

February 22, 2008

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
Chairman
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Reyes,

The President asked us to respond to your letter of February 14, 2008, concerning the urgent need to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). Your assertion that there is no harm in allowing the temporary authorities provided by the Protect America Act to expire without enacting the Senate's FISA reform bill is inaccurate and based on a number of misunderstandings concerning our intelligence capabilities. We address those misunderstandings below. We hope that you find this letter helpful and that you will reconsider your opposition to the bill passed last week by a strong bipartisan majority in the Senate and, when Congress returns from its recess, support immediately bringing the Senate bill to the floor, where it enjoys the support of a majority of your fellow members. It is critical to our national security that Congress acts as soon as possible to pass the Senate bill.

Intelligence Collection

Our experience since Congress allowed the Protect America Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill demonstrates why the Nation is now more vulnerable to terrorist attack and other foreign threats. In our letter to Senator Reid on February 5, 2008, we explained that: "the expiration of the authorities in the Protect America Act would plunge critical intelligence programs into a state of uncertainty which could cause us to delay the gathering of, or simply miss, critical foreign intelligence information." That is exactly what has happened since the Protect America Act expired six days ago without enactment of the bipartisan Senate bill. We have lost intelligence information this past week as a direct result of the uncertainty created by Congress' failure to act. Because of this uncertainty, some partners have reduced cooperation. In particular, they have delayed or refused compliance with our requests to initiate new surveillances of terrorist and other foreign intelligence targets under existing directives issued pursuant to the Protect America Act. Although most partners intend to cooperate for the time being, they have expressed deep misgivings about doing so in light of the uncertainty and have indicated that they may well cease to cooperate if the uncertainty persists. We are working to mitigate these problems and are hopeful that our efforts will be successful. Nevertheless, the broader uncertainty caused by the Act's expiration will persist unless and until the bipartisan Senate bill is passed. This uncertainty may well continue to cause us to miss information that we otherwise would be collecting.

Thus, although it is correct that we can continue to conduct certain activities authorized by the Protect America Act for a period of one year from the time they were first authorized, the Act's expiration has and may well continue to adversely affect such activities. Any adverse

effects will result in a weakening of critical tools necessary to protect the Nation. As we explained in our letter to Senator Reid, expiration would create uncertainty concerning:

- The ability to modify certifications and procedures issued under the Protect America Act to reflect operational needs and the implementation of procedures to ensure that agencies are fully integrated protecting the Nation;
- The continuing validity of liability protection for those who assist us according to the procedures under the Protect America Act;
- The continuing validity of the judicial mechanism for compelling the assistance of private parties needed to protect our national security;
- The ability to cover intelligence gaps created by new communication paths or technologies.

Our experience in the past few days since the expiration of the Act demonstrates that these concerns are neither speculative nor theoretical: allowing the Act to expire without passing the bipartisan Senate bill has had real and negative consequences for our national security. Indeed, this has led directly to a degraded intelligence capability.

It is imperative that our intelligence agencies retain the tools they need to collect vital intelligence information. As we have explained before, the core authorities provided by the Protect America Act have helped us to obtain exactly the type of information we need to keep America safe, and it is essential that Congress reauthorize the Act's core authorities while also extending liability protection to those companies who assisted our Nation following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Using the authorities provided in the Protect America Act, we have obtained information about efforts of an individual to become a suicide operative, efforts by terrorists to obtain guns and ammunition, and terrorists transferring money. Other information obtained using the authorities provided by the Protect America Act has led to the disruption of planned terrorist attacks. The bipartisan Senate bill would preserve these core authorities and improve on the Protect America Act in certain critical ways, including by providing liability protection to companies that assisted in defending the country after September 11.

In your letter, you assert that the Intelligence Community's ability to protect the Nation has not been weakened, because the Intelligence Community continues to have the ability to conduct surveillance abroad in accordance with Executive Order 12333. We respectfully disagree. Surveillance conducted under Executive Order 12333 in a manner that does not implicate FISA or the Protect America Act is not always as effective, efficient, or safe for our intelligence professionals as acquisitions conducted under the Protect America Act. And, in any event, surveillance under the Protect America Act served as an essential adjunct to our other intelligence tools. This is particularly true in light of the changes since 1978 in the manner in

which communications are transmitted. As a result of these changes, the Government often has been required to obtain a FISA Court order prior to surveillance of foreign terrorists and other national security threats located outside the United States. This hampered our intelligence collection targeting these individuals overseas in a way that Congress never intended, and it is what led to the dangerous intelligence gaps last summer. Congress addressed this issue temporarily by passing the Protect America Act but long-term FISA reform is critical to the national security.

We have provided Congress with examples in which difficulties with collections under the Executive Order resulted in the Intelligence Community missing crucial information. For instance, one of the September 11th hijackers communicated with a known overseas terrorist facility while he was living in the United States. Because that collection was conducted under Executive Order 12333, the Intelligence Community could not identify the domestic end of the communication prior to September 11, 2001, when it could have stopped that attack. The failure to collect such communications was one of the central criticisms of the Congressional Joint Inquiry that looked into intelligence failures associated with the attacks of September 11. The bipartisan bill passed by the Senate would address such flaws in our capabilities that existed before the enactment of the Protect America Act and that are now resurfacing. We have provided Congress with additional and detailed examples of how the Protect America Act temporarily fixed this problem and have demonstrated the operational need to provide a long-term legislative foundation for these authorities by passing the bipartisan Senate bill.

In your letter, you also posit that our intelligence capabilities have not been weakened, because the Government can employ the outdated provisions of FISA as they existed before the Protect America Act. We respectfully disagree. It was that very framework that created dangerous intelligence gaps in the past and that led Congress to pass the Protect America Act last summer.

As we have explained in letters, briefings and hearings, FISA's requirements, unlike those of the Protect America Act and the bipartisan Senate bill, impair our ability to collect information on foreign intelligence targets located overseas. Most importantly, FISA was designed to govern foreign intelligence surveillance of persons in the United States and therefore requires a showing of "probable cause" before such surveillance can begin. This standard makes sense in the context of targeting persons in the United States for surveillance, where the Fourth Amendment itself often requires probable cause and where the civil liberties of Americans are most implicated. But it makes no sense to require a showing of probable cause for surveillance of overseas foreign targets who are not entitled to the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed by our Constitution. Put simply, imposing this requirement in the context of surveillance of foreign targets located overseas results in the loss of potentially vital intelligence by, for example, delaying intelligence collection and thereby losing some intelligence forever. In addition, the requirement to make such a showing requires us to divert our linguists and analysts covering al-Qa'ida and other foreign threats from their core role—protecting the Nation—to the task of providing detailed facts for FISA Court applications related to surveillance of such foreign targets. Our intelligence professionals need to be able to obtain foreign intelligence from

foreign targets with speed and agility. If we revert to a legal framework in which the Intelligence Community needs to make probable cause showings for foreign terrorists and other national security threats located overseas, we are certain to experience more intelligence gaps and miss collecting information.

You imply that the emergency authorization process under FISA is an adequate substitute for the legislative authorities that have lapsed. This assertion reflects a basic misunderstanding about FISA's emergency authorization provisions. Specifically, you assert that the National Security Agency (NSA) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) "may begin surveillance immediately" in an emergency situation. FISA requires far more, and it would be illegal to proceed as you suggest. Before surveillance begins the Attorney General must determine that there is probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that FISA's other requirements are met. As explained above, the process of compiling the facts necessary for such a determination and preparing applications for emergency authorizations takes time and results in delays. Again, it makes no sense to impose this requirement in the context of foreign intelligence surveillance of targets located overseas. Because of the hurdles under FISA's emergency authorization provisions and the requirement to go to the FISA Court within 72 hours, our resource constraints limit our use of emergency authorizations to certain high-priority circumstances and cannot simply be employed for every foreign intelligence target.

It is also inaccurate to state that because Congress has amended FISA several times, there is no need to modernize FISA. This statement runs counter to the very basis for Congress's passage last August of the Protect America Act. It was not until the passage of this Act that Congress amended those provisions of FISA that had become outdated due to the communications revolution we have experienced since 1978. As we explained, those outdated provisions resulted in dangerous intelligence gaps by causing constitutional protections to be extended to foreign terrorists overseas. It is critical that Congress enact long-term FISA modernization to ensure that the Intelligence Community can collect effectively the foreign intelligence information it needs to protect the Nation. The bill passed by the Senate would achieve this goal, while safeguarding the privacy interests of Americans.

Liability Protection

Your assertion that the failure to provide liability protection for those private-sector firms that helped defend the Nation after the September 11 attacks does not affect our intelligence collection capability is inaccurate and contrary to the experience of intelligence professionals and to the conclusions the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reached after careful study of the matter. It also ignores that providing liability protection to those companies sued for answering their country's call for assistance in the aftermath of September 11 is simply the right thing to do.

Through briefings and documents, we have provided the members of your committee with access to the information that shows that immunity is the fair and just result.

Private party assistance is necessary and critical to ensuring that the Intelligence Community can collect the information needed to protect our country from attack. In its report on S. 2248, the Intelligence Committee stated that “the intelligence community cannot obtain the intelligence it needs without assistance” from electronic communication service providers. The Committee also concluded that “without retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation. The possible reduction in intelligence that might result from this delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.” Senior intelligence officials also have testified regarding the importance of providing liability protection to such companies for this very reason.

Even prior to the expiration of the Protect America Act, we experienced significant difficulties in working with the private sector because of the continued failure to provide liability protection for such companies. These difficulties have only grown since expiration of the Act without passage of the bipartisan Senate bill, which would provide fair and just liability protection. Exposing the private sector to the continued risk of billion-dollar class action suits for assisting in efforts to defend the country understandably makes the private sector much more reluctant to cooperate. Without their cooperation, our efforts to protect the country cannot succeed.


Pending Legislation

Finally, as you note, the House passed a bill in November to amend FISA, but we immediately made clear that the bill is unworkable and unacceptable. Over three months ago, the Administration issued a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) that stated that the House bill “falls far short of providing the Intelligence Community with the tools it needs to collect effectively the foreign intelligence information vital for the security of the Nation” and that “the Director of National Intelligence and the President’s other senior advisers would recommend that the President veto the bill.” We adhere to that view today.

The House bill has several grave deficiencies. First, although numerous senior intelligence officials have testified regarding the importance of affording liability protection for companies that assisted the Government in the aftermath of September 11, the House bill does not address the critical issue of liability protection. Second, the House bill contains certain provisions and serious technical flaws that would fatally undermine our ability to collect effectively the intelligence needed to protect the Nation. In contrast, the Senate bill deals with the issue of liability protection in a way that is fair and that protects the national security. In addition, the Senate bill is carefully drafted and has been amended to avoid technical flaws similar to the ones in the House bill. We note that the privacy protections for Americans in the Senate bill exceed the protections contained in both the Protect America Act and the House bill.

The Department of Justice and the Intelligence Community are taking the steps we can to try to keep the country safe during this current period of uncertainty. These measures are remedial at best, however, and do not provide the tools our intelligence professionals need to protect the Nation or the certainty needed by our intelligence professionals and our private partners. The Senate passed a strong and balanced bill by an overwhelming and bipartisan margin. That bill would modernize FISA, ensure the future cooperation of the private sector, and guard the civil liberties we value. We hope that you will support giving your fellow members the chance to vote on this bill.

Sincerely,



Michael B. Mukasey
Attorney General



J.M. McConnell
Director of National Intelligence

cc: The Honorable Peter Hoekstra
Ranking Member, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence