WILLIAM E. BROCK, SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND ALAN C. MCMILLAN, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, APPELLANTS V. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. No. 85-1530 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Jurisdictional Statement TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Question Presented Statement The question is substantial Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H OPINIONS BELOW The order of the district court (App., infra, 1a-10a) is reported at 624 F. Supp. 197. The prior order of the district court granting appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction (App., infra, 11a-19a) is reported at 603 F. Supp. 249. The Secretary's findings and preliminary order (App., infra, 20a-23a) are unreported. The recommended decision and order of the administrative law judge (App., infra, 29-43a) are unreported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 24a) was entered on November 18, 1985. The notice of appeal to this Court was filed on December 17, 1985 (App., infra, 25a-26a, 27a-28a). On February 6, 1986, Justice Powell issued an order extending the time within which to docket this appeal to and including March 17, 1986. The jurisdiction of this Court rests upon 28 U.S.C. 1252. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law * * * . 2. Section 405(a) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(a), provides: No person shall discharge, discipline, or in any manner discriminate against any employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because such employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding relating to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety rule, regulation, standard, or order, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding. 3. Section 405(c) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c), provides: (1) Any employee who believes he has been discharged, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section may, within one hundred and eighty days after such alleged violation occurs, file (or have filed by any person on the employee's behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging such discharge, discipline, or discrimination. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the Secretary of Labor shall notify the person named in the complaint of the filing of the complaint. (2)(A) Within sixty days of receipt of a complaint filed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct an investigation and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit and notify the complainant and the person alleged to have committed a violation of this section of his findings. Where the Secretary of Labor has concluded that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he shall accompany his findings with a preliminary order providing the relief prescribed by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. Thereafter, either the person alleged to have committed the violation or the complainant may, within thirty days, file objections to the findings or preliminary order, or both, and request a hearing on the record, except that the filing of such objections shall not operate to stay any reinstatement remedy contained in the preliminary order. Such hearings shall be expeditiously conducted. Where a hearing is not timely requested, the preliminary order shall be deemed a final order which is not subject to judicial review. Upon the conclusion of such hearing, the Secretary of Labor shall issue a final order within one hundred and twenty days. In the interim, such proceedings may be terminated at any time on the basis of a settlement agreement entered into by the Secretary of Labor, the complainant, and the person alleged to have committed the violation. (B) If, in response to a complaint filed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Secretary of Labor determines that a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section has occurred, the Secretary of Labor shall order (i) the person who committed such violation to take affirmative action to abate the violation, (ii) such person to reinstate the complainant to the complainant's former position together with the compensation (including back pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of the complainant's employment, and (iii) compensatory damages. If such an order is issued, the Secretary of Labor, at the request of the complainant may assess against the person against whom the order is issued a sum equal to the aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including attorney's fees) reasonably incurred, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, by the complainant for, or in connection with, the bringing of the complaint upon which the order was issued. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether Section 405(c) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c), which provides that the Secretary of Labor -- upon a finding of "reasonable cause to believe" that an employee in the motor transportation industry was discharged in retaliation for the employee's safety complaints -- "shall" order the temporary reinstatement of the employee pending a hearing regarding the reasons for the discharge, is invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Secretary is not required to afford the employer an evidentiary hearing before issuing the temporary reinstatement order. STATEMENT 1. Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. App. 2305, prohibits employers in the motor transportation industry from taking retaliatory measures against employees who assert their rights to safe working conditions. The statute provides that "(n)o person shall discharge, discipline, or in any manner discriminate against any employee with respect to the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the ground that the employee filed a complaint or otherwise instituted a proceeding "relating to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety rule, regulation, standard, or order" or on the ground that the employee objected for safety reasons to operating a commercial motor vehicle. 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(a) and (b). /1/ An employee who "believes he has been discharged, disciplined, or otherwise discriminated against by any person" in violation of these statutory protections may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor (49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(1)). /2/ Upon receipt of a complaint, the Secretary is required to "notify the person named in the complaint of the filing of the complaint" (ibid.). The Secretary must then investigate the complaint in order to "determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the complaint has merit" (49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A)). /3/ If, as a result of the investigation, the Secretary "conclude(s) that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he shall accompany his findings with a preliminary order" providing for (1) abatement of the retaliatory conduct, (2) reinstatement of the employee to his former position, and (3) back pay and any other compensatory damages (ibid.). The employee or the employer may file objections to the Secretary's findings and request a "hearing on the record," which "shall be expeditiously conducted" (49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A)). The statute specifically provides that the filing by the employer of objections to the Secretary's findings and a request for a hearing "shall not operate to stay any reinstatement remedy contained in the preliminary order" (ibid.). The hearing is held before an administrative law judge (ALJ), who issues a recommended decision that is reviewed by the Secretary. The Secretary must issue a final order within 120 days of the conclusion of the hearing; that order is subject to judicial review in the appropriate court of appeals. 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A) and (d)(1). /4/ 2. Appellee is a motor common carrier engaged in the interstate trucking business, and therefore is subject to the requirements of Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. 49 U.S.C. App. 2301(3); App., infra, 1a, 20a, 46a. On November 22, 1983, appellee discharged Jerry Hufstetler, one of its truck drivers, allegedly because Hufstetler had committed an act of dishonesty; appellee asserted that Hufstetler intentionally disabled several of the lights on his truck, thereby creating a false breakdown. Hufstetler filed a grievance under his union contract claiming that he had been fired in retaliation for his repeated safety-related requests for repairs to his truck. The first arbitration panel could not reach a decision regarding the grievance; the second panel rejected Hufstatler's claim. App., infra, 1a-2a, 21a, 47a-48a. Hufstetler next filed a complaint with the Secretary alleging that he had been discharged in violation of Section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act because his discharge was in retaliation for his requests for safety repairs. The Secretary conducted an investigation of Hufstetler's allegations, and verified the allegations "through credible, independent evidence." App., infra, 44a-45a. In the course of the investigation, appellee was afforded "the opportunity to fully state and support (its) positions" (id. at 45a). Appellee submitted a "written position statement with supporting affidavits explaining the circumstances of the discharge," and appellee's attorneys orally presented its views at a meeting with Labor Department officials. Id. at 49a; Complaint Paragraphs 11, 13. After an 11-month investigation, the Secretary concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that appellee had discharged Hufstatler in violation of Section 405, and issued a preliminary order directing appellee to reinstate Hufstetler (App., infra, 3a, 20a-23a). The Secretary found that "(Hufstetler) had a two year history of bringing vehicle safety problems to the attention of (appellee) and had complained to (the Department of Transportation) and to elected public officials. These complaints constitute protected activity under the (Surface Transportation Assistance) Act" (id. at 22a). The Secretary further found that "(appellee) had warned (Hufstatler) and threatened to get him due to his excessive breakdowns due to (Hufstetler's) recognition of safety violations" and that "(appellee) had threatened to do anything (it) could to catch (Hufstatler) doing something wrong, to get rid of him" (id. at 21a, 22a). With respect to appellee's allegation that Hufstetler had been dishonest, the Secretary determined that "(appellee's) evidence to support the discharge is conjecture. (Hufstetler) has presented evidence to support his innocence" (App., infra, 21a). Based on these facts, the Secretary concluded that "(appellee's) termination of (Hufstetler's) employment was discriminatorily motivated by (Hufstetler's) protected activity" (id. at 22a), and ordered appellee "to immediately offer reinstatement to (Hufstetler)," to compensate Hufstetler with back pay, and "to expunge from (Hufstetler's) personnel records any adverse references to his discharge or any protected activity" (id. at 23a). 3. On February 1, 1985 -- 11 days after the Secretary's issuance of the preliminary order -- appellee commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the Secretary's order and a declaratory judgment that the Secretary's order was unconstitutional. Appellee claimed that the issuance of the reinstatement order without a prior "evidentiary hearing" violated its due process rights. Complaint Paragraphs 19, 22. The district court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Secretary's reinstatement order. App., infra, 11a-19a. /5/ On November 18, 1985, the district court issued an order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment (App., infra, 1a-10a). The court declared Section 405(c)(2)(A) "unconstitutional and void to the extent that it empowers (appellants) to order reinstatement of discharged employees prior to conducting an evidentiary hearing" and entered a permanent injunction "restrain(ing) and enjoin(ing) (appellants) from further issuance of preliminary orders of reinstatement * * * without first conducting an evidentiary hearing which complies with the minimum requirements of procedural due process" (id. at 9a). /6/ The district court observed that in order to ascertain the requirements of due process it is necessary to consider "the private interest affected by the government's action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; and the government's interest, including the function involved and the administrative and fiscal burdens that the additional procedural requirement would entail" (App., infra, 6a). The court found that appellee had "important interests in not being compelled to reinstate an employee discharged for wrongful conduct" (ibid.), noting that reinstatement of an unsatisfactory employee could undermine discipline and morale and "'ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or agency.'" Id. at 7a, quoting Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 1985). The court further found that "the procedures used by (the Department of Labor) were inherently unreliable, inasmuch as they did not provide any means for resolving disputed issues of fact and credibility. An evidentiary hearing, prior to mandatory reinstatement, would clearly strengthen the reliability of the procedures and the ultimate decision, and hedge against the risk of erroneous deprivation" (App., infra, 8a (citation omitted)). /7/ With respect to the government interest, the court concluded that "(a)lthough the governmental interests in promoting safety on the highways and prohibiting retaliatory discharge are indeed valid, (the Department of Labor) has failed to show any compelling considerations which necessitate postponing the hearing" (ibid.). It found that "the administrative or fiscal burdens attendant to such a hearing prior to reinstatement would be negligible" because the statute provides for a postreinstatement hearing (ibid.). Weighing these considerations, the court found that "(t)o the extent that the statute fails to provide employers with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it fails to meet the requirements of due process. Such deficiency may only be remedied by conducting a hearing, prior to an order of reinstatement, whereby the parties are given a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the Secretary's decision" (App., infra, 9a). The court concluded that the requirements of due process could be satisfied only through a prereinstatement "evidentiary hearing" at which the employer is afforded "at minimum, an opportunity to present his side and a chance to confront and cross examine witnesses" (ibid.). THE QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIAL In a sweeping injunctive order, the district court has invalidated a clearly articulated element of Congress's plan to enforce compliance with safety standards in the motor transportation industry. Congress concluded that safety complaints by motor carrier employees would be a significant source of information about motor carriers' compliance with safety standards. It therefore expressly protected such employees against reprisals for safety-related activity, and specifically provided that an employee discharged in violation of this statutory protection would be reinstated on a temporary basis as soon as the Secretary found reasonable cause to support his claim of retaliatory discharge. The district court's requirement of an "evidentiary hearing" prior to the temporary reinstatement of an unlawfully discharged employee plainly interferes with the protection Congress has accorded employees who report safety violations. Moreover, the district court's decision rests upon an erroneous view of both the requirements of due process and the regulatory scheme at issue here. This Court repeatedly has held that "(i)n general, 'something less' than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action," and that "notice and an opportunity to respond" are all that is required in such circumstances. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, No. 83-1362 (Mar. 19, 1985), slip op. 12 (citation omitted). The district court ignored this settled rule in holding that the Secretary must conduct an "evidentiary hearing" before issuing a preliminary reinstatement order, even though the statute expressly requires a prompt postreinstatement hearing. The district court also ignored the fact that the procedures followed by the Secretary in this case -- which reflect the Secretary's written policy regarding the enforcement of Section 405 -- afforded appellee notice and an opportunity to respond prior to the issuance of the preliminary reinstatement order. Congress's scheme thus plainly comports with the requirements of due process; review by this Court therefore is clearly warranted. 1. The threshold question in assessing a procedural due process claim such as appellee's claim here is whether the challenged government action resulted in the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Loudermill, slip op. 4-5; Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578 (1972). We do not dispute that the Secretary's order would have deprived appellee of such a property interest. The order required appellee to rehire its former employee; it therefore would have resulted in a deprivation of property because appellee would have been required to pay the salary of the rehired employee during the term of his reinstatement. The issue here, therefore, is to ascertain the procedures that the Due Process Clause requires before the Secretary may order the temporary reinstatement of an employee pending further review: "Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due" (Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Under this Court's decisions, "identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Loudermill, slip op. 9; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578-580 (1975). We certainly do not dispute that an employer should be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the employer may be required to reinstate an employee on a temporary basis pending further review of the matter. In our view, however, the district court erred in concluding that an evidentiary hearing -- complete with an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnessess -- must be held before the issuance of such a temporary reinstatement order. This Court's decisions make clear that it is sufficient for the Secretary to afford an employer notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegation of an unlawful discharge before issuing a temporary reinstatement order, so long as a prompt postdeprivation hearing also is available. a. This Court has considered in a variety of other contexts the question presented here -- whether the Due Process Clause requires a predeprivation evidentiary hearing when a postdeprivation hearing is provided to the person deprived of the property interest. The "'ordinary principle'" established by the Court's decisions is that "'something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.'" Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (citation omitted); see also Loudermill, slip op. 8-9, 12; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343. Thus, "(i)n only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has the Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to adverse government action" (Loudermill, slip op. 12). The Court otherwise has concluded that due process is satisfied so long as the party to be deprived of the property interest is provided with notice of the case against him and an opportunity to present his side of the story. Ibid.; Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1979); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13-15; Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-113 (1977); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-349; see also Signet Construction Corp. v. Borg, 775 F.2d 486, 491-492 (2d Cir. 1985). For example, in Barry v. Barchi, supra, the Court held that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the temporary suspension of a horse trainer suspected of complicity in the drugging of a race horse. The Court stated that "the State is entitled to impose an interim suspension, pending a prompt judicial or administrative hearing that would definitely determine the issues, whether it has satisfactorily established probable cause to believe that a horse has been drugged and that a trainer has been at least negligent in connection with the drugging" (443 U.S. at 64). The Court held that the finding of the testing official that the horse was drugged, combined with a state evidentiary presumption, was sufficient to establish probable cause. It noted that the trainer "was given more than one opportunity to present his side of the story to the State's investigators" (id. at 65), and concluded that these procedures "sufficed for the purposes of probable cause and interim suspension" (id. at 66). Thus, so long as a prompt postdeprivation hearing is available under the relevant statutory scheme; the Court "generally (has) required no more than that the predeprivation procedures used be designed to provide a reasonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the official action are as a responsible governmental official warrants them to be" (Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13). An assessment of the factors identified by the Court in Mathews makes clear that this general rule regarding predeprivation process applies in the present context. First, the employer's interest, although significant, is not more substantial than the interests at issue in the Court's previous cases concerning predeprivation process. Thus, despite "the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood," the Court has held that the termination of a government employee need only be preceded by notice and an opportunity to respond (Loudermill, slip op. 9). The same is true of the temporary revocation of a license required in order to practice one's livelihood (Barry v. Barchi, supra), and the termination of disability benefits (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra). Here, appellee would be required to pay the salary of a reinstated employee pending the outcome of the postdeprivation hearing, but it would receive "the benefit of the employee's labors" (Loudermill, slip op. 11). Thus, the deprivation of property is limited by the receipt of value in return for the expenditure of funds. The district court's statement (App., infra, 7a) that the reinstatement of an employee could adversely affect office morale does not provide sufficient grounds for requiring a greater degree of procedural protection in the present context. The government may terminate an employee's interest in continued employment after supplying the employee with notice and an opportunity to respond, and the same process is sufficient to protect the employer's correlative interest in removing unsatisfactory employees. Cf. Loudermill, slip op. 9-11. /8/ Second, the government interest here is quite weighty. In enacting Section 405, Congress was concerned about "the increasing number of deaths, injuries, and property damage due to commercial motor vehicle accidents." 128 Cong. Rec. S15610 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1982) (summary of safety provisions submitted by Sen. Danforth). The antiretaliation provision "underscore(s) the strong Congressional policy that persons reporting health and safety violations should not suffer because of this action" (ibid.). This Court has recognized in other contexts that such antiretaliation provisions are important means of promoting enforcement of regulatory standards. NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-124 (1972); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960); see also Donovan v. Square D Co., 709 F.2d 335, 338 (5th Cir. 1983); Phillips v. Interior Board of Mine Operations Appeals, 500 F.2d 772, 778, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975). Congress plainly included temporary reinstatement authority in Section 405 because it believed that the availability of prompt reinstatement would encourage employees to report safety violations. Requiring the Secretary to afford employers an evidentiary hearing prior to temporary reinstatement would interfere with this congressional scheme, resulting in longer periods of unemployment for discharged employees. Since an employee is not likely to be financially able to withstand a long period of unemployment or reduced income (see Loudermill, slip op. 9), the elimination of temporary reinstatement necessarily will reduce an employee's willingness to engage in safety-related activity. The rule adopted by the district court thus discourages the filing of safety complaints by employees and, as a result, undermines Congress's goal of promoting safety in commercial vehicle operations. The district court's decision cannot be squared with this Court's repeated conclusion that the government interest is promoting safety is sufficient to justify limited predeprivation procedures under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299-303 (1981); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 114-115; Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 17-18. Moreover, requiring a prereinstatement evidentiary hearing would impose additional fiscal and administrative burdens upon the government. The number of hearings undoubtedly would increase under such a rule because an employer would make use of the hearing and any possible appeal to prolong the status quo; "experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional cost in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347; see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 114. With respect to the third factor identified in Mathews, the risk of an erroneous decision, the Labor Department's procedures require that an employer be afforded notice and an opportunity to respond in order to diminish the risk of an erroneous temporary reinstatement order. See page 5 & note 3, supra. There is no basis for concluding that additional procedures are required at the prereinstatement stage. Indeed, faced with a due process challenge to the termination of a government employee -- involving the identical factual inquiry into the reasons for a discharge -- the Court has held that due process does not require a pretermination evidentiary hearing. Loudermill, slip op. 12; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-158 (1974) (plurality opinion); id. at 167-171 (opinion of Powell, J.). The district court stated that an evidentiary hearing was needed because dismissals often involve "disputed issues of fact and credibility" (App., infra, 8a). But this Court in Loudermill acknowledged that "(d)ismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes" (slip op. 9), and concluded that only notice and an opportunity to respond, not an evidentiary hearing, is required prior to the termination of a government employee (id. at 12). Here, as in the public employment context, the predeprivation hearing "need not definitely resolve the propriety of the (government action). It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions -- essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." Ibid.; see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 65 (the state "need not postpone a suspension (of a horse trainer's license) pending an adversary hearing to resolve questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence. At the interim suspension stage, an expert's affirmance, although untested and not beyond error, would appear sufficiently reliable to satisfy constitutional requirements"); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 15; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-125 (1975). Of course, the Due Process Clause requires that the final disposition of the case be preceded by a full and prompt postreinstatement hearing. Thus, this Court has indicated that "(a)t some point, a delay in the (postdeprivation) hearing would become a constitutional violation." Loudermill, slip op. 13; Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. at 66. But here the statute itself provides for the necessary postreinstatement procedural protections. Section 405 states that the postreinstatement hearing "shall be expeditiously conducted" and sets a time limit of 120 days after the conclusion of the hearing for issuance of the post-hearing order. 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A); see page 6, supra. The statutory scheme therefore accords fully with the requirements of due process. /9/ In the final analysis, the Court must determine "when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness" (Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348). In assessing what process is due prior to the issuance of a temporary reinstatement order, substantial weight should be given to the reasonable judgment of Congress that an employer subject to Section 405 should bear the expenses associated with a reasonably disputed discharge pending a final disposition on the merits. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 17. b. Appellee was accorded all of the predeprivation process required by the Due Process Clause. It is undisputed that the Secretary complied with the statutory directive to "notify the person named in the complaint of the filing of the complaint" (49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(1)). Appellee obviously was aware of the relevant factual issues; it had litigated the propriety of the Hufstetler discharge twice before in contract grievance proceedings. /10/ The Secretary's thorough 11-month investigation supplied the "initial check against mistaken decisions" required by the Due Process Clause (Loudermill, slip op. 12). Moreover, appellee received two opportunities to submit its side of the story prior to the issuance of the Secretary's order. First, appellee supplied the Secretary with a written position paper -- accompanied by supporting affidavits -- regarding the events surrounding the discharge. Second, appellee's attorneys met with Labor Department officials to present appellee's view of the case. App., infra, 45a, 49a; page 7, supra. Thus, appellee received the requisite "notice and * * * opportunity to respond" (Loudermill, slip op. 12). The district court's contrary conclusion rests upon its apparent view that "a meaningful opportunity to be heard" automatically requires an evidentiary hearing (see App., infra, 9a). In fact, this Court has observed that an evidentiary hearing is "neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. at 13; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583. As we have discussed, the general rule is that such a hearing is not required prior to a temporary deprivation of property, so long as a prompt postdeprivation hearing is available under the relevant statutory scheme. The district court did not discuss any reasons that this general rule should not apply in the present context. /11/ 2. The question presented in this case clearly warrants review by this Court. The district court's invalidation on constitutional grounds of the temporary reinstatement remedy set forth in Section 405 substantially alters the protection conferred upon motor carrier employees by Congress. Moreover, the effect of the decision below is not limited to the present case. Although appellee did not request certification of a class, the district court's injunction by its terms does not bar only the issuance of temporary reinstatement orders against appellee; it appears to bar the Secretary from issuing a temporary reinstatement order against any employer. This Court, however, has made clear that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiff. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410 (1945); cf. Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, No. 84-571 (Mar. 27, 1985), slip op. 10. A district court may not correct putatively unconstitutional action wherever it may occur. Its role is limited to taking whatever steps are necessary to provide full relief to those who have invoked its jurisdiction. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-176 (1803); cf. General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982). Thus, because the district court did not certify a plaintiff class, and because no individuals sought to join the action, there is no justification here for nationwide injunctive relief. Of course, once this Court has addressed the merits of appellee's claim, the issue will be resolved for appellants, appellee, and all employers. As a result of the district court's overbroad injunction, however, if this Court should for some reason delcine to note probable jurisdiction, the Secretary would never again be able to utilize the statutory temporary reinstatement remedy, and this Court would not have another opportunity to review the correctness of the constitutional analysis applied by the district court. In addition, the constitutional question decided by the district court does not arise only in the present context. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(1), bars mine operators from discriminating against miners in retaliation for the miners' health or safety complaints. The statute provides that if the Secretary of Labor finds that a complaint alleging such retaliation was not "frivolously brought," the Secretary may apply to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission for an order requiring the reinstatement of the miner (30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2)). The Commission's regulations closely resemble the procedures set forth in Section 405, authorizing the issuance of a temporary reinstatement order on the basis of the Secretary's application, to be followed by a prompt postreinstatement evidentiary hearing. See 29 C.F.R. 2700.44. The Sixth Circuit recently held that the issuance of a temporary reinstatement order without a prior evidentiary hearing violates the mine operators' procedural due process rights. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1985). Thus, the question presented in this case is closely related to the constitutionality of the temporary reinstatement remedy under this separate federal program. For these reasons, review by this Court plainly is warranted. CONCLUSION Probable jurisdiction should be noted. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General CAROLYN B. KUHL Deputy Solicitor General ANDREW J. PINCUS Assistant to the Solicitor General GEORGE R. SALEM Deputy Solicitor of Labor ALLEN H. FELDMAN Acting Associate Solicitor MARY-HELEN MAUTNER Counsel for Appellate Litigation STEVEN J. MANDEL Attorney Department of Labor MARCH 1986 /1/ The statute defines a "commercial motor vehicle" as a vehicle used "principally to transport passengers or cargo" that has a weight rating of ten thousand or more pounds, is designed to transport more than ten persons, or is used to transport hazardous materials. 49 U.S.C. App. 2301(1). /2/ The Secretary has delegated his authority under Section 405 to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, who, in turn, has delegated this authority to the Regional Administrators of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. /3/ The Secretary has adopted detailed written procedures governing the investigation of complaints filed by employees under Section 405. The current version of these procedures requires the Labor Department investigator to interview the complainant and encourage the complainant to identify witnesses who can support his allegations. The investigator must also "contact the (employer), notify the (employer) of the substance of the complaint and arrange to meet with the (employer) or its counsel to interview the appropriate witnesses." OSHA Instruction DIS.4A at V5 (Aug. 26, 1985). The written procedures emphasize that the investigator should obtain evidence corroborating the complainant's allegations, secure the employer's response to the allegations, and attempt to corroborate the employer's response (id. at V5-V7). The procedures in effect at the time of the events in this case similarly required the investigator to consult with the employer. OSHA Instruction CPL 2.45A CH-4 at X5 (Mar. 8, 1984); OSHA Instruction DIS.6 at 4, 8-9 (Dec. 12, 1983); OSHA Investigation Manual Section 11(c) at V1, VI3-VI4 (1979). /4/ If neither the employer nor the employee requests a hearing, "the preliminary order (is) deemed a final order which is not subject to judicial review" (49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A)). /5/ Appellee also filed objections to the Secretary's findings and a request for an on-the-record hearing pursuant to 49 U.S.C. App. 2305(c)(2)(A). The hearing was held before an administrative law judge on March 26-29, 1985, and the ALJ issued his recommended decision and order on October 30, 1985 (App. infra, 29a-43a). The ALJ observed that Hufstetler had filed numerous safety-related complaints (id. at 32a-35a, 39a-41a), and found that "(t)he record is replete with many statements by (appellee's) supervisors demonstrating their animus toward (Hufstetler) as a result of his engaging in protected activities. The issuance of warning letters to (Hufstetler), while other employees were not reprimanded for similar acts, and the acrimonious statements cause the conclusion that the discharge had a retaliatory motive" (id. at 41a). The ALJ further found that the evidence did not indicate that Hufstetler was discharged for a reason other than his safety-related activities (id. at 41a-42a). /6/ The district court also held that appellee was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies (App., infra, 4a-5a), that the controversy between the parties was not moot (id. at 5a), and that the district court did not lack jurisdiction over appellee's claim (ibid.). We do not seek review of these determinations. /7/ The court noted (App., infra, 7a) that the Secretary "failed to make available the names and statements of witnesses upon which (the) decision was based." /8/ The Court's determination in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, that an evidentiary hearing was required prior to the termination of welfare benefits rested on its conclusion that "termination of (welfare assistance) pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation because immediately desperate" (397 U.S. at 264). Appellee cannot claim that the temporary reinstatement of a discharged employee will place it in similar desperate straits. /9/ In the present case, appellee never was subjected to a deprivation of property because enforcement of the Secretary's order was enjoined by the district court; appellee accordingly cannot complain of any delay in the statutory hearing. This Court therefore need not consider the permissibility of the length of the delay in this case. /10/ Appellee noted that it was deprived of access to the witness statements and the identities of the witnesses (App., infra, 49a). The Secretary declined to disclose the statements on confidentiality grounds. In view of the previous litigation concerning this discharge, however, appellee cannot contend that it was unaware of the parameters of the factual dispute. /11/ The district court particularly did not explain the reason that it deemed the disclosure of the identity of witnesses and an opportunity for cross examination necessary in this context, even though this Court typically has not found such procedures to be constitutionally required prior to temporary deprivations of property. APPENDIX