No. 98-2016
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JOSEPH GUARINO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
KARIN B. HOPPMANN
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a court reviewing the constitutionality of a search warrant may
look to evidence other than the affidavit accompanying the warrant application
and a contemporaneous record of the warrant hearing to determine whether
the warrant was issued on probable cause.
2. Whether, on the facts of this case, petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to challenge affidavits presented to establish that the search warrant
in question was issued on probable cause.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 98-2016
JOSEPH GUARINO, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A22) is reported at 169
F.3d 418. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. B1-B10) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 17, 1999. A
petition for rehearing was denied on March 17, 1999 (Pet. App. D1). The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on June 15, 1999. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
Petitioner entered a conditional plea of guilty in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois to one count each of illegal
possession of machine guns, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(o), possession
of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861, and possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841. He
was sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed.
Pet. App. A4-A7.
1. On May 2, 1995, Judge Nello Gamberdino of Cook County, Illinois, issued
a search warrant for petitioner's residence. Pet. App. C1. The warrant was
based on a complaint that relayed, in first person narrative, the observations
of a confidential informant referred to as "John Doe." The informant
indicated that he had purchased cocaine from petitioner on repeated occasions
and represented that, while in petitioner's residence one day earlier, he
was told that petitioner had just received a large shipment of cocaine;
the informant also reported that he saw petitioner bring up from the basement
a clear plastic bag filled with many smaller packages of cocaine. Id. at
A2-A3, C3-C4. The complaint, however, was not signed by the confidential
informant; instead, it was signed by the officer who requested the warrant,
Ken Howard. Id. at A3, C4. When county police officers executed the warrant
on May 3, 1995, they seized numerous items, including the guns and drugs
that formed the basis of the federal indictment against petitioner. Id.
at A3-A4.
Petitioner moved to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant,
claiming that the warrant had been issued in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Petitioner argued that because John Doe did not sign the complaint himself,
there was no evidence that Doe had been placed under oath as required by
the Oath or Affirmation Clause of the Fourth Amendment.1 Petitioner also
argued that the complaint was constitutionally defective because it contained
no information establishing Doe's reliability as an informant.
In response, the government presented affidavits from Judge Gamberdino (Pet.
App. C6-C7) and Officer Howard (id. at C8-C9). Judge Gamberdino stated in
his affidavit that both Officer Howard and John Doe (whom the Judge understood
to be appearing under a pseudonym), had appeared personally before him on
May 2, 1995, for the warrant hearing. The Judge also stated that he issued
the warrant only "[a]fter reviewing the complaint * * * and considering
the under oath statements of both individuals." Id. at C6. Moreover,
although he could not recall his particular questions on May 2, the Judge
stated that it was his "usual and regular practice to question both
the officer and the informant" regarding reliability and credibility.
Id. at C6-C7. See also id. at A5.
Officer Howard stated in his affidavit that he and John Doe had both appeared
personally before Judge Gamberdino, and that the Judge had questioned them
both about the complaint under oath. Officer Howard also stated that, although
he did not recall the specific questions Judge Gamberdino had asked, he
did recall "that they concerned the reliability and credibility of
the informant and his basis of knowledge for the facts alleged in the *
* * complaint for search warrant." Pet. App. C8-C9. See also id. at
A5.
Based on those affidavits, the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied petitioner's motion to suppress. Pet. App. B2. The court
stated that, without more, the warrant on its face might violate the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at B5. However, the court concluded that the affidavits established
both that the Oath or Affirmation Clause was satisfied (by John Doe's sworn
testimony concerning the complaint before Judge Gamberdino), and that the
credibility and reliability requirement was presumptively satisfied (by
Judge Gamberdino's questioning of Doe and Howard in court). Thus, Judge
Gamberdino did not err in issuing the warrant. Id. at B5-B7.
Following the district court's decision, petitioner pleaded guilty to several
of the charges in the indictment against him. He reserved the right to appeal
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. Pet. App. A7.
2. On appeal, petitioner challenged the denial of his pretrial motion to
suppress, and claimed for the first time that he was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to challenge the affidavits the government had submitted. Pet. App.
A8.
The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A22. Although the court opined
that "the preferred practice counsels that the issuing judge require
that informants' statements be reduced to writing," the court also
concluded that the "procedure employed in this case gave the judicial
officer sufficient opportunity to obtain, under oath, enough information
from the informant to satisfy the concerns protected by the oath or affirmation
requirement." Id. at A13. In particular, the court explained, "the
issuing judicial officer's questioning of both Officer Howard and John Doe
under oath prior to signing the search warrant was sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional 'oath or affirmation' requirement," because Doe
had been "subjected * * * to the possibility of prosecution for perjury,"
and the Judge's questioning had "enabled the judge to assess John Doe's
credibility and reliability." Id. at A14.
Regarding petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, the court stated
that the request would be reviewed only for plain error. No plain error
had occurred, the court concluded, because petitioner had not offered any
evidence to refute the affidavits and therefore had failed to raise a "significant
disputed factual issue" requiring a hearing. Pet. App. A16-A17.
ARGUMENT
On June 21, 1999, this Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari
in Wilson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 2383, a case arising from the same
underlying facts as this petition, and involving issues identical to those
presented here.2 Petitioner's case is no more worthy of this Court's review.
1. Petitioner argues (Pet. 6-11) that the district court incorrectly relied
on the affidavits of the issuing judge and the requesting officer to find
probable cause. He claims that the Fourth Amendment requires that a court
reviewing the constitutionality of a search warrant confine itself to the
assessment of records made contemporaneously with the warrant proceeding.
Petitioner does not, however, identify a division in circuit authority,
or any other reason why review by this Court is currently appropriate.
Petitioner is, moreover, incorrect on the merits. The Fourth Amendment declares
that search warrants shall not issue "but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment requires that the oath or affirmation or the basis for probable
cause be reduced to writing. The courts of appeals have, as a result, concluded
not only that a judge may issue a warrant based on sworn testimony outside
the warrant affidavit, see United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th
Cir.) (upholding warrant because oral testimony at warrant hearing supplied
basis for issuing judge's finding that informant was reliable), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 907 (1994), but also that the Constitution does not require that
such supplemental information be recorded, see United States v. Shields,
978 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The Fourth Amendment does not require
that statements made under oath in support of probable cause be tape-recorded
or otherwise placed on the record or made part of the affidavit.").
See also Clyburn, 24 F.3d at 617 (citing cases from the Third, Fifth and
Eighth Circuits). If the Constitution does not require contemporaneous recording
of the evidence supporting probable cause, it surely cannot require that
the reviewing court ignore all evidence other than the contemporaneous recording
when assessing whether probable cause was established.3
For related reasons, courts have consistently upheld warrants based on non-contemporaneous
testimony regarding what occurred during the warrant hearing. See, e.g.,
United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 1343 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding pseudonym
warrant based on requesting officer's testimony that issuing judge knew
informant was using pseudonym), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1024 (1994); United
States v. Smith, 9 F.3d 1007, 1012 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding warrant based
on issuing Judge's testimony at suppression hearing that he had relied on
sworn testimony outside the affidavit). Indeed, if petitioner were correct,
there would be no need for a suppression hearing when a warrant is challenged,
as the reviewing court would be confined to written and electronically-recorded
evidence; it would have no need for oral testimony regarding what actually
occurred. In sum, the United States is aware of no authority supporting
petitioner's position.4
To the extent that petitioner challenges the court of appeals' finding that
the warrant in this case was based on probable cause (Pet. 11), that challenge
is factbound and without merit. The confidential informant, under oath,
indicated that he personally had bought cocaine from petitioner; that petitioner
had told him that a large shipment of cocaine had arrived; and that he saw
petitioner bring a clear bag full of smaller cocaine packages up from his
basement. Pet. App. A2-A3, C3-C4. The judge that issued the warrant had
the opportunity to question the informant, observe his demeanor, and make
a reliability determination. Id. at A13, C6-C7. Because the judge that issued
the warrant had a "'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that
probable cause existed," the courts here properly declined to set that
determination aside. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983) (quoting
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
2. Petitioner also argues (Pet. 12-15) that he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to challenge Judge Gamberdino's and Officer Howard's affidavits.
The court of appeals was correct to review that claim only for plain error,
see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), and it is clear that the district court did
not commit an "obvious" error that "affect[ed] [petitioner's]
substantial rights" by failing sua sponte to hold an evidentiary hearing
concerning the content of the affidavits. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 732-733, 734 (1993).
Petitioner claims (Pet. 13) that he is entitled to a hearing because "[i]t
is beyond real dispute that the statements in [Judge Gamberdino's] affidavit
are conclusionary in form and ambiguous." There is no need, however,
to hold a hearing to consider that type of claim; it can be resolved by
looking to the affidavit itself, and already has been-to petitioner's detriment.
Petitioner, moreover, offered no evidence to suggest that Judge Gamberdino's
or Officer Howard's accounts were untruthful or incorrect. Under those circumstances,
the district court did not commit plain error by failing to hold the hearing
that petitioner never requested.
Finally, petitioner claims (Pet. 12) that the "importance of review"
requires that oral testimony, instead of written affidavits, be offered
in support of a finding of probable cause. The argument is difficult to
reconcile with petitioner's contrary argument that, when reviewing whether
probable cause was established, the court should look at the written record
alone. In any event, petitioner offers no explanation why a court cannot
review testimony equally well in written or oral form.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
JAMES K. ROBINSON
Assistant Attorney General
KARIN B. HOPPMANN
Attorney
SEPTEMBER 1999
1 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV (emphasis added). The Clause requires that a person
giving information to support a finding of probable cause "manifest
a recognition of his duty to speak the truth." United States v. Richardson,
943 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1991).
2 Both petitioner and Wilson were named in the May 2, 1995 search warrant,
both resided in the residence searched, and both were indicted based on
items seized during that search. Wilson joined petitioner's motion to suppress,
which was denied. Pet. App. A2-A5. In his petition for a writ of certiorari
(at ii, 11), Wilson v. United States, supra (No. 98-9497), Wilson requested
review of a question essentially identical to the first question presented
in this case.
3 Petitioner's reliance (Pet. 8) on Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565
n.8 (1971), is misplaced. There, the Court indicated that an "insufficient
affidavit cannot be rehabilitated" through testimony that was "not
disclosed to the issuing magistrate." Ibid. Here, the question is whether
an affidavit can be supplemented by testimony that was disclosed to the
magistrate in order to give a fuller and hence more accurate picture of
whether the warrant was issued on the basis of probable cause.
4 Petitioner apparently relies (Pet. 10) on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41, which requires a contemporaneous recording of search warrant proceedings
before a federal court. Rule 41 does not apply in petitioner's case because
the warrant in question was issued by a state court and executed by state
police officers. See, e.g., Clyburn, 24 F.3d at 616. Petitioner does not
suggest that the Constitution incorporates the procedural requirements of
Rule 41.