## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, : Civil Action 96-1285

et al.

Plaintiffs :

v. : Washington, D.C.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

Defendants : Thursday, August 28, 2008

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES ROBERTSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## **APPEARANCES:**

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## PROCEEDINGS

COURTROOM DEPUTY: This is civil action 96-1285,
Elouise Cobell, et al. versus Dirk Kempthorne, et al. For the
plaintiff we have Dennis Gingold and Elliott Levitas; for the
defendants John Stemplewicz, John Warshawsky, Robert Kirschman,
and Michael Quinn.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. I called this status conference for a three-week period after I issued the opinion that you've all read and probably studied and some of you reacted to on August 7th. I feel some need to begin this conference by re-emphasizing what I hoped was made very clear in the opinion that I issued three weeks ago, but which somehow has been either misconstrued or glossed over or misrepresented in the press.

I didn't issue a damages award against the government. The amount of money that I find the government owes to the plaintiff class does not include, does not include most of the claims that I think comprise many of the grievances that Indian country has or thinks it has against the BIA. Income that was not collected is not included in my judgment; assets that may have been sold or leased below market is not included in my decision; funds that may have been stolen or misappropriated are not included in my opinion; any failure on the part of the government or Indian agents to enforce lease terms, not included; any money that may not have been paid on direct pay

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contracts, not included.

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This line between what is damages or what might be included in a claim by IIM accountholders for mismanagement, this line was carefully drawn on the very first day of the trial we had in October -- not in October, but whenever it was, by the plaintiffs' own witness, Professor Laycock, who was at some pains, as we have all been at some pains, to distinguish what this court can award from what this court cannot award.

So whether or not the plaintiffs can recover for any of these things that I've just enumerated under the rubric of damages, I don't know. I do know they can't recover it in this court. And if there's going to be a recovery, it has to be, I think, in the Court of Federal Claims. Whether it can be done as a class action, I don't know. Again, that's for another court and another case. The plaintiffs made the decision to cabin their case very, very carefully so that they would not be seeking damages, which they knew they could not receive in this court.

Now, I have to lay frankly at the feet of the plaintiffs the responsibility for hyping expectations about what might result from this case. But \$455.6 million is all I think I could possibly have awarded, and the government may take the position that that -- even that was a stretch.

The question now is where we go from here. We have never resolved the class action questions that have been lurking

around the edges of this matter, and what I hope we can have today is some discussion - and I think discussion is the right word for it, unless anybody has a position they want to advocate and argue - a discussion of the questions, of a number of questions that occur to me. And you may have others.

One such question is, is it now time to prepare and issue the historical statements of account that the government has wanted me to authorize them to send for years, and wanted Judge Lamberth to authorize to send for years before that.

How should the amount that I've concluded the government owes the IIM accountholders, how should it be allocated; per capita, equally per capita, as I think

Mr. Gingold has recommended earlier? Is that the equitable way to distribute funds? Should the distribution be weighted for the age of IIM accounts or the size of IIM accounts or both, or is there some other way to allocate these funds?

Should the class be notified of a proposed method of allocation by a notice to the class that would be sent to the 23(b)(2) class? Rule 23 does contemplate the issuance of notices to the class in a (b)(2) class action.

Obviously there will be a share of this recovery to which plaintiffs' counsel are entitled. Do I need a motion for that in a (b)(2) class action?

Now, I want to hear where you-all are on these questions. And I don't want to try to put my thumb on the scale

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at all, but I do want to make this observation: It seems to me, just because it seems like the most orderly way to do it, that there should be a period in which -- it seems to me that there should be notice to the class. It seems to me that the parties should have time to either try to agree on what that notice would be, or if they can't agree, submit proposed forms of notice to the class. I don't know how much time that would be, a couple of weeks, 30 days.

Then you get notice together, you send it out to the plaintiff class, you wait for responses, and somebody reads and analyzes and considers the responses. We're talking about a couple of months, at least. Then you're talking about some time period in which all of this is reduced to a final award or judgment. I think as a practical matter it's not prudent to think that a final judgment on that kind a timetable could be issued much before the end of the year, if then.

And the question that I frankly -- I just want to lay on the table, and you people may want to respond to it or not, the question is, if there are going to be appeals, and the plaintiff has indicated to the press that they're certainly going to appeal this, if there are going to be appeals, what's the point of waiting four months? Maybe we should either certify the matter in some interlocutory way or issue a partial summary judgment under Rule 54(b). Because otherwise, to take four months to sort out the details of how the money is to be

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distributed just adds four months to the bottom line.

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So that, I think, is a brief outline of the discussion - I underscore the discussion - that I would like to have with the parties. And I will hear from anybody who wants to stand up and speak about anything that he or she wants to speak about, I guess.

Who's first? Well, thank you very much. It's been nice seeing you-all.

MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, good afternoon.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Gingold.

MR. GINGOLD: I would like to start with your last point first, since it is probably the most important point. Plaintiffs do intend to appeal, and we believe it would be more efficient for this court and better for the parties if the issues that remain unclear at least in plaintiffs' view be resolved by the appellate courts. We believe it would be very difficult to fashion a clear and accurate notice to the class without first resolving many of the issues that exist with regard to, for example, interest, among other things, as to whether or not that's damages or specific relief.

We think that the class should be informed as clearly and as comprehensively as possible as to what their rights are, as declared, and what their share is and how that share should be determined. I think it is important to determine those issues, at least resolve those issues on appeal before we can

make those statements affirmatively --

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THE COURT: How are you going to resolve those issues on appeal when they have never been resolved here?

MR. GINGOLD: No. For example, I think it makes an enormous difference if this is, in plaintiffs' view, a trust, and if, in plaintiffs' view, there are certain duties and responsibilities and there are certain proofs that are required, and burdens; it would make a significant difference with regard to potentially whether or not there's a pro rata or weighted share, whether or not, for example, the Osage, whose funds were deposited -- the Osage individuals whose funds were deposited in the Osage Tribal Account prior to distribution are included; it would have an effect on the Osage individuals whose funds were deposited at some point in the 14X6039 account.

The amount this court has stated clearly is an amount it has determined based on a model that we believe needs to be addressed on appeal. We don't believe that established, based on our understanding of the testimony, accurate account balances or funds that were not distributed. And it all ties back to whatever the controlling law is as we understand it, this Court understands it, or an appellate Court understands it in this circuit and otherwise.

And we think it would be -- this process is an expensive process. We've done some -- we've had discussions in the interim period of time with professionals who do that for a

living. The nature and scope of the class itself is an issue, as this court has defined it in significant part in the January 30th, 2008 opinion; how the class is defined in accordance with the language of the class certification order very well determines the share of individuals.

We would envision issues that were not addressed on appeal in the January 30th opinion to be also addressed in this regard, and without a complete resolution, we may have to do this process again. And we think it would be more efficient and very -- much less costly to only have to do this process once and finally.

Quite frankly, given, as this court quite accurately noted, plaintiffs do intend to appeal, and if we prevail on perhaps any one of the major issues as we see it, it could dramatically change what was stated in the notice.

THE COURT: Sure. Sure.

MR. GINGOLD: Therefore, this case has gone on for over 12 years, the trust is over 121 years old; whatever views are correct we believe need to be finally determined and expeditiously determined in order to finally resolve it, so we're not caught up in proceedings simultaneously in the claims court, in this court, in the Federal Circuit, in the DC Circuit.

The efficiencies are important, the cost is very important, the reliance on whichever systems need to be relied on to even determine the beneficiaries -- and by the way, Your

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Honor, I believe at least as of the most recent quarterly report, there are over 80,000 Whereabouts Unknown trust beneficiaries identified. How the class is defined will affect the ability to even deliver notice to the right people.

We need these issues resolved. They are material issues. We understand and respect what this court has done. As this court knows from our pretrial submissions and also our posttrial submissions, we interpret things a great deal differently, and we would hope that we can accomplish what this court seeks, which is a fair and expeditious resolution, more appropriately if we can get the issues resolved on appeal first.

There are so many issues we believe are necessary to provide a clear and accurate notice that they cannot be provided --

THE COURT: So not to put too fine a point on it, what you want me to do is either by means of partial summary judgment or by means of a judgment that just -- a judgment that says the plaintiff class is entitled to \$455.6 million, you want that put into appealable form and you want to leave all the rest of this stuff aside until you hear from the Court of Appeals. Is that right?

MR. GINGOLD: You're absolutely right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What says the government?

MR. QUINN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

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MR. QUINN: I understand Mr. Gingold's comments just now, and empathize with the concern about going through the process of issuing notice and so forth.

However, there have already been a fair number - in fact, I've lost number of the exact number - of appeals that have already gone up to the DC Circuit on this one case.

THE COURT: Nine I think is the last count.

MR. QUINN: I knew I needed at least two hands to count them, but I wasn't sure of the exact number. And with the last appeal, the court urged this court, revisiting, remanding the case, to move forward with all due speed to resolve the case.

I think there's a way that Your Honor could come to a final judgment without having to send a further piecemeal appeal up to the DC Circuit. I think, in fact, you could enter a final judgment that considers all these issues, distribution, who's in the class, what the attorney's fee -- if there's anything to be charged against the award, how that would be done. I think it would be less efficient, in essence, to send the case on a partial summary judgment, leaving all these issues unresolved.

I heard Mr. Gingold say we want these issues resolved.

I think it's better that the court address and resolve all these issues and enter a final judgment that reserves jurisdiction to administer and oversee distribution as whatever the court finally enters as the plan for distribution, and then take all those issues up.

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Taking plaintiffs' position, you could have the consequence of having an appeal go up, where in effect you are affirmed and it comes back and we go through the process of defining the distribution, and there's a further dispute and we wind up yet having another appeal because some of these remaining issues haven't been resolved now.

I think it's in everyone's interest to try to come to the best final conclusion of the case, short of actually disbursing the money or going through the notice process, and making those determinations now, so that if there is a difference of opinion, the parties have an issue that's been decided by this court that could be incorporated with any appeal to the Circuit Court.

THE COURT: Well, we all have our own -- we all bring our own ideas of what might happen here to the table. My own view is that what really -- aside from the question of whether the Osage are in or out, which is not a small question, what the plaintiffs are most exorcised about is that this dollar has two fewer zeros than they wanted, and one fewer than they really thought they were entitled to, even without the interest and the -- or whatever -- I'm happy to hear Mr. Gingold call this number interest. He was steering away from that number -- that word like crazy until today, but calling it what it sort of is, that's where the most dollars are.

The next most dollars have to do with this whole burden

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of proof question, and the third most dollars have to do with the Osage question. I think when those three questions are resolved, there's not going to be a lot of nifnawing about notice to the class or who gets it or how it's sent out.

I haven't heard the government say what their view is of this opinion. Are you going to defend it or cross appeal, or do you know?

MR. QUINN: I think in essence we were waiting to hear and see what exactly the plan -- how the plaintiffs would propose to bring this to resolution. There were seven things we were going to suggest that plaintiffs -- that the court should ask the plaintiffs to brief as part of their proposal for distribution, and I could tick those off if you like.

THE COURT: Yeah, tick them off.

MR. QUINN: And then the government would respond to that proposal.

The first would be addressing fees and expenses that may be charged against the award. I think Your Honor, under Rule 23(h), to the extent there are any attorneys' fees that will be petitioned to the court that would come out of an award, Your Honor is required to give notice to the class with respect to any legal fee petition.

Earlier in this case, on the first phase EAJA petition, where the fees weren't even coming out of plaintiffs' pocket but the fees were coming through the EAJA Act from the government,

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Judge Lamberth ordered notice be issued with respect to that fee petition in accordance with Rule 23(h).

So I think at a minimum, Your Honor will have to issue -- if there's going to be requests with respect to the award, Your Honor will be required to issue a notice to class. And then the question becomes what other kinds of notice would you include in that if you're going to issue anything to the class.

As part of the written description, we would like to know from plaintiffs, for instance, in terms of what specific recovery will be given to the named plaintiff parties here. In some class actions there's certain additional awards that are given to named parties. I don't know whether the plaintiffs considered that. They haven't indicated that at all. I don't want to suggest that, but to the extent there's going to be any difference in payments between the named plaintiffs, the representative plaintiffs, and the class members, that ought to be made known.

What if any - we've already addressed this - notice to class members would be distributed, what the wording of that notice would be, what the manner of distribution would be.

Fourth, whether and the process by which class members could at all object.

Five would be a final -- you know, what plaintiffs' final determination -- what their argument would be in terms of

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finally determining who's in the class, class membership issues.

Six would be a description about how the disbursement of the award would be distributed, the actual mechanics. Would you hire an administrator, who would hold the money, how that would be accomplished, the time frames and so forth.

And then seven, actually the physical aspects, if you will, about how the judgment would be distributed and how that would be accomplished. And we sort of envision that plaintiffs, obtaining the benefit of the award and representing the class members as a whole, would submit a written proposal, if you will, to the court on these and any other issues that they believe are germane for purposes of the award, and that the government would respond to those points that were of concern.

THE COURT: Well, two questions occur to me after what you've said. The first is whether any of those are questions that have to be decided now if the plaintiffs want to take an appeal. And the second, quite frankly, is which of those questions is a question in which the government actually has any interest? I mean, the payment of the money would be by the government, but after that point I'm not sure the government has much skin in the question of the final determination of who's in the -- except, of course, that the government continues to be the fiduciary for all of the members of the plaintiff class, and so I suppose in its capacity as fiduciary, it continues to be interested in that.

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MR. QUINN: Well, I agree with you. I think that's accurate, from a general perspective. It's just that class action cases are all animals of a different color. They all have their own particularities about them, and the manner -- the specifics, the things that would prompt concern by the government would be based upon what the specifics are of how this thing would be administered; how many years it would be open, how the costs are going to be borne, what kind of information demands would be made of the government.

It's one thing if you are going to do a pro rata distribution, whether it's by number of accounts or by number of accountholders, and quite another if you're going to say, well, we're going to consider how long somebody has held an account or how much has gone through the account. Because you could wind up putting information demands on the government that are close to if not equal or exceeding the cost of conducting the accounting itself. I mean, you wind up going back to the same information sources to make those determinations.

So we were requesting that the court direct the parties to brief these issues, asking plaintiffs to make their proposal, and that we would respond to those particular items that are of concern to the government, making suggestions on those points.

Some points, as you mentioned, we wouldn't have any comment on one way or the other.

But I think it's beneficial to all parties to have

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finality, to get to a judgment that can be appealed completely, short of actual execution of the notice and award of -- distribution of funds.

THE COURT: Well, I indicated in the last line of the opinion I issued a few weeks ago that perhaps it would not be too much to suggest that the parties could have some offline discussion and settle this case. I guess that was too much to expect and that's not happening.

MR. QUINN: There have been offline -- at your suggestion, Your Honor, there has been offline conversations between the parties. I haven't been privy to that conversation. If you would like to address those, I would ask Mr. Kirschman to come up.

THE COURT: Well, if there's anything anybody wants to tell me about it. I mean, settlement discussions are by their nature very private. I don't want -- there's a lot of people in this courtroom. I don't want any of that to be spread on the public record. If there have been discussions, more power to you.

But I have to tell you that when I took this case on, I tried to make it very clear to everybody that one of my principal concerns was getting it done and getting it over with. And I'm still working on that project. And from what you've said and from what Mr. Gingold has said, it seems to me that the most efficient use of my time and your time and the Court of

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Appeals' time is to put this thing in a posture where it can be appealed right now.

The question is exactly how to do that. I mean,

Rule 54(b) -- there's Rule 54(b) and there's 1492(b). One is an interlocutory appeal the other is an appeal from a partial judgment. I don't know of any other way to get it to the Court of Appeals.

MR. QUINN: Not without a final judgment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: 54(b) is a little problematical because it permits me to direct entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties. This is a class action.

If I just say the government owes the plaintiff class
\$455.6 million, so adjudged and decreed, that doesn't really -it actually doesn't even tee up the question that Mr. Gingold wants teed up, which is what about the Osage. It does, I think, tee up the question about interest. Can we all call it that shorthand? Interest and the whole burden of proof question, the allocation of burdens.

MR. QUINN: Your Honor, if I may, there's one additional concern. And we're going to address this at another juncture, but I think it's a factor here in terms of getting to a final judgment or whether you do something short of a final judgment at this point.

And that is, there are certain orders in effect, interim orders that have been going on in place throughout this

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case, that impose certain reporting duties on the department, some with trust reform aspects, fixing the system, that are for all intents and purposes over. That part of the case is over, yet those reporting obligations have continued.

I think we would expect with a final judgment in place that the government would be relieved of those burdens. To the extent that those could be addressed short of final judgment, that might make a difference as well.

But there are continuing burdens to leaving the case open and having any kind of further appeal short of a final judgment. And I still think you can get to a quick judgment without going through the notice process, which seemed to be the primary concern, the costs of distributing a notice and so forth.

THE COURT: Yeah, I agree with you. I think we can clean up a lot of these housekeeping matters that have been running along for some time, status reports, quarterly reports, maybe even historical statements of account. Because as I understand Mr. Gingold, and I'm not surprised by what he says, again the main questions that drive the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with this opinion are interest, whether they proved their \$4 billion, and what do we do about the Osage. I think the rest of it is nickel-dime issues, relatively speaking.

All right. Thank you. Maybe it's time for me to hear from the plaintiffs again.

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MR. DORRIS: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, sir.

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MR. DORRIS: We would request that the judgment be entered under 54(b). I believe that it can be fashioned along the lines that you're talking about in terms that the defendants are ordered to pay the amount to the plaintiff class, and then stay further proceedings regarding the distribution of those amounts until the appeals.

Kind of a belt and suspenders approach would be to then also state that you would be granting interlocutory appeal with respect to any and all issues arising out of your two orders here, or your two opinions that you've issued, the one in January and now the one in August. And I think that that would clear up -- if there became an issue as to the extent to which that judgment was appealable, we would still be able to get up, get the issues heard, and back.

The reason that the -- one of the reasons the plaintiff thinks it's important that the judgment be entered under 54(b) is that that would at least start the clock ticking on postjudgment interest. As the court is well aware, all of the calculations for that \$455 million amount were through the end of fiscal year 2007, so it's been even a year since that has stopped. So we would ask that the court do it in fashion that would at least get the postjudgment interest clock ticking on it as we move forward.

I don't know that I need to address all of the seven issues that were listed, but I do want to say, because the court asked about a motion for fees and expenses, and under 23(h)(1), that is going to be done at a time when the court sets and asks the plaintiffs for that type of motion. Typically, and what we would think would be the most economical and efficient fashion, is that that's done in conjunction with -- when the case comes back down from the appeal, Your Honor, would be done as part of the same notice that goes out to the plaintiff class so that it's all done one time.

That's a very expensive process, to provide notice certainly to this many plaintiffs, and we would ask that that be set by the court when it comes back down from appeal to be addressed all at the same time, so there's one single notice that goes out to the plaintiff class.

I'm not sure if there's anything else, Your Honor, you would like me to address that's been brought up, but we'll be glad to try to do so.

THE COURT: No, I don't think so.

MR. DORRIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Yes, sir, good morning. Good afternoon.

MR. KIRSCHMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. To the extent that we would be moving to a final judgment, there are issues, as Mr. Quinn indicated, that would assist us in being resolved, would close out the record.

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One of those was the question you yourself raised regarding the HSA's. A question Interior has that we have is not only regarding the HSA's that are presently before you that have been pending, but those that they have been preparing since we first addressed this issue. Work has continued, as we've told you, and those are on both the per capita and judgment accounts, and also more recently more modern land-based accounts.

So a question we would like resolved, if we could, we would like to have answered, is what you view as Interior's responsibility to continue to prepare those for your consideration, those that are not yet before you. And also, once final judgment is issued, what Interior's responsibilities regarding historical accounting are, at least for the time that your finding of impossibility is the law of the case.

This is a question that's very significant because of funding and the allocation of resources, especially in light of, as you're well aware, the Tribal cases. But it's a question that burdens our client, because they have certainly continued with the accounting of the IIM accounts. They feel, we feel that there is a ruling under Cobell VI, an interpretation under Cobell VI that found a responsibility to do that under the '94 Act, but also too as trustee we face a question of impossibility.

So that's an important issue for the Department of

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Interior, and it goes I think hand in hand with not only should we issue now the HSA's that have been before the court, but should we continue to follow the process that we have, provide you with notice of subsequent documents that have been prepared.

Regarding any appeal or apparently a cross appeal, that is a subject that there's been no decision on. It would ultimately be up to the Solicitor General's office to make such a decision. So that is something that's being considered, but certainly we can't represent today what that decision is or what issues could possibly be appealed. It's a complex matter, obviously.

So those are the issues I wanted to further raise with the court. Thank you.

MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, with respect to the HSA's, there was no evidence regarding the HSA's that was introduced during the trial that was completed this June. Issues were raised with regard to both the understanding of the description of what the HSA's were and the basis for the decisions that were made with regard to amounts estimated. And Your Honor, I say estimated because the administrative record demonstrated there was debate among the contractors with regard to how issues were to be resolved on the HSA's, particularly, Your Honor, with regard to the allocation and computation of the compound interest that was reflected in the administrative record, and questions were raised substantially in that regard. However,

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Your Honor, there was no evidence introduced during the trial that was completed in that regard.

And Your Honor may recall, one of the issues that was involved - and we briefed this - was the HSA's were to be used as the basis to trigger an anticipated administrative process that would effectively require each beneficiary to present his information, to be able to challenge HSA's, when Your Honor, our clients have never been provided the information. That was one of the critical problems associated with the HSA's, in addition to the fact that the computation of interest remained a question mark that was not provided, and answers to which were not provided in the administrative record.

So without the evidence introduced, Your Honor, we think it would be unfair and almost impossible for the individual members of the class whose funds are included in the judgment accounts to be put through a process where nothing has ever been provided to them that can be determined as verified or otherwise. This court has noted in its January 30th, 2008 opinion the difficulties that exist with regard to the records. Our clients are the beneficiaries, they're not the trustees, and they have not been provided this information, nor would they be in a position -- because it would be done on an individual basis, nor would they be in a position to address the particular statements that would be given to them.

I think, Your Honor, our clients would be put in an

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impossible position to be able to challenge the HSA's, because there are time periods within which they would have to be challenged effectively or they are out of luck. I don't think those issues, Your Honor, should be addressed at this point in time because the bigger issues have to be addressed first at the circuit which this court --

THE COURT: What's your reaction to the -- what's your response to the question of whether the government should continue to prepare and complete HSA's for land-based accounts and keep that whole process going? Or just bag it, since I've said that it's impossible?

MR. GINGOLD: Your Honor, there are two elements of the issue we're dealing with. And as this court and the Court of Appeals has noted, the accounting -- an accounting involves three components, the historical accounting, the current accounting, and future accountings.

Your Honor, they have specific statutory duties with regard to accounting. Those statutory duties exist whether or not this litigation was ever brought. They are trustees and they have the duty to do this, and Your Honor, they're paid significant fees by the beneficiaries to do this. As this court may recall, evidence was introduced in the October trial from the administrative record that confirmed that eight to 10 percent of all revenue generated by timber is paid to the government as fees, administrative fees, that out of the

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Agua Caliente or the Palm Springs agency office, leases -- there were lease schedules in place where in one case a \$60,000 fee was paid as administrative fees.

Your Honor, the government is obligated as a trustee to do this anyway. This trial is about a historical accounting. At the beginning of this case, for many years we sought reform of the systems to ensure that the current and future accountings could also be done properly, and it could not be done without adequate systems, staffing, and records. This court is well aware of how those have been resolved, but the Court of Appeals has never backed away from the fact that the obligation to do current and future accountings exists.

So Your Honor, we believe the obligation exists. We believe every trustee has that duty, and the government is not excluded. In fact, Congress has reinforced that with the Trust Reform Act.

But Your Honor, there are also damages issues that this court has raised. The list that this court identified are damages issues, and we have never shied away from that and we were never dancing on the head of the pin. We brought this action, as the Court of Appeals confirmed, to enforce the duties owed -- the trust obligations owed by the United States government. That included an accounting, it included restitution, it included what we believe is also specific relief. That's an issue this court believes, with regard to

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interest, although it's provided by statute, is also damages.

That issue needs to be addressed as quickly as possible at the Court of Appeals. The other damages issues, Your Honor, would have to be resolved properly either in the Court of Claims, or, if the Little Tucker Act is invoked, in this court as well.

THE COURT: By individuals?

MR. GINGOLD: No. Your Honor, the Little Tucker Act provides, and all the authorities are in accord, that where you have a class action, it's \$10,000 apiece. Subject to the Little Tucker Act, it's not \$10,000 aggregate, it's \$10,000 per member of the class.

THE COURT: Would that be a related case assigned to me?

MR. GINGOLD: That could also be part of this case, Your Honor. If it was filed in this court separately --

THE COURT: No way, Mr. Gingold.

MR. GINGOLD: I think Your Honor would not like to see us a lot more, so -- but Your Honor, I just wanted to point out, there are damages issues that can be addressed in this court, up to \$10,000 per beneficiary, and Your Honor, if it's 500,000 beneficiaries, that's \$5 billion. If it's other damages issues, such as the ones you identified, they're properly in the claims court.

But Your Honor, we don't believe HSA's should go out,

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we don't believe any new processes should be triggered, we don't believe the government's accounting duties have been in any way suspended or should be suspended by a final judgment or by an interim order or by a certification for interlocutory appeal.

Those obligations have existed prior to the '94 Act, and continue to exist and are reaffirmed explicitly.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. QUINN: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. QUINN: Let me just quickly -- just a couple of quick points in response to Mr. Gingold's comments just now.

What we're referring to is just the historical accounting aspect, not the current accounting aspect. We continue with those present current duties.

But as it relates to this case, to the extent the case remains open and doesn't go to a final judgment, the faster it goes to a final judgment, the claim that was presented to this court for the historical accounting, and the findings of this court with respect to the historical accounting obligation, that issue, that claim becomes merged into any judgment that's entered by this court. And that would define the rights and obligations of the parties as adjudicated by this court.

To the extent that the judgment -- no final judgment is entered, it leaves open these questions about the continuing historical obligation vis-a-vis this class of plaintiffs. I

think if the plaintiffs ask for a historical accounting, the court has ruled as a matter of law it's impossible. If you conclude that case and essentially made an order with respect to \$456 million in terms of a finding, that resolves the matter between the parties as to the historical accounting aspects for purposes of rendering that accounting.

But as long as the judgment remains open, we continue to have these issues about, as an ongoing basis, to go back and continue to do the accounting.

THE COURT: Are you telling me the government wants to stop preparing historical statements of account for land-based accounts?

MR. QUINN: We would like to know whether we need to continue to do so. I think it's the lack of certainty. When members of the department go up to ask and make appropriations requests on the Hill, there are always competing obligations and they get asked to justify the request.

THE COURT: All right. Here's what I think we ought to do. And I'm going to need some agreement from the parties, if that's possible, to get there.

I think I should put this case in a posture as soon as possible, as soon as next week, so that the plaintiffs have something that they can appeal if they want to appeal it. I think the plaintiffs are right that that's Rule 54(b). I don't think it's too hard to form an order that qualifies as a final

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judgment under Rule 54(b) that permits -- that leaves open issues of administration of the plaintiff class, attorneys' fees, and so forth.

I invite either or both parties to present me with forms of order that they think will satisfy that responsibility or those requirements. And, as I said, I think we can get this entered by the end of next week, so when I say invite forms of orders, I think you better get something in my hands no later than Wednesday.

But there are ongoing questions that have to do with historical statements of account, that have to do with quarterly status reports, that have to do with I don't know what else, but what I would like to have from the parties is the agreement that my jurisdiction to deal with those matters is not terminated or ousted by the pendency of an appeal.

In other words, we can run on two tracks. We can deal with -- and I don't think it is -- I think an appeal of the basic underlying obligation to pay does not stop everything in this court. That's my belief anyway, but I would be much more comfortable if the parties would both recite their agreement to that so that we can deal with this HSA question and other related questions on a more deliberate basis with maybe written motions or written requests and I can sort them out. I'm not going to sort them out here in this courtroom this afternoon.

And I don't want to stop the music while we have a

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round of motions to deal with them, either. Because I do think the most efficient way to get this case to the finish line is if it's going to be appealed - and I'm not surprised that it will be - is to get that started as soon as possible. Let the clock start ticking, and Mr. Gingold makes a correct point about postjudgment interest as well.

MR. DORRIS: Your Honor, on behalf of plaintiffs, we would agree to what you've just proposed in terms of your jurisdiction.

THE COURT: Government okay with that?

MR. KIRSCHMAN: I will have to address it with others.

I'm sorry, I can't answer that right now. We will have a quick

answer for you, but I can't address it standing here.

THE COURT: All right. I'll have a quick answer in a few days, and by the middle of next week you'll tell me. I think I have the jurisdiction to deal with these housekeeping matters even if the underlying case is on appeal anyway, but if you have a different view, let me know and let me know why.

So we have sort of a plan here: Proposed forms of order or judgment by the middle of next week, something entered by the end of next week, and unless I'm convinced that I don't have any jurisdiction to do otherwise, then we'll deal with this HSA question in a more deliberate fashion by renewed motions or whatever you want to present to me.

Anything else today, counsel? Thank you very much.

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