<< COB0000001 >>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ELOUlSE PEPION COBELL, et aL,	)
)
	Plaintiffs,	)	Civil Action No. 96-1285 (RCL)
)
	v.	)
		)
GALE A. NORTON, et al.,	)
)
	Defendants.	)
MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONFOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY INTERIOR
DEFENDANTS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES AND COUNSEL ShOULD
NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR DESTROYING E-MAIL
	The United States respectftilly moves the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 to strike Plaintiffs Reply Brief in support of the motion filed March 20, 2002 for an
order to show cause. The motion, supporting memorandum and draft order were served on
plaintiff on May 24, 2002, more than 21 prior to filing of this motion. Counsel for United States
consulted with counsel for Plaintiffs about this motion on June 18, 2002, and counsel for Plaintiffs
indicated that they would not withdraw or amend the reply brief and that they oppose this motion.
	A memorandum in support of this motion and a proposed order are attached.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
<< COB0000002 >>
STUART E. SCHIFFER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
J.	CHRISTOPHER KO}{N
SANDRA P. SPOONER
Deputy Director
D.C. Bar No. 261495
Dodge Wells
Senior Trial Counsel
D.C. Bar No. 425194
Tracy L. Hilmer
D.C. Bar No. 421219
Trial Attorney
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 261
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 307-0474
OF COUNSEL:
Sabrina A. McCarthy
Department of the Jnterior
Office of the Solicitor
DATED:	June 24, 2002
-2-
<< COB0000003 >>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et ab,	)
)
		Plaintiffs,	)	Civil Action No. 96-1285 (RCL)
			)
	V.		)
)
GALE A. NORTON, et al.,	)
)
	Defendants.	)
ORDER
	This matter having come before the Court on the motion of the United States, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, to strike Plaintiffs Reply Brief in support of the motion filed
March 20, 2002 for an order to show cause, the Court, upon consideration of all memoranda and
evidentiaiy material submitted in support of and in opposition to Plaintiffs' March 20, 2002
Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Interior Defendants and Their Employees and Counsel
Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Destroying E-mail, Plaintiffs' Reply filed on April 15, 2002
and exhibits thereto, and all memorandum and evidentiary material submitted in support of and
in opposition to the motion to strike Plaintiffs' Reply Brief,
IT IS I{EREBY ORDERED that the motion of the United States to strike Plaintiffs Reply Brief
in support of the motion filed March 20, 2002 for an order to show cause is granted.
<< COB0000004 >>
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated:
-2-
<< COB0000005 >>
cc:
Michael F. Hertz
Dodge Wells
Tracy L. Hilmer
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 261
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Fax:	(202) 616-3085
Dennis M Gingold, Esq.
Mark Brown, Esq.
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue. N.W.
Ninth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004
Fax (202) 318-2372
Keith Harper, Esq.
Native American Rights Fund
1712 N Street, NW.
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976
Fax (202) 822-0068
Elliott Levitas, Esq.
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-453 0
•	Joseph S. Kieffer, 111
Court Monitor
420 - 7~' Street, N.\V.
Apartment 705
Washington, D.C. 20004
<< COB0000006 >>
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that, on June 24, 2002 I served the Foregoing Motion to Strike
Plaint ifs' Reply in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Interior Defendants and
Their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Destroying E-mail, by hand:
Keith Harper, Esq.	Dennis M Gingold, Esq.
Native American Rights Fund	Mark Kester Brown, Esq.
1712 N Street, N.W.	1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976	Ninth Floor
202-822-0068	Washington, D.C. 20004
	202-318-2372
By US. Mail upon:
Elliott Levitas, Esq.
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530
By Facsimile and U.S. Mail:
Alan L. Balaran, Esq.
Special Master
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
12th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 986-8477
Courtesy Copy by U.S. Mail:
Joseph S. Kieffer, 111
Court Monitor
420 - 7th Street, N.W.
Apartment 705
Washington, D.C. 20004
Kevin P. KThgston
<< COB0000007 >>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR ThE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al.,	)
)
		Plaintiffs,	)	Civil Action No. 96-1285 (RCL)
			)
	v.		)
)
GALE A. NORTON, et al.,	)
)
	Defendants.	)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ORDER TO 5110W CAUSE WHY INTERIOR DEFENDANTS
AND THEIR EMPLOYEES AND COUNSEL SHOULD NOT
BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR DESTROYING E-MAIL
	Plaintiffs reply brief in support of the motion filed March 20, 2002 for an order to show
cause (the "Reply Brief') contains factual misrepresentations about prior proceedings in this case
and unsupported and unsupportable accusations of ethical misconduct against individuals, some
of whom are neither parties to the case nor named as respondents in the March 20, 2002, motion.
The counsel for plaintiffs who signed the Reply Brief have violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. As a sanction for the violation, the United States requests entry of an order
striking the Reply Brief. As required by Rule II (c)(l)(A), the United States served this motion
upon plaintiffs more than 21 days before filing this motion. However, plaintiffs have not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected the Reply Brief.
	The United States presents this motion with considerable reluctance, recognizing that the
government in general must be relatively thick-skinned, and also recognizing that the filing of
this motion risks further bogging down this case in collateral proceedings. However, the Reply
<< COB0000008 >>
Brief contains baseless accusations of wrongdoing that should not be tolerated and cannot be
ignored. The March 20, 2002, motion was itse]f irresponsible (See Philip A. Brooks' Opposition
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Order to Show Cause Why He Should Not Be Held in Contempt for
Destroying E-Mail at 12-14), but the reply brief is even worse. This behavior must end.
	I.	RULE 11 REQUIRES COUNSEL TO UNDERTAKE A REASONABLE
		INQUIRY BEFORE MAKING FACTUAL ASSERTIONS IN A BRIEF
	Rule II provides, in pertinent part,
(b) By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other
paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -
	(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose
	(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely lo
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.
	By signing the Reply Brief, plaintiffs' counsel made "a certification - a personal
testimony as to the truth of the matter asserted - that the signer (1) has read the document (2) has
concluded, after a reasonable inquiry into both the facts and the law, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support the document, and (3) is
acting without an improper motivation. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 1335 (2d ed., 2001 Supp. 2001).' The rule imposes an objective test -
	'Characteristically, plaintiffs' discussion of Rule 11 iniastates the duties imposed by the
rule. The rule does not, as plaintiffs claim, impose on litigation counsel the responsibility "for
certifying the truthfulness and the accuracy of any filing." Reply Brief, at 4, n.6. The rule does,
-2-
<< COB0000009 >>
whether a competent attorney who conducted a reasonable inquiry into the pertinent facts would
have concluded that the allegations were well grounded. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp.
Derivative Action Litigation, 96 F. Supp. 2d 403, 405 (D.N.J. 2000); Lewis v. Cooke, 95 F. Supp.
2d 513, 526-27 (E.D. Va. 2000). The Reply Briefs multiple violations of Rule II in regard to
factual assertions are in two general categories, misrepresentation of the record in this case,
discussed in Part IT, and unsupported accusations of unethical conduct, discussed in Part 111.
II.	THE REPLY BRIEF REPEATEDLY MISSTATES THE RECORD
	The Reply Brief repeatedly misstates the record in this case, and, on the basis of the
erroneous factual assertions, makes sweeping accusations ofinisconduct against the Secretary,
Department of Interior employees, government counsel or anyone else who dares to disagree with
plaintiffs' counsel. Three pages of the Reply Brief are spent on spurious accusations that the
government "duped this Court and Plaintiffs" on the scope of the August 12, 1999 document
retention order. Plaintiffs' March 20, 2002, motion asserted that overwriting of Solicitor's Office
back-up e-mail tapes violated the August 12, 1999 order. That order required retention of
categories of documents identified in "Attachment A." The government's response to the March
20, 2002, motion noted that "Documents and data maintained by the Solicitor's Office are not
listed among the categories identified in Attachment A." Government's Opposition to Plaintiffs'
March 20, 2002 Motion for Orders to Show Cause Why Interior Defendants and Their
Employees and Counsel Should not Be Held in Contempt ("Government's Opposition") at 12.
however, impose the responsibility of undertaking a reasonable investigation before making
factual assertions in a brief. The Reply Brief falls far short of both the strict standard plaintiffs
seek to impose on government counsel and the more lenient standard of the rule itself
-3-
<< COB0000010 >>
	Rather than addressing the argument actually made by the government - that the August
12, 1999, order did not list documents and data maintained by the Solicitor's Office - plaintiffs'
counsel assert that the government hoodwinked everyone else by substituting a revised
Attachment A at the last minute which deleted references to e-mails that had been contained in
every other draft of Attachment A throughout negotiations of the Order. Reply Brief at 5-7. The
precise charges of plaintiffs' counsel are clear and unambiguous:
Specifically, each draft of the negotiated order -consented to by plaintiffs and
defendants- incorporated by reference supporting documents that included
language explicitly listing "electronic files" and "electronic backups" within the
scope of protection.
Id. at5.
Attachment A identifies types of documents that must be searched by defendants,
and it includes an expansive explanatory footnote that defines documents to be
preserved, searched, and produced to include "electronic files" and all their
'electronic backup."
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
[o]n August 12, 1999, Attachment A was secretly altered without notice or the
consent of the Master or plaintiffs -solely to delete the explanatory footnote....
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). On the basis of these factual allegations that on the day the
August 12, 1999, order was entered, the government secretly removed language from the
attachment that had been in every other draft of the negotiated order, plaintiffs' counsel charged
that the government acted in bad faith, with intent to defraud at the time the August 12, 1999,
Order was entered, Reply Brief, at 7, and compounded the fraud by using the "fraudulent"
document to support a claim that the August 12, 1999, Order "is ambiguous because it does not
-4-
<< COB0000011 >>
explicitly include e-mail or backup tapes by name."2 Id. at 5 (emphasis is original).
	The clear and unambiguous factual allegations made by plaintiffs' counsel on which the
charges of fraud are based are clearly and unambiguously wrong. The July 1999 Report of the
Special Master, which was sent to the Court on August 2, 1999, stated "After considerable
negotiation, the parties have agreed to the terms of a document preservation order which
delineates the respective obligations of the Department of the Interior and the Department of the
Treasury regarding TIM records retention. See Exhibits 2 and 3." The version of Attachment A
included in the July 1999 Report of the Special Master is identical to the Attachment A included
in the Order issued on August 12, 1999 and does not contain the "explanatory footnote" which
plaintiffs assert was contained in each draft. The July 1999 Report and Exhibit 2 thereto are
Exhibit I to this memorandum. Moreover, contrary to the representations of plaintiffs' counsel,
the versions of Attachment A which were included in drafts of the negotiated order circulated to
the Special Master and plaintiffs' counsel on July 12, 1999 (See Exhibit 2), July 28, 1999 (See
Exhibit 3), and August 5, 1999 (See Exhibit 4) were identical to the Attachment A to the Order
as finally issued by the Court on August 12, 1999.
	A "reasonable inquiry" to support the allegations that Attachment A to "each draft" of the
negotiated order prior to August 12, 1999 contained the explanatory footnote, let alone the
allegations of fraud and bad faith, would have required, at a minimum, a review of the files to
ascertain what the earlier drafts actually said. If plaintiffs' counsel had not retained the earlier
drafts, the accusations should not have been made.
	2 Of course, the argument the government actually made is that the August 12, 1999,
Order is inapplicable because it does not cover documents maintained by the Solicitor's Office.
Government's Opposition at 11.
-5-
<< COB0000012 >>
	The misstatements concerning the August 12, 1999, order are not the only instances in the
Reply Brief in which plaintiffs' counsel misstate the record and base unsupported accusations of
misconduct on those misstatements. Part II of the Reply Brief is a compendium of similarly
baseless accusations of alleged misrepresentations contained in the government's opposition.
While some of the accusations are simply silly,3 others are clearly false representations which are
used as the basis of reckless accusations of misconduct. For example, the Government's
Opposition stated that the "Special Master found that software systems at the Solicitor's Office
headquarters office and 18 regional and field offices are backed up on a daily and weekly basis
on tape media used to recover lost data in the event of a system crash." Government's Opposition
at 4, quoted in the Reply Brief at 10. Plaintiffs' counsel assert that "Department of Justice
counsel deceptively omitted the material fact that the Special Master was quoting from Glenn
Schumaker's November 20, false declaration..." Rcply Brief at 10 (emphasis in original). The
Special Master did not, as plaintiffs' counsel claim, quote Mr. Schumaker's declaration. Rather,
the Special Master cited Mr. Schumaker's declaration. Even a cursory review of the Special
Master's opinion would have demonstrated that the statement in the Reply Brief was false.
Plaintiffs' counsel compounds its factual error by asserting that the statement in the Government's
Opposition that "[T]he Special Master's identification of the first period of overwriting (June to
November 1998) conflicts with an earlier finding in the opinion that the Solicitor's Office had
	~ For example, plaintiffs' observation that compliance with the paper recordkeepking e-
mail retention system depends on the good faith and vigilance of employees, Reply Brief at 8-9,
hardly demonstrates the falsity of the government's statement that Interior had such a system in
place. Contrary to plaintiffs' charges (Reply Brief at 9-10), the Special Master's finding that the
e-mail backup tapes contain certain fields of information not captured in print-outs of the e-mails
(a finding discussed at page 26 of the Government's Opposition), is not inconsistent with the
government's statement that the Special Master "found only that e-mail backup tapes had been
erased, not that c-mails generally had not been printed out."
-6-
<< COB0000013 >>
- -
begun saving backup e-mail tapes between February and November 1998 as a result of the
Independent Counsel investigation. [Special Master's Opinion] at 4, citing Nov. 20, 1998
Declaration of Glenn Schumaker, ~ 4" is a further example of the improper and unethical use of
the Schumaker declaration. Again, a cursory inquiry would have shown that the government
correctly referenced the Special Master's opinion.
	The misrepresentations of the record by plaintiffs' counsel are by themselves sanctionable
under Rule 11. See Flanagan v. Shamo, 111 F. Supp. 3d 892, 899 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(misrepresentation of a witness' deposition testimony is sanctionable). What is far worse is
plaintiffs' counsel's use of its misrepresentations of the record to launch unsupported accusations
of unethical, indeed, of criminal, conduct by government counsel and government employees.
The unsupported accusations against individuals are discussed in Part m.
III. THE REPLY BRIEF REPEATEDLY MAKES UNSUPPORTED CHARGES
OF UNETHICAL OR CRIMINAL CONDUCT AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
	The Reply Brief is rife with serious accusations of wrongdoing by numerous individuals
but is noticeably thin in evidentiary support for the charges. Most of the unsupported accusations
are casual slanders, tossed off without a thought of the harm to the individuals involved. The
following is a representative, but by no means exhaustive sample:
[t]he Secretary, through her employees and counsel routinely destroyed an unquantifiable
amount of relevant e-mail records.
Reply Brief at 3. Leaving aside the question of whether the backup tapes are "records," See
Government's Opposition at 18-19, and also ignoring that plaintiffs have supplied no evidence
that relevant e-mails were destroyed, there is absolutely no evidence that counsel have
overwritten any backup tapes, nor have plaintiffs' counsel explained how Department of Justice
-7-
<< COB0000014 >>
attorneys would be able to destroy Department of Interior electronic data even if they wanted to.
In the same vein, plaintiffs' counsel allege:
Anne Shields called a TMTP meeting 9/7/99, the principal purpose of which was to
inform the Court [of failures of TAAMS]. Over the following weeks, numerous e-rnails
necessarily had to have been sent by and between Anne Shields, Solicitor's Office
attorneys and various employees discussing how, when and why and what this Court was
to be informed as to the state of affairs that contradicted sworn testimony.
Moreover, each of these e-mails was responsive to plaintiffs' discovery requests
and was covered by the Special Master's May 11, 1999 order that compelled
production (and preserv~ition) of such e-mails that -without any doubt - would
have revealed the pervasive deception that defendants and their counsel had
practiced on this Court.
Id. at 22-23.
[p]laintifTh were provided nothing and the Secretary and her counsel continued to
destroy evidence in massive quantities.
Id. at 23.
Solicitor's Office attorneys on the brief (Mines. Blackwell and Lundgren and Mr.
Cair) obviously knew that e-mail was continuing to be destroyed. - . in fact, they
and their colleagues routinely destroyed their own e-mail.4
Id. at 4, n.6. Plaintiffs' counsel raise the ante even higher:
[tihe Secretar/s trial counsel (e.g., Messrs. Brooks, Findlay and Eichner and Ms.
Schiffer) as a matter of practice filed pleadings and procured supporting
declarations in this regard that are materially false and deceptive.S
Id. at 3. This language appears to track 18 U.S.C. § 1622, and thus appears to be a thinly veiled
4Ms. Lundgren and Mr. Carr are neither parties to this suit nor respondents to the March
20, 2002 contempt motion.
	~ Mr. Eichner is neither a party to this suit nor a respondent to the March 20, 2002
contempt motion.
-8-
<< COB0000015 >>
accusation of criminal conduct.6 Plaintiffs' counsel also assert that the November 20, 1998
declaration of Glenn Schumaker, a Management Information System official of the Department
of the Interior, was perjurious on its face, Reply Brief at 10, n.13. The accusation that the
declaration is perjurious is an accusation that Mr. Schumaker wilfully gave false testimony on a
material matter, United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Plaintiffs' counsel do not
even bother to identify which statement or statements in the declaration they believe are false, let
alone proffer evidence showing that any errors were wilful or material.
	The accusations in the Reply Brief are very serious charges. Secretary Norton,
government counsel and the Department of the Interior employees accused in the Reply Brief
were injured by these charges as soon as the Reply Brief was filed and was made part of the
public record. Redd v. Fisher Controls, 147 F.R.D. 128, 132 (W.D. Texas 1993). However,
Plaintiffs' counsel have proffered no evidence to support any of these charges. Charges of
unethical conduct by opposing counsel, a party, or a third party without supporting evidence
violate Rule 11. Laurino v. Tate, 220 F. 3d. 1213, 1216-18 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming Rule 11
sanctions for allegations in a brief, without supporting evidence, that police officers may have
committed perjury); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998) (attorney
ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for accusing a prosecutor of unethical
behavior when he had made "no effort to substantiate his serious charge even to the extent of
submitting an affidavit"); Nault's Auto Sales v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 35-
37 (D.N.H. 1993) (attorneys sanctioned for accusing opposing counsel of perjury and subornation
of perjury when support for the accusations did not rise beyond suspicion).
	6 18 U.S.C. § 1622 provides "whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty
of subornation ofpe~~...
-9-
<< COB0000016 >>
	This "deluge of ad hominem assaults and insupportable accusations of contempt, perjury,
and criminal activity," Nault'~s Auto Sales, 148 F.R.D. at 36, cannot be excused, even if plaintiffs'
counsel believe the accusations are correct.7 In Nault~, plaintiffs counsel also accused
defendant's employees of submitting perjured declarations in a discovery dispute, and accused
defense counsel of perjury, subornation of perjury, fraud and other criminal conduct in the
context of a discovery dispute. Although expressing its own concerns with defendants'
discovery, the court stated that:
[Plaintiffs counsel's] subjective good faith belief in the veracity of their
accusations which they have leveled against opposing counsel is entirely
irrelevant to the inquiry at hand. They are of course free to believe whatever they
choose to believe. They are not free to indiscriminately bludgeon the professional
reputations of opposing counsel out of frustration, or in angry overreaction, or on
mere suspicion alone.
When making serious charges of unprofessional and criminal conduct against an
individual in pleadings filed with the Court, the certitude of suspicion alone is not
enough. Exasperation and frustration may serve as explanations, but not
acceptable excuses. Rule 11 demands objectively reasonable conduct, including a
reasonable inquiry into the facts.
Id, at 36-37. Finding the conduct unreasonable and the accusations unsupported, the court struck
the offending memoranda, ordered plaintiffs counsel to write a letter of apology which was to be
made part of the record in the case, and ordered that all future filings by plaintiff's counsel be
reviewed in advance by a Rule 11 committee. Id. at 37-38. Here, the government is merely
asking for the first sanction imposed by the Nault~ court - that the offending and offensive Reply
Brief be stricken.
While the behavior exhibited in the Reply Brief would justify far harsher sanctions, it is
	~ Of course, the accusations are even more unethical if plaintiffs' counsel are simply using
them for tactical purposes or for some other reasons without a belief that they are accurate.
-10-
<< COB0000017 >>
the government's hope that the minor sanction will be sufficient to end the abusive accusations
and permit the case to proceed with civility and professionalism.
	The Reply Brief runs directly counter to the principals espoused in the D.C. Bar
Voluntary Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct ("Civility Standards").8 The Civility
Standards state, inter alia:
Except within the bounds of fair argument in pleadings or in
formal proceedings, we will abstain from disparaging personal
remarks or acrimony toward such participants and treat adverse
witnesses and parties with fair consideration.
We will not bring the profession into disrepute by making
unfounded accusations of impropriety or making ad hominem
attacks on counsel, and , absent good cause, we will not attribute
bad motives or improper conduct to other counsel.
Civility Standards ¶¶ 3 and 5 (Exhibit 5). Although the Civility Standards are voluntary, this
Court has recognized that "these standards provide useful and appropriate guidance to lawyers
when questions are raised about professional conduct." Alexander v. FBI, 1999 WL 314170 *1
(D.D.C. 1999) (directing all counsel planning to attend redeposition of witness to ccrti1~ in
advance "that they have carefully read the D.C. Bar Voluntary Standards for Civility in
Professional Conduct... ."); see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 239-40 (D.D.C.
1999) (Friedman, J.) ("Lawyers are not to reflect in their conduct, attitude or demeanor their
clients' ill feelings toward other parties and may not 'even if called upon by a client to do so,
engage in offensive conduct directed towards other participants in the legal process,' or 'bring the
	8'~j~ Court has explicitly endorsed the Civility Standards in its Local Rules. See, e.g.,
Local Civil Rule 83. 8(b)(6)(v) (requiring applicants for admission to the bar of the District Court
to certify familiarity with Civility Standards); Local Civil Rule 83.9 (requiring each member of
the bar of the District Court to certify familiarity with Civility Standards upon renewing
membership every three years).
-11 -
<< COB0000018 >>
the profession into disrepute by. . . making ad hominern attacks.') (quoting Civility Standards).
CONCLUSION
For the forogoing reasons, the Government requests that Plaintiffs' Reply Brief be stricken.
Rcspectfuliy submitted,
ROBERT D. McCNLUJM, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
STUART E. SCH~FER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
.1.	CHRISTOPHER KOHN
SANDRA P. SPOONER
Deputy Director
D.C. Bar No, 261495
Dodge Wells
Senior Trial Counsel
D.C. Bar No. 425194
Tracy L. Hilmer
I).C. Bar No. 421219
Trial Attorney
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 261
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
(202) 307-0474
OF COUNSEL:
Sabiina A. McCarthy
Department of the Interior
Offico oFthc Solicitor
DATED:	May24, 2002
12
<< COB0000019 >>
CERTIIqCATE OF SERVICE
	I declare under penalty of perjury that, on May 24, 2002, 1 served the foregoing Motion to
Strike Plaint ffs'Reply in Support of Motion For Order to Show Cause Why Interior Defendants
and Their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Destroying E-Mail by
hand-delivery upon:
Keith Harper, Esq.	Dennis M Gingold, Esq.
Native American Rights Fund	Mark Brown, Esq.
l7l2NStreet,NW	1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976	Ninth Floor
202-822-0068	Washington, D.C. 20004
	202-318-2372
	Michael B. Doherty