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KEVIN V. RYAN (CSBN 118321)  
United States Attorney  
  
LESLIE R. CALDWELL (NYSB 1950591)  
Director, Enron Task Force

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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BY COURT ORDER~~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

**CR 03 0026**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
JEFFREY S. RICHTER,  
Defendant.

No.:  
VIOLATIONS: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 -  
Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud; False  
Statement  
  
SAN FRANCISCO VENUE

**WHA**

INFORMATION

The United States Attorney charges:

1. At all relevant times, Enron Corp. ("Enron") was a publicly traded Oregon corporation with its headquarters in Houston, Texas. Through its subsidiaries, Enron was engaged in the purchase and sale of natural gas and electricity, construction and ownership of pipelines and power facilities, provision of telecommunications services, and trading in contracts to buy and sell various commodities. Before December 2, 2001, Enron was the seventh largest corporation in the United States.
2. From approximately 1997 to 2002, the defendant JEFFREY S. RICHTER was employed by Enron. In late 1997, he moved to Enron's West Power Trading Division ("West

1 Power”) in Portland, Oregon. In June 1999, defendant RICHTER became a trading assistant on  
2 West Power’s Short-Term California desk. In January 2000, Enron promoted defendant  
3 RICHTER to manage the Short-Term desk. In that capacity, defendant RICHTER managed  
4 electricity traders, schedulers and analysts, and oversaw the marketing (buying and selling) of  
5 electricity through the California wholesale markets. Defendant RICHTER was also responsible  
6 for the Short-Term desk’s profits and losses. Under his management, the desk’s profits increased  
7 1400% in one year.

8 3. In 2000, the California wholesale electricity markets were operated by two  
9 institutions: the California Power Exchange (“PX”) and the California Independent System  
10 Operator (“ISO”). The PX acted as the primary marketplace for wholesale electricity in  
11 California. The ISO managed the State’s electricity transmission grid, which included  
12 maintaining a balanced energy market, controlling transmission flows over the electric power  
13 lines, and purchasing “ancillary services” (readily available emergency stand-by power).

14 4. The PX operated two electricity markets, the “day-ahead market,” for energy  
15 delivery the following day, and the “day-of market,” for energy delivery the same day. The ISO  
16 operated the “real-time” electricity market. Through the “real-time” market, the ISO bought and  
17 sold power to account for and correct any imbalances between supply and demand during each  
18 operating hour. Through these markets, generators and energy marketers (including Enron) bid  
19 for and scheduled fixed amounts of electricity for delivery to their wholesale and retail customers  
20 (known as “load”).

21 5. The ISO also managed the actual flow of electricity across California’s electricity  
22 transmission system. The transmission system is a set of interconnecting power lines that carry  
23 electricity into, within, and out of California. These power lines vary both in distance covered  
24 and electricity capacity. In part to ensure that electricity supplies did not exceed transmission  
25 capacity, the ISO required energy marketers and generators to submit transmission schedules that  
26 identified the amount and type of electricity they proposed to transmit, the source of the  
27 electricity, and its destination.

28 6. Depending upon the total amount of electricity scheduled and the net direction of

1 the electricity flow, a power line could become "congested." When congestion occurred, the ISO  
2 operated day-ahead and hour-ahead "transmission" markets, in which energy suppliers were  
3 allowed to submit "adjustment" bids and/or revised schedules. The bids would indicate the price  
4 (or amount of money) a supplier would accept to "relieve" congestion by cutting or curtailing its  
5 scheduled delivery of electricity. A supplier could relieve congestion by scheduling energy in the  
6 opposite direction of the congested line (a "counterflow"). Based on the scheduled energy and  
7 the submitted adjustment bids, an ISO computer program would calculate a "congestion  
8 management fee." The fee acted as a toll for using an overcrowded line and was charged to those  
9 suppliers who ultimately transmitted their electricity on the line. The proceeds of that toll were  
10 paid to two groups: (1) the owners of the Firm Transmission Rights ("FTRs") on the congested  
11 line; and (2) the entities who submitted successful bids or schedules to "relieve" congestion.

12 7. As noted above, the ISO also operated day-ahead and hour-ahead markets for  
13 ancillary services. Through these markets, the ISO bought the right to reserve stand-by  
14 electricity generation capacity that it could draw upon in the event of a sudden loss of electricity  
15 supply. By regulation, the ISO was required to have an amount of generation capacity on stand-  
16 by equal to 7 percent of the total amount of scheduled demand for the State. If the ISO  
17 anticipated that it would not have enough stand-by capacity available, then it would be forced to  
18 declare an "Emergency."

19 8. The ISO was also responsible for calculating and billing all market participants on  
20 a monthly basis. Depending on the amount of electricity and ancillary services bought or sold  
21 and the amount of congestion fees due or owed, the ISO would issue a net credit or charge to  
22 each marketer, generator, and customer. These payments were sent to the participants, including  
23 Enron, by wire transmission through the Bank of America in San Francisco, California.

#### 24 SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

25 9. In or about 2000, within the Northern District of California and elsewhere, the  
26 defendant JEFFREY S. RICHTER and others did knowingly devise and attempt to devise a  
27 scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of false and  
28 fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises from electricity customers in California and

1 other participants in the California wholesale electricity markets.

2 10. It was part of the scheme and artifice that defendant RICHTER and other Enron  
3 officers and employees, directly and indirectly, engaged in trading strategies that involved the  
4 submission of false and fraudulent schedules, bids and information to the ISO.

5 "Load Shift"

6 11. Specifically, defendant RICHTER and others devised and engaged in a strategy  
7 referred to as "Load Shift." In connection with the "Load Shift" strategy, defendant RICHTER  
8 and others knowingly filed, and caused to be filed, energy schedules and bids that over-  
9 represented the load or demand for electricity Enron intended to serve within a particular area of  
10 California in order to create the appearance of congestion on a transmission line. The purpose  
11 and effect of this strategy was to manipulate the ISO's calculation of congestion management  
12 fees, artificially inflate the market price for congestion, earn congestion payments that would  
13 otherwise not be available, and obtain increased fees for Enron as a result of its ownership of  
14 FTRs.

15 "Get Shorty"

16 12. Defendant RICHTER and others also devised and engaged in a strategy referred to  
17 as "Get Shorty." In connection with the "Get Shorty" strategy, defendant RICHTER and others  
18 knowingly filed, and caused to be filed, bids in the ISO's day-ahead ancillary services market that  
19 falsely represented to the ISO that Enron committed and intended to supply ancillary services that  
20 Enron did not have, and did not intend to supply. The strategy required Enron to fabricate the  
21 source and nature of the ancillary services it agreed to supply in exchange for payments from the  
22 ISO. The purpose and effect of "Get Shorty" was to sell fictitious ancillary services at a high  
23 price in the day-ahead market, and then by cancelling the commitment and purchasing the  
24 services in the hour-ahead market at lower price, to reap the difference in price between the two  
25 markets.

26 13. As a result of the scheme and artifice to defraud, Enron manipulated prices in  
27 certain wholesale electricity markets and obtained fees and payments in excess of what it would  
28 have received with accurate schedules and bids.

1 COUNT ONE: (18 U.S.C. § 371 - Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud)

2 14. Paragraphs 1 through 13 of this Information are realleged and incorporated here as  
3 though set in full.

4 15. In or about 2000, within the Northern District of California and elsewhere, the  
5 defendant

6 JEFFREY S. RICHTER

7 and others known and unknown, conspired to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to  
8 obtain money by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and for  
9 the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, to transmit and cause to be transmitted wire  
10 communications in interstate commerce, all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section  
11 1343.

12 16. Among the means and methods by which defendant RICHTER and his co-  
13 conspirators would and did carry out the conspiracy were those described in Paragraphs 10  
14 through 12 of this Information, as well as others.

15 17. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, defendant  
16 RICHTER and his co-conspirators committed and caused to be committed the following overt  
17 acts in the Northern District of California and elsewhere: filing schedules and bids with the ISO  
18 which caused the monthly transmission of payments by the ISO to Enron for congestion fees and  
19 ancillary services, sent by wire transmission through the Bank of America in San Francisco,  
20 California.

21 All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

22  
23 COUNT TWO: (18 U.S.C. § 1001 - False Statement to a Government Agency)

24 18. Paragraphs 1 through 13 of this Information are realleged and incorporated here as  
25 though set in full.

26 19. On or about September 26, 2002, within the Northern District in California, in a  
27 matter within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an agency within the  
28 Executive Branch of the United States of America, the defendant

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JEFFREY S. RICHTER


did knowingly and willfully make and cause to be made a materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation.

20. Specifically, during an interview with the FBI and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California, defendant RICHTER did knowingly and willfully state that he never intentionally deceived anyone when submitting power schedules, when in truth and in fact as he well knew at the time, he had submitted false bids to receive congestion payments and had intentionally deceived participants in the California wholesale electricity markets, as set forth above.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001.

DATED: 1/30/05

KEVIN V. RYAN  
United States Attorney



CHARLES B. BIRCH  
Chief, Criminal Division

(Approved as to form: )  
AUSAs: Robbins, Jacobs, Tenorio-Kutzkey