Lulling Letters, Telegrams and Telephone Calls
In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), mailings
occurred after the scheme ended fell outside the prohibitions of the
See also United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 556 (8th Cir.
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) and Battaglia v. United
349 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (wire
after the scheme has come to an end is not within the statute); cf.
United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.)(Maze
no adverse impact on fraud prosecutions where the scheme has not reached
fruition.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976).|
It is a well-established principle of mail fraud law, however, that
of the mails after money is obtained may nevertheless be "for the purpose of
executing" the fraud. This proposition was considered by the Supreme Court
United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), where salesmen
obtained applications and advance payments from businessmen and then mailed
acceptances to the defrauded victims to lull them into believing the
would be performed. The Court held that such a "lulling" use of the mails
for the purpose of executing the fraudulent scheme. Thus, post-purchase
or wire transmissions that are designed to lull the victim into a false
security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less
can be in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Rogers, 9 F.3d
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 95 (1994).
[cited in USAM 9-43.100]