



Department of Justice

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ANTITRUST DIVISION ANNOUNCES NEW DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

David S. Sibley to Serve as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- R. Hewitt Pate, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, today announced that David S. Sibley will serve as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis in the Antitrust Division.

"David Sibley is an accomplished scholar whose knowledge and experience will be of great value to the Antitrust Division's efforts to promote competition in today's global economy. I look forward to working with him," said Pate.

As Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Sibley will supervise all economic analysis within the Antitrust Division and direct the Division's Economic Analysis Group.

Since 1991, Sibley has served as a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin. He currently is the John Michael Stuart Centennial Professor of Economics, and his field of specialization is industrial organization, including telecommunications policy, the theory of tying and bundling, and vertical relationships.

From 1984-1991, Sibley headed the Economics Research Group at Bell Communications Research. From 1973-1983, he was a researcher at Bell Laboratories. During part of that time from 1978-1981, he took leave from Bell Laboratories to work on the staff of the Council of Economic Advisers and at the Civil Aeronautics Board.

Since 1991, Sibley has worked with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice on a variety of antitrust matters, including both the trial and remedies phases of the Microsoft case.

Sibley graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Economics in 1969. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University in 1973. An author of numerous articles on regulatory and antitrust issues, Sibley is also Associate Editor of the Journal of Regulatory Economics.

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