NO. 05-5068 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
V. 
GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS 
PETER D. KEISLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN 
United States Attorney 
GREGORY G. KATSAS 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT E. KOPP 
MARK B. STERN 
THOMAS M. BONDY 
ALISA B. KLEIN 
MARK R. FREEMAN 
I. GLENN COHEN 
(202) 514-5089 
Attornevs, Appellate Staff 
Civil Division, Room 7531 
Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
Washinston, D.C. 20530-0001 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
I. THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION, WHICH IS WITHOUT 
FACTUAL PREDICATE, IMPOSES A PANOPLY OF 
REQUIREMENTS NEVER AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS 
AND EXCEEDS SETTLED LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
A. The Record Demonstrates The Commitment 
Of Enormous Resources Resulting In Tangible 
Paqe 
1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4 
4 
4 
10 
15 
Accomplishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
B. Plaintiffs' Argument Rests On The Mistaken 
Premise That The Court Could Properly Require 
Expenditure Of Billions Of Dollars To Perform 
Tasks That Congress Has Not Authorized . . . . . . . . 7 
C. Plaintiffs Err In Insisting That The District 
Court Could Properly Formulate 
A Plan For An Accounting And Direct Its 
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
D. The Specific Requirements Of The Structural 
Injunction Are At Odds With Congress's 
Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. Substantive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 
a. Closed accounts and the 
conclusiveness of probate . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
b. Transactions before 1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
c. Land transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
d. Funds never held in IIM accounts . . . . 20 
e. Statute of limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 
2. Methods And Means Of The Accounting. . . . . . 22 
i 11. PLAINTIFFS’ ATTEMPT TO AVOID REVIEW OF THE 
LEGAL PREMISES OF THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION 
SHOULD BE REJECTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CERT I F I CATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) (7) (c) 
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
24 
30 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES' 
(D.C. Cir . 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Federal Power Comm'n v . Idaho Power Co., 
344 U.S. 17 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co . v . Bruch. 
489 U.S. 101 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Kosty v . Lewis. 319 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir . 1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
* Norton v . Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. 
11. 14. 22 
Cases : 
Cobell v . Norton. 283 F . Supp . 2d 66 
Cobell v . Norton. 240 F.3d 1081 
* Cobell v . Norton. 392 F.3d 461 
* QPJI 
Bell v . Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520. 562 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
Cobell v . Babbitt. 30 F . Supp . 2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998) . . . . . . . . 27 
Cobell v . Babbitt. 91 F . Supp . 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) . . . . . . 19. 25 
Cobell v . Norton. 226 F . Supp . 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) . . . . . . . 5. 6 
Cobell v . Norton. 260 F . Supp . 2d 98 (D.D.C. 2003) . . . . . . . . 21 
(D.D.C. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. 4. 22. 23. 28-29 
(D.C. Cir . 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.12.18.19.22. 23 
Cobell v . Norton. 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir . 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Cobell v . Norton. 391 F.3d 251 (D.C. Cir . 2004) . . . . . . . . 13-14 
P a q e 
8-16.19.22.25. 28 
15 
12 
10 
124 S . Ct . 2373 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
v . Richmond. 496 U.S. 414 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
'Authorities on which we chiefly rely are marked with 
asterisks . 
iii United States v . Lara. 541 U.S. 193 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
United States v . Taylor. 104 U.S. 216 (1881) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
18 
Statutes: 
Act of June 24. 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
* Pub . L . No . 103-412, § 102(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16. 18 
Pub . L . No . 108-108. 117 Stat . 1263 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. 13. 28 
Pub . L . NO . 108-447. § 112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
5 U.S.C. 706(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15 
28 U.S.C. 2401(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
18 
Regulations: 
43 C.F.R. 4.240(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
43 C.F.R. 4.271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
16 
8. 25 
Legislative Materials: 
149 Cong . Rec . S13. 785 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
H.R. Conf . Rep . No . 108-330 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
H.R. Rep . No . 102-499 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. 17. 19. 22 
Miscellaneous: 
42 Am . J u r . 2d Injunctions (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
iv [NOT YET SCHEDULED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT] 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
NO. 05-5068 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
V. 
GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs' position, in a nutshell, is this: The district 
court was entirely correct to announce a series of duties never 
contemplated by Congress at a cost of billions of dollars. 
However, this Court should not review the legal premises of the 
structural injunction because its extraordinary requirements 
might be impossible to perform. Instead, this Court should 
remand so that the district court can consider plaintiffs' 
preferred alternative to an accounting, which is an order 
requiring the government to pay the billions of dollars that, in 
plaintiffs' view, were generated by trust assets over the 
lifetime of the trusts but not properly disbursed. 
Plaintiffs' eagerness to avoid scrutiny of the injunction is 
understandable, but their invitation cannot properly be accepted. The district court has twice issued the provisions now on review 
and has made clear, in the current order, that it desires 
expedited resolution of the legal issues that the injunction 
presents. Plaintiffs have argued since January 2003 that an 
accounting (as they would define it) is impossible and that the 
district court should "restate" the account balances based on 
plaintiffs' estimate of the money that should be in the accounts. 
See Plaintiffs' Plan For Determininq Accurate Balances In The 
Individual Indian Trust, at 3, 39-55. The district court has 
declined to do so (and there would of course be no legal basis 
for such an order). In effect, therefore, plaintiffs would have 
this Court leave the legal premises of the injunction untouched 
and require the district court to consider again their proposed 
revenue model based on those same premises. No basis exists for 
proceeding in this fashion. 
Plaintiffs fail to perceive the irony of their 
"impossibility" argument. They repeatedly assert that the 
staggering cost of the court-ordered accounting would render it 
impossible, implicitly recognizing that Congress has no intention 
of funding an endeavor of this kind. That the accounting ordered 
by the district court is flatly at odds with congressional intent 
does not mean that the accounting required by law is impossible. 
The point, instead, is that the accounting ordered by the court 
is not required by law. Indeed, plaintiffs do not identify any 
respect in which the parameters of Interior's accounting plan are 
2 inconsistent with any statutory requirement or with the mandate 
of this Court's 2001 decision. 
To avoid the obvious conclusion that the accounting they 
defend is not required by law, plaintiffs engage in a highly 
abstract discussion of the incorporation of common law trust 
duties that provides no support for their position. It is a 
given that Congress legislates against the background of common 
law trust principles and does not need to identify all 
obligations with precision. Common law principles may thus be 
used to interpret statutory provisions. But they cannot properly 
be invoked to frustrate congressional intent. Plaintiffs insist 
that it is irrelevant whether Congress intended to authorize an 
accounting of the kind envisioned by the district court. See P1. 
Br. 16. But a court cannot properly order expenditure of 
billions of dollars of taxpayer money in aid of an accounting 
that Congress never authorized, much less required. 
Moreover, as this Court has made clear, a court, in ordering 
relief, must take into account the differences as well as the 
similarities between various Indian trust relationships and 
common law trusts. Congress's role as appropriator of funds has 
no apt analog in the operation of private trusts where, as this 
Court has explained, expenses are generally paid from the trust 
itself. The common law provides no example of an order requiring 
a trustee to expend billions of dollars of its own money to 
perform the kind of obligations established by the structural 
injunction. 
3 In sum, plaintiffs do not and cannot show that the 
accounting ordered by the district court is consistent with the 
1994 Act or any other enactment. Their attempt to avoid review 
of the injunction should be rejected. The district court’s 
ruling should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the 
agency to permit the government to complete its accounting 
activities consistent with this Court‘s mandate and congressional 
intent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION, WHICH IS WITHOUT 
FACTUAL PREDICATE, IMPOSES A PANOPLY OF 
REQUIREMENTS NEVER AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS AND 
EXCEEDS SETTLED LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY. 
Accomplishment. 
As discussed below and in our opening brief, the structural 
injunction rests on multiple legal errors that would require 
reversal even if there had been a factual predicate for the 
district court‘s intervention. It should be emphasized at the 
outset, however, that there was no such predicate. The record 
demonstrates an unswerving commitment by the government to 
implement the mandate of this Court’s 2001 decision. 
As discussed in our opening brief (Br. 38-40) and as 
plaintiffs do not dispute, the only record proceeding to consider 
Interior’s efforts to comply with the 2001 decision was the 
portion of the 2002 contempt trial that reviewed Secretary 
Norton’s alleged failure “‘to initiate a Historical Accounting 
A. The Record Demonstrates The Commitment Of 
Enormous Resources Resulting In Tangible 
4 Project. r l l Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 
2002)). Plaintiffs mistakenly contend that this Court’s decision 
vacating the contempt ruling did not disturb the underlying 
findings of fact. P1. Br. 30 n.28. But even assuming that to be 
the case, plaintiffs do not and cannot explain how any of those 
fact-findings demonstrates delay or recalcitrance of any kind. 
To the contrary, after reviewing those findings and the relevant 
record, this Court explained that as of December 2001, Interior 
had “made more progress . . . in six months than the past 
administration did in six years,” 334 F.3d at 1148 (quotation 
marks and citation omitted), and declared that the “uncontested 
facts” were “inconsistent with a finding that Secretary Norton 
failed to” initiate an historical accounting project, ibid. 
(emphasis added). 
Likewise, as plaintiffs do not dispute, the 44-day Phase 1.5 
trial that began in May 2003 produced no evidence of delay. 
Indeed, that was not its purpose. The decision to issue a 
structural injunction had already been made by the time of the 
Phase 1.5 trial; the purpose of the Phase 1.5 proceeding was to 
determine the content of the injunction. See 226 F. Supp. 2d at 
147-48. 
The agency‘s record of accomplishment since 2001 in the face 
of extraordinary obstacles cannot seriously be questioned. 
Within months of this Court’s 2001 ruling, the district court 
announced that the use of statistical sampling would be “clearly 
5 contemptuous," thus depriving the agency of the tool that it has 
consistently stated is essential to any feasible audit of the 
account statements produced for the land-based accounts. Tr., 
Oct. 30, 2001, at 29; see also Tr. at 4386 (reiterating, when 
Secretary Norton testified at the contempt trial, that \\I had 
said from the bench that I thought your signature on that 
document [endorsing the use of sampling] was clearly 
contemptuous"). As of October 2001, therefore, the agency was on 
notice that the use of statistical sampling courted contempt. 
The following year, the district court formally rescinded 
the short-lived remand to the agency, declaring the Secretary an 
"unfit" trustee and announcing that the court would assume 
control over accounting operations through a structural 
injunction. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1, 148-49, 161 
(D.D.C. 2002). Congress, in response to the structural 
injunction, then declined to provide any funding in its FY 2004 
appropriation for long-term historical accounting activities f o r 
land-based accounts. See Pub. L. No. 108-108, 117 Stat. 1263. 
Despite these major impediments, the agency's 
accomplishments have been substantial. As plaintiffs do not 
dispute, the agency has devoted an extraordinary level of 
resources to historical accounting activities, with obligated 
funds already exceeding $100 million. 2005 Cason Decl. at 3. 
This commitment of money and personnel has provided the 
groundwork for completing accounting for land-based accounts, 
with respect to which ongoing records collection, indexing, 
6 imaging, and coding activities continue to proceed. See a. at 
12. In addition, although the terms “judgment account,” “per 
capita account” and ”special deposit account” do not even appear 
in plaintiffs’ brief (outside their “Glossary”), it is undisputed 
that as of December 2004, Interior had accounted for 36,701 
judgment accounts with balances totaling almost $53 million, and 
7,360 per capita accounts with balances of approximately $21.7 
million, and had completed work on 8,496 special deposit accounts 
totaling over $40.8 million. See Opening Br. 55-56; see also 
Quarterly Report No. 21, at 16-24 (May 2005). 
In short, no basis existed for revoking the short-lived 
remand to the agency, and no factual predicate exists that would 
warrant greater judicial oversight than that authorized by this 
Court in its 2001 decision. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Argument Rests On The Mistaken 
Premise That The Court Could Properly Require 
Expenditure Of Billions Of Dollars To Perform 
Tasks That Congress Has Not Authorized. 
As shown in our opening brief, the structural injunction 
would require expenditure of billions of dollars to perform tasks 
without anchor in any statute. Plaintiffs do not suggest that 
Congress has mandated or even authorized performance of these 
obligations. Nor do they show how Interior‘s understanding of 
its obligations, as set out in its Historical Accountinq Plan for 
Individual Indian Money Accounts, is inconsistent with any 
statutory provision or with this Court‘s 2001 decision 
interpreting the accounting duties at issue. 
7 As this Court observed, Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 108-108 
in direct response to the original structural injunction, “to 
clarifv Congress’s determination that Interior should not be 
obliged to perform the kind of historical accounting the district 
court required.” Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs stress that the statute is no 
longer in place, P1. Br. 17, but they do not suggest that this 
Court misunderstood the point of the enactment. As this Court 
explained, the conference committee “’reject [edl the notion that 
in passing the American Indian Trust Fund Management Reform Act 
of 1994 Congress had any intention of ordering an accounting on 
the scale of that which has now been ordered by the Court,”’ 
stressing that ’‘I [sluch an expansive and expensive undertaking 
would certainly have been judged to be a poor use of Federal and 
trust resources. ‘’I 392 F.3d at 466 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
108-330, at 118 (2003)). See also Pub. L. No. 108-447, S 112 
(limiting the funds for historical accounting activities 
(individual and Tribal) in FY 2005 to $58 million). 
The views of the conference committee accurately reflect the 
legislative history of the 1994 Act, which plaintiffs do not even 
cite. As plaintiffs do not dispute, the “Misplaced Trust” report 
that gave rise to the 1994 Act stressed that “[~Ibviously, it 
makes little sense to spend [$281 million to $390 million] when 
there was only $440 million deposited in the IIM trust fund for 
account holders as of September 30, 1991.” H.R. Rep. No. 102- 
499, at 26 (1992). 
8 Plaintiffs’ response is to insist that whether Congress 
“intended to authorize an historical accounting of the kind 
envisioned by the district court” poses “the wrong question.” 
P1. Br. 16. Plaintiffs are not altogether clear as to what the 
risht question would be. Their view seems to be, however, that 
because Congress created the trust relationship, it does not 
matter whether it authorized the obligations imposed by the 
district court. 
As this Court’s previous decisions make clear, plaintiffs 
are quite wrong. The Constitution grants Congress “plenary power 
to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.“ United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). It is common ground that Congress legislates against 
the background of common law trust principles and that all trust 
duties need not be spelled out in detail in a statute. Thus, 
‘once a statutory obligation is identified, the court may look to 
common law trust principles to particularize that obligation.” 
392 F.3d at 471-72. This does not mean, however, that 
enforceable duties may be “abstracted . . . from any statutory 
basis.” Ibid. To the contrary, the ”government‘s duties must be 
’rooted in and outlined by the relevant statutes and treaties,’ 
although those obligations may then be ‘defined in traditional 
equitable terms. ,,’ Id. at 472 (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 240 
F.3d 1081, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). The central point is that, 
apart from claims arising directly under the Constitution, \\no 
money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been 
9 v. Richmond, 496 U.S. appropriated by an act of Congress,” QPJI 
414, 424 (1990), and a court has no license to impose obligations 
costing billions of taxpayer dollars except as authorized by 
Congress. 
Nor could congressional intent be dismissed by an analogy to 
private trust law. As Professor Langbein explained, “Congress is 
the functional equivalent of settlor of a private trust whose 
trust instrument establishes the terms of that trust,” and 
Congress’s enactments define and amend trust obligations. 
Langbein Report at 6; see also Tr., June 2, 2003 p.m., at 59-60. 
Plaintiffs‘ attempt to dismiss congressional intent is 
particularly anomalous because the law governing private trusts 
provides no ready analogy to Congress‘s role as appropriator. As 
this Court observed, “while the expenditures that plaintiffs seek 
are to be made out of appropriated funds, trust expenses for 
private trusts are normally met out of the trust funds 
themselves.” 392 F.3d at 473. Congressional appropriations 
limiting expenditures thus define the trustee’s duties. 
In sum, it is one thing to state that the authorization for 
court-ordered expenditures need not be explicit in all 
particulars. It is quite another to say that the authorization 
is irrelevant. 
C. Plaintiffs Err In Insisting That The District 
Court Could Properly Formulate A Plan For An 
Accounting And Direct Its Implementation. 
Plaintiffs argue at length that the district court could 
properly develop its own “accounting” plan and direct its 
10 implementation. Even if the court could properly assume that 
role, it could not, of course, establish obligations never 
authorized by Congress. But plaintiffs are mistaken in believing 
that this Court's discussion of the limits on judicial authority 
are irrelevant to the accounting portion of the structural 
injunction. 
In vacating the original structural injunction, this Court 
observed that the district court, in the accounting portion of 
its opinion, had "used language suggesting an intent to take 
complete charge of the details of whatever plan Interior might 
submit: 'If the court [concludes that the plan will not satisfy 
defendants' legal obligation], it may decide to modify the 
institutional defendant's plan, adopt a plan submitted by another 
entity, or formulate a plan of its own that will satisfy the 
defendant's liability. ", 392 F.3d at 475 (quoting Cobell v. 
Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66, 142 (D.D.C. 2003)). The Court 
explained that this assertion of authority was "in sharp 
contrast" with the point emphasized by the Supreme Court "that 
' S i 706(1) empowers a court only to compel an agency . . . to take 
action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act."' 
Ibid. (quoting Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 
S. Ct. 2373, 2379 (2004)). 
It is not plausible to suggest, as plaintiffs do, that this 
Court's discussion had no application to the very passage that it 
quoted. The Court recognized that judicial review should take 
into account the nature of the suit and common law trust 
11 principles. See 392 F.3d at 473. But, as it noted, the common 
law, like the APA, does not contemplate that a court will 
instruct the trustee as to the means by which it fulfills its 
responsibilities. As the Court stressed, "[a] court of equity 
will not interfere to control [trustees] in the exercise of a 
discretion vested in them by the instrument under which they 
act." Ibid. (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 
U.S. 101, 111 (1989)) (emphasis in original). The common law 
thus does not anticipate a substantially more intrusive judicial 
role than the APA, and restrictions inherent in judicial review 
of executive branch action implementing congressional mandates 
are readily harmonized with common law. 
Plaintiffs are likewise wrong to assert that the decision 
vacating the structural injunction conflicted with this Court's 
previous decisions. This Court's initial decision in 2001 
affirmed a district court order that "remand[ed] to the agency 
for the proper discharge of its obligations." 240 F.3d at 1109. 
The order, this Court explained, was authorized by 5 U.S.C. 
706(1), which empowers a court to "to compel agency action 
'unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.'" 240 F.3d at 
1095. This Court's decision looked to § 706(1) and cases 
applying that provision to determine that the district court had 
not exceeded its authority in retaining jurisdiction for five 
years and requiring peEiodic progress reports. At the same time, 
however, this Court emphasized that \\we expect the district court 
to be mindful of the limits of its jurisdiction," id. at 1110. 
12 This Court observed that it was possible that the agency might 
take steps \\so defective that they would necessarily delay rather 
than accelerate the ultimate provision of an adequate accounting, 
and the detection of such steps would fit within the court’s 
jurisdiction to monitor the Department‘s remedying of the delay.” 
Ibid. This Court stressed that, “beyond that, supervision of the 
Department‘s conduct in preparing an accounting may well be 
beyond the district court’s jurisdiction.” Ibid. That decision 
is entirely consistent with this Court’s later declaration that 
the district court had erred in formulating its own plan in the 
form of a structural injunction. 
Plaintiffs are on no firmer ground in attempting to discover 
a conflict between this Court’s decision vacating the structural 
injunction and its decision, released six days earlier, that 
vacated the order requiring Interior to disconnect its computer 
systems from the Internet. See Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251 
(D.C. Cir. 2004); P1. Br. 24. The internet disconnection 
decision did not address historical accounting activities; 
indeed, it was precisely because the activities at issue did not 
involve historical accounting that the case was not controlled by 
Pub. L. No. 108-108. See 391 F.3d at 256-57. More important, 
this Court’s analysis was premised on the existence of a consent 
order that had authorized judicial control over the reconnection 
of computer systems to the internet. The mechanism established 
in the consent decree (which involved supervision by the Special 
Master) had become the subject of dispute. At that point, this 
13 Court concluded, the district court had equitable authority to 
enforce the consent order by other reasonable means (although the 
injunctions actually issued could not be sustained). See ibid. 
Accordingly, this Court had no reason to address Southern Utah 
and the principles that it reaffirmed. 
By contrast, the structural injunction is not a consent 
decree or an attempt to enforce a consent decree. In directing 
the agency to perform accounting activities unreasonably delayed, 
the district court must exercise its authority consistent with 
the limits reflected in § 706(1). 
In insisting that this Court‘s decision vacating the 
original structural injunction has no relevance to the accounting 
portion of the injunction, plaintiffs struggle to explain this 
Court’s references to statistical sampling. This Court 
contrasted its earlier approval of the district court‘s 
’expression of intent to leave [the] issue of choice of 
accounting methods, including statistical sampling, to 
administrative agencies,“ 392 F.3d at 473 (citing 240 F.3d at 
1104), with the district court’s September 2003 order “forbidding 
use of statistical sampling,” ibid. (citing 283 F. Supp. 2d at 
289). Plaintiffs respond that this Court “stated only that 
statistical sampling might be within an agency’s discretion in a 
case governed by traditional APA principles.” P1. Br. 42 n.40 
(citing 392 F.3d at 473). Inasmuch as this Court has twice 
stated that statistical sampling is within the agency‘s 
14 discretion in this case, plaintiffs' point is difficult to 
comprehend. 
Plaintiffs urge that § 706(1) has no application because the 
order requiring Interior to produce account statements is 
backward-looking and remedial. The order is remedial in the 
sense that all orders under § 706(1) remedy an agency's 
unreasonable delay. That the government was found to have 
unreasonably delayed action in this case does not render the APA 
framework inapplicable. Indeed, even when a court reviews final 
agency action, its role is not to establish detailed programs for 
agency implementation but to permit the agency to implement 
programs in light of the legal principles clarified by the court. 
The "guiding principle . . . is that the function of the reviewing 
court ends when an error of law is laid bare." Federal Power 
Comm'n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952). No principle 
of law permits the district court to establish and direct a 
multi-billion dollar program of agency activities under the 
general rubric of an "accounting. ' I 
D. The Specific Requirements Of The Structural 
Injunction Are At Odds With Congress's Intent. 
The dangers of implying duties without regard to 
congressional intent are made manifest by the specific 
requirements of the structural injunction. Any number of 
activities might be deemed a useful adjunct to a particular 
accounting process. But it is for Congress to weigh the costs 
and benefits of various requirements. Plaintiffs' defense of the 
15 injunction amply illustrates the extent to which "plaintiffs here 
are free of private beneficiaries' incentive not to urge judicial 
compulsion of wasteful expenditures." 392 F.3d at 473. Although 
they defend the injunction in its entirety, they make absolutely 
no attempt to refute the sentiment expressed by Senator Burns in 
response to the original structural injunction: "'If there is 
one thing with which everybody involved in this issue seems to 
agree, it is that we should not spend that kind of money on an 
incredibly cumbersome accounting that will do almost nothing to 
benefit the Indian people.'" 392 F.3d at 466 (quoting 149 Cong. 
Rec. S13,785 (2003). Plaintiffs thus sidestep not only the 
question of whether Congress authorized the injunction's 
requirements but the question of why Congress would have done so 
when "the disparity between the costs of the judicially ordered 
accounting, and the value of the funds to be accounted for, 
rendered the ordered accounting, as one senator put it, 'nuts.'" 
392 F.3d at 466 (quoting 149 Cong. Rec. at S13,786 (2003) 
(statement of Sen. Dorgan)). 
1. Substantive Oblisations. 
a. Closed accounts and the conclusiveness of probate. 
The 1994 Act directs the government to "account for the 
daily and annual balance of all funds held in trust" for the 
benefit of an individual Indian. Pub. L. No. 103-412, S 102(a). 
In its 2001 opinion, this Court reasoned that the government 
could not provide an accurate current balance without reviewing 
past transactions, and the Interior plan thus provided for a review of past transactions in all accounts open when the 1994 
Act was enacted or thereafter. Plaintiffs insist, however, that 
the government must produce account statements for all accounts 
open at any time in history. P1. Br. 33. Thus, even if an 
account holder died in 1948 and her estate went through probate, 
the government would now be required to create a statement for 
the long closed account. 
Congress was clearly of a different mind. As plaintiffs do 
not dispute, the "Misplaced Trust" report contemplated an 
accounting for the roughly 300,000 open accounts and, even then, 
recognized that the expense of the project would require use of 
techniques such as statistical sampling. Thus, the report 
observed that \\it may be necessary to review a range of sampling 
techniques and other alternatives before Droceedinq with a full 
accountinq of all 300,000 accounts in the Indian trust fund." 
H.R. Rep. No. 102-499, at 26 (emphasis added). See also id. at 
7, 16, 23 (similar references to accounting of the 300,000 open 
accounts). 
Consistent with this history, the 1994 Act requires that 
Interior account for 'the daily and annual balance" of funds held 
in the IIM accounts. Closed accounts have no balance. And as 
our opening brief explained (Br. 45-47), it would be particularly 
anomalous to require Interior to revisit transactions in accounts 
that have gone through probate, which, as plaintiffs do not 
dispute, affords heirs the opportunity to contest Interior's 
determination of the estate's holdings. 43 C.F.R. 4.271. Once 
17 probate proceedings are completed, a final order is entered. 43 
C.F.R. 4.240(b). Nothing in the 1994 Act contains the slightest 
hint that closed probate proceedings were to be reopened, or that 
current beneficiaries may demand an accounting on behalf of 
former account holders. The obligations imposed by the district 
court thus would transform the nature of the accounting 
activities contemplated by Congress at an exponential increase in 
cost and without any apparent benefit. 
b. Transactions before 1938. 
The 1994 Act requires that the government account for the 
daily and annual balances of "funds which are deposited or 
invested pursuant to the Act of June 24, 1938 (25 U.S.C. 162a)." 
Pub. L. No. 103-412, § 102(a). Plaintiffs would further revise 
the nature of the obligations contemplated by Congress by 
requiring an accounting not only of closed accounts but of all 
account transactions reaching as far back as the initial land 
allotments in 1887. P1. Br. 34. Thus, even if an account holder 
died in 1918, a full account statement would be required. 
Although plaintiffs attempt to find support for their 
position in this Court's 2001 decision, their quotation simply 
omits this Court's reference to the 1938 Act. Compare P1. 
Br. 34, 35, with 240 F.3d at 1102 ("'all funds' means all funds, 
irrespective of when they were deposited (or at least so lonq as 
they were deposited after the Act of June 24, 1938)") (second 
emphasis added). And while plaintiffs would deem 1938 an 
'arbitrary" date, P1. Br. 35, it was significant to Congress as 
18 the point at which the government was authorized to deposit 
Indian trust funds in private banks or invest them in public 
securities. 
c. Land transactions. 
Although the 1994 Act requires that the Secretary account 
for the daily and annual balances of funds held in trust, the 
district court ordered the government to account for all 
transactions in land since 1887. The injunction thus ignores the 
language of the Act as well as this Court’s recognition that 
“funds have quite a different legal status from the allotment 
land itself.” 392 F.3d at 464. Indeed, as our opening brief 
explained (Br. 43-44), there is no “unitary” Indian trust; each 
individual‘s IIM account is separate from those of other 
individuals, and the land held in trust for an individual Indian 
is distinct from the funds held in trust for the same individual. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the order would require 
Interior to reconstruct the entire process of “fractionation” of 
land that, as the “Misplaced Trust” report observed, has yielded 
over the past century land ownership interests recorded to the 
42nd decimal point. H.R. Rep. No. 102-499, at 28. They insist, 
however, that this Court‘s 2001 decision compelled such an 
extraordinary undertaking. See P1. Br. 36. Plaintiffs are 
mistaken. This Court’s 2001 decision affirmed an order requiring 
an accounting “‘of all money‘” in the IIM accounts. 240 F.3d at 
1103 (quoting Cobell v. Babbitt, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1, 58 (D.D.C. 
1999) (emphasis added)). This Court did not hold (or remotely 
19 suggest) that the government was required to recreate the history 
of transactions in land. Indeed, plaintiffs do not explain how 
the plaintiff class, which is defined solely in terms of IIM 
account holders, would even have standing to seek such relief.' 
d. Funds never held in IIM accounts. 
As our opening brief explained (Br. 4 7 ) , the injunction 
requires Interior to account for funds that were never held in an 
IIM account, but were instead paid directly to the Indian owner 
of the land by a third-party lessee. Plaintiffs cannot square 
this requirement with the terms of the 1994 Act, which require 
Interior to account for the balances of funds held in trust. Nor 
could plaintiffs defend it by analogy to common law, where such 
direct pay arrangements are unknown. & Tr., June 1, 2003, p.m. 
at 72-74 (Langbein). Plaintiffs note that Interior has some 
trust responsibilities in direct pay situations, such as in 
approving certain direct pay contracts. P1. Br. 38. But this 
observation provides no basis for requiring Interior to account 
for payments that the government never had an obligation to 
collect or hold. Indeed, as plaintiffs do not dispute, in many 
cases Interior would not even be informed of the direct payments. 
& Cason Decl. 10. 
e. Statute of limitations. 
As our opening brief explained, the district court 
compounded its multiple errors by concluding that duties 
Plaintiffs' brief misstates the certified class. Compare 
Pl. Br. i & n.1, with Order Certifying Class at 2-3. 
2 0 untethered to any statute may be enforced without regard to any 
statute of limitations. The court declared that claims for 
\\trust mismanagement," including failure to provide an 
accounting, cannot accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) 
"until the trustee has repudiated the beneficiary's right to the 
benefits of the trust." Cobell v. Norton, 260 F. Supp. 2d 98, 
105 (D.D.C. 2003). But as our opening brief explained (Br. 47- 
49), repudiation or breach may provide the basis for accrual of a 
claim. The cases that plaintiffs cite address instances in which 
the claimed breach of a private trust was the repudiation and the 
question was when the repudiation occurred. See, e.q., Kosty v. 
Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1963); see also United States 
v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 222 (1881) (citing the general principle 
that a limitations period runs from the time that the beneficiary 
becomes aware that the trustee "unequivocally repudiates the 
trust, and claims to hold the estate as his ownN). 
Plaintiffs provide no reason why customary limitations 
principles should not apply. In particular, plaintiffs do not 
explain how claims that have not yet accrued could form the basis 
for a lawsuit. If such claims really do not accrue until a trust 
has been repudiated, it must also be the case that the claims 
cannot be asserted until that time.2 
Plaintiffs' argument regarding tribal management of trust 
assets (Pl. Br. 38-39) misunderstands Interior's accounting plan, 
which did not suggest that tribal management of revenue-producing 
assets would relieve Interior of the obligation to account for 
the funds that it holds in an IIM account. 
21 2. Methods And Means Of The Accountinq. 
As this Court stressed in vacating the original structural 
injunction, the district court may direct the agency to take 
action required by law, but may not direct \\\how it shall act."' 
392 F.3d at 475 (quoting Southern Utah, 124 S. Ct. at 2379). In 
this regard, the limits on APA review largely correspond to 
principles of common law, which foreclose judicial attempts to 
direct the manner in which a trustee performs its functions. 
id. at 473. 
Consistent with these principles, this Court has twice 
indicated that decisions regarding accounting methodology, 
including the use of statistical sampling, are properly left to 
the agency. See ibid. (citing 240 F.3d at 1104). Nonetheless, 
the district court reissued the provisions of the injunction 
'forbidding use of statistical sampling" that were cited with 
disapproval by this Court. Ibid. (citing 283 F. Supp. 2d at 
289). 
Although plaintiffs defend this bar, P1. Br. 41-42, they do 
not dispute that the enormous number of transactions involving 
small amounts of money would make statistical sampling crucial to 
any viable plan to audit the land-based account statements. See 
Opening Br. 50. Nor do they dispute that the "Misplaced Trust" 
report specifically contemplated that Interior would "review a 
range of sampling techniques and other alternatives before 
proceeding with a full accounting of all 300,000 accounts in the 
Indian trust fund." H.R. Rep. No. 102-499, at 26. 
22 Instead, plaintiffs assert that "statistical sampling is no 
part of a recognized accounting." P1. Br. 42. Like the district 
court, plaintiffs confuse the process of creating a ledger of 
account transactions with the process of auditing (or verifying) 
that ledger. As the record reflects, the Interior plan would 
use statistical sampling to create the ledger; sampling would be 
used only in the audit process. See Tr. 6/20/03 p.m., at 59 
(Lasater). And as the district court recognized, sampling is an 
accepted auditing tool. See 283 F. Supp. 2d at 192. Plainly, 
the district court had no basis for requiring Interior to verify 
every account transaction through supporting documentation, a 
requirement that would impose staggering costs and delay 
indefinitely the production of account statements for the land- 
based accounts. 
Nor did the district court have any basis for directing the 
details of agency operations, such as the collection and indexing 
of trust records. Indeed, as this Court observed in its 2001 
decision, the district court itself had previously recognized the 
limits of its role. See 240 F.3d at 1108 ("the [district] court 
properly notes that it 'cannot "become . . . enmeshed in the 
minutiae" of agency administration'") (quoting 91 F. Supp. 2d at 
54) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)). 
Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that the government's "gap- 
filling" approach to third party records is "inappropriate," P1. 
Br. 44, and assert that the government must obtain all such 
records immediately. But as we explained in our opening brief 
23 (Br. 54-55) , there is no good reason for Interior to "spend[] a 
lot of time collecting records that may end up being duplicates 
of all of the records we [already] have," Tr., June 5, 2003 p.m., 
at 55, and the subpoena process that plaintiffs envision has 
considerable potential to embroil the government in ancillary 
disputes and to delay the production of account statements. The 
district court had no basis to second-guess the agency's judgment 
in this regard, and its efforts to regulate every aspect of the 
accounting process reflects a deeply mistaken vision of its role. 
11. PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO AVOID REVIEW OF THE LEGAL 
12 n.16. 
perform. 
REJECTED 
PREMISES . OF THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION SHOULD BE 
Plaintiffs insist that the requirements of the structural 
injunction, individually and collectively, are required by law. 
They nevertheless assert that the case should be remanded without 
consideration of its legal premises because the sweeping program 
imposed by the injunction might be impossible to perform. In 
particular, plaintiffs repeatedly emphasize that the cost of the 
injunction has been estimated at $12 billion. See P1. Br. 6, 8, 
Plaintiffs' logic thus comes full circle. It was altogether 
proper, they insist, for the court to impose requirements never 
authorized by Congress. However, since no one believes that 
Congress would appropriate funds to conduct activities that it 
never authorized, the injunction's requirements are impossible to 
24 Plaintiffs’ conundrum is entirely of their own making. An 
injunction that imposes obligations never authorized by Congress 
is not ”impossible” to perform: it is an invalid injunction 
without basis in law. In reviewing such an injunction, the role 
of the appellate court is to identify its mistaken premises and 
vacate the injunction. No authority or principle suggests that 
the Court should leave the legal premises of the injunction in 
place and remand so that the district court can \\fashion other 
equitable relief,” P1. Br. 10, based on the same mistaken view of 
the law. 
As the treatise that plaintiffs cite makes plain, the 
doctrine of “impossibility” cabins a court’s discretion even when 
an injunction would otherwise be wholly proper. See 42 Am. Jur. 
2d Injunctions § 21 (2005) (“Injunctive relief that is otherwise 
appropriate may be denied if there are inherent difficulties in 
framing or enforcing an effective order.”). Plaintiffs’ 
”impossibility” argument skips over the crucial antecedent 
question: Did Congress require the multi-billion dollar package 
of obligations imposed by the district court? As we have shown, 
it plainly did not. The multi-billion dollar price tag that 
plaintiffs cite as evidence of impossibility only confirms that 
Congress never \\\had any intention of ordering an accounting on 
the scale’” ordered by the district court. 392 F.3d at 466 
(quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-330, at 118). The very 
magnitude of the district court’s error cannot be a reason to 
immunize its legal premises from judicial review. 
25 Plaintiffs' appellate brief does not explain what they mean 
by the "other equitable relief" that they would have the district 
court fashion, but their district court pleadings have been more 
forthcoming. As plaintiffs note, in the plan that they submitted 
in January 2003 and at the Phase 1.5 trial, plaintiffs "took the 
position that it was impossible f o r the decree to be implemented 
to lead to an adequate historical accounting." P1. Br. 8. 
Accordingly, they urged the district court to "restate" the 
account balances based on plaintiffs' model for estimating the 
revenues generated by trust assets over the lifetime of the 
trusts, plus interest. See Plaintiffs' Plan For Determininq 
Accurate Balances In The Individual Indian Trust, at 3, 39-55. 
More recently, plaintiffs proposed that the government be 
required to pay $13 billion into a court registry. Dkt. #2886, 
at 22-25 (filed 3/15/05) . 3 
Plaintiffs' ultimate position boils down to this: (1) This 
Court held that the government should complete an historical 
accounting; (2) in response to that mandate the district court 
properly imposed a multi-billion dollar package of requirements 
without regard to congressional intent; (3) those requirements 
In the same filing, plaintiffs also proposed that the 
district court order "the removal of the Interior defendants as 
trustee-delegates," relief that plaintiffs described as an 
"intermediate remedy" within the inherent power of the district 
court. Dkt. #2886, at 21. Plaintiffs have also improperly 
sought to transform the ongoing evidentiary proceeding regarding 
internet security into a forum for arguing that internet security 
problems render the entire accounting undertaking "impossible." 
See P1. Br. 9. 
26 will never be funded and are thus impossible to perform; 
( 4 ) erqo, the district court should adopt some form of revenue 
model based on the same legal premises underlying the structural 
injunction. Thus, once the issue of congressional authorization 
has been declared irrelevant, the panoply of unauthorized 
requirements can be transformed into a basis for various forms of 
monetary relief. 
The attempt to obtain relief never authorized by Congress is 
improper regardless of the form it takes, and the error of 
plaintiffs’ strategy is plain. Moreover, since plaintiffs’ 
appellate brief does not identify the alternative “equitable“ 
relief they seek, it also makes no attempt to explain how such 
relief could fall within the parameters of the APA, or, for that 
matter, private trust law.4 
Plaintiffs’ models for distributing billions of dollars to 
the plaintiff class are strikingly at odds with the statements 
that they made in order to bring the case within the scope of the 
district court‘s jurisdiction in the first place. The district 
court rejected the government‘s contention that suit should have 
been brought in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act 
based on the representations of class counsel that plaintiffs 
sought ”only an accounting, not a cash infusion” into the IIM 
accounts, Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d 24, 40 (D.D.C. 1998), 
and that ‘all of the money that should be held collectively in 
their IIM accounts is already there; the plaintiffs simply 
contend the individual account balances are misstated,” id. at 
39. Accordingly, to establish the propriety of its jurisdiction, 
the district court struck from the complaint various allegations 
that could be read to seek a cash infusion, including the 
allegation that ”the true totals would be far greater than those 
amounts, but for the breaches of trust herein complained of.” 
- Id. at 40 & n.18. Now, however, plaintiffs demand an infusion of 
$13 billion - from sources they do not specify - into a registry 
of the court. See Dkt. #2886, at 22-25. 
27 The crucial point here, however, is that no basis exists for 
declining to review the structural injunction actually issued by 
the district court. That would be the case even if there were 
some reason to believe that the district court was unaware of 
plaintiffs' "impossibility" contentions. But, of course, 
precisely the opposite is true. As just explained, the plan that 
plaintiffs submitted in January 2003 asserted that deficiencies 
in trust records made an adequate accounting impossible and urged 
the district court to adopt their revenue model. Likewise, on 
remand from this Court's decision vacating the original 
structural injunction, plaintiffs renewed the contention that any 
accounting effort is futile and that the district court should 
"adopt alternative methods to ensure that the beneficiaries are 
paid at least what they are owed[.]" Dkt.# 2798, at 6 (filed 
12/30/04). 
Even if the district court could be thought to have been 
unaware of the cost of compliance when it first issued its 
structural injunction, it could not have been unaware when it 
reissued the accounting injunction. The cost of compliance with 
the injunction had been underscored by Congress in enacting Pub. 
L. No. 108-108 and by this Court in the decision vacating the 
initial injunction. See 392 F.3d at 466. The district court, 
however, has long deemed irrelevant the vast gulf between the 
injunction's cost and Congress's appropriations. See, e.q., 283 
F. Supp. 2d at 262 ("claims of lack of funding cannot be allowed 
to legally impair the United States' trustee-delegates' exacting 
28 fiduciary duties toward management of this trust”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The reissued injunction reflects the considered and 
unwavering views of the district court. The district court has 
expressly asked that its injunction be reviewed on the merits and 
that the appeal proceed on an expedited basis. Mem. Op. at 14- 
15. The government is just as eager as the district court for 
this Court‘s expedited determination of the nature and scope of 
Interior‘s statutory accounting responsibilities. There is 
plainly no basis for a remand to the district court, which would 
only delay the performance of the accounting activities 
contemplated by Congress. 
2 9 V 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our opening 
brief, the judgment of the district court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER D. KEISLER 
Assistant Attorney General 
KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN 
United States Attorney 
GREGORY G. KATSAS 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
ROBERT E. KOPP 
MARK B. STERN 
THOMAS M. BONDY 
ALISA B. KLEIN 
MARK R. FREEMAN 
I. GLENN COHEN 
(202) 514-5089 
Attorneys, Appellate Staff 
Civil Division, Room 7531 
Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. 
Washinqton, D.C. 20530-0001 
JULY 2005 
3 0 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 32(a) (7) (c) 
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
I hereby certify pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a) (7) ( C ) 
that the foregoing brief contains 6,922 words, according to the 
count of Core1 Wordperfect 9. (202) 508-5800 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of July, 2005, I 
caused copies of the foregoing reply brief to be sent to the 
Court and to the following counsel by hand delivery: 
The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth 
United States District Court 
United States Courthouse 
Third and Constitution Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001 
Keith M. Harper 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
(202) 785-4166 
G. William Austin 
Kilpatrick Stockton 
607 14th Street, N.W., Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
and to the following by federal express, overnight mail: 
Elliott H. Levitas 
Law Office of Elliott H. Levitas 
1100 Peachtree Street 
Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 
(404) 815-6450 
and to the following by regular, first-class mail: 
Dennis Marc Gingold 
607 14th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Earl Old Person (pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
THOMAS M. BONDY J L ? \ . &+