RICHARD A. LYNG, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, APPELLANT V. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, ET AL. No. 86-1471 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1986 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Brief for the Appellant PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING In addition to those named in the caption, the parties are: United Mine Workers of America (UMWA); Mary Berry; Johnie B. Blake; Barm Combs; Patricia Ann Combs; Mark Dyer; Geneva Dyer; and a class of persons composed of certain UAW and UMWA strikers and their households. TABLE OF CONTENTS Parties to the proceeding Opinions below Jurisdiction Statutory provision involved Questions presented Statement A. The Food Stamp program B. The present controversy Summary of argument Argument: The challenged provision of the Food Stamp Act is constitutional A. Congress acted rationally in declining to extend food stamps to households based on income lost during a strike B. Section 2015(d)(3) does not warrant heightened scrutiny under the Constitution C. The judgment of Congress on questions of social policy is entitled to deference from the courts Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The memorandum of the district court holding the relevant provision of the Food Stamp Act unconstitutional (J.S. App. 1a-16a) is reported at 648 F. Supp. 1234, and its accompanying order (J.S. App. 71a-72a) is unreported. An earlier decision of the district court (J.S. App. 17a-47a) is reported at 648 F. Supp. 1241. Subsequent decisions and orders of the district court (J.S. App. 48a-65a, 66a-70a) are reported at 651 F. Supp. 855. JURISDICTION The order of the district court declaring the statute unconstitutional (J.S. App. 71a-72a) was entered on November 14, 1986. The order of the district court enjoining the Secretary from enforcing the statute (J.S. App. 48a-50a) was entered on December 22, 1986. A notice of appeal to this Court (J.S. App. 73a) was filed on December 11, 1986, and an amended notice of appeal (J.S. App. 74a) was filed on December 30, 1986. On February 2, 1987, the Chief Justice extended the time within which to docket this appeal to and including March 12, 1987. The jurisdictional statement was filed on that date, and probable jurisdiction was noted on May 4, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1252. STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a household shall not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any member of such household, not exempt from the work registration requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection, is on strike as defined in section 142(2) of title 29, because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout) as defined in section 152(9) of title 29: Provided, That a household shall not lose its eligibility to participate in the food stamp program as a result of one of its members going on strike if the household was eligible for food stamps immediately prior to such strike, however, such household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a decrease in the income of the striking member or members of the household: Provided further, That such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout. QUESTION PRESENTED Section 6(d)(3) of the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3), generally provides that a household shall not become eligible to participate in the food stamp program at any time that a member of the household is on strike. The statute further provides that a household already participating in the program shall not receive an increased allotment of food stamps by reason of the loss of income occasioned when a member of the household goes on strike. The question presented is whether this statute is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. STATEMENT The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 71 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2011 et seq., established a public welfare program, funded by the Department of Agriculture and administered by state agencies, that supplements the food purchasing power of low-income households. This suit was brought by a number of potential food-stamp recipients and certain labor unions against the Secretary of Agriculture (the Secretary), challenging the constitutionality of Section 6(d)(3) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3). That Section generally provides that a household may not become eligible for food stamps -- or, if already eligible, may not receive an increased allotment of food stamps -- by reason of a decrease in household income occasioned by the fact that any member of the household is on strike. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that Section 2015(d)(3) is unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The court held that the statute violates the First Amendment rights of strikers to associate with their families and with other union members. The court also held that Section 2015(d)(3) violates equal protection principles by creating a classification that discriminates against striking employees. A. The Food Stamp Program 1. The Food Stamp program is a federally-funded, state-administered effort to "permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power." 7 U.S.C. 2011. Participating households receive coupons (food stamps) that can be used for food purchases at retail stores. 7 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 2013. Over the years, the Food Stamp program has become the Nation's second most costly "needs-based" public assistance program. See S. Rep. 97-128, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). Program outlays were in excess of $10 billion in 1985, providing assistance to nearly 20 million participants. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987, at 112. The program has grown dramatically since its inception, registering a 20-fold increase in outlays and a three-fold increase in participation since 1970. /1/ To contain the Food Stamp program within financially practicable limits, and to ensure that funds are channeled to those who are most in need of assistance, the Act prescribes a number of eligibility requirements. First, the Act imposes an income threshold for the receipt of benefits. Food stamps are provided only to households with aggregate income and financial resources below certain specified national standards. 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2014. The Act also establishes various non-financial criteria. For example, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 2015(d)(1) withholds food stamps from households in which the head of the household refuses to register for employment, refuses to participate in an employment and training program, or refuses to accept employment at a wage not less than the specified minimum. 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2015(d)(1)(A)(i), (ii) and (iii). Section 2015(d)(1)(B)(ii) makes ineligible for 90 days a household whose head voluntarily quits a job without good cause. And 7 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 2029 permits the states to disquality certain households whose members refuse to participate in "workfare programs." See also 7 U.S.C. 2015(b) (disqualification for engaging in fraud and misrepresentation about food-stamp eligibility). 2. Consistent with its policy of ensuring that limited federal funds remain available to assist the neediest households, Congress has repeatedly considered, and several times enacted, measures designed to restrict the availability of food stamps to households with members who are on strike. Four years after the Food Stamp Act was passed, the House of Representatives in 1968 adopted an amendment to the Act that would have made persons engaged in a labor dispute ineligible for food stamps unless those persons had been eligible for and were receiving food stamps before the labor dispute began. See H.R. Rep. 1619, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968). In reporting its version of the amendment, the House Agricultural Committee explained (id. at 2): In view of the original intent and purposes of the food stamp program, the acute need to stretch the funds of Government to reach as many of the needy as possible and the adequacy of other resources, public and private, to help * * * participants in industrial disagreements, the committee voted to prohibit the use of stamps * * * to support industrial disputes(.) Although this amendment passed the House, /2/ it was eventually deleted in conference. See H.R. Rep. 1908, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968); 114 Cong. Rec. 28002 (1968) (Rep. Poage). Similar amendments were again proposed and debated in 1970, 1971, and 1972. /3/ In 1973, the House once more adopted an amendment to the Food Stamp Act limiting the eligibility of striking employees and their families. The bill provided that "a household shall not participate in the food stamp program while its principal wage-earner is * * * on strike: Provided, That such ineligibility shall not apply to any household that was eligible for and participating in the food stamp program immediately prior to the start of such strike * * *." See H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-126 (1977); 119 Cong. Rec. 24928 (1973) (Rep. Dickinson). /4/ After the Conference Committee was unable to reconcile a disagreement between the House and the Senate, the amendment was eliminated. See H.R. Rep. 93-427, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 40 (1973). /5/ A nearly identical bill was unsuccessfully proposed in 1974 (see 120 Cong. Rec. 20613-20616), and again in 1977 (see H.R. Rep. 95-464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129-130 (1977)). In 1979 Congress enacted an amendment to the Food Stamp Act providing that "(n)o household that contains a person involved in a labor-management dispute shall be eligible to participate in the food stamp program unless the household meets the income guidelines, asset requirements, and work registration requirements of this Act." Pub. L. No. 96-58, Section 9, 93 Stat. 392, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979) 2015(i). The purpose of the legislation was "to stop the practice of * * * issuing food stamps to strikers on a helter-skelter basis" (125 Cong. Rec. 20199-20200 (1979) (Sen. Helms)). Instead, Congress aimed to make clear that strikers "would have to meet identical eligibility rules" as other food stamp applicants. H.R. Rep. 96-788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1980). See S. Rep. 96-261, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979); 125 Cong. Rec. 20199 (1979). The following year, Congress "reiterate(d) its intention that the food stamp program be limited to the truly needy" by adding an amendment to the Act "that makes crystal clear that it does not countenance making any striker or the striker's household eligible for food stamps by virtue solely of the existence of the strike" (H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 131). The amendment set forth a general rule that households containing strikers were to be ineligible for food stamps, subject to the proviso that "such ineligibility shall not apply if the household meets the income qualifications, assets requirements, and work registration requirements, as mandated in (the Act)." Pub. L. No. 96-249, Section 114, 94 Stat. 361, 7 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980) 2015(d)(4). See H.R. Rep. 96-957, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 21-22 (1980). /6/ 3. In 1981 Congress enacted the amendment challenged in this case. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 109, 95 Stat. 361. Now codified at 7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3), /7/ the amendment generally provides that "a household shall not participate in the food stamp program at any time that any (otherwise-qualified) member of such household * * * is on strike." A proviso states that a household already eligible for food stamps shall not lose its eligibility if one of its members goes on strike, but that "such household shall not receive an increased allotment as the result of a decrease in the income of (its) striking member or members." The 1981 amendment was designed to promote three distinct goals. The first and foremost of these goals was a reduction in the cost of the Food Stamp program. Section 2015(d)(3), as amended, was part of a package of across-the-board budget cuts whose purpose was to effect "dramatic changes in Federal spending policy * * * necessary in order to wage an effective battle against the high inflation and unemployment which have plagued the national economy for many years." S. Rep. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981). Cf. Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 205 (1985). Indeed, the 1981 amendment to Section 2015(d)(3) was only one of many changes in the Food Stamp Act enacted by OBRA in an effort to achieve significant budgetary savings. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 101, 95 Stat. 358, 7 U.S.C. 2012(i) (providing that parents and children who live together shall comprise a single household for food stamp purposes); Pub. L. No. 97-35, Section 104(a), 95 Stat. 358, 7 U.S.C. 2014(c)(2) (establishing new gross income eligibility standard for the Food Stamp program). See generally S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 52-53, 55-57. All told, supporters anticipated that these "substantial reforms in the food stamp program * * * (would) pare its burgeoning cost by nearly $2.5 billion in fiscal year 1984, with slightly smaller savings in fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 1983" (127 Cong. Rec. 13919 (1981) (Sen. Thurmond)). Accord, id. at 13930 (Sen. Huddleston). And the amendment now codified in Section 2015(d)(3) was itself expected to yield savings of approximately $165 million over the three-year period from 1982 to 1984. S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 63. See also id. at 119 (detailing administrative savings expected to result from the amendment). Secondly, by significantly restricting the availability of food stamps to households that included strikers, Congress sought to promote "the underlying policy of tying receipt of food stamps to the ability and willingness to work, as exemplified by provisions requiring work registration, denying benefits to those voluntarily quitting a job without good cause, and allowing the establishment of workfare programs." S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62. Congress determined that a person who goes on strike, unlike needy persons without job opportunities, "has given up the income from the job of his own volition" (ibid.). And Congress concluded that "(u)nion strike funds should be responsible for providing support and benefits to strikers during labor-management disputes" (ibid.). Finally, Congress reiterated the view -- repeatedly expressed during congressional consideration of the many precursors of the bill -- that the 1981 amendment would help promote government neutrality in labor disputes. According to the Senate Report, providing food stamps to striking workers could "be seen as encouragement to workers to 'wait out' management, rather than compromise." S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62. Congress was particularly concerned about strikes by public employees, who under previous law might receive food stamps "even though the strikes in which they (were) participating (were) illegal" (ibid.). B. The Present Controversy Appellees are two labor unions and several individual union members. On October 29, 1984, they filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of Section 2015(d)(3) and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On September 30, 1985, the district court denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss the complaint (J.S. App. 17a-47a). The parties thereafter conducted discovery and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 14, 1986, the court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and issued a declaratory judgment (J.S. App. 1a-16a, 71a-72a). The district court acknowledged that Section 2015(d)(3) "is, in one sense, rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives -- requiring a person able to work to do so in order to receive food stamps and promoting government neutrality in strikes" (J.S. App. 10a). Nevertheless, identifying five deficiencies in the statute, the court held it unconstitutional. First, the court found that the statute "interferes or threatens to interfere with the First Amendment right of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families, with their union, and with fellow union members, as well as the reciprocal First Amendment right of each union plaintiff to its members' association with the union" (J.S. App. 11a (citations omitted)). Second, relying on this Court's decisions in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the court determined that "(t)he statute as administered interferes with strikers' right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the government" (J.S. App. 11a). Third, the court stated that strikers as a group have historically "'been subject to discrimination,'" possess "'obvious and distinguishing characteristics,'" and have "frequently been in the stance of an unpopular political minority" (J.S. App. 12a (citations omitted)). The court accordingly suggested that strikers should be considered a suspect or quasi-suspect class for equal-protection purposes. Fourth, the court discerned in the statute (id. at 13a) "significant and discriminatory differences between the treatment accorded a strker who stops work in concert with others and an individual who quits a job." As a result, the court stated that one of the rationales advanced by Congress for Section 2015(d)(3) -- the desire to tie the receipt of food stamps to the willingness to work -- was "seriously weakened" (J.S. App. 13a). Finally, in an analysis that the court termed "critical to (its) appraisal of rationality," the court stated that Section 2015(d)(3) "impermissibly strikes at the striker through his family" (J.S. App. 13a). In the district court's view, "(n)either administrative convenience nor the desirability of maintaining government neutrality in labor disputes justifies the denial of food stamps to innocent members of a striker's household if this legislative purpose could be achieved by more narrowly tailored measures." The court surmised that "(a)djusting the food stamp allotment to exclude the striker would be neither difficult nor intrusive" (id. at 14a). It accordingly held that the statute, "when considered in light of its impact on the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and on innocent members of the families of the individual plaintiffs, is not sufficiently tailored to the objectives stated by its defenders to pass constitutional muster" (id. at 15a). The court issued an order granting a declaratory judgment consistent with this decision (id. at 71a-72a). On December 22, 1986, the district court granted appellees interim injunctive relief (J.S. App. 48a-50a). In relevant part, the court enjoined the Secretary (id. at 48a-49a) "pending further orders of this Court or the Supreme Court, from enforcing the provisions of 7 U.S.C. Section 2015(d)(3) and its implementing regulations to disqualify class members from participation in the Food Stamp program when they are determined by a state or local Food Stamp agency to meet the other eligibility requirements of the Food Stamp Act." /8/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The district court has held unconstitutional a carefully considered provision of the Food Stamp Act, whose evident purpose is to allocate finite resources to those most in need of government assistance. Applying a loose amalgam of heightened and rational-basis scrutiny, the district court held that Section 2015(d)(3) impinges on fundamental rights of free speech and association, burdens a suspect class, and irrationally discriminates against striking workers. The court's analysis is flawed at every turn. It ignores settled equal protection principles and improperly second-guesses the complex choices made by Congress when it amended the Food Stamp Act. The result cannot be reconciled with this Court's decisions and reflects a marked lack of deference to "the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government." Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985). Congress amended Section 2015(d)(3) as part of a broader legislative effort to reduce the federal deficit and to channel scarce resources to persons whom Congress believed to be most in need of assistance. At the same time, Congress chose to remove itself from labor disputes by withdrawing benefits that it thought were more appropriately provided by union strike funds. These choices, whatever their wisdom, are plainly rational and easily survive scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. Recognizing explicitly that Section 2015(d)(3), as amended, is "rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives" (J.S. App. 10a), the district court applied a more exacting analysis and found the statute to fail a variety of doctrinal tests. But the real failure, we submit, lies in the court's tests, and not in the statute. Section 2015(d)(3) infringes no rights of association, since nothing in the statute prevents employees from exercising those rights. The court likewise erred in finding an abridgment of freedom of expression, since Section 2015(d)(3) does not abridge speech but merely declines to underwrite it. There was, moreover, no warrant for the court's suggestion that strikers are a suspect class deserving of greater constitutional solicitude; indeed, the evidence marshalled by the court for that surprising proposition compels precisely the opposite conclusion. Finally, the court's "critical" concern (J.S. App. 13a) -- that Section 2015(d)(3) "impermissibly strikes at the striker through his family" -- misapprehends the nature of the Food Stamp Act, which provides benefits to "households" that otherwise meet the requirements of the statute. ARGUMENT THE CHALLENGED PROVISION OF THE FOOD STAMP ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL A. Congress Acted Rationally In Declining To Extend Food Stamps To Households Based On Income Lost During A Strike Equal protection principles generally require that legislation accord like treatment to similarly situated individuals. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). But the precept of equal protection only requires that the distinctions made by legislators be rational. "A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the (government) to remedy every ill." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216. Particularly in cases involving social welfare programs -- where Congress must "make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries while making allocations from a finite fund" (Bowen v. Owens, No. 84-1905 (May 19, 1986), slip op. 5) -- the judiciary must give broad deference to the choices of Congress, "the appropriate representative body through which the public makes democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981). In the end, courts "seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216. /9/ These principles confirm that Congress did not violate equal protection when it amended Section 2015(d)(3). By 1981 Congress recognized that the Nation faced budget deficits of commanding proportions. In its Report on the January 1981 Economic Report of the President, the Democratic members of Congress recommended that "(f)ederal spending * * * be reduced promptly" and concluded that "(n)ogovernment spending program should be exempt from scrutiny." H.R. Rep. 97-5, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981). The Republicans took the same view, endorsing the President's "proposed * * * array of spending cuts" even though concededly "some program cuts will hurt some people" (id. at 102). The 1981 amendments to the Food Stamp Act must therefore be understood, first and foremost, as part of a much broader economic strategy, intended to bring inflation to a halt and to reduce dramatically the growth of federal spending. /10/ Faced with that overwhelming budget deficit (see Economic Report of the President, H.R. Doc. 97-3, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1981)), and with ever-increasing demands on federal resources, Congress decided to "concentrate limited funds where the need (was) likely to be greatest." Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979); accord, Bowen v. Owens, slip op. 8. It concluded, quite reasonably, that households whose members are on strike have greater access to the means of self-support than households whose members are entirely without employment opportunities. By making such necessarily close distinctions, Congress determined that it could conserve as much as $165 million over the three-year period from 1982 to 1984. S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 63. And by doing so, Congress believed that it could channel scarce resources to persons who were "genuinely in need" (119 Cong. Rec. 24929 (1973) (Rep. Young)). That choice -- a culmination of 13 years of debate and congressional consideration of comparable legislation (see pages 4-8, supra) -- is plainly rational. Congress in amending Section 2015(d)(3) was also animated by a desire to achieve a greater measure of neutrality in labor disputes. Again, there is nothing irrational about that course of action. In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), this Court expressly recognized that the government acts rationally when it seeks to remain neutral in labor disputes. At issue in Hodory was a state statute that denied unemployment compensation to employees who were out of work as the result of a labor dispute other than a lockout. Appellee, who was furloughed when the plant at which he worked was shut down because of a strike at the company's coal mines, contended that the statute denying him unemployment compensation was irrational. This Court disagreed. Noting that under the state system the employer was obligated to make contributions to the state's unemployment compensation fund, the Court observed (id. at 492) that as a result "(t)he employer's costs go up with every laid-off worker who is qualified to collect unemployment." The Court held that the state was constitutionally entitled to remain neutral in labor disputes by not compelling the employer to absorb these added costs (ibid.): Qualification for unemployment compensation thus acts as a lever increasing the pressures on an employer to settle a strike. The State has chosen to leave this lever in existence for situations in which the employer has locked out his employees, but to eliminate it if the union has made the strike move. Regardless of our views of the wisdom or lack of wisdom of this form of state "neutrality" in labor disputes, we cannot say that the approach taken by (the State) is irrational. Here, as in Hodory, Congress has endeavored to construct a statutory scheme that will not favor either side in a labor dispute. Congress perceived that granting food stamps to striking employees enhances the union's power by alleviating some of the economic costs to one set of parties to the strike, thereby perhaps prolonging the strike. /11/ Congress accordingly declined to provide, in the form of food stamps, the practical equivalent of strike benefits that it believed could ordinarily be paid from union funds. See S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62. On the other hand, Congress took steps to avoid favoring employers involved in labor disputes. The statute accordingly provides that a household is ineligible for food stamps only where a member "is on strike * * * because of a labor dispute (other than a lockout)" (7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3) (emphasis added)). And whereas the refusal of the head of the household to accept employment normally disqualifies the household from receiving food stamps (7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(1)), no disqualification results where that person "refuses to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or lockout" (7 U.S.C. 2015(d)(3) (emphasis added)). The statutory scheme set forth in Section 2015(d)(3) is thus entirely rational. As this Court has noted, "the availability of state welfare assistance for striking workers * * * pervades every work stoppage (and) affects every existing collective-bargaining agreement." Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 124 (1974). /12/ Congress was free to conclude, as it did, that by lending financial support to striking workers it would thereby "encourage() * * * workers to 'wait out' management, rather than compromise" (S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 62). And it was likewise free to conclude that it no longer wished to foster that result. In sum, the 1981 amendment to Section 2015(d)(3) redressed an array of legitimate governmental interests and did so in a way that cannot be described as "patently arbitrary or irrational." United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 (1980). The statute thus easily meets the traditional "rational basis" test applied to public welfare programs. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230; Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). Every other court that has considered the constitutionality of Section 2015(d)(3) has held it valid on that basis. See Ledesma v. Block, No. G82-94 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 1985), appeal pending, No. 85-1730 (6th Cir.); United Steelworkers v. Block, 578 F. Supp. 1417, 1421-1424 (D.S.D. 1982) (alternative holding). B. Section 2015(d)(3) Does Not Warrant Heightened Scrutiny Under The Constitution The district court acknowledged that Section 2015(d)(3) is "rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives -- requiring a person able to work to do so in order to receive food stamps and promoting government neutrality in strikes" (J.S. App. 10a). /13/ The case should have ended upon that conclusion. Instead, the district court embarked upon a rudderless voyage into heightened scrutiny. In so doing, the court relied, indiscriminately, upon cases involving suspect classifications, gender discrimination, fundamental rights, and "rational basis" analysis. This jumble of loosely connected precedent cannot support the application of heightened scrutiny to the legislative classification effected by Section 2015(d)(3). 1. The court held, first, that "(t)he disputed limitation on food stamps for strikers interferes or threatens to interfere with the First Amendment right of the individual plaintiffs to associate with their families, with their union, and with fellow union members" (J.S. App. 11a (citations omitted)). This Court rejected a nearly identical contention in Lyng v. Castillo, No. 85-250 (June 27, 1986). That case involved a challenge to a provision of the Food Stamp Act that generally treated parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single "household" for purposes of determining need and eligibility for benefits. Applying heightened scrutiny, the district court had concluded that this provision infringed the rights of family members to associate with one another. In reversing, this Court upheld the statutory classification because it did not "'directly and substantially' interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right" (slip op. 3 (citation omitted)). In particular, the Court observed that the provision defining "household" did not "order or prevent any group of persons from dining together" (id. at 4). And the Court found it "exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps" (ibid.). More recently, in Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, No. 86-421 (May 4, 1987), the Court reaffirmed the proposition that associational rights are not abridged by statutes that on their face do not prevent the association from taking place. In that case, the appellant contended that a state law requiring local Rotary Clubs to admit women violated the First Amendment rights of members to associate in pursuit of various protected activities. This Court acknowledged that "Rotary Clubs engage in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First Amendment" (slip op. 10). Rejecting the associational claim, however, the Court held that the challenged state law "does not require (the clubs) to abandon their basic goals * * *. Nor does it require them to abandon their classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross-section of the community" (ibid.). The Court's analysis in Castillo and Rotary Club squarely disposes of appellees' First Amendment "associational" claim. By limiting the availability of food stamps to households that include strikers, Congress did not "directly and substantially interfere" with family members' ability to associate with each other or "require them to abandon" one another. Nor did Congress directly interfere with union members' ability to associate with their union. See Florida AFL-CIO v. Florida Dep't of Labor & Employment Security, 676 F.2d 513, 516 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to state statute that withheld unemployment compensation from workers who quit their jobs upon expiration of labor contracts). And there is no more reason here than in Castillo to believe that families "will choose to live apart," or, to use the language from Rotary Club, to imagine that workers will "abandon" their union, in order to acquire food stamps. /14/ 2. The district court also concluded that Section 2015(d)(3) abridges union members' First Amendment freedom of expression (J.S. App. 11a-12a). The court reasoned (id. at 11a (citation omitted)) that in order to qualify for food stamps, striking workers may find it necessary to "'pressure their union to reach a settlement.'" Relying on this Court's decisions in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the district court held that in this manner Section 2015(d)(3) "interferes with strikers' right to express themselves about union matters free of coercion by the government" (J.S. App. 11a). The district court's analysis ignores the fact that Section 2015(d)(3) does not prohibit union members from expressing their views. It simply refuses to fund the decision to strike. This Court has made it clear that while the Constitution "protect(s) against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-318 (1980). "A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity" (id. at 317 n.19). "It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit * * * (an activity) and quite another to say that such (activity) must * * * receive state aid." Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973). Accord, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545-546 (1983); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). The Court applied that principle in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), when it sustained a statute that provided public funding for presidential conventions and campaigns, but which distinguished among major, minor and new parties in the amount of allotted funds. Rejecting a claim that the statute abridged the First Amendment and Due Process rights of minor and new-party candidates, the Court stressed that unlike laws that "direct(ly) burden() * * * the candidate's ability to run for office (and) * * * the voter's ability to voice preferences," the challenged statute "does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice" (424 U.S. at 94). Whatever impediments a minor or new-party candidate may experience "derive not from lack of public funding," the Court explained, "but from their inability to raise private contributions. Any disadvantage suffered * * * is thus limited to the claimed denial of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate that the (statute) afford(s) eligible candidates" (id. at 94-95). Here, too, any incentive a striker may have to "pressure (his) union to reach a settlement" (J.S. App. 11a) does not stem from any species of governmental restraint. It derives, rather, from the striker's loss of wages, which the government has simply elected under Section 2015(d)(3) not to replace. But it has long been clear that "the right to bargain collectively does not entail any 'right' to insist on one's position free from economic disadvantage" (American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309 (1965)). And the present case is easier than Buckley, since here the funds withheld from the claimants are not made available to their competitors. For substantially the same reasons, Section 2015(d)(3) is distinguishable from the statute involved in the Abood case, on which the district court relied. The statute in Abood required public employees to contribute funds to employee unions, even though the unions used the funds to promote political objectives unrelated to their collective-bargaining responsibilities. The Court held that statute unconstitutional, observing that the law required public employees to support "an ideological cause (they) may oppose" (431 U.S. at 235). The statute challenged in Abood thus violated the principle "at the heart of the First Amendment * * * that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State" (id. at 234-235). Section 2015(d)(3), by contrast, does not require citizens to spend their money on political causes in which they do not believe. It simply withholds government funds from a class of households that Congress reasonably concluded had relatively less need of government assistance. The Sherbert decision, also relied on by the district court, is equally inapposite. The Court in Sherbert upheld a Free Exercise challenge to a state denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Sabbatarian who refused to work on Saturdays. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, No. 85-993 (Feb. 25, 1987). But the Court has never extended the reasoning in Sherbert beyond the unique context "of a constitutionally imposed 'governmental obligation of neutrality' originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-475 n.8(refusing to extend the holding in Sherbert to a claim that a state statute was unconstitutional because it denied funding for abortions). Compare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (refusing to extend Sherbert to a claim that a federal statute was unconstitutional because it withheld Medicaid funding for abortions) with Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981) (applying Sherbert to a state denial of unemployment compensation to a worker who quit his job for religious reasons). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 93 n.127. 3. The district court next held (J.S. App. 12a-13a (citations omitted)) that labor unions in general, and striking workers in particular, warrant special constitutional protection in that they have historically been "'subject to discrimination'" and possess "'obvious and distinguishing characteristics.'" This Court has twice rejected that precise claim. In City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976), the Court upheld, under a rational-basis analysis, a city's refusal to withhold union dues from the paychecks of city firefighters. The Court specifically rejected the contention that "respondents' status as union members * * * is such as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause" (426 U.S. at 286). Similarly, in Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, supra, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a state statute that denied unemployment benefits to persons who unemployment resulted from a labor dispute. The Court upheld the statute under a rational-basis standard, expressly finding (431 U.S. at 489) that "(t)he statute does not involve any discernible fundamental interest or affect with particularity any protected class." Accord, Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting First Amendment and equal protection challenges to state law denying welfare benefits to strikers); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 362-363 (D. Md.) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (rejecting equal protection challenge to state regulations denying AFDC benefits to families of striking workers). /15/ Insisting, nevertheless, on some form of heightened scrutiny, the district court noted (J.S. App. 13a) that "labor unions and strikers have been the beneficiaries of extensive legislation designed to ameliorate historic discrimination against them." But the court drew exactly the wrong inference from this fact. Far from showing that heightened judicial solicitude is merited, a group's achievement of significant legislative success "belies a comtinuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 443. See generally J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980). There is thus no basis whatever for the district court's suggestion that strikers are a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" class. /16/ 4. Finally, the court held (J.S. App. 13a) that because Section 2015(d)(3) "cuts off food stamps not only from a striker but also from the entire household, including the striker's spouse and children," the statute must be "narrowly tailored" in order to survive constitutional scrutiny. The court's holding mischaracterizes the structure and purpose of the statute, as well as the practicalities of its administration. More fundamentally, the court's underlying premise -- that legislative lines must be narrowly drawn when they have an impact on the welfare of family members -- cannot be squared with traditonal equal protection principles. To begin with, the district court paid insufficient attention to the fact that Congress chose to award food stamps to households, not to individual family members. The Act routinely provides that a household will lose its eligibility if one of its members performs, or fails to perform, certain acts. Thus, if the head of any household who is fit to work fails to register for work, or refuses to accept certain jobs, the entire household is disqualified from participation in the food stamp program. The same result follows if the head of a household voluntarily quits his job, or if any qualified member of a household refuses to participate in an approved "workfare" plan. In each of these situations, the "onus" of the statute may be said to fall, in the district court's words (J.S. App. 13a), "as heavily on the innocent members of the family as it does on" the person who refuses to accept employment. But the district court did not suggest, and it could not credibly be suggested, that these provisions are therefore unconstitutional for want of being "narrowly tailored." There is no logical basis for reaching a different result where, as here, a household's disqualification results from a member's refusal to accept employment by virtue of a strike. Section 2015(d)(3) can no more be said to "punish" a family for the conduct of a member who goes on strike than the provisions just described can be said to "punish" a family for the conduct of a member who refuses to work on other grounds. In positing a distinction between the two situations, the district court again hypothesized (J.S. App. 13a) that strikers occupy a privileged constitutional status. But that hypothesis, as we have already explained, is erroneous. The district court surmised that it "would be neither difficult nor intrusive" for Congress to have adjusted the food stamp allotment so as to exclude only the striker himself rather than his entire family (J.S. App. 14a). This surmise is incorrect as a practical matter; /17/ more fundamentally, it ignores basic equal protection principles. Legislative classifications need only be narrowly drawn when they impinge on fundamental interests or burden suspect classes. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 425 (1981); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). In the absence of a basis for strict scrutiny, "a classification is not deficient simply because the State could have selected another means of achieving the desired ends." Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 969 (1982). It is true that the eligibility requirement erected by Section 2015(d)(3), like the rest of the Act's eligibility requirements, may have an effect upon "innocent members of the family" (J.S. App. 13a). But that is a feature of most social welfare legislation. It is the function of such legislation to "allocat(e) limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 487. Inevitably, classifications will be drawn that, in one respect or another, may be said to disadvantage certain needy persons. But this Court has never found unconstitutional an otherwise rational statute that allocates social welfare benefits simply because the prescribed allocation has such disadvantageous effects. /18/ C. The Judgment Of Congress On Questions Of Social Policy Is Entitled To Deference From The Courts When judging the constitutionality of a federal statute, this Court gives significant deference "to the duly enacted and carefully considered decision of a coequal and representative branch of our Government." Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 319. In particular, "(t)his Court has granted a 'strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation conferring monetary benefits, because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238 (citations omitted). Appellees nonetheless urge this Court to declare Section 2015(d)(3) unconstitutional on public policy grounds, contending (Mot. to Aff. 6-7) that the denial of food stamps to households of strikers has had undesirable effects on living arrangements in certain circumstances. Whatever the merit of appellees' policy objections to Section 2015(d)(3), their arguments "are addressed to an inappropriate forum" (United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965)). See, e.g., Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. at 590-592; Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 238-239. Congress, and not the judiciary, is charged with establishing eligibility requirements and benefit levels under the Food Stamp program, and the courts "do not sit to pass on policy or the wisdom of the course Congress has set." Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 212 (1985). "The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). However unwisely a court may think that a political branch has acted, "(g)overnmental decisions to apend money to improve the general public welfare in one way and not another are 'not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.'" Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)). CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General ALBERT G. LAUBER, JR. Deputy Solicitor General LAWRENCE S. ROBBINS Assistant to the Solicitor General WILLIAM KANTER JOHN S. KOPPEL MARK L. GROSS Attorneys JUNE 1987 /1/ Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, at 123. In 1965, approximately 633,000 persons participated in the Food Stamp program, representing a federal outlay of $33 million (ibid.). By 1970, participation had grown to nearly 6.5 million persons, representing a federal outlay of $550 million (ibid.). In 1975, nearly 20 million persons participated, representing a federal outlay of over $4.3 billion (ibid.). /2/ Supporters of the amendment stated that its purpose was "to keep the (Food Stamp) program as close as possible to the original intent of the Congress in establishing it as a means of reaching the involuntarily poor" (114 Cong. Rec. 23946 (1968) (Rep. May)). Representative May observed that "(i)t would be possible, of course, to devise a food stamp program to reduce the cost of food to all Americans, but the expense of such a program would be astronomical, and certainly there is no justification for using public funds to reduce the cost of food to those who are capable of earning enough to buy it" (ibid.). "The question," she explained, "becomes one of where to draw the line," and Representative May concluded that the Committee amendment correctly limited the availability of food stamps to "those who are involuntarily poor" (ibid.). See also id. at 24237 (Rep. Teague). Supporters also endorsed the amendment as a way to ensure that "the Federal Government and the taxpayers (not) * * * be involved in the collective bargaining process on either side()" (id. at 24231 (Rep. Edwards)). In their view, "permit(ting) strikers to participate in the food stamp program * * * (would) upset() th(e) delicate balance between labor and management when a strike is resorted to as an economic weapon in the collective bargaining process()" (id. at 24232 (Rep. Michel)). /3/ See H.R. Rep. 91-1402, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970); 117 Cong. Rec. 21671-21676 (1971). In 1972, the House proposed legislation providing that no funds appropriated for the Food Stamp Act could be used "to make food stamps available for the duration of a strike to a household which needs assistance solely because any member of such household is a participant in such strike" (118 Cong. Rec. 23364 (1972) (Rep. Michel)). Representative Michel, the sponsor of the bill (see id. at 22462 (Rep. Anderson)), explained that "(f)ood stamps were intended to assist the unfortunate families whose breadwinners have been unwillingly unemployed. It is not bargaining legislation and we have no right to use food stamps for this purpose. * * * To provide food stamps to strikers increases the union's ability to 'hold out' and by doing this, Government automatically places business at a disadvantage in the negotiating process" (id. at 23366). Representative Michel also contended (id. at 23367) that union strike funds should be relied on to support striking employees and their households. See also id. at 23367-23368 (Rep. Abbitt); id. at 23368 (Rep. Pelly); id. at 23368-23369 (Rep. Teague); id. at 23370-23371 (Rep. Anderson); id. at 23373-23374 (Rep. Crane); id. at 23375 (Rep. Winn); ibid. (Rep. Fisher); id. at 23375-23376 (Rep. Quie); id. at 23376-23377 (Rep. Blackburn); id. at 23377 (Rep. Lloyd); ibid. (Rep. Skubitz); id. at 23377-23378 (Rep. Conover). By a vote of 199 to 180, the bill was defeated on the House floor (id. at 23378). /4/ Representative Dickinson, the sponsor of the legislation, stressed that it was "not an anti-organized labor amendment, but rather it is a pro-poor-people amendment. Every dollar that is taken away from those who are in need to help subsidize someone on strike, who is not in need, to that extent it is a perversion of the intent of the original passage of the law." 119 Cong. Rec. 24928 (1973). Supporters also stated that federal funds should not be used to assist only one side of a labor dispute (see, e.g., ibid. (Rep. Dickinson); id. at 24929 (Rep. Young); id. at 24939 (Rep. Burke)), and contended that union strike funds were the appropriate sources of assistance (see, e.g., id. at 24929 (Rep. Young); id. at 24932 (Rep. Rousselot); ibid. (Rep. Teague); id. at 24937 (Rep. Michel); id. at 24939 (Rep. Burke)). Other members observed that the proposed limitation was consistent with the policy that "(a)n able-bodied man who elects to stop working * * * should not be * * * encouraged in his actions by the Federal Government" (id. at 24929 (Rep. Young); see also id. at 24938 (Rep. Henderson)). /5/ Although the Conferees could not agree on the House proposal, they made clear their intent that persons unemployed by strikes, like persons unemployed for other reasons, had to satisfy the work-registration requirements of 7 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 2015(d)(1) in order for their households to qualify for food stamps. The Conferees stated (H.R. Rep. 93-427, supra, at 40) that they deplore the lack of enforcement of existing food stamp regulations which require that an able-bodied person in the household register for employment "including a person who is not working because of a strike or lockout at his usual place of employment." It is the specific intent of the Conferees that this provision of the regulations be rigidly and uniformly enforced by the Department of Agriculture * * *. Eligibility of strikers for food stamps should be carefully scrutinized prior to certification and certification made only in those cases where the household of the individual striker applicant meets all of the requirements of eligibility as in the case of other applicants. /6/ At the same time, Congress rejected a proposal to "automatically and unequivocally disqualify() any and all strikers from participation in the food stamp program" because it concluded that such an absolute bar would unduly pressure the employee and his family to abandon the strike. H.R. Rep. 96-788, supra, at 132-133. /7/ The 1981 amendment was accomplished by deleting the third proviso from the 1980 version of Section 2015(d)(4) and by making certain ancillary changes. See 7 U.S.C. (Supp. V. 1981) 2015(d)(4). Section 2015(d)(4) was redesignated as Section 2015(d)(3) by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, Section 190(b), 96 Stat. 787. /8/ On the same day, the district court also granted class certification (J.S. App. 66a-70a) and ordered the union appellees to furnish a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the Secretary's costs of food stamps provided under the injunction pending appeal (id. at 50a). /9/ See also Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 588-593 (1982) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal limitations that result in higher Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) than to persons who are self-supporting); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. at 230-239 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on SSI eligibility that provides benefits only to residents in public institutions who receive Medicaid funds for their care); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174-178 (1978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to federal limitations on payment of SSI benefits to persons who reside outside the United States for a period of greater than 30 days); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to the divorced wives of retirees); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503-516 (1976) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a federal limitation on payment of Social Security benefits to surviving illegitimate children who are unable to establish dependency on the putative parent). /10/ In accordance with this broader strategy, in February 1981 the President submitted to Congress an economic program calling for a "comprehensive reduction in the rapid growth of Federal spending." The President proposed "a careful set of guidelines" to identify "programs in virtually every department and agency that can be eliminated, reduced, or postponed." Program For Economic Recovery, H.R. Doc. 97-21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1981). The plan, largely enacted by the OBRA legislation, reflected the belief that "(t)he uncontrolled growth of government spending has been a primary cause of the sustained high rate of inflation experienced by the American economy" (id. at 32). One (but only one) part of this plan envisioned restoring "(t)he Food Stamp program * * * to its original purpose, to assist those without resources to purchase sufficient nutritional food" (id. at 3). /11/ Congress received testimony showing a causal connection between the provision of food stamps and the length of strikes. See Proposed Reauthorization of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 (Food Stamps): Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. II, at 162-165, 431-433 (1981). See also id. at 349-350 (statement of the National Labor-Management Foundation). Indeed, the declarations and affidavits submitted by appellees to the district court in support of their motion for summary judgment confirm that Congress was correct in its determination that granting food stamps to striking workers typically prolongs strikes and increases negotiated wage rates. See J.A. 9, 21, 26, 28, 32, 45, 47, 52. /12/ Accord, New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dep't, 440 U.S. 519, 531-532 (1979) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) (state unemployment compensation scheme, which furnished employer-financed benefits to striking workers, "not only provides financial support to striking employees but also adds to the burdens of the struck employers, * * * (thereby) alter(ing) the economic balance between labor and management"). /13/ The district court at one point suggested that Congress's effort to justify Section 2015(d)(3) as an effort to tie receipt of food stamps to recipients' willingness to work was "seriously weakened" by what the court perceived to be "significant and discriminatory differences between the treatment accorded a striker who stops work in concert with others and an individual who quits a job" (J.S. App. 13a; see id. at 44a-47a). This reasoning is flawed. In according somewhat more favorable treatment to voluntary quitters, Congress could reasonably have concluded that strikers, who have a job waiting for them whenever they choose to return to it, are better off than quitters, who have no certain prospect of employment whatsoever. Moreover, offering food stamps to quitters does not require the government to support a particular side of a labor dispute, whereas Congress could rationally conclude that the provision of food stamps to strikers would have that undesired effect. In any event, "(i)f the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citation omitted). "(T)he drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). /14/ If anything, Section 2015(d)(3) imposes fewer pressures on associational rights than did the statutory provisions upheld in Castillo and Rotary Club. In Castillo, the definition of "household" imposed a permanent limitation on the availability of food stamps to households made up of close relatives. The state law upheld in Rotary Club imposed a permanent constraint on the admission policies of the local clubs. In the present case, by contrast, the eligibility limitation applies only as long as the household member remains on strike. /15/ Moreover, it is obvious that strikers do not possess "immutable characteristic(s) determined solely by the accident of birth" (Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)), and that unions have not been "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process" (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). These attributes, both of which are lacking here, are "the traditional indicia of suspectedness" (Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974)). /16/ For the same reason, the district court's reliance (J.S. App. 12a-13a) on United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), is misplaced. In Moreno the Court held unconstitutional a 1971 definition of "household" that effectively denied food stamps to households that shared their income with one or more unrelated persons. The Court observed that the statute had been enacted out of animus against "hippies" and held that such "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in the original). The district court here, by contrast, acknowledged that Section 2015(d)(3) is "rationally related to legitimate legislative objectives" (J.S. App. 10a), and, as we explain in the text, strikers are not a politically unpopular group or otherwise "suspect" class. Finally, the statutory scheme does not reflect the pervasive animus against strikers that the district court imagined. Under the first proviso to Section 2015(d)(3), for example, persons on strike retain whatever eligibility for food stamps they may have had before the strike began; they simply do not qualify for additional food stamps by reason of the loss of income occasioned by the strike. And while Section 2015(d)(3) may disadvantage strikers to some degree, the statute incorporates other provisions that work to the disadvantage of employers involved in labor disputes, thus preserving an overall posture of government neutrality. See page 19, supra. /17/ Congress expressly found that the elimination of benefits to households of striking workers would reduce administrative costs. As the Senate report put it (S. Rep. 97-139, supra, at 119), "(b)ecause (strikers') tenure in the program is temporary, their elimination will reduce the administrative expense of initiating and then terminating (usually within several months) eligibility." /18/ The district court predicated its "narrow tailoring" requirement on this Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), but that case simply will not bear such an expansive rendering. The Court in Plyler held unconstitutional a Texas statute that withheld funds for the education of children who were not legally admitted into the United States. In doing so, however, the Court made clear (457 U.S. at 221) that education is not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." To the contrary, the Court noted (id. at 223) that the denial of an education -- unlike the denial of routine welfare benefits -- "imposes a lifetime hardship" and a "stigma of illiteracy (that) will mark (the children) for the rest of their lives." Moreover, whereas the Food Stamp program has always operated on a household basis, the statute in Plyler made only the "innocent children * * * its victims" (id. at 224). Only by ignoring the explicit rationale of the Court in Plyler could the district court find that decision to support its reasoning here.