2252

Statutory Authority for Forfeiture Sale

In construing statutes, it is important to remember that if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, further review is not required. In Consumer Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle by stating that "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." 447 U.S. at 108. Unless the literal or ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature would lead to absurd results, or thwart the obvious purpose of the statute, those interpreting statutes do not look beyond the words used by that body. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965); National Small Shipment v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975); Perrin v. United States, 440 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); cf. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 830 (1983). The Court has also cautioned that "[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from [the plain and unambiguous] language" of a statute. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)) (emphasis added); See also, United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly Known as 916 Douglas Avenue, Elgin, Illinois, 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990). Finally, forfeiture statutes are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 12 (1890). Applying these principles, Congress has clearly stated that the Attorney General has the authority to dispose of property "by sale or other commercially feasible means." 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(B); 21 U.S.C. §  853(h); and 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f). The Attorney General's authority to sell forfeited property has been delegated to the United States Marshal. 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(i) (the U.S. Marshal can dispose of property); 28 C.F.R. §  0.156 (the Deputy Marshal can sign deeds transferring the property). Once the property is finally forfeited, title to the property is in the United States, and the forfeiture statutes provide the Attorney General with complete authority to dispose of the property by selling it, or by disposing of it by other possible commercially feasible means, such as transferring it to a state or local government. Any other interpretation thwarts congressional intent. The forfeiture process was thoroughly reviewed by Congress when it enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. As part of that review process, Congress obviously looked at various ways forfeited property could be disposed and by whom. It appears that Congress selected the Attorney General as the focal point for judicial forfeiture actions, for maintaining the seized and forfeited property, for handling the disposition of that property and for maintaining the Assets Forfeiture Fund. (See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) which grants the Attorney General power to pay expenses for maintaining, disposing and selling forfeited property, etc.) Significantly, Congress never used the term "judicial sale." Moreover, Congress obviously wanted the Attorney General to act independently since it used virtually identical language in each of the forfeiture statutes. Each of the statutes plainly states that the Attorney General can sell forfeited property or dispose of it using any other commercially feasible way. Conversely, Congress made no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 2001 or the need for confirmation of the sale by the court. Moreover, our construction of the statutes is fully supported by the existing legislative history of the relevant forfeiture statutes. [cited in USAM 9-115.310]