UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS, APPELLANT V. ANTHONY J. GALIOTO No. 84-1904 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey Brief for the Appellant TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinion below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Questions presented Statement Summary of argument Argument: Congress acted constitutionally in prohibiting persons with a proven history of mental illness from obtaining firearms A. Congress acted rationally in imposing permanent firearms disabilities on persons with a proven history of mental illness B. The classification created by Title IV should not be subjected to heightened scrutiny C. Even assuming that Title IV sweeps too broadly, the district court erred in invalidating all of Title IV's restrictions on the ability of mentally ill persons to obtain firearms D. Title IV does not create an unconstitutional "irrebuttable presumption" Conclusion OPINION BELOW The opinion and order of the district court (J.S. App. 1a-22a) are reported at 602 F.Supp. 682. JURISDICTION The judgment of the district court (J.S. App. 23a) was entered on February 7, 1985. A notice of appeal (J.S. App. 24a) was filed on March 7, 1985. On April 25, 1985, Justice Brennan extended the time for docketing the appeal through June 5, 1985; the jurisdictional statement was filed on that date. The Court noted probable jurisdiction on November 4, 1985. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth at, App., infra, 1a-4a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., prohibits several categories of persons, including felons and individuals who have been committed to mental institutions, from receiving, transporting or shipping firearms in interstate commerce. Title IV also empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief from these disabilities to certain felons. The questions in this case are: 1. Whether Title IV violates the equal protection and due process components of the Fifth Amendment by imposing firearms disabilities on persons who have been committed to mental institutions without making administrative relief from those disabilities available to such persons. 2. If so, whether the district court erred in remedying the constitutional violation by invalidating all of Title IV's restrictions on the acquisition of firearms by persons who have been committed to mental institutions, rather than by either expanding or nullifying only the administrative relief provision. STATEMENT 1. Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title IV), as amended by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act), 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., prohibits any individual who "has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to any mental institution" from receiving, transporting or shipping a firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 922(h)(4)), and makes it unlawful for a federal firearms licensee knowingly to sell a gun to such a person. 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(4). Title IV also imposes identical disabilities on several other categories of persons, including those who have been convicted of a felony. /1/ Similarly, the partially overlapping provisions of Title VII of the Gun Control Act (Title VII), 18 U.S.C. App. 1201 et seq., prohibit several categories of persons -- including felons and persons who "ha(ve) been adjudged by a court * * * of being mentally incompetent" (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1) and (3)) -- from lawfully receiving, possessing or transporting firearms. /2/ Title IV also, in limited circumstances, empowers the Secretary of the Treasury (and through him his delegate, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF)) to lift the disabilities imposed by Titles IV and VII on certain convicted felons. Under 18 U.S.C. 925(c), a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may apply to the Secretary for administrative relief; the Secretary may grant the application if he is satisfied "that the circumstances regarding the conviction, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest." Ibid. Such relief is not available, however, to felons convicted of crimes, "involving the use of a firearm or other weapon or a violation of (18 U.S.C. 921-928) or of the National Firearms Act." Ibid. 2. On May 11, 1971, appellee "suffered an acute mental breakdown" (J.S. App. 3a) and voluntarily entered a mental hospital in Summit, New Jersey. /3/ He was diagnosed as having experienced "an acute schizophrenic episode with paranoid features" (ibid.). Shortly after his admission to the hospital appellee "became extremely violent, resistive and unable to control his emotions" (J.A. 8); when appellee expressed his intention to leave the hospital within 72 hours, he was committed upon the application of his physician (J.S. App. 3a). /4/ Appellee was discharged from the hospital on June 4, 1971, upon a finding that his condition had improved (ibid.). At that time he was given a course of antipsychotic drugs and adivsed to continue out-patient psychiatric care (J.S. 11). Almost 10 years later, on April 27, 2981, appellee obtained a firearms purchaser identification card pursuant to New Jersey law. /5/ In October 1982, however, a federally-licensed firearms dealer refused to sell appellee a gun after appellee acknowledged that he once had been committed to a mental institution (Pet. App. 4a). Citing 18 U.S.C. 925(c), appellee then applied to BATF, seeking relief from the disability that followed from his commitment. He included a statement from his physician certifying that he "was no longer suffering from any mental disability that would interfere with his handling of firearms" (J.S. App. 4a). On April 13, 1984, BATF denied appellee's application, explaining that he remained "'subject to Federal firearms disability because of his commitment'" (id. at 5a). 3. Appellee then brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arguing that the disability provisions of the federal firearms laws are unconstitutional because they make administrative relief available to felons but not to persons who have been committed to mental institutions. The court accepted this contention, invalidating as inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and due process guarantees the provisions of Title IV that deny persons who have been committed the opportunity to obtain firearms. /6/ The district court began its equal protection analysis by concluding that "persons with histories of mental illness are a quasi-suspect class deserving of intensified 'intermediate' scrutiny," so that "any statute treating them differentially must be related to a 'substantial' governmental interest" (J.S. App. 9a). After reaching this conclusion, however, the court expressly declined to rest its holding on the application of such a test (id. at 12a), finding instead that the challenged provisions of the Gun Control Act are wholly irrational. In making this determination, the district court first opined that of all the persons affected by the federal firearms laws, "only ex-convicts and former psychiatric patients are classed according to a past occurrence in their lives" (J.S. App. 15a (emphasis in original)). And because Section 925(c) permits convicted felons to overcome the statutory disabilities, the court concluded, "out of all the categories of individuals disabled from purchasing firearms, only the former mental patients are permanently disabled on the basis of a past event * * * with no opportunity to establish that, in fact, they are now capable of safe handling" (J.S. App. 15a-16a (footnote omitted)). The district court then found that this distinction between felons and former mental patients is irrational, explaining that "if anything, the bar would be more logically applied to convicts than to former mental patients, rather than vice versa" (J.S. App. 16a). Several factors contributed to this conclusion: "the bar has a punitive aspect" (ibid.); felons have demonstrated that they are capable of criminal activity; and a patient is unlikely to appeal his commitment after he is discharged, "so the propriety of the initial commitment may never be fully explored" (id. at 17a). The court also noted that commitment proceedings have fewer procedural protections than do criminal trials, adding that appellee had cited studies showing that such proceedings "are replete with erroneous factual findings" (ibid.). The court therefore found that the distinction drawn by the federal firearms laws between felons and mental patients must have been based upon outdated notions that "ignore() expanding knowledge about the causes of mental illnesses, their reversibility and treatment" (id. at 18a). The district court also added an alternative holding: that the challenged provisions violate due process standards because they deny "former mental patients the opportunity to establish that they no longer present the danger against which the statute was intended to guard" (J.S. App. 18a). This factor "in effect creates an irrebuttable presumption that one who has been committed, no matter (what) the circumstances, is forever mentally ill and dangerous" (ibid.). The court found the use of such a presumption irrational because, "without any good faith extrinsic justification * * * it relies on psychiatric evidence introduced in one proceeding to impose a burden on an individual, and then refuses to accept the same evidence when the individual seeks to have the burden removed" (id. at 19a). The district court acknowledged that statutes generally prohibiting former mental patients from purchasing firearms are not irrational (J.S. App. 21a) and that such regulations serve "a legitimate, indeed substantial, state objective" (id. at 18a). But the court held that such prohibitions are both irrational and unconstitutional if they do "not include some provision for the granting of relief from disability to former mental patients in appropriate cases" (id. at 21a). Because the court believed that it lacked the competence to make administrative relief available to appellee, it simply declared unconstitutional "those provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 921 et seq. which have been used to deprive (appellee) of his ability to purchase a firearm" (ibid.). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT A. 1. The district court's invalidation of the challenged provisions of Title IV was grounded on a misconception of the statutory scheme. Persons with a history of mental illness are not the only ones subjected to permanent disabilities by the firearms laws: Titles IV and VII (which were intended to complement one another) keep firearms out of the hands of several "categories of presumptively dangerous persons" (Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980)), including felons, persons who have been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, and individuals who have renounced American citizenship. As the district court itself acknowledged, Congress's decision to include persons with a history of commitment on this list -- and thus to use commitment as a trigger for Title IV's disabilities -- was entirely reasonable. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 828 (1974). 2. In finding the challenged provisions unconstitutional, the district court accordingly focused its attention not on Title IV's basic restrictions, but rather on 18 U.S.C. 925(c), which makes administrative relief available only to certain felons. The court reasoned that Congress singled out persons with a history of commitment for uniquely unfavorable treatment when it failed to accord them administrative relief, a judgment that the court concluded must have been based on "'archaic and stereotypic'" notions that mental illness is always incurable (J.S. App. 17a-18a). The district court failed to realize, however, that Congress withheld relief from virtually all of the categories of "presumptively dangerous persons" that are subjected to permanent disabilities by the Gun Control Act. The relief provision is a narrow one that generally excludes the felons who must clearly pose a risk of dangerous behavior -- that is, those who have committed firearms offenses or crimes involving weapons. Also excluded are persons who were dishonorably discharged from the armed forces or who renounced American citizenship. And the legislative history confirms that Section 925(c) was intended to function as a modest departure from the otherwise absolute disabilities imposed on presumptively risky persons; its enactment was inspired by the drastic effect that the felony disability provision had on corporate firearms manufacturers, who in the absence of a relief provision would be forced out of the firearms business upon being found guilty of a felony. In assuming that Congress chose to "single out" those with a history of commitment for unfavorable treatment, the court below thus misunderstood the history of Section 925(c). Congress's decision to withhold relief from such individuals, as well as from most other persons in presumptively risky categories, reflects its judgment that broad prophylactic rules are the most effective way to protect the public, rather than a conclusion that "mental illness is always, in every instance, permanent and incurable" (J.S. App. 18a). That Congress chose to modify the felony disability provisions to remedy a perceived defect did not obligate it to modify the other disability rules as well: "(A) legislature 'may implement (its) program step by step, * * * adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). 3. Even considered in isolation from its history, there was nothing irrational in Congress's decision to make relief available to the presumptively less dangerous category of felons whose crimes did not involve the use of a weapon, while failing to create a parallel administrative mechanism that would attempt to identify and provide relief to nondangerous persons with a history of commitment. Its decision to withhold relief from the latter category of persons plainly was based on the congressional belief that, whatever the nature of any "subsequent curative events," individuals who have been committed, "though unfortunate, (are) too much of a risk to be allowed firearms privileges." Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 116 (1983). That risk undoubtedly is a real one. Commitment may be ordered only in the presence of clear and convincing evidence that the individual involved presents a danger to himself or others. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). And once such a showing of serious mental illness has been made, subsequent predictions about future dangerousness cannot be stated with confidence. See id. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981). Against this background, Congress was under no obligation to base its legislative efforts on the district court's assessment of the "expanding" body of knowledge relating to the causes and treatment of mental illness (J.S. App. 18a). It is enough that Congress reasonably believed that persons with a history of commitment pose special risks. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-111 (1979). Indeed, the relatively uncertain and evolving nature of psychiatry itself makes expansive restrictions on the acquisition of firearms by those with a history of commitment necessary to fulfill the broad prophylactic purpose of Title IV. Congress's determination not to impose equally absolute restrictions on a limited category of felons -- who do not share the psychological characteristics of the mentally ill, and who may be better able than those with a history of commitment voluntarily to conform their conduct to the law's requirements -- does not make the legislative scheme as a whole irrational. B. The conclusion that Congress acted rationally in enacting Title IV should end the equal protection inquiry, for the district court plainly erred in concluding that "former mental patients" are a "'quasi-suspect class'" who must be protected by "'intermediate' scrutiny" (J.S. App. 10a). This Court repeatedly has explained that "what differentiates (suspect classes) from * * * nonsuspect statuses * * * is that (a suspect) characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (footnote omitted) (plurality opinion). See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985), slip op. 6, 8. Yet many of the mentally ill undoubtedly "do have reduced ability for personal relations, for economic activity, and for political choice" (Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1979)), and the uncertain nature of psychiatric judgments suggests that at least some persons with a history of commitment either share these characteristics or will again exhibit symptoms of mental illness in the future. There accordingly is no reason for the courts to presume that restrictions such as those found in Title IV were inspired by an unreasoning antipathy towards the mentally ill. Similarly, the other considerations set out in this Court's equal protection decisions -- the affirmative nature of the legislative response to the problems of the class at issue, the amorphousness of that class, and the responsiveness of the political process to the needs of the mentally ill -- also militate against the application of intermediate scrutiny here. C. There is one final flaw in the district court's equal protection analysis: even if its constitutional holding was correct, it erred in its choice of remedy. The equal protection violation here (if one exists) is the denial of equal treatment to appellee that is embodied in Section 925(c)'s provision of administrative relief to certain felons but not to persons with a history of commitment. Upon finding a violation of this sort, the court should have either declared Section 925(c) a nullity or extended that provision's limited benefits to appellee's class. See Heckler v. Mathews, No. 82-1050 (Mar. 5, 1984), slip op. 9-10; Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979). In choosing instead to invalidate all of Title IV's underlying restrictions on the acquisition of firearms by persons who have been committed to a mental institution -- a ruling that makes it lawful even for the demonstrably insane to purchase a gun -- the court below exceeded its "constitutional competence" (id. at 91), while failing to "accommodate as fully as possible the policies and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole" (id. at 94 (opinion of Powell, J.)). D. The district court's alternative holding, which turned on its conclusion that the challenged provisions of Title IV create a constitutionally infirm "irrebuttable presumption," also is flawed. A legislative classification statisfies due process standards if Congress reasonably could have concluded "that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule." Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975). Here, given the "fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis" (Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979)), it hardly was unreasonable for Congress to have concluded that an individual who once was committed may pose a greater than usual risk of becoming a threat to society. And where any error in prediction may have catastrophic consequences, "generalized rules" plainly "are appropriate to (Congress's) purpose and concerns." Salfi, 422 U.S. at 785. ARGUMENT CONGRESS ACTED CONSTITUTIONALLY IN PROHIBITING PERSONS WITH A PROVEN HISTORY OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM OBTAINING FIREARMS Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 was enacted as a central portion of the congressional effort to curb the "real, * * * urgent and * * * increasing" problem of firearms absue. S. Rep. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1968). Congress recognized that easy access to firearms by persons likely to misuse them posed a significant threat to public safety. See id. at 28; S. Rep. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968). It therefore created general prophylactic rules designed "broadly to keep firearms away from * * * persons * * * classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous." Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976). The district court invalidated one of those prophylactic rules because it believed that the congressional scheme is insufficiently precise. But in reaching this conclusion -- and by issuing a judgment that permits even demonstrably incompetent or insane individuals to obtain guns -- the district court failed to recognize that it is the very breadth of Title IV's proscriptions that make the statute effective as a means of "keep(ing) firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them." S. Rep. 1501, supra, at 22. The decision below thus cannot be squared with the repeated holdings of this Court that have "recognized and given weight to the (Gun Control) Act's broad prophylactic purpose." Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983). A. Congress Acted Rationally In Imposing Permanent Firearms Disabilities On Persons With A Proven History Of Mental Illness 1. At the outset, the district court's holding that the challenged provisions of Title IV lack a rational basis was grounded on a misconception of the statutory scheme. Despite the court's suggestion to the contrary, persons with a history of commitment /7/ are not the only ones subjected to permanent disabilities by the firearms laws. Instead, Title IV presents "a carefully constructed package of gun control legislation" (Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 570 (1977)) that, in combination with Title VII, /8/ is designed to keep firearms out of the hands of several "categories of presumptively dangerous persons." Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64 (1980). See New Banner, 460 U.S. at 112 n.6, 119. In addition to individuals with a history of commitment, these provisions impose lifetime firearms disabilities on felons (18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1), (g)(1) and (h)(1), and 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1)), persons who are discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable circumstances (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(2)), and individuals who renounce American citizenship (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(4)) -- groups linked to one another by the congressional judgment that each contains significant numbers of "especially risky people." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 345 (1971). As the district court itself acknowledged (J.S. App. 21a), the inclusion on this list of persons with a history of commitment is eminently reasonable. It seems plain that "'(n)o one can dispute the need to prevent * * * mental incompetents * * * from buying, owning, or possessing firearms.'" Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 828 (1974), (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 21784 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler)). And a "legislative determination that, in essence, predicts a potential for future criminal behavior" is, in any event, entitled to substantial deference. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 67 n.9. See United States v. Meldish, 722 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101 (1984). Given this Court's judgment that "(t)he subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach" (Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)), a history of commitment thus serves as a reasonable trigger for Title IV's restrictions. Cf. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66 ("Congress could rationally conclude that any felony conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm"); New Banner, 460 U.S. at 120. 2. a. In finding the challenged provisions irrational, the district court accordingly focused its attention not on Title IV's basic restrictions, but rather on 18 U.S.C. 925(c), which makes administrative relief from the lifetime disabilities available only to certain felons. The court reasoned that Congress in the Gun Control Act "singl(ed) out mental patients" (J.S. App. 16a) by failing to accord them administrative relief, and thus must have based its legislation on "'archaic and stereotypic notions' * * * that mental illness is always, in every instance, permanent and incurable" (id. at 17a-18a (citation ommitted)). Again, however, the district court's conclusion followed from a misunderstanding of the statute. In fact, Congress withheld administrative relief from virtually all of the categories of "especially risky people" that are subjected to permanent disabilities by the Gun Control Act. Section 925(c) does not grant all felons rights that are withheld from former mental patients: the relief provision is a narrow one that generally excludes the felons who most clearly pose a risk of dangerous behavior -- that is, those who have committed firearms offenses or crimes involving weapons. See New Banner, 460 U.S. at 117. At the same time, persons who were dishonorably discharged from the armed forces or have renounced United States citizenship also are not provided an avenue for administrative relief. /9/ The statutory scheme thus does not single out persons with a history of commitment for uniquely unfavorable treatment; to the contrary, it carves out a special exemption granting favorable treatment to a narrow subcategory of felons. The legislative history confirms that Section 925(c) was intended to function as a modest departure from the otherwise absolute disabilities imposed on most categories of presumptively risky persons. The Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, Section 2(d), 52 Stat. 1251 (repealed 1968), originally prohibited all persons convicted of a "crime of violence" from receiving a firearm, but contained no relief provision. The crime of violence limitation was deleted in 1961, and the Act's disabilities extended to reach any person convicted of a federal felony. Pub. L. No. 87-342, Sections 1, 2, 75 Stat. 757. See H.R. Rep. 1202, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961). This amendment, however, had an unanticipated effect on the manufacturers of firearms. Such companies were forced "to cease the interstate commercial shipment of firearms" upon being found guilty of a felony, even when their crimes were wholly unrelated to their firearms operations. See S. Rep. 666, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965). In response to this development, /10/ an administrative relief provision -- the predecessor to Section 925(c) -- was enacted in 1965. See S. Rep. 666, supra, at 2-4; H.R. Rep. 708, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1965), In its original form, this provision directly addressed the problem of the wayward firearms manufacturer, permitting the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief to a felon when he believed that the applicant would "not be likely to conduct his operations in an unlawful manner." Pub. L. No. 89-184, 79 Stat. 788. The relief provision was carried over without change as Section 925(c) of Title IV. Pub. L. No. 90-351, Section 902, 82 Stat. 233. See S. Rep. 1097, supra, at 118. When Congress amended Title IV through the enactment of the Gun Control Act of 1968 later that year, without extended discussion it substituted the current "not be likely to act in a (dangerous) manner" standard for the standard relating to the lawfulness of the applicant's conduct of his business. See 114 Cong. Rec. 27456-27457 (1968); H.R. Conf. Rep. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1968). /11/ In assuming that Congress decided to "single out" those with a history of commitment for unfavorable treatment -- an action that the district court imagined must evidence Congress's ignorance of the "reversibility" of some forms of mental illness (J.S. App. 18a) -- the court below thus misunderstood the history of Section 925(c). Congress obviously recognized that only a relatively small number of persons in the presumptively dangerous categories would misuse firearms were they able to obtain them. Cf. United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 129 (2d Cir. 1984). It nevertheless concluded that the difficulty of making individual determinations of future dangerousness required the use of "sweeping" prophylactic rules (Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63) that would operate broadly against high risk groups. See pages 13-14, supra. Congress's decision to withhold relief from individuals with a history of commitment therefore reflected a judgment that a broad rule was the most effective way to protect the public, rather than a conclusion that "mental illness is always, in every instance, permanent and incurable" (J.S. App. 18a). Section 925(c)'s relief provision is not inconsistent with this scheme. It originated as a response to a narrow problem related to the felony disability provision of the firearms laws. That Congress chose to stop after remedying the defects that it perceived in the felony provision does not render its action constitutionally suspect: "(A) legislature 'may implement (its) program step by step, * * * adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.'" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-487 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). /12/ And if Congress was not obligated to provide relief to more than one category of "especially risky people" at a time, the district court's recognition that a history of commitment is a reasonable trigger for Title IV's permanent disabilities necessarily is fatal to its holding. b. Even considered in isolation from its history and the other disability provisions of Title IV, there was nothing irrational in Congress's decision to make relief available to the presumptively less dangerous category of felons whose crimes did not involve the use of a weapon, while failing to create a parallel administrative mechanism that would attempt to identify and provide equivalent relief to non-dangerous persons with a history of commitment. Congress obviously was aware that "a person committed to a mental institution later may be deemed cured and released." New Banner, 460 U.S. at 116. See 114 Cong. Rec. 21805 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Sikes). But it nevertheless chose not to accord such persons relief. /13/ Its decision plainly was based on the congressional belief that, whatever the nature of any "subsequent curative events," individuals who have been committed, "though unfortunate, (are) too much of a risk to be allowed firearms privileges." New Banner, 460 U.S. at 116. That risk undoubtedly is a real one. This Court has indicated that civil commitment /14/ may be ordered only in the presence of clear and convincing evidence that the individual involved presents a danger to himself or others, a showing that presumably is satisifed only in the presence of some objective indicia of serious abnormality. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-433; O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). /15/ And once a finding of pronounced mental illness has been made, subsequent predictions about future dangerousness cannot be stated with confidence; "(d)espite many recent advances in medical knowledge, it remains a stubborn fact that there are many forms of mental illness which are not understood, some which are untreatable in the sense that no effective therapy has yet been discovered for them, and that rates of 'cure' are generally low." O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Indeed, as the Court has noted, at least "some in the psychiatric community are of the view that clinical predictions as to whether a person would or would not commit violent acts in the future are 'fundamentally of very low reliability.'" Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 (1981). /16/ And this problem may be compounded if -- as in this case -- the individual's "subsequent curative event" turns on his voluntary continuation of medication or other therapy. Cf. New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 591-592 (1979). Of course, the district court may well have been correct in its view that the uncertain nature of psychiatric judgments occasionally leads to mistaken commitments. J.S. App. 17a. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612-613 (1979); id. at 628-629 (opinion of Brennan, J.). And we do not deny that many persons who have been committed to mental institutions subsequently lead unexceptionable lives. But Congress certainly was entitled to conclude that persons whose psychiatric problems were serious enough to have called for commitment or for an adjudication of incompetence may pose unusual risks of "becom(ing) dangerous" (114 Cong. Rec. 14773 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Long); cf. id. at 21829 (remarks of Rep. Bingham)), and to err on the side of caution in determining which psychiatric judgments or pronouncements of cure should be given force. Congress, in fact, was entitled to reason that commitment decisions -- which are made in response to specific showings of abnormality -- are more reliable than subsequent, general predictions about an individual's likely dangerousness in the indefinite future. While Title IV's prophylactic rule undoubtedly is imprecise, the impossibility of making foolproof predictions about any individual's future dangerousness makes that imprecision necessary if the statute is to serve its purpose. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975); Toner, 728 F.2d at 129. Against this background, Congress was under no obligation to base its legislative efforts on the district court's assessment of the "expanding" body of knowledge relating to the causes and treatment of mental illness (J.S. App. 18a). "In ordinary civil litigation, the question frequently is which party has shown that a disputed historical fact is more likely than not to be true. In an equal protection case of this type, however, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-111 (1979). See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463-364, 466; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-154 (1938). Here, while the nature and causes of the phenomenon are the subject of continuing debate, a substantial body of data indicates that persons who have been committed to mental institutions are more likely than are members of the general public to engage in violent acts. /17/ That this data may be disputed should not have been relevant to the district court's analysis, for "'(i)t is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety.'" Bradley, 440 U.S. at 112, quoting Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916). /18/ Indeed, the relatively uncertain and evolving nature of psychiatry, as well as the fallibility of individual psychiatirc diagnoses, itself makes expansive restrictions on the acquisition of firearms by those with a history of commitment necessary to fulfill the "broad prophylactic purpose" of Title IV. New Banner, 460 U.S. at 118. Congress's decision not to impose equally absolute restrictions on a limited category of felons -- who may not share the psychological characteristics of the mentally ill, and who may in the aggregate be better able than those with a history of mental illness voluntarily to conform their conduct to the law's requirements /19/ -- hardly makes the legislative scheme as a whole irrational. See generally Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234-235 (1981); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-175 (1980); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303. B. The Classification Created By Title IV Should Not Be Subjected To Heightened Scrutiny The conclusion reached above -- that the challenged provisions of Title IV "rationally advance() a reasonable and identifiable governmental objective" (Wilson, 450 U.S. at 235) -- should end the equal protection inquiry, for the district court clearly erred in its lengthy dictum on the propriety of applying "'intermediate' scrutiny" to the classifications at issue in this case. The district court concluded that regulations directed at "former mental patients" must be regarded as "'quasi-suspect'" to forestall the danger that such legislation may be grounded on "'inaccurate and stereotypic fears.'" J.S. App. 10a (quoting J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126, 1130-1131 (9th Cir. 1983)). The district court's approach, however, cannot be squared with the equal protection analysis set out in this Court's decisions. /20/ 1. While this Court has looked to a number of criteria in determining whether regulations directed at given groups should be labeled "'suspect'" or "'quasi-suspect'" (see generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-218 & n.16 (1982); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)), it invariably has held that classifications demanding heightened scrutiny have one necessary hallmark: "what differentiates (suspect classes) from * * * nonsuspect statuses * * * is that (a suspect) characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); id. at 518 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because "for most legislative purposes there simply are no meaningful differences" between members of a suspect or quasi-suspect class and the rest of the population (Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)), regulations burdening such classes "are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985), slip op. 6. See Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979). Such regulations therefore "demand close judicial scrutiny." Toll, 458 U.S. at 21 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Reviewing this area of the law, the Court explained last Term: (W)here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end. City of Cleburne, slip op. 8. Applying this test, the Court held in City of Cleburne that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class. The Court found it beyond dispute that mentally retarded individuals have a reduced capacity to function in society. Ibid. The Court therefore recognized that legislation "singling out the retarded for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences between the retarded and other." Id. at 10. The same reasoning is fully applicable to regulations directed at persons with a demonstrated history of serious mental illness. /21/ It is indisputable that "many of the mentally ill do have reduced ability for personal relations, for economic activity, and for political choice," so that any differential treatment accorded such individuals will be "related, even if imperfectly, to real inabilities from which many of the mentally ill suffer." Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1979). By definition, persons whose psychological problems are serious enough to demand commitment or an adjudication of incompetence have exhibited instability or an inability to function in society, characteristics that undoubtedly are relevant to legislation -- like Title IV -- that relates to public safety. And the uncertain nature of psychiatric judgments suggests that at least some persons who have been released from commitment share these characteristics, or will again share them in the future. /22/ See pages 19-21, supra. Certainly, "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe" that a classification grounded on a history of commitment "would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." City of Cleburne, slip op. 2 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., concurring). See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 180-181 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). /23/ There accordingly is no reason for the courts to presume that restrictions such as those found in Title IV were inspired by an unreasoning antipathy towards the mentally ill. To the contrary, the application of such a presumption, with its concomitant heightened scrutiny, would threaten to invalidate a significant body of legislation that is based on readily articulable and self-evidently legitimate concerns. Indeed, the Court's holding in City of Cleburne was in part inspired by its reluctance to "set out on (a) course" that would have granted quasi-suspect status to the "mentally ill." Slip op. 12. 2. While this consideration suffices to dispose of the district court's intermediate scrutiny analysis, it should be noted that the other criteria set out in the Court's equal protection decisions also militate against treatment of Title IV's classifications as quasi-suspect. The Court in City of Cleburne noted that the affirmative legislative response to the problems posed by mental retardation "demonstrates not only that (the mentally retarded) have unique problems, but also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." Slip op. 9. The same sort of constructive legislative response is visible in the area of mental illness. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 794 (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. 289d-1, 300x et seq. (Public Health Service Act); 42 U.S.C. 9401 et seq. (Mental Health Systems Act). At the same time, mental illness covers a broad spectrum of disorders with varying and often unpredictable prognoses, a factor suggesting that "governmental bodies must have a certain amount of flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and limiting their remedial efforts." City of Cleburne, slip op. 11 Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. There also is no reason to believe that the normal political process will be unable to rectify improvident government action bearing on those with a history of commitment. Formerly institutionalized individuals, at least, have not been "relegated to * * * a position of political powerlessness." Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Compare City of Cleburne, slip op. 9 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the mentally retarded often are formally excluded from participation in the political process). Because no special factors are at work in this area that may "curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" (Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-153 n.4), there is no special call for close judicial scrutiny of restrictions affecting persons with a history of commitment. /24/ 3. Finally, although the Court need not reach the question, it is worth adding that Title IV's restrictions would survive even elevated scrutiny, because they bear a "close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-725 (1982). The federal interest in preventing the misuse of firearms is, of course, nothing short of "urgent." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). See Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63, citing S. Rep. 1097, supra, at 76-78; H.R. Rep. 1577, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1968); S. Rep. 1501, supra, at 22-23. This interest is directly served by the Gun Control Act's "sweeping prophylaxis" against the acquisition of firearms by "presumptively dangerous persons." Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63-64. And the inclusion on this list of those with a history of commitment is not "an 'accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking'" (Heckler v. Mathews, No. 82-1050 (Mar. 5, 1984), slip op. 15-16, quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)); it is, instead, grounded on objective indicia of past instability. The district court nevertheless suggested that Congress might have tailored Title IV's restrictions more precisely by permitting the acquisition of firearms by individuals with a commitment history who have demonstrated that they are not dangerous. J.S. App. 21a. But, as noted above, "(e)ven under the best of circumstances psychiatric diagnosis and therapy decisions are fraught with uncertainties." Parham, 442 U.S. at 629 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Any limitation on the broad congressional restriction -- that is, any room for the application of questionable psychiatric judgments about future dangerousness -- accordingly threatens to frustrate the congressional purpose. Because any mistake would have an immediate and disastrous effect on the public welfare, Congress was entitled to proceed in the gun control field with all the caution it deemed necessary. C. Even Assuming That Tile IV Sweeps Too Broadly, The District Court Erred In Invalidating All Of Title IV's Restrictions On The Ability Of Mentally Ill Persons To Obtain Firearms There is one additional flaw in the district court's equal protection analysis: even if that court was correct in its finding that appellee has made out an equal protection violation, its choice of remedy was erroneous. As the district court itself recognized (J.S. App. 21a), the equal protection violation in this case (if one exists) plainly is not Title IV's basic restriction on appellee's opportunity to purchase a firearm; it lies, rather, in the denial of "equal treatment" to appellee that is embodied in 18 U.S.C. 925(c)'s provision of administrative relief to certain felons but not to persons with a history of commitment. Mathews, slip op. 10. See J.S. App. 16a-18a. Upon finding a violation of this sort, the district court had "'two remedial alternatives.'" Mathews, slip op. 9, quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). It could have "'declare(d) (Section 925(c)) a nullity and order(ed) that its benefits'" -- that is, the availability of administrative relief -- "'not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it (could have) extend(ed) the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by the exclusion.'" Mathews, slip op. 9. See id. at 10 n.6 (citing cases); Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931). In choosing between these remedies, the court was obligated to "accommodate as fully as possible the policies and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole." Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.). See Mathews, slip op. 9 n.5. The district court, however, chose neither of these alternatives. Instead, it invalidated all of Title IV's underlying restrictions on the acquisition of firearms by persons who have been committed to a mental institution or adjudicated incompetent, a ruling that makes it lawful even for individuals who presently are under an order of commitment to purchase a firearm. Because this action went far beyond what was necessary to correct the asserted denial of equal treatment (see Mathews, slip op. 10), it was (despite the government's apparent suggestion to the contrary below) /25/ beyond the "constitutional competence" of the court. Westcott, 443 U.S. at 91. Indeed, even if the district court's chosen remedy otherwise was within its authority to grant, that remedy -- far more than either the simple extension or the outright nullification of Section 925(c) -- plainly acted to "'circumvent the intent of the legislature.'" Mathews, slip op. 9 n.5, quoting Westcott, 443 U.S. at 94 (opinion of Powell, J.). In choosing a remedy for an equal protection violation, a court is obligated to "'measure the intensity of (Congress's) commitment to the residual policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme.'" Mathews, slip op. 9 n.5, quoting Welsh, 398 U.S. at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). Here, Congress made it clear beyond dispute that one of its central purposes in passing the Gun Control Act was to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who have suffered from "mental disturbances." 114 Cong. Rec. 21829 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Bingham). See id. at 13868 (remarks of Sen. Long); id. at 21780 (remarks of Rep. Sikes); id. at 21784 (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 21791 (remarks of Rep. Thompson); id. at 21812 (remarks of Rep. Schwengel); id. at 21838 (remarks of Rep. Lloyd); id. at 21835 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Bolton); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Hanna); id. at 22251 (remarks of Rep. Scheuer); id. at 22262 (remarks of Rep. Fisher); id. at 22270 (remarks of Rep. Skubitz); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Cohelan); id. at 22747 (remarks of Rep. McClory); id. at 22752 (remarks of Rep. Reid); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Boland); id. at 23091 (remarks of Rep. Donahue); id. at 27152 (remarks of Sen. Dodd); id. at 27420 (remarks of Sen. Cannon). /26/ Against this background, the district court's choice of remedy "involve(s) a restructuring" of the statute (Westcott, 443 U.S. at 92) that threatens to frustrate one of its principal aims. In the event that this Court affirms the district court's constitutional judgment, then, it nevertheless must vacate that court's invalidation of those portions of the Gun Control Act that impose disabilities on persons with a history of commitment. D. Title IV Does Not Create An Unconstitutional "Irrebuttable Presumption" The district court's alternative holding, which turned on its conclusion that the challenged provisions of Title IV create a constitutionally infirm "irrebuttable presumption," is equally flawed. As this Court has made clear, legislation that satisfies equal protection requirements "'is perforce consistent with the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment.'" Salfi, 422 U.S. at 770, quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). The question for due process purposes therefore is a simple one: "(W)hether Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule." Salfi, 422 U.S. at 777. The district court concluded that it was irrational for Congress to have based the imposition of firearms disabilities on a psychiatric determination, while declining to lift those disabilities in response to subsequent psychiatric evidence. J.S. App. 19a. As noted above, however, civil commitment is not simply the product of a predictive judgment; it generally may be ordered only in response to clear evidence that the individual involved presents a danger to himself or others. See page 19, supra. Presumably for this reason, the district court conceded a history of commitment to be a reasonable trigger for Title IV's disabilities. And once an individual is shown to have been dangerous, it hardly seems irrational, given the "fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis" (Parham, 442 U.S. at 609), for Congress to have concluded that the individual poses a greater than normal risk of again "'becoming a threat to society.'" Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 572. In these circumstances, that the congressional rule sweeps too broadly by imposing disabilities on many non-dangerous persons -- indeed, that it "filters out more members of the class than nonmembers" (Salfi, 422 U.S. at 777) -- does not create constitutional difficulties. Congress obviously recognized that many of the persons affected by Title IV's disabilities would not misuse firearms were they able to obtain them. But in cases turning on psychiatric opinion, it may well be impossible (and certainly beyond the competence of law enforcement officials) to establish that any given individual will not be dangerous in the future. Cf. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 782-783 & n.15. It was for this very reason that Congress established class-wide disabilities. In such a scheme, where any error has potentially catastrophic consequences, "generalized rules" plainly "are appropriate to (Congress's) purposes and concerns." Id. at 785. And where its legislation so directly touches the safety of the public, Congress surely may choose to establish rules that sweep too broadly rather than make do with rules that do not reach broadly enough. Cf. id. at 780; Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1976). CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General KENNETH S. GELLER Deputy Solicitor General CHARLES A. ROTHFELD Assistant to the Solicitor General NICHOLS S. ZEPPOS Attorney JANUARY 1986 /1/ The other enumerated categories are fugitives from justice (18 U.S.C. 922(d)(2), (g)(2) and (h)(2)) and persons who are users of, or addicted to, certain drugs. 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(3), (g)(3) and (h)(3). Title IV's felony disability attaches to any person convicted of a "'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.'" The disability does not apply, however, to individuals convicted of antitrust and related trade regulation offenses or of certain crimes classified as misdemeanors under state law. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). /2/ Also subject to disabilities under Title VII are convicted felons (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(1)); persons who have been discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(2)); persons who have renounced United States citizenship (18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(4)); and aliens illegally present in the United States. 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(5). /3/ During the two-year period prior to his commitment, appellee's behavior, while "satisfactory," was "compulsive in nature and (his) speech was at times illogical. He began discussing God, at times stating that he was God and at other times emphatically stating that he was not" (J.A. 11). During the week prior to his admission to the hospital appellee "became extremely psychotic, delusional and assaultive at home, destroying part of the house when he could not control his anxiety and became overwhelmed by his delusions" (id. at 8; see id. at 5-6). /4/ Appellee's commitment required a judicial finding that there "exist(ed) in the patient a diagnosed mental illness of such degree and character that the person, if dischared, (would) probably imperil life, person or property." N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 30:4-48 (West 1981). /5/ Such a card, which in New Jersey must be obtained prior to the purchase of a firearm, may not be issued to a person "who has ever been confined for a mental disorder * * * unless * * * (he) produces a certificate of a medical doctor or psychiatrist licensed in New Jersey, or other satisfactory proof, that he is no longer suffering from that particular disability in such a manner that would interfere with or handicap him in the handling of firearms." N.J. Stat. Ann. Section 2C:58-3(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985). /6/ Although appellee's complaint noted that he was subject to disabilities under Title VII as well as under Title IV, the district court's opinion does not discuss Title VII and the court's order does not invalidate Title VII's disability provisions. The court did not explain the reason for this omission. /7/ For convenience, the phrase "persons with a history of commitment" will be used to refer to all of the categories of persons described in 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(4), (g)(4) and (h)(4), and 18 U.S.C. App. 1202(a)(3) -- that is, persons who have been "adjudicated as a mental defective," "committed to a mental institution," or "adjudged * * * mental incompetent." /8/ Title VII was intended to "complement" Title IV (United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 342 (1971)); the Court accordingly has "treated Title VII and IV as in pari materia." New Banner, 460 U.S. at 117. See generally United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 120 (1979). /9/ BATF will provide administrative relief pursuant to Section 925(c) to a person whose dishonorable discharge followed from the commission of a felony, so long as the crime did not involve the use of a weapon. /10/ Congress was responding to the case of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation, a diversified manufacturing corporation whose operations were carried on by nine separate operating divisions. The company had pleaded guilty to conspiracy and making false statements in connection with its pharmaceuticals business. The violations "in no way related to arms or ammunition nor did (they) have any connection with Olin's (firearms) division." H.R. Rep. 708, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965). Under the pre-1965 law, however, Olin's guilty plea required the company to "cease the interstate commercial shipment of firearms." Ibid. See S. Rep. 666, supra, at 3. /11/ Indeed, the brief description of the amendment, which was offered on the Senate floor, characterized the amendment in terms quite similar to the existing relief provision; the amendment was said to give the Secretary "the power to grant an application for * * * relief if it is stated to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the conviction and the applicant's record and reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to conduct his operations in an unlawful manner, and that granting of the relief sought would not be contrary to the public interest." 114 Cong. Rec. 27457 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Dodd). The primary purpose of this amendment was not to change the applicable standard, but rather to ensure that a relief provision would be applicable to the felony disabilities imposed by both Titles IV and VII. See ibid. (colloquy between Sen. Hruska and Sen. Dodd). /12/ Nor is Section 925(c) suspect because it benefits persons in addition to the firearms manufacturers whose problems inspired passage of the original administrative relief provision. "(T)he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional." Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-488. Congress was able to incrementally adjust the relief provision in 1968 after several years of experience with a system that permitted the Secretary to lift the disabilities imposed upon certain categories of felons; in doing so, Congress was not obligated to take the considerably more dramatic step of extending relief to entirely new categories of especially risky people. /13/ There is no doubt that Congress intended a history of commitment to serve as a permanent bar to the acquisition of a weapon; it "made no exception for subsequent curative events." New Banner, 460 U.S. at 116. See Barrett, 423 U.S. at 217; Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 570. Indeed, during the debate on Title IV it was noted that the bill did not provide relief for "those who have been committed to a mental institution who have subsequently been cured and have had their rights as citizens restored to them." 114 Cong. Rec. 21805 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Sikes). Rep. Celler, the bill's floor manager, responded simply that "we incline to the view that a mental defective should not be permitted to ship, transport or receive a gun" (ibid.). Although opponents of the bill suggested "the draftsmanship of an amendment so that someone could be relieved of this disability" (ibid. (remarks of Rep. MacGregor)), it appears that no such amendment was offered. /14/ The Gun Control Act's disabilities also apply to persons who have been found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. Redford v. United States Department of Treasury, 691 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1982). /15/ At the time of appellee's commitment, New Jersey law evidently required a finding, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he posed a threat to himself or others. See note 4, supra; State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 252, 344 A.2d 189, 298 (1975). As the facts of this case suggest (see pages 3-4 & note 3, supra), even under this standard commitment can be expected to follow from objective indicia of abnormality. /16/ The difficulty of predicting whether a given individual will become dangerous in the future has been widely acknowledged. See, e.g., Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 693 (1974); Lambert, Sherwood & Fitzpatrick, Predicting Recidivism Among First Admissions at Tennessee's State Psychiatric Hospitals, 34 Hosp. & Community Psychiatry 951 (1983); Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 97, 110-117 (1984); Steadman & Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 60 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 226 (1978). /17/ See J. Monahan, Predicting Violent Behavior 115-117 (1981); Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Reconsidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 Am. J. Psychiatry 33 (1978); Durbin, Pasewark & Albers, Criminality and Mental Illness: A Study of Arrest Rates in a Rural State, 134 Am. J. Psychiatry 80 (1977); Zitrin, Hardesty, Burdock & Drossman, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 142 (1976); Giovannoni & Gurel, Socially Disruptive Behavior of Ex-Mental Patients, 17 Archives of Gen. Psychiatry 146 (1967). See also Rabkin, Criminal Behavior of Discharged Mental Patients: A Critical Appraisal of the Research, 86 Psychological Bull. 1 (1979). /18/ Even if the rate of violent crime among those with a history of commitment is no higher than that among the general public, Congress justifiably may have believed that certain individuals with a history of mental illness are likely to commit especially serious violent offenses. See 114 Cong. Rec. 21813 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Schwengel). Similarly, Congress may have feared that persons with a history of commitment pose a substantial danger to themselves. See id. at 21784 (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("It is not only deliberate murder, robbery and assault which this legislation seeks to reduce, but also acts of passion, and gun suicides which have grown to 11,000 in 1967"); id. at 21811 (remarks of Rep. Schwengel). /19/ Similarly, Congress was entitled to rely on the fact that the federal law enforcement officials who administer the Gun Control Act are experienced in making judgments about the rehabilitation and future dangerousness of persons who have violated the law; that sort of determination, which is routinely made in parole and related proceedings, is a familiar one in our legal system. But those officials are not in a position to make complex psychiatric judgments about the future conduct of individuals who have been pronounced cured and released from mental institutions. /20/ At the time that the district court issued its decision, this Court had reserved judgment on what standard of review applies to legislation expressly classifying the mentally ill as a discrete group. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 231 n.13. The decision below thus predated this Court's holding in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985) that the mentally retarded do not constitute a quasi-suspect class for the purposes of equal protection analysis. Prior to the decision in City of Cleburne, several lower courts had used a rational basis standard in assessing the constitutionality of statutes classifying persons on the basis of a history of institutionalization. Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1979) (rejecting attempt to preliminary enjoin enforcement of state statute governing benefits for inmates of private mental institutions); United States v. Jones, 569 F.Supp. 395 (D.S.C. 1983) (rejecting equal protection challenge to 18 U.S.C. 922(h)(4)). Cf. Legion v. Richardson, 354 F.Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973) (addressing challenge to Medicare and Medicaid provisions affecting patients in psychiatric hospitals). The Ninth Circuit has held that the mentally ill do constitute a quasi-suspect class (J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (1983)); its decision, however, was influenced by the substance of the challenged regulation -- an ordinance hampering the establishment of group homes for former mental patients in residential neighborhoods -- which, in the court of appeals' view, denied the affected individuals a right "essential to (their) full participation in society." Id. at 1129. /21/ As a preliminary matter, it is far from clear that Title IV in fact subjects those with a history of commitment, "as a discrete group, to special or subordinate treatment." Wilson, 450 U.S. at 231. As we explain above, while Section 925(c) withholds administrative relief from such individuals, "in so doing it imposes equivalent deprivation on other groups who are not mentally ill" (450 U.S. at 231). That is, it makes administrative relief equally unavailable to certain felons, to drug addicts, to fugitives from justice, to those dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, to individuals who have renounced United States citizenship, and to aliens illegally present in the United States. The challenged provisions thus make "a distinction not between the mentally ill and a group composed of nonmentally ill" (id. at 232), but between presumptively dangerous and presumptively non-dangerous persons. And the district court itself recognized that Congress acted properly when it placed persons with a history of commitment in the presumptively dangerous category. In these circumstances, the district court erred in reading the challenged provisions in isolation as "classify(ing) directly on the basis of mental health." Id. at 231 (footnote omitted). /22/ Thus, given the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis and the uncertainties concerning the causes, development and cure of mental illness (see page 19-21, supra), a history of mental illness is relevant to government regulation bearing on public safety. Certainly, once the presumptive relevance of an existing psychological abnormality is granted, a physician's opinion about changes in the mental state of a given patient should not affect the degree of constitutionally-mandated scrutiny accorded government classifications involving that patient. /23/ It is undeniable that commitment to a mental institution is an event that often is misunderstood, and one that may have unfortunate and unfair social consequences for the committee. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-426. As this Court has noted, however, "what is truly 'stigmatizing' is the symptomatology of a mental or emotional illness," rather than commitment itself. Parham, 442 U.S. at 601. Indeed, empirical data indicate "'that the stigma of mental hospitalization is not a major problem for the ex-patient.'" Id. at 601 n.12, quoting Schwartz, Myers & Astrachan, Psychiatric Labeling and the Rehabilitation of the Mental Patient, 31 Archives of Gen. Psychiatry 329, 333 (1974). This consideration suggests that disparate treatment accorded those with a history of commitment is grounded more on objective considerations than on "irrational discrimination" (Toll, 458 U.S. at 20 (Blackman, J., concurring)); certainly, regulations singling out such persons are of a different order than those classifying on the basis of race, religion, national origin or sex. See City of Cleburne, slip op. 6-7; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-217 n.14. /24/ While the Court also has made use of heightened scrutiny in cases bearing on the exercise of fundamental rights (see generally Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312-313), the opportunity to acquire a firearm has not been held to fall within this category. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65-66 n.8; Toner, 728 F.2d at 128; United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974). Similarly, Title IV's disability provisions -- in contrast, for example, to the regulation at issue in City of Cleburne -- hardly affect an interest so great as to deny persons with a history of commitment "much of what makes for human freedom and fulfillment." City of Cleburne, slip op. 6 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). /25/ See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 9. /26/ That Congress would have disapproved the district court's choice of remedy is confirmed by the inclusion of a strong severability provision in Title IV. 18 U.S.C. 928 ("If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby."). That provision "'discloses an intention to make the (statute) divisible and creates a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the legislature would have been satisfied with what remained.'" Welsh, 398 U.S. at 364, quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932). It thus points up the emphasis that Congress placed on keeping the Gun Control Act's basic disability provisions in force. Ct. Mathews, slip op. 9 n.5; Westcott, 443 U.S. at 90. APPENDIX