SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER V. LEON S. DAY, ET AL. No. 82-1371 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1982 The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING The petitioner is the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Richard S. Schweiker, the appellant in the court of appeals, resigned as Secretary effective February 4, 1983, and his successor has not yet been appointed. The respondents are Leon S. Day and Amedie Maurais, who are representatives of the following class of claimants for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 401 et seq.: All present and future Vermont residents seeking to secure Social Security disability benefits who, following an initial determination by the (Secretary) that no disability exists, experience an unreasonable delay in the scheduling of and/or issuance of decisions in reconsiderations and fair hearings. App. D, infra, 12a n.1. /1/ TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Statutory provision involved Statement 1. Background 2. The proceedings in this case Reasons for granting the petition Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (App. A, infra, 1a-9a) is reported at 685 F.2d 19. The opinions of the district court (App. D & E, infra, 12a-20a, 21a-31a) are unreported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (App. B, infra, 10a) was entered on June 28, 1982, and a petition for rehearing was denied on September 17, 1982 (App. C, infra, 11a). On December 7, 1982, Justice Marshall extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including February 14, 1983. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED Section 205(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b), provides in pertinent part: The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment under this suchapter. Any such decision by the Secretary which involves a determination of disability and which is in whole or in part unfavorable to such individual shall contain a statement of the case, in understandable language, setting forth a discussion of the evidence, and stating the Secretary's determination and the reason or reasons upon which it is based. Upon request by any such individual or upon request by a wife, divorced wife, widow, surviving divorced wife, surviving divorced mother, husband, widower, child, or parent who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights may be prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has rendered, he shall give such applicant and such other individual reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse his findings of fact and such decision. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether, in the absence of any showing of bad faith, delays in the administrative adjudication of claims for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 401 et seq., arising from a substantial backlog of cases and resource limitations, violate claimants' statutory right to "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" (42 U.S.C. 405(b)) and justify judicial imposition of time limits on the processing of such claims. 2. Whether, in the absence of statutory authorization, a court may enforce judicially imposed processing deadlines by requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to pay interim benefits from the Disability Insurance Trust Fund to claimants who have not been found entitled to such benefits but whose cases have not been decided prior to the deadlines. STATEMENT 1. Background Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 401 et seq., provides, inter alia, for the payment of disability benefits to insured individuals who, because of physical or mental impairment, are unable to do their previous work or to engage in any kind of substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A). Disability benefits also are payable under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program established by Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 1381 et seq. See 42 U.S.C. 1382(a)(2)(B). Both statutory provisions require the Secretary, in determining whether a claimant is disabled, to consider the claimant's physical and mental impairments and the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience. The disability programs established by Title II and XVI "are of a size and extent difficult to comprehend." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971). In fiscal year 1981 alone, approximately 2.3 million claims for disability benefits were filed under the two titles. /2/ To provide for an orderly determination of the eligibility of this number of claimants, Congress and the Secretary have devised a four-level system of administrative consideration of disability claims. Under the Title II program, with which this case is concerned, the determination whether a claimant is under a disability and the date on which the disability began or ceased is made by a state agency in the first instance. 42 U.S.C. 421(a); 20 C.F.R. 404.1503. By regulation, the Secretary has provided that if the claimant is dissatisfied with the initial eligibility determination, he may request a de novo reconsideration by the appropriate state agency. 20 C.F.R. 404.907-404.921 and 404.1615. In fiscal year 1981, more than 413,000 requests for reconsideration were processed. /3/ If the decision after reconsideration by the state agency is adverse to the claimant, he is entitled to a hearing by the Secretary in the same manner as provided in 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b) for all other claimants under the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program. See 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 421(c); 20 C.F.R. 404.929-404.961. Under 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b), the Secretary is required to provide "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" with respect to "decisions as to the rights of any individual applying for a payment" of benefits under Title II. If the claimant is dissatisfied with the decision rendered after the hearing, he may take an administrative appeal to the Appeals Council in HHS. 20 C.F.R. 404.967-404.983. After the individual has exhausted his administrative remedies in this fashion, he may seek judicial review of a final denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(g). See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-339 (1976). /4/ The administrative hearings provided for in 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 405(b) are conducted by a corps of Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) in HHS. 20 C.F.R. 404.929. The total number of ALJ hearings requested annually under all Social Security programs increased from approximately 72,000 in fiscal year 1973 to more than 320,000 in fiscal year 1982. /5/ The vast majority of these hearing requests are in disability cases. /6/ The increase in the number of hearing requests is expected to continue in future years, in part because of a legislative requirement that the Secretary provide for a periodic review of the eligibility of individuals who are already receiving disability benefits -- a process that predictably will result in an increase in the number of recipients whose benefits are terminated and who subsequently request reconsideration and an ALJ hearing. See Section 221(i) of the Act (42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 421 note), as added by Section 304(a) of the Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 457. /7/ To meet this greatly increased workload, the number of ALJs in HHS was increased from 420 in fiscal year 1973 to 813 in October 1982. The support staff per ALJ was more than doubled during this same period, and there is now an average of more than four support personnel for each ALJ. The result of these and other administrative initiatives has been to increase the average number of dispositions per ALJ each month from 14 in 1973 to 34 in 1982. Thus, today, on the average, an ALJ decides 1 1/2 cases each working day. /8/ During this same 10-year period, the average processing time from the date on which an evidentiary hearing was requested to the date on which the ALJ rendered his decision varied between a high of 288 days in fiscal year 1976, when Mathews v. Eldridge was decided (see 424 U.S. at 341-342), to a low of 151 days in 1979. In fiscal year 1982, the average processing time was 174 days, the same as it had been in 1973, thereby indicating that HHS now has been able to absorb the more than four-fold increase in its hearing caseload since 1973 without further extreme impact on the claimants' interest in receiving a hearing within a reasonable period. Congress repeatedly has studied the problem of the backlog of disability cases arising from the increase in hearing requests (see pages 19-21, infra), but it has declined to impose deadlines for the holding of hearings or the rendering of decisions by the ALJs. For example, although Congress provided in 42 U.S.C. 1383(c)(2) that Title XVI claims generally are to be determined within 90 days of the request for a hearing, Congress expressly excepted disability cases from that deadline, apparently because of the complexity of the disability determination. In 1980, Congress directed the Secretary to submit for its consideration a report "recommending the establishment of appropriate time limitations governing decisions on claims for benefits under title II of the Social Security Act," including a recommended time limitation for all four levels of administrative review. Pub. L. No. 96-265, Section 308, 94 Stat. 458. However, Congress took no action to impose such deadlines after receiving the Secretary's report (App. E, infra, 28a n.7). Finally, in December 1982, when Congress did take affirmative action to reduce the impact of the time needed to adjudicate claims, it did so only in cases involving the cessation of the payments of disability benefits to individuals who previously had been found to be eligible. Congress required that the state agency furnish an opportunity for a face-to-face evidentiary hearing at the reconsideration stage in these termination cases in addition to the opportunity for an ALJ hearing at a later date. Congress further provided, on a one-year experimental basis, that the claimant in a termination case may elect to continue to receive benefits through the ALJ stage, subject to recoupment if he is found to have been ineligible. Pub. L. No. 97-455, Sections 2 and 4, 96 Stat. 2498, 2499. Congress did not provide, however, for a face-to-face hearing at the reconsideration stage in the case of new applications for benefits; nor did it authorize the payment of interim benefits pending the ALJ's decision following a hearing on a new application. 2. The Proceedings In This Case a. This class action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont on November 15, 1978, challenging the period of time that elapsed in Title II disability cases in Vermont between a request for reconsideration and the decision on reconsideration and between a request for a hearing and the convening of the hearing. Respondent Day, who had been receiving disability benefits, was initially found to be no longer disabled in December 1977. He requested a reconsideration of this determination on December 21, 1977, and his claim was denied after reconsideration on June 6, 1978 -- 167 days later. Day then requested an ALJ hearing. That hearing was held on December 4, 1978, soon after Day filed this action and 173 days after he had requested the hearing. On January 17, 1979, the ALJ issued a decision reaffirming the cessation of benefits (App. D, infra, 13a-14a). Respondent Maurais, who intervened in this suit on December 1, 1978, was notified in April 1978 that his disability had ceased. He requested reconsideration of that initial determination on June 2, 1978, and an adverse reconsideration decision was rendered on January 4, 1979 -- 215 days after his request. Maurais then requested an ALJ hearing, and the hearing was held 65 days later (id. at 14a). b. On December 28, 1978, the district court granted partial summary judgment for respondents with respect to the timing of ALJ hearings. Relying on the Second Circuit's prior decisions in White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978), and Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978), the district court held that the provision in 42 U.S.C. 405(b) for the Secretary to afford a claimant "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing" requires that the ALJ hearing be conducted within a "reasonable" time after it is requested (App. D, infra, 15a). In White v. Mathews, supra, a class action of Title II claimants in Connecticut, the court of appeals had held that the average period of 211.8 days between a request for a hearing and the decision following a hearing did not afford an opportunity for a hearing within a reasonable time and ordered the Secretary to reduce that time period for Connecticut claimants to 120 days. 559 F.2d at 858-860. In Barnett v. Califano, supra, the court of appeals had held that the period of 6 or 7 months that ordinarily elapsed between a hearing request and the hearing date for Title XVI disability claimants in Vermont was unreasonable and ordered that this time be reduced to 90 days. 580 F.2d at 31-33. The district court acknowledged that the Social Security Administration (SSA) "has made admirable strides in reducing the average length of delay experienced by claimants a few years ago" (App. D, infra, 17a). Nevertheless, on the basis of the holdings in White and Barnett and evidence in this case that 43% of Vermont residents who requested hearings on their Title II disability claims waited more than 90 days for their hearings, the court found that a substantial number of claimants had been denied their statutory right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the court ordered that ALJ hearings be held within 90 days of a request, subject to certain exceptions for delays attributable to the claimant (id. at 19a; App. F, infra, 33a-34a). /9/ c. On August 19, 1981, the district court granted summary judgment for respondents on the reconsideration aspect of the case as well. Although the Act does not require that there be a de novo reconsideration by a state agency or that any such reconsideration be held within a reasonable time, the court reasoned that reconsideration is an administrative prerequisite to an ALJ hearing and that delays in the reconsideration procedures trench on the statutory duty to provide a hearing within a reasonable time (App. E, infra, 27a). The court noted that for the years 1977-1980, reconsideration processing time ranged between 17 and 251 days in Vermont, with a mean processing time of 68 days, and that approximately 35% of the reconsideration requests took more than 90 days to process. The court recognized that it is often necessary to generate additional evidence on reconsideration, but held that a peeriod of time for reconsideration in excess of 90 days is unreasonable except in certain situations in which delay is attributable to the claimant (id. at 30a; App. F, infra, 33a). /10/ The district court also ordered the Secretary to pay interim disability benefits to any claimant who has not received a reconsideration determination or hearing within 180 days of the request for reconsideration or has not received a hearing within 90 days of his hearing request, even though the claimant has not yet been found by the State or the Secretary to be entitled to such benefits. These benefits were made subject to recoupment by the Secretary if the claimant later were found not to be eligible (App. E, infra, 30a-31a; App. F, infra, 34a-35a). d. The court of appeals affirmed (App. A, infra, 1a-9a). The court of appeals expressed its "sympath(y) with the severe problems that beset SSA" and its understand(ing) that (the district court's) decision may have a significant impact on its operations" (id. at 6a). But the court nevertheless concluded that judicially imposed timetables were appropriate for the processing of the "flood of claims" confronting SSA (ibid., quoting White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 859). The court of appeals "share(d) the First Circuit's concern that 'if the Secretary's resources truly are inadequate to the task, the more litigious of the applicants may gain an advantage over the less assertive'" (App. A, infra, 7a, quoting Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1978)). The court concluded, however, again quoting the Caswell decision, that it should not be deterred from awarding relief to the claimants before it by "the alleged inability of the (Secretary) fully to meet his obligations to others'" (ibid.). The court of appeals also recognized "that in the last five years Congress has involved itself heavily in the administration of the Act" and that "Congress has refused to impose its own deadlines," but the court viewed Congress' failure to enact clarifying legislation as perhaps implying that Congress is satisfied that the problem of delay is being handled effectively by the courts (App. A, infra, 7a). The court of appeals also approved the district court's extension of its holding in White to the reconsideration level (id. at 7a-8a). In sustaining judicially imposed time limits, the court of appeals explicitly acknowledged (App. A, infra, 7a-8a) that its decision conflicted with Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (1978), in which the Seventh Circuit held that the time between request and hearing did not warrant any judicial intervention, and was at odds with Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 335 (1978), in which the Sixth Circuit eschewed judicially imposed deadlines and instead ordered the Secretary to promulgate nationwide regulations to implement the reasonable time requirement. The Second Circuit nevertheless adhered to its prior precedent in White, Barnett, and Sharpe v. Harris, 621 F.2d 530 (1980) (App. A, infra, 6a-8a). Finally, the court of appeals rejected the contention that the payment of interim benefits following the violation of judicially imposed deadlines is barred by 42 U.S.C. 405(i), which limits payments from the Disability Insurance Trust Fund to those made "(u)pon final decision of the Secretary or upon final judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction, that (the) person is entitled to any payment or payments" under Title II. In the court's view, this provision does not "'(e)xclude the possibility of interim payments ordered by a court exercising its remedial power" (App. A, infra, 8a, quoting White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 861). The court of appeals did not believe that its earlier holding in White, which awarded interim benefits in the absence of statutory authorization, was undermined by this Court's intervening decision in Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981). The court stated that the interim payments at issue here flow from the "district court's inherent powers to fashion a remedy," not from estoppel (App. A, infra, 8a-9a). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION This case directly concerns the most serious administrative problem confronting the Department of Health and Human Services today in its implementation of the Social Security Act: how to assure an accurate, fair, uniform and efficient determination of the entitlement to disability benefits of the several million individuals who apply for benefits or whose continuing eligibility is reviewed each year and the hundreds of thousands of such individuals who seek an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The disability hearing system has been characterized as "probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world," /11/ and it is to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not to the courts, that Congress has entrusted its stewardship on a nationwide basis. 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 405(b). The ruling of the court of appeals is another in a line of decisions that have sanctioned an unwarranted and increasingly burdensome judicial intrusion into the ALJ hearing process through the imposition of fixed deadlines that Congress itself has declined to impose. The necessary effect of these decisions will be to require the Secretary to divert scarce resources to the detriment of claimants in other geographic areas and in programs that are not yet subject to judicial decrees. Two other courts of appeals have rejected this approach, recognizing that the courts must defer to the Secretary in giving effect to the statutory requirement of "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing." Moreover, in the instant case, the court of appeals has for the first time extended the principle of judicially fashioned processing deadlines to the reconsideration stage, which is primarily the responsibility of the States, not the federal government. The court of appeals also erred in ordering the payment of interim benefits when its judicially imposed deadlines are not met. This aspect of the decision is inconsistent with statutory provisions directing that funds may be paid out of the Trust Fund only if the recipient has been found eligible for benefits and with this Court's holding in Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981), that such statutory prerequisites to the disbursement of public funds must be honored by the courts. Review plainly is warranted to resolve these important and recurring questions. 1. a. Four courts of appeals have addressed the issue of the timing of ALJ disability hearings in the last several years, with four different results. The Second Circuit, in the instant case and in three preceding cases, held that the hearing times involved were unreasonable, imposed deadlines on the hearing process, and ordered the payment of interim benefits when those deadlines are not met. /12/ The First Circuit, in Caswell v. Califano, supra, concurred in the appropriateness of judicially imposed time limits (583 F.2d at 15-18), but did not order the payment of interim benefits. /13/ The Sixth Circuit also held that the hearing delays were statutorily unreasonable. Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 333-334 (1978). However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's order providing for judicially imposed deadlines, principally for three reasons: Congress had declined to impose fixed time limits; such an order in one State would require the shifting of resources from other States; and "(s)implistic and unreasonably short time limitations imposed from the outside without a thorough understanding of the reasons for the problem will frustrate welfare administration, just as it would frustrate judicial administration." Id. at 335. Instead, the Sixth Circuit ordered the Secretary to exercise his rulemaking authority under 42 U.S.C. 405(a) to formulate regulations giving substance to the statutory requirement of "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing." /14/ The Seventh Circuit, in Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (1978), on the other hand, concluded that no judicial intervention whatever in the hearing delay problem was warranted. The Seventh Circuit expressly refused (ibid.) to follow White, Barnett, and Caswell, the decisions upon which the court below relied in the instant case (App. A, infra, 5a-8a). /15/ In the Seventh Circuit's view, a court ordinarily is not competent to evaluate the efficiency of an administrative agency and to make the essentially legislative judgment whether the agency is performing its work with reasonable dispatch. 587 F.2d at 352-353. The Seventh Circuit observed that Congress had committed the timing of hearings to the discretion of the Social Security Administration and unlike the court below, found it significant that Congress, despite careful monitoring, had failed to prescribe mandatory time limits on that process or to direct the payment of interim benefits. Id. at 353. The Seventh Circuit further explained that since the hearing delays complained of were systemwide -- and there were no allegations of bad faith, dilatory attitude, or lack of evenhandedness -- whether the agency acted reasonably should be judged in light of the resources Congress supplied and the impact of the delay. In these circumstances, the Seventh Circuit concluded, a court should be reluctant to intervene absent "clear congressional guidelines." In Wright itself, "given the good faith efforts of the SSA to cope with the delay problem under severe resource constraints and the prospect of future progress," the court could not find that the time spent in processing hearing requests was so unreasonable as to warrant judicial intervention. 587 F.2d at 353-354. Thus, the courts of appeals are in conflict on the propriety of judicial intervention in the HHS disability hearing process and the payment of mandatory interim benefits. The divergence in the lower courts can only be expected to increase in the future, in view of the pendency of at least 13 more class actions challenging delays in the administrative claims procedures. /16/ b. This conflict among the lower courts has substantial practical consequences. The courts of appeals that have considered the matter uniformly have recognized that the Secretary has made significant efforts to manage a caseload that has quadrupled in size over the past decade; and no court has suggested the existence of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of HHS. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, supra, 587 F.2d at 334; Wright v. Califano, supra, 587 F.2d at 352-354; Caswell v. Califano, supra, 583 F.2d at 17-18; Barnett v. Califano, supra, 580 F.2d at 32; White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 861. The district court in this case likewise noted that the Secretary had made "admirable strides" in reducing the waiting period from what it had been several years earlier (App. D, infra, 17a). But despite those efforts, the nationwide median case processing time at the hearing stage is currently between 170 and 180 days (see page 5, supra). It is therefore clear that the Secretary could not satisfy the 90-day deadline for the holding of hearings imposed in this case or comparable deadlines imposed in other cases if those deadlines were extended nationwide. The only way that such deadlines can be met in the District of Vermont or in other districts where court-imposed deadlines are in effect is for the Secretary to divert scarce resources from other geographic areas and other programs that are not yet subject to such judicial decrees. This would, of course, work to the detriment of claimants who are awaiting hearings in those areas and programs. /17/ Such a regime undermines the agency's obligation of evenhanded treatment, which is an important element of the guarantee of an opportunity for a hearing within a "reasonable" time. Wright v. Califano, supra, 587 F.2d at 352-353; FTC v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 336 F.2d 687, 691-692 (5th Cir. 1964); Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1943, 1425 (1968). It was precisely this prospect of uneven treatment of claimants in different States that led the Sixth Circuit in Blankenship to overturn the hearing deadlines imposed by the district court for Kentucky claimants. 587 F.2d at 335. Even the Second Circuit in the instant case and the First Circuit in Caswell expressed their concern that if the Secretary's resources are inadequate, litigious applicants in one State will attain an advantage over less assertive claimants in other States (App. A, infra, 7a; 583 F.2d at 17). But they proceeded to ignore this concern by nevertheless imposing hearing deadlines of far shorter duration than the national average. Moreover, there is no unformity even among those courts which have concluded that judicial intervention is appropriate. The processing time allowed from hearing request to decision varies between 120 days /18/ and 180 days, /19/ while in other cases, as in the decision below, the relevant deadline is for the holding of the hearing by the ALJ, not his rendering of a decision. /20/ These various deadlines are subject to exceptions that in turn vary from district to district, and the reporting and other compliance features of the decrees also differ. The result is to produce disparity even as among the claimants sought to be benefited by the respective decrees and to introduce complex administrative burdens for HHS in seeking to comply with them. /21/ The efficient nationwide administration of the Titles II and XVI disability programs cannot tolerate this increasing balkanization. Review by this Court therefore is necessary to resolve the conflict among the circuits and district courts on the legal issues presented and the appropriate contours of relief, as well as to eliminate the practical disparity among different classes of claimants that has been generated by this and other decisions. /22/ 2. a. The court of appeals plainly erred in concluding that the processing time for hearing requests in Vermont was not "reasonable" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b) and that a judicially imposed deadline of 90 days was appropriate. When Congress has desired a fixed deadline for the conduct of ALJ hearings, it has expressly so provided in the Social Security Act itself. For example, Congress has specified that determination of entitlement to SSI benefits should be made within 90 days of the request for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. 1383(c)(2). Prompt action on claims for SSI benefits is of greater importance because entitlement to such benefits, unlike those provided under Title II of the Act, is based on need. 42 U.S.C. 1382(a); compare Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 340-341. Even in the case of SSI benefits, however, Congress excluded disability cases from the 90-day requirement, presumably because of the greater complexity of the determination of disability as compared with other questions involved in SSI cases. In its decision in White v. Mathews, supra, followed in this case, the Second Circuit relied in imposing time limitations on the language in 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b) that requires the Secretary to provide "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing." See 559 F.2d at 858. We agree that timing is one aspect of the requirement that the opportunity for a hearing be "reasonable," but other considerations are relevant as well. As early as 1975, a congressional report observed that "although mandating by statute certain processing time limits might seem on the surface a desirable thing to do, such legislation might also have an adverse effect on the quantity and uniformity of disability adjudication which is already somewhat suspect." /23/ Similary, in 1980, when Congress by statute required the Secretary to submit a report recommending the establishment of time limitations, the statute itself directed the Secretary to take into account "both the need for expeditious processing of claims for benefits and the need to assure that all such claims will be thoroughly considered and accurately determined." Pub. L. No. 96-265, Section 308, 94 Stat. 458. See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1981); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27-28 (1981). The important interest in assuring uniform, thorough, and accurate decisions would not be served if fixed deadlines do not allow a sufficient time for a reasoned adjudication of individual cases or the caseload generally. The court of appeals failed to explore these countervailing considerations that Congress itself declared to be relevant in this very context. Moreover, even on the question of timing, the individual claimant's interest is only one of the relevant factors, just as it is under the three-part due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 335. It is necessary as well under Mathews v. Eldridge to consider "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail" (ibid.). So here, the court of appeals was required to consider the resource limitations and administrative burdens confronting HHS in determining the reasonableness of the timing of the reconsideration and hearing process and the appropriateness of court-ordered deadlines. Note, Judicial Resolution of Systemic Delays in Social Security Hearings, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 959, 977 (1979). Cf. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 614-616 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court below erred in myopically considering only respondents' individual concerns. b. The numerous and competing factors that must be taken into account in effectuating the statutory requirement of a "reasonable * * * opportunity for a hearing" under programs as vast as Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act underscore that the problem inherently is one for administrative or legislative -- not judicial resolution. Indeed, at various times, both Congress and the Secretary have adopted measures to improve the adjudication process. In 1976, for example, Congress addressed the backlog problem by permitting the use of non-ALJ hearing officers to consider disability cases. Pub. L. No. 94-202, Section 3, 89 Stat. 1135. In 1978, the Secretary, in order to ensure uniform and efficient determinations of disability, adopted the medical-vocational guidelines at issue in Schweiker v. Campbell, No. 81-1983. Similarly, in 1982, Congress afforded the Secretary flexibility in selecting cases for periodic review in order to enable him to accommodate the backlog of new applications and state staffing levels. Pub. L. No. 97-455, Section 3, 96 Stat. 2499. Congress also provided for face-to-face hearings by state agencies at the reconsideration stage and the payment of interim benefits through the ALJ stage in disability benefit termination cases, in recognition of the backlog in the ALJ hearing process and the special equities involved when a person is currently receiving and perhaps dependent upon his benefits. Pub. L. No. 97-455, Sections 2 and 4, 96 Stat. 2498, 2499. See 128 Cong. Rec. S15963 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Armstrong); id. at S15964 (remarks of Sens. Dole and Levin); id. at 15965 (remarks of Sen. Cohen). Thus, Congress was aware of the impact of delays in the ALJ hearing process and adopted what it determined to be appropriate remedies. It did not, however, choose to impose deadlines on the ALJ hearing process or provide for any additional procedures or the payment of interim benefits in the case of new applicants, as the decision of the court of appeals would do. "(T)his Court has been willing to assume a congressional solicitude for fair procedure" (Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)). It also has admonished that "substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals" (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 349). As noted above, no court has suggested that the delays experienced in determining disability claims are the product of bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of HHS. See page 15, supra. Accordingly, and in view of the continuing oversight of the process by Congress and the Secretary, there was no basis for the courts below to "engraft() their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978). 3. Finally, the court of appeals acted without legal authority in ordering the payment of interim benefits as a remedy for the violation of judicially imposed time limits. This Court has emphasized repeatedly that a court may not order monetary relief against the federal government absent a congressional enactment waiving the United States' sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, No. 80-1437 (June 1, 1982); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976); Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 196 (1922); cf. United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law * * * "). There is no such statutory authority for the interim payment of disability benefits on the ground of delay. To the contrary, the Social Security Act allows the payment of benefits only upon a "final decision of the Secretary or upon final judgment of any court of competent jurisdiction" that a person is "entitled to payment" (42 U.S.C. 405(i)). In order to be "entitled" to disability benefits, a person must be, inter alia, "under a disability" (42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IV) 423(a)(1)). Until the Secretary or a court has found that the claimant is disabled and satisfies the other eligibility criteria, the statute does not authorize payment. /24/ It also is significant that when Congress has wished to provide for interim benefits, it has enacted a statute, as it did last year. See page 21, supra. The absence of such authorization in other settings reinforces the conclusion that such payments are barred. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 162-163 (1981). Just two terms ago, in a Social Security case, this Court reiterated "the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury.'" Schweiker v. Hansen, supra, 450 U.S. at 788, quoting Federal Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). The court of appeals in the instant case refused to heed this duty. It sought to avoid the force of Hansen by characterizing the interim benefit requirement as flowing from the "district court's inherent powers to fashion a remedy" (App. A, infra, 8a). But the courts of the United States have no "inherent power" to order the payment of money from the federal Treasury whenever they find a violation of a statute. United States v. Testan, supra, 424 U.S. at 401, 403. Moreover, the remedy a court may fashion for a violation of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 405(b) surely is limited by the conditions on the payment of money from the Trust Fund contained in Subsection (i) of that same statutory provision. Compliance with those conditions is not excused by mere delay in processing a claim. Cf. INS v. Miranda, No. 82-89 (Nov. 8, 1982). The decision of the court of appeals directing the payment of interim benefits therefore should not be permitted to stand. CONCLUSION The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General J. PAUL MCGRATH Assistant Attorney General KENNETH S. GELLER Deputy Solicitor General EDWIN S. KNEEDLER Assistant to the Solicitor General WILLIAM KANTER JOHN F. CORDES Attorneys FEBRUARY 1983 /1/ Respondents Day and Maurais had received an ALJ hearing and decision prior to the district court's certification of the class on June 14, 1979. The district court held that the case was not moot, however, concluding that the case fell within the exception recognized in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975), for situations in which the challenged condition is temporary and the issue as regards any particular class representative might become moot before the district court even could rule on the class certification issue. C.A. App. 78a. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 n.11 (1975); United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398-399 (1980). The district court also found that respondents Day and Maurais would be suitable representatives of the class in these circumstances. C.A. App. 77a; see United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, supra, 445 U.S. at 405-407. /2/ Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1981, at 23, 26 (1982). /3/ Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Key Workload Indicators 15 (Oct. 1982). /4/ Similar procedures are followed in SSI disability cases under Title XVI of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. 416, Subpart N. /5/ Key Workload Indicators, note 3, supra, at 1. /6/ In fiscal year 1981, more than 250,000 of the 281,737 hearing requests were in disability cases. 1981 Annual Report, note 2, supra, at 23, 26. In fiscal year 1980, more than 95% of all hearing requests involved Title II or Title XVI disability claims. Subcomm. on Social Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Social Security Hearings and Appeals: Pending Problems and Proposed Solutions, 2 (Comm. Print 1981). /7/ See Comm. Print, note 6, supra, at 1. /8/ Key Workload Indicators, supra, note 3, at 1. /9/ The district court previously had imposed a 90-day deadline for the convening of a hearing in Title XVI disability cases in Vermont. See Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1978). /10/ Because the district court found violations of the Social Security Act, it did not reach respondents' arguments that the challenged practices violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act (App. D, infra, 15a; App. E, infra, 26a). The court of appeals likewise did not consider those arguments (App. A, infra, 9a n.8). /11/ J. Mashaw, et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals: A Study of the Social Security Administration Hearing System xi (1978). /12/ White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 858-860; Barnett v. Califano, supra, 580 F.2d at 31-33; Sharpe v. Harris, supra, 621 F.2d at 531. See also Martinez v. Califano, Civ. No. 73-C-900 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1978). /13/ However, a district court decision ordering the payment of interim benefits if judicially imposed time limits are not met is currently pending before the First Circuit on the Secretary's appeal. Crosby v. Social Security Administration, No. 81-675-T (D. Mass. Nov. 16, 1982), appeal pending, No. 83-1077. /14/ On remand in Blankenship, the Secretary attempted to develop acceptable regulations and submitted various regulatory proposals to the district court. In the end, however, the Secretary concluded that burgeoning and unpredictable caseloads made any commitment to fixed time limitations in regulations unworkable. The Secretary therefore moved for relief from the regulations requirement in favor of a commitment to establish processing goals. The district court denied the Secretary's motion, ordered him to publish regulations requiring a hearing decision within 180 days of request, and required the payment of interim benefits when the time limits are not satisfied. In a companion case decided the same day, Finch v. Schweiker, No. Civ. Nos. C 75-0185 L(A), C 76-0441 L(A) (W.D. Ky. Feb. 17, 1982), the district court imposed time limits on yet another stage of the administrative process -- decisions by the Appeals Council. Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 532 F. Supp. 739, 746-747 (W.D. Ky. 1982). The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of the orders in Blankenship and Finch pending the Secretary's appeal. The appeal was argued on October 8, 1982, but no decision has yet been rendered. Blankenship v. Schweiker, Nos. 82-5130, 82-5204. /15/ Wright v. Califano involved applicants for old age and survivors benefits, not disability benefits, but this distinction did not play a role in the Seventh Circuit's legal analysis. /16/ In addition to those cited in notes 13 and 14, supra, other pending cases include: Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222 (D.D.C. 1979), vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1980), pending on remand, Civ. 78-1147 (D.D.C. Cortez v. Califano, Civ. No. B-79-517 (D. Conn.); Dixon v. Miller, Civ. No. 77-C-1125 (N.D. Ill.); Fuentes v. Harris, Civ., No. SA-81-CA-398 (W.D. Tex.); Holman v. Harris, Civ. Action No. 78-494 (M.D. Pa.); Lopez v. Harris, Civ. No. 81-121 (D. Conn.); Maloney v. Califano, Civ. No. 77-644 (D.N.M.); Matheny v. Califano, Civ. No. C-78-132 (E.D. Wash.); Quintana v. Califano, Civ. No. 78-397 (D.N.M.); White v. Schweiker, Civ. No. 81-4023 (E.D. N.Y.); Williams v. Schweiker, Civ. No. 81-1070-C (II) (E.D. Mo.). /17/ We have been informed by HHS, for example that between January 1980 and September 1981, in order to comply with judicially imposed deadlines in the Sharpe and Martinez decisions in New York (see note 12, supra), it was necessary for HHS to transfer more than 5000 cases to ALJs outside of the administrative region and more than 1400 cases to ALJs in other States within that region. Similarly, we have been informed that in order for HHS to comply with the district court's order in Crosby (see note 13, supra), it has been necessary to transfer all new cases to ALJs outside of Massachusetts while ALJs in that State reduce their backlog. /18/ White v. Mathews, supra, 559 F.2d at 855; Sharpe v. Harris, supra, 621 F.2d at 531. /19/ Blankenship v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, supra, 532 F. Supp. at 746; Crosby v. Schweiker, note 13, supra. /20/ App. A, infra, 5a; Caswell v. Califano, supra, 583 F.2d at 11; Barnett v. Califano, supra, 580 F.2d at 33. /21/ We have been informed by HHS, for example, that differing court orders in Sharpe, Martinez, and other cases in New York (see note 12, supra) have necessitated the establishment of three different administrative systems in that State alone to track the processing of hearing requests. /22/ The Court denied the Secretary's certiorari petition in 1978 seeking review of the judgment of the Second Circuit in White v. Mathews, 435 U.S. 908. White, however, was the first court of appeals' decision presenting these questions. There accordingly was no conflict among the circuits at that time, and the practical consequences might have appeared to the Court to be uncertain. There is now a clear conflict among the circuits, and the adverse consequences of the proliferation of such decisions are manifest, especially since the nationwide caseload continues to increase. /23/ See Report of the Staff of the House Subcomm. on Special Security of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Appeals Process: Areas of Possible Administrative or Legislative Actions, 1-2 (Comm. Print 1975). /24/ Although the district court's order permits the interim benefits to be recouped if the claimant is later found to be ineligible (App. F, infra, 35a), this "theoretical right of the Secretary to recover undeserved benefits (would not) result, as a practical matter, in any substantial offset to the added outlay of public funds." Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 347. Appendix Omitted