IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, al., a Plaintiffs, V. ) ) ) ) Case No. 1:96CV01285 (RCL) (Special Master Alan L. Balaran) GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of the Interior, - et 4 7 a1 Defendants. ) 1 1 ) 1 1 INTERIOR DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF DEPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS DIRECTED TO NON-PARTY MICHAEL CARR AND DEFENDANTS AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL MICHAEL CARR'S DEPOSITION AND THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RELATED THERETO Plaintiffs' opposition and cross-motion to compel ("Opposition") are so clearly without merit that Interior Defendants will respond only briefly so as not to belabor the arguments already set out in their Motion for Protective Order and to Quash and in their responses to plaintiffs' "bills of particulars" regarding Mr. Carr and the other Named Individuals.' 'In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of arguments already in the extensive record in this case, the govcrnnieiit incorporates herein by reference the follorvirig pleadings: hfenzoriindiini oj*Poitits otitl iliitfioritics it1 Opposition t o Plirintiffs' Bills of Porticiilars it1 Snipport of'klotion for Order to Stioiv Crrzise Wiy Ititcnor L)ej&clunts atzcf Their- Employees unrl Counsel Sfiould Not Bt. Held in Conteniptjor Viokitirig Court Orders undjbr Deji-iiuciriig Tjiis Court in Connection with Triiil One (Filed Octobcr 19, 2001) (filed June 2, 2003) (the "Government's June 2, 2003 Opposition"); United Stutes' KcpJv lo Pluititifls' Opposition to Bills of PLirticidm-s Rcliitiiig to Plairitlffs ' Octohcr 19, 3001 Motion for Order to S h i v Ciiuse (filed A u ~ . 18, 2003). 1. The Proceedings Regarding the October 19,2001 Show Cause Motion Unquestionably Involve Potential Criminal Ramifications for the Named Individuals. Plaintiffs have consistently sought criminal sanctions against Michael Carr and the other non- party individuals named in their October 19, 2001 show cause motion. Plaintiffs' Opposition provides no indication that plaintiffs have abandoned their pursuit of such criminal sanctions. To the contrary, plaintiffs appear to admit that they intend to use the civil discovery rules as a stalking horse to build a criminal case against the Named Individuals. Such manipulation of the civil rules is, of course, absolutely improper and justifies the imposition of a protective order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) ("[Tlhe court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. . . ."). There can be no serious question that plaintiffs' attempt to deprive Mr. Carr of his constitutional due process rights is, at a minimum, oppressive.' While the government recognizes that plaintiffs' petition for rehearing is currently before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals' decision still stands. That decision is itself based upon and supported by other governing precedent that makes clear that the particular allegations made against Mr. Cam and the other Named Individuals cannot be characterized as civil in nature 21ndeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that it is often appropriate for a district court to impose a protective order "to prevent parties from using civil discovery to evade restrictions on discovery in criminal cases.'' Degen v. United States, 5 17 U.S. 820, 826 (1996) (citing cases); see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1,8-9 (1970) (presuming that appropriate remedy in a civil case where no corporate officer could respond to interrogatories without being subject to a "'real and appreciable' risk of self-incrimination" would be a protective order "postponing civil discovery until termination of the criminal action.") (internal citations omitted). Thus, there is ample authority supporting the imposition of a protective order to prevent civil discovery from going forward where there are unresolved criminal allegations arising from the same matters. -2- because plaintiffs have identified no action these individuals could take to purge the allegedly contumacious conduct, nor any damages they have allegedly suffered because of the claimed actions of any of these individuals. See International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 5 12 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) ("Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge."); National Org. for Wurnen v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646,658-62 @.C. Cir. 1994); Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Government's June 2,2003 Opposition at 7- 10 (discussing essential elements of civil contempt proceeding). Mr. Carr no longer works for the federal government, so he has no ability to purge any civil contempt the court might order.3 Accordingly, there is no place for civil discovery in the proceedings associated with the plaintiffs' October 19,200 1 motion. 2. Plaintiffs Cannot Serve as Roving "Inspectors General." Plaintiffs invite the Court to disregard the Supreme Court's holding in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787,814 (1987), and its own recent ruling in LandmarkLegal Foundation v. EPA, 2003 WL 21715678 at "4 (D.D.C. July 25,2003), and to permit them to conduct criminal investigations of federal employees and attorneys. See Opposition at 2. The Court should decline the invitation. Plaintiffs' additionally note the Court's "truth-seeking" function. Opposition at 3. Plaintiffs, however, pay no heed to the clear limitations on the federal judicial power, as recently clarified by the Court of Appeals. In the portion of the July 18,2003 decision that plaintiffs have not challenged, the Court of Appeals held that a "'roving federal district court"' has no role in our constitutional system. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1141-43 (D.C. 31ndeed, as we pointed out in the Government's June 2,2003 Opposition at 12-13 & n.5, plaintiffs' counsel has conceded on the record that former government officials and employees cannot be liable for civil contempt. -3- Cir. 2003), quoting with approval Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 11 15, 1162 (5th Cir.), amended in part, reh'g denied in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982). Accordingly, district courts are not empowered to appoint agents to function in "an investigative, quasi-inquisitorial, quasi-prosecutorial role that is unknown to our adversarial legal system." Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1142. Significantly, the plaintiffs have identified no order of this Court that has provided them with the authority they claim to conduct fiee-ranging investigations of alleged misconduct of their adversaries in this litigation, and we are aware of none. Indeed, the Court's decision in Landmark Legal Foundation, supra, directly contradicts plaintiffs' claimed authority. 3. The Court's September 17,2002 Order Did Not Award Civil Discovery as a "Sanction" and Was Far More Limited Than Plaintiffs Contend. Remarkably, plaintiffs contend that the Court ordered discovery as a "sanction" for the contempt it had found. Opposition at 2 , 6 . There is no indication in the September 17,2002 order that the Court took any such action, nor do plaintiffs cite any authority that would permit a court to allow discovery not otherwise permitted by Rule 26(b) as a "punishment." In setting forth the scope of civil discovery, Rule 26(b)( 1) authorizes parties to obtain discovery "that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party. . .'I and further permits courts, "[flor good cause", to ''order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action." Discovery may be further limited by the court, but there is no provision in the rules for expanding the scope of discovery beyond that set forth in Rule 26(b). In any event, the Court of Appeals specifically vacated the findings of contempt and the sanctions imposed by the Court pursuant to those findings. Accordingly, even if the discovery permitted by the September 17,2002 order could conceivably have been meant as a 'kanction" -4- for the finding of contempt, plaintiffs cannot rely upon a vacated sanction as a basis for their claimed right to employ civil discovery to investigate their sundry suspicions? At this time, no proceeding before the Court requires any discovery. Trial 1.5 has been concluded and the Court has ruled upon the issues raised there. There is no indication in the September 17,2002 ruling that the Court intended to permit plaintiffs to conduct fishing expeditions into matters unrelated to the issues before the Court in Trial 1.5, much less that the Court intended to permit discovery to continue even after the conclusion of Trial 1.5 and the issuance of the Court's opinion. Indeed, nothing in the injunction issued by the Court on September 25,2003, provides for further discovery. The lack of any proceeding towards which discovery may be directed and the lack of any pre-discovery scheduling conference is an additional ground for granting Interior Defendants' motion. 4. Rule 53 Grants a Special Master the Authority to Set Schedules and to Conduct Proceedings Efficiently. In referring the October 19,2001 motion to the Special Master, the Court plainly intended the Special Master to have the usual powers granted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(c). Specifically, Rule 53(c) provides: "Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order [of reference], the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order." Nothing in the September 17,2002 order of reference purports to limit this power. 4Moreover, plaintiffs cannot use a "sanction" supposedly imposed upon the Interior Defendants in their official capacities as a basis for taking discovery of a non-party like Mr. Carr and the other Named Individuals, who had no right or opportunity to participate in the proceedings that concluded with the Court's September 1 7,2002 decision. -5- The government has objected to the referral of the contempt proceedings to the Special Master on the grounds that the Special Master should play no role in a proceeding that involves potential criminal consequences for the Named Individuals and has moved to recuse the Special Master on other grounds. However, the government does not contest the power afforded a special master under Rule 53(c) where a matter has properly been referred to a special master. Plaintiffs have never challenged the order of reference and do not seem to be challenging it now. Instead, plaintiffs appear to challenge the scope of a special masterk authority under Rule 53(c) to set schedules and protocols. Specifically, plaintiffs complain about the deadlines set by the Special Master for filing their "bills of particulars" and his determination that no discovery would take place before the issuance of his reports and recommendations on the legal sufficiency of the "bills of particulars." However, these sorts of determinations are precisely the type of actions contemplated by Rule 53(c). While plaintiffs may belatedly wish to raise an objection regarding the schedule and procedures established by the Special Master more than 10 months ago, they clearly are not permitted to issue discovery requests or engage in other "self-help" without a ruling by the Court that the Special Master has somehow exceeded or abused his Rule 53(c) authority. Thus, plaintiffs should have timely asked the Court to clarify or modifL the Special Masterk November 4,2002 Revised Procedures and Schedule for Investigation Into Plaintifs' Motion for Orders to Show Cause ("Revised Procedures Memorandum") and not simply ignored it. Their discovery and their motion to compel are, accordingly, improper. Even if the plaintiffs' motion to compel is viewed as a challenge to the Special Master's Revised Procedures Memorandum, it should still be rejected. As noted in the Government's June 2,2003 Opposition at 4-5, plaintiffs were directed by the Court on March 15,2002 to file individualized specifications of their charges, and the Special Master simply adopted and -6- reiterated that directive in his Revised Procedures Memorandum. Plaintiffs complain that the Special Master's schedule did not permit them adequate time to file bills of particulars regarding the October 19,2001 motion, but in fact plaintiffs had more than a year and a half to formulate specific charges against the Named Individuals. If plaintiffs did not have enough evidence to support their extremely serious allegations against the Named Individuals, they should never have filed the October 19,2001 motion in the first place. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b). In short, there was nothing unreasonable about the schedule that the Special Master set for plaintiffs to file their bills of particulars. Likewise, it was entirely proper for the Special Master to defer the commencement of any civil discovery until he and the Court had first reviewed the plaintiffs' allegations for legal sufficiency and for a determination of the precise character of the proceeding. The government and the Named Individuals have consistently argued that the presence of allegations of criminal misconduct precludes the employment of civil discovery procedures. Thus, the Special Master established a protocol that would address concerns of efficiency and economy as well as concerns regarding the protection of the constitutional due process rights of the Named Individuals whom plaintiffs have accused of criminal misconduct. Plaintiffs articulate no reason to revisit the Special Master's schedule or procedures, and none exists. Rather, as urged by the government and the Named Individuals in their personal capacities, the proceedings before the Special Master should be terminated because of the criminal nature of the plaintiffs' allegations and because plaintiffs have failed to supply a legal basis for their charges. -7- denied. For all the reasons stated above and in Interior Defendants' opening brief, the motion for protective order and to quash should be granted, and plaintiffs' motion to compel should be Conclusion Respecthlly submitted, ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR. Associate Attorney General PETER D. KEISLER Assistant Attorney General STUART E. SCHIFFER Deputy Assistant Attorney General MICHAEL F. HERTZ Senior Trial Munsel ' D.C. Bar No. 425194 Tracy L, Hilmer D.C. Bar No. 421219 Trial Attorney Commercial Litigation Branch Civil Division P.O. Box 261 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044 (202) 307-0474 DATED: October 3,2003 -8- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ~ ~ ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., ) 1 ) Civil Action No. 96-CV-1285 (RCL) Plaintiffs, V. GALE A. NORTON, et al., ) ) ) 1 Defendants . day of ,2003, hereby ORDER Upon consideration of PZaint@s' Motion to Compel Michael Carr's Deposition and the Production ofDocuments Related Thereto (filed Sept. 24,2003), Interior Defendants' opposition thereto and the entire record in this case, it is this ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion be, and hereby is, DENIED. HON. ROYCE C. LAMBERTH United States District Judge CC: Tracy Hilmer Dodge Wells Sandra Spooner Commercial Litigation Branch Civil Division P.O. Box 875 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 Fax (202) 5 14-9 163 (202) 616-3085 Alan L. Balaran, Esq. Special Master 17 17 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20006 (202) 986-8477 Keith Harper, Esq. Native American Rights Fund 1712 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 (202) 822-0068 Counsel for Plaintiffs Dennis M Gingold, Esq. Mark Kester Brown, Esq. 607 14th Street, N.W. Box 6 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 3 18-2372 Counsel for Pluintgs Elliott Levitas, Esq. 1 100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 Counsel for Pluintifs Earl Old Person (Pro se) Blackfeet Tribe P.O. Box 850 Browning, MT 5941 7 (406) 338-7530 Mary Lou Soller, Esq. Adam Feinberg, Esq. Miller & Chevalier 655 15th Street, N.W., Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 By First Class Mail Counsel for Chester Mills and Terence Virden Earl J. Silbert, Esq. Robert A. Salerno, Esq. Adam Hoffinger, Esq. Piper Rudnick LLP 1200 19th Street, N.W., 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for John Cruden, Jack Huugrud and Sarah Himmelhoch David S. Krakoff, Esq. Alessio D. Evangelista Jamie Abrams Christine Stroop Beveridge & Diamond, P.C. 1350 I Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005-33 11 Counsel for Daryl m i t e Amy Berman Jackson, Esq. Trout & Richards 1 100 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Suite 730 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for Edith Blackwell William H. Briggs, Jr., Esq. Marc E. Rindner, Esq. Ross, Dixon & Bell 2001 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-1 040 Counsel for Phillip Brooks Michael Bromwich, Esq. Anne Perry, Esq. Fried Frank Hams Shiver & Jacobson 100 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W .Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20004-2505 - 2 - B. Michael Rauh, Esq. Julie Campbell, Esq. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP 150 1 M Street, N. W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 Counsel for Neal McCaleb Barry Boss, Esq. Asbill, Junkin, Moffitt & Boss 1615 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 William Gardner, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1 1 1 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Counsel for Willa Perlmutter Barbara Van Gelder, Esq. Eric Lyttle, Esq. Wiley, Rein & Fielding LLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-2304 and Erika C. Birg, Esq. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1300 Washington, DC 20036 Counsel for James Eichner Roger Zuckerman, Esq. Leslie Kiernan, Esq. William Taylor, Esq. Zuckerman, Spader, GoIdstein, Taylor & Kolker, LLP 1201 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for Robert Lamb and Hilda Manuel Christopher Mead, Esq. London & Mead 1225 19th Street, N.W. Suite 320 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for Ken Rossman Robert Luskin, Esq. Patton Boggs 2550 M St., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20037-1350 Counsel for Edward Cohen, Bruce Babbitt and John Leshy Plat0 Cacheris, Esq. John F. Hundley, Esq. Sydney J. Hoffinann, Esq. Baker & McKenzie 8 15 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Counsel for John Berty and Glen Schumaker R. Christopher Cook, Esq. Jones Day Reaves & Pogue 5 1 Louisiana Ave, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20001-21 13 Counsel for Michael Carr Kathleen E. Voelker, Esq. 1101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for James Douglas Martha Rogers, Esq. Leon Rodriguez, Esq. Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shnver 1410 H Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005 Counsel for Timothy Elliott - 3 - Herbert Fenster, Esq. Jane Ann Neiswender, Esq. Daniel G. Jarcho, Esq. McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP 370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4800 Denver, Colorado 80202 Counsel for Gale Norton James Johnson, Esq. Jamie Levitt, Esq. Morrison & Foerster 1290 Sixth Avenue New York, NY 10 104 Counsel for Sabrina McCarthy E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. Scharn Robinson, Esq. Paul, Hasting, Janofsky & Walker LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2400 Counsel for William Myers Stephen M. Byers, Esq. Miguel Rodriguez, Esq. Crowell & Moring 100 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2595 Counsel for Dominic Nessi Elizabeth Wallace Fleming, Esq. Trout & Richards PLLC 1100 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 730 Washington, DC 20036 Counsel for Michael Rossetti Jeffrey D. Robinson, Esq. Dwight Bostwick, Esq. Melissa McNiven, Esq. Baach, Robinson & Lewis One Thomas Circle, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 Counsel for Lois Schiffer and Anne Shields Steven J. Roman, Esq. John A. Gibbons, Esq. Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinshy 2101 L Street NW Washington, DC 20037- 1526 Counsel for David Shilton and John Bryson Michael Goodstein, Esq. Deanna Chang, Esq. Resolution Law Group, P.C. 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 350 Washington, D.C. 20015 Counsel for Tom Clark Stanley Brand, Esq. Andrew D. Herman, Esq. Brand & Frulla 923 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Counsel for Peter Coppelman Hamilton P. Fox III, Esq. Kathleen M. Devereaux, Esq. Gregory S. Smith, Esq. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP 1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2415 Counsel for Charles Findlay Thomas E. Wilson, Esq. John A. Ordway, Esq. Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP 1101 17th Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for John Most Larry A. Nathans, Esq. Robert W. Biddle, Esq. Bennett & Nathans, LLP 210 East Lexington Street, Suite 301 Baltimore, MD 2 1202 Counsel for David Shuey - 4 - Eugene R. Fidelt, Esq. Matthew S. Freedus, Esq. Feldesman, Tucker, Leifur, Fidell& Bank LLP 2001 L Street, N.W., 2nd Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 Counsel for James Simon - 5 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I declare under penalty of perjury that, on October 3,2003, I served the foregoing Interior Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash Plaint@s' Notice of Deposition and Request for Production of Documents Directed to Non-Party Michael Carr and Defendants; and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Michael Carr's Deposition and the Production of Documents Related Thereto in the manner stated upon the persons listed on the attached service list. By Hand Delivery and by facsimile: Alan L. Balaran, Esq. Special Master 171 7 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20006 (202) 986-8477 By facsimile, pursuant to written agreement: Keith Harper, Esq. Native American Rights Fund 1712 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 (202) 822-0068 Counsel for Plaintiffs Dennis M Gingold, Esq. Mark Kester Brown, Esq. 607 - 14th Street, NW Box 6 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 3 18-2372 Counsel for Plaint@@ and by U.S. Mail upon: Elliott Levitas, Esq. 1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 Counsel for Plaintiffs Earl Old Person (Pro se) Blackfeet Tribe P.O. Box 850 Browning, MT 594 17 (406) 338-7530 By first-class mail, postage prepaid, andor by facsimile or email pursuant to written agreement: Mary Lou Soller, Esq. Adam Feinberg, Esq. Miller & Chevalier 655 15th Street, N.W., Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 By First Class Mail Counsel for Chester Mills and Terence Virden Earl J. Silbert, Esq. Robert A. Salerno, Esq. Adam Hoffinger, Esq. Piper Rudnick LLP 1200 19th Street, N.W., 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20036 By Email to: earl.silbert@pipemdnick.com By Email to: robert. salerno@pipermdnick. corn By Email to: adam. hoffinger@pipemdnick. corn Counsel for John Cruden, Jack Haugrud and Sarah Himmeihoch David S. Krakoff, Esq. Alessio D. Evangelista Jamie Abrams Christine Stroop Beveridge & Diamond, P.C. 1350 I Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005-33 1 1 By Email to: dkrakoff@bdlaw.com By Email to: aevangelista@bdlaw.com By Email to: jabrams@bdlaw.com By Email to: cstroop@bdlaw.com Counsel for Daryl White - 1 - Amy Berman Jackson, Esq. Trout & Richards 1350 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Suite 1220 Washington, D.C. 20036 By Email to: abj@troutrichards.com Counsel for Edith Blackwell Michael Bromwich, Esq. Anne Perry, Esq. Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson 100 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20004-2505 By Email to: Michael-Bromwich@ffhsj .com By Email to: perryan@ffhsj.com Counsel for Sharon Blackwell B. Michael Rauh, Esq. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP 1501 M Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 By Email to: mrauh@manatt.com Counsel for Neal McCaleb Barry Boss, Esq. Asbill, Junkin, Moffitt & Boss 1615 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20009 By Fax: 202-332-6480 Counsel for Stephen Swanson William Gardner, Esq. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1 1 1 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004 By Fax: 202-739-3001 Counsel for Willa Perlmutter William H. Briggs, Jr., Esq. Marc E. Rindner, Esq. Ross, Dixon & Bell 2001 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006-1040 By Email to: bbriggs@rdblaw.com By Email to: mrindner@rdblaw.com Counsel for Phillip Brooks Barbara Van Gelder, Esq. Eric Lyttle, Esq. Wiley, Rein & Fielding LLP 1776 K Street, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20006-2304 By Fax: 202-7 19-7049 and Erika C. Birg, Esq. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1300 Washington, DC 20036 By Email to: ebirg@paulweiss.com Counsel for James Eichner Roger Zuckerman, Esq. Leslie Kiernan, Esq. William Taylor, Esq. Zuckerman, Spader, Goldstein, Taylor & Kolker, LLP 1201 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20036 By First Class Mail Counsel for Robert Lamb and Hilda Manuel Christopher Mead, Esq. London & Mead 1225 19th Street, N.W. Suite 320 Washington, D.C. 20036 By Fax: 202-785-4280 Counsel for Ken Rossman - 2 - Robert Luskin, Esq. Patton Boggs 2550 M St., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20037-1350 By Email to: lUuskin@PattonBoggs.com Counsel for Edward Cohen, Bruce Babbitt and John Leshy Plat0 Cacheris, Esq. John F. Hundley, Esq. Sydney J. Hoffmann, Esq. Baker & McKenzie 8 15 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20006 By Email to: caro1yn.j .coffman@bakernet.com By Email to: svdnevhoffman@aol.com Counsel for John Berry and Glen Schumaker R. Christopher Cook, Esq. Jones Day Reaves & Pogue 5 1 Louisiana Ave, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001-21 13 By Emi1 to: christophercook@JonesDay.com Counsel for Michael Carr Kathleen E. Voelker, Esq. 1101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036 By Email to: kathleenvoelker@aol.com Counsel for James Douglas Martha Rogers, Esq. Leon Rodriguez, Esq. Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver 1410 H Street, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20005 By Email to: mprogers@ober.com By Email to: lrodriguez@ober.com Counsel for Timothy Elliott Herbert Fenster, Esq. Jane Ann Neiswender, Esq. Daniel G. Jarcho, Esq. McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP 370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4800 Denver, Colorado 80202 By Email to: hfenster@mckennalong.com By Email to: jneiswender@mckennalong .com By Email to: djarcho@mckennalong.com Counsel for Gale Norton James Johnson, Esq. Jamie Levitt, Esq. Morrison & Foerster 1290 Sixth Avenue New York, NY 10 104 By Email to: jamesjohnson@mofo.com By Email to: jlevitt@mofo.com Counsel for Sabrina McCarthy E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. Scharn Robinson, Esq. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP 1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2400 By Fax: 202-508-9700 Counsel for William Myers Stephen M. Byers, Esq. Miguel Rodriguez, Esq. Crowell & Moring 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Washington, D.C. 20004-2595 By Email to: sbyers@crowell.com By Email to: mrodriguez@crowell.com Counsel for Dominic Nessi Elizabeth Wallace Fleming, Esq. Trout & Richards PLLC 1350 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 1220 Washington, DC 20036 By First Class Mail Counsel for Michael Rossetti - 3 - Jeffrey D. Robinson, Esq. Dwight Bostwick, Esq. Melissa McNiven, Esq. Baach, Robinson & Lewis One Thomas Circle, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20005 By Email to: jeffiey.robinson@baachrobinson.com By Email to: dwightbostwich@baachrobinson.com By Email to: melissa.mcniven@baachrobinson.com Counsel for Lois Schiffer and Anne Shields Steven J. Roman, Esq. John A. Gibbons, Esq. Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinshy 2101 L Street N W Washington, DC 20037-1 526 By Email to: romanS@dsrno.com By Email to: gibbonsj@dsmo.com Counsel for David Shilton and John Bryson Michael Goodstein, Esq. Deanna Chang, Esq. Resolution Law Group, P.C. 5335 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 350 Washington, D.C. 20015 By Fax: 202-686-4843 Counsel for Tom Clark Stanley Brand, Esq. Andrew D. Herman, Esq. Brand & Frulla 923 Fifteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 By First Class Mail Counsel for Peter Coppelman Hamilton P. Fox III, Esq. Kathleen M. Devereaux, Esq. Gregory S. Smith, Esq. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP 1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Waslungton, D.C. 20004-2415 By Fax: 202-637-3593 Counsel for Charles Findlay Thomas E. Wilson, Esq. John A. Ordway, Esq. Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP 1101 17th Street, N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, D.C. 20036 By Email to: bjones@bcr-dc.com By Email to: jaoabcr-dc.com Counsel for John Most Larry A. Nathans, Esq. Robert W. Biddle, Esq. Bennett & Nathans, LLP 210 East Lexington Street, Suite 301 Baltimore, MD 2 1202 By First Class Mail Counsel for David Shuey Eugene R. Fidell, Esq. Matthew S. Freedus, Esq. Feldesman, Tucker, Leifur, Fidell & Bank LLP 2001 L Street, N.W., 2nd Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 By Email to: efidell@feldesmantucker.com By Email to: mfreedus@feldesmantucker.com Counsel for James Simon - 4 -