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W THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
ELOUISE al., 1 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
PEPION COBELL, a 
V. 1 Case No. 1 :96CV01285 
) (Judge Lamberth) 
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of the Interior, gt &,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THAT INTERIOR’S HISTORICAL ACCOUNTING PLAN COMPORTS 
WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO PERFORM AN ACCOUNTING 
Defendants submit this Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition (“Opposition”) to Defendants’ 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment That Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan Comports 
With Their Obligation To Perfonn An Accounting (“Motion”). 
As set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Opposition is based largely on the “customary statcmcnts 
of grievances and purple prose” that the Court cautioned “Plaintiffs would be well-advised to 
avoid.” Order of Apr. 8, 2003, at 2 n. 1. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ baseless, but rhetorically-charged 
assertions: (1) Defendants’ Statement Of Material Facts As To Which No Genuine Issue Exists 
For Motion For Partial Summary Judgment That Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan Comports 
With Their Obligation To Perform An Accounting (Jan. 31,2003) (“Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts” or “Statement”) complies with Local Civil Rule 7.l(h), and even if it did not, the 
proper remedy would be, at most, for the Court to require both parties to amend and re-file their 
Rule 7.1(h) Statements; (2) PIaintiffs are not entitled to an adverse inference that necessitates the This is the background image for an Adobe Acrobat Capture page with image plus hidden text.  
denial of Defendants’ Motion or precludes Defendants from filing any further summaryjudgment 
or pre-trial dispositive motions; and (3) Defendants’ experts have opined that Interior’s Historical 
Accounting Plan is feasible and comports with Defendants’ obligation to perform an accounting, 
as the scope of that accounting is explicated in Defendants’ Motion.’ Furthermore, Defendants 
respectfully observe that the legal arguments set forth in Defendants’ Motion remain undisputed. 
I. Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts Complies With Local Civil 
Rule 7.l(h), And Even If It Did Not, The Proper Remedy Would Be, At Most, For 
The Court To Require Both Parties To Amend and Re-File Their Statements 
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts fails to comply 
with the requirements of Local Civil Rule 7.1(h) and that Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment should therefore be denied. See Opposition at 6-8. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, 
however, Defendants’ Statement does comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(h). Furthermore, even if 
the Statement failed to comply with this Rule, the proper remedy would not be to dismiss 
Defendants’ Motion, but rather, at most, to order both parties to amend and re-file their 
Statements. 
‘Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ Motion must be denied because it is “based on 
their planned future conduct-how they intend to perform the accounting.” Opposition at 1 
(emphasis in original). As Defendants have previously argued, they agree that the Court lacks 
the authority to undertake a Phase 1.5 trial for the purpose of reviewing Interior Defendants’ 
Historical Accounting Plan and thereupon entering injunctive relief dictating how they must 
comply with their obligation to account to individual Indian money (“IIM”)account holders. See 
Defendants’ Motion at 1-2; Brief for the Appellants (filed Dec. 6,2002). However, the Court’s 
order requiring Defendants to file an accounting plan and stating its intent to hold a trial thereon, 
-see Order of Sept. 17,2002, reflects the Court’s conclusion that the legality of “Interior’s planned 
future conduct” is justiciable at this time. Accordingly, as in any other lawsuit, Defendants are 
entitled to seek summaryjudgment. See also Order of Oct. 17,2002 (providing a “[dleadline for 
filing summary judgment motions”). 
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Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1 (h), “[elach motion for summaryjudgment shall be 
accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no 
genuine issue, which shall include references to the parts of the record relied on to support the 
statement.” LCVR7.1(h). In accordance with this Rule, Defendants filed a Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts in support of their Motion. Although this Statement is brief, it hlly 
conforms with Local Civil Rule 7.1(h) because Defendants’ Motion relies almost entirely on 
legal (and, in particular, statutory) analysis and, as a result, there are very few facts material to 
deciding it. While Plaintiffs insist that “there are considerable ‘genuine issues’ on material facts 
making summary judgment inappropriate,” Opposition at 14, they nowhere identify what these 
alleged material facts might be. Indeed, despite their argument that Defendants’ Statement is 
improper, they themselves filed a Statement that is equally brief, as it is confined to “address[ing] 
defendants’ . . .proposed undisputed facts.” Plaintiffs’ Statement Of Genuine Issues In 
Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For Partial Summary Judgment That Interior’s Historical 
Accounting Plan Comports With Their Obligation To Perform An Accounting 34 (Apr. 18, 
2003). 
As Plaintiffs correctly observe, Local Civil Rule 7.1(h) serves to “isolate[] the facts that 
the parties assert are material, distinguish[] disputed from undisputed facts, and identiqy] the 
pertinent parts of the record.” Opposition at 7 (quoting Gardels v. CIA, 637 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980)). In other words, “[als Gardels . . .intimates in its examination of the Rule’s purpose, 
a district court judge should not be obliged to sift through hundreds of pages of depositions, 
affidavits, and interrogatories in order to make his own analysis and determination of what may, 
or may not, be a genuine issue of material disputed fact.” Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 
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(D.C. Cir. 1988). Because Defendants’ Motion relies so heavily on legal analysis, there is 
simply no need for the Court to “sift through” a large record to decide it, and thus no need for 
Defendants to file an extensive Statement of Undisputed Material Facts with numerous citations 
to the record. 
However, even if Defendants’ Statement failed to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(h), 
the case law on which Plaintiffs themselves rely indicates that the proper remedy would not be to 
dismiss Defendants’ Motion, but rather, at most, to order both parties to amend and re-file their 
Statements. In Gardels v. CIA, the D.C. Circuit held that, because the CIA had filed an 
“inadequate . . . Statement” pursuant to a predecessor of Local Civil Rule 7.1(h), it was 
“impossible for . . . [it] to determine whether genuine issues of material fact existed when 
summaryjudgment was granted.” Gardels, 637 F.2d 770, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accordingly, it 
decided to “remand the case to the District Court so that the CIA may file a proper Rule 1-9(h) 
Statement.” Id. Likewise, in Robertson v. American Airlines, Inc., the district court ‘‘flou]nd[] 
that the defendants’ statement does not comply with Rule 56.1,” which is identical to Local Civil 
Rule 7.l(h), but “decline[d] to adopt the plaintiffs suggestion of striking the statement and 
denying the defendants summaryjudgment. Robertson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 5 , 9 (D.D.C. 2002). 
Instead, it determined that the proper relief was to “strike[] the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, and permit[] the defendants to refile a motion that complies with the letter and spirit of 
the rule.” Id.Accordingly, because any basis for concluding that Defendants’ Rule 7.l(h) 
Statement is improper necessarily implies that Plaintiffs’ Rule 7.1(h) Statement is also improper,2 
2Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants have filed an improper Statement does not excuse 
them from their obligation to file a proper one. Thus, if the Court adopts Plaintiffs’ argument 
that Defendants’ Statement failed to comply with Local Civil Rule 7.l(h), the same reasoning 
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the appropriate remedy for the Court would be, at most, to order both parties to amend and re-file 
their statement^.^ 
As the D.C. Circuit has recently emphasized, however, “this court has long recognized 
that the district court does not abuse its discretion by declining to invoke the requirements of the 
local rule in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Burke v. Could, 286 F.3d 5 13,519-20 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Indeed, the Burke Court observed: 
[Blecause the Local Rules ‘supplement’ and ‘shall be construed in 
harmony’ with the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, 
-see Local Rule 1.1(a); . . . ,the district court is required by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) itself to consider the ‘pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any,’ in determining whether ‘there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c); . . . . Although Local Rule 56.1 [which is identical to Local 
Civil Rule 7.l(h)] facilitates more precise identification of the 
record materials on which the parties rely, Rule 56(c) identifies the 
materials the court is to consider before granting summary 
judgment. 
would indicate that Plaintiffs’ Statement-which is confined to “address[ing] 
defendants’ . . .proposed undisputed facts,” Plaintiffs’ Statement at 34-is also improper. 
3Ratherthan ordering the refiling of the Rule 7.l(h) Statement, some courts have 
addressed the problem of an improper statement by striking the statement and adopting as 
admitted the facts set forth in the opponent’s statement. See, e.p., Jackson v. Finnegan, 
Henderson, Farabow. Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[Having struck 
Jackson’s . . . statement, the district court properly deemed as admitted the material facts set forth 
in the law firm’s . . . statement of material facts not in dispute.”); Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 
1425 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[Iln the absence of the statement required to be furnished by Twist, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting as ‘admitted’ the facts identified by the 
government in the government’s statement of material facts.”); cf.LCvR 7.l(h) (“In determining 
a motion for summaryjudgment, the court may assume that facts identified by the moving party 
in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement 
of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.”). Here, however, the remedy of striking 
Defendants’ Statement and adopting Plaintiffs’ is unavailable, because any conclusion that 
Defendants’ Statement is infirm inexorably leads to the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ is as well. 
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-Id. at 519-20 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the materials filed pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), and in particular the pleadings themselves, constitute a sufficient 
basis for the Court to decide Defendants’ Motion without requiring the parties to amend and refile 
their statements. 
11. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To An Adverse Inference That Necessitates The Denial 
Of Defendants’ Motion Or Precludes Defendants From Filing Any Further 
Summary Judgment Or Pre-Trial Dispositive Motions 
Plaintiffs ask the Court “summarily [to] reject defendants’ motion for [partial] summary 
judgment . . . because of their massive destruction of relevant trust documents and the effect of 
the adverse inference resulting therefrom.” Opposition at 11. They then argue that, “given the 
wholesale lack of credibility that the persistent lies, misrepresentations and malfeasance by 
defendants and their counsel have hung around their own necks,” the Court should adopt “a 
standing adverse inference” that would “preclude defendants from bringing any 
further. . , summary judgment or other dispositive motions.” Id.at 13. As demonstrated below, 
these arguments are totally without merit. 
Under well-established case law, a party seeking an adverse inference regarding the 
content of destroyed evidence must make three separate showings. First, it must demonstrate 
that “the party having control over the evidence . .. had an obligation to preserve it at the time it 
was destroyed.” Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998). Second, it must 
show that the “evidence was intentionally destroyed.” Id.at 127; see also Bvrnie v. Cromwell, 
243 F.3d 93, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that destruction that occurred through bad faith or 
gross negligence has sometimes been deemed sufficient). Third, the party requesting the adverse 
inference must demonstrate a “‘likelihood that the destroyed evidence would have been of the 
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nature alleged by the party affected by its destruction.”’ Bvrnie, 243 F.3d at 108 (quoting 
Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 127). To demonstrate such a likelihood, this party must “produce ‘some 
evidence suggesting that a document or documents relevant to substantiating his claim would 
have been included among the destroyed files.”’ Id.(quoting Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 128). As the 
D.C. Circuit has cautioned, “[mlere innuendo” is insufficient. Wvler v. Korean Air Lines Co., 
928 F.2d 1167,1174 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
As indicated by these three required showings, the party seeking an adverse inference 
must make them as to particular pieces of destroyed evidence and must claim a precise adverse 
inference rePardinP the content of that evidence. For example, in Kronisch, the D.C. Circuit 
ruled that the district court had improperly denied plaintiff an adverse inference in a suit alleging 
that he had been made to participate without his consent in a CIA-run program designed to test 
the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Plaintiff sought an adverse inference arising 
from the CIA’Sintentional destruction of a particular set of records-namely, those relating to this 
drug-testing program. Furthermore, he identified the adverse inference that he sought with 
precision, arguing that the destroyed “files may have contained evidence helping to substantiate 
plaintiffs claim that Gottlieb [a CIA agent] drugged him in Paris in 1952.” Kronisch, 150 F.3d 
at 129. 
Likewise, in Bymie, where Plaintiff sued a school system and board of education, arguing 
that they failed to hire him as a part-time art teacher on the basis of age and gender 
discrimination, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred in denying plaintiff an adverse 
inference. Here as well, however, plaintiff identified the destroyed documents and the adverse 
inference he sought with precision. In particular, he pointed to: (1) “the missing application 
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materials of the other candidates;” (2) “the written ballot form” used by “the screening committee 
members .. .to rank the 21 applications to determine which applicants would receive an 
interview - . . ,along with the tally sheet that compiled their votes;” (3) “the forms on 
which, . .. [elach Committee member independently wrote down his or her top three choices for 
the job opening, in order of preference, after the first round of interviews, along with the tally 
sheet adding up the votes;” (4) “any notes made by the interviewers in the first and second rounds 
of interviews-and Nappi [the school principal] testified that it was likely that such notes were 
made;” and ( 5 ) “the notes Nappi relied upon in drafting the summary of the hiring process that 
the CCHRO [Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities] Answer [to 
plaintiffs complaint] was based upon.” Bvmie, 243 F.3d at 107. Having thus identified a 
specific set of documents that were destroyed, plaintiff sought the precise adverse inference that 
“the destroyed documents would show unlawful discrimination.” @. at 1 10. 
Here, Plaintiffs cannot make the three showings required to obtain an adverse inference 
because they do not identify which documents (or categories of documents) Defendants have 
destroyed and how these specific documents give rise to a particular adverse inference. Indeed, 
instead of identifying specific destroyed documents, Plaintiffs rely on their customary vague and 
unsupported allegations, referring to the unspecified “destr[uction] of vast numbers of trust 
documents” and “massive, systematic, and intentional destruction.” Opposition at 8-9. Not 
surprisingly, given Plaintiffs’ utter failure to identify any particular relevant documents that were 
destroyed, they do not (and cannot) even remotely delineate the adverse inference that they seek. 
Thus, rather than arguing that Defendants’ destruction of (particular) documents gives rise to a 
particular adverse inference about the content of those (particular) documents which-when 
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weighed with all other evidence-requires denial of Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiffs simply insist 
that the unspecified document destruction mandates the Motion’s denial. 
In sum, Plaintiffs cite case law regarding the evidentiary doctrine of the adverse 
inference, but the real basis for their argument is their customary rhetoric about Defendants’ 
“inequitable attempts to gain unfair advantage.” Opposition at 9. It is, however, particularly 
ironic that Plaintiffs cite the destruction of trust documents as proof that Defendants’ Motion is 
inequitable, since one of the primary purposes of Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan, as to 
which Defendants’ Motion seeks partial summaryjudgment, is to devise an accounting that 
addresses the problem of missing documents-a problem of which Congress itself was fully 
apprised when it enacted the 1994 Act in which it mandated an accounting. Interior’s 
Historical Accounting Plan at 111-13 (“It is certain that some gaps in the transaction history or in 
records and documentation will be encountered during the historical accounting. . . . Various 
options, including forensic accounting methods, can be used to address gaps in documentation.”); 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-778, at 10’30 (Oct. 3, 1994) (discussing the well-known Misplaced Trust: 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Mismanagement of the Indian Trust Fund, H.R. Rep. No. 102-499 
(Apr. 22, 1992), which in turn describes, inter aha, problems with the management of IlM trust 
records). 
That Plaintiffs’ request for an “adverse inference” requiring denial of Defendants’ Motion 
is really based on a generalized grievance, rather than the law of evidence, is suggested by their 
even more far-fetched assertion that the Court should adopt “a standing adverse inference” that 
would “preclude defendants from bringing any further . . . summary judgment or other 
dispositive motions.” Opposition at 13. As Plaintiffs do not (and cannot) cite any authority in 
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support of this extraordinary request (let alone any case law concerning adverse inferences), the 
Court should summarily deny it.4 
111. Defendants’ Experts Have Opined that Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan is 
Feasible And Comports With Defendants’ Obligation To Perform An Accounting, 
As The Scope Of That Accounting Is Explicated In Defendants’ Motion 
Plaintiffs rely on snippets of the reports and deposition testimony of Defendants’ expert 
accountant and historians, David Lasater, Edward Angel, and Alan Newell, to argue that 
Defendants lack “competent experts willing to opine that Defendants’ Historical Plan will 
comply with their fiduciary duty to provide a complete and accurate accounting of all individual 
Indian trust assets.” Opposition at 26. 
Plaintiffs’ argument, however, completely misconstrues the subject matter as to which 
Defendants’ experts are opining. Assuming Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan is feasible, the 
question of whether it comports with Defendants’ obligation to perform an accounting is a legal 
one. As such, it is appropriate for summary judgment and not for the expert testimony of 
accountants and historians. The correctness of Defendants’ various legal interpretations 
regarding the scope of the required accounting-such as their determination that it must be for 
funds held in TIM trust accounts on or after passage of the 1994 Act on October 25, 1994-is for 
the Court to decide. Defendants’ experts are offered simply to establish that, given these legal 
interpretations underlying the Accounting Plan, the accounting set forth therein is feasible. 
Consider, for example, Plaintiffs’ assertion that “Lasater’s testimony effectively refutes 
any notion that Defendants’ Historical Plan is sufficient as a matter of law or fact to constitute 
4Plaintiffs’request to preclude Defendants from filing any further summaryjudgment or 
other dispositive motions is also not properly before the Court, as Plaintiffs failed to file a motion 
requesting such relief. 
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the ‘all funds’ accounting ordered by this Court.” Opposition at 18. In support of this assertion, 
they note, inter alia, that Dr. Lasater testified that Interior’s Plan seeks to provide accountings 
“‘within a limited time period,”’& at 17 (quoting Lasater Dep.), that it is a ‘“fair statement”’ 
that the accounting is “‘not going to be [to] all past and present Individual Indian Trust 
beneficiaries,”’ &.at 18 (quoting Lasater Dep.), and that if there is absolutely no documentation 
concerning a transaction, that transaction “‘is not quantifiable,”’ id.(quoting Lasater Dep.). As 
these statements go to the legal question of the scope of the accounting set forth in Interior’s 
Plan, they have nothing to do with the expert opinion regarding the Plan’s feasibility for which 
Defendants offer Dr. Lasater’s testimony. 
As for Plaintiffs’ challenges to the expert testimony of Edward Angel and Alan Newell, 
these are based primarily on the fact that these individuals are historians, rather than accountants. 
Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Angel is “utterly unschooled, incompetent and inexperienced with 
respect to accounting and trust matters,” Opposition at 19, and that Mr. Newell “was only 
opining from a historian’s perspective,” id.at 24. This is hardly surprising, however, or 
detrimental to Defendants’ case, since it is precisely as experts in history, rather than accounting, 
that Defendants have offered the testimony of Dr. Angel and Mr. Newell. Given this obvious 
point, Plaintiffs’ strained efforts to discredit Dr. Angel and Mr. Newell by pointing to their lack 
of expertise regarding such concepts as what constitutes an “accurate accounting,” at 18-19, 
or the meaning of “reconciliation,” id.at 22-23, miss the mark. 
After thus challenging Defendants’ experts on irrelevant grounds, Plaintiffs cite the report 
of their identified “expert,” Paul M. Homan, for his opinion that “Defendants’ Historical Plan 
Does Not Comport With Their Fiduciary Obligation To Provide A Complete And Accurate 
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Accounting.” Id.at 27. However, Mr. Homan bases this opinion on his own view of how 
properly to interpret the scope of the accounting required by law. Thus, for example, as Plaintiffs 
note, Mr. Homan opines that “[tlhe DO1 Historical Accounting Plan” cannot account for ‘all 
funds’ held in the Individual Indian Trust.” Id.at 27 (quoting Homan Report). However, 
because the phrase “all funds,” quoted by Mr. Homan, is language from the 1994 Act, the 
question of its meaning is one that necessarily involves statutory interpretation, a subject on 
which Mr. Homan is not qualified to offer expert testimony. 
Finally, although Plaintiffs, as is their wont, remark on Defendants’ alleged “temerity” 
and “inequitable attempts to gain unfair advantage,” 9.at 9, it is Plaintiffs themselves who 
demonstrate these characteristics in devoting half of their brief-sixteen out of twenty-nine 
pages-to expert reports and deposition testimony. Indeed, Plaintiffs even go so far as to criticize 
Defendants’ Motion on the ground that “the matter to which they seek judgment is one . . . that is 
a subject of expert testimony where plaintiffs have already proffered cogent, contrary expert 
reports not addressed by Defendants’ Motion.” Opposition at 1 (emphasis added). The only 
reason that Plaintiffs are able to discuss these reports and deposition testimony in their 
Opposition is that they failed to file their Opposition until about two months after it was due, and 
then only because the Court so directed. See LCvR 7.l(b) (“Within 11 days of the date of service 
or at such other time as the court may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a 
memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion.”); Order of Apr. 8,2003 
(requiring Plaintiffs to file their Opposition “no later than Friday, April 18,2003). Defendants 
did not have the opportunity to discuss expert reports in their Motion because they complied with 
the Court’s Order of October 17,2002, which, while providing that February 28,2002 was the 
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“[dleadline for filing expert reports and for the identification of both parties’ testifying experts,” 
required all motions for summaryjudgment to be filed a month earlier, on January 31,2003. & 
Oct. 17,2002. 
IV. The Legal Arguments Set Forth In Defendants’ Motion Remain Undisputed 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition fails to address the legal claims that form the basis of Defendants’ 
Motion. While Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that Interior’s Historical Accounting Plan does not 
comport with Defendants’ accounting obligation, such a blanket assertion does not constitute a 
legally cognizable response to Defendants’ carefully explicated legal analyses; nor, indeed, do 
their constant references to Defendants’ alleged “frauds, misrepresentations and concealments.” 
&., Opposition at 11. 
In particular, Plaintiffs have not disputed, inter alia, the following legal arguments set 
forth in Defendants’ Motion: (1) the accounting required by the American Indian Trust Fund 
Management Reform Act of 1994 (“1994 Act”) (codified as 25 U.S.C. 5 401 1) is an accounting 
of “funds” rather than “assets;’’(2) the 1994 Act requires Interior Defendants to account for 
funds deposited after the Act of June 24, 1938; (3) the accounting required is for funds held in 
IIMtrust accounts on or after passage of the Act on October 25, 1994, and not for DM accounts 
that were distributed and closed prior to this date; (4)the statutory duty to account does not 
extend to funds that were never received by the United States because they were paid directly to 
the Indian beneficiary of the underlying trust asset; and ( 5 ) Interior Defendants are not obligated 
to examine the transactions in the account of a deceased predecessor of a current IIM account 
holder in order to provide an accounting to the current account holder. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion is without merit 
and Defendants respectfully renew their request for partial summaryjudgment that Interior’s 
Historical Accounting Plan comports with their obligation to perform an accounting. 
Dated: April 25,2003 Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
STUART E. SCHIFFER 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN 
Director 
~~~ 
SANDRA P. SPOONER 
Deputy Director 
D.C. Bar No. 261495 
JOHN T. STEMPLEWICZ 
Senior Trial Counsel 
AMALIA D. KESSLER 
Trial Attorney 
Commercia1 Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
(202) 5 14-7194 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that, on April 25,2003 I served the foregoing 
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment That Interior’s 
Historical Accounting Plan Comports with Their Obligation to Perform an Accounting by 
facsimile in accordance with their written request of October 31, 2001 upon: 
Keith Harper, Esq. 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
(202) 822-0068 
Per the Court’s Order of April 17,2003, 
by facsimile and by U.S. Mail upon: 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
(406) 338-7530 
By facsimile and U.S. Mail: 
Alan L. Balaran, Esq. 
Special Master 
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
13th Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 986-8477 
Dennis M Gingold, Esq. 
Mark Kester Brown, Esq. 
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Ninth Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
(202) 318-2372 
By U.S. Mail upon: 
Elliott Levitas, Esq 
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530