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Sample Jury Instructions—Public Accommodations

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Criminal No. Plaintiff, v. ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, ROY RAY MARTIN Defendants. ______________________________ THE UNITED STATES' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 1 Count One of the Indictment reads as follows: From on or about October 16, 1994, and continuing until on or about October 17, 1994, in the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA did willfully conspire, combine and agree with one another to commit offenses against the United states constituting a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 245(b)(2)(B), that is, they conspired to willfully injure, intimidate and interfere, by force and threat of force, with black individuals in Lubbock, because of their race and color and because they were enjoying public facilities provided and administered by the City of Lubbock, a subdivision of Texas, namely the public streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, which resulted in the death of Melvin Dewayne Johnson, and bodily injury to Autry Morgan Vaughn and Triellis Lee Stewart, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 245(b)(2)(B). It was the plan and purpose of the conspiracy to force blacks off the streets of Lubbock, and to intimidate them from using the streets of Lubbock on account of their race by driving through the streets while armed looking for blacks who were using the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, and shooting them with a short-barreled shotgun. In furtherance of this conspiracy, the defendants committed the following acts, among others: OVERT ACTS On or about October 16, 1994, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA met at the house of defendant ROY RAY MARTIN, and discussed their mutual hatred of blacks and how they wanted to start a revolution or a race war that would involve killing and eliminating blacks. During the conversation, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA discussed attacking blacks, obtained a short-barreled shotgun from the house of defendant ROY RAY MARTIN, and subsequently left the house in a vehicle to hunt for blacks who were using the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock. Defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, while in the vehicle, approached Autry Morgan Vaughn in or around the corner of Avenue U and 8th Street in Lubbock, and defendant ROY RAY MARTIN, aided and abetted by defendants ELI TREVINO MUNGIA and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, shot Autry Morgan Vaughn, wounding him in the face and upper body. Defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, then drove to the East side of Lubbock, and while in the vehicle, approached Melvin Dewayne Johnson, in or around the 2600 block of Martin Luther King Boulevard in Lubbock. Defendant ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, aided and abetted by defendants ROY RAY MARTIN and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, shot and killed Melvin Dewayne Johnson. On or about the early morning hours of October 17, 1994, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, drove further down Martin Luther King Boulevard and while in the vehicle, approached Triellis Lee Stewart, in or around the corner of Martin Luther King Boulevard and 38th Street in Lubbock. Defendant RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, aided and abetted by defendants ELI TREVINO MUNGIA and ROY RAY MARTIN, shot and wounded Triellis Lee Stewart, causing him to lose a finger. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 18 U.S.C. § 371 The statute provides as follows: If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against the United States ... and one or more of such persons do an act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each [is guilty of a crime]. _______________________ Authority: 18 U.S.C. § 371 UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 3 Elements of the Offense Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, makes it a crime for anyone to conspire with someone else to commit an offense against the laws of the United States. In this case, the defendants are charged with conspiring to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 245(b)(2)(B). Specifically, it is alleged that the defendants conspired to willfully intimidate and interfere, by force or threat of force, with black individuals in order to prevent them from enjoying and participating in using the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas because of their race and color, which resulted in the death of Melvin Johnson and bodily injury to Autry Vaughn and Triellis Stewart. A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of "partnership in crime" in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. For you to find a defendant guilty of this crime you must be convinced that the government has proven each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That two or more persons made an agreement to commit the crime described in Count One of the Indictment, that is, you must find that the defendant, with at least one other person, agreed to injure, intimidate, or interfere, by force or threat of force, with black individuals in order to prevent them from enjoying and participating in the use of the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas because of their race and color, which resulted in the death of Melvin Johnson and bodily injury to Autry Vaughn and Triellis Stewart. Second: That the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement and joined in it willfully, that is, with the intent to further the unlawful purpose; Third: That one of the conspirators during the existence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts described in the Indictment in order to accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy. One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part. The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves either verbally or in writing all the details of the scheme. Nor need it be shown that the acts of the defendants were premeditated or of long duration. Similarly the government need not prove that all the details of the scheme alleged in the Indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out. Nor must it prove that all the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in accomplishing their unlawful objectives. Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator. Although you must unanimously agree that the same overt act was committed, the government is not required to prove more than one of the overt acts charged in the Indictment. As I previously instructed you, willfulness means that the defendant acts voluntarily and intentionally and with a specific intent to do something that the law forbids. _____________________________ Authorities: Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases, U.S. FifthCircuit, 1990 Edition, Section 2.21. Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (4th Edition, 1990), § 28.05 (need not show acts werepremeditated or of long duration) United States v. Martin, 790 F.2d 1215, 1219 (5th Cir.),cert. denied, 470 U.S. 868 (1986) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 Statements Made In Furtherance Of The Conspiracy If and when it appears from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a conspiracy did exist and that the defendant was one of the members of the conspiracy, then the acts thereafter knowingly done, and the statements thereafter knowingly made by any person also found to be a member of the conspiracy may be considered by you as evidence in the case as to every defendant found to have been a member of the conspiracy, even though those acts and statements may have occurred in the absence, and even without the knowledge, of the defendant, provided these acts or statements were knowingly made and done during the continuance or the life of the conspiracy and in furtherance of an object or purpose of the conspiracy. ____________________________ Authorities: 2 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (3d ed. 1977), § 27.06. United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)(co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule firmly rooted in jurisprudence). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 Count Two of the Indictment reads as follows: On or about October 16, 1994, in the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, aiding and abetting one another, willfully injured, intimidated and interfered and attempted to injure, intimidate and interfere, by force and threat of force, with Autry Morgan Vaughn, a black man, by shooting at him because of his race and color and because he was enjoying facilities provided and administered by a subdivision of the state, namely the public streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas, resulting in bodily injury to Autry Morgan Vaughn. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 245(b)(2)(B) and 2. Count Four of the Indictment reads as follows: On or about October 16, 1994, in the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, aiding and abetting one another, willfully injured, intimidated and interfered and attempted to injure, intimidate and interfere, by force and threat of force, with Melvin Dewayne Johnson, a black man, by shooting him because of his race and color and because he was enjoying facilities provided and administered by a subdivision of the state, namely the public streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas, resulting in the death of Melvin Dewayne Johnson. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 245(b)(2)(B) and 2. Count Six of the Indictment reads as follows: On or about October 17, 1994, in the Lubbock Division of the Northern District of Texas, defendants ROY RAY MARTIN, ELI TREVINO MUNGIA, and RICKY RIVERA MUNGIA, aiding and abetting one another, willfully injured, intimidated and interfered and attempted to injure, intimidate and interfere, by force and threat of force, with Triellis Lee Stewart, a black man, by shooting him because of his race and color and because he was enjoying facilities provided and administered by a subdivision of the state, namely the public streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas, resulting in bodily injury to Triellis Lee Stewart. In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 245(b)(2)(B) and 2. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 6 All three defendants are charged in Counts Two, Four, and Six of the Indictment with violating Section 245(b)(2)(B) of Title 18, United States Code. The words of the statute pertinent to that count are as follows: Whoever...by force or threat of force willfully ...intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to ...intimidate or interfere with...any person because of race [or] color and because he is or has been...participating in and enjoying any...facility...provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof [shall be guilty of an offense against the United States]. ________________________________ Authority: 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 Five elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish the violation of Section 245 charged in Counts Two, Four and Six. FIRST: The defendant acted by force or threat of force. SECOND: The defendant either injured, intimidated, or interfered with or attempted to injure, intimidate, or interfere with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, or Triellis Stewart. THIRD: The defendant acted at least in part because of Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, and Triellis Stewart's race or color and because Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, and Triellis Stewart were participating in or enjoying a facility provided or administered by Lubbock, Texas, in this case, a sidewalk or a street. FOURTH: The defendant acted willfully. FIFTH: The defendant's conduct resulted in the death of Melvin Johnson or bodily injury to Autry Vaughn or Triellis Stewart. I will now explain each of these five elements in more detail. _________________________ Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B). United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir. 1983)(racial motivation element of § 245(b)). United States v. Price, 464 F.2d 1217, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972)(intent element). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 The first element requires proof that the defendant used force or threat of force against one or more persons. The term "force" means the use of physical power, that is, any use of power, violence, compulsion, or restraint exerted upon a person, such as shooting someone with a weapon. "Threat of force" means that a threat was made to the victim, either through words or gestures, to inflict harm upon him. ___________________________ Authority: 1968 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 1837, 1838-40, 1843, 1845. UNITED STATES' JURY PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9 For the second element of the offense charged in Counts Two, Four and Six the words "injure," "intimidate," and "interfere with" have no technical meaning; they are to be understood in their ordinary meaning, and cover conduct intended to hurt, harm or frighten other persons. UNITED STATES' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 Intent The third and fourth elements of this offense concern the defendants' intent. The Indictment charges that the defendant did willfully intimidate and interfere, or attempted to intimidate and interfere, with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, and Triellis Stewart because of their race, color, and because they had been participating in or enjoying a facility provided or administered by a subdivision of a state, that is, the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas. An act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with a specific intent to do something that the law forbids. With respect to this statute, specific intent means that the defendant (1) intended to engage in conduct which would intimidate or interfere with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, and Triellis Stewart (2) that the defendant engaged in such conduct because of the victims' race or color, and (3) because the victims were participating in or enjoying the use of the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas. Specific intent is a state of mind and can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Indeed, it can rarely be established by any other means. In determining whether this element of specific intent was present, you may consider all the attendant circumstances of the case. With respect to whether the defendant intended to intimidate or interfere with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, or Triellis Stewart in order to deprive them of their right to use the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, I charge you that you may infer that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done. In other words, you may in this case infer and find that the defendant intended all the consequences that a person, standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge, should have expected to result from the acts he knowingly committed. If you find that the defendant acted in order to interfere with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, or Triellis Stewart's use of the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas because of their race or color, it would not matter if the defendant had other reasons as well for doing what he did, such as personal anger. In other words, if you find that the defendant had the intent I have just described, the presence of other reasons does not make his conduct any less a violation of the law. ___________________________ Authorities: United States v. Price, 464 F.2d 1217, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972)(one is presumed to have intended normal consequences of one's acts). Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1947)(defendant can act with requisite intent even if he also acts with other motives; one is presumed to have intended normal consequences of one's acts). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11 Facilities: Definition With respect to the part of the Indictment which alleges that the defendants intended to intimidate or interfere with Melvin Johnson, Autry Vaughn, or Triellis Stewart's use of "facilities provided and administered by a subdivision of the state, namely the public streets and sidewalks of Lubbock, Texas," you need only decide whether the public official who testified regarding this issue was credible and whether you believe his testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, in order to prove that the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock are "facilities administered or provided" by the city of Lubbock, the government has introduced testimony through an official of the city of Lubbock. If you believe the public official's testimony beyond a reasonable doubt, then I instruct you that the streets and sidewalks of Lubbock are a facility provided or administered by the city of Lubbock. _____________________ Authority: Instruction Given By United States District Judge Terry Means, Fort Worth, Texas, in United States v. Kila (1994). United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d 706, 716 (4th Cir. 1992)(whether incident occurred in "place of entertainment" mixed question of law and fact; jury to determine whether witnesses believable and judge to determine whether testimony met standard for place of entertainment). United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1978)(approving instruction concerning mixed question of fact and law.) United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1979)(approving instruction concerning mixed question of fact and law.) United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991) (similar instruction given by U.S. District Judge Barefoot Sanders regarding "place of public accommodation" although issue not raised on appeal). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 12 The fifth element to be proved for the offense charged in Counts Two, Four and Six is that the defendants' conduct resulted in the death of Melvin Johnson, and resulted in bodily injury to Autry Vaughn or Triellis Stewart. The term "bodily injury" means any injury, no matter how temporary. Bodily injury includes physical pain, cuts, bruises, or any other impairment of a bodily organ. It is not necessary that the defendant intended to cause physical injury or death to the victim. The United States need only prove that acts of the defendant resulted in the death or bodily injury of the victim. ________________________ Authorities: 18 U.S.C. § 1365(g)(4) 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(5) United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1572 (11th Cir. 1992) (approving bodily injury instruction). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 Counts Two, Four, and Six of the Indictment also charge the defendants with aiding and abetting one another to violate Section 245 of Title 18, United States Code. Title 18, Section 2 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part: Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids or abets or counsels, commands or induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. _________________________ Authority: 18 U.S.C. 2(a). UNITED STATES' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14 The guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof that the defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged. For example, a defendant need not have been the actual shooter to be criminally responsible for offenses arising out of a particular shooting. The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may also be accomplished by that person through direction of another person as his agent, or by acting in concert with, or under the direction of, another person or persons in a joint effort or enterprise. So, if another person is acting under the direction of the defendant or if the defendant joins another person and performs acts with the intent to commit a crime, then the law holds the defendant responsible for the acts and conduct of such other person just as though the defendant had committed the acts or engaged in such conduct. Notice, however, that before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator. In other words, you may not find any defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these instructions was committed by some person or persons, and that the defendant voluntarily participated in its commission with the intent to violate the law. __________________________ Authorities: Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases, U.S. Fifth Circuit, 1990 Edition, 2.06. [cited in Civil Rights Resource Manual 60]