No. 98-456
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
JOE BOEHMS, PETITIONER
v.
CRAVEN CROWELL, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
EDWARD S. CHRISTENBURY
General Counsel
JAMES E. FOX
Deputy General Counsel
THOMAS F. FINE
Assistant General Counsel
JOHN E. SLATER
Attorney
Tennessee Valley Authority
Knoxville, TN 37902-1499
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether 29 U.S.C. 633a (1994 & Supp. II (1996)) authorizes an award
of backpay for the period following a federal employee's retirement from
federal service.
2. Whether Section 633a authorizes an award of attorney's fees to successful
claimants.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
No. 98-456
JOE BOEHMS, PETITIONER
v.
CRAVEN CROWELL, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. i-xx) is reported at 139
F.3d 452. The May 15, 1996 (Pet. App. xxi-xxvi), October 1, 1996 (Pet. App.
xxvii-xxix), and December 20, 1996 (Pet. App. xxx) orders of the district
court are unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on April 15, 1998. A petition
for rehearing was denied on June 12, 1998. Pet. App. xxxi-xxxii. The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 10, 1998. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner is a former employee of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
a corporate agency of the United States. See generally Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 315 (1936); Pet. App. xviii. In April 1991, TVA reorganized
its Customer Group, transforming its 15 district offices into 13 customer
service centers (CSCs). Under the reorganization, each CSC was headed by
a CSC manager, assisted, at the top of the organizational hierarchy, by
an operations manager and a marketing manager. Petitioner, who was then
55 years old and had been manager of TVA's Tupelo district office for approximately
three years before the reorganization, applied for the CSC manager position
at the Tupelo CSC after the reorganization. In January 1992, petitioner's
supervisor informed him that another employee, who was then 32 years old,
had been selected for that position, but that petitioner could have the
job of operations manager. If petitioner had taken that job, he would have
continued earning an annual salary (approximately $70,000) identical to
the salary he had earned as district manager. Pet. App. ii-iii, x; Stipulation
of Facts (Stip.) ¶ 8.
Petitioner considered the offer a demotion and did not accept it. Because
his existing job was being eliminated in the reorganization, he enrolled
in TVA's Employee Transition Program (ETP), which allowed him to remain
on the TVA payroll for up to six months while he looked for suitable alternative
employment, both within and outside of TVA. During that period, petitioner
twice rejected offers for the CSC operations manager position at the center
in West Point, Mississippi, and he refused to entertain similar positions
advertised at other offices. No CSC manager position became available, and
no other employment opportunities arose that petitioner found satisfactory.
In November 1992, petitioner was "reduced in force," and, invoking
his retirement privileges, he became eligible to receive federal retirement
benefits. See Pet. App. iii-iv, xiii-xiv; see also Boehms C.A. Br. 30 (noting
petitioner's receipt of "retirement benefits").
2. On May 19, 1992, several months after his nonselection for the CSC manager's
position but nearly six months before his retirement, petitioner filed an
administrative complaint with TVA. He alleged that his nonselection was
based on age and that it violated the provisions of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA) applicable to federal employment. See 29 U.S.C.
633a (1994 & Supp. II 1996). After failing to obtain administrative
relief, petitioner filed suit under Section 633a in district court. That
court found that petitioner was denied the manager's position because of
his age, in violation of Section 633a (Pet. App. xxii-xxv), and it granted
him a backpay award for the period between his nonselection on January 15,
1992 and his retirement on November 13, 1992 (id. at xxviii). The court
rejected petitioner's request for additional backpay beyond the date of
his retirement on the ground that such relief is available only when an
employee is "constructively discharged," a claim that petitioner
could not make here. Id. at xxvii. The district court then granted petitioner
attorney's fees, even though it acknowledged that many courts "have
refused to order the recovery of attorney's fees against federal defendants"
in cases arising under Section 633a. Id. at xxviii.
3. The court of appeals affirmed on the issues of liability and damages
but vacated the award of attorney's fees. Like the district court (Pet.
App. xxv-xxvi), the court of appeals rejected TVA's argument that, by declining
offers of employment as a CSC operations manager, petitioner had failed
to "mitigate damages" during the period in which he was enrolled
in the ETP. The court thus upheld the district court's award of backpay
for the entire period leading up to petitioner's retirement. Id. at ix-xii.
The court separately upheld the district court's refusal to grant additional
backpay for the period following that retirement. Relying on its earlier
decision in Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990), the court reaffirmed
that, to be eligible for such an award, the employee must demonstrate that
he had been "constructively discharged" from his job. Pet. App.
xiii. Petitioner, the court held, could make no such showing: "When
he chose to retire from TVA, [petitioner] had, at the very least, an offer
to remain as Tupelo CSC [operations] manager at the same salary he had been
earning as district manager. In addition, several district managers other
than [petitioner] accepted positions as CSC operations managers pursuant
to TVA's agency-wide reorganization." Id. at xiv. The court concluded
that, because acceptance of such a position would plainly not have been
"so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled
to resign," petitioner could not claim constructive discharge and therefore
could not recover post-retirement backpay. Ibid.
Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claim that he was entitled to attorney's
fees directly under Section 633a. The court held that, as distinguished
from the provisions of the ADEA applicable to private-sector age discrimination
(see 29 U.S.C. 626(b)), Section 633a contains no provision authorizing such
a fee award. Although Section 633a(c) does authorize a district court to
provide "such legal and equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes"
of the ADEA, the court followed the First Circuit's decision in Nowd v.
Rubin, 76 F.3d 25 (1996), in holding that Section 633a(c) does not "overcome
either the doctrine of sovereign immunity or the so-called American Rule
of attorney's fees." Pet. App. xvi. The court remanded the case, however,
for a determination as to whether petitioner might nonetheless be entitled
to attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(b).
Pet. App. xvii.
DISCUSSION
1. Petitioner first challenges (Pet. 7-8) what he characterizes as the court
of appeals' holding "that a failure to reasonably mitigate damages
cuts off all backpay regardless of whether reasonable mitigation could equal
complete mitigation of lost wages." Pet. 7. That challenge is difficult
to understand. Rejecting TVA's arguments to the contrary, the court of appeals
held that petitioner had "mitigated damages"-even though he persistently
rejected offers of employment at the same salary he had received before
TVA's 1991 reorganization-and that he was therefore entitled to full backpay
for the entire period preceding his voluntary retirement from federal service.
See Pet. App. ix-xii. For that reason, petitioner's arguments concerning
"mitigation" (Pet. 7-8)-the subject of the first two questions
presented in the petition (Pet. 1)-are largely irrelevant to the proper
disposition of this case.
Petitioner appears to have conflated two quite different issues arising
under the provisions of the ADEA specific to federal employment (29 U.S.C.
633a (1994 & Supp. II 1996))1: whether a federal employee alleging violations
of those provisions has reasonably mitigated damages during periods for
which he would otherwise be entitled to backpay, and whether that employee
is entitled to backpay for the period following his voluntary retirement
from federal service. Because petitioner prevailed on the first issue in
the court of appeals, only the second is presented here. And, with respect
to that issue, the court of appeals correctly held that petitioner was ineligible
for backpay for the period following his retirement because he could not
plausibly claim that he had been "constructively discharged."
Pet. App. xiii-xiv (following Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The court of appeals' factbound determination that petitioner had not been
constructively discharged sharply distinguishes this case from the private-sector
employment cases from other courts of appeals that petitioner mistakenly
characterizes (Pet. 7-8) as conflicting with the decision below. Those cases,
unlike this one, did involve either a constructive discharge or an outright
dismissal.2 Whereas involuntary termination is itself often the basis for
a discrimination claim (subject to a duty to mitigate post-termination damages),
voluntary retirement of the kind at issue here gives rise to no such claim.3
Moreover, contrary to petitioner's suggestion (Pet. 9-10), there is nothing
anomalous about the rule entitling a federal employee to collect backpay
from the government for the period during which he remained in federal service,
but not for the period following his voluntary retirement, during which
he performs no work for the government and becomes eligible for federal
retirement benefits. Indeed, petitioner's contrary interpretation of Section
633a would conflict with the principle that "a waiver of the Government's
sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in
favor of the sovereign." Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996);
see, e.g., Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-161 (1981); Library of
Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
2. The third question presented in the petition is whether "a successful
age discrimination plaintiff [is] entitled to seek an award of attorney['s]
fees" in cases arising under Section 633a. Pet. 1; see Pet. 11. As
an initial matter, this case would be an odd vehicle for this Court's consideration
of that issue. The court of appeals held that, even though Section 633a
does not itself authorize an award of attorney's fees, the Equal Access
to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(b) (EAJA), might nonetheless support such
an award in this case, and it remanded to the district court for further
consideration of the issue. See Pet. App. xv-xviii. Petitioner neither mentions
that remand order nor explains why, in these circumstances, any fee award
under EAJA would be inadequate.
In any event, the court of appeals was correct in holding that Section 633a
does not itself support awards of attorney's fees. Waivers of the government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed, and courts should "not
enlarge the waiver 'beyond what the language requires.'" Library of
Congress, 478 U.S. at 318 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S.
680, 685 (1983)). As distinguished from the provisions of the ADEA applicable
to the private sector (see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 626(b)), Section 633a contains
no authorization for such awards. See generally 29 U.S.C. 633a(f); Lewis,
953 F.2d at 1283. And, as the court of appeals explained, "the generalized
language" of Section 633a(c), which authorizes only "such legal
and equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the ADEA,
"cannot be interpreted as * * * an unequivocal waiver of the government's
sovereign immunity vis a vis awards of attorney's fees." Pet. App.
xvii (citing Nowd v. Rubin, 76 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1996)). Petitioner's
claim is also independently foreclosed by the so-called American Rule of
attorney's fees: that, in the absence of an express statutory authorization
to the contrary, litigants must pay their own such fees. Id. at xvi-xvii
(citing Nowd, 76 F.3d at 27).
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
EDWARD S. CHRISTENBURY
General Counsel
JAMES E. FOX
Deputy General Counsel
THOMAS F. FINE
Assistant General Counsel
JOHN E. SLATER
Attorney
Tennessee Valley Authority
DECEMBER 1998
1 "[S]ection 633a is a self-contained provision applicable exclusively
to ADEA claims against public sector employers." Nowd v. Rubin, 76
F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1996); see 29 U.S.C. 633a(f). In enacting Section
633a as an amendment to the ADEA, "Congress chose to create a separate
and discrete federal remedial scheme rather than subsume [federal] employees
under the pre-existing enforcement procedures in the private sector."
Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 1992).
See generally Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160-161 (1981).
2 See Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860 (3d Cir. 1995) (claim of racially
motivated discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(1)); Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d
149, 159-160 (7th Cir. 1981) (claim of discriminatory layoff and refusal
to rehire under private-sector provisions of ADEA), overruled on other grounds
by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); Cassino
v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987) (claim of discriminatory
firing under private-sector provisions of ADEA), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1047 (1988); Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.
1985) (claim of racially discriminatory discharge under Title VII); EEOC
v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664 (8th Cir. 1992) (claim of gender-based
constructive discharge under Title VII); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (interpreting duty to mitigate under 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(g) in Title VII case involving discriminatory refusal to hire).
3 The petition does not present, and petitioner has not preserved, any claim
of constructive discharge. See, e.g., Stip. ¶ 6 (confirming that administrative
complaint underlying these proceedings was filed in May 1992, several months
before petitioner's retirement). Like the district court (Pet. App. xxii,
xxviii), the court of appeals determined, on the facts of this case, that
petitioner's departure from government service was a voluntary retirement,
despite the characterization of that retirement as a "reduc[tion] in
force." See id. at xiii-xiv; see also id. at iv. That determination
was factbound and correct.