UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. IKE KOZMINSKI, ET AL. No. 86-2000 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1987 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Brief for the United States TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional and statutory provisions involved Statement Summary of argument Argument: The means by which a person may unlawfully hold another to "involuntary servitude" are not limited to physical or legal coercion A. By their terms, the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 extend to any form of conduct that compels a person to work for another against his will B. The history of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 does not support the court of appeals' restrictive interpretation C. A construction of "involuntary servitude" commensurate with its plain meaning is not unduly broad and does not present vagueness concerns Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the en banc court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-71a), is reported at 821 F.2d 1196. The opinion of the three-judge panel of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 72a-106a) is unreported. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 107a) was entered on April 16, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 18 U.S.C. 241 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; * * * * * * * * They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. 1584 provides as follows: Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether "involuntary servitude," as prohibited and made criminal by the Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 241 and 1584, is present only where a person compels another to remain in his service through physical or legal coercion or, if the victim is a minor, an immigrant, or a mental incompetent, through fraud and deceit. STATEMENT Respondents Ike and Margarethe Kozminski and their son John Kozminski were convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on charges of conspiring to deprive two mentally retarded men of their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 241. Ike and Margarethe Kozminski were also convicted of holding the two men to involuntary servitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584. John Kozminski was acquitted on that count. All three respondents were placed on probation for two years. In addition, Ike Kozminski was fined $20,000 and was ordered to pay $6,190.80 in restitution to each of the two victims. John Kozminski was fined $10,000. 1. The evidence at trial showed that in 1967 Margarethe Kozminski picked up Robert Fulmer while he was walking down the road and took him to work on the Kozminski family farm (Pet. App. 3a-4a; J.A. 92-93). At the time, Fulmer was working at another farm, and Mrs. Kozminski simply left a note telling Fulmer's former employer that Fulmer had gone (J.A. 93, 163). Mrs. Kozminski later told several people that she had kidnapped Fulmer (id. at 32, 88). Fulmer has an I.Q. of 67 (Pet. App. 3a). He lived in foster homes until he was eleven and spent some of his childhood at a training school (ibid.). Louis Molitoris came to the Kozminski farm in the early 1970's (Pet. App. 4a). Molitoris had been living on the streets in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and had sometimes used the Kozminski barber shop in Ann Arbor as a place to sleep (ibid.). At some point after they met, Ike Kozminski took Molitoris to work on his farm (ibid.; J.A. 96-97). Molitoris has an I.Q. of 60 (Pet. App. 3a) and was once institutionalized at a state mental hospital (J.A. 129). Initially, the Kozminskis paid Fulmer $15 per week, plus room and board and clothing (J.A. 94). The pay was soon cut to $11 per week (id. at 96-97). Eventually, the Kozminskis eliminated regular pay entirely, and the only money the men received were gifts of $10 each on holidays and at the time of the county fair (id. at 97, 111-112). Fulmer and Molitoris worked seven days a week, often from 3 a.m. until 8:30 p.m., and sometimes as late as 10 p.m. (J.A. 98, 102). A major part of their work was cleaning the cow manure out of the barn twice a day, since the machine used for that task was broken (id. at 42-43). The rest of the day they did odd jobs around the farm (id. at 99). The men were occasionally taken to a baseball game, and they were taken to the county fair once a year, but they never had a vacation (id. at 104, 118, 167). From about 1980, the men were housed in a dilapidated, insect-infected trailer that had broken windows, no running water, no lights, and no heat (J.A. 37, 56). The two men slept on cots, with no sheets (id. at 41). The Kozminskis dressed the men in tattered clothes that were inadequate for warmth (Pet. App. 74a; J.A. 53); neighbors had to provide the men with gloves in the winter (J.A. 72). The men's clothing became filthy, and the only laundry equipment available to them was a broken washing machine in the barn (J.A. 39, 146). While the Kozminskis once paid for some dental care for Fulmer (J.A. 125), both men were otherwise denied needed medical assistance (Pet. App. 74a). On one occasion, Fulmer cut off the tip of his thumb, and the Kozminskis would not let him go to the hospital (ibid.; J.A. 109-110). Molitoris was once gored by a bull and at another time kicked by a calf, but on both occasions the Kozminskis refused his request to see a doctor (J.A. 131-133). After his removal from the farm, Fulmer was found to be suffering from hypertension and arthritis (id. at 75). Molitoris was suffering from hypertension that damaged his heart muscle and several blood vessels in his eye (id. at 77). He had no teeth, scoliosis, an anotropic right testicle, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (id. at 77, 79). He was also substantially underweight, had peripheral nerve damage in his hands and feet, and had severe diarrhea -- all resulting from deficiencies in his diet (ibid.). The Kozminskis subjected Fulmer and Molitoris to physical and verbal abuse when they did not do their work as they were directed (Pet. App. 74a; see J.A. 37, 44, 52, 54-55, 70, 94, 105-106, 127, 152). In addition, the Kozminskis' herdsmen were instructed to hit Fulmer and Molitoris if necessasry to get them to work (J.A. 37), and Molitoris was beaten nearly every day by one of the herdsmen (id. at 105). The Kozminskis directed the men not to leave the farm (J.A. 110, 134). The Kozminskis also threatened to send the men to institutions if they did not do what they were told (Pet. App. 19a; J.A. 56-57, 108). While Fulmer did not mind living at the training school when he was young, he was afraid to go back there as an adult (J.A. 92, 108). Ike Kozminski told Molitoris that he had to spend the rest of his life on the farm, although Molitoris testified that he did not believe that (J.A. 151). /1/ The Kozminskis told the men not to talk to others and told others not to talk to them (Pet. App. 74a; J.A. 51, 69-70, 111). Once, when Fulmer used the phone to call a neighbor, Margarethe Kozminski ripped the phone from the wall and told him never to use it again (Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 109). On another occasion, the Kozminskis told Molitoris that a neighbor might shoot him (J.A. 63). To prevent others from interfering, the Kozminskis falsely told neighbors, farm hands, and visitors that the men were in their legal custody as wards of the state (Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 37, 66, 71). The Kozminskis also discouraged relatives from contacting the men, and they discouraged the men from contacting their relatives (Pet. App. 74a). When Fulmer's sister called to arrange a visit, Margarethe told her that Fulmer would be upset by such a visit and that she should not come (J.A. 90). Margarethe made the same representation to Fulmer's brother (id. at 169). Fulmer once told Ike Kozminski that he would like to visit his brother and sister, and Ike replied that they did not care about him (Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 112). Shortly after Molitoris came to the farm, the Kozminskis had him burn the trunk containing all his possessions -- including his family pictures -- because, they claimed, the trunk had cockroaches (Pet. App. 5a; J.A. 136-137). The men were not physically imprisoned or continuously guarded, and sometimes they left the farm for brief periods to visit neighbors or to go into town (Pet. App. 3a, 5a). Each time the men tried to run away, however, the Kozminskis or one of their employees went after them and brought them back (id. at 74a; J.A. 59-62, 134-135). Once when they were away from the farm, Fulmer and Molitoris ran into a policeman, but they did not ask for help (J.A. 113-114, 142). As their circumstances deteriorated, however, Fulmer and Molitoris began to plead with people to help them leave the farm (Pet. App. 74a). Molitoris once begged someone who did business with the Kozminskis to call the police to take him away (J.A. 49). Fulmer told a neighbor that he had to get away from the Kozminskis because "'they are killing me'" (id. at 73). And Molitoris pleaded with a temporary resident of the farm to take him along when he left (id. at 87-88). In August of 1983, a newly hired herdsman helped the men to leave the farm. While the Kozminskis were out of town, the herdsman notified county officials of the conditions under which the men lived (J.A. 38). When the sheriff and a social service employee came to the farm, Fulmer and Molitoris asked to be taken away before the Kozminskis returned (id. at 84-85). The men were then taken to an adult foster care home (id. at 85). Expert testimony established that Fulmer and Molitoris view the world like children of between seven and ten years of age (J.A. 160). If someone in authority tells them to do something, they do not look at their options as an adult would (id. at 160-161). They are far more compliant, and they usually just do what they are told to do (ibid.). The Kozminskis were fully aware that the men had limited mental abilities (id. at 35). 2. At the close of the evidence, the district court instructed the jury concerning the meaning of the term "involuntary servitude." The same instructions applied to both the Section 1584 count and the Section 241 count for conspiring to deprive Fulmer and Molitoris of their Thirteenth Amendment rights (see Pet. App. 109a-112a; J.A. 171-176, 185). The court instructed the jury that it was "to determine if there was a means of compulsion used, sufficient in kind and degree, to subject a person having the same general station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no reasonable means of escape and no choice except to remain in the service of the employer" (Pet. App. 110a). The court stated that involuntary servitude "may include situations in which * * * coercive acts or words cause persons in employment to believe they cannot freely leave employment if the acts are done or the words spoken with the intent to cause this result" (id. at 109a). The court cautioned the jury that "an employer can use any legitimate means to retain the services of an employee, such as offering the employee benefits, or seeking to convince the employee that he would be better off if he continued in his employment" (id. at 110a). The court also instructed the jurors that in order to convict, they had to find that respondents' actions were done "knowingly and willfully," and with specific intent to hold the victims to involuntary servitude (Pet. App. 112a-113a). Finally, the court instructed the jury that in addition to the necessary coercion and intention on the part of respondents, "you must find that those means were an actual and necessary cause of the decision of one or both of the alleged victims to continue working for (respondents)" (id. at 111a). 3. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions (Pet. App. 72a-106a). The court rejected respondents' claim that Section 1584 would be unconstitutionally vague if not limited to cases of physical or legal coercion (Pet. App. 77a-78a). Adopting the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1454-1455, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984), the court concluded that Section 1584's "mens rea requirement vitiated vagueness concerns" that might otherwise be presented by a broader construction of the statute (Pet. App. 79a). 4. On rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed (Pet. App. 1a-71a). The court agreed with the district court that "involuntary servitude" requires a showing that "the servant believes that he has no viable alternative but to perform service for the master" (id. at 12a). And the court agreed that there was sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to find that the victims believed they had "no viable alternative but to perform the labor in question" (id. at 15a). The court held, however, that the district court had improperly instructed the jury on the standard for proving involuntary servitude and remanded for a new trial. The en banc count concluded that a holding to involuntary servitude occurs only when (id. at 12a (footnote omitted)): (a) the servant believes that he or she has no viable alternative but to perform service for the master (b) because of (1) the master's use or threatened use of physical force, or (2) the master's use or threatened use of state-imposed legal coercion (i.e., peonage), or (3) the master's use of fraud or deceit to obtain or maintain services where the servant is a minor, an immigrant or one who is mentally incompetent. In the court's view, the jury charge was too broad because it "would appear to criminalize general psychological coercion without fraud, deceit, force or legal coercion and would include all individuals within the covered class of victims subject to psychological coercion, not just the particularly vulnerable classes" (Pet. App. 14a). Finding sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the victims were mentally incompetent and that the defendants practiced fraud and deceit in maintaining their services, the court remanded for a new trial on that limited ground (id. at 14a-15a). /2/ Five judges dissented (Pet. App. 50a-68a). They concluded that the court had instructed "an arbitrary definition (of involuntary servitude) that raises more questions than it answers" (id. at 51a). The dissenters stated that the definition "not only unduly focuses on the means of accomplishing involuntary servitude, but also, at least as to its third prong, would define and limit the classes of persons to whom it applies" (ibid. (emphasis in original)). According to the dissenters, involuntary servitude occurs whenever "'the subjugation of the will of the servant is so complete as to render him incapable of making a rational choice'" (id. at 52a, quoting United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 488 (2d Cir. 1964) (Dimock, J., concurring)). /3/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 1584 contain broad prohibitions against "involuntary servitude." The terms of the two provisions do not limit the prohibition to servitude that is imposed on particular groups of people or by particular methods. The court of appeals, however, held that "involuntary servitude," within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584, is limited to service that is obtained by either legal or physical force, except in the case of minors, incompetents, and immigrants, when it includes service obtained by fraud or deceit. That analysis is wrong for several reasons: it imposes an unwarranted restriction on the means by whch the condition of involuntary servitude can be imposed; it recognizes three classes of persons who are entitled to special treatment, in spite of the absence of any textual support for such a distinction in the Thirteenth Amendment or Section 1584; and it ignores a common form of involuntary servitude, where the master subjugates the will of the servant by a variety of means to the point that the servant is deprived of the capacity to make any choice at all. The broad and straightforward language of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 does not comport with the intricate and restrictive gloss embraced by the court of appeals. Contrary to the view of the court of appeals, we submit that the condition of involuntary servitude can arise from a variety of causes -- not just legal or physical coercion. The history of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 likewise does not support the restrictive construction adopted by the court of appeals. The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to be comprehensive in its scope and to help maintain "a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States." Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). Nothing in the history of the Thirteenth Amendment suggests that its ban on involuntary servitude was meant to be limited to involuntary labor obtained through physical or legal coercion. Section 1584 was enacted in 1948. It was the product of the consolidation and extension of two predecessor statutes -- the Slave Trade statute and the Padrone statute. Although both of those statutes were significantly narrower in certain respects than Section 1584, neither was confined in its language or purpose in the way that the court of appeals held Section 1584 should be. Both statutes were enacted out of concern about forms of involuntary labor performed by particularly vulnerable persons, but Congress did not limit the reach of either statute to any particular class of persons, nor did Congress limit the kinds of coercion that it deemed to fall within the prohibition of those two statutes. Indeed, the background of the two statutes suggests that the victims about whom Congress was most concerned were persons whose involuntary labor was being obtained not by force, but by more subtle forms of coercion. Section 1584, which was based on the two predecessor statutes, thus cannot properly be read to be limited to legal and physical forms of coercion. The elements of a Section 1584 or Thirteenth Amendment violation are as follows: (1) the victim must have worked for the defendant against his will; (2) the defendant must have specifically intended that result; and (3) the defendant's conduct must have been the cause of that outcome. Although the court of appeals expressed concern that in that form the statute would sweep too broadly, we submit that in fact the statute is quite limited in its reach. In order to prove that the victim is working for another against his will, the government must show either that the defendant physically restrained the victim or that he left the victim no choice but to remain. That is, the victim must have had no tolerable alternative, or must have been deprived altogether of his power to choose. In addition, the government must show that the defendant specifically intended to compel the victim to work against his will. Thus, in the case of a particularly vulnerable victim, the government must show that the defendant was aware of the victim's vulnerabilities and deliberately exploited them to compel the victim to continue in service. Finally, the government must show that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the victim's involuntary labor. Economic necessity or other social conditions that induce an employee to work contrary to his choice would not constitute involuntary servitude within the meaning of Section 1584 or the Thirteenth Amendment. Viewed in this fashion, the term "involuntary servitude" is sufficiently specific to satisfy constitutional standards, and it is sufficiently narrow to satisfy concerns that the term will be used to criminalize the driving of hard bargains in the employment context. A person who obtains service by forcing another to work against his will has ample notice of the unlawfulness of his conduct, regardless of the means he uses in achieving his aim. ARGUMENT THE MEANS BY WHICH A PERSON MAY UNLAWFULLY HOLD ANOTHER TO "INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE" ARE NOT LIMITED TO PHYSICAL OR LEGAL COERCION Involuntary servitude exists whenever the victim's service is compelled against his will. The term involuntary servitude refers to the victim's condition, not to the circumstances that led to it. In this case, as in most cases, /4/ the victims' involuntary servitude was the product of a combination of measures. Respondents physically intimidated their victims, verbally abused them, subjected them to degrading and substandard living conditions, deprived them of needed medical care, kept them in poverty and under their control by denying them any pay, /5/ directed them not to leave the farm and brought them back when they ran away, threatened to have them institutionalized if they failed to follow orders, isolated them from persons who might attempt to assist them, and dissuaded others by claiming (falsely) to be the legal guardians of the two workers. Although the court of appeals agreed that this evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude "that the victims believed that they had no viable alternative but to perform the labor in question" (Pet. App. 15a), the court held, in effect, that most of this evidence was improperly before the jury because Section 1584 and the Thirteenth Amendment generally do not apply to forms of coercion other than legal or physical force. We submit that nothing in the language or relevant history of either law supports that result. A. By Their Terms, The Thirteenth Amendment And Section 1584 Extend To Any Form Of Conduct That Compels A Person To Work For Another Against His Will The Thirteenth Amendment proclaims that "involuntary servitude * * * shall (not) exist within the United States." Section 1584 expresses Congress's continuing commitment to that promise by making it unlawful to "knowingly and willfully hold() to involuntary servitude * * * any other person for any term." Except for the Thirteenth Amendment's obvious exclusion of criminal punishment, there are no words of limitation. /6/ We submit that the straightforward prohibition against involuntary servitude extends to any conduct that is designed to compel a person to work for another against his will. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the elements of a criminal violation of Section 1584 and the Thirteenth Amendment are: (1) the victim must be working for another against his will; (2) the defendant must have specifically intended that result; and (3) the defendant's conduct must have caused that outcome. /7/ The court of appeals, however, read the simple terms of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 to create a complex and sharply qualified formula. According to the court of appeals, a person is held to involuntary servitude only when the person's service is compelled by physical or legal coercion, unless he is a minor, an immigrant, or a mental incompetent, in which case he can be held to involuntary servitude if his service is compelled by fraud or deceit. /8/ The decision of the Sixth Circuit is wrong for several reasons. First, the court's limitation of the means by which one may hold another to involuntary servitude is groundless. Both the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 condemn the intentional creation of a result: involuntary servitude. Neither prescribes the means by which that result is achieved. It is certainly true that involuntary servitude can result from legal coercion, physical restraints, or threats of violence that restrain the victim by stating or implying that serious physical injury will result if the servant attempts to leave the master's service. But nothing in the Thirteenth Amendment or Section 1584 suggests that the kind of conduct that leads to involuntary servitude is limited to legal or physical coercion. In the absence of some textual basis for the distinction, it makes no sense to say that a threat of physical violence against the victim can give rise to a condition of involuntary servitude, but a threat of violence against the servant's relatives cannot. Likewise, if a threat of physical violence is enough to lead to a violation of Section 1584, surely the same must be true of a threat to burn down the servant's house or a threat to confiscate and destroy all the servant's property. It is also difficult to explain why a direct physical threat may lead to involuntary servitude, but it is not enough for the master to use deceit to persuade the servant, falsely, that he will suffer grave physical consequences if he leaves the master's service. /9/ Second, there is no textual support for the court of appeals' special treatment of minors, incompetents, and immigrants. Nothing in the text of either the Thirteenth Amendment or Section 1584 suggests that certain coercive means can create involuntary servitude only in certain classes of victims. Nor is there anything in the text of either provision to suggest that the expansion of grounds for liability in such a case should be limited to fraud and deceit. The creation of a class comprised of minors, immigrants, and incompetents, for whom involuntary servitude may be established by proof of fraud or deceit, is a distinctly legislative-type judgment, and it is one that has no footing in the language of either provision that is before the Court. /10/ Finally, and more fundamentally, the court of appeals mistakenly assumed that involuntary servitude results only when the master restrains the servant either physically or by threats that make known the severe consequences of leaving the master's service. Involuntary servitude, however, may also result from depriving the servant of the capacity for rational calculation. In that setting, the inquiry into wrongful subjugation focuses not on the offering of a choice the master has no right to present, but on the deliberate creation of conditions in which the servant is deprived of the capacity to choose at all. Physical abuse is no doubt an important cause of that state of mind in many, if not most, circumstances, but there is no logical reason why physical or legal coercion must be the sole cause. Indeed, the psychological nature of the process of subjugating a victim's will suggests the opposite conclusion. This kind of involuntary servitude demands judicial inquiry into matters other than mere physical and legal coercion. Although this Court has not previously addressed the issue raised in this case, its prior decisions discussing the Thirteenth Amendment, and the anti peonage law that was promulgated in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment, /11/ confirm that the plain meaning and "natural sense" (see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 (1824)) of the term "involuntary servitude" are contrary to the court of appeals' restrictive gloss. This Court and others have repeatedly interpreted the language of the Thirteenth Amendment and its statutory progeny as broadly denouncing "a status or condition, irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is created." Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905); see United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 144 (1914) (quoting Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. at 215) ("'peonage, however, created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude'"); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1917) ("The law takes no account of the * * * means of coercion."); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir. 1944) (same); In re Peonage Charge, 138 F. 686, 688 (N.D. Fla. 1905) ("This amendment denounces a state or condition irrespective of the manner or authority by which it is created."); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1903) ("The real vice * * * (is) the 'condition' it brought about."). Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911) (The law "is concerned with a fact, wherever it might exist; with a condition, however named and wherever it might be established, maintained, or enforced."); see also id. at 241 ("(T)he essence of involuntary servitude" is "that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed or or coerced for another's benefit."). Unlike the court of appeals, moreover, this Court has expressly recognized the second type of involuntary servitude, which involves "'the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another.'" Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906) (citation omitted). This type of involuntary servitude occurs not when the master compels the service against the victim's will by explicit or implicit threats that the victim is meant to comprehend, but instead, as the Court has described (ibid.), when the victim "has lost the power of resistance" and "surrenders himself to any power whatever" (ibid.). Cf. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). /12/ B. The History Of The Thirteenth Amendment And Section 1584 Does Not Support The Court Of Appeals' Restrictive Interpretation The court of appeals relied heavily on the historical background of the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584 to justify its narrow construction of those provisions. In fact, the historical background does not support that restrictive interpretation. 1. The immediate objective of the Thirteenth Amendment, of course, was the abolition of the system of African slavery. /13/ But the framers of the Amendment had a larger purpose as well: to prevent the emergence of any form of compulsory labor. To accomplish that purpose, the framers deliberately borrowed the language of the Northwest Ordinance, which included a separate prohibition against involuntary servitude and which had previously been construed to prohibit forms of compulsory service other than classic slavery. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 240-241; Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483-1490 (1864). /14/ During the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, Senator Sumner objected to the use of the language from the Northwest Ordinance, on the ground that while "slavery in our day is something distinct, perfectly well known, requiring no words of distinction outside of itself," the separate prohibition against involuntary servitude was superfluous and would "introduce a doubt" (Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1487-1488 (1864)). Congress, however, was not persuaded. Supporters of the language of the Ordinance argued in favor of the use of a "clear, brief, and comprehensive clause" (id. at 1489 (remarks of Sen. Howard)). The supporters made clear that the Amendment was not intended to reach certain exceptional cases of involuntary service that had always been viewed as socially beneficial, such as the duty of a child to his parent and of the apprentice to his master. Id. at 1424 (remarks of Sen. Johnson); id. at 1437 (remarks of Sen. Harlan). With those narrow exceptions, however, the framers intended for the Amendment to have a "comprehensive" sweep (see note 6, supra). The inclusion of the prohibition against involuntary servitude was significant. As explained by this Court soon after the Amendment's enactment, "(t)he word servitude is of larger meaning than slavery." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1872). "(I)nvoluntary servitude was intended to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce undesirable results." Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916). Hence, "(t)he undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment * * * was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States." Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 241 ("to make labor free"); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("established universal freedom"). Moreover, the history of the Thirteenth Amendment offers no support for the court of appeals' creation of distinctions in its application to different categories of persons. Instead, as this Court has observed, the Amendment established "a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag" (Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 240-241 (emphasis added); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. at 17 ("every individual"); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) ("everyone"); In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) ("all persons")). 2. The legislative background to Section 1584 does not suggest that Congress intended that law to have a narrower scope than the Thirteenth Amendment. Rather, the statute was the culmination of Congress's effort to combat new forms of involuntary servitude as they arose and came to Congress's attention. That effort began only two years after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, when Congress passed the Anti-Peonage Act, making it unlawful to "hold() * * * any person to a condition of peonage." Rev. Stat. Section 5526 (1878 ed.). Peonage differed substantially from classic slavery. The peon voluntarily entered into the service of his master, the master advanced a sum of money, and the peon agreed to serve until the debt was repaid. Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 673-674 (M.D. Ala. 1903). This agreement was enforced not through physical force but through laws that required imprisonment or fines if the peon failed to honor his obligations (id. at 674). Despite the differences between peonage and classic slavery, Congress concluded that peonage was a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment and sought to extinguish it. In 1874, Congress concluded that further legislation was needed to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Prompted by reports that over 5,000 Italian children were being "held in something kindred to slavery" (2 Cong. Rec. 2 (1873) (statement of Sen. Summer)), Congress enacted the "Padrone statute," one of the two predecessors to Section 1584. That statute made it unlawful (1) to inveigle or kidnap any person from another country with the intent to hold that person to involuntary service; (2) to sell any such person into involuntary service; or (3) to hold any such person to involuntary service. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464, Section 1, 18 Stat. 251. The practice Congress sought to abolish was commonly known as the "padrone system." Under that system, padrones would go to Italy and pay parents to apprentice their children to them for a period of years. During their apprenticeships, the children would work for the padrones without pay as street musicians and beggars. United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 678-680 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880). The padrones would entice the children to come by telling them that they would be taught how to play musical instruments and that they would eventually prosper. Once here, without parents or relatives to turn to, the children had little choice but to submit to the demands of whose who asserted authority over them. Id. at 683. Because of the immense psychological pressure on the children to remain with their masters, Congress concluded that the patrone system resulted in a form of involuntary servitude, even though the victims were not subjected to either legal or physical coercion. Ibid. In 1909, Congress again decided that new legislation was necessary to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, and it enacted the second of the two immediate predecessors to Section 1584. The 1909 Act was actually an amendment to the Slave Trade statute, an 1818 Act that had prohibited the practice of bringing blacks into this country to be held as slaves. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, Section 6, 3 Stat. 452. Under the terms of the amendment, Congress made it unlawful to bring "any person" into the United States from another country as a slave or "to be held to service or labor," or to hold anyone brought into the country for that purpose. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, Section 248, 35 Stat. 1139. In explaining the purpose of the amendment, Senator Heyburn pointed out that although "the conditions that made (the earlier) legislation necessary have passed away * * * other conditions have arisen" (42 Cong. Rec. 1114 (1908)). In particular, he explained, the new statute was addressed to cases in which persons from Asia and Europe were brought to this country to work under contracts entered into on their behalf by others (id. at 1115). In response to arguments that such contracts are not binding and cannot be specifically performed, Senator Heyburn stated that the amendment was designed to protect those who come here "without being a party to the disposition of their services or the control of their rights, whether they be children of irresponsible years and conditions or whether they be people who, because of their environment or the condition of their lives, can not protect themselves" (ibid.). Thus, in the case of the Slave Trade statute, as in the case of the Padrone statute, Congress used the concept of involuntary servitude to protect persons who were subject to coercion because of their vulnerability, and not because of legal or physical force. Section 1584 was enacted as part of the 1948 revision to the Criminal Code (see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 773). Although it was based on the Slave Trade statute (18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 423) and the Padrone statute (see 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 446), Section 1584 was significantly broader than either of its predecessors. Neither of those statutes made unlawful the mere holding of another to involuntary servitude; rather, each required that the person being held have been previously brought to this country from abroad or sold into involuntary servitude. See Brodie, The Federally Secured Right To Be Free From Bondage, 40 Geo. L.J. 367, 369 (1952). The expansion of the scope of the new statute was no mere happenstance. Since the early 1900s, the Department of Justice had sought such an amendment in order to bolster the Department's effort to bring successful criminal prosecutions against coercive practices which resulted in involuntary servitude, but which fell outside the scope of federal peonage laws because they did not depend on claims of indebtedness. See 1 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 11, 207-208 (1907) (hereinafter 1907 Ann. Rep.); C. Russell, Report on Peonage (1908); see generally P. Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (1972); Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. Southern Hist. 31 (Feb.-Nov. 1976). The Department recommended that "the definition of legal peonage be made broad enough to include the holding of persons in servitude whether in liquidation of an indebtedness 'or otherwise'" (1907 Ann. Rep. 207; C. Russell, supra, at 24-25). The first report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which was published in 1947, just before the enactment of Section 1584, made a similar strongly-worded proposal for legislation. The Committee recommended that Congress enact "a new criminal statute on involuntary servitude, supplementing Sections 443 and 444 of Title 18 of the United States Code" (Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights 158 (1947)). According to the Report, the enactment "should make full exercise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment by defining slavery and involuntary servitude broadly" (ibid.). Congress's enactment of Section 1584 in 1948 had the effect of adopting those recommendations and putting them into effect. To be sure, none of the congressional reports or other materials accompanying the 1948 legislation comments on the change in the law made by Section 1584. /15/ Nonetheless, the expansion of the scope of Section 1584 over that of its predecessors was obvious on its face, and clearly effected a broadening of the reach of the prior statutes. /16/ In light of the familiar and longstanding Executive Branch recommendation to broaden the statutory prohibition against involuntary servitude, the 1948 change that produced Section 1584 is best seen as congressional adoption of that recommendation. /17/ In light of this legislative background, it is not surprising that every court of appeals but one /18/ has read Section 1584 more broadly than the Sixth Circuit in this case. Those decisions support our view that physical or legal coercion are not the exclusive means of holding another to involuntary servitude and that a person may be held to involuntary servitude by being intentionally deprived of the ability to make a rational choice not to remain in the master's service. According to the Ninth Circuit, the "crucial factor" is not the precise character of the means of coercion. See United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1453, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). Rather, "(a) holding to involuntary servitude occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by improper or wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, or does cause, the other person to believe that he or she has no alternative but to perform the labor" (ibid.). Prior decisions of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have suggested their agreement with the Ninth Circuit standard and their disagreement with the inflexible standard now adopted by the Sixth Circuit in this case. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1977) ("the law takes no account of the means of coercion"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 833-834 (11th Cir. 1985) ("(v)arious forms of coercion may constitute a holding in involuntary servitude"); see also United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 488 (Dimock, J., concurring) ("Where the subjugation of the will of the servant is so complete as to render him incapable of making a rational choice, the servitude is involuntary."). In reaching a contrary view, the court below drew the wrong lesson from the historical materials. Rather than viewing the two predecessor statutes of Section 1584 as demonstrating Congress's awareness that involuntary servitude is not invariably accompanied by legal or physical coercion, the court of appeals focused on the precise evil that had provoked each of those statutes, and concluded that Congress was specially concerned with the exploitation of minors, incompetents, and immigrants. Yet by their terms, the predecessor statutes were not limited to persons in those groups, and there is no suggestion in the history of Section 1584 that Congress meant to confine the new statute in that way. The important point that the court of appeals overlooked is that the two predecessor statutes establish that Congress has never subscribed to the view that legal or physical coercion is a necessary component of involuntary servitude. Section 1584 simply applied that principle in a more general fashion. Accordingly, the background of Section 1584 does not at all support the restrictive construction adopted by the Sixth Circuit or even the more restrictive reading adopted by the Second Circuit, which would limit the scope of the statute in all cases to instances of legal or physical coercion. There is no such language of limitation in the statute, and that result is manifestly not what the 1948 Congress intended. C. A Construction Of "Involuntary Servitude" Commensurate With Its Plain Meaning Is Not Unduly Broad And Does Not Present Vagueness Concerns Respondents (Br. in Opp. 5) and the Sixth Circuit (Pet. App. 14a), have suggested that the term "involuntary servitude" must be read narrowly to avoid sweeping into the criminal net a host of innocent "day-to-day activities" involving "general psychological coercion" (ibid.). These concerns are unfounded. 1. The stringent demands of the elements of the involuntary servitude offense ensure that prosecutions will occur, as in this case, only in the most egregious circumstances. The small number of prosecutions brought under these prosecutions testifies to the stringency of their elements. As previously noted, the government must establish that: (1) the victim worked for another against his will; (2) the defendant acted "knowingly and willfully" with the specific intent to overcome the will of the victim; and (3) the defendant's conduct caused the forbidden result. Contrary to respondents' suggestion (Br. in Opp. 4), there is no danger that prosecutors, courts, and juries will be unable to distinguish, through the application of those elements, between psychological coercion linked to "the ineffable attraction of a loved one, the charisma of a spiritual leader, (and) the compelling character of a political leader" and the type of coercive conduct engaged in by respondents in this case. 4 a. First, the government must prove that the victim is working for another against his will. To do so, the government must show either that the master physically restrained the victim or left the victim no choice but to remain. "No choice" does not merely mean that there are no attractive or painless options. Instead, the victim must have been left, or believed that he was left, with no tolerable alternative, but to remain in the master's service. For the victim to have no choice means either that his power to choose must have been destroyed by the master or that his only choice besides working for the master is to suffer death or physical injury, or a consequence that the victim regards as equally serious or even more serious than those. /19/ Hence, as the district court instructed the jury in this case (see Pet. App. 11a), "an employer can use any legitimate means to retain the services of an employee, such as offering the employee benefits, or seeking to convince the employee that he would be better off if he continued in his employment." Such inducements do not wrongfully eliminate choice, and while they may persuade the employee to remain, they do not have the effect of overcoming the employee's right to choose his employment. /20/ Likewise, poor working conditions do not themselves establish involuntary servitude. "(I)n general, the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers" (Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. at 18), and even occupations (see Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)). Finally, where it is at issue, the government ordinarily must explain why the victim could not, or believed he could not, escape or seek assistance from law enforcement officials or others. Evidence that the victim did not take advantage of opportunities to escape or seek assistance will make it difficult for the government to prove that the victim lacked any choice but to continue in servitude, unless the evidence provides a satisfactory explanation for the victim's failure to exploit such opportunities. /21/ b. Second, the government must establish that the defendant knowingly and willfully compelled the victim to work against his will, which means that the defendant must specifically intend to cause that result by his conduct. "(S)pecific intent or purpose * * * require(s) some specialized knowledge or design for some evil beyond the common-law intent to do injury." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 265 (1952) (footnote omitted). For instance, in a case such as this one, which involves victims who are particularly susceptible to coercion, the government must do more than just show that respondents' conduct had the effect of compelling their labor; the government must further establish that respondents were aware of their victims' vulnerabilities and deliberately exploited them for the purpose of compelling their continued labor against their will. The specific intent element removes from the reach of federal criminal sanctions the kinds of innocent "day-to-day activities" involving psychological inducements that the court of appeals feared would be subject to criminal prosecution under the interpretation of the involuntary servitude provisions that we propose. c. Finally, the defendant's conduct must be the cause of the victim's condition. A person does not hold another to involuntary servitude when the coercion stems from societal conditions rather than from the defendant's own conduct. For instance, "economic necessity may force persons to accept jobs that they would prefer not to perform or to work for wages they would prefer not to work for (and) (s)uch persons may feel coerced into laboring at those jobs." United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d at 1453. An employer is not legally responsible for that source of coercion under either the Thirteenth Amendment or Section 1584 and hence could not be prosecuted on that basis. For that reason, an employer does not engage in coercive activity within the scope of either the Thirteenth Amendment or Section 1584 when he truthfully informs an employee about the severe economic disadvantages of leaving, even if those disadvantages include the possibility of no further employment (and starvation), and even if the employer provides that information to the employee for the purpose of inducing the employee to remain in his service. 2. Nor is the meaning of the term "involuntary servitude" so vague as to raise constitutional concerns and justify "distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation." United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 529-530 (1944) (footnote omitted) (rejecting vagueness challenge to federal Anti-Peonage Act). We submit that the term "involuntary servitude" affords defendants "a reasonable degree of certainty" as to the scope of the prohibition. Boyce Motor Lines v. United Stagtes, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). "(O)rdinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited," and "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" is not encouraged. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Moreover, the requirement that the government prove specific intent on the part of any defendant to hold a victim in involuntary servitude provides significant protection against the infirmities of vague legislation. A specific intent requirement has often been held to allay vagueness concerns in legislation subject to a due process challenge. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 349 U.S. 379, 395 (1979); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947). Accordingly, this Court and lower courts have uniformly rejected vaguenss challenges to criminal laws the violation of which, as in this case, turns on the degree of coercion used or the absence of a victim's consent. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 3, 5-8 (upholding statute making it unlawful to "coerce" an employer to hire more employees than he needs); CISPES v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 475-477 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding statute making it unlawful to coerce certain foreign officials); International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 830-831 (5th Cir. 1979) (upholding ordinance making it unlawful to coerce another person at an airport); NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 11 n.9 (1st Cir. 1976) (upholding statute prohibiting unions from coercing employees in the exercise of their labor law rights), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). /22/ To be sure, whether a person has been held to involuntary servitude may be a matter of degree in a particular case. "(T)he location of the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, (is a) question of degree -- at time, perhaps, of fact." Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937). A criminal provision is not, however, rendered unconstitutionally vague on that account. "That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense." United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7. The line-drawing problem cannot be avoided by taking refuge in the standard adopted by the Second Circuit in Shackney and the court of appeals in this case (as it pertains to persons other than minors, immigrants, and incompetents). Threats of physical violence are seldom explicit, and they are often conveyed in a manner that is made to appear, at least in part, as an expression of concern for the victim's welfare. Thus, the employer's statement to the employee that if he leaves his employment he will starve is not a direct threat of physical violence, but it has the same effect. And the employer's statement that if the employee leaves, the state will imprison him for unlawfully leaving his job is not a threat of physical injury or a form of coercion by force of law, but if the employee believes it to be true, the employer's "prediction" has precisely the same impact as such a threat. Yet it is not clear whether that conduct would violate the involuntary servitude provisions under the test adopted by the Second and Sixth Circuits. A defendant subject to prosecution for such conduct could make the same claim that respondents made here -- that the involuntary servitude provisions, even as construed by the Second and Sixth Circuits, are unconstitutionally vague. In sum, involuntary servitude is a condition that, as Congress has repeatedly recognized, manifests itself in many forms. For that reason, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define the term with perfect precision while at the same time being faithful to the purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment and the statutes Congress has enacted to enforce it. We submit, however, that a defendant who willfully seeks to obtain service from another individual by forcing him to work against his will, by whatever means, has notice that his conduct is criminal and may not seek refuse in the contention that the prohibitions against involuntary servitude are impermissibly vague. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated and the case should be remanded for retrial under standards consistent with the views expressed herein. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General WM. BRADFORD REYNOLDS Assistant Attorney General WILLIAM C. BRYSON Deputy Solicitor General ROGER CLEGG Deputy Assistant Attorney General RICHARD J. LAZARUS Assistant to the Solicitor General JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER IRVING GORNSTEIN Attorneys DECEMBER 1987 /1/ Immediately after his release from the farm, Fulmer told a police officer that he did not believe that the Kozminskis would actually send him to the training school (J.A. 126). When he was no longer under the stress of the event, however, Fulmer told the government psychologist who examined him that he believed the threat and that it made him afraid to leave (id. at 161). Fulmer also testified at trial that the threat made him afraid to leave (id. at 108). /2/ The court of appeals also held that the district court erred in admitting expert psychological testimony that the defendants had broken Fulmer and Molitoris of their will to leave by "involuntarily converting" them (Pet. App. 15a-17a). The court concluded that for such expert testimony to be admissible, it must conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory and that the testimony on involuntary conversion did not satisfy that requirement (ibid.). We have not sought review of that ruling. Thus, we acknowledge that this case must be remanded for a new trial; the issue before this Court is what definition of involuntary servitude shall apply on retrial. /3/ The dissenters also concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in admitting the government's expert testimony on involuntary conversion (Pet. App. 53a-68a). /4/ Involuntary servitude is in most cases the product of a combination of coercive means, and not exclusively the result of physical and legal coercion, or even fraud and deceit. See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827, 830-832 (11th Cir. 1985) (physical violence, no pay, placement in unfamiliar setting, verbal intimidation, induced dependency on alcohol), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986); United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1450 (9th Cir.) (withholding passports, indebtedness, insubstantial pay, no vacation, isolation), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1098 (4th Cir.) (physical violence, denial of medical assistance, withholding of wages), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214 (1983); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 563-564 (4th Cir. 1981) (physical violence, verbal intimidation, withholding of wages). /5/ Of course, neither the presence or absence of pay is conclusive as to the voluntariness of the worker's labor. See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942). The absence of pay, however, may effectively compel the victim to remain and be evidence of the defendant's intent to accomplish that result. /6/ Certain kinds of service have, of course, always been treated as falling outside the contemplation of the Thirteenth Amendment, such as "military and naval enlistments, or * * * the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children." Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897). See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589-590 n.11 (1973) (compulsory witness); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military draft); Butler v. Petty, 240 U.S. 328, 332-333 (1916) (state law requiring able-bodied males to do work on public roads); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1424 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Johnson); id. at 1437 (remarks of Sen. Harlan). /7/ Of course, respondents' conviction under 18 U.S.C. 241, for conspiring to deprive the two farm workers of their Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude does not require a showing that the two workers were actually held to involuntary servitude. A conspiracy need not achieve its object to fall within the scope of the federal criminal prohibition. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975). /8/ As noted by the court of appeals (Pet. App. 2a n.3), respondents have not contended that the term "involuntary servitude" has a different meaning in the Thirteenth Amendment and Section 1584. /9/ In other settings, this Court and others have recognized that involuntariness can be provoked by coercive conditions other than physical force. To determine whether a victim has been kidnapped against his will, the Court considers whether there has been "unlawful physical or mental restraint" against the victim. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 461 (1946). Physical or legal coercion are not the exclusive means of compulsion. The issue is whether the defendant "willfully intended through force, fear, or deception to confine the (victim) against her desires" (326 U.S. at 460). Likewise, although the use of physical force is especially weighty evidence with regard to the voluntariness of a confession, a court must consider all the evidence of coercion, psychological as well as physical, in deciding the issue of voluntariness. "When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical or mental ordeal." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). /10/ The facts of this case demonstrate the unsoundness of the court of appeals' standard. Although the two farm workers in this case are both mentally retarded and easily coerced, it is unclear that either would be considered legally incompetent. Under the court of appeals' standard, however, the jury could not consider whether fraud and deceit played a role in securing their continued service unless it were first determined that they were legally incompetent. And even then, the jury could consider only fraud and deceit, along with threats of physical violence, in determining whether the victims were coerced into remaining on the Kozminski farm. The jury would not be permitted to consider other conduct by respondents, no matter how much that conduct was intended to ensure the subjugation of the victims' wills, and no matter how successful that conduct was in achieving its purpose. /11/ Soon after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Anti-Peonage Act, making it unlawful to "hold () * * * any person * * * to a condition of peonage" (ch. 187, Section 1, 14 Stat. 546). See generally, Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era -- Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 646 (1982). /12/ In Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 244, the Court rejected the argument that peonage occurs only when "a man is kept by bodily compulsion against his will" (id. at 246 (Holmes, J., dissenting)). The Court recognized that the "'compulsion to such service by the fear of punishment under a criminal statute is more powerful than any guard which the employer could station'" (id. at 244 (citation omitted)). The same underlying rationale supports the rejection of the court of appeals' rigid claim that physical or legal coercion are the exclusive means of holding another to involuntary servitude. Other "fear(s)" may be "more powerful" coercive measures than either physical or legal coercion in a particular case. Indeed, the court of appeals conceded as much by extending the scope of the inquiry to fraud and deceit, but then arbitrarily limited the relevance of that evidence to certain legal categories of persons. /13/ The historical background of the Thirteenth Amendment is discussed in detail in Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 Nat'l B.J. 26, 26-82 (Mar. 1951); and Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 10 Nat'l B.J. 7, 7-77 (Mar. 1952). /14/ Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 provides that "(t)here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes * * *." See, e.g., In re Clark, 1 Black. 122 (Ind. 1821) (specific performance of a personal service contract violates the Ordinance). The origin of this language (including its authorship) has been the subject of considerable controversy. See generally, Galbreath, The Ordinance of 1787, Its Origin and Authorship, 33 Ohio Archaeological & Hist. Q. 111 (1924); Merriman, The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, 5 Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc'y 303 (1889). /15/ See S. Rep. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. Rep. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A110 (1947); H.R. Rep. 152, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, A101 (1946); Staff of the House Comm. on Revision of the Laws, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Revision of Federal Criminal Laws: Preliminary Draft of Part 1 -- Crimes with Reviser's Notes 320-321 (Comm. Print 1944); Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (hereinafter 1947 House Hearings); Revision of Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing on H.R. 5450 Before the House Comm. on Revision of the Laws, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) (hereinafter 1944 House Hearing). /16/ A contemporaneous court decision construing the term "involuntary servitude" illustrates the understanding of the term prevalent at the time of the 1948 enactment -- an understanding that is consistent with the construction we propose here. In United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947), the district court upheld a conviction under a related statute, 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 443 (now 18 U.S.C. 1583), which prohibits the carrying away of another as a slave. See generally Folsom, A Slave Trade Law in a Contemporary Setting, 29 Cornell L.Q. 203 (1943). The Ingalls case involved facts strikingly like those present in this case. The court held that the term "slave" in the post-Civil War enactment should be equated with "involuntary servitude" and concluded that the facts of the case "compel the conclusion that the servant * * * was a person wholly subject to the will of (the) defendant; that she was one who had no freedom of action and those person and services were wholly under the control of (the) defendant and who was in a state of enforced compulsory service to the defendant" (73 F. Supp. at 78). In Ingalls, as in this case, the involuntary servitude was the product of a combination of coercive methods, not merely physical and legal coercion. Like the two victims in this case, the victim in Ingalls: (a) was "forbidden to leave"; (b) "performed drudgery of the most menial and laborious type, without compensation"; (c) "had no days off from * * * work, no vacation"; (d) was provided living "quarters (that) were among the poorest"; (e) was "furnished * * * by (the) defendant (with substandard food)"; (f) was "denied the right to have friends and * * * required to send away a relative who called"; (g) "physically abused on several occasions"; and (h) was threatened with commitment to a mental institution. Id. at 77. The totality of these circumstances persuaded the court in Ingalls, as they did the jury in this case, that the victim was "'in a state of enforced compulsory service'" (id. at 78) (citations omitted). /17/ Testimony in hearings held before the House Committee on Revision of the Laws in 1944 and before the House Committee on the Judiciary in 1947 confirms that Congress was aware of the "revival" then occurring in the use of the slavery and peonage provisions of the Criminal Code. See 1947 House Hearings 14 (testimony of Justin Miller); 1944 House Hearing 14 (same). Although Congress expanded the scope of Section 1584 beyond that of both the Padrone statute and the Slave Trade statute, it declined requests that it enact even broader legislation on the same subject, which was deferred until a later date (1947 House Hearings 14; 1944 House Hearing 14). /18/ The sole exception is the Second Circuit in United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486-487 (1964). /19/ Because the severity of the threatened harm depends on the subjective view of the victim, it is not possible to devise a categorical list of the kinds of threatened injuries that are sufficient to subject an individual to involuntary servitude. As Judge Dimock explained in his opinion concurring in the judgment in United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d at 487, "(i)t is impossible to generalize the means by which the will of man can be subjugated." To a drug addict, "the threat of deprivation of his supply is certainly more overbearing than the threat of almost any kind of force" (ibid.). Nonetheless, certain injuries fall so far short of what is generally viewed as a grave loss that it is virtually inconceivable that they would be the equivalent in any victim's mind to death or serious bodily injury. Thus, Judge Friendly's hypothetical case in Shackney, 333 F.2d at 480, involving an employer's threat to prevent his employee's son from being admitted to Yale Law School -- which we, like Judge Friendly, will assume to be an injurious result -- is not remotely of the type that would ordinarily be deemed to leave an employee with "no choice" but to continue to work for the master. /20/ The Court's decision in Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946), involving the federal kidnapping statute, illustrates the extent of the government's burden in an analogous context. In Chatwin, this Court held that the kidnapping statute did not apply where a 68-year-old man and several others, all of whom were members of a fundamentalist cult, persuaded a 15-year-old girl that she should abide "'by the law of God rather than the law of man,'" and leave and hide from her family to live with them (id. at 458). The Court concluded (id. at 464) that however distasteful the circumstances, the federal kidnapping statute had not been violated, because a lack of voluntariness had not been established. The Court rejected (id. at 460-461) the government's argument that the young girl was incapable of rational choice, and the Court found that she had been a willing participant in the events. /21/ That the two farm workers were physically free to leave respondents' farm and on several occasions returned to respondents' farm on their own renders proof of involuntary servitude more difficult in this case, but those factors do not preclude prosecution of respondents, because other evidence overwhelmingly establishes the involuntary nature of the workers' remaining on the farm and returning to it on those occasions. Cf. United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) ("During the years slavery existed in this country, slaves often worked in the fields and went into town with little direct supervision, thereby offering them opportunities to escape. Yet it is beyond argument that the slaves were held in involuntary servitude."); Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 675 ("Peons had become so degraded that in many instances they voluntarily returned to the compulsory service."). /22/ A number of other federal civil rights statutes similarly prohibit certain coercive activities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1971(b) (making it unlawful to coerce someone for the purpose of interfering with his right to vote); 42 U.S.C. 2000a-2 (making it unlawful to coerce someone for the purpose of interfering with his right to nondiscriminatory access to places of public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. 3617 (making it unlawful to coerce someone in the exercise of his rights to fair housing).