No. 98-50
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1998
KEWEENAW BAY INDIAN COMMUNITY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
ROBERT H. OAKLEY
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a Tribe must satisfy the requirements in Section 20 of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2719, before conducting Class III
gaming pursuant to a compact on off-reservation land taken in trust by the
United States after October 17, 1988.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM 1998
No. 98-50
KEWEENAW BAY INDIAN COMMUNITY, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-12) is reported at 136
F.3d 469. The first opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 13-23) is reported
at 914 F. Supp. 1496. The second opinion of the district court (Pet. App.
24-33) is reported at 940 F. Supp. 1139.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 10, 1998. A
petition for rehearing was denied on April 1, 1998. Pet. App. 34. The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 30, 1998. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., established
a framework for the regulation of gaming on Indian land. IGRA divides gaming
into three categories. Class I gaming encompasses "social games solely
for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged
in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies
or celebrations." 25 U.S.C. 2703(6). Such gaming is subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribes and is not subject to regulation under
IGRA. 25 U.S.C. 2710(a)(1). Class II gaming includes bingo and similar games,
25 U.S.C. 2703(7), and is subject to tribal regulation and federal oversight
by the National Indian Gaming Commission, 25 U.S.C. 2710(a)-(c), 2706(b).
Class III gaming encompasses all other forms of gaming, 25 U.S.C. 2703(8),
and includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing,
and lotteries. Class III gaming is lawful only if it is (1) authorized by
a tribal ordinance, (2) located in a State that permits such gaming for
any purpose by any person, organization, or entity, and (3) conducted in
conformance with a Tribal-State compact. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1).
In addition, except in limited circumstances, "gaming regulated by
[IGRA] shall not be conducted on [off-reservation] lands acquired by the
Secretary in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17,
1988" (after-acquired land). 25 U.S.C. 2719. One of the circumstances
in which such gaming may be conducted is when "the Secretary, after
consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials,
including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming
establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the
Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding
community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity
is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." 25 U.S.C.
2719(b)(1) (A).
2. In September 1990, a tract of land in Marquette County, Michigan, was
taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Keweenaw Bay
Indian Community (petitioner). Pet. App. 2. In 1993, petitioner and the
State of Michigan entered into a Tribal-State compact which permits Class
III gaming on "Indian lands." Ibid. The compact specified that
it would take effect upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, including
endorsement by the Governor of Michigan and approval by the Secretary of
the Interior. Ibid. All specified conditions were fulfilled. Ibid.
In August 1994, petitioner sought approval from the Secretary of the Interior
to operate a Class III casino gaming operation on the Marquette County property.
Pet. App. 3. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) informed petitioner that
it would have to satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 2719 before
Class III gaming operations could commence. Ibid. Petitioner opened the
facility on the Marquette County property without complying with Section
2719. Ibid.
Petitioner subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan against the United States seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief that would permit Class III gaming on the Marquette
County property. Pet. App. 3. The United States filed a counterclaim against
the Tribe. Ibid. It sought (1) a declaration that the gaming activities
at petitioner's casino violate state and federal law; (2) an injunction
preventing petitioner from licensing, authorizing or operating a Class III
gaming facility until the requirements of 25 U.S.C. 2719 had been met; and
(3) abatement of the gaming and confiscation of the unlawful gaming devices.
Ibid.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioner. Pet.
App. 13-23. The district court ruled that the requirements of 25 U.S.C.
2719 do not apply to petitioner's Marquette County gaming operation. Pet.
App. 21. The court reasoned that Section 2719 applies only to gaming "regulated
by" IGRA, and that the Marquette County gaming operation is regulated
by petitioner's compact with the State of Michigan and not by IGRA. Ibid.
The district court also concluded that it would be "nonsensical"
to require compliance with 25 U.S.C. 2719, because such compliance would
require petitioner to obtain two approvals each from the Governor of Michigan
and the Secretary of the Interior. Ibid.
The United States moved for reconsideration, and the State of Michigan intervened
and filed a similar motion. Pet. App. 3. The district court denied the motions
for reconsideration. Id. at 24-33.
3. The court of appeals reversed. Pet. App. 1-12. The court held that the
approval requirements in Section 2719 apply to petitioner's Marquette County
gaming operation. Id. at 7. The court of appeals rejected the district court's
view that Class III gaming conducted pursuant to a compact is not "regulated
by" IGRA within the meaning of Section 2719. Ibid. The court of appeals
explained that "any gaming subject to a tribal-state compact is necessarily
regulated by the IGRA," because "the compact mechanism is created
and governed by the IGRA" and because "provisions of the IGRA
other than the compact provisions regulate compact-authorized gaming."
Id. at 7. The court of appeals noted (ibid.) that the Chairman of the National
Gaming Commission has the power to approve pre-1988 Class III tribal gaming
ordinances, 25 U.S.C. 2712(a), and that the National Indian Gaming Commission
has power to levy civil penalties and to order temporary closure of Indian
gaming, 25 U.S.C. 2713.
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's conclusion that
it would be "nonsensical" to apply Section 2719 to gaming authorized
by a compact because it would require the Secretary of the Interior and
the Governor of a State to approve such gaming twice. Pet. App. 9-10. The
court of appeals noted that the two approvals by the Secretary of the Interior
involve different considerations. The Secretary must approve a Tribal-State
compact under Section 2710 unless the compact violates a provision of IGRA,
another federal law, or the United States' trust obligations to a Tribe.
25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(B). Pet. App. 9. In contrast, in circumstances like
those presented here, the Secretary may approve gaming on after-acquired
land only if "after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate
State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes,
[the Secretary] determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired
lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members,
and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community," and only
"if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be
conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." Ibid. (quoting
25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A)). The court also concluded that "the Michigan
Governor's endorsement of the compact per the terms of the compact itself
is * * * of a qualitatively different nature from his concurrence in the
Interior's Secretary's discretionary 'best-interests waiver' of [Section]
2719's general gaming prohibition." Pet. App. 10 (citation omitted).
ARGUMENT
1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 6-10) that Class III gaming authorized by a
compact is not subject to the requirements set forth in Section 2719 for
the conduct of gaming on off-reservation, after-acquired land. That contention
is without merit and does not warrant review.
Section 2719(a) provides that, subject to certain exceptions, "gaming
regulated by this subchapter shall not be conducted" on off-reservation,
after-acquired land. 25 U.S.C. 2719(a). By its plain terms, Section 2719
applies to all gaming regulated by IGRA; there is no exception for Class
III gaming conducted pursuant to a compact.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 6) that Section 2719 does not apply to gaming
authorized by a compact, because such gaming is "regulated by"
the compact and not by IGRA. As the court of appeals concluded, however,
gaming subject to a compact is "necessarily regulated by" IGRA,
because "the compact mechanism is created and governed by the IGRA,"
and because "provisions of the IGRA other than the compact provisions
regulate compact-authorized gaming." Id. at 7. For example, as the
court of appeals noted (ibid.), the National Indian Gaming Commission has
power to levy civil penalties and to order temporary closure of such gaming.
25 U.S.C. 2713. Section 2719 therefore unambiguously applies to compact-authorized
gaming, and such gaming may not be conducted on off-reservation, after-acquired
land unless one of the exceptions to Section 2719 is applicable.
Applying Section 2719 to compact-authorized gaming does not, as petitioner
asserts, "diminish[] the central importance of the tribal-state compact
in the statutory scheme." Pet. 6. A valid Tribal-State compact is a
necessary condition for all Class III gaming. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1). In light
of the special considerations involved in expanding gaming to off-reservation
after-acquired land, however, Section 2719 introduces an additional set
of requirements before gaming regulated by IGRA may be conducted on such
land. In particular, in circumstances like those presented here, Class III
gaming may be permitted only if "the Secretary, after consultation
with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including
officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment
on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe
and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community,"
and only if "the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity
is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." 25 U.S.C.
2719(b)(1) (A). The existence of a valid compact does not eliminate the
need to conduct that special inquiry, which takes into account local interests
that are not taken into account in the compact approval process. Indeed,
since Class III gaming is not authorized under IGRA on any Indian lands
in the absence of a valid compact, petitioner's contention would have the
implausible effect of rendering the special requirement of Section 2719
totally inapplicable to Class III gaming.
2. Petitioner errs in suggesting (Pet. 7) that the decision below conflicts
with Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 22 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir.
1994), and Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir.)
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919 (1994). Neither of those cases involved Class
III gaming on off-reservation land acquired after October 17, 1988. Wisconsin
Winnebago Nation, 22 F.3d at 722; Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at
689. The courts in those cases therefore had no occasion to address the
question resolved by the court of appeals in this case-whether the requirements
in Section 2719 apply to compact-authorized gaming on off-reservation, after-acquired
land. Consistent with the plain language and purposes of Section 2719, the
court of appeals in this case correctly held that Section 2719 applies to
such gaming, and the court's holding does not conflict with a decision by
any other court of appeals.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
ROBERT L. KLARQUIST
ROBERT H. OAKLEY
Attorneys
SEPTEMBER 1998