U.S. Department of Justice

Attorney General's
Semiannual Management Report
to Congress

Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft

The orchestrated terrorist attacks of September 11th forever changed our perception of our homeland security. With these attacks, terrorism ceased to be seen as a distant threat and became an imminent danger to our families, our institutions, and our freedoms. The first and overriding priority of the Department of Justice is to protect Americans against future acts of terrorism and to bring terrorists to justice. We are devoting all resources necessary to accomplish this critical mission.

In the year since the September 11th attacks the Department has worked vigorously to improve information sharing among all levels of law enforcement, enhance our capability to prevent terrorist incidents, and restructure our organizations and operations to accomplish our mission better.

To continue our pursuit against terrorism and to enforce vigorously the laws of the United States, the Department of Justice must operate with the highest levels of efficiency and effectiveness. Pursuant to that goal, I am pleased to present this Semiannual Management Report to accompany the Department of Justice Inspector General's Semiannual Report to Congress. As required by statute, this report summarizes the Department's management decisions, actions completed and actions in progress in response to audit reports issued by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

Taken together, these reports represent the Department of Justice's efforts to identify and correct weaknesses in current activities and provide a road map for improving management and operations. I am pursuing aggressively the implementation of management improvements in an atmosphere of cooperation with the Inspector General, and welcome the progress we have already made in many areas.

For example, as I previously reported, the Department of Justice achieved its first clean, unqualified opinion on all of its consolidated financial statements as well as unqualified opinions on all 10 of the reporting components' financial statements that support the consolidated report. The Department's components worked diligently for this unprecedented accomplishment and we are grateful for their efforts. The Department of Justice is committed to maintaining its unqualified opinion in future financial statement audits and to doing so in a way that is highly efficient. Early indications are that the Department will meet this challenge.

In addition, while the Department is continuing aggressively its efforts to adequately secure sensitive computer systems, the OIG did report improvement in the controls over these systems during the reviews it conducted pursuant to the Government Information Security Reform Act.

A primary component in the war on terrorism, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is moving forward aggressively to reform the organization to elevate performance in all areas of mission accomplishment. The OIG highlighted its examination of selected activities of the FBI and has issued reports that identified weaknesses. The FBI has taken immediate action to address these weaknesses, and in some cases, began remediation prior to receiving the report and recommendations of the OIG..

In a special report, initiated by the OIG at my request, the OIG examined the INS's admission of two September 11th terrorists and the weaknesses in the INS process that allowed the two terrorists to gain admission. While the OIG found no evidence that INS policies and practices had been violated in this case, we are committed to improving the policies and procedures of the INS to ensure that no such incident will happen again. In fact, since September 11th substantial changes have been made to ensure adequate scrutiny of those seeking to enter the United States.

I am concerned that, in the same report on the INS, the OIG found the INS's 1) adjudication process to be untimely and flawed and 2) system for monitoring and tracking foreign students in the United States to be antiquated and inadequate. The INS is now taking steps to ensure that the adjudicators have complete information prior to making their determinations, and is developing an automated computer tracking system, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, to address many of the failings of its current manual system.

In two other reports related to the INS's efforts to control illegal immigration, the OIG examined the INS's control of nonimmigrant overstays and the institutional removal program. These reports examine issues that have been reviewed previously, making the OIG reports of continued difficulties in these areas especially troubling. With respect to overstays, the OIG reported that the INS does not have a reliable system to track overstays and cannot provide accurate data on overstays as required by the Visa Waiver Program. However, the INS has taken aggressive steps to strengthen the Visa Waiver Program.

In addition, significant strides have already been made in implementing a comprehensive Entry-Exit system. The INS has established a multi-agency Project Management Office to coordinate all activity associated with the establishment of an Entry-Exit program, to include a fully integrated automated system to be deployed at over 300 ports of entry. In addition to several components within the INS, the Project Office has membership from other Department of Justice components, the United States Customs Service, the Department of State's Visa and Passport Offices and the Department of Transportation. In addition, the INS is working with the Department of State and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop a technology standard that would allow for the use of biometrics in the Entry-Exit system. The first phase of the program was launched on September 11, 2002, with the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS). The NSEERS focuses on a specific population and requires additional information including two live-scan fingerprints and a photograph. The NSEERS is deployed to all major airports and land border ports of entry. Both NSEERS and the systems established as part of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program will be integrated into the larger Entry-Exit System.

The INS also continues to take action to improve its Institutional Removal Program (IRP). The OIG had reported that the INS did not effectively manage the IRP resulting in some deportable foreign-born inmates being released without being identified by the INS. The INS has proposed to undertake a complete accounting of the resources required to address this population and has developed a multi-year plan to expand its Detention Officer positions. To enhance efficiency and minimize detention costs, the INS is developing an operation manual and appropriate training for the clear, consistent, and standardized procedures for IRP documentation and A-file organization and taking steps to ensure that its officers use authorized streamlined procedures for removal proceedings.

In a report on its review of the FBI's Counterterrorism Program, the OIG found that the FBI did not perform a comprehensive assessment of the threat and risk of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil nor did it incorporate such an assessment into its strategic plan. Further, the OIG stated that the FBI does not have sufficient performance measures and standards to hold managers accountable for achieving goals and objectives. The FBI has taken some important steps to improve its counterterrorism program, and continues to identify additional steps for constant improvement. It is improving its intelligence analyzing capabilities and is taking a "connect the dots" approach to analyzing disparate terrorism-related information flowing to it. Further, the FBI has established an Office of Intelligence and supplemented the staff with 25 experienced intelligence analysts. This should improve the FBI's ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information. In addition, the FBI refocused its traditional crime-fighting orientation after September 11th placing its highest priority on, and shifting resources to, preventing terrorist acts.

Finally, I am deeply concerned about the OIG findings related to Department's controls over weapons and laptops. Any loss of sensitive equipment is troubling. As the components initiated immediate steps to inventory and account for all missing sensitive property, the Justice Management Division (JMD), as the oversight body for policy controls over sensitive equipment, took swift action to improve oversight of this equipment. The JMD proposed changes to policy that will 1) mandate the integration and reconciliation of the accounting and property management systems, 2) provide standards for securing weapons, 3) require annual physical inventories of laptops and weapons, and 4) establish standards for reporting losses of sensitive equipment.

As Attorney General, I have pledged to confront injustice by leading a professional Justice Department that is free from politics, defined by integrity and dedicated to upholding the rule of law. I am continuing to pursue aggressively a timely and efficient process of audit resolution, believing firmly that it is a valuable tool to elevating continually the performance of the Department and thus will help ensure that we serve all Americans with integrity and impartiality.

CLOSED AUDIT REPORTS

REPORTED IN PREVIOUS

SEMIANNUAL MANAGEMENT REPORTS

The following audit reports were reported in the Attorney General's Semiannual Management Report to Congress: October 1, 2001 - March 31, 2002 in the chart entitled "Management Decisions on Audit Reports Not Implemented Within One Year." During the reporting period ending September 30, 2002, the Department completed the corrective actions necessary to close these reports.

• United States Marshals Service Annual Financial Statement Fiscal Year 1997



• United States Marshals Service Intergovernmental Service Agreement for Detention Facilities with the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island



• U.S. Department of Justice Annual Financial Statement Fiscal Year 1997

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 (the Act), Section 106(b), sets forth the reporting requirements for this semiannual report. The table below cross-references the prescribed reporting requirements to the specific pages in the report where they are addressed.

As required by the Act, the statistical tables and supporting schedules in this report reflect the actions taken by the Department to resolve and implement OIG audit recommendations during the reporting period. The Department considers an audit report resolved when the Department and the OIG have agreed upon every recommendation and cost exception in the audit report. An audit report is closed when the Department completes every agreed-upon action for the audit report. This semiannual report is consistent with the Act in that audit reports and the associated potential benefits are included in the ending balance of the appropriate table and supporting schedules until final action is completed for every audit recommendation.

Audit Reports Issued: Reports of audits completed by the OIG and those processed by the OIG but completed by other Federal auditors; State, institutional and other non-Federal governmental auditors; and independent public accountants. The OIG's processing of audit reports completed by auditors outside of the OIG includes assessing the quality of work performed and transmitting the report to the Departmental component responsible for the audited program.

Management Decision: The evaluation by management of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to such findings and recommendations, including planned corrective actions to remedy weaknesses identified in the report.

Audit Reports Resolved: Reports on which DOJ management made a written, final determination of the actions to be taken to address the audit report recommendations and the OIG concurred with the planned corrective actions.

Questioned Costs: Costs questioned by the OIG as a result of:

Disallowed Costs: Questioned costs that DOJ management in a management decision sustained or agreed should not be charged to the Government.

Recommendation that Funds be Put to Better Use: A recommendation by the OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if management took action to implement and complete the recommendations, including:

Final Action: The completion of all actions that DOJ management concluded in its management decision were necessary with respect to the findings and recommendations included in the audit report. In the event that DOJ management concluded no action was necessary final action occurred when the management decision was made.

Management Actions - Questioned Costs: The following is a list of the different management actions used by DOJ management to resolve address questioned costs in an audit report.

COPS Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

CRM Criminal Division

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

ENRD Environment and Natural Resources Division

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FPI Federal Prison Industries, Inc.

FY Fiscal Year

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRP Institutional Removal Program

JMD Justice Management Division

NSEERS National Security Entry Exit Registration System

OIG Office of the Inspector General

OJP Office of Justice Programs

USMS United States Marshals Service

VAR Various

1. This figure reflects the total number of audit reports for which final action was taken during the reporting period. The Department took multiple actions on several audit reports; thus, this total does not represent the sum of the two preceding figures.

2. Several audit reports had more than one recommendation to put funds to better use; therefore, this total does not represent the total of the two preceding figures in this column.