No. 03-1234
In the Supreme Court of the United States
MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS PAUL D. CLEMENT JEFFREY A. ROSEN QUESTIONS PRESENTED The State of Michigan imposes upon motor carriers a $100 annual fee for
each vehicle license-plated in the State and "operating entirely in
interstate commerce." Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 478.2(2) (West
2002). The question presented in this case is as follows: Whether the $100 fee upon vehicles operating solely in interstate commerce
is preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504. In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 03-1234 MID-CON FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES This case presents the question whether a $100 annual fee imposed by
the State of Michigan on each commercial motor vehicle "registered
in this state and operating entirely in interstate commerce," Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. (MCL)
§ 478.2(2) (West 2002), is preempted by the federal law that governs
the Single State Registration System (SSRS) for commercial motor vehicles.
The United States has a substantial interest in the Court's resolution
of that question. Congress has assigned responsibility for administration
of the SSRS to the Secretary of Transportation, see 49 U.S.C. 14504, and
the Court's resolution of the preemption issue presented here may have a
significant economic impact upon interstate motor carriers. At the invitation
of the Court, the United States filed a brief as amicus curiae at the petition
stage of this case. STATEMENT 1. Congress has long required motor carriers operating in interstate
commerce to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity or
comparable form of authorization from the federal government. "[I]n
1965, Congress authorized States to require interstate motor carriers operating
within their borders to register with the State their Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) operating permits." Yellow Transp., Inc. v. Michigan,
537 U.S. 36, 39 (2002); see Pub. L. No. 89-170, § 2, 79 Stat. 648 (49
U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970)). Congress provided that such a requirement by
a State to register an ICC certificate or permit "shall not constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce provided that such registration is
accomplished in accordance with standards * * * promulgated by the Commission."
Ibid.; see Yellow Transp., 537 U.S. at 39. Former Section 302(b)(2) further
provided: "To the extent that any State requirements for registration
of motor carrier certificates or permits issued by the Commission impose
obligations which are in excess of the standards or amendments thereto promulgated
under this paragraph, such excessive requirements shall * * * constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce." 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970).1 In its rules implementing Section 302(b) and its statutory successors,
the ICC initially imposed a $5-per-vehicle cap on the fee that a State could
charge for registration of a carrier's ICC certificate. See 49 C.F.R. 1023.33
(1971). That limit was subsequently increased to $10 per vehicle. See
47 Fed. Reg. 8365-8366 (1982); 49 C.F.R. 1023.33 (1982); Yellow Transp.,
537 U.S. at 39. The means by which registration was accomplished under
the ICC's rules came to be known as the "bingo card" system because
each State issued a stamp for each vehicle operating within its borders,
and the motor carrier affixed the stamp to a card carried in the vehicle,
as proof of registration. 49 C.F.R. 1023.32 (1992); Yellow Transp., 537
U.S. at 39. The $10-per-vehicle fee for registering an interstate motor carrier's
federal certificate has never been regarded as the only state "registration"
fee that the carrier may be required to pay. A motor vehicle operating
in interstate commerce is always required to have a license plate from some
State, and the fees charged for that registration and plating of commercial
trucks can run into the hundreds or even thousands of dollars. See, e.g.,
American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 271, 282 (1987) (noting
that Pennsylvania's registration fees for some commercial trucks were as
high as $1125 during the years 1980-1982, and that "[t]he State's vehicle
registration fee has its counterpart in every other State and the District
of Columbia"). Congress has encouraged States to join the International Registration
Plan (IRP), a reciprocity agreement among the States of the United States
and the provinces of Canada for the registration/license-plating of commercial
motor vehicles. See 49 U.S.C. 31704; Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 271. Under
the IRP, a commercial motor vehicle is registered and license-plated in
a single State; it can then travel freely through other participating States
for which an IRP registration fee has been paid without registering separately
in each; and the State of registration apportions the registration fees
among the other States in which the vehicle traveled during the prior year
in proportion to the volume of miles traveled. Id. at 271-272 & n.6;
see MCL § 257.801g (West 2001) (provision of Michigan law governing
registration of vehicles with the Secretary of State and apportionment of
fees under the IRP). All 48 contiguous States currently participate in
the IRP. Federal law provides that "Section[] 31704 * * * of [Title
49] do[es] not limit the amount of money a State may charge for registration
of a commercial motor vehicle." 49 U.S.C. 31707. 2. In 1991, in order to reduce the administrative burdens that the bingo
card system had imposed on interstate motor carriers, Congress directed
the ICC to implement a new system, called the Single State Registration
System (SSRS), under which a motor carrier operating in interstate commerce
"is required to register annually with only one State by providing
evidence of its Federal registration." 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(1)(A).
To register under the SSRS, the carrier submits evidence of its federal
operating authority, proof of insurance or qualification as a self-insurer,
the appropriate registration fees, and the name of a local agent for service
of process. 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). The carrier
must also inform the registration State of "[t]he number of motor
vehicles [the carrier] intends to operate in each participating State during
the next registration year." 49 C.F.R. 367.4(c)(4)(i); see 49 U.S.C.
14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(I). SSRS registration does not, however, require the
identification or registration of specific vehicles. Indeed, the statute
provides that the standards promulgated by the Secretary for SSRS registration
"shall not require decals, stamps, cab cards, or any other means of
registering or identifying specific vehicles operated by the carrier."
See 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B)(iii).2 Under the SSRS, each participating State may charge a fee, "equal
to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or
charged as of November 15, 1991." 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).3
That fee, however, may now be charged only for filing the required proof
of insurance. See 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(A)(ii), 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv). No
fee may be charged for filing the evidence of federal registration itself.
49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B)(v). The fees are collected by the State in which
the carrier is registered for SSRS purposes, which then is responsible for
distributing the money among the other States through which the vehicle
travels. 49 C.F.R. 367.6(a). A motor carrier is required to select "the
State in which it maintains its principal place of business" as its
SSRS registration State, unless that State is not a participant in the SSRS.
49 C.F.R. 367.3(a).4 When Congress abolished the ICC in 1995, it assigned authority to administer
the SSRS to the Secretary of Transportation. Yellow Transp., 537 U.S. at
39-40 n.* (citing ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat.
803). In its current form, the Title 49 provision that establishes the
SSRS provides in pertinent part as follows: The requirement of a State that a motor carrier, providing [interstate]
transportation * * * and providing transportation in that State, must
register with the State is not an unreasonable burden on [interstate] transportation
* * * when the State registration is completed under standards of the
Secretary [of Transportation] under subsection (c). When a State registration
requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary,
the part in excess is an unreasonable burden. 49 U.S.C. 14504(b). The statute further states that "[t]he charging
or collection of any fee under this section that is not in accordance with
the fee system established under subparagraph (B)(iv) of this paragraph
shall be deemed to be a burden on interstate commerce." 49 U.S.C.
14504(c)(2)(C). 3. The provision of Michigan law through which that State implements
the SSRS is MCL § 478.7. That provision was enacted in 1988 (and amended
in 1989), before the SSRS was enacted by Congress in 1991, see MCL §
478.7 (Historical and Statutory Notes), and is administered by respondent
Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC). Subsection (1) of MCL §
478.7 provides that "[a] motor carrier shall not engage in interstate
or foreign transportation of property for compensation without first having
registered with the [MPSC] and paid the required registration and vehicle
fees." Subsection (2) provides that a motor carrier operating in Michigan
under authority granted by the ICC "shall file and maintain a record
of that authority with the [MPSC]." Although this provision on its
face continues to require every carrier operating in interstate commerce
within the borders of Michigan to file evidence of its federal certificate
with the State, it apparently has been administered by the MPSC, since the
SSRS went into effect, in a manner that is consistent with the SSRS-i.e.,
to provide for the filing of the proof of federal registration and associated
information with the MPSC only when the carrier selects Michigan as its
single registration State in accordance with the SSRS. See J.A. 26-27.
Subsection (4) of MCL § 478.7 provides that "[t]he annual fee
levied on each interstate or foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this
state and licensed in another state or province of Canada shall be $10."
MCL § 478.7(4) (emphasis added). That provision is consistent with
the $10 cap now in effect under the SSRS. As is clear from its text, however,
MCL § 478.7(4) does not apply to vehicles that are operating in interstate
commerce and are licensed-plated in Michigan. The fee requirement for such
vehicles is instead contained in MCL § 478.2(2), the specific provision
of Michigan law at issue in this case. Under that provision, Michigan imposes
"an annual fee of $100.00 for each vehicle operated by the motor carrier
which is registered in this state and operating entirely in interstate commerce."
It is undisputed that the statutory phrase "registered in this state"
refers to commercial motor vehicles license-plated in Michigan, not to vehicles
that are license-plated in other States but are operated by carriers for
whom Michigan is the SSRS registration State. See J.A. 59 (affidavit of
state official explains that, "[h]istorically, the Michigan Public
Service Commission [MPSC] has interpreted MCL 478.2(2)'s applicability requirement
of 'vehicles registered in Michigan' to mean vehicles which have Michigan
license plates obtained through the Michigan Secretary of State");
J.A. 24, 27, 57, 67; Pet. 6 n.3, 23-24; Br. in Opp. 2, 11, 17, 19, 20. The applicability of the two different fees imposed on trucks operating
in interstate commerce within Michigan's borders is reflected in the SSRS
registration form utilized by the MPSC. See J.A. 65-67. That form states
that "ICC [now DOT] carriers with vehicles based outside of Michigan
must register those vehicles on this form at a fee of $10.00 per vehicle,"
but that "[v]ehicles based in Michigan are required to have a $100.00
MPSC decal (Household Goods carriers $50)." J.A. 67 n.* For the latter
vehicles, the Michigan SSRS form directs the registering interstate carrier
to "[u]se Equipment List (form P-344-T) to order MPSC decals."
Ibid. 4. Petitioners filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims, contending
that MCL § 478.2(2) imposes a registration fee in excess of the $10-per-vehicle
SSRS maximum and is therefore preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504. The Court of
Claims denied petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Pet. App. 36-50.
The court held that MCL § 478.2(2) is not preempted by federal law
because Section 478.2(2) applies only to vehicles registered in Michigan by Michigan-licensed
motor carriers, i.e., where Michigan is the "registering state."
The SSRS fee system places a $10.00 annual vehicle fee limit on only the
"participating states," however, not on the "registering
state." The SSRS neither prohibits nor preempts [MCL § 478.2(2)'s]
vehicle fee. Pet. App. 46. The Michigan Court of Claims subsequently granted the
State's motion for summary disposition, id. at 54-56, and denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration, id. at 57-72. In its order denying reconsideration,
the court reiterated its previously stated view that "[t]he fee limits
that were imposed" by the SSRS and its statutory predecessors "applied
only to states where the vehicles were not based and registered."
Id. at 68. 5. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. J.A. 68-102. The court rejected
the view of the Michigan Court of Claims that the SSRS $10-per-vehicle limit
is inapplicable to fees charged by the "registration state."
J.A. 80-82. The court explained that "when the [federal] statute states
that a participating state may not charge a fee in excess of $10, this includes
the registration state. To conclude otherwise, that a registration state
could set its own fee, would contravene the express language and purpose
of the statute." J.A. 82. The Michigan Court of Appeals held, however, that the $100 annual fee
imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) on vehicles license-plated in the State and
operating solely in interstate commerce is a "regulatory fee"
rather than a "registration fee" and therefore is not preempted
by 49 U.S.C. 14504. J.A. 83-85. The court explained that the $100 interstate fee could reasonably be classified as a regulatory
fee because it is a fee imposed for the administration of the [state Motor
Carrier Act], particularly covering costs of enforcing safety regulations.
If the purpose of a fee is to regulate an industry or service, it can be
properly classified as a regulatory fee. Because the fee in MCL 478.2(2)
is not a registration fee, it is not subject to preemption. J.A. 83-84 (footnote and citation omitted).5 6. The Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioners' application for leave
to appeal. Pet. App. 73-75. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT A. Since 1965, federal law has expressly authorized States to require
interstate motor carriers to register proof of their federal operating permits,
but has limited the fees that a State may charge in connection with that
registration process. The $10-per-vehicle limit on such fees, first imposed
by ICC regulation and subsequently adopted by Congress (see 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III)),
ensures that States do not use the registration of federal operating authority
as a means to impose disproportionate burdens on interstate carriage. The
limit thus serves an important federal interest, even though States remain
free to subject interstate carriers to a variety of fees and attendant administrative
requirements, so long as those burdens are imposed on intrastate carriers
as well. B. As amended in 1978 and again in 1991, the current SSRS preemption
provision is worded more broadly than was the predecessor provision contained
in 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970). Whereas former Section 302(b)(2) preempted
"State requirements for registration of motor carrier certificates
or permits issued by the [ICC]" to the extent that such requirements
exceeded ICC standards, current 49 U.S.C. 14504(b) more generally encompasses
"State registration requirement[s]" that "impose[] obligations
in excess of the standards of the Secretary" of Transportation. The
statute in its current form thus preempts state laws that require interstate
carriers to register with the State on account of their interstate operations,
except in accordance with the standards governing the SSRS, whether or not
the relevant state law specifically requires registration of the carrier's
federal operating authority. C. MCL § 478.2(2) is preempted by federal law because it imposes
the very sort of exorbitant and discriminatory burden on interstate commerce
that the SSRS $10-per-vehicle limit is intended to prevent. Section 478.2(2)
is a "State registration requirement" within the meaning of 49
U.S.C. 14504(b), and the fee it imposes plainly exceeds the $10-per-vehicle
limit established by the governing federal statute and the Secretary of
Transportation's implementing regulations. MCL § 478.2(2) is therefore
expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504(b). But even if the term "State
registration requirement" were construed not to encompass the challenged
fee, MCL § 478.2(2) would be impliedly preempted because it subverts
the congressional policy judgment reflected in the SSRS. D. The fact that fees collected under MCL § 478.2(2) are subsequently
used by the State for highway-related purposes is irrelevant to the preemption
analysis. Like its statutory and regulatory predecessors, 49 U.S.C. 14504
limits the amount of the fee that a State may collect in certain circumstances
but does not constrain the State's subsequent use of the money it receives.
Because MCL
§ 478.2(2) effects precisely the singling out of interstate commerce
that the $10-per-vehicle SSRS registration limit was intended to prevent,
it is preempted by federal law, regardless of the use to which the funds
are subsequently put. E. The $100-per-vehicle fee under MCL § 478.2(2) is not saved from
preemption by the fact that it is imposed only upon commercial motor vehicles
license-plated in Michigan. Nothing in the text or history of 49 U.S.C.
14504 suggests that the SSRS fee limit is inapplicable to vehicles license-plated
in the charging State, and any such exception would subvert Congress's effort
to prevent discrimination against interstate carriage. Nor does MCL §
478.2(1), under which the State imposes a $100 annual fee on other Michigan-plated
commercial motor vehicles, provide a basis for disregarding the facially
discriminatory character of MCL § 478.2(2). ARGUMENT THE $100 ANNUAL FEE IMPOSED BY MCL
§ 478.2(2) ON MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSE-PLATED WITHIN THE STATE AND
"OPERATING ENTIRELY IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE" IS PREEMPTED BY 49
U.S.C. 14504 The terms "register" and "registration" are a potential
source of confusion in this case because a motor carrier operating in interstate
commerce must comply with two distinct registration requirements. For purposes
of the SSRS, the carrier registers in a single State (typically the State
in which the carrier has its principal place of business, see 49 C.F.R.
367.3(a)) by submitting evidence of its federal operating authority, proof
of insurance or qualification as a self-insurer, the appropriate fees (up
to $10 per vehicle
for each State in which the vehicle will operate), and the name of a
local agent for service of process. 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); see
p. 4, supra. In order for its SSRS fees to be computed and properly apportioned
among the States in which its vehicles travel, the carrier must identify
the number of vehicles that it intends to operate in each of the participating
States. The carrier's obligations under the SSRS, however, do not include
any duty to identify or register specific motor vehicles. See pp. 4-5 &
note 2, supra. Each motor vehicle operating in interstate commerce is also subject to
the separate, generally applicable state-law requirement-which applies as
well to non-commercial motor vehicles (e.g., passenger cars) and to commercial
motor vehicles operating wholly intrastate-that the individual vehicle must
be registered in some State, and that the operator must obtain a license
plate for the vehicle in connection with that distinct state registration
process. The fees charged for that registration and for issuance of a license
plate may run into the hundreds or even thousands of dollars for large commercial
motor vehicles. The State in which a particular vehicle is license-plated
will sometimes, but not always, be the same as the operating carrier's SSRS
registration State. Under current law and practice, license-plating of
motor vehicles used in interstate commerce is typically accomplished by
the base-plating State in accordance with the IRP. For present purposes,
the salient features of the IRP are that (a) each vehicle is license-plated
in a single State, (b) a fee for each State in which the vehicle is to be
operated is paid to the license-plating State's IRP administrative office,
(c) the vehicle may then travel freely throughout the States for which IRP
registration has been paid, and (d) the total registration fee collected
by the license-plating State is apportioned on the basis of mileage traveled
among the various States in which the vehicle operates. See IRP §§
102, 104, 300, 400; American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,
271-272 & n.6 (1987); pp. 3-4, supra. The Michigan statutory provision that is at issue in this case implicates
both types of registration procedures. MCL
§ 478.2(2) applies only to motor vehicles that are "registered"
(in the sense of license-plated) in the State of Michigan. See pp. 7-8,
supra. Under most circumstances, the federal statutory provision (49 U.S.C.
14504) governing the SSRS would not limit the authority of the license-plating
State to assess any otherwise lawful fees that it chose to levy in connection
with that separate "registration" process. MCL § 478.2(2)'s
$100 annual fee is imposed, however, not upon Michigan-plated vehicles generally,
but only upon those that "operat[e] entirely in interstate commerce."
Because Section 478.2(2) is triggered by interstate operations, it is in
conflict with the express terms of 49 U.S.C. 14504(b) and with the concerns
that underlie that provision and its $10-per-vehicle maximum for SSRS registration.
MCL § 478.2(2) therefore is preempted by federal law. A. The $10-Per-Vehicle Limit For State Registration Of Interstate Carriers
Under The SSRS Serves To Prevent States From Imposing Distinct Or Disproportionate
Burdens On Interstate Commerce 1. In 1965, Congress expressly authorized each State to require an interstate
motor carrier operating within its jurisdiction to "register its certificate
of public convenience and necessity or permit issued by the [ICC]."
Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 648 (49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970)). The 1965
statute provided that such registration requirements "shall not constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce provided that such registration is
accomplished in accordance with standards * * * promulgated by the [ICC]."
Ibid. That basic authorization has remained in place for the past 40 years,
though the adoption of the SSRS has streamlined the process by which registration
is accomplished. The fees that a State may charge in connection with that registration
process, however, have consistently been limited by federal law. Thus,
the 1965 statute that initially authorized the States to require registration
of a carrier's federal operating authority provided: "To the extent
that any State requirements for registration of motor carrier certificates
or permits issued by the Commission impose obligations which are in excess
of the standards or amendments thereto promulgated under this paragraph,
such excessive requirements shall * * * constitute an undue burden on
interstate commerce." 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970). In implementing
former Section 302(b), the ICC initially adopted rules setting a $5-per-vehicle
maximum on the fee that a State could charge for registration of a carrier's
ICC certificate. The ICC subsequently raised that cap to $10 per vehicle,
and the $10-per-vehicle regulatory limit remained in effect until it was
adopted by Congress in 1991. See pp. 3, 4-5, supra; 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B). 2. Congress had good reason to focus on state requirements for registration
of ICC certificates and on the fees charged by States for such registration.
The distinctive feature of carriers having such certificates (or, under
the current statutory regime, carriers registered by the Secretary of Transportation,
see 49 U.S.C. 13901, 13902) is that they operate in interstate commerce.
States historically have been prohibited by the Commerce Clause from regulating
interstate commerce as such. They are also prohibited by the Commerce Clause
from discriminating against out-of-State commercial entities, see, e.g.,
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 197 (1995) ("States
are barred from discriminating against foreign enterprises competing with
local businesses."), or against in-State commercial entities based
on their participation in interstate commerce, see, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576 (1997) (State violates the Commerce
Clause when it "distinguishes between entities that serve a principally
interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market").
Any attempt by a State to single out interstate motor carriers as such,
or to impose requirements on such carriers that it does not impose on similarly
situated intrastate operators, thus would raise substantial constitutional
and policy concerns. Specific federal authorization for States to require interstate carriers
to register their federal certificates-a requirement that by its nature
would have no application to purely intrastate operators-eliminated any
potential Commerce Clause objection to such a registration requirement.
See 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970) (requirement that interstate carrier register
its federal certificate with the State "shall not constitute an undue
burden on interstate commerce provided that such registration is accomplished
in accordance with [ICC] standards"). But if States were vested with
unrestricted authority to require registration of an interstate operator's
federal certificate, they might use that authority to subject interstate
carriers to burdensome filing requirements and exorbitant fees that are
not imposed on intrastate businesses. The $10-per-vehicle limit on fees
for registration of ICC certificates or comparable federal operating authority
thus serves the important federal interest in protecting interstate commerce
against the imposition of distinct or discriminatory burdens. States remain
free under the Commerce Clause, however, to levy a variety of other fees
and taxes, including fees for the license-plating of individual vehicles,
that do not single out carriers or vehicles operating in interstate commerce
for discriminatory burdens. The question in this case is whether the $100 annual fee imposed by MCL
§ 478.2(2) on Michigan-plated trucks operating entirely in interstate
commerce is preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504, the current version of the federal
statute authorizing a State to require an interstate carrier to file evidence
of its federal registration with the State, even though MCL § 478.2(2)
does not specifically link the payment of the fee to the carrier's filing
of its federal registration. As explained in Points B and C below, 49 U.S.C.
14504 preempts any state registration requirement imposed on an interstate
carrier by reason of its interstate operations, and therefore preempts MCL
§ 478.2(2). B. Section 14504(b) Preempts Any State Registration Requirement Imposed
On Interstate Motor Carriers By Reason Of Their Interstate Operations 1. In 1978, as part of a revision and recodification of Title 49, Congress
carried forward the provision in former 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) that a state-law
requirement for an interstate carrier to register its ICC certificate or
permit with the State is not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce
if the State's registration requirements are consistent with standards adopted
by the ICC. See 49 U.S.C. 11506(b) (1982). The next sentence then stated:
"When a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess
of the standards [of the ICC], the part in excess is an unreasonable burden."
Ibid. The wording of this latter sentence was revised from the corresponding
sentence in its predecessor, 49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2) (1970). Whereas the predecessor
had provided that "state requirements for registration of motor carrier
certificates or permits issued by the [ICC]" were an undue burden on
interstate commerce to the extent they were in excess of ICC standards,
the 1982 version provided that a "State registration requirement"
was an undue burden on interstate commerce to the extent it imposed obligations
in excess of the ICC standards. It is unclear whether this change in language was intended to have any
operative effect. On the one hand, the 1982 Act of Congress that enacted
the overall revision was entitled "An Act To revise, codify, and enact
without substantive change the Interstate Commerce Act and related laws
as subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code, 'Transportation.'"
Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (emphasis added). On the other hand,
the Reviser's Notes explaining the revision and recodification state that
the revision of the language in the particular sentence at issue here was
made "for clarity." 49 U.S.C. 11506 note (1982) (emphasis added).
This explanation could be read to suggest that the new reference in the
second sentence to "State registration requirement" was meant
to clarify an intent that was perhaps thought to be implicit in the prior
49 U.S.C. 302(b)(2)- namely, that the federal statute preempted any state
registration requirement (not merely a state registration requirement specifically
applicable to the filing of the carrier's ICC certificate) that was imposed
on a carrier by reason of its interstate operations and that was in excess
of the ICC standards referred to in the first sentence. There is no need in this case to decide whether the use of the new wording
("State registration requirement") in the second sentence of 49
U.S.C. 11506(b)(1982) was meant to have any broader preemptive effect than
its predecessor. The 1982 statute was in turn superseded by the current
SSRS provision in 1991, and as explained below (see pp. 18-20, infra), the
preemptive scope of the current provision plainly is broader than the 1965
version. But whatever the scope of the 1982 version while it was in effect,
there is no indication that it was either intended or understood to introduce
broad preemption in traditional areas of state regulation, such as state
requirements associated with the plating and licensing of individual motor
vehicles, even though such provisions might literally constitute "State
registration requirement[s]." Cf. Scheiner, 483 U.S. at 282 (noting
that Pennsylvania's "vehicle registration fee has its counterpart in
every other State and the District of Columbia"). 2. In 1991, Congress extensively revised the statutory provision governing
state registration requirements for carriers operating in interstate commerce.
The new statute, now codified at 49 U.S.C. 14504, establishes the current
SSRS registration system and specifies in considerable detail the permissible
scope of the standards the Secretary of Transportation may adopt to govern
state registration requirements under the SSRS system. See 49 U.S.C. 14504(c);
pp. 4-5, supra. Significantly, moreover, Congress in 1991 also revised the language specifying
which state registration requirements would and would not constitute an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. See 49 U.S.C. 14504(b). The
relevant subsection in the 1982 version of the statute had stated, in its
first sentence, that any requirement by a State that a motor carrier subject
to federal regulation "register the certificate or permit issued to
the carrier" by the ICC would not constitute an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce if the state requirement conformed to standards issued
by the ICC. See 49 U.S.C. 11506(b) (1982) (emphasis added). The first
sentence in subsection (b) of the current 49 U.S.C. 14504 is written more
broadly. It provides: "The requirement of a State that a motor carrier,
providing transportation" subject to federal jurisdiction, "must
register with the State" is not an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce when "completed under standards of the Secretary under subsection
(c)"-i.e., when completed under the standards governing the SSRS (emphasis
added). The second sentence of Section 14504(b) then provides that "[w]hen
a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of the standards
of the Secretary, the part in excess is an unreasonable burden" on
interstate commerce. Those two sentences of the current Section 14504(b),
read together, make clear that state requirements that interstate carriers
"must register with the State" are preempted as a general matter
if they do not conform to the standards governing the SSRS, whether or not
those state requirements are specifically worded in terms of a carrier's
registration of its federal certificate with the State. There is, however, no indication that the current Section 14504(b), any
more than its predecessor, was intended to preempt state laws and fees in
traditional areas of state regulation, such as those governing registration
and license-plating of trucks under the IRP. Rather, Section 14504(b) is
most naturally read as prohibiting state registration requirements that
are imposed on interstate carriers by reason of their operation in interstate
commerce, except as authorized under the SSRS itself.6 C. Because MCL § 478.2(2) Imposes Distinct Burdens On A Class Of
Interstate Motor Vehicles, Based On The Interstate Character Of Their Operations,
It Is Preempted By 49 U.S.C. 14504 Because MCL § 478.2(2)'s $100 annual fee is imposed only on vehicles
"operating entirely in interstate commerce," it effects precisely
the singling out of interstate commerce for burdensome additional state
requirements that 49 U.S.C. 14504(b) and the $10-per-vehicle SSRS cap are
intended to prevent. The fee imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) is not in terms
a charge for the filing by the carrier of its proof of insurance (the only
filing for which a fee may be charged under the SSRS), or even for the filing
of any of the other items of information (i.e., evidence of the interstate
carrier's federal registration and the name of a local agent for service
of process) that the carrier must submit to the registration State under
the SSRS. See 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(A)(i) and (iv). The fee is triggered,
however, by the very conduct-a motor carrier's transportation of goods in
interstate commerce-that is the basis for the carrier's registration in
a single State under the SSRS and the assessment of SSRS fees. The $10-per-vehicle
SSRS limit would be deprived of any practical effect if States could assess
a larger fee upon the same class (or a subclass) of the vehicles covered
by the SSRS, based on the same criterion (operating in interstate commerce)
that governs the SSRS process, simply by labeling the fee as a charge for
something other than the filing of the specific information identified in
the federal statute. The relevant provision of Michigan law literally imposes a "State
registration requirement" (49 U.S.C. 14504(b)) in addition to and different
from that permitted under the SSRS, and it is therefore preempted. Michigan
law requires an interstate carrier, before its Michigan-plated vehicles
that are engaged entirely in interstate commerce may travel on the State's
roads, to submit a non-SSRS form to the MPSC to obtain a decal for any such
vehicle (J.A. 67 n.*); to list specific vehicles on that form (ibid.); and
to pay a $100 fee for each such vehicle (MCL § 478.2(2)).7 See also
MCL § 478.7(1) (carrier must register with MPSC and pay all required
registration and vehicle fees before engaging in interstate or foreign commerce
in Michigan). And because Section 478.2(2) applies only to vehicles operating
in interstate commerce, it is precisely the type of "State registration
requirement" that Congress sought to preclude. The $100-per-vehicle
fee is plainly "in excess of the standards of the Secretary" of
Transportation, which impose a $10-per-vehicle limit, and it is therefore
expressly preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504(b). Moreover, even if the term "State registration requirement"
in 49 U.S.C. 14504(b) did not literally apply to the $100-per-vehicle fee
in MCL 478.2(2), Michigan's assessment of that fee on vehicles "operating
entirely in interstate commerce" would be impliedly preempted because
it directly subverts Congress's efforts to minimize burdens targeted specifically
at interstate transportation by motor carrier. This Court has made clear
that state law may be preempted based on an implied conflict with federal
law, even when the relevant federal statute contains an express preemption
provision that does not cover the state law at issue. See Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867-874 (2000). The fee imposed by MCL §
478.2(2) impliedly conflicts with 49 U.S.C. 14504 because it "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." Geier, 529 U.S. at 873 (quoting Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The clear inconsistency between
MCL § 478.2(2) and the congressional policy judgment reflected in the
SSRS provides an independent basis for holding Section 478.2(2) to be preempted,
whether or not the $100-per-vehicle fee is a "State registration requirement"
within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 14504(b). D. The Fact That The Contested Fees Are Used After Collection To Finance
The State's Regulatory Programs Is Irrelevant To The Preemption Analysis The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the $100-per-vehicle annual fee
imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) is not preempted by 49 U.S.C. 14504(b) because
the challenged assessment is a "regulatory" rather than a "registration"
fee. J.A. 83-85. The court observed that the fee under MCL
§ 478.2(2) is "imposed for the administration of the [state
Motor Carrier Act], particularly covering costs of enforcing safety regulations."
J.A. 83. The court held that, "[i]f the purpose of a fee is to regulate
an industry or service, it can be properly classified as a regulatory fee."
Ibid. That analysis is wholly misconceived. Whatever the precise scope of the term "State registration requirement"
in 49 U.S.C. 14504(b), nothing in the text or purposes of the statute suggests
that its preemptive effect can turn on the use to which a particular state
motor vehicle fee will be put after it has been collected. Section 14504,
like its statutory and regulatory predecessors, limits the amount of the
fee that a State may collect in certain circumstances but places no constraint
on the State's subsequent use of the funds. Section 14504 has neither the
purpose nor the effect of requiring that motor-vehicle assessments be spent
for highway-related purposes; it serves instead to ensure that such assessments
do not place a disproportionate burden on interstate commerce. MCL
§ 478.2(2) on its face effects precisely the singling out of interstate
carriage that the $10-per-vehicle SSRS registration limit was intended to
prevent. The statute is therefore preempted by federal law, regardless
of the use to which the fees are subsequently put.8 E. The Fact That MCL § 478.2(2)'s Coverage Is Restricted To Vehicles
License-Plated In Michigan Does Not Eliminate The Conflict With Federal
Law As the State emphasizes (see Br. in Opp. 2, 11, 17, 19, 20), the fee
at issue in this case is imposed solely upon commercial motor vehicles license-plated
in Michigan. That limitation on the scope of MCL § 478.2(2)'s coverage,
however, does not save it from preemption. 1. As a general matter, the federal ban on "State registration requirement[s]"
that "impose[] obligations in excess of the standards of the Secretary"
of Transportation
(49 U.S.C. 14504(b)), and the $10-per-vehicle limit on the fee that a
State may charge under the SSRS (49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III)), do
not restrict a State's authority to collect otherwise lawful fees in connection
with the separate process of registering and license-plating individual
motor vehicles under state law. Thus, if the Michigan Legislature had simply
increased by $100 each of the registration fees set forth in MCL §
257.801 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004), no SSRS preemption question would
arise.9 Unlike an ordinary license-plating charge, however, the fee imposed
by MCL
§ 478.2(2) is assessed not upon motor vehicles generally, or upon
a particular class of motor vehicles defined by weight or other physical
attribute, but only upon motor vehicles "operating entirely in interstate
commerce." Section 478.2(2) therefore effects precisely the singling
out of vehicles operating in interstate commerce that the SSRS $10-per-vehicle
limit was intended to prevent. Nothing in the text or history of 49 U.S.C. 14504 suggests that the SSRS
fee limit is inapplicable to vehicles license-plated in the charging State.
Any such exception would disserve Congress's objective of preventing the
imposition of exorbitant fees specifically targeted at interstate carriage.
Indeed, Michigan does not assert a right, in its capacity as an SSRS registration
State, to charge a fee of greater than $10 for Michigan-plated vehicles.
Its argument instead is that 49 U.S.C. 14504 is inapplicable here because
the fee imposed by MCL § 478.2(2) is not framed as a charge for the
registration of federal operating authority or of the other information
specified in 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(A). But if we are correct in our basic
submission (see pp. 14-20, supra)- i.e., if 49 U.S.C. 14504 generally preempts
any state registration requirement or fee that is imposed on vehicles because
they operate in interstate commerce, even if the fee is not in terms a charge
for registration of SSRS-related information -then the State's decision
to impose such a charge only upon Michigan-plated vehicles cannot justify
a different result here. 2. The preemption issue in this case is complicated by MCL § 478.2(2)'s
immediately preceding subsection, MCL § 478.2(1). On its face, that subsection appears to impose a $100
annual fee on every "self-propelled motor vehicle operated by or on
behalf of [a] motor carrier" operating in the State. Section 478.2(1)
has been interpreted and applied by Michigan officials, however, as covering
only those commercial motor vehicles that undertake point-to-point hauls
within the State. See note 5, supra. Section 478.2(1) is not limited to
vehicles license-plated in Michigan, but it does encompass all Michigan-plated
vehicles that make intrastate hauls-which is to say, all Michigan-plated
commercial vehicles that are not covered by MCL § 478.2(2). The apparent practical effect of MCL § 478.2(1) and (2), taken together,
is thus to impose a $100 fee (in addition to the much larger plating fees
separately required by MCL
§ 257.801) on every commercial motor vehicle license-plated in Michigan,
regardless of the nature of its operations. It therefore might be argued
that MCL § 478.2(2) is not preempted by the SSRS because it is part
of a larger statutory regime that, considered as a whole, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce. For a variety of reasons, however, we believe
that the preemption question presented in this case is properly resolved
by considering MCL § 478.2(2) on its own terms, without reference to
the preceding subsection. a. Neither the Michigan Court of Appeals' opinion nor the State's brief
in opposition suggests that MCL § 478.2(1) is relevant to the proper
disposition of petitioners' preemption claim. The State's brief in opposition
does emphasize that MCL § 478.2(2) applies only to vehicles license-plated
in Michigan. The thrust of the State's argument, however, is that, so long
as the fee is levied only on trucks with a significant regulatory "presence"
in Michigan, as evidenced by license-plating within that State, the SSRS
does not preclude the Legislature from imposing distinctive burdens on particular
vehicles based on their operation in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Br.
in Opp. 17, 20. Michigan appears to construe 49 U.S.C. 14504 to preempt
only those state requirements that expressly pertain to registration of
the specific information provided by the carrier during the SSRS process.
See Br. in Opp. 6. In light of the manner in which the State has litigated
the issue on which the Court granted certiorari, this case squarely presents
only the question whether SSRS preemption is in fact so limited, or whether
the preemptive effect of Section 14504 extends to other laws that impose
burdens on interstate carriers specifically because their vehicles operate
in interstate commerce. b. The opacity of the overall state statutory scheme provides further
reason for considering MCL § 478.2(2) on its own terms. MCL §
478.2(1), on its face, would appear to impose a $100 annual fee on all trucks
traveling in Michigan, including the Michigan-plated motor vehicles that
operate solely in interstate commerce and are therefore covered by MCL §
478.2(2). If MCL § 478.2(1) were read in that manner, Section 478.2(1)
and (2) would discriminate against interstate commerce even when taken together,
by imposing two $100 fees rather than one upon those Michigan-plated trucks
that conduct wholly interstate operations. As explained above, the MPSC
does not in practice construe and apply MCL § 478.2(1) to cover vehicles
operating entirely in interstate commerce. See note 5, supra. And for
purposes of deciding American Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Public Service
Commission, No. 03-1230, in which the constitutionality of MCL § 478.2(1)
is directly at issue, it is appropriate for this Court to accept the shared
understanding of the parties to that case that the State assesses the Section
478.2(1) fee only upon vehicles that undertake point-to-point hauls within
Michigan. Given the State's failure to rely upon Section 478.2(1) in this
case, however, there exists no similar justification for invoking a consideration
(license-plating in Michigan) that does not appear in the text of Section
478.2(1) as a basis for disregarding the explicit terms of MCL
§ 478.2(2) that single out trucks operating in interstate commerce
for assessment of a $100 fee. c. Moreover, even as it appears to have been interpreted and applied
by Michigan officials, MCL § 478.2(1) is not framed as a condition
upon the issuance of a Michigan license plate. Rather, under the State's
apparent administrative practice, the trigger for the Section 478.2(1) fee
is the conduct of a particular type of trucking operation (point-to-point
hauls within Michigan), not the decision to obtain a license plate in Michigan.
As a result, Section 478.2(1) requires the payment of a $100 fee for trucks
license-plated in other States, as well as for Michigan-plated vehicles,
if those trucks engage in point-to-point hauls in Michigan. Under the IRP, fees for the registration of commercial motor vehicles
are generally apportioned among the States in which a vehicle operates,
based on the relative mileage traveled in each State. See pp. 3-4, 13,
supra. Michigan law does not appear, however, to provide for the apportionment
of fees collected under MCL § 478.2(1) or (2). See MCL
§ 257.801g (authorizing apportionment, when the IRP is applicable,
of registration fees that would otherwise be assessed under MCL § 257.801(1)(j)
or 801(1)(k) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)); J.A. 64 (State's affiant recognizes
that fees collected under MCL § 478.2(1) are not apportioned under
the IRP). The State's apparent failure to apportion fees collected from
interstate carriers under MCL § 478.2(1) and (2) reinforces the conclusion
that Michigan regards those fees as something other than a license-plating
charge. There is consequently no basis to infer that the Michigan Legislature
conceived of MCL § 478.2(1) and (2) as parts of an integrated scheme
to assess a uniform $100 annual fee on every commercial motor vehicle license-plated
in the State. It is therefore appropriate to take MCL § 478.2(2) at
face value, as reflecting the Legislature's deliberate policy choice to
impose distinct burdens on Michigan-plated vehicles that "operat[e]
entirely in interstate commerce" and to make such interstate operations
within the borders of Michigan the legal incidence of the fee. See Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981) (focusing on the "operating
incidence" of tax) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377
U.S. 436, 440-441 (1964)); cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation,
515 U.S. 450, 458-460 (1995) (validity of state tax on transactions in Indian
country turns on the "legal incidence" of the tax, rather than
on a judicial assessment of the tax's likely economic consequences). Because
the imposition of such burdens is flatly inconsistent with the limitations
placed upon the States by 49 U.S.C. 14504, MCL § 478.2(2) is preempted
by federal law. CONCLUSION The judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. PAUL D. CLEMENT JEFFREY A. ROSEN FEBRUARY 2005 1 The Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
stated, with respect to the 1965 law that specifically authorized the States
to require registration of an interstate carrier's ICC certificate, that
such registration would "encourage greater participation by the States
in curbing illegal for-hire trucking" by enabling state officials to
identify motor carriers operating in interstate commerce without the requisite
federal authority. 111 Cong. Rec. 9672 (1965) (Rep. Harris). It appears
that some States were requiring interstate carriers to register their ICC
certificates even before the 1965 legislation was enacted. The House Report
accompanying the relevant bill explained that, "[a]t present, registration
requirements differ widely among the States; and this circumstance alone
may impose undue burdens on carriers. Therefore, enactment of this legislation
is necessary in order that relief from this multiplicity of different State
registration requirements be achieved." H.R. Rep. No. 253, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1965). 2 Information as to the aggregate number of vehicles the carrier intends
to operate in each State is necessary both to compute the carrier's total
SSRS fee and to enable the registration State to apportion that fee among
the various States in which the carrier's vehicles operate. 3 The 39 States that participated in the bingo card system as of January
1, 1991, are eligible to participate in the SSRS. 49 U.S.C. 14504(c)(2)(D).
The 11 ineligible States are listed in H.R. Rep. No. 171, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. Pt. 1, at 49 (1991). Oregon is eligible to participate but does not
do so. Thus, 38 States participate in the SSRS program. 4 The State in which the carrier is registered for purposes of the SSRS,
see 49 C.F.R. 367.3(a), will not necessarily be the same as the State in
which the vehicles operated by the carrier are registered (i.e., license-plated)
for purposes of the IRP. Under the IRP, a carrier's "base jurisdiction"
for license-plating purposes is "the jurisdiction where the registrant
has an established place of business, where distance is accrued by the fleet
and where operational records of such fleet are maintained or can be made
available." International Registration Plan, Inc., International Registration
Plan § 210 (revised Oct. 1, 2004). That provision will often give
large carriers considerable discretion in choosing the State in which their
vehicles will be license-plated. See Single State Ins. Registration, 9
I.C.C. 2d 610, 620-621 (1993) (recognizing that the "principal place
of business" test for SSRS registration will give carriers less flexibility
to choose a registration State than is available under the IRP, but rejecting
a commenter's suggestion that the IRP rule for selection of a registration
State should be adopted for purposes of the SSRS). 5 Under MCL § 478.2(1), the State also imposes "an annual fee
of $100.00 for each self-propelled motor vehicle operated by or on behalf
of" a licensed motor carrier. In the courts below, that provision
was the subject of a separate challenge brought under the Commerce Clause.
Although Section 478.2(1) does not on its face make the applicability of
the fee dependent on the nature of the routes that a particular vehicle
travels, the parties to that dispute agree that, in practice, the State
imposes the fee only upon vehicles that engage at least in part in "intrastate"
operations -i.e., vehicles that make at least one delivery during the year
between two points within the State of Michigan. See J.A. 22-23; 03-1230
Pet. at 3. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the constitutional challenge
to Section 478.2(1), see J.A. 98-102, and this Court has granted certiorari
to review the question. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, No. 03-1230 (Jan. 14, 2005). 6 Until it was repealed by the 1995 ICC Termination Act (see p. 6, supra),
former 49 U.S.C. 10521(b)(4) (1994) provided that, with isolated exceptions
not relevant here, the Title 49 provisions governing motor carriage did
not "affect the taxation power of a State over a motor carrier."
The House Report accompanying the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 expressed the
understanding that the relevant federal statutory provisions
do not apply to that body of taxes known as highway user taxes that are
levied on owners or operators of motor vehicles because of their use of
public highways. These highway user taxes include, but are not limited
to, motor fuel taxes, registration fees, driver licenses, vehicle user taxes,
ton-mile taxes, and other motor vehicle related taxes; the proceeds of these
taxes, for the most part, are expended through a State highway fund or otherwise
earmarked for highway construction, maintenance, or operation. H.R. Rep. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1980). A former ICC regulation
similarly disclaimed any intent on the part of the agency "to affect
the collection or method of collection of taxes or fees by a State from
motor carriers for the operation of vehicles within the borders of such
State." 49 C.F.R. 1023.104 (1991); see J.A. 84. None of those provisions
suggests, however, that States have broad authority to single out or discriminate
against interstate commerce by imposing upon interstate carriage burdens
that are not placed upon intrastate transportation. The statutory and regulatory
provisions governing state registration of interstate carriers' federal
operating permits speak directly to that question, and those provisions
have always imposed strict limits on the amount of fees that may be charged
for such registration. 7 As noted above, the SSRS system specifically does not permit a requirement
that specific vehicles be identified or that decals be obtained or displayed
for individual vehicles. See pp. 4-5, supra. 8 Michigan law specifically reserves for the State's truck safety fund
a segment (not less than 90% of any amounts in excess of $1,400,000 in a
given year) of the SSRS fees that the State collects. MCL § 478.7(5);
see J.A. 27 (State's affiant describes the implementation of that requirement).
The statutory requirement that a portion of the State's SSRS fees be devoted
to highway-related purposes simply highlights the illusory nature of the
claimed distinction between "registration" and "regulatory"
fees. 9 With respect to vehicles covered by the IRP, however, that additional
$100 increment would need to be apportioned among the States in which the
trucks traveled according to the miles they traveled in each State. See
pp. 3-4, 13, supra.
AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
PETER D. KEISLER
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
SUSHMA SONI
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
General Counsel
PAUL M. GEIER
Assistant General Counsel
for Litigation
DALE C. ANDREWS
Deputy Assistant General
Counsel for Litigation
PAUL S. SMITH
Senior Trial Attorney
BRIGHAM A. MCCOWN
Chief Counsel
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20590
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
Acting Solicitor General
PETER D. KEISLER
Assistant Attorney General
EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Deputy Solicitor General
MALCOLM L. STEWART
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
SUSHMA SONI
Attorneys
General Counsel
PAUL M. GEIER
Assistant General Counsel
for Litigation
DALE C. ANDREWS
Deputy Assistant General
Counsel for Litigation
PAUL S. SMITH
Senior Trial Attorney
BRIGHAM A. MCCOWN
Chief Counsel
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration
Department of Transportation