No. 98-525
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
OPERATION RESCUE NATIONAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
FRANK W. HUNGER
Assistant Attorney General
MARK B. STERN
PETER J. SMITH
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended by the Westfall Act,
28 U.S.C. 2671 and 2679(b)(1), which grants immunity from common law tort
actions to "officers or employees" of "the executive departments
[and] the judicial and legislative branches," provides Members of Congress
with such immunity from suit.
2. Whether the Westfall Act's grant of immunity from suit to Members of
Congress is within the scope of Congress's constitutional authority.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
No. 98-525
OPERATION RESCUE NATIONAL, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-7a) is reported at 147
F.3d 68. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 8a-56a) is reported
at 975 F. Supp. 92.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 1, 1998. The petition
for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 28, 1998. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. In 1988, in response to this Court's decision in Westfall v. Erwin, 484
U.S. 292 (1988), Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, by enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563,
popularly known as the Westfall Act. The Westfall Act made clear that employees
of the federal government have immunity from common law tort actions for
acts undertaken in the scope of their official duties. Congress recognized
that such immunity is "essential if Federal employees [a]re to be willing
to carry out the duties of their office." H.R. Rep. No. 700, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
Under the Westfall Act, when an individual employee of the federal government
is sued in state court for a wrongful or negligent act, the Attorney General
(or her designee) may certify that the employee "was acting within
the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of
which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2). If the Attorney General
makes such a certification, then the suit is deemed to be one against the
United States, which is then substituted for the employee as the defendant
to the tort action, the individual defendant is dismissed from the suit,
and the case proceeds against the United States alone, pursuant to the provisions
of the FTCA (including removal to federal court). 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(2);
see Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 419-420 (1995). Moreover,
the remedies available against the United States under the FTCA are exclusive,
and any other action against the individual employee is precluded. 28 U.S.C.
2679(b). In effect, the Westfall Act shields individual government personnel
from personal liability for common law tort actions for acts within the
scope of their official duties. That immunity attaches even when, as in
the present case, sovereign immunity prevents the plaintiff from recovering
against the United States under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. 2680(h) (providing
that no FTCA remedy shall be available for "any claim arising out of
* * * libel [or] slander); United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165-167
(1991).
In the Westfall Act, Congress also amended the FTCA to make clear that its
coverage (as to both liability and immunity) extends to torts committed
by "officers or employees" of "the judicial and legislative
branches." See Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 3, 102 Stat. 4564 (amending
28 U.S.C. 2671). By that amendment, Congress sought to ensure that judicial
and legislative personnel would "be covered by the FTCA in the same
way as employees of the Executive Branch." H.R. Rep. No. 700, supra,
at 8. Congress also provided that the United States, as the substituted
defendant, would be able to invoke any defenses of judicial or legislative
immunity that would be available to the original defendant. See Pub. L.
No. 100-694, § 4, 102 Stat. 4564 (amending 28 U.S.C. 2674).
2. On November 15, 1993, United States Senator Edward M. Kennedy attended
a fund-raising luncheon at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel. Pet. App. 17a. At
a press conference following the luncheon, Senator Kennedy addressed issues
of public concern, including a then-pending bill to enact what became the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE).1 Id. at 18a. Senator
Kennedy was the principal sponsor of that legislative proposal, which created
federal criminal penalties and civil remedies for the use or threat of violence,
physical obstruction, or destruction of property to interfere with access
to facilities providing reproductive health care. Id. at 16a. The full Senate
was scheduled to take up debate on that measure on November 16, 1993, the
day after the press conference at issue. Id. at 19a.
At the press conference, in response to a question regarding the reasons
for the Senator's support for the FACE, the Senator stated:
Basically, this is legislation to deal with violence and constitutional
rights. We're talking about access to a facility for a woman to be able
to have her constitutional rights protected, but many of these facilities
also provide extremely important services and preventative health care,
prescreening, mammography, pap smears, and a number of other health-related
items. [P]eople can have a difference on public policy issues, but when
we have a national organization like Operation Rescue that has as a matter
of national policy firebombing and even murder, that's unacceptable. This
is a very targeted legislative remedy to deal with that kind of situation
which exists in Massachusetts and in many other parts of the country. Massachusetts
in the last two weeks has taken steps to address it and I think it's important
that we did.
Pet. App. 18a.
3. a. In November 1994, petitioners brought this suit against Senator Kennedy
in the Superior Court for Norfolk County, Massachusetts, claiming that they
were defamed by the Senator's remarks. Pet. App. 9a. The United States Attorney
for the District of Massachusetts, acting under a delegation of authority
from the Attorney General, see 28 C.F.R. 15.3(a), made the requisite statutory
certification under the Westfall Act that the Senator's remarks were made
within the scope of his official duties. Pet. App. 9a. Based on that certification,
the United States invoked the removal and substitution provisions of the
Westfall Act, pursuant to which the action was removed to federal district
court, and the United States was substituted as the sole defendant. Ibid.
b. In district court, the United States moved to dismiss the action on the
ground, inter alia, that the FTCA expressly bars defamation actions. See
28 U.S.C. 2680(h). The district court granted the United States' motion
to dismiss. Pet. App. 56a. The court rejected petitioners' argument that
Senator Kennedy is not protected by the Westfall Act, concluding that Members
of Congress fall within the definition of "employee[s] of the Government"
under the FTCA. Id. at 23a-35a. The court noted that the FTCA defines "employees
of the Government" for purposes of that statute to include "officers
and employees" of the "legislative branch[]." Id. at 28a.
It also stressed that, in several other contexts, Congress has used the
term "officers" to include Members of Congress, see id. at 29a-31a;
Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103 (1916), and that such usage is within
the ordinary meaning of the term "officer." The court also aligned
itself with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Williams v. United States, 71
F.3d 502, 504-505 (1995), which concluded that the Westfall Act applies
to Members of Congress.
The court rejected petitioners' arguments that the Westfall Act would be
unconstitutional if applied to shield Members of Congress from personal
liability. The court emphasized Congress's broad authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18, and concluded that
Congress may invoke that power to protect its own ability effectively to
carry out its basic power to legislate, as reflected in Article I, Section
1. Pet. App. 42a-51a. In addition, the court rejected petitioners' assertions
that the Speech or Debate Clause, U.S Const. Art. I, § 6, Cl. 1, prohibits
application of the Westfall Act to Members of Congress. Pet. App. 51a-56a.
4. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1a-7a. The court rejected (id.
at 4a-5a) petitioners' argument that, because Congress has often referred
to Members of Congress in statutes as "members" rather than "officers"
or "employees," Congress's omission of the term "members"
in the Westfall Act's amendment of the FTCA should be taken as indicative
of intent not to cover Members of Congress in that amendment. That argument
failed, the court concluded, because, in the Westfall Act, Congress simply
amended the term "federal agency" to include the legislative and
judicial branches; it did not affirmatively use any "restrictive language"
with the intent to exclude Members of Congress. And the Court agreed with
the district court's rejection of petitioners' argument that, as a matter
of law, Members of Congress are not "officers" or "employees"
of the government. Id. at 5a-6a. The court further rejected petitioners'
contention that the Speech or Debate Clause defines a "ceiling rather
than a floor" of immunity from suit available to Members of Congress,
and that the Westfall Act is unconstitutional, describing petitioners' contention
as based on "singular logic." Id. at 7a.
ARGUMENT
The decision below is correct. It is also in accord with the decision of
the only other court of appeals that has addressed the question whether
the Westfall Act applies to Members of Congress. See Williams v. United
States, 71 F.3d 502, 505 (5th Cir. 1995); cf. Sullivan v. United States,
21 F.3d 198, 203 n.8 (7th Cir.) (suggesting that federal judges also have
immunity under the Westfall Act), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1060 (1994). Further
review is therefore not warranted.
1. a. The court of appeals correctly concluded that a straightforward reading
of the pertinent statutory language shows that Members of Congress fall
within the broad range of "employee[s] of the Government" to whom
the FTCA and the Westfall Act apply. The FTCA expressly defines "[e]mployee
of the government" to include "officers or employees of any federal
agency." 28 U.S.C. 2671. "Federal agency," in turn, expressly
includes "the judicial and legislative branches * * * of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. 2671. Senator Kennedy was therefore exempt from
liability under the Westfall Act because he is an "officer" of
the "legislative branch * * * of the United States."
The pivotal statutory language, used both in creating a remedy against the
United States and in making that remedy exclusive, refers to "any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment."
28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2679(b)(1). As just noted, the FTCA further defines those
terms in 28 U.S.C. 2671, where "[e]mployee of the government"
is broadly defined to include "officers or employees of any federal
agency * * * and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official
capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation." 28 U.S.C. 2671. "Federal
agency," in turn, was given a broad definition in language that includes
"the judicial and legislative branches" of government. 28 U.S.C.
2671. The latter provision was added by the Westfall Act to "explicitly
extend[] the coverage of the FTCA to officers and employees of the legislative
and judicial branches." H.R. Rep. No. 700, supra, at 5. See also Williams,
71 F.3d at 505.
The court of appeals correctly recognized that the ordinary meaning of the
word "officer" is entirely consistent with application of the
Westfall Act to Members of Congress. Pet. App. 6a. In common parlance, the
term "officer" applies to "one who holds an office"
or "one who is appointed or elected to serve in a position of trust,
authority, or command." Id. at 31a (quoting Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1567 (1976)). These definitions reflect the "plain meaning"
of the term "officer" and comport with a United States Senator's
position as an official elected to a position of trust to serve as a representative
of the people. See Williams, 71 F.3d at 505.2
The court of appeals' reading of the FTCA and the Westfall Act to include
Members of Congress also is fully consonant with the dual purposes of those
Acts: providing compensation to persons injured by federal personnel, and
ensuring that federal personnel are not deterred from fully carrying out
their duties. By including Members of Congress within the definition of
"[e]mployee" of the federal government, Congress ensured that
negligent acts committed by Members of Congress in the scope of their employment
(as, for example, a negligent automobile accident) could form the basis
of liability against the United States if the FTCA permitted such liability;
petitioners' construction, by contrast, would preclude recovery against
the United States in all such circumstances. At the same time, the Westfall
Act's extension of immunity from personal liability for common law tort
actions to Members of Congress ensures that such Members, like other federal
officers, are not unduly chilled in executing their official functions by
the prospect of lawsuits and damages.
b. Petitioners argue (Pet. 8-12) that the term "officer" as used
in federal statutes has a constitutionally based meaning, predicated on
the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6, Cl. 2, that necessarily
excludes Members of Congress. This Court, however, has construed the term
"officers" in a federal statute to include Members of Congress.
In Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103 (1916), the Court held that a Member
of Congress is an "officer acting under the authority of the United
States" within the meaning of a criminal statute punishing the impersonation
of such an officer. Id. at 112-113. In so doing, the Court specifically
rejected the argument that interpretation of such a statute must be dictated
by the use of the term "officer" in the Incompatibility Clause;
the Court looked instead to the ordinary meaning of the term as found in
dictionaries, as well as a consideration of the terms and purposes of the
statute as a whole. Ibid. Similarly, a broad reading of the term "officer"
has been adopted in a line of lower-court decisions holding Members of Congress
to be "officer[s] of the United States" for the purposes of 28
U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), which permits federal officers to remove state court
actions to federal court. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,
62 F.3d 408, 412-415 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Williams v. Brooks, 945 F.2d 1322,
1325 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992); Richards v.
Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 86-87 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioners' textual arguments
are therefore without merit.
2. The court of appeals also correctly concluded that Congress has the constitutional
authority to grant its Members immunity from common law tort suits. As the
lower courts observed, see Pet. App. 7a, the Necessary and Proper Clause,
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18, affords Congress broad authority to
enact legislation that Congress deems necessary to carry out its underlying
constitutional powers. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819). That authority is sufficient to sustain the grant of immunity
to legislators in the Westfall Act, which reflects Congress's determination
that such immunity is necessary to protect the official functions of federal
legislators.
In order for Congress to exercise any of the powers enumerated in the Constitution,
its Members must have the ability to legislate. The Constitution itself
grants Members of Congress immunity from suit based on their acts of debate
and voting in the Houses themselves. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 6, Cl. 1
(Speech or Debate Clause). But Congress could rationally conclude that,
to be effective legislators, Members of Congress must have a broader immunity,
extending to all acts in the scope of their official duties, and not just
debate and voting. As the district court observed, to serve their constituents
and the public faithfully, Members of Congress are expected to inform constituents
and the public at large about issues of public concern being considered
by Congress. Pet. App. 48a (citing Williams, 71 F.3d at 507). It was therefore
reasonable for Congress to conclude "that its members would be aided
in their effort to inform their constituents, to provide leadership on issues
of public importance and, in the process of being more candid and forthcoming,
to be more readily accountable to those who elected them if they were not
inhibited by the threat of lawsuits and liability for the statements they
made outside of Congress in performing these functions." Id. at 49a.
This Court has frequently recognized Congress's authority to define the
scope of federal officers' immunity from suit. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 500, 504 (1978) (refusing to accord federal officials a higher
degree of common law immunity from liability than that accorded state officials
"in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary");
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 747 (1982); id. at 790 (White, J., dissenting);
cf. Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1652 (1997) (noting that Congress
may "respond with appropriate legislation" if it believes that
the Presidentshould be granted immunity beyond that already recognized by
the courts). Indeed, in Westfall this Court specifically invited congressional
action to address the scope of federal official immunity, recognizing that
"Congress is in the best position to provide guidance for the complex
and often highly empirical inquiry into whether absolute immunity is warranted
in a particular context." 484 U.S. at 300. Congress's extension of
Westfall Act immunity to Members of Congress reflects its recognition that
the policies supporting official immunity from common law suits are as applicable
to the official functions of federal legislators as to officers and employees
of the other Branches.
Petitioners' suggestion that Congress does not possess constitutional authority
to grant its Members immunity beyond that conferred upon them by the Speech
or Debate Clause (Pet. i, 25) is without merit. That Clause, which provides
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House" the Members of
Congress "shall not be questioned in any other Place," U.S. Const.
Art. I, § 6, Cl. 1, is included in the text of the Constitution among
the privileges of Members of Congress, not among the limitations on Congress's
power set forth in Article I, Section 9. Thus-quite to the contrary of petitioners'
supposition-the structure of the Constitution strongly indicates that the
Speech or Debate Clause imposes no prohibition upon legislation that otherwise
is properly within the power of Congress to enact.
This Court has specifically rejected the proposition that the Speech or
Debate Clause impliedly precludes the development of further immunities
not expressly called for in the Constitution. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731, 750 n.31 (1982) (rejecting the argument that because the Speech
or Debate Clause provides a textual basis for congressional immunity, "the
Framers must be assumed to have rejected any similar grant of executive
immunity"). It is undisputed, moreover, that Congress has authority
to grant immunity from suit to officials and employees in the other Branches
of government. Under petitioners' constitutional theory, however, Congress
would be the only Branch of gov- ernment subject to a constitutional ceiling
on its immunity-simply because the Framers singled it out for protection
by providing a constitutional floor of immunity in the Speech or Debate
Clause. Nothing in precedent, logic, or the text of the Constitution supports
such an anomalous result.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
FRANK W. HUNGER
Assistant Attorney General
MARK B. STERN
PETER J. SMITH
Attorneys
DECEMBER 1998
1 S. 636, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). That bill subsequently was enacted
into law, as Pub. L. No. 103-259, § 3, 108 Stat. 694 (codified at 18
U.S.C. 248).
2 Other aspects of the FTCA also support the decision below. First, the
FTCA, as amended by the Westfall Act, allows the United States, once it
is substituted as a defendant for the individual officer or employee, to
invoke any defense of judicial or legislative immunity that could have been
invoked by the individual defendant. 28 U.S.C. 2674. This suggests that
Congress intended the Westfall Act to cover those who were covered by legislative
immunity, including Members of Congress. And even if there were doubt as
to whether Senator Kennedy were an "officer" of the Legislative
Branch, the FTCA's definition of "[e]mployee" also covers "persons
acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity," 28 U.S.C.
2671, language plainly broad enough to cover a United States Senator fulfilling
his official functions.