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No. 04-1115
In the Supreme Court of
the
United States
Seattle Housing and Resource Effort,
petitioner v. John
E. Potter, Postmaster General, et al.
ON
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Paul D. Clement
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Peter D. Keisler
Assistant Attorney General
Barbara C. Biddle
Irene M. Solet
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
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QUESTION PRESENTED
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| Whether
the United States Postal
Service's restrictions on the availability of general delivery service
and
no-fee boxes violate the First Amendment rights of
homeless individuals. |
In the Supreme Court of
the
United States
| No.
04-1115 |
| Seattle
Housing and Resource Effort,
petitioner |
| v. |
| John
E. Potter, Postmaster General, et al. |
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|
|
|
|
|
| ON
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| BRIEF
FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION |
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet.
App. 1-35) is
reported at 379 F.3d 716. The opinion of the district court
(Pet. App. 36-54) is reported at 190 F. Supp. 2d 1221.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
August 12, 2004. A petition for rehearing was denied on
November 17, 2004 (Pet. App. 57-58). The petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed on February 15, 2005. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1.
Carl Currier, David Bar, and Willard Johnson are
three homeless men who live in Seattle, Washington. Pet.
App. 2-3. In May and June of 2000, they sought from the
United States Postal Service either no-fee boxes or general
delivery at local postal facilities. Id. at 3. Under
then-existing postal regulations, persons ineligible for carrier
delivery service could obtain no-fee postal boxes. See Domestic
Mail Manual (DMM) D910.5.1(a) (Issue 55, Jan. 10, 2000). Because of
increased security concerns, those regulations
were subsequently revised to require persons seeking a no-fee box to
have a physical address. Pet. App. 20; see DMM
D910.5.2 (Issue 57, June 30, 2002). General delivery allows
a person to receive mail addressed to his or her name, with
the designation "General Delivery, [City Name]." Pet. App.
3. Mail is held for 30 days for pick-up by the addressee. DMM D930.1.4.
In a city with multiple postal facilities,
general delivery is provided only at a single location. DMM
D930.1.2.
The Postal service informed Currier, Bar, and Johnson
that they were ineligible for no-fee postal boxes and that
they could receive general delivery only at the Main Post
Office in downtown Seattle. Pet. App. 4. With the assistance of Seattle
Housing and Resource Effort (petitioner),
a homeless-advocacy group, Currier, Bar, and a third
homeless person, James Kerns, filed an administrative
challenge to the denial of those services. Ibid. An
Administrative Law Judge held that the services were properly
denied. Id. at 59-74. In the absence of any administrative
appeal, that decision became the final decision of the Postal
Service. Id. at 75.
Petitioner and the three individual homeless persons
then filed suit against the Postal Service in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging inter
alia, that the denial of no-fee boxes and
general delivery at locations other than the Main Post Office violated
the First Amendment rights of homeless persons. The district court
rejected that First Amendment
claim. The court reasoned that the Postal Service's policies
concerning no-fee boxes and general delivery are content-neutral and
reasonably advance the statutory goals of efficient and economical mail
delivery. Pet. App. 49-51.
3.
The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. 1-35. The
court applied forum analysis to resolve petitioner's First
Amendment claim. As the court explained, under forum
analysis, a court first identifies the relevant forum; it then
decides whether the forum is public or nonpublic; and it
then applies the level scrutiny that is dictated by the nature
of the forum. Id. at 13.
Applying that analysis, the court first held that the relevant forum
for petitioner's challenge to the Postal Service's
restriction on general delivery is the general delivery mail
service, rather than the mail system as a whole. Pet. App.
14. The court reasoned that the relevant forum is the one
to which a speaker seeks access, and the homeless persons
here seek access to the general delivery mail system, rather
than to the mail system as a whole. Ibid.
The court next held that the general delivery mail service is a
nonpublic forum. The court concluded that the
general delivery mail service "lacks the hallowed history as
a crucible of unfettered public debate necessary to establish
traditional public forum status." Pet. App. 17. The court
also concluded that the general delivery mail service is not
a limited public forum, because the Postal Service intends
for that service to facilitate temporary mail delivery to a
limited class of postal customers, not to serve as a public
forum for the exchange of a wide range of views. Id. at 17-18.
Applying the "reasonableness standard" applicable to
restrictions on access to a nonpublic forum, the court of
appeals held that the Postal Service policy of limiting general
delivery to a single location is consistent with the First
Amendment because it is content-neutral and is reasonable
in light of the Postal Service's resource and efficiency concerns. Pet.
App. 19. Noting that it was presented only with
a facial challenge, the court expressed "no opinion regarding whether
relief might be appropriate upon an individual
plaintiff's affirmative demonstration that the regulation as
applied to his individual circumstances effectively bars him
from receiving mail at the sole general delivery location." Id.
at 19-20 n.9.
The court of appeals also rejected the First Amendment
challenge to the Postal Service's no-fee box policy. Pet.
App. 20-21. Viewing such boxes as nonpublic fora, the court
concluded that the restrictions on their availability are both
content-neutral and reasonable in light of the Postal Service's
statutory mandate to provide efficient and economical
service. Ibid.
Judge Gould concurred in the judgment, but dissented
from some of the court's reasoning. Pet. App. 24-35. Viewing the
relevant forum as the entire mail system, and viewing that forum as a
public forum, Judge Gould nonetheless
concluded that the policies at issue are facially constitutional. Id.
at 35. While Judge Gould agreed that this case
involved only a facial challenge, he concluded that the policies would
be unconstitutional as applied to homeless persons who "lack an
adequate alternative channel of communication if they practically
cannot receive general delivery
mail at the main post office." Id. at 34-35.
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does
not conflict with any decision of this Court or of another
court of appeals. Further review is therefore not warranted.
1.
The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioner's
challenge to the Postal Service policies at issue in this case.
Applying settled principles, the court of appeals correctly
held that the general delivery system and no-fee boxes are
nonpublic fora and that the Postal Service policies at issue
impose reasonable limitations on access to those fora.
a.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 17) that the court erred by
identifying the relevant fora as the general delivery system
and the no-fee boxes, rather than the mail system as a
whole. In defining the relevant forum, however, the Court
has focused on "the access sought by the speaker." Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 800-801 (1985). Here, petitioner sought access to
the general mail delivery system and no-fee boxes. Accordingly, the
court correctly identified the general mail delivery system and no-fee
boxes, rather than the mail delivery
system as a whole, as the relevant fora.
The Court's decision in United States Postal Service v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114
(1981), reinforces that conclusion. In that case, the plaintiffs
claimed a First Amendment right to deposit
unstamped letters in home mail boxes. In rejecting that
claim, the Court focused on the letterboxes as the relevant
forum, not the mail system as a whole.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 17 & n.17) that Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,
460 U.S. 37 (1983), and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
418 U.S. 298 (1974), support its view that the mail system as
a whole is the relevant forum. Petitioner's reliance on those
cases is misplaced. In Perry, the Court held that the
relevant forum was an internal school mail system, not an individual
teacher's mail box, and in Lehman, the Court held
that the forum was a city's transit advertising program,
rather than individual city buses. According to petitioner,
those cases demonstrate that "[w]hen components of a forum are
substantially similar and serve the same communicative purpose,
* * * the forum [is defined] as the aggregate of
the components." Pet. 17. Even if that abstract
principle could be derived from those cases, however, it
would not assist petitioner. Unlike the teacher mailboxes
in Perry and the buses in Lehman, the various
services
provided by the Postal Service are not "substantially similar." The
Postal Service offers four "modes of delivery"--general delivery,
caller service, carrier delivery, and
post office box service. 39 C.F.R. Pt. 3001, Subpt. C, App.
A § 2010. Each one has different costs and operational
demands for the Postal Service. See, e.g., Pet. App. 3-4, 19,
21
(describing general delivery and no-fee postal box service). The
aggregation principle that petitioner would derive from
Perry and Lehman is therefore inapposite here.
Petitioner's reliance (Pet. 18) on Texas v. Knights of
the
Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995), is also misplaced. In
that case, the court held that denying the Ku
Klux Klan the opportunity to participate in the State's
adopt-a-highway program did not violate the Klan's First
Amendment rights. Because the Klan sought access to the
adopt-the-highway program, the court held that the relevant forum was
that program and not the public highways
as a whole. Id. at 1078. There is no inconsistency between
that decision and the decision in this case. To the contrary,
in both cases the courts identified the relevant forum based
on the access sought by the plaintiff.
b.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 21) that even if the mail
system as a whole is not the relevant forum, general delivery and
no-fee boxes are public fora. As the court of appeals explained (Pet.
App. 17), however, general delivery
lacks the history as a forum of unfettered public debate,
and the Postal Service has not affirmatively opened it up as
a general forum for public debate. Instead, the Postal Service uses
general delivery service "merely to facilitate temporary mail delivery
to a limited class of users." Id. at 18. Similarly, no-fee
boxes are not traditional public fora, and
the Postal Service has not opened them up as fora for general public
debate. The court of appeals therefore correctly
concluded that general delivery and no-fee boxes are
nonpublic fora.
Petitioner argues (Pet. 21) that general delivery and no-fee boxes are
public fora because they serve a communicative function. Under this
Court's cases, however, "the mere
fact that an instrumentality is used for the communication
of ideas does not make it a public forum." Cornelius, 460
U.S. at 49 n.9; see Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 130 n.6. Just as
the letterboxes at issue in Greenburgh constituted
nonpublic fora even though they were used for communicative purposes,
the general delivery service and no-fee boxes
are also nonpublic fora.
c.
The Postal Service's polices easily satisfy the "reasonableness"
standard applicable to nonpublic fora. See
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Confining general delivery service to
a single location in areas where a post office operates
through multiple branches serves the statutory objective of
efficient and economical mail delivery. See 39 U.S.C. 403(a)
(duty of Postal Service to "provide adequate and efficient
postal services at fair and reasonable rates and fees"). Expanding
general delivery to all branch post offices in an
attempt to allow homeless customers to pick up items addressed to them
at the nearest location would impose significant practical
difficulties. Many senders of general delivery mail address items with
a station or branch name but
an incorrect ZIP Code. If general delivery were expanded
to all branch offices, the Postal Service would have no way
to determine the intended location for such items. Suppl.
Excerpts of Record (SER) 2-3.
Decentralizing general delivery service would also impose additional
burdens and costs. Mail items addressed to
an individual at "General Delivery" usually cannot be
sorted by automated equipment because most of the items
lack ZIP Codes. Excerpts of Record (ER) 158-159; SER
29. That service also requires a counter transaction for
each delivery. ER 158-159. Centralizing general delivery
at a single location in a city also permits economies of scale. If such
mail went to all branch post offices, it would overburden those already
operating at capacity, especially if the
incremental workload did not justify hiring an additional
worker. SER 24.
The Seattle Main Post Office receives approximately
500 to 600 first class letters, 250 to 300 larger envelopes and
magazines, and 25 parcels per week addressed to individuals at "General
Delivery." SER 29. For two or three days
at the beginning of each month, the letter volume doubles
(as a result of government benefit checks). Ibid.
Approximately 80 to 100 persons per day call for general delivery
mail at that facility. Ibid. The tasks of sorting that
incoming mail, serving those customers, and returning unclaimed
items require a full-time clerk. Ibid. Dispersing those
tasks to all 32 geographically separate stations that are
part of the Seattle Post Office would require significant
additional resources (SER 22), and the costs would be much
magnified if such expanded service were to be made available in cities
nationwide.
Petitioner contends (Pet. 24-25) that the government
may not legitimately take into account such burdens and
costs. In support of that contention, petitioner relies on
three Ninth Circuit decisions that invalidated restrictions
on prisoners' ability to receive bulk mail. Those cases, however, did
not reject administrative burdens and budgetary
impacts as legitimate considerations. In two of the cases,
the court struck down the limitations at issue as arbitrary
because the record did not establish any basis for distinguishing the
prohibited categories of mail from permitted
categories. Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d
692,
700 (9th Cir. 2005); Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d
896, 903-904
(9th Cir. 2001). In the third case, the court held that the
record failed to show that the restriction relieved any significant
burden on staff resources. Prison Legal News v.
Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the record
contains substantial evidence supporting the Postal Service's
conclusion that expanding general delivery would
impose significant burdens and costs. The decisions relied
on by petitioner are therefore inapposite here.
For similar reasons, the Postal Service's policies concerning no-fee
boxes satisfy the reasonableness standard. The costs of providing
no-fee boxes to all homeless persons
would be substantial, Pet. App. 21, and the Court has
squarely rejected the notion "that First Amendment rights
are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized
by the State." Regan v. Taxation With Representation of
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1993) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
2.
Review is also unwarranted in this case because petitioner's contention
that the Postal Service's policies violate
the rights of all homeless persons as a class could not succeed even if
the relevant forum were the mail system as a
whole and the mail system were viewed as a public forum. In that event,
the Postal Service's policies would have to
satisfy the standards for time, place, and manner restrictions. They
would have to (1) be "justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech," (2) be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest,"
and (3) "leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The
Postal Service polices satisfy that standard as applied to
homeless persons as a class. As Judge Gould explained in
his concurring and dissenting opinion, the Postal Service
policies are content neutral, they significantly further the
legitimate interest in keeping costs down, and there has
been no showing that all homeless persons as a class lack
adequate means for receiving their mail. Pet. App. 31-35.
3.
Review is also unwarranted in this case because of
the limited nature of the court of appeals' decision. The
court in this case addressed only petitioner's contention
that the Postal Service's general delivery and no-fee box
policies violate the First Amendment rights of all homeless
persons as a class, without regard to whether such persons
have adequate means of receiving mail. The court expressed "no opinion
regarding whether relief might be appropriate upon an individual
plaintiff's affirmative demonstration that the regulation as applied to
his individual circumstances effectively bars him from receiving mail
at the
sole general delivery location." Pet. App. 19-20 n.9. Because the court
correctly resolved the broad-based attack
launched by the individual plaintiffs and petitioner, and left
open as-applied challenges by persons who could make a
showing that the Postal Service's policies preclude them
from receiving their mail, review by this Court is clearly not
warranted.
4.
Finally, the individual homeless persons who originally brought this
action are no longer parties to the case. The sole petitioner is a
homeless advocacy group. There is
a substantial question whether that organization has standing to
maintain this action. For that reason as well, review
is unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
Paul D. Clement
Acting Solicitor General
Peter D. Keisler
Assistant Attorney General
Barbara C. Biddle
Irene M. Solet
Attorneys
May 2005