UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. GERMAN MUNOZ-FLORES

   No. 88-1932

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1989

   On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of
Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

   Supplemental Memorandum For The United States

   In our petition for a writ of certiorari, we pointed out that the
question presented in this case -- whether 18 U.S.C. 3013 (Supp. IV
1986) was enacted in violation of the Origination Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, Section 7, Cl. 1 -- was presented in a number of
cases pending before the courts of appeals and that several district
courts had already rejected the Ninth Circuit's view on the question.
Pet. 11-12.  The Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have now held that
Section 3013 is valid under the Origination Clause, squarely rejecting
the Ninth Circuit's view.  /*/

   In United States v. Griffin, No. 89-1105 (Aug. 29, 1989), and
companion cases, the Second Circuit ruled that Section 3013 was not
enacted for the purpose of raising revenue within the meaning of the
Origination Clause.  Explaining that the special assessments imposed
under Section 3013 were intended to be, and are in fact imposed as,
part of the criminal sentence, the court concluded that the
assessments are penalties rather than taxes.  Slip op. 3-6.
Accordingly, the court held that the defendants' Origination Clause
challenge was without merit regardless of whether Section 3013
originated in the House or in the Senate.  Slip op. 3.  The court
expressly recognized (id. at 5) that its ruling was contrary to that
of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654
(1988), the decision that we ask this Court to review in our petition
for a writ of certiorari in the present case.

   In United States v. Simpson, No. 89-3180 (Sept. 5, 1989), and
companion cases, the Third Circuit likewise held that Section 3013 was
not enacted to raise revenue within the meaning of the Origination
Clause.  After ruling that the defendants' Origination Clause
challenge presented a justiciable question (slip op. 7-10), the court
concluded that Congress enacted Section 3013 for the purpose of
defraying the costs of victim-assistance programs, not to raise
revenue for the general use of the government (slip op. 10-21).  The
court disagreed with both the holding and the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Munoz-Flores.  Slip. op. 14-21.

   In United States v. Ashburn, No. 89-3227 (Sept. 7, 1989), the Sixth
Circuit similarly held that Section 3013 was not enacted for the
purpose of raising revenue within the meaning of the Origination
Clause.  The court concluded that the assessments imposed under
Section 3013 are essentially penalties, not taxes, and that any
raising of revenue under the provision is in any event merely
incidental to the provision's purpose of funding victim-assistance
programs.  Slip op. 3-5.  The court expressly disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's ruling in Munoz-Flores.  Slip op. 5.

   In short, there is now a conflict between the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits, on one side, and the Ninth Circuit, on the other, on
the question presented in this case.  Cases that present the issue are
currently awaiting decision in several other circuits.  For those
reasons, and for the reasons set forth in our petition, the petition
for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

   Respectfully submitted.

   KENNETH W. STARR

      Solicitor General

   SEPTEMBER 1989

   /*/ Ten copies of the recent court of appeals decisions have been
lodged with the Clerk of this Court.