UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, APPELLANT V. ANTHONY J. GALIOTO No. 84-1904 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey POST-ARGUMENT MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT 1. At the time that appellee's suit was initiated and decided by the district court, Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title IV), as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. (& Supp. II) 921 et seq., prohibited any person who "has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental institution" from receiving, transporting, or shipping firearms or ammunition in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) and (h)(4)). Title IV and the partially overlapping provisions of Title VII of the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Title VII), 18 U.S.C. App. (& Supp. II) 1201 et seq., also prohibited several other categories of persons, including persons who have been convicted of a felony, from obtaining firearms. In limited circumstances, Title IV empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to lift these firearms disabilities from certain convicted felons (18 U.S.C. 925(c)); Section 925(c) relief was unavailable, however, to persons subjected to firearms disabilities because they had been committed to a mental institution. Appellee had been committed to a mental hospital in 1971, and therefore was barred by Title IV from obtaining a firearm. In 1984, he brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing that the disability provisions of the federal firearms laws were unconstitutional because they made relief available to felons but not to persons who have been committed to mental institutions. The district court agreed with this contention. The court held (J.S. App. 15a-18a) that Title IV denied appellee equal protection by making an irrational distinction between felons and former mental patients. Alternatively, the court held (id. at 18a-19a) that the challenged provisions violated due process standards by denying former mental patients an opportunity to show that they no longer are dangerous. While the court acknowledged the legitimacy of restrictions on the availability of firearms, it found such restrictions unconstitutional if they do "not include some provision for the granting of relief from disability to former mental patients in appropriate cases" (J.A. App. 21a). Because the court believed that it lacked the competence to make administrative relief available to appellee, it accordingly declared unconstitutional "those provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq. which have been used to deprive (appellee) of his ability to purchase a firearm" (ibid.). 2. On May 19, 1986, almost two months after the argument in this case, the President signed into law Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 et seq. (reprinted in 132 Cong. Rec. H1753 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1986)). Section 105 of that statute, among other things, amends 18 U.S.C. 925(c) by making administrative relief from the firearms disabilities imposed by Titles IV and VII available to any person who "is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition" (132 Cong. Rec. H1756 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1986)). Section 110(b) of Pub. L. No. 99-308 makes this amendment "applicable to any action, petition, or appellate proceeding pending on the date of enactment of this Act" (132 Cong. Rec. H1757 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1986)). This amendment fundamentally modifies the provisions of Title IV that were found to be constitutionally defective by the district court. Because administrative relief is now available to all persons who are subject to firearms disabilities, no grounds exist for an equal protection challenge to Section 925(c). Similarly, Title IV no longer may be said to "create( ) an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter (what) the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous" (J.S. App. 18a), a development that obviates the district court's due process analysis. And Congress's decision to accord relief to persons such as appellee makes unnecessary the district court's blanket invalidation of "those provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq. which have been used to deprive (appellee) of his ability to purchase a firearm" (J.S. App. 21a). In these circumstances, it would be appropriate for this Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case to that court for reconsideration in light of Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 et seq. Such a course will remove the cloud cast upon the enforceability of Title IV by the district court's broad ruling, while permitting that court to determine whether any portion of the controversy here survives the recent amendment. Appellee's counsel has authorized us to state that he joins in recommending this course of action. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judgment of the district court should be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in light of Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 et seq. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General JUNE 1986 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE POST-ARGUMENT MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT Pursuant to Rule 35.6 of the Rules of this Court, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the appellant, moves for leave to file the annexed post-argument memorandum. This case was argued on March 26, 1986. Since that time, Congress has materially amended 18 U.S.C. 925(c), the provision of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that is the subject of the constitutional attack in this case. Because this amendment may make it unnecessary for the Court to resolve the merits of the controversy here, the annexed memorandum describes the new legislation and discusses its effect on the proper disposition of this case.