Whether a Three-Day Recess by One Chamber of Congress Constitutes an Adjournment for Purposes of the Pocket Veto Clause
It is doubtful that a three-day recess by the Senate, with the House continuing in session, constitutes an adjournment by Congress that would “prevent [the] Return” of a bill that has been presented to the President under the Pocket Veto Clause of the Constitution.
Constitutionality of Legislation to Confer Citizenship Upon Albert Einstein
Congress has the authority to enact a law granting citizenship to Albert Einstein.
Exercising the Pocket Veto
When the President wishes to disapprove a bill, and Congress’s adjournment has prevented the President’s return of the bill, the safer course for the President to exercise his power of disapproval is through a pocket veto, instead of endorsing the bill with the word “disapproved” and the President’s signature.
Legality of an Executive Order Requiring Executive Departments and Independent Establishments to Make Monthly Financial Reports
Although the regulations prescribed by the proposed executive order, requiring executive departments and independent establishments to provide the Secretary of the Treasury with monthly financial reports, are not expressly authorized by any statute, the President has authority to issue the order by virtue of his inherent power as Chief Executive.
Removal of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce by the Appointment of a Successor
The removal from office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce can be properly effected merely by the appointment of a successor by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Filling the Vacancy Following the Death of the Secretary of War
The performance of the duties of the Secretary of War by an acting secretary may not extend beyond thirty days from the date of the death of the late Secretary of War, and it will be necessary for a new Secretary of War to be appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Appointments Clause of the Constitution to perform those duties after that date.
There is some doubt whether the duties specifically imposed by Congress upon the Secretary of War may be performed by the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army, or by any other person not serving as the Secretary of War.
Authority of the Federal Communications Commission to Deny a Broadcast License to a Newspaper Owner
The Federal Communications Commission does not have authority under the Communications Act of 1934 to refuse to grant broadcasting licenses on the ground that the ownership of the proposed facilities is in, or in common with, a newspaper.
It is doubtful that Congress has the power to broaden the Act to provide the FCC with such authority.
Such a provision would not violate the First Amendment clauses protecting the freedom of speech and of the press, but it would probably be held arbitrary and violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Censorship of Transmission of Trotzky Speech From Mexico
The Federal Communications Commission does not have statutory authority to censor the telephone transmission from Mexico into the United States of a speech by Leon Trotzky.
Presidential Authority to Direct Departments and Agencies to Withhold Expenditures From Appropriations Made
Neither the Economy Act of 1933 nor any other statute authorizes the President to direct departments and agencies, either on a percentum basis or with reference to specific items, to withhold expenditures from appropriations made.
In the absence of legislative sanction, an executive order withholding expenditures from appropriations made would not be binding on the disbursing officers in the event that a department head or other authorized official should desire funds from the amount ordered to be withheld.
The President may request or direct the heads of the departments and agencies to attempt to effect such savings as may be possible without violation of a duty prescribed by law.
The President’s Power in the Field of Foreign Relations
The first section of this memorandum canvasses the historical precedents that delineate the President’s prerogatives vis-à-vis Congress in foreign relations. These precedents tend to fall into one of two categories: those reflecting the Hamiltonian view that the President as Chief Executive has sole and unlimited authority to determine the nation’s foreign policy, and those reflecting the Madisonian view that Congress as the law-making body has primary authority to determine the nation’s foreign policy, which the President must take care to enforce.
The second section of this memorandum concludes that the power of the President to repel invasion is unquestioned. It would not be necessary to resolve the conflict between the Hamiltonian and Madisonian views in the event of an invasion, because statutes expressly provide that “whenever the United States shall be invaded or in imminent danger of invasion by any foreign nation,” the President may use the military and naval forces to repel such invasion.
The third section of this memorandum discusses the application of the Neutrality Act of 1937 to the Spanish Civil War and the China-Japan conflict.