No. 99-798
In the Supreme Court of the United States
PRISCILLA M. LIPPINCOTT ADAMS, PETITIONER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LORETTA C. ARGRETT
Assistant Attorney
General
GILBERT S. ROTHENBERG
MICHELLE B. O'CONNOR
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the imposition of federal income taxes, penalties and interest on
petitioner violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 99-798
PRISCILLA M. LIPPINCOTT ADAMS, PETITIONER
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A22) is reported at 170
F.3d 173. The opinion of the United States Tax Court (Pet. App. A23-A27)
is reported at 110 T.C. 137.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on March 4, 1999. The petition
for rehearing was denied on June 10, 1999 (Pet. App. A53). On August 27,
1999, Justice Souter granted an extension of time in which to file a petition
for certiorari to and including November 7, 1999. The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on November 8, 1999 (a Monday). The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(l).
STATEMENT
1. Petitioner is a member of the Religious Society of Friends, commonly
known as the Quakers, who sincerely believes that participation in war is
contrary to God's will (Pet. App. A33-A34). Petitioner also believes that
the voluntary payment of taxes-one made without the compulsion of a levy
or court order-is against the will of God to the extent that such taxes
are used to fund participation in war by others (id. at A34).
Beginning in 1985, petitioner was employed by the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting
of the Society of Religious Friends (PYM), a Quaker organization. For the
years 1985 through 1989, petitioner claimed on her federal withholding forms
that she was exempt from taxation. As the result, no federal income tax
was withheld from her salary. On April 20, 1989, the Internal Revenue Service
directed PYM to withhold federal income taxes from petitioner's salary as
if she were married and entitled to one withholding allowance (Pet. App.
A34-A35). PYM partially complied with that directive (id. at 35). Under
PYM policy, however, employees who are religiously opposed to paying taxes
that support the military may elect to have PYM set aside (and not pay to
the government) a portion of the federal income taxes withheld from the
employee's pay equal to the percentage of the federal budget allocated to
defense spending (ibid.). The portion of withheld taxes not paid over to
the government was deposited by PYM into a trust account at petitioner's
request (id. at A35-A36).
Petitioner has stated that she elected not to pay her federal income taxes
in full for the years 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, and 1994 because "her
deeply held religious beliefs precluded her [from doing so]" (Pet.
App. A33, A36-A38). Petitioner further stated that she did not timely file
federal income tax returns for any of those years because she believed that
it would violate her religious beliefs to provide the government with information
that would assist it in collecting her taxes (id. at A37).
2. In 1996, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued notices of deficiency
to petitioner for her federal income taxes for the years 1988, 1989, 1992,
1993, and 1994. The Commissioner also determined that additions to tax were
required (i) under Section 6651(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
6651(a), for petitioner's failure to timely file federal income tax returns
and (ii) under Section 6654(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 6654(a),
for petitioner's failure to make required payments of estimated taxes (Pet.
App. A29-A32).
3. Petitioner challenged the Commissioner's determinations in Tax Court.
That court, however, rejected petitioner's claims and entered decision in
favor of the Commissioner. The court first rejected petitioner's reliance
upon the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et
seq. (RFRA). The court noted that RFRA restored the compelling interest
test applied prior to the decision in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and that, prior to Smith,
"the Supreme Court repeatedly held that neutral, generally applicable
tax laws meet the compelling interest test" (Pet. App. A25-A26). In
rejecting petitioner's claim that the government was required to accommodate
her religious-based opposition to war, the court explained that (id. at
A26 (citations omited)):
[T]he Supreme Court has established that uniform, mandatory participation
in the Federal income tax system, irrespective of religious belief, is a
compelling governmental interest. As a result, requiring [taxpayer's] participation
in the Federal income tax system is the only, and thus the least restrictive,
means of furthering the Government's interest.
The court therefore concluded that petitioner was liable for the income
tax deficiencies asserted in the notices of deficiency (ibid.). For the
same reasons, and in reliance upon its prior decision in Babcock v. Commissioner,
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 931 (1986), the court also sustained the additions to tax
imposed under Sections 6651(a)(1) and 6654(a) for petitioner's willful failure
to comply with the filing and estimated tax requirements of the Internal
Revenue Code (Pet. App. A26-A27).
4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. A1-A22). The court concluded
that neither RFRA nor the Constitution bars imposition of the taxes and
additions to tax in this case because "[t]he least restrictive means
of furthering a compelling interest in the collection of taxes * * * is[,]
in fact, to implement that system in a uniform, mandatory way, with Congress
determining in the first instance if exemptions are to [be] built into the
legislative scheme" (id. at A14).
ARGUMENT
This case presents the same questions currently pending on petition for
writ of certiorari in Browne v. United States, No. 99- 632. For the reasons
detailed in our brief in opposition in Browne, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied both in Browne and in this case.*
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LORETTA C. ARGRETT
Assistant Attorney
General
GILBERT S. ROTHENBERG
MICHELLE B. O'CONNOR
Attorneys
DECEMBER 1999
* We are providing herewith to petitioner a copy of the government's brief
in opposition to the petition in Browne.