N002481

January 21, 2002

Kenneth L. Zwick, Director
Office of Management Programs
Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Main Building - Room 3140
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Re: Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 - Interim Final Rule

Dear Mr. Zwick:

The undersigned, as general counsel for the Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York, hereby submit comments on the "Interim Final Rule" promulgated pursuant to Title IV of the Air Transportation Safety & System Stabilization Act.

We believe that the Interim Final Rule (hereinafter "IFR") must be modified in several ways, both in the interest of fairness and in order to properly comply with the intent of Congress and the specific language of the statute. We also note that even though we represent the firefighter community, many of our comments are applicable to all victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Our specific comments are as follows:

Eligibility

The IFR defines eligible individuals to include claimants who were "present" at the World Trade Center "at the time or in the immediate aftermath of the crashes."

The IFR defines "immediate aftermath" to be up to 12 hours after the crashes, except for rescue workers. For those rescue workers, the time period is currently expanded to 96 hours.

However, the IFR requires that an injured claimant have an objectively verifiable physical injury that was treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of sustaining the injury or within 24 hours of rescue.

We submit that the 24-hour requirement noted above is unreasonable. We particularly have in mind the thousands of New York City firefighters who responded to the 09/11/01 attacks at the World Trade Center and thereafter continued to search for their fallen brothers. We have heard countless stories that no firefighters were taking medical leave given the tremendous losses the Fire Department suffered and the emotionally-charged environment requiring that they stay at Ground Zero to help.

We are also sure that many non-rescue workers were too dazed or frightened by the events of 09/11 to seek care within 24 hours of being hurt.

We suggest that reviewing hospital and/or medical records will adequately insure that anyone claiming injury was actually hurt in the "immediate aftermath" of the attacks as defined by the rule. It would be grossly unfair to penalize any individual present during the attacks or who risked life and limb in rescue efforts for not having taken the step to seek medical treatment in the first 24 hours after being hurt.

Beneficiaries

Section 104.3 of the IFR provides that those qualifying as beneficiaries shall be determined under the laws of the decedent's domicile. Under current New York law, a "registered domestic partner" would not share in the proceeds of a wrongful death recovery. Nevertheless, it is clear that those firefighters, and other who had "registered domestic partners" under the New York City Administrative Code (Sections 3-240, et seq.), wanted them to be treated as if they were their spouses. We respectfully suggest that the IFR be amended to include a provision that a "registered domestic partner" be entitled to participate in any award to the same extent as would a spouse under State law.

Economic and Non-Economic Loss/Collateral Sources

The most troublesome provisions of the IFR relate to the calculation of economic and non-economic losses and the manner in which collateral source payments serve to reduce the net recovery of a claimant.

Section 402(5) of the Act defines economic loss to mean "any pecuniary loss resulting from harm. . .to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable State law."

In reviewing Section 104.43 of the IFR, however, it seems to focus solely upon calculations geared to a loss of earnings resulting from the decedent's death (in addition to medical expenses and burial costs).

A review of applicable New York law reveals additional components of economic loss that are not at all addressed by the IFR.

Under New York law, the loss of services of the decedent by his distributees are an integral part of economic loss. NO mention of this is made in the IFR.

I am aware that the rules contend that a portion of the awards for "non-economic losses," namely $50,000.00 for the surviving spouse and each dependent, include a non-economic component of "replacement services loss."

It is impossible to judge from the IFR the amount of this "component." Furthermore, since it is an across-the-board benefit for every death claim, it certainly has no relationship to the actual circumstances of individual cases. This can create a great injustice.

For example, we are aware of a case in which the surviving widow is legally blind and relied entirely upon her late husband for household work, transportation, home repairs and just about everything else.

We are also aware of a situation in which a widow has severe emotional problems requiring that her late husband do nearly all household chores and essentially act as a nurse for his wife on a daily basis.

We respectfully, submit that whatever portion the "replacement services" loss of the $50,000.00 for spouses and each dependent may be, it would be clearly inadequate in these and similar cases.

Simply put, the rules ignore the potentially significant concept of economic loss under New York law for the loss of services component of wrongful death damages. We are certain that testimony from forensic economists will establish a much greater value for this item of economic loss than permitted by the IFR.

An even more glaring omission is the failure of the IFR to provide any form of compensation for the economic loss of the intellectual, moral and physical training and guidance that a deceased parent would have given his children. Loss of this parental care and guidance is a traditionally significant element of wrongful death damages under New York law. For example, enclosed herewith please find a copy of a decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Paccione V. Greenberg, 256 A.D.2d 559, 682 N.Y.S.2d 442 (2d Dep't, 1998) permitting a damage award of 1.5 million dollars per child, aged three and six, for the wrongful death of their mother.

With respect to non-economic loss, the rules set a basic $250,000.00 figure, plus an additional $50,000.00 for the spouse and each dependent of the victim. As noted above, a portion of the $50,000.00 for the spouse and each dependent is alleged to have a "non-economic" component.

In defining non-economic loss [Section 402(7)], the language of the Act is very broad and includes within the definition, "loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium and hedonic damages and all other non-pecuniary losses of any kind or nature."

Significantly, unlike the statutory definition of economic loss, the definition of non-economic loss is not limited to those allowed under applicable state law.

Nevertheless, the IFR award for non-economic loss for decedents contains none of these elements - nothing is awarded for loss of consortium, loss of enjoyment of life or hedonic damages. We respectfully submit that inclusion of these items should result in a substantially larger award for non-economic loss than "presumed" under the IFR.

Collateral Compensation

We are aware of the constraints placed upon the Special Master by the definition of "collateral source" contained within the Act.

However, we believe the IFR gives an overly broad and incorrect interpretation of the manner in which the collateral source deduction of an award is to be made. It appears that once the amount of economic and non-economic losses are calculated, collateral source payments received by the claimant are deducted from the total in an "across-the-board" approach.

We submit that the methodology outlined in the IFR is both unfair to claimants and contrary to prevailing law. For example, pension payments made to a widow are clearly intended to replace the lost earnings resulting from the death of her husband. Therefore, if reductions are to be made, they would be properly subtracted from the lost earnings' component of economic loss. IT makes no sense, however, to reduce the non-economic loss portion of the award by a pension or, for that matter, even the economic portion of the award which is not related to a lost earnings' claim.

In that regard, you are respectfully referred to the decision of the New York State Court of Appeals in Oden V. Chemung County Industrial Development Agency, 87 N.Y.2d 81, 637 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1995) requiring that collateral source deductions be made only when they represent reimbursement of a particular category of loss for which damages were awarded.

Similarly, it also makes little sense to deduct pension payments, life insurance payments or other payments made to a surviving spouse from that portion of an award intended to compensate children of the decedent for their loss of parental care and guidance. We respectfully submit that further thought should be given to the manner in which collateral source deductions are made so that they can be properly allocated to the appropriate portion of the award and not unfairly penalize the claimants and the decedents' distributees.

Furthermore, any collateral source deductions must not include contributions by the decedent, earnings on those contributions or the premiums paid for the life insurance coverage.

Nor with respect to pensions should there be deduction for that portion already earned or vested by the decedent.

Finally, with regard to injured but surviving police and firefighters who were disabled by their injuries, and receive a line-of-duty disability pension, it would make no sense to deduct the present value of that pension from anything but the loss of earnings component of the claimant's damages. Otherwise, the pain and suffering component of claimant's award would be substantially eliminated and a non-disabled claimant would receive more than one who was disabled.

Life Insurance

At the risk of stating obvious, we believe the IFR should make clear that if the decedent left a life insurance policy payable to persons who are not intestate distributees, that life insurance should not be deducted from claimant's award. Only the beneficiary of the life insurance payment should be subject to the collateral source deduction of such payment.

Taxes

The Special Master's explanation of the manner in which presumed awards for economic loss are calculated state that: "Projected future income is adjusted to account for taxes that would have been paid." Once again, this is contrary to prevailing law. under New York law, unless there is an express statute to the contrary, there should be no deduction of taxes in calculating the value of the loss of future earnings. [See, Johnson v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority, 71 N.Y.2d 198, 524 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1988).]

Forfeiture of Right to Sue

One of the provisions that had caused great consternation to survivors and the families of deceased victims of the September 11th attacks is the rule that filing of a claim constitutes a permanent waiver of the right to file or be party to a civil action. While we are not unmindful of the language of Section 405(c)(3)(B)(i), we believe it would be equitable and appropriate for the final rules to define "submission of a claim" as to include the announcement of a "presumed award" by the Special Master. Only in that way can individuals who suffered tremendous losses on September 11th make an intelligent and informed choice of whether to take advantage of the Act or seek re-dress through litigation. There is no question that the Act creates an unprecedented method to compensate victims. However, it is the very unprecedented nature of this method that creates such uncertainty among the claimants. We submit that there will be no prejudice to the government or potential civil defendants if the above noted suggestion is adopted.

Life and Work Expectancy Tables

We are advised that the life and work expectancy tables utilized by the Special Master in calculating the presumed awards set forth in the IFR are out of date and unfair. They particularly ignore the increased role of woman in the workplace and the fact that individuals today work much longer than in the past. We suggest that any tables used be the most up-to-date and reflective of the reality of today's work force.

We ask that the Department of Justice seriously consider the above comments, as well as the comments submitted by others.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Comment by:

Uniform Firefighters
Association of Greater New York

Attachment

VIA FACSIMILE -         

(UF-050123)


442
682 NEW YORK SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES

defendant), convicting them of possession of
an ammunition-feeding device in violation of
the Administrative Code of the City of New
York Sec. 10-306(b), upon their pleas of guilty,
and imposing sentences.  The appeals bring
up for review the denial, after a hearing, of
that branch of the defendants' omnibus motion
 which was to suppress physical evidence.
   ORDERED that the judgments are re-
versed, on the law, that branch of the defen-
dants' omnibus motion which was to suppress
physical evidence is granted and the indict-
ment is dismissed insofar as asserted against
the appellants.

  On the evening of November 10, 1996, the
Kings County Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children (hereinafter SPCC) re-
ceived an anonymous complaint that there
were two children screaming in apartment 2
at 1107 Carroll Street in Brooklyn. The next 
evening, several SPCC agents went to the
building, knocked on the door of apartment
2A, which was the first door on the second
floor, and asked if they could check on the 
welfare of the children. The woman who
opened the door denying that there were any
children present and, protesting that "this
was not Nazi Germany", refused to let the
SPCC agents enter the apartment. After
they interviewed some neighbors, who said
they had seen two children enter the apart- 
ment on prior occasions, the SPCC agents
summoned the police.

  When the woman refused to let the police 
enter the apartment without a warrant, they
called the Emergency Services Unit (herein-
after ESU), who threatened to use force if 
she did not open the door. During the ensu-
ing search, an ESU officer discovered 12
handguns, 23 rifles, and various forms of
ammunition hidden behind a false wall in a 
coat closet. The defendant's who were ar-
rested and charged with 38 counts of weap
ons possession, moved to suppress the physi-
cal evidence. At the suppression hearing, 
none of the SPCC agents or police officers
testifies that they, or any of the neighbors
they interviewed, heard any children scream-
ing on the night in question.

  Contrary to the conclusion reached by the 
hearing court, we find that the warrantless
search of the defendant's apartment was not
justified by the emergency exception to the 
warrant requirement. In People v. Mitchell,
39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246,
347 N.E.2d 607, cert. denied 426 U.S.953, 96
S.Ct. 3178, 49 L.Ed.2d 1191, the Court of 
Appeals set forth the following three-prong
test for the application of the emergency
doctrine:
   "(1) The police must have reasonable
     grounds to believe that there is an emer-
gency at hand and an immediate need for
their assistance for the protection of life or
property.
  "(2) The search must not be primarily mo-
tivated by intent to arrest and seize evi-
dence.
  "(3) There must be some reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate
the emergency with the area or place to be
searched."

  In the present case, the prosecution failed
to satisfy the first prong of the Mitchell text.
The record reveals that the police entry and
ensuing search were triggered by ambiguous
and uncorroborated information relayed by
the members of a volunteer organization,
who were responding to a day-old anonymous
complaint. Moreover, the warrantless night-
time search of the defendants' apartment was
conducted after a minimal police investiga-
tion which failed to establish that any chil-
dren were in imminent danger. In the ab-
sence of an emergency situation justifying
the search, the motion to suppress the weap-
ons and ammunition should have been grant-
ed.

West Key Number System

   25b A.D.2d 559
Kevin PACCIONE, etc., et al.,
respondents-appellants
                    v.
A. Saul GREENBERG, etc.,
appellant-respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
    Second Department.
  Dec. 28, 1998.

  Husband whose wife had died during
surgery brought wrongful death action based

PACCIONE v. GREENBERG
Cite as 682 N.Y.S.2d 442 (A.D.2 Dept. 1998)

on medical malpractice against physician who
had cleared wife for surgery. The Supreme 
Court, Kings County, Garry J., entered
judgment on jury finding physician 24% at
fault, and awarding damages of $6,020,000.
Appeals were taken, and the Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, held that: (1) evidence
supported jury finding that physician's fail-
ure to read patient's hospital chart, and note
patient's liver problems, before clearing her 
for gall bladder surgery was a substantial
factor in causing patient's death; (2) awards
of $2.5 million each for loss of parental guid-
ance to both of wife's children were exces-
sive, and would be reduced to $1.5 million;
but (3) award to husband for loss of consor-
tium was not excessive.

   Affirmed as modified.

1. Physicians and Surgeons 15(12)

  Evidence supported jury finding that
physician's failure to read patient's hospital
chart, and note patient's liver problems, be-
fore clearing her for gall bladder surgery
was a substantial factor in causing patient's
death

2. Physicians and Surgeons 18.120

  Jury findings that physician's action in
giving cardiology clearance for patient to un-
dergo gall bladder surgery was not substan-
tial factor in causing patient's death, but that
failure to read her chart and note existence
of liver problems was such a substantial fac-
tor, were not irreconcilably inconsistent.

3. Physicians and Surgeons 18.110

  Awards of $2.5 million for loss of paren-
tal guidance to both of decedent's two minor
children were excessive in wrongful death
action based on medical malpractice, and 
would be reduced to $1.5 million each.

4. Death 103(4)

  Jury in wrongful death action could con-
sider issue of surviving husband's damages
for loss of wife's services, even through court
did not admit expert economist testimony as
to value of such services. McKinney's EPTL
5-4.3(a)

  Martin Clearwater & Bell (Mauro &
Goldberg, Great Neck, N.Y. [Barbara D.
Goldberg, Kenneth Mauro, and John L.A
Lyddane] of counsel). for appellant-respon-
dent.

  Coiro, Wardi, Chinitz & Silverstein, New
York, N.Y. (Sylvester J. Garamella and Rob-
ert M. Silverstein of counsel), for respon-
dents-appellants.

O'BRIEN, J.P., PIZZUTO, JOY and
GOLDSTEIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

  In an action to recover damages for medi-
cal malpractice and wrongful death, etc., the
defendant appeals, as limited by his brief,
from so much of a judgment of the Supreme
Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), entered Oc-
tober 10, 1997, as, upon a jury verdict finding 
him 24% at fault, and finding that the plain-
tiffs suffered damages in the total sum of
$6,020,000, is in favor of the plaintiffs and
against him in the principal sum of $1,477,-
513.41 and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, as lim-
ited by their brief, from so much of the 
judgment as apportioned liability to other
defendants who had settled with the plain-
tiffs prior to trial, and failed to submit the
issue of the plaintiff's damages for loss of the 
decedent's services to the jury.

  ORDERED that the judgment is modified,
on the facts and as a matter of discretion, by
(1) deleting the provision thereof which
awarded damages for loss of parental guid-
ance and substituting therefor a provision
severing the cause of action to recover those
damages and granting a new trial with re-
spect thereto, unless within thirty days after
service upon him of a copy of his decision
and order will notice of entry, the plaintiff
shall serve and file in the office of the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, Kings County, a writ-
ten stipulation consenting to reduce the ver-
dict for loss of parental guidance from the 
principal sum of $5,000,000 to the principal


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