Intent to Carry Out ThreatSecret Service
In Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969), the
dealt expressly with the issue of intent and held ". . . the statute to
only that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would
that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm
or take the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result
mistake, duress, or coercion." See also United States v.
681 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1982); this Manual at
(Threats Against Former Presidents and Certain Other Secret Service
While it is well settled that 18 U.S.C. § 871 requires only a
showing of general intent, Roy, supra; United States v.
Johnson, 14 F.3d 766, 768 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
S.Ct. 2751 (1994), 18 U.S.C. § 879, with substantially similar
subject to contrary conclusions. Section 879(a) of Title 18 has been
to require a showing of specific intent. See United States v.
Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Kosma, 749 F.Supp 1392, 1401-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d
(3d Cir. 1991) (same). In light of the April 24, 1996 amendment to 18
§ 1114, section 115 of Title 18 may also be applicable to conduct
constituting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 879. See Antiterrorism
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 727, 110 Stat.
[cited in USAM 9-65.200]