22. See, e.g., Perlman, 312 F.3d at 107-09 (ordering release of extensive details
    concerning IG investigation of former INS general counsel who was implicated in
    wrongdoing, and enunciating unique five-factor test to balance government
    employee's privacy interest against public interest in disclosure, including
    employee's rank, degree of wrongdoing and strength of evidence, availability of
    information, whether information sheds light on government activity, and whether
    information is related to job function or is personal in nature); Stern, 737 F.2d at 94
    (ordering release of name of FBI Special Agent-in-Charge who directly participated
    in intentional wrongdoing, while protecting names of two mid-level agents whose
    negligence incidentally furthered cover-up); Chang v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 00-0783,
    slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2004) (approving disclosure of details of nonjudicial
    punishment and letter of reprimand of commander of ship punished for dereliction of
    duty) (Privacy Act "wrongful disclosure" decision interpreting Exemption 6); Wood v.
    FBI
    , No. 02-2058, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5525, at **50-52 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2004)
    (applying Perlman test in disallowing Exemption 6 protection and ordering release
    of information identifying FBI Special Agent with supervisory authority who was
    investigated for wrongdoing, but withholding names of investigators under
    Exemption 7(C)); see also Jefferson v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-1418, slip
    op. at 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2003) (protecting details of IG investigation of government
    attorney-advisor with no decisionmaking authority as employee whose rank was not
    so high that public interest in disclosure could outweigh personal privacy interest in
    learning of any investigated alleged misconduct).

    23. See, e.g., Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (finding unfounded complaints of government
    misconduct insufficient to outweigh law enforcement officers' substantial privacy
    interests); Hale, 973 F.2d at 901 (holding unsubstantiated allegations of government
    wrongdoing do not justify disclosing law enforcement personnel names); Davis, 968
    F.2d at 1281 ("undercover agents"); In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1992) (FBI
    Special Agent); Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 601 (3d Cir. 1990) (FBI personnel);
    Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1519 (deciding that FBI Special Agents' identities are properly
    protectible absent evidence in record of impropriety); Dorsett v. United States Dep't
    of the Treasury
    , 307 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2004) (withholding names of Secret
    Service Special Agents and personnel, FBI Special Agents, and other employees in
    face of allegations of misconduct); Lopez v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 99-1722, slip op. at 10-12 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2003) (protecting names of government
    employees absent evidence of misconduct), summary affirmance granted in
    pertinent part
    , No. 03-5192, 2004 WL 626726 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2004); Pontecorvo v.
    FBI
    , No. 00-1511, slip op. at 41 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2001) (withholding identity of FBI
    Special Agent who conducted plaintiff's background investigation, absent sufficient
    evidence of misconduct); Robert v. Dep't of Justice, No. 99-CV-3649, slip op. at 16
    (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001) (withholding employees' names and personal information
    because disclosure could cause embarrassment in light of "plaintiff's far[-]reaching
    allegations of departmental wrongdoing"); Manchester v. DEA, 823 F. Supp. 1259,
    1271 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (withholding agents' names despite plaintiff's sweeping
    allegations of governmental misconduct); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 778 F.
    Supp. 1212, 1215 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (affirming government may neither confirm nor deny
    existence of records concerning results of INS investigation of alleged misconduct of
    employee); see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581-82 (holding that requester who asserts
    a "government misconduct public interest" must produce evidence that would be
    deemed believable by a "reasonable person" for there to exist a "counterweight on
    the FOIA scale for the court to balance against the cognizable privacy interests in
    the requested records"); Aldridge, No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at *3 (ordering
    disclosure of recommendation concerning potential disciplinary action against IRS
    employees, with only their names redacted, based upon public's "interest in knowing
    how well a particular agency's employees behave on the job").

    24. See, e.g., Castañeda v. United States, 757 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (treating
    USDA investigator's privacy interest as "not great," based upon novel reasoning that
    his "name would be discoverable in any civil case brought [against the agency]"),
    amended upon denial of panel reh'g, 773 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1985); Iglesias, 525 F. Supp.
    at 563 (disclosing names of government employees involved in conducting
    investigation); Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.D.C. 1980)
    (releasing names of SEC investigators). But see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court
    Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing questionable
    viability of Castañeda decision in light of Supreme Court's repudiation of Ninth
    Circuit's privacy jurisprudence).

    25. See Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1223 (ordering disclosure of physical description of state
    law enforcement officers, and citing only general public interest in ensuring
    reliability of government investigations); Hardy, No. 95-883, slip op. at 21 (D. Ariz. July
    29, 1997) (releasing identities of supervisory ATF agents and other agents publicly
    associated with Waco incident, finding that public's interest in Waco raid "is greater
    than in the normal case where release of agent names affords no insight into an
    agency's conduct or operations"); Butler, 1994 WL 55621, at *13 (releasing identities
    of supervisory FBI personnel upon finding of "significant" public interest in protecting
    requester's due process rights); cf. Weiner v. FBI, No. 83-1720, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal.
    Dec. 6, 1995) (finding public interest in release of names and addresses of agents
    involved in management and supervision of FBI investigation of music legend John
    Lennon) (applying FOIA analysis in civil discovery context). But see FOIA Post,
    "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out
    that Lissner decision is now "discredit[ed] or effectively overrule[d]" by Supreme
    Court's repudiation of Ninth Circuit's privacy jurisprudence).

    26. 674 F. Supp. at 888.

    27. See, e.g., Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985)
    (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and nonagent personnel); Kirk v. United
    States Dep't of Justice
    , 704 F. Supp. 288, 292 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Just like FBI [S]pecial
    [A]gents, administrative and clerical personnel could be subject to harassment,
    questioning, and publicity, and the Court concludes that the FBI did not need to
    separate the groups of employees for purposes of explaining why disclosure of their
    identities was opposed.").

    28. Southam News v. INS, No. 85-2721, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1989).

    29. Id.; see also Judicial Watch v. United States, 84 Fed. Appx. 335, 339 (4th Cir.
    2004) (protecting names and home addresses of lower-level IRS employees absent
    compelling evidence of agency corruption, in order to avoid potential harassment)
    (Exemption 6), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3644 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 03-1389);
    Halpern, 181 F.3d at 296 (concluding that disclosure of names of law enforcement
    personnel could subject them to "harassment in the conduct of their official duties");
    Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (holding law enforcement officers involved in La Cosa Nostra
    investigation have substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names);
    Joyce v. FBI, 152 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2001) (approving the redaction of names
    of, and identifying information about, law enforcement personnel, given the
    "potential for harassment and the infringement on the private lives of law-enforcement officials"); Morales Cozier, No. 99-CV-0312, slip op. at 17 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
    25, 2000) (withholding identities of FBI Special Agents who investigated requester
    after her professional contact with Cuban citizen; citing potential for "harassment,
    surveillance, or [undue] investigation of these [Special A]gents by foreign
    governments"); Bartolotta, No. 99-1145, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. July 13, 2000) (accepting
    that disclosing identities of two Criminal Division attorneys could result in
    harassment or reprisals, and could make it more difficult for them to perform duties
    that require low profile); Hambarian v. IRS, No. 99-9000, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6317, at
    *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2000) (protecting names and identification numbers of IRS
    employees "who participated in the investigation of" the requester); Ortiz, No. 97-140,
    slip op. at 7 (M.D. La. Aug. 25, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding that
    disclosure of names of FBI personnel could subject them to "harassment and
    annoyance"), adopted (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 1998); Smith, 977 F. Supp. at 499 (finding
    disclosure of law enforcement officers' names "might seriously prejudice their
    effectiveness in conduct of investigations"); Harvey v. United States Dep't of Justice,
    No. 96-0509, 1997 WL 669640, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 1997) (recognizing that release of
    names of DEA support personnel could target them for "'harassing inquiries for
    unauthorized access' to information"); Simon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 752 F.
    Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1990) (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and other
    government personnel involved in processing FOIA request), aff'd, 980 F.2d 782 (D.C.
    Cir. 1992).

    30. Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 663 n.1 (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and
    clerical employees who participated in investigation of assassination of Robert F.
    Kennedy); see also Hoffman v. Brown, No. 97-1145, 1998 WL 279575 (4th Cir. May 19,
    1998) (per curiam) (withholding portions of transcript of unauthorized audiotaped
    conversations of Veterans Administration Medical Center employees made during
    IG investigation); Wichlacz, 938 F. Supp. at 334 (E.D. Va. 1996) (protecting names of
    Park Police officers who investigated suicide of Deputy White House Counsel
    Vincent Foster, as well as psychiatrists who were listed on paper found in Foster's
    wallet, because disclosure would cause "onslaught of media attention" and could
    cause camera crews to "besiege" their workplaces and homes), aff'd per curiam, 114
    F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Exner v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 902 F. Supp. 240, 243-45 (D.D.C. 1995) (protecting identities of deceased
    former FBI Special Agent and his two sons, one of whom FBI may have observed "in
    criminally suspect behavior" at requester's apartment, which requester claimed had
    been searched for political reasons involving her alleged relationship with President
    Kennedy), appeal dismissed, No. 95-5411, 1997 WL 68352 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 1997); cf.
    Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (finding that agency had not adequately defended categorical rule for withholding
    identities of low-level FBI Special Agents) (Exemption 6).

    31. See, e.g., Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 83 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996)
    (Fernandez, J., dissenting) ("Once again we are asked to bridle at and practically
    ignore the FOIA teachings of the United States Supreme Court."), summarily rev'd &
    remanded per curiam
    , 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (Exemption 6); see also FOIA Update, Vol.
    XVIII, No. 1, at 1 (discussing the Supreme Court's extraordinary action in summarily
    reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bibles).

    32. 241 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001).

    33. 217 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000), summary judgment granted on remand, No. CV 97-1479, 2001 WL 770410 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2001), aff'd, 37 Fed. Appx. 863 (9th Cir. 2002),
    rev'd sub nom. NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004
    WL 108633 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

    34. See FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 3 (analyzing the Supreme Court's Reporters
    Committee
    decision).

    35. 241 F.3d at 1224.

    36. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 ("[T]he FOIA's central purpose is to ensure
    that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny . . . .").

    37. See 217 F.3d at 1174.

    38. See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
    (finding that the spouse, parents, and children of Deputy White House Counsel
    Vincent Foster have a discernible privacy interest in not having his death-scene
    photographs made public; holding that to show that an invasion of privacy is not
    unwarranted, the plaintiff must produce "'compelling evidence that the agency
    denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity, and access to the
    [photograph] is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence'" (quoting
    SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205-06)); see also Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Office of Indep.
    Counsel
    , 61 Fed. Appx. 712 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (ruling that requester had
    "once again failed to demonstrate" that agency engaged in illegal activity, and
    finding that same privacy interest in nondisclosure of photograph of hand and
    description of body existed as in Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 122).

    39. 217 F.3d at 1174; see also id. at 1184 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (observing that
    "Favish has made no showing that anyone connected with the OIC's investigations . .
    . engaged in wrongful conduct"; explaining that the requester bears the burden of
    advancing the public interest, and that this requester "has failed to do so").

    40. Favish, 2001 WL 770410, at *1 (ordering five of ten photographs at issue
    released to plaintiff).

    41. 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004 WL 108633 (U.S. May 17,
    2004).

    42. Id. at 1581.

    43. Id.

    44. Id. at 1580-81; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in
    Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing higher standard, as well as continued need for
    showing of Reporters Committee-type public interest even when requester
    successfully alleges government wrongdoing).

    45. See, e.g., Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1224; Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 812; Dobronski v. FCC,
    17 F.3d 275, 278 (9th Cir. 1994); Dow Jones Co., Inc. v. FERC, 219 F.R.D. 167, 175-76
    (C.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering disclosure of names of individuals who cooperated with
    investigation, expressly based upon Ninth Circuit's now-repudiated Favish ruling,
    merely because they were not accused of criminal activity); see also FOIA Post,
    "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (analyzing
    Favish decision's sweeping impact on Ninth Circuit case law).

    46. 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that disclosure of mug shots of indicted
    individuals who had already appeared in court and had their names divulged did not
    constitute unwarranted invasion of privacy).

    47. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 763; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court
    Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing vital privacy
    interests found in Reporters Committee and Favish).

    48. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1576-77.

    49. Id. at 1577, 1580 (stating that when subject of government record is private
    citizen, privacy interest is "at its apex," and finding that "public" nature of
    photographs does not detract from "weighty" privacy interests involved); see also
    FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04)
    (discussing fact that public location and disclosure of photographs did not
    negatively impact privacy interests).

    50. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577-79; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for
    'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out that in Favish "this meant
    that the expected 'public exploitation' of the requested records through 'attempts to
    exploit pictures of the deceased family member's remains for public purposes' by the
    media, among other things, were properly taken into consideration").

    51. Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (finding protectable privacy interest in
    mug shot despite fact that defendant was well known and photograph already had
    been made public).

    52. 489 U.S. at 762-63, 780.

    53. Id. at 764; see Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1047 (protecting FBI records reflecting
    information that is also available in "various courthouses"); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v.
    United States
    , 138 F.3d 1075, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that clear privacy interest
    exists with respect to names, addresses, and other identifying information, even if
    already available in publicly recorded filings (citing DOD v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 500
    (1994) (Exemption 6))); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79 (holding that public
    dissemination of mug shot after trial would trigger renewed publicity and renewed
    invasion of privacy of subject); Billington v. United States Dep't of Justice, 11 F. Supp.
    2d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that "agency is not compelled to release information
    just because it may have been disclosed previously"), aff'd in pertinent part, 233 F.3d
    581 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Greenberg v. United States Dep't of Treasury, No. 87-898, 1998
    U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9803, at *55 (D.D.C. July 1, 1998) (finding third party's privacy interest
    not extinguished because public may be aware he was target of investigation);
    Baltimore Sun Co. v. United States Customs Serv., No. 97-1991, slip op. at 4 (D. Md.
    Nov. 12, 1997) (holding that inclusion of poor copy of defendant's photograph in
    publicly available court record did not eliminate privacy interest in photo altogether);
    Lewis v. USPS, No. 96-3467, slip op. at 2 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 1997) (holding that fact that
    complainant's name is already known, whether disclosed by investigating agency or
    otherwise, is irrelevant; declaring that "limited oral disclosure" does not constitute
    waiver of exemption).

    54. See, e.g., Hoffman, 1998 WL 279575 (protecting "private citizen identifiers" in VA
    investigative report); Beard v. Espy, No. 94-16748, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38269, at *2
    (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) (protecting complaint letter); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (holding
    that interviewees and witnesses involved in criminal investigation have substantial
    privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names, particularly when requester held
    high position in La Cosa Nostra); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256 (protecting identities of
    witnesses and third parties involved in criminal investigation of maritime disaster);
    Massey, 3 F.3d at 624 (declaring that disclosure of names of cooperating witnesses
    and third parties, including cooperating law enforcement officials, could subject
    them to "embarrassment and harassment"); KTVY-TV v. United States, 919 F.2d 1465,
    1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (withholding interviewees' names as "necessary to
    avoid harassment and embarrassment"); Cleary v. FBI, 811 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir.
    1987) (deciding disclosure would subject "sources to unnecessary questioning
    concerning the investigation [and] to subpoenas issued by private litigants in civil
    suits incidentally related to the investigation"); Cuccaro v. Sec'y of Labor, 770 F.2d
    355, 359 (3d Cir. 1985) ("privacy interest of . . . witnesses who participated in OSHA's
    investigation outweighs public interest in disclosure"); L&C Marine Transp., Ltd. v.
    United States
    , 740 F.2d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 1984) (reasoning that disclosure of
    identities of employee-witnesses in OSHA investigation could cause "problems at
    their jobs and with their livelihoods"); New England Apple, 725 F.2d at 144-45
    ("Disclosure could have a significant, adverse effect on this individual's private or
    professional life."); Kiraly v. FBI, 728 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that, in
    absence of public benefit in disclosure, informant's personal privacy interests do not
    lapse at death); Holy Spirit Ass'n v. FBI, 683 F.2d 562, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
    (concurring opinion) (citing "risk of harassment" and fear of reprisals); Alirez v. NLRB,
    676 F.2d 423, 427 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that disclosure would result in
    "embarrassment or reprisals"); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 488 ("'Those cooperating with law
    enforcement should not now pay the price of full disclosure of personal details.'"
    (quoting Lesar, 455 F. Supp. at 925)); cf. Grand Cent. P'ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473,
    486 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that HUD failed to prove that disclosure of documents
    would identify individuals). But see Cooper Cameron Corp. v. United States Dep't of
    Labor
    , 280 F.3d 539, 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (rebuffing idea of retaliation against
    employees who gave statements to OSHA investigator, and ordering disclosure of
    source-identifying content of statements despite fact that identifiable employee-witnesses' names already had been released in separate civil proceeding).

    55. See Coulter v. Reno, No. 98-35170, 1998 WL 658835, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1998)
    (protecting names of witnesses and of requester's accusers); Spirko, 147 F.3d at 998
    (protecting notes and phone messages concerning witnesses); Computer Prof'ls, 72
    F.3d at 904 (protecting names of witnesses); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (deciding
    witnesses in La Cosa Nostra case have "substantial" privacy interest in
    nondisclosure of their names); L&C Marine, 740 F.2d at 922 ("employee-witnesses . . .
    have a substantial privacy interest"); Antonelli v. Sullivan, 732 F.2d 560, 562 (7th Cir.
    1984) ("[The requester] has mentioned no legitimate need for the witnesses' phone
    numbers and we can well imagine the invasions of privacy that would result should
    he obtain them."); Johnson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137
    (W.D. Wash. 2002) (protecting identifying information of third parties and witnesses
    contacted during IRS investigation); Hogan v. Huff, No. 00-6753, 2002 WL 1359722, at
    **9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (protecting identities of witnesses); Wayne's Mech. &
    Maint. Contractor, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor
    , No. 1:00-CV-45, slip op. at 9
    (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2001) ("In the context of OSHA investigations, employee-witnesses
    have a substantial privacy interest regarding statements given about a work-related
    accident in light of the potential for embarrassment and retaliation that disclosure of
    their identity could cause."); Heggestad v. United States Dep't of Justice, 182 F. Supp.
    2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2000) (withholding identities of certain grand jury witnesses); May, 85
    F. Supp. 2d at 946 (protecting personal information about witnesses); Foster v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 933 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (protecting
    prospective witnesses); Crooker v. Tax Div. of the United States Dep't of Justice, No.
    94-30129, 1995 WL 783236, at *18 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1995) (magistrate's
    recommendation) (holding names of witnesses and individuals who cooperated with
    government protected to prevent "undue embarrassment and harassment"),
    adopted (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 1995), aff'd per curiam, 94 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 1996)
    (unpublished table decision); Cappabianca v. Comm'r, United States Customs Serv.,
    847 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (witnesses, investigators, and other subjects
    of investigation have "substantial privacy interests"); Farese v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 683 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D.D.C. 1987) (protecting names and number of family
    members of participants in Witness Security Program, as well as funds authorized to
    each, because disclosure "would pose a possible danger to the persons named" or
    "might subject those persons to harassment"); see also Kilroy v. NLRB, 633 F. Supp.
    136, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (protecting names and telephone numbers of persons who
    provided affidavits), aff'd, 823 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision); cf.
    Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (protecting information concerning
    witness who testified against requester) (Exemption 6). But see Cooper Cameron,
    280 F.3d at 545, 554 (holding names of three employee-witnesses exempt, yet
    inconsistently ordering release of source-identifying content of their statements);
    Lipman v. United States, No. 3:97-667, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 1998) (releasing
    names of witnesses who testified at trial based upon assumption defendant had
    already received information under Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)),
    appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 98-7489 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999).

    56. See Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1044 (withholding names of informants); Quiñon, 86
    F.3d at 1227, 1231 (protecting informants' identities in absence of agency
    misconduct); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (protecting names of persons who provided
    information to FBI); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904-05 (protecting names of
    informants, including name of company that reported crime to police, because
    disclosure might permit identification of corporate officer who reported crime);
    Manna, 51 F.3d at 1162 (safeguarding names of informants in La Cosa Nostra case);
    Jones, 41 F.3d at 246 (protecting informants' identities); McCutchen v. HHS, 30 F.3d
    183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (protecting names of individuals alleging scientific
    misconduct); Koch v. USPS, No. 93-1487, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26130, at *2 (8th Cir.
    Oct. 8, 1993) ("The informant's interest in maintaining confidentiality is considerable
    [because] the informant risked embarrassment, harassment, and emotional and
    physical retaliation."); Nadler v. United States Dep't of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1490
    (11th Cir. 1992) ("Disclosure of the identities of the FBI's sources will disclose a great
    deal about those sources but in this case will disclose virtually nothing about the
    conduct of the government."); Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 02-79-A,
    slip op. at 11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2002) (protecting names and identifying information of
    people who aided in investigation of Ruby Ridge incident); LaRouche v. United
    States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 90-2753, slip op. at 17-18 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) (finding that
    informant's handwritten drawings could reveal identity); Gonzalez v. FBI, No. CV F
    99-5789, slip op. at 18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2000) (finding that privacy interest is not
    invalidated merely because person is confirmed informant); Unger v. IRS, No. 99-698,
    2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5260, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2000) (protecting "identities of
    private citizens who provided information to law enforcement officials"); Petterson v.
    IRS
    , No. 98-6020, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 1999) (protecting informant's personal
    data); Pfannenstiel v. FBI, No. 98-0386, slip op. at 7 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 1999) (withholding
    identities of confidential informants); Schlabach v. IRS, No. 98-0075, 1998 U.S. Dist.
    LEXIS 19579, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 1998) (withholding personal information
    obtained from private citizens during investigation); Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees
    Int'l Union v. GSA
    , No. 97-8509, 1998 WL 726000, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (finding
    that disclosure of names of individuals who provided information during
    investigation may subject them to threats of reprisal); Billington, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 63
    (finding that witnesses' privacy interests outweigh public interest, even when
    witnesses appeared in court or participated in media interview); Thompson, No. 96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (protecting names and identifying
    information about individuals who provided or could provide information concerning
    investigation); Hayes v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 96-1149, slip op. at 16 (S.D.
    Ala. June 10, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (withholding identity of
    confidential source), adopted (S.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 1998); Rosenberg, No. 97-0476, slip
    op. at 10 (D.D.C. May 13, 1998) (protecting names of individuals who cooperated and
    actively participated in investigation, as well as of "individuals who provided
    assistance to the operation because of their occupation or use of their property");
    Steinberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 179 F.R.D. 357, 363 (D.D.C. 1998)
    (withholding informants' names, alias names, and portions of interview regarding
    terrorist activities); see also Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., No. 3:91-1005, slip op. at
    14-15 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 1993) (protecting identity of person alleging
    discrimination), aff'd, 16 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).

    57. Gabrielli v. United States Dep't of Justice, 594 F. Supp. 309, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1984);
    see also Block v. FBI, No. 83-813, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1984) ("[The
    requester's] personal interest in knowing who wrote letters concerning him . . . is not
    sufficient to demonstrate a public interest.") (Exemption 6).

    58. Compare Myers, No. 85-1746, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20058, at **4-7 (D.D.C. Sept.
    22, 1986) ("no privacy interest exists" as to names of law enforcement personnel who
    testified at requester's trial), with Prows v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 87-1657, 1989 WL 39288, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1989) ("[T]he protection of Exemption 7(C)
    is not waived by the act of testifying at trial."), summary affirmance granted, No. 89-5185 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 1990).

    59. See Jones, 41 F.3d at 247 (holding fact that law enforcement employee chose to
    testify or was required to testify or otherwise come forward in other settings does
    not amount to waiver of personal privacy); Burge, 934 F.2d at 579 (affirming refusal,
    under Exemption 7(C), to confirm or deny existence of information in FBI files
    regarding individuals who testified at plaintiff's murder trial); Boyd v. United States
    Marshals Serv.
    , No. 99-2712, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that plaintiff's
    assertion that informant and others who testified at his criminal trial waived their
    right to privacy by testifying is "simply wrong"); Galpine, No. 99-1032, slip op. at 12
    (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (reiterating that Exemption 7(C) protects "identities of
    individuals who testified at [requester's] criminal trial"); Rivera v. FBI, No. 98-0649, slip
    op. at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1999) ("Individuals who testify at trial do not waive their
    privacy interest[s] beyond the scope of the trial record."); Robinson v. DEA, No. 97-1578, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 1998) (stating that "[t]he disclosure during a trial of
    otherwise exempt information does not make the information public for all
    purposes"); Baltimore Sun, No. 97-1991, slip op. at 5 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 1997) (reasoning
    that request for original photograph of defendant because court's copy was
    unreproducible is evidence that "substance of photograph had not been fully
    disclosed to the public," so defendant retained privacy interest in preventing further
    dissemination); Dayton Newspapers, No. C-3-95-328, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12,
    1996) (finding that victims who testified at trial retain privacy interests in their
    identities); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *10 (holding that requester's
    knowledge of identities of informants who testified against him does not diminish
    their privacy interests); cf. Bey v. FBI, No. 01-0299, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002)
    (releasing most of list of telephone numbers (captured on court-ordered "pen
    register") that were dialed from telephone in plaintiff's house, because numbers
    were made public in open-court testimony at plaintiff's criminal trial). But see Linn v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 92-1406, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9321, at *17 (D.D.C.
    May 29, 1997) (finding no justification for withholding identities of witnesses who
    testified against requester at trial) (Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F)), appeal dismissed
    voluntarily
    , No. 97-5122 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1997).

    60. See Rosenglick v. IRS, No. 97-747-18A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3920, at *9 (M.D. Fla.
    Mar. 10, 1998); Watson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 799 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D.D.C.
    1992).

    61. See, e.g., Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 ("Confidentiality interests cannot be waived
    through . . . the passage of time."); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256 (deciding that passage
    of forty-nine years does not negate individual's privacy interest); Maynard, 986 F.2d
    at 566 n.21 (finding effect of passage of time upon individual's privacy interests to be
    "simply irrelevant"); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (concluding that passage of more
    than thirty years irrelevant when records reveal nothing about government
    activities); Keys, 830 F.2d at 348 (holding that passage of forty years did not "dilute
    the privacy interest as to tip the balance the other way"); King, 830 F.2d at 234
    (rejecting argument that passage of time diminished privacy interests at stake in
    records more than thirty-five years old); Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1983)
    ("the danger of disclosure may apply to old documents"); Perlman, No. 00-5842, 2001
    WL 910406, at **4-5 (deciding that subject of investigation does not lose privacy
    rights through passage of time); Sinito v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 87-0814,
    slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. July 12, 2000) (concluding that the "passage of time ordinarily
    does not diminish the applicability of Exemption 7(C)"); Franklin, No. 97-1225, slip op.
    at 12 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (rejecting argument
    that passage of time vitiates individual's privacy interest in nondisclosure), adopted
    (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 664 (explaining that FBI Special
    Agents who participated in investigation over twenty years ago, even one as well
    known as RFK assassination, "have earned the right to be 'left alone' unless an
    important public interest outweighs that right"); see also Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244
    n.7 (holding that fact that incidents in question "occurred more than thirty years ago
    may, but does not necessarily, diminish the privacy interest"); Branch, 658 F. Supp. at
    209 (The "privacy interests of the persons mentioned in the investigatory files do not
    necessarily diminish with the passage of time."); cf. Schrecker v. United States Dep't
    of Justice
    , 349 F.3d 657, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (approving FBI's use of "100-year rule,"
    which presumes that individual is dead if birthdate appeared in documents
    responsive to request and was more than 100 years old, to determine if subject of
    requested record is still alive and has privacy interest); Oglesby v. United States
    Dep't of the Army
    , 79 F.3d 1172, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that "mere passage of
    time is not a per se bar to reliance on [E]xemption 1"). But see Davin, 60 F.3d at 1058
    (finding that for some individuals, privacy interest may become diluted by passage
    of over sixty years, though under certain circumstances potential for embarrassment
    and harassment may endure); Outlaw v. United States Dep't of the Army, 815 F.
    Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1993) (ordering release of twenty-five-year-old
    photographs of murder victim with no known surviving next of kin); Silets, 591 F.
    Supp. at 498 ("[W]here documents are exceptionally old, it is likely that their age has
    diminished the privacy interests at stake.").

    62. See, e.g., Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[The
    target of a McCarthy era investigation] may . . . deserve greater protection, because
    the connection to such an investigation might prove particularly embarrassing or
    damaging."); see also Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 193 F. Supp. 2d 29,
    40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that "the persons who were involved in [investigation of
    1960s writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin] deserve protection of their
    reputations as well as recognition that they were simply doing a job that the cultural
    and political climate at the time dictated").

    63. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767 ("[O]ur cases have also recognized the
    privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even when the
    information may at one time have been public."); Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495
    F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[A] person's privacy may be as effectively infringed by
    reviving dormant memories as by imparting new information.") (Exemption 6), aff'd,
    425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 903 F.
    Supp. 131, 133 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that passage of thirty or forty years "may actually
    increase privacy interests, and that even a modest privacy interest will suffice" to
    protect identities). See generally Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581 (according full privacy
    protection without any hesitation, notwithstanding passage of ten years since
    Vincent Foster's death).

    64. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
    see also Ford v. West, No. 97-1342, 1998 WL 317561, at *3 (10th Cir. June 12, 1998)
    (holding fact that requester obtained some information through other channels does
    not change privacy protection under FOIA and no waiver of third parties' privacy
    interests due to "inadequate redactions"); L&C Marine, 740 F.2d at 922 ("An individual
    does not lose his privacy interest under 7(C) because his identity . . . may be
    discovered through other means."); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FBI, No. 00-745, slip op. at
    11 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2001) ("The fact that the requester might be able to figure out the
    individuals' identities through other means or that their identities have been
    disclosed elsewhere does not diminish their privacy interests . . . ."); Voinche v. FBI,
    No. 99-1931, slip op. at 13 n.4 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) ("The fact that Mr. Voinche [might
    have] learned of the identity of these individuals by reading a publication does not
    impair the privacy rights enjoyed by these three people."); Billington v. Dep't of
    Justice
    , 69 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 (D.D.C. 1999) (deciding that disclosure of unredacted
    records due to administrative error did not "diminish the magnitude of the privacy
    interests of the individuals" involved); Cujas, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466, at *9
    (reiterating that fact that information available elsewhere does not diminish third-party privacy interests in such law enforcement records); Smith, 977 F. Supp. at 500
    (finding fact that plaintiff "can guess" names withheld does not waive privacy
    interest); Master v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (D.D.C. 1996) (protecting subjects of
    investigative interest even though plaintiffs allegedly know their names), summary
    affirmance granted
    , 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). But
    see
    Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 553 (refusing to protect the content of three
    employee-witness statements after release of the witnesses' names, even though
    disclosure would result in linking each employee to his or her statement).

    65. See, e.g., Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1047 (concluding that privacy interests are not
    lost by reason of earlier publicity); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 ("Confidentiality interests
    cannot be waived through prior public disclosure . . . ."); Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949
    (finding that even after subject's public acknowledgment of charges and sanction
    against him, he retained privacy interest in nondisclosure of "'details of investigation,
    of his misconduct, and of his punishment,'" and in "preventing speculative press
    reports of his misconduct from receiving authoritative confirmation from official
    source" (citing Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255)); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410-11 (deciding fact that
    much of information in requested documents was made public during related civil
    suit does not reduce privacy interest); Jones, 41 F.3d at 247 (holding fact that law
    enforcement employee chose to testify or was required to testify or otherwise come
    forward in other settings does not amount to personal privacy waiver); Hunt, 972
    F.2d at 288 ("public availability" of accused FBI Special Agent's name does not defeat
    privacy protection and "would make redaction of [the agent's name in] the file a
    pointless exercise"); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (concluding fact that CIA or FBI may
    have released information about individual elsewhere does not diminish the
    individual's "substantial privacy interests"); Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255 (finding that
    "previous publicity amounting to journalistic speculation cannot vitiate the FOIA
    privacy exemption"); Shores v. FBI, 185 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83 (D.D.C. 2002) (deciding that
    privacy interests are not diminished by the fact that plaintiff "may deduce the
    identities of individuals through other means or that their identities have already
    been disclosed" (citing Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768, and Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1491));
    LaRouche, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 24 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) (holding that "release of
    similar information in another case does not warrant disclosure of otherwise
    properly exempted material"); Ponder v. Reno, No. 98-3097, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan.
    22, 2001) (deciding that the fact that the government "failed to fully redact all agents'
    names does not constitute a waiver of Exemption 7(C)"); McGhghy v. DEA, No. C 97-0185, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Iowa May 29, 1998) (holding that "mere fact that individuals
    named in withheld documents may have previously waived their confidentiality
    interests, either voluntarily or involuntarily, does not mandate disclosure of withheld
    documents"), aff'd per curiam, No. 98-2989, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16709 (8th Cir. July
    13, 1999); Thomas v. Office of United States Attorney, 928 F. Supp. 245, 250 & n.8
    (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that despite public disclosure of some information about
    attorney's connection with crime family, he still retains privacy interests in
    preventing further disclosure), appeal dismissed, No. 93-CV-3128 (2d Cir. Oct. 29,
    1996); Crooker, 1995 WL 783236, at *18 (holding that despite fact that requester may
    have learned identities of third parties through criminal discovery, Exemption 7(C)
    protection remains). But see Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98 (finding no
    unwarranted invasion of privacy in disclosure of mug shots of indicted individuals
    who had already appeared in court and had their names divulged); Steinberg v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 179 F.R.D. 366, 371 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding content of
    sources' interviews must be disclosed once agency disclosed their identities); cf.
    Grove v. CIA, 752 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 1990) (ordering FBI to further explain
    Exemption 7(C) withholdings in light of highly publicized nature of investigation and
    fact that CIA and Secret Service released other records pertaining to same
    individuals).

    66. Kirk, 704 F. Supp. at 292; see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580 (holding that "the fact
    that other pictures had been made public [does not] detract[] from the weighty
    privacy interests" in the remaining pictures); Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949 (reasoning
    that merely because subject of investigation acknowledged existence of
    investigation -- thus breaking bulwark level of "Glomarization" -- does not constitute
    waiver of subject's interest in keeping contents of Office of Professional
    Responsibility report confidential).

    67. See Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (explaining once agency shows that privacy interest
    exists, court must balance it against public's interest in disclosure); Computer Prof'ls,
    72 F.3d at 904 (finding after privacy interest found, court must identify public interest
    to be served by disclosure); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624-25 (holding once agency
    establishes that privacy interest exists, that interest must be balanced against value
    of information in furthering FOIA's disclosure objectives); Church of Scientology, 995
    F.2d at 921 (remanding case because district court failed to determine whether
    public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns); Grine v. Coombs, No. 95-342, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1997) (requiring balancing of
    privacy interest and extent to which it is invaded against public benefit that would
    result from disclosure); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at 250 (observing that since personal
    privacy interest in information is implicated, court must inquire whether any
    countervailing factors exist that would warrant invasion of that interest); Globe
    Newspaper Co. v. FBI
    , No. 91-13257, 1992 WL 396327, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 1992)
    (finding public interest in disclosing amount of money government paid to officially
    confirmed informant guilty of criminal wrongdoing outweighs informant's de minimis
    privacy interest); Church of Scientology, 816 F. Supp. at 1160 (concluding while
    employees have privacy interest in their handwriting, that interest does not
    outweigh public interest in disclosure of information contained in documents not
    otherwise exempt); see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1582 (holding that "only when the
    FOIA requester has produced evidence to satisfy [a belief by a reasonable person]
    will there exist a counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance against
    the cognizable privacy interests in the requested records"); Lawyers Comm. for
    Human Rights v. INS
    , 721 F. Supp. 552, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (balancing plaintiff's
    interests in disclosure of names of individuals listed in INS Lookout Book on basis of
    ideological exclusion provision against excluded individuals' privacy interests); FOIA
    Post
    , "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing
    balancing of privacy interests and public interest); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7.

    68. 489 U.S. at 773; see also Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the
    Navy
    , 109 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (concluding that questionnaire
    responses by court-martial members were properly withheld because the
    "information contained therein sheds no light on the workings of the government").

    69. See, e.g., Oguaju v. United States, 288 F.3d 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that
    plaintiff's "personal stake in using the requested records to attack his convictions
    does not count in the calculation of the public interest"), vacated & remanded, 124 S.
    Ct. 1903 (2004); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (ruling that requester's wish to establish his
    own innocence does not create FOIA-recognized public interest); Hale, 973 F.2d at
    901 (finding no FOIA-recognized public interest in death-row inmate's allegation of
    unfair trial); Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1991)
    (finding no public interest in disclosure of identities of individuals involved in murder
    investigation because such release would not shed light on how FBI fulfills its
    responsibilities), cert. denied on Exemption 7(C) grounds, 506 U.S. 868 (1992), rev'd &
    remanded on other grounds
    , 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Burge, 934 F.2d at 580 ("requester's
    need, however significant, does not warrant disclosure"); Taylor v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 257 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110 (D.D.C.) (finding no public interest in
    disclosure of third-party information that requester asserted might assist him in
    challenging his conviction), reconsideration denied, 268 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2003),
    appeal dismissed sub nom. Taylor v. FBI, No. 03-5111, 2003 WL 22005968 (D.C. Cir.
    Aug. 19, 2003); Boyd, No. 99-2712, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding requests
    for Brady material to be outside the proper role of FOIA); Galpine, No. 99-1032, slip
    op. at 13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (restating that requests for exculpatory evidence are
    "'outside the proper role of FOIA'" (quoting Colon, 1998 WL 695631, at *5)); Fedrick v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 984 F. Supp. 659, 664 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (magistrate's
    recommendation) (finding that requester's personal interest in seeking information
    for use in collateral challenge to his conviction does not raise "FOIA-recognized
    interest"), adopted, No. 95-558 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997), aff'd sub nom. Fedrick v. Huff,
    165 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Trupei, 1998 WL 8986, at *3
    (concluding that request for Brady material is not within role of FOIA); Smith, 977 F.
    Supp. at 499 (holding that requester's personal interest in obtaining exculpatory
    statements does not give him greater rights under FOIA); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at
    251 (holding that prisoner's personal interest in information to challenge his
    conviction "does not raise a FOIA-recognized interest that should be weighed
    against the subject's privacy interests"); Durham v. USPS, No. 91-2234, 1992 WL
    700246, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 1992) (holding "Glomar" response appropriate even
    though plaintiff argued that information would prove his innocence), summary
    affirmance granted
    , No. 92-5511 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1993); Johnson, 758 F. Supp. at 5
    ("Resort to Brady v. Maryland as grounds for waiving confidentiality [under
    Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D)] is . . . outside the proper role of the FOIA. Exceptions
    cannot be made because of the subject matter or [death-row status] of the
    requester."). But see Lipman, No. 3:97-667, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 1998)
    (making exceptional finding of public interest in plaintiff's quest to discover whether
    government withheld Brady material).

    70. See Massey, 3 F.3d at 625 ("[The] mere possibility that information may aid an
    individual in the pursuit of litigation does not give rise to a public interest."); Joslin v.
    United States Dep't of Labor
    , No. 88-1999, slip op. at 8 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1989) (finding
    no public interest in release of documents sought for use in private tort litigation);
    Garcia, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (holding that a request seeking information in
    furtherance of private litigation falls outside "the ambit of FOIA's goal of public
    disclosure of agency action"); Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244 & n.8 (explaining requester's
    interest in pursuing legal remedies against person who entered her apartment does
    not pertain to workings of government); Bruscino, No. 94-1955, 1995 WL 444406, at *9
    (D.D.C. May 12, 1995) (concluding no public interest in release of information
    concerning other inmates sought for use in private litigation); Andrews v. United
    States Dep't of Justice
    , 769 F. Supp. 314, 317 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (deciding no public
    interest in satisfaction of private judgments). But see Butler, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL
    55621, at **5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (ordering identities of supervisory FBI personnel
    disclosed because of "significant" public interest in protecting requester's due
    process rights in his attempt to vacate sentence).

    71. See Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 ("As a general rule, withholding information under
    FOIA cannot be predicated on the identity of the requester."); see also FOIA Post,
    "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out
    that "Favish thus stands as a reminder to all agencies that their consideration of
    potential privacy invasions must include both what the requester might do with the
    information at hand and also what any other requester (or ultimate recipient) might
    do with it as well").

    72. See Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580-81 (stating that when the privacy concerns of
    Exemption 7(C) apply, an agency can require the requester "to establish a sufficient
    reason for the disclosure" by having the requester demonstrate both "that the public
    interest sought to be advanced [by disclosure] is a significant one" and that
    disclosure of the "information [requested] is likely to advance that interest"); see also
    FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish (posted 4/9/04)
    (discussing public interest standard adopted in Favish, as well as required "nexus"
    between requested information and public interest asserted).

    73. 124 S. Ct. at 1581; see also Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (holding that "bald
    accusations" of prosecutorial misconduct are insufficient to establish public interest);
    Spirko, 147 F.3d at 999 (finding no public interest in names and information
    pertaining to suspects and law enforcement officers absent any evidence of alleged
    misconduct by agency); Enzinna v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-5078, 1997
    WL 404327, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1997) (finding that without evidence that
    Assistant United States Attorney made misrepresentation at trial, public interest in
    disclosure is insubstantial); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1231 (holding that in absence of
    evidence FBI engaged in wrongdoing, public interest is "insubstantial"); Schiffer, 78
    F.3d at 1410 (finding "little to no" public interest in disclosure when requester made
    unsubstantiated claim that FBI's decision to investigate him had been affected by
    "undue influence"); McCutchen, 30 F.3d at 189 (finding "negligible" public interest in
    disclosure of identities of agency scientists who did not engage in scientific
    misconduct); Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1492-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding
    that agency properly "Glomarized" request for records concerning alleged
    wrongdoing by two named employees; no public interest absent any evidence of
    wrongdoing or widespread publicity of investigation); KTVY-TV, 919 F.2d at 1470
    (allegations of "possible neglect"); Shores, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (finding no public
    interest in unsubstantiated assertion that certain FBI Special Agents committed
    unlawful acts); Ligorner, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (when considering privacy interests of
    person accused of misconduct, public interest is "de minimis"); Greenberg v. United
    States Dep't of Treasury
    , 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs' "post-hoc rationalization of public interest" in FBI investigation because they had not even
    suggested FBI wrongdoing during investigation); Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244-45 & n.9
    (finding allegation of FBI cover-up of "extremely sensitive political operation"
    provides "minimal at best" public interest); Triestman v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 878 F. Supp. 667, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no substantial public interest in
    disclosure when request seeks information concerning possible investigations of
    wrongdoing by named DEA agents); Buros, No. 93-571, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct.
    26, 1994) (holding even though subject's potential mishandling of funds already
    known to public, "confirming . . . federal criminal investigation brushes the subject
    with an independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing"); Williams v. McCausland,
    No. 90-7563, 1994 WL 18510, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1994) (protecting identities of
    government employees accused of improper conduct) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C));
    Manchester, 823 F. Supp. at 1271 (sweeping allegations of governmental
    misconduct). But see Providence Journal Co. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 981
    F.2d 552, 567-69 (1st Cir. 1992) (making aberrational finding of public interest in
    disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations against two senior officials); McLaughlin v.
    Sessions
    , No. 92-0454, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1993)
    (reasoning that because request seeks information to determine whether FBI
    investigation was improperly terminated, requester's interest in scope and course of
    investigation constitutes recognized public interest which must be balanced against
    privacy interests of named individuals).

    74. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581-82 (stating that Court cannot ignore fact that five
    different investigations into Foster matter reached same conclusion, and noting that
    Favish failed to produce any evidence of government impropriety that would be
    believable by reasonable person); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for
    'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing specific public interest
    standard as enunciated in Favish).

    75. 124 S. Ct. at 1582; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy'
    in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing necessary nexus between requested
    information and asserted public interest).

    76. See Landano, 956 F.2d at 430 (stating that there is "no FOIA-recognized public
    interest in discovering wrongdoing by a state agency"); Garcia, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 374
    ("The discovery of wrongdoing at a state as opposed to a federal agency . . . is not
    the goal of FOIA."); LaRouche, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 17 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) ("The
    possible disclosures of state government misconduct is not information that falls
    within a public interest FOIA [was] intended to protect."); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at
    251 (recognizing that FOIA cannot serve as basis for requests about conduct of state
    agency). But see also Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1223 (rationalizing that public interest
    exists in Custom Service's handling of smuggling incident despite fact that
    information pertained to actions of state law enforcement officers).

    77. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775; see also FOIA Update, Vol. XII, No. 2, at 6
    (explaining that "government activities" in Reporter's Committee standard means
    activities of federal government).

    78. See Ford, 1998 WL 317561, at *3 (holding that plaintiff's prior EEO successes
    against agency do not establish public interest in disclosure of third-party names in
    this investigation); Massey, 3 F.3d at 625 (finding that the identity of the requesting
    party and the use that that party plans to make of the requested information have
    "no bearing on the assessment of the public interest served by disclosure"); Stone,
    727 F. Supp. at 668 n.4 (stating that court looks to public interest served by release of
    information, "not to the highly specialized interests of those individuals who
    understandably have a greater personal stake in gaining access to that
    information"). But cf. Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (deciding that although court does not
    usually consider requester's identity, fact that requester held high position in La
    Cosa Nostra is certainly material to protection of individual privacy).

    79. See Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 588 (holding general interest of legislature in
    "getting to the bottom" of highly controversial investigation not sufficient to
    overcome "substantial privacy interests"); Morales Cozier, No. 1:99-CV-0312, slip op.
    at 18 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (concluding that public interest in knowing what
    government is up to in relation to investigation of individuals having contact with
    Cubans is not furthered by disclosing government employees' names and identifying
    information); Schrecker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 74 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C.
    1999) (finding requester's "own personal curiosity" about names of third parties and
    agents insufficient to outweigh privacy interests), rev'd on other grounds, 254 F.3d
    162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (describing public
    interest in public figure's mug shot as "purely speculative" and therefore readily
    outweighed by privacy interest); Ajluni, 947 F. Supp. at 605 ("In the absence of any
    strong countervailing public interest in disclosure, the privacy interests of the
    individuals who are the subjects of the redacted material must prevail."); Fitzgibbon
    v. United States Secret Serv.
    , 747 F. Supp. 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding public interest
    in alleged plot in United States by agents of now deposed dictatorship insufficient to
    overcome "strong privacy interests"); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 667-68 n.4 ("[N]ew
    information considered significant by zealous students of the RFK assassination
    investigation would be nothing more than minutia of little or no value in terms of the
    public interest."); see also Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, 981 F. Supp. at 23-24
    (finding "minuscule privacy interest" in identifying sellers in multiple-sales gun
    reports in comparison to public interest in scrutinizing ATF's performance of its duty
    to enforce gun control laws and to curtail illegal interstate gun trafficking);
    Steinberg, 1998 WL 384084, at *3 (finding significant public interest in criminal
    investigation of alleged counterterrorist activities, which outweighs privacy interests
    of informants known to plaintiff). But see Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 547, 554
    (mischaracterizing a "general public interest in monitoring" a specific OSHA
    investigation as sufficient to overcome employee-witnesses' privacy interests
    against employer retaliation).

    80. King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286, 294 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd,
    830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Beck, 997 F.2d at 1494 (observing that because
    request implicates no public interest at all, court "'need not linger over the balance;
    something . . . outweighs nothing every time'" (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed.
    Employees v. Horner
    , 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C));
    Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (same); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7.

    81. See, e.g., Abraham & Rose, 138 F.3d at 1083 (stating that public may have
    interest in learning how IRS exercises its power over collection of taxes but that this
    does not mean that identity or other personal information concerning taxpayers will
    shed light on agency's performance) (Exemption 6); Spirko, 147 F.3d at 999
    (recognizing strong privacy interests of suspects and law enforcement officers when
    requested documents neither confirm nor refute plaintiff's allegations of government
    misconduct); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1231 (finding insufficient public interest in disclosing
    individuals mentioned in FBI files when no evidence of wrongdoing; even if
    individuals had engaged in wrongdoing, such misconduct would have to shed light
    on agency's action); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (recognizing "little to no" public interest
    in disclosure of persons in FBI file, including some who provided information to FBI,
    when no evidence of FBI wrongdoing); Schwarz v. INTERPOL, No. 94-4111, 1995 U.S.
    App. LEXIS 3987, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1995) (ruling that disclosure of any possible
    information about whereabouts of requester's "alleged husband" is not in public
    interest); Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 (disclosing information concerning low-level FBI
    employees and third parties not in public interest); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768
    ("[T]here is no reasonably conceivable way in which the release of one individual's
    name . . . would allow citizens to know 'what their government is up to.'" (quoting
    Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 1481)); Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
    Labor
    , No. 01-AR-1421, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2001) (finding no public interest
    in disclosing identities of employees who completed race-discrimination
    questionnaire); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (holding that privacy interests of
    individuals mentioned in FBI surveillance tapes and transcripts obtained in arms-for-hostages investigation clearly outweigh any public interest in disclosure);
    McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958-61 (finding, where no evidence of agency
    wrongdoing, no public interest in disclosure of information concerning criminal
    investigations of private citizens); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 666-67 (stating that
    disclosing identities of low-level FBI Special Agents who participated in RFK
    assassination investigation is not in public interest); see also KTVY-TV, 919 F.2d at
    1470 (stating that disclosing identities of witnesses and third parties would not
    further plaintiff's unsupported theory that post office shootings could have been
    prevented by postal authorities); Halloran v. VA, 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989)
    ("[M]erely stating that the interest exists in the abstract is not enough; rather, the
    court should have analyzed how that interest would be served by compelling
    disclosure."); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 6; cf. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 895
    (finding that "in some, perhaps many" instances when third party seeks information
    on named individual in law enforcement files, public interest will be "negligible"; but
    when individual had publicly offered to help agency, disclosure of records
    concerning that fact might be in public interest by reflecting "agency activity" in how
    it responded to offer of assistance). But cf. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577-79 (recognizing
    "survivor privacy" principle, and holding that family of deceased individual has own
    right and interest in personal privacy protection with respect to decedent's death-scene photographs due to their exceptional sensitivity); Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d
    at 123 (protecting autopsy and death-scene photographs arising out of the
    investigation of Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster's suicide, and rejecting
    plaintiff's categorical argument that the "FOIA's protection of personal privacy ends
    upon the death of the individual depicted"); FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for
    'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing "survivor privacy" principle
    and its exceptional contours).

    82. 349 F.3d at 663 (approving FBI's method to determine whether individual was
    living or dead); see also Johnson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310
    F.3d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (approving of the agency's inquiries concerning the
    subject of a request, and refusing to establish a "brightline set of steps for an
    agency" to determine whether they were living or dead).

    83. Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 663-66.

    84. 489 U.S. at 776-80.

    85. Id. at 780. But see also Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 553 (acknowledging that
    statements to OSHA by employee-witnesses are "a characteristic genus suitable for
    categorical treatment," yet inconsistently declining to use categorical approach).

    86. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206.

    87. Id. at 1205.

    88. Id. (recognizing privacy interests of suspects, witnesses, and investigators).

    89. Id.

    90. Id.

    91. Id. at 1206; see also Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (finding that "exposing a single,
    garden-variety act of misconduct would not serve the FOIA's purpose of showing
    'what the Government is up to'" (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780)); Quiñon,
    86 F.3d at 1231 (finding insufficient public interest in revealing individuals mentioned
    in FBI files absent evidence of wrongdoing; even if individuals had engaged in
    wrongdoing, such misconduct would have to shed light on agency's action);
    McCutchen, 30 F.3d at 188 ("Mere desire to review how an agency is doing its job,
    coupled with allegations that it is not, does not create a public interest sufficient to
    override the privacy interests protected by Exemption 7(C)."); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282
    ("[W]hen . . . governmental misconduct is alleged as the justification for disclosure,
    the public interest is 'insubstantial' unless the requester puts forward 'compelling
    evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity' and
    shows that the information sought 'is necessary in order to confirm or refute that
    evidence.'" (quoting SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205-06)); Goldstein v. Office of Indep.
    Counsel
    , No. 87-2028, 1999 WL 570862, at *9 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) (magistrate's
    recommendation) (finding "significant public interest" in documents relating to FBI's
    terrorism investigations but concluding that withholding of third-party names is
    proper absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by FBI); Chasse v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , No. 98-207, slip op. at 11 (D. Vt. Jan. 12, 1999) (magistrate's
    recommendation) (deciding that Exemption 7(C) does not apply to information
    regarding job-related activities of high-level INS officials alleged to have deceived
    members of congressional task force), adopted (D. Vt. Feb. 9, 1999), aff'd, No. 99-6059
    (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (Privacy Act wrongful disclosure case); McGhghy, No. C 97-0185,
    slip op. at 10 (N.D. Iowa May 29, 1998) (holding that there is "no compelling public
    interest rationale" for disclosing the names of law enforcement officers, private
    individuals, investigative details, or suspects' names from DEA files); cf. Nation
    Magazine
    , 71 F.3d at 895-96 (noting that when individual had publicly offered to help
    agency, disclosure of records concerning that fact might be in public interest by
    reflecting "agency activity" in how it responded to offer of assistance); Dunkelberger,
    906 F.2d at 782 (finding some cognizable public interest in "FBI Special Agent's
    alleged participation in a scheme to entrap a public official and in the manner in
    which the agent was disciplined"); Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
    the Interior
    , 24 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that public interest in
    knowing how government enforces and punishes violations of land-management
    laws outweighs privacy interests of cattle trespassers who admitted violations)
    (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)). But see Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98 (finding, despite
    no evidence of government wrongdoing, public interest in disclosure of mug shots of
    indicted individuals who had already appeared in court and had their names
    divulged); Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 811-12 (making exceptional finding of public interest
    in disclosure of names of subjects of investigatory interest because disclosure would
    serve public interest by shedding light on FBI actions and showing whether and to
    what extent FBI "abused its law enforcement mandate by overzealously
    investigating a political protest movement"); Providence Journal, 981 F.2d at 567-69
    (making exceptional finding of public interest in disclosure of unsubstantiated
    allegations); Bennett v. DEA, 55 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 1999) (ordering release of
    informant's rap sheet after finding "very compelling" evidence of "extensive
    government misconduct" in handling informant); Davin, No. 92-1122, slip op. at 9
    (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1998) (ordering disclosure of names and addresses of individuals in
    records of FBI investigation of Workers Alliance of America conducted between 1938
    and 1964).

    92. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206; see also Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (adopting SafeCard
    approach). But see Baltimore Sun, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 730 n.5 (rationalizing that
    "plaintiff need not provide compelling evidence of government wrongdoing in light of
    the inapplicability of the categorical rule of SafeCard" to this case; deciding that "[a]
    more general public interest in what a government agency is up to is sufficient
    here").

    93. See FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted
    4/9/04) (advising that the Supreme Court "has explained that in seeking to apply
    some 'clear' or 'compelling' evidence test in such a case an agency now specifically
    should consider whether the requester has 'produced any evidence that would
    warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged [g]overnment impropriety
    might have occurred'" (quoting Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1582)).

    94. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int'l v. United States Dep't of Justice, 30 F.3d 224,
    230-31 (1st Cir. 1994) (deciding that Vaughn Index must explain why documents
    entirely withheld under Exemption 7(C) could not have been released with
    identifying information redacted); Canning v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-2215, slip op. at 19 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2004) (finding application of Exemption 7(C) to
    entire documents rather than to personally identifying information within documents
    to be overly broad); Rashid v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 99-2461, slip op. at 21
    (D.D.C. June 12, 2001) (concluding that all identifying information, including
    information that would be traceable to specific individuals, may be withheld); Prows
    v. United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 90-2561, 1996 WL 228463, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 25,
    1996) (concluding that rather than withholding documents in full, agency simply can
    delete identifying information about third-party individuals to eliminate stigma of
    being associated with law enforcement investigation); Lawyers Comm., 721 F. Supp.
    at 571 (finding a middle ground in balancing of interest in disclosure of names in INS
    Lookout Book on basis of "ideological exclusion" provision against individuals' privacy
    interest by ordering release of only the occupation and country of excluded
    individuals); see also Aldridge, No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at **2-3 (deciding
    that privacy of IRS employees could be adequately protected by redacting their
    names from recommendation concerning potential disciplinary action against them).

    95. See Ray, 778 F. Supp. at 1215; FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5; FOIA Update, Vol.
    VII, No. 1, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: Privacy 'Glomarization'"); FOIA Update, Vol. III, No.
    4, at 2; see also Enzinna, 1997 WL 404327, at *2 (finding government's "Glomar"
    response appropriate because acknowledging existence of responsive documents
    would associate witnesses with criminal investigation); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624
    ("individuals have substantial privacy interests in information that either confirms or
    suggests that they have been subject to criminal investigations or proceedings");
    Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1983) ("even acknowledging that certain
    records are kept would jeopardize the privacy interests that the FOIA exemptions
    are intended to protect"); Burke v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 96-1739, 1999
    WL 1032814, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1999) (permitting agency to "simply 'Glomarize'" as
    to portion of request that seeks investigatory records); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at
    24 (holding "Glomar" response appropriate when existence of records would link
    named individuals with taking of American hostages in Iran and disclosure would
    not shed light on agency's performance); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 957-60 (allowing
    FBI and INTERPOL to refuse to confirm or deny whether they have criminal
    investigatory files on private individuals who have "great privacy interest" in not
    being associated with stigma of criminal investigation); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
    7266, at **12-13 (permitting FBI to refuse to confirm or deny existence of any law
    enforcement records, unrelated to requester's case, concerning informants who
    testified against requester); Latshaw v. FBI, No. 93-571, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
    21, 1994) (deciding that FBI may refuse to confirm or deny existence of any law
    enforcement records on third party), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished
    table decision).

    96. See, e.g., Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775 (upholding FBI's refusal to confirm or
    deny that it maintained "rap sheets" on named individual); Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451
    (approving the government's use of "Glomar" response for a third-party request for
    any information on an individual who testified at the requester's trial when the
    requester provided no public interest rationale); Schwarz, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3987,
    at *7 (holding "Glomar" response proper for third-party request for file of requester's
    "alleged husband" when no public interest shown); Antonelli, 721 F.2d at 617
    (deciding that "Glomar" response is appropriate for third-party requests when
    requester has identified no public interest in disclosure); Boyd v. DEA, No. 01-0524,
    slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2002) ("The FBI's Glomar response was appropriate
    because the subject of the FOIA request was a private individual in law enforcement
    records and plaintiff's claim of his misconduct would not shed light on the agency's
    conduct."); Daley v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1750, slip op. at 2-3 (D.D.C.
    Mar. 9, 2001) (holding "Glomar" response proper when request seeks information
    related to third party who has not waived privacy rights); Schwarz v. United States
    Dep't of Treasury
    , 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that "Glomar"
    response is proper in connection with request for third party's law enforcement
    records); Claudio v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. H-98-1911, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Tex. May 24,
    2000) (holding "Glomar" response proper when request sought any investigatory
    records about administrative law judge); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 954 (deciding
    that "Glomar" response concerning possible criminal investigatory files on private
    individuals is appropriate where records would be categorically exempt); Early v.
    Office of Prof'l Responsibility
    , No. 95-0254, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1996)
    (concluding that "Glomar" response concerning possible complaints against or
    investigations of judge and three named federal employees was proper absent any
    public interest in disclosure), summary affirmance granted, No. 96-5136, 1997 WL
    195523 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 1997); see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5; FOIA
    Update
    , Vol. VII, No. 1, at 3-4. But cf. Jefferson v. Dep't of Justice, 284 F.3d 172, 178-79
    (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to affirm district court's approval of "Glomar" response to
    request for Office of Professional Responsibility records pertaining to Assistant
    United States Attorney, because of possibility that some non-law enforcement
    records were within scope of request).

    97. See, e.g., Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894-96 (holding categorical "Glomar"
    response concerning law enforcement files on individual inappropriate when
    individual had publicly offered to help agency; records discussing reported offers of
    assistance to agency by former presidential candidate H. Ross Perot "may implicate
    a less substantial privacy interest than any records associating Perot with criminal
    activity," so conventional processing is required for such records); see also FOIA
    Update
    , Vol. XVII, No. 2, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: The Bifurcation Requirement for
    Privacy 'Glomarization'").

    98. See, e.g., Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178-79 (refusing to allow categorical Exemption
    7(C) "Glomar" response to request for Office of Professional Responsibility records
    concerning Assistant United States Attorney because agency did not bifurcate for
    separate treatment of its non-law enforcement records); Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at
    894-96 (deciding that "Glomar" response is appropriate only as to existence of
    records associating former presidential candidate H. Ross Perot with criminal
    activity), on remand, 937 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that "Glomar" response
    as to whether Perot was subject, witness, or informant in law enforcement
    investigation appropriate after agency searched law enforcement files for records
    concerning Perot's efforts to assist agency), further proceedings, No. 94-00808, slip
    op. at 9-11 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1997) (ordering agency to file in camera declaration with
    court explaining whether it ever assigned informant code to named individual and
    results of any search performed using that code; agency not required to state on
    record whether individual was ever assigned code number), further proceedings,
    No. 94-00808, slip op. at 9-10 (D.D.C. May 21, 1997) (accepting agency's in camera
    declaration that search of its records using code number assigned to named
    individual uncovered no responsive documents); Burke, 1999 WL 1032814, at *5
    (finding no need to bifurcate request that "specifically and exclusively" sought
    investigative records on third parties); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *4
    (upholding privacy "Glomarization" after agency bifurcated between aspects of
    request); Nation Magazine v. Dep't of State, No. 92-2303, slip op. at 23-24 (D.D.C. Aug.
    18, 1995) (requiring FBI to search for any "noninvestigative" files on Perot); Grove, 802
    F. Supp. at 510-11 (finding agency conducted search for administrative records
    sought but "Glomarized" part of request concerning investigatory records); accord
    Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757 (involving "Glomarization" bifurcation along "public
    interest" lines); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (approving
    "Glomarization" bifurcation that acknowledged overt contacts with educational
    institution but refused to confirm or deny covert contacts) (Exemptions 1 and 3); cf.
    Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 179 (requiring Office of Professional Responsibility to
    determine nature of records contained in file pertaining to Assistant United States
    Attorney before giving categorical "Glomar" response).

    99. Accord FOIA Update, Vol. XVII, No. 2, at 3-4; see, e.g., Nation Magazine, 937 F.
    Supp. at 45 (finding that "Glomar" response as to whether presidential candidate H.
    Ross Perot was subject, witness, or informant in law enforcement investigation
    appropriate after agency searched law enforcement files for less sensitive law
    enforcement records); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *4 (finding that agency
    properly bifurcated between aspects of request); Grove, 802 F. Supp. at 510-14
    (allowing Navy to bifurcate between "administrative documents" and those held by
    its investigative component, Naval Investigative Service).

    100. See McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958 (finding that "Glomar" response is proper so
    long as agency employing it has not publicly identified individual as subject of
    investigation); cf. Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that
    CIA properly "Glomarized" existence of records concerning plaintiff's alleged
    employment relationship with CIA despite allegation that another government
    agency confirmed plaintiff's status as former CIA employee) (Exemptions 1 and 3).

    101. 489 U.S. at 767.

    102. See FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5 (stating that under Reporters Committee,
    Exemption 7(C) "Glomarization" can be undertaken without review of any responsive
    records, in response to third-party requests for routine law enforcement records
    pertaining to living private citizens who have not given consent to disclosure); see
    also
    FOIA Update, Vol. XII, No. 2, at 6 (warning agencies not to notify requesters of
    identities of other agencies to which record referrals are made, in any exceptional
    case in which doing so would reveal sensitive abstract fact about existence of
    records).

    103. See Ely v. FBI, 781 F.2d 1487, 1492 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986) ("the government must first
    offer evidence, either publicly or in camera to show that there is a legitimate claim");
    McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 957-58 (finding agencies' affidavits sufficient to support
    "Glomar" response); Nation Magazine, No. 94-00808, slip op. at 9-11 (D.D.C. Feb. 14,
    1997) (ordering agency to file in camera declaration with court explaining whether it
    ever assigned informant code to named individual and results of any search
    performed using that code); Grove, 752 F. Supp. at 30 (requiring agency to conduct
    search to properly justify use of "Glomar" response in litigation).

    104. See, e.g., Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757 (request for any "rap sheet" on
    individual defense contractor); Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (request for information on
    individual who testified at requester's trial); Schwarz, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3987, at
    *7 (request for file on "alleged husband"); Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493-94 (request for
    records concerning alleged wrongdoing by two named DEA agents); Dunkelberger,
    906 F.2d at 780, 782 (request for information that could verify alleged misconduct by
    undercover FBI Special Agent); Freeman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 86-1073, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1986) (request for alleged FBI informant file of
    Teamsters president); Strassman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 792 F.2d 1267,
    1268 (4th Cir. 1986) (request for records allegedly indicating whether governor of
    West Virginia threatened to invoke Fifth Amendment); Antonelli, 721 F.2d at 616-19
    (request seeking files on eight third parties); Voinche, No. 99-1931, slip op. at 12-13
    (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) (request for information on three individuals allegedly involved
    in Oklahoma City bombing); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (request for information
    relating to involvement of named individuals in "October Surprise" allegations); Early,
    No. 95-0254, slip. op. at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1996) (request for complaints against or
    investigations of judge and three named federal employees); Triestman, 878 F. Supp.
    at 669 (request by prisoner seeking records of investigations of misconduct by
    named DEA agents); Ray, 778 F. Supp. at 1215 (request for any records reflecting
    results of INS investigation of alleged employee misconduct); Knight Publ'g Co. v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 84-510, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 1985)
    (request by newspaper seeking any DEA investigatory file on governor, lieutenant
    governor, or attorney general of North Carolina); Ray v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 558 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (D.D.C. 1982) (request by convicted killer of Dr. Martin
    Luther King, Jr., seeking any file on requester's former attorney or Congressman
    Louis Stokes), aff'd, 720 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision); Blakey
    v. Department of Justice
    , 549 F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (D.D.C. 1982) (request by professor
    seeking any records relating to a minor figure in investigation of assassination of
    President Kennedy who was indexed under topics other than Kennedy
    assassination), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 720 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
    (unpublished table decision).

    105. See Shaw v. FBI, 604 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (D.D.C. 1985) (seeking any
    investigatory files on individuals whom requester believed participated in
    assassination of President Kennedy); Flynn v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 83-2282, slip op. at 1-3 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 1984) (alleging documents reflect judicial bias),
    summary judgment for agency granted (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1984); see also Knight Publ'g,
    No. 84-510, slip op. at 2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 1985) (unsealing of in camera affidavit on
    motion to compel).

    106. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577 (noting that "law enforcement documents obtained by
    Government investigators often contain information about persons interviewed as
    witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of
    mere happenstance").

    107. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 9-12; see also
    Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 (evincing the Supreme Court's reliance on "the Attorney
    General's consistent interpretation of" the FOIA in successive such Attorney General
    memoranda); accord Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in
    FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (stressing importance of protecting law enforcement
    interests).

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