

[PUBLIC] 1

the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

Nos. 23-13254, 23-13383

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARK GYETVAY, 1

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00083-JNE-NPM-1

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B for ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and WILSON, circa 1970s.

LAGOA, irc i J g :

Mark Gy vay, an American accountant and financial executive who worked for many years in Russia, was indicted on a variety of tax-related charges, following an investigation in which all of his company filings and concealment of funds in Swiss bank accounts. Gy vay was convicted a series of offenses: failure to file income tax returns for 2013 and 2014 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, making false statements on his SRAmlin Foreign Office Procedures certification in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and failure to file a 2014 Foreign Bank Account Report in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a).

On appeal, Gyday raises four arguments. First, argues that the IRS's reliance on the "substantial authority" test is arbitrary and capricious. Second, argues that the IRS's reliance on the "substantial authority" test is arbitrary and capricious. Third, argues that the IRS's reliance on the "substantial authority" test is arbitrary and capricious. Fourth, argues that the IRS's reliance on the "substantial authority" test is arbitrary and capricious.

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review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm the court's judgment, vacate the court's judgment, and remand for reconsideration.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Every American taxpayer making a gross income above a minimum exempt amount must file an annual tax return. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011(a), 6012(a). Under 26 U.S.C. § 7203, willfully failing to timely file a tax return is a misdemeanor.¹ Additionally, under the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations, every American taxpayer with interests or authority over a regulated account with a balance exceeding \$10,000 must file an annual

¹ 26 U.S.C. § 7203 reads as follows:

Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or submit any statement, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or submit such statement, at the times or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to the penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than \$25,000 (\$100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs or costs thereof. In the case of any person with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall apply to such person with respect to such a failure there is added to the tax under section 6654 or 6655 with respect to such a failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision of section 6050I, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting "felony" for "misdemeanor" and "5 years" for "1 year". c

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R [redacted] por of For ign Bank and Financial Acco n s form known as an “FBAR”) wi [redacted] IRS, id n ifying and d scribing a acco n . See (31 .F.R. §§ 1010.306 c), 1010.350 a). “T s r por s ar d sign d o lp gov rnm en ‘rac f nds’ a may b s d for ‘illici p rpos s’ and id n ify ‘nr por d incom e’ a may b s bj c o axa ion s para ly nd r rms of In rnal R v n od .” *Bittner v. United States*, 598 U.S. 85, 89–90 (2023) q o ing IRS P b. 5569, R [redacted] por of For ign Bank & Financial Acco n s FBAR) R f r- nc G id , p.1 R v. 3–2022)). Willf l fail r o fil an FBAR is a f lony nd r 31 U.S. . § 5322 a).

Gy vay, an Am erican ci iz n, is an acco n an d financial x c iv . In 1990s and arly 2000s, Gy vay work d in Moscow offic of Pric Wa r o s oop rs, v n ally ac i ving rank of par n r. In 2003, l f Pric Wa r o s oop rs o b com e i f Financial Offic r of Nova k, R ssia’s larg s pri- va na ral gas company. In 2005, Gy vay was “poin man” for Nova k’s ini ial p blic off ring “IPO”). Ov r n x s v ral y ars, in xc ang for is work on IPO, Gy vay r c iv d \$9.35 million in form of a call op ion and 7,287,134 s ar s of Nova k s ock, on op of millions of dollars in ann al incom e In 2007, d posi d \$9.35 million in a Swiss bank acco n ld in nam of Opo iki Mark ing L d. “Opo iki acco n ”). In 2009, (d posi d Nova k s ock in a Swiss s c ri i s acco n ld in nam e of F licis omm rcial orp. “F licis acco n ”). Bo acco n s w r op n d a o s Bank. (

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In mid-2010, Citibank informed Gyetvay that his Onshore tax returns needed to be disclosed for declared tax compliance by the end of June 2010. Gyetvay then disclosed the Onshore tax returns at Citibank and transferred them to another Swiss bank, HSBC, this time listing his wife, Nadezda Gavrilova, as the “beneficial owner” of the accounts. Citibank recorded Gyetvay’s “reason for disclosure” in the bank as “U.S. client tax compliance.”

Around September 2010, Gyetvay hired an accountant named Alex Kight to prepare his U.S. income tax returns for 2006–2009. By that time, Gyetvay’s tax returns for 2006, 2007, and 2008 were already late. That day, Kight asked Gyetvay whether he had any foreign bank accounts, and Gyetvay admitted that he had only “[] one account” in Russia with a balance over \$10,000. Kight also informed Gyetvay of his obligation to file BAR returns for the preceding years, but, according to Kight, Gyetvay dismissed the recommendation to add to file BARs for the years prior to 2010. Gyetvay concedes that he “did not file timely tax returns for BARs from 2008 to 2013,” and he admits that the “elusive account we tried to disclose” through that entire period.

In 2014, Citibank notified Gyetvay that it was participating in a program, established by the U.S. and Swiss governments, that would require that it provide U.S. tax authorities with information about Gyetvay’s past accounts at Citibank. Citibank advised Gyetvay of the IRS’ “Streamlined Foreign Offshore Procedures,” F

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which allowed taxpayers to file any delinquent tax returns for most recent years and any delinquent BARs for most recent six years. To participate in Streamlined Procedures, taxpayers had to certify that any prior failures to file tax returns, report foreign accounts, and pay taxes were “non-willful,” i.e., “due to negligence, inadvertence, or mistake” or “a good-faith misunderstanding of the requirements of law.” In 2014, Gyvay retained firm Anaford to help him with Streamlined Procedures, and in 2015, submitted his Streamlined filing to the U.S. government, along with his long-ardent tax returns for 2011–2013 and BARs for 2008–2013. Gyvay reported in his late-filed 2013 BAR that his net worth had grown to contain \$84,264,354, while Opoiki accounted for \$9,148,420. In his Streamlined filing, Gyvay certified that his “delay in filing U.S. tax returns [was] not due to any willful intent, but rather the result of [his] reasonable attempts to comply with increasingly difficult administrative requirements.” In June 2015, Gyvay filed a late BAR for 2014, in which he represented that he had signed a voluntary over-burdened financial instrument—a single Swiss bank account containing an “amount unknown.” He indicated that Gyvay intentionally “omitted Opoiki account” from his 2014 BAR (although Gyvay insists that it was because “[he] relied on blank fields” on the form).

Eventually, a grand jury began investigating the veracity of Gyvay’s statements on his Streamlined certification, as well as his history of tax evasion, failure to report income, “scores of Swiss bank accounts,” and “failure to disclose existence of those accounts to the government as required.” Before an indication was F

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returned, the government filed a *ex parte* application under 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1) to suspend the running of the statute of limitations against certain “Target Offenses” that the grand jury was investigating. On April 3, 2020, the district court overseeing the grand jury investigation granted that application and told the statute of limitations “for the offenses set forth in the government’s *ex parte* application.”

The grand jury returned a indictment on September 22, 2021, and a second superseding indictment on May 4, 2022 (which we’ll refer to as the “superseding indictment”). In the superseding indictment, the grand jury charged Gyetvay with three counts assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (Counts 1–3), three counts tax evasion, violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (Counts 4–6), and five counts willfully failing to file income tax returns between 2010–2014 (Counts 7–11). Count 12 charged Gyetvay with willfully making false statements in his IRS Streamlined Procedures certification, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Count 13 charged Gyetvay with willfully failing to file an FBAR disclosing that he had a financial interest, and signature and authenticity over, a foreign bank account, “to wit, the Otk account.” Counts 14 and 15 charged Gyetvay with wire fraud.

Gyetvay went to trial in March 2023. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all the fifteen counts: Counts 10 and 11 (failure to file income tax returns for 2013 and 2014), Count 12 (making false statements in his Streamlined certification), and Count 13 *a*

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(fail r o fil a complian 2014 FBAR . T j ry acq i d Gy vay
on on of co n s of wir fra d and ng on all o r c arg s.)
T dis ric co r s n nc d Gy vay o 86 mon s' imprisonm en
and ord r d im o pay \$4,021,074 in r s i ion o IRS.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Tolling the Statute of Limitations

T firs iss in is cas pos s a q s ion of firs impr s-
sion for is o r : nd r 18 U.S. . § 3292(a (1 , can a dis ric co r
oll s a of limi a ions for an off ns a was no id n ifi d
in gov rnm en 's *ex parte* olling applica ion? Und r a plain r ad-
ing of s a , w concl d a answ r is no.

Gy vay was convic d of o n s 10 and 11 of s p rs d-
ing indic m en , w ic c arg d im wi willf l fail r o fil f d-
ral income ax r rns for y ars 2013 and 2014, in viola ion of
26 U.S. . § 7203. T s a of limi a ions for § 7203 is six y ars.
26 U.S. . § 6531(4 . Gy vay's 2013 ax r rn was d on Oc ob r
15, 2014, and is 2014 ax r rn was d on April 15, 2015. T
ini ial indic m en was fil d on S p mb r 22, 2021. T par i s s
agr a , abs n olling of s a of limi a ions, o n s 10
and 11 ar imebarr d, sinc indic m en was r rn d mor
an six y ars af r d adlin s for Gy vay's 2013 and 2014 ax
r rns.

In a criminal cas , pon applica ion of gov rnm en , 18
U.S. . § 3292 allows for olling or "s sp nsion" of s a
of limi a ions if s v ral condi ions ar m e. T s a provid s:)

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U a l cat the U ted States, filed be re re-
 tur a d ctme t, d cat that ev de ce a
 ffe se s a re c u try, the d str ct c urt be re g
 wh ch a ra d jury s m p a eled t vest ate the -
 e se shall sus e d the ru the statute l m-
 tat s r the ffe se the c urt fi ds by a re -
 dera ce the ev de ce that a ffic al request has
 bee made r such ev de ce a d that t reas ably
 a ears, r reas ably a eared at the t me the re-
 quest was made, that such ev de ce s, r was, such
 re c u try.

Id. § 3292(a)(1). I ter ret th s statute, th s C urt has held that,
 due t the “*ex parte* ature § 3292 r ceed s,” a d because
 “statutes l m tat s are themselves mecha sms r e sur
 the rel ab l ty ev de ce submitted c urt r ceed s,”
 § 3292(a)(1) requ res the ver me t t “ r v de s meth w th
 ev de t ary value—that s, test m o y, d cume ts, r ffers, a d
 ther subm ss s bear s me d c a rel ab l ty—te d t
 r ve t s reas ably l kely that ev de ce the char ed ffe ses s
 a re c u try.” *United States v. Trainor*, 376 F.3d 1325, 1332
 (11th C r. 2004). The d str ct c urt must make fi d s by a re-
 dera ce the ev de ce, wh le the ver me t bears ts w
 burde rese t the c urt w th e u h ev de ce t sat s y that
 sta dard, wh ch “requ res the tr er act t bel eve that the ex st-
 e ce a act s m ore r bable tha ts ex ste ce[.]” *Id.* at 1331
 (qu t *Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension*
Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)). g

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On April 3, 2020, during inv s iga ory s ag o is cas ,
gov rnm en l d an *ex parte* applica ion und r § 3292(a)(1) o fi
susp nd running o s a u limi a ions or c r ain “Tar-
g Off ns s.” In suppor o i s applica ion, gov rnm en r pr -
s n d a :

A grand jury duly mpan l d in is dis ric as b n
inv s iga ing Mark Gy vay wi r sp c o als s a -
m en s mad on a volun ary disclosur l d wi

IRS, is us o s cr Swiss bank accoun s, is ail-
ur o disclos xis nc o os accoun s o
gov rnm en as r quir d, and is po n ial ailur o
r por all income arn d roug accoun s. Pos-
sibl criminal c arg s agains Gy vay includ : (i) ax
vasion, in viola ion o 26 U.S. . § 7201; (ii) ling als
ax r urns and docum en s wi IRS, in viola ion
o 26 U.S. . § 7206(1); (iii) aiding and assis ing in
pr para ion and pr s n a ion o als docum en s wi

IRS, in viola ion o 26 U.S. . § 7206(2); (iv) imp d-
ing du adminis ra ion o In rnal R v nu
laws, in viola ion o 26 U.S. . § 7212(a); (v) conspiracy
o d raud Uni d S a s, in viola ion o 18 U.S. .
§ 371; (vi) als s a m en s o Uni d S a s, in vi-
ola ion o 18 U.S. . § 1001; (vii) ailur o l FBARs,
in viola ion o 31 U.S. . §§ 5314 and 5322; and wir fi
raud and conspiracy o commi wir raud, in viola-
ion o 18 U.S. . § 1343 and § 1349; (“ Targ O -
ns s”).

T gov rnm en av rr d a “ vid nc o [s] Targ Off ns s,
o wi , bank accoun , busin ss r cords, and or ign ax r cords, ar fi

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[sic] indicated “Switzerland, Russia and Cyprus.” The district judge for the grand jury vesting granted the allocation to sustain, the “rule” of the statute limiting the offenses set forth the government’s *ex parte* allocation” based on its finding that “it reasonably appears that evidence of the Target Offenses solicited Switzerland, Russia and Cyprus.” Neither the allocation nor the trial judge denied a violation of § 7203 as to the “Target Offenses.”

On May 4, 2022, the grand jury returned the second superseding indictment which indicted Gyetvay for violation of § 7203 including willfully failing to make income tax returns for calendar years 2013 and 2014. Counts 10 and 11. The § 7203 violations were charged for the total indictment and Gyetvay moved to dismiss the superseding indictment including Counts 10 and 11 grounds of immateriality. The government argued, *res se*, that the trial judge allowed these charges despite the fact that the government’s allocation did not deny the statute under which these offenses were charged and the trial judge contacted evidence to find these charges. The district court denied Gyetvay’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The government then filed a motion *in limine* requesting that the court “find that the trial judge erroneously applied the statute limiting ‘Article 3, 2020’ or ‘all charges’ of the indictment.” Without much explanation, the district court granted that motion finding that “the United States’ allocation under Section 3292 . . . [was] valid and properly allocable to all charges of the [superseding] indictment” , including Counts 10 and 11.

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On appeal, Gy vey contends that the district court erred in holding that the constitutional provisions of sections 10 and 11 of the Indian Offenses Act support Gy vey's argument. His reasoning is straightforward: On its reading of the Act, the provision "offenses" within § 3292(a)(1) refers to offenses that the government seeks to prohibit—here, offenses of failure to file tax returns in violation of § 7203. Because the government never applied or relied on the "offenses" of failure to file tax returns in violation of § 7203, Gy vey reasons, the constitutional provisions or those offenses should not have been held, and the arguments were imbecilic. Gy vey urges that, as a result, the government had included § 7203 in its application, the district court is likewise bound to make its required actual findings under § 3292(a)(1).

The government acknowledges that it did not "cite 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (willful failure to file a tax return)" in its opening application, but insists that it did not need to. According to the government, its "description of offenses" was sufficiently specific to "cover[] failure-to-file offenses ultimately argued in sections 10 and 11." The government adds that a Special Agent's declaration filed in support of its opening application did mention Gy vey's failure to file timely income tax returns, so (in the government's view) the district court was correct to later find that its application and opening order relied on the constitutional provisions proffered in sections 10 and 11.

To sum up, the government's *ex parte* application sought to rely on the "Target Offenses," none of which argued a violation of § 7203. The opening order issued during its investigation.

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er d the case sus e ded the ru g the statute l m iat-
t s “ r the ffe ses set rth” the a l cat . N etheless
the d str ct c urt later read the g ver me t’s t ll g a l cat
a d the vest gat g judge’s t ll g rder t have sus e ded the
statute l m iat s r b th c u ts alleg g v lat s § 7203. ,

The a l cat a statute l m iat s s a quest
law rev ewed *de novo* while a d str ct c urt’s fi d gs act are re-
v ewed r clear err r. *Trainor* 376 F.3d at 1329–30. Whe t c mes
t quest s statut ry ter retat we beg as always “by
exam i g the text the statute t determ i e whether ts mea g
s clear.” *Harry v. Marchant* 291 F.3d 767 770 (11th C r. 2002) (e
ba c). I deed “[] c stru g a statute” we “ te sh uld e d as
well w th the la guage the statute tsel .” *United States v. Steele*
147 F.3d 1316 1318 (11th C r. 1998) (e ba c). “We g ve the w rds
a statute the r ‘ rd ary c tem p rary c mm mea g’ ab-
se t a d cat C gress te ded them t bear s me d ffere t
m rt.” *Williams v. Taylor* 529 U.S. 420 431 (2000) (qu t g *Wal-*
ters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc. 519 U.S. 202 207 (1997)).

As qu ted ab ve § 3292 erm ts the U ted States t file a
“a l cat ... d cat g that ev de ce a ffe se s a re g
c u try.” 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1). The the d str ct c urt “be re
wh ch a gra d jury s m pa eld t vest gate *the offense* shall sus-
e d the ru g the statute l m iat s r *the offense* ” t
“fi ds by a re dera ce the ev de ce that a ffic al request
has bee made r such ev de ce a d that t reas ably a ears”
that “such ev de ce” s abr ad. *Id.* (em phas s added). “Words are ,

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o b giv n meaning a prop r grammar and usag would assign m.” A. ALIA & B. GARNER, *READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT* 140 (2012). In is cas , “gram- mar and usag s ablis a ‘ ’ is ‘a unc ion word . . . indica [ing] a a ollowing noun or noun quival n is d fini or as b n pr viously sp cifi d by con x .” *Nielsen v. Preap*, 586 U. . 392, 408 (2019) (quo ing MERRIAM-WEB TER’ COLLEGIATE DI TIONARY 1294 (11 d. 2005)). Wh r a law us s a “d fini ar icl wi a singular noun,” law r rs o a “discr ing.” *Niz-Chavez v. Garland*, 593 U. . 155, 166 (2021). On a plain r ading o our s a u , r or , a dis ric cour can only oll s a u o limi a ions or “an off ns ” i Uni d a s fil s an applica ion indica ing a vid nc o “ off ns ”—i.e., a d fini or pr viously sp cifi d off ns —is in a or ign coun ry. Lik wis , dis ric cour mus find by a pr pond ranc o vid nc a vid nc o a d - ini or pr viously sp cifi d off ns is or was r asonably lik ly o b in a or ign coun ry.

Bas d on is plain- x r ading o s a u , w ic is un- ambiguously off ns -sp cific, w conclud a dis ric cour rr d in susp nding limi a ions p riod or oun s 10 and 11, b caus gov rnm en ’s olling applica ion did no indica a vid nc o os off ns s was loca d in a or ign coun ry, and dis ric cour n v r ound by a pr pond ranc o vid nc a suc vid nc was abroad.

Whil gov rnm en do s no app ar o con s is plain- x r ading, i argu s a i s applica ion was suffici n b caus S

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goverment, when allegedly right, need not deny fees by statutory tax, and, instead, “need only r v de a reas ably c s e f i d e s r t the fees under vest gat ” to meet the requirements § 3292(a)(1). The government claims that its desire that the fees was s e f i e u g h t e m pass the allure-t -file fees later charged C u t s 10 a d 11, because the actual “described the grand jury’s vest gat mult le - e ses, lud g d e e d a t’s ‘ t e t a l a l u r e t r e r t a l l m e e a r e d .”

We agree that the text § 3292(a)(1) does not require the government to list by tax the fees that may have been committed. But we are hesitant to create a rule so broad that it would allow the government to act with a wide brush and later be able to sweep (and roll up the statute limit as to) all sorts of fees to meet its actual .² On the government’s view, the sufficiently actual, the government appears to seemingly “[meet] the standard” right as long as it “deserve[s]” a fee with reasonable security. As the government

² I believe that the United States, for example, a district court held that an actual was sufficiently “s e f i ” to toll the statute limit as a tax-raid until it met the actual right order, because “tax raid s *intimately related to* the wire raid, money laundering, and so on, to commit money laundering fees that were under vest gat a d l s t e d the actual a d t l l g [] order.” *United States v. Swartzendruber*, 2009 WL 485144, at *5 (D.N.D. Feb. 25, 2009) (emphasis added).

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argued below, “ v n oug gov rnm en ’ applica ion pap r-
work did no ci o 26 U.S. . § 7203, r can b no di pu a
 applica ion d crib d off n o ailing o fil a ax r urn,” s
and “[] a i all a u r quir .”

But a i no all a u r quir . A bo a u ory
language and our ca law mak plain, § 3292(a)(1) r quir
gov rnm en and di ric cour o a i ya pr pond ranc -o -
vid nc andard. T gov rnm en mu me a andard by
providing r liabl vid nc a vid nc o ac off n a i u i
r a onably lik ly o b loca d abroad. *See Trainor*, 376 F.3d a 1336
(gov rnm en mu provid vid nc “ a i r a onably app ar
the requested evidence i in a or ign coun ry” (mp a i add d)); *id.*
a 1332 (gov rnm en mu provid ome ing wi vid n iary
valu “ nding o prov i i r a onably lik ly a vid nc *of the*
charged offenses i in a or ign coun ry” (mp a i add d)). For i
par , cour “ o w om applica ion i pr n d” mu find,
again by a pr pond ranc , a “(1) Gov rnm en a mad an
official r qu or vid nc loca d in a or ign coun ry, and (2) ‘i
r a onably app ar , or r a onably app ar da ime r qu
wa mad , a uc vid nc i , or wa , in uc or ign coun ry.’”
Id. a 1328 (quo ing § 3292(a)(1)). So, w il x o § 3292(a)(1)
do no r quir gov rnm en o num era off n by ci a ion,
w r j c argum en a gov rnm en ’ d crip ion o an o -
n —w ic , in i ca , did no v n d crib off n o ail-
ing o fil incom e ax r urn —i “all a u r quir .” s

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At a high level, “Congress has declared a policy that the statute should not be extended ‘(e)xce pt as therw se expressly r v ded by law.’” *Toussie v. United States*, 397 U.S. 112, 15 (1970) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3282). Where a doubt exists about the statute’s applicability in a criminal case, the statute should be construed narrowly against the government and in favor of the defendant. *BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton*, 549 U.S. 84, 95 (2006); *United States v. Gilbert*, 136 F.3d 1451, 1454 (11th Cir. 1998). This rule is “designed to protect individuals from having their lives and property seized by the government when the basic acts have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official abuse because acts that are distant in time and space may have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials to properly investigate suspected criminal activity.” *Toussie*, 397 U.S. at 114–15. Wherever statutory terms “extend[] the statute’s applicability,” the terms should be construed “narrowly.” *United States v. Maher*, 955 F.3d 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing *Toussie*, 397 U.S. at 115). m

With all this said, we think the best way to construe § 3292(a)(1) is to require the government to identify the offenses at issue with enough specificity to (1.) make clear to the judge what the allegations are related to which charges the government seeks to be tried, and (2.) “elicit evidence of the alleged violation under investigation by the grand jury.” *United States v. Wilson*, 249 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting *United States v. Neill*, 952 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D.D.C. 1996)), *abrogated on other grounds by Whitfield v. United States*, 543 U.S. 209 (2005). For example, m

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Wilson, Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's § 3292 colling order and rejected appellant's argument that a government's memorandum was not sufficient to toll statute of limitations with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 1957, because a statute was not specifically enumerated in the law. 249 F.3d at 374. *Wilson* relied on a government's use of perjury in its colling application, and a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is considered only in regard to as "perjury." See *id.* ("This circuit has previously held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 as 'perjury'"). As such, it was "clear" to the court that "[g]overnment's use of perjury in its request for assistance was 'reasonably specific' [to identify] all good violations under investigation] and ad quam toll limitations are off limits." *Id.*

Having concluded this conclusion, we return to our analysis in this case. As a preliminary matter, we find it irrelevant that on the "Target Offenses" in colling application was a violation in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. That paragraph is a (a) as under *Schmuck* (S) § 7203 is not a lesser-included offense of § 7201, because the offenses "require an element not required or granted by the offenses." *Schmuck v. United States*, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989).

Next, the government did not require notice of § 3292(a)(1) of offenses 10 and 11, and the relevant Gy v. Gay's failure to file a tax return in a declaration was inadequate. The government's application did not identify § 7203 as an offense under investigation. And the application's broad language—referring to Gy v. Gay's "potential failure to report all income earned through m

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acc u ts”—is suffic e t t c ver r e c mpass “the ffe se”
 a lure t le t mely c me tax retur s. Because the s ec c - fi
 e se w ll ul a lure t le c me tax retur s was t me t ed
 the g ver me t’s a l cat , the g ver me t d d t sat s y the
 requ reme ts § 3292(a)(1) t sus e d the ru g the statute
 l m iat s r C u ts 10 a d 11.

Gyetvay als argues that the d str ct c urt de e de tly
 a led t make d gs as requ red by the t ll g statute. We agree.
 Recall, u der § 3292(a)(1), the d str ct c urt must “ d[] by a re-
 dera ce the ev de ce that a ffic al request has bee made
 r[ev de ce a ffe se a re g c u try] a d that t reas -
 ably a ears, r reas ably a eared at the t me the request was
 made, that such ev de ce s, r was, such re g c u try.” A
 d str ct c urt “ca d th s ly t s g ve s meth g w th ev de -
 t ary value, that s, s meth g bear g d c a rel ab l ty, t eval-
 uate.” *Trainor*, 376 F.3d at 1332. But the c urt must tsel make
 d gs su rted by a re dera ce the ev de ce be re sus-
 e d g the ru g the statute l m iat s r the ffe se
 u der vest gat . A ter all, due t the *ex parte* ature § 3292
 r ceed gs, “the d str ct c urt s res s ble r e sur g that [a
 de e da t’s] terests are r tected.” *Id.*

Here, the d str ct c urt made d gs whats ever ev-
 de ce a v lat § 7203 ts rder gra t g the *ex parte* a -
 l cat , stead mak g d gs the “Target Offe ses” al e.
 The c urt u d, based a re dera ce the ev de ce, that
 “ t reas ably a ears that ev de ce of *the Target Offenses* s l cated fi

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in Switzerland, Russia, and Cyprus,” which made no such finding regarding violation of Gy vay’s alleged offshore income tax returns. Thus, the United States government’s application somehow encompassed violations alleged in Counts 10 and 11, as each was not properly alleged, causing the district court to discontinue the case without prejudice. The district court, therefore, erred in retroactively applying the holding of Counts 10 and 11, causing the government to prevail on its claim of violation of Gy vay’s alleged offshore income tax returns in 2013 and 2014, in violation of § 7203, was located in a foreign country.

For the reasons, we conclude that Counts 10 and 11 are dismissed. We reverse Gy vay’s convictions on those counts, vacate his sentence, and remand for sentencing.

B. Fourth Amendment Challenge

Next, Gy vay argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant of his email account causing the warrant and seizure to violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment “categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except on ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’” *Marlyland v. Garrison*, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. b

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IV). As the Supreme Court has explained the “mandatory” the particularity requirement is to “reveal general searches.” *Id.* “By limiting the authorized search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” *Id.*

On February 21, 2020, a magistrate judge signed a search and seizure warrant authorizing a search “[t]he contents of all emails associated with” Gyetvay’s Yahoo!.com email account “for the period January 1, 2005 to November 11, 2019.” Under the section titled “Information to be seized by the government” the warrant authorized law enforcement officers to “review the records produced by the Provider to determine whether the evidence consists of and includes a scheme to hide assets, offshore investments, and accounts to evade taxes or to conceal income derived from such assets, specifically the crimes: (i) evading taxes, violation 26 U.S.C. § 7201; (ii) making and subscribing to a false tax return, violation 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); (iii) aiding and assisting the preparation of a false tax return, violation 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2); (iv) willfully failing to make a tax return, violation 26 U.S.C. § 7203; (v) willfully failing to file or willfully filing a false return regarding back taxes, violation 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314–5322; and (vi) wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, violation 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and § 1349.” The warrant further specified the types of evidence sought to include “[e]vidence concerning any domestic or foreign reported assets financial,

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in r s s, p rsonal xp ndi r s, and/or bank acco n s ld in Gy ay's nam eor nominally ld by o r indi id als or n i i s," "[] id nc r fl c ing communica ions or corr spond nc b - w n Gy ay and is acco n an s and ad isors abo s r c ring financial ransac ions and/or Gy ay's ass s in a mann r o con- c al Gy ay's own rs ip of ass s," and "[] id nc r fl c ing communica ions or corr spond nc in ol ing Gy ay and any b sin ss par n r, associa , fri nd or r la i d mons ra ing Gy - ay's d cision o alloca im e, r so rc s, and ffor on affairs and ma rs o r an complying wi is ax and o r filing obliga- ions."

Gy ay ak s iss wi is las cla s , arg ing a "[a] s arc warran a d mands all mails r la ing o id nifi d ax ac i i i s, and mails no r la ing o os ac i i i s, simply d - mands all mails." H ealso arg s a ca gori s r la ing o is financial ac i i i s w r no drawn wi par ic lari y. Gy ay mo d o s ppr ss warran on S p mb r 2, 2022, on similar gro nds. On D c mb r 19, 2022, dis ric co r d ni d Gy - ay's mo ion o s ppr ss. T co r ld, firs , a mo ion was n im dy, b ca s i was "fil d l n mon s af r D f ndan r - c i d s arc ma rials in disco ry, [] long af r [c]o r 's d adlin for pr rial mo ions," and "l n mon s af r r c i ing a copy of warran and affida i ." T dis ric co r n ld a , " n if mo ion w r im dy fil d, [c]o r wo ld s ill d ny r li f," sinc warran "app ars o b s ffici n ly par ic lar in lig of compl x na r and siz abl im ed ra ion of ax fra d sc m eD f ndan is acc s d of commi ing." v

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I review a district court's decision affirming a summary judgment, we ordinarily review the court's findings of fact for clear error and the court's application of the law to those facts *de novo*. *United States v. Noriega*, 676 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012). However, when a district court decides a summary judgment on the basis of a summary judgment, we review for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Smith*, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990); *see also United States v. Taylor*, 792 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion where the defendant challenged the decision affirming a summary judgment); *United States v. Andres*, 960 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We review for abuse of discretion the decision [a]ffirming a summary judgment on the grounds of a summary judgment.” (citing *Smith*, 918 F.2d at 1509)).³ When a party also establishes a cause for a summary judgment on summary judgment, the issue raised the matter is not reserved, so we review the merits of the matter for any legal error. *Andres*, 960 F.3d at 1315–16; *United States v. Milian-*

³ *Smith* and *Taylor* interpreted the former version of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which has since been amended. The amended version went into effect on December 1, 2014. This Court has continued to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard to decisions affirming a summary judgment under the amended version of Rule 12. *See, e.g., Andres*, 960 F.3d at 1315; *United States v. Bowers*, 811 F.3d 412, 421 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Bowers moved to sever the indictment counts after the district court’s re-trial motion deadline, but before his trial, and with the attempt to establish a cause for his delay. His motion was, therefore, under re-amended Rule 12(e) and would likely have been under amended Rule 12(c)(3).”). y

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Rodriguez, 828 F.2d 679, 683–84 (11th Cir. 1987); *United States v. Bowers*, 811 F.3d 412, 421 (11th Cir. 2016) .

Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, any motion or suppression of evidence must be made before trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(A). The district court may “sustain or deny” a motion or make pretrial motions and may also schedule a motion hearing. In court decisions on, “denial is ‘sustainable.’” FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(1). “If a party does not make a denial or making a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the motion is unimpeachable. But a court may consider denials, objection, or requests if a party shows good cause.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3) .

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gy vey’s motion to suppress on inadmissible grounds. The defendant’s filing of pretrial motions was October 7, 2021. Gy vey filed his motion to suppress on September 2, 2022—nearly 14 months later. We recognize that Gy vey did not receive a copy of the warrant until around October 7, 2021, the same time as motions denied. But Gy vey never moved for an extension of time, nor did he acknowledge the motion’s inadmissibility or attempt to show good cause when he eventually filed his motion to suppress.

Again, Rule 12 provides that a district court may consider an unimpeachable motion to suppress only if the moving party “shows good cause.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(3). Gy vey did not do so in his unimpeachable motion to suppress or in a motion or extension of time, so we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in .

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de y g the m α as u t mely. *See, e. ., Milian-Rodri uez*, 828 F.2d at 682–83 (affirm i g d str ct c urt’s de al m α t su ress as g u t mely abuse- d scret sta dard where the a ella t m oved r rec s derat the c urt’s su ress dec s rty- e days a ter the fil g deadl e, a d the a ella t’s just fi- cat that he ly rece tly lear ed terve g case law d d t suffice); *Andres*, 960 F.3d at 1316 (h ld g that the d str ct c urt d d t abuse ts d scret de y g m α t su ress as u t mely because the de e da t’s “dec s t t t mely file a m α t su ress . . . based h s bel e that he w uld be subject t ma - dat ry l e m prs me t” d d t c st tute g d cause).

I h s re ly br e , Gyetvay argues that the d str ct c urt’s de al h s su ress m α was a abuse d scret because he rece ved the warra t at the same t me as the deadl e, he filed h s su ress m α s x m o ths be re tr al, a d the “g ver - me t where de t fies a earl er deadl e that Gyetvay sh uld have met.” But we have held that cla ms made re tr al m α s were u t mely a d, there re, r e ted⁴ where the de e da t “m ved t sever the d cted c u ts a ter the d str ct c urt’s re- tr al-m α deadl e, but *before his trial*, a d w th attem pt t establ sh g d cause r h s delay.” *Bowers*, 811 F.3d at 421 g

⁴Pr r t the 2014 ame dme ts, Rule 12 used the term “wa ved” t re er t a m α t t mely led. U der the ew vers the rule, wh ch m is the w rd “wa ved,” u t mely m α s are c s dered “ r e ted rather tha wa ved.” *Bowers*, 811 F.3d at 421. g

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(emphasis added). So too for, Gyday filed its motion to suppress before trial but offered no good cause or is l n-mon v d lay.

Moreover, questions before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying its motion as unimply—no whether the government should admit if it had an earlier adlin, nor whether the district court could (or should) admit and deny its motion differently. See *Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of North Miami*, 283 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (“When a district court as discretion, it is usually a range of choices it may make and still be affirmed; it is not only on rigid choice or court to make.”); *In re Rasbury*, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994) (“By definition[,] under abuse of discretion standard or it will v be occasions in which we affirm district court enough we would agree on our way ad in our call. That is how an abuse of discretion standard differs from a *de novo* standard or it will.”). In this case, the court simply ordered its own adlin a r Gyday filed its own good cause excuse is l n-mon d lay in filing a motion to suppress. A district court’s “scheduling order is not a ridiculous picture, idly n r d, which can be carefully disregarded by counsel with impunity.” *Cruz v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., PR, Inc.*, 699 F.3d 563, 570 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting *Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.*, 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992)). Rule 12 is clear that the onus is on the unimply party to show good cause, and Gyday did not do so. v

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Additionally, Gyetvay argues that a de al a m t su ress t mel ess gr u ds sa a use d scret where the c urt als reaches the mer ts the m t . But ur case law el es th s assert . I *Milian-Rodriguez*, r exam ple, we held that the d str ct c urt d d t a use ts d scret fi d g that a m t t rec s der a su ress rder was u t mely, the r ceeded t h ld that the d str ct c urt's a lure t su ress the ev de ce was t la err r. 828 F.2d at 683–84. We rejected the a ella t's r st that a arty's r e ture thr ough u t mel ess “s ex cused the d str ct c urt r ceeds t e terta the mer ts the arty's u t mely m t .” *Id.* at 683. F r all these reas s, the , we c clude that the d str ct c urt d d t a use ts d scret de y g Gyetvay's m t t su ress as u t mely, ecause the m - t was filed eleve m o ths a ter the deadl e set y the c urt, a d Gyetvay d d t sh w g d cause r the delay, as requ red y Rule 12(c)(3).

Because the d str ct c urt d d t a use ts d scret de y g Gyetvay's m t t su ress as u t mely, we rev ew the u derly g mer ts the m t r la err r. *Andres*, 960 F.3d at 1315–16; *Bowers*, 811 F.3d at 421. U der la -err r rev ew, we w ll reverse a d str ct c urt's dec s ly (1) a err r ccurred; (2) the err r was la ; (3) t affected the a ella t's su sta t al r ghts; a d (4) t ser usly affected the a r ess, tegr ty, r u l cre uta t jud c al r ceed gs. *United States v. Doyle*, 857 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th C r. 2017). We c clude that the d str ct c urt d d t la ly err decl g t su ress the ev de ce ta ed thr ough the search warra t. b

In *United States v McCall*, we recently held a “warrant authorizing a search of someone’s digital account” is a “particularized” search under the Fourth Amendment. 594 U.S. 1317, 1327 (11 Apr. 2023). The first particularization a warrant must satisfy is “narrowing the search based on subject matter or data.” For example, a warrant may limit investigation to a search of communications data of only communications with known or suspected co-conspirators.” *Id.* This condition and “predefined method of limiting the scope of a search warrant or a cloud account” is a “temporal limitation.” *Id.* at 1327–28. As we explained in *McCall*: “By narrowing a search to data created or uploaded during a relevant time connected to criminal investigation, officers can particularize their search to avoid general rummaging. Broad or data-based warrants with a sufficiently tailored time-based limitation can undermine any claim that a warrant is unreasonably broad.” *Id.* at 1328 (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the district court found a warrant was sufficiently particularized because it laid out discrete categories of video observations. Specifically, the warrant laid out categories of video observations that officers were allowed to search and a warrant tailored to crimes under investigation. Some of the categories used narrow language, such as “[v]ideo concerning any domestic or foreign bank accounts held by Gyday, including in his name, in his name as a nominee, and in his name as a nominee individual.” Nonetheless, Gyday argues that the categories were overbroad because they sought “communications about

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taxes and *not* about taxes” and “thus included ‘every email’ he sent over 14 years.”

We are convinced by this letter that the warrant. The warrant does authorize law enforcement officers to locate evidence communicating between Gyetvay and his associates about any issues related to “taxes [and] the avoidance of taxes,” as we have evidenced “viewing Gyetvay and a [associate] demonstrating Gyetvay’s decision to allocate time, resources, and effort to affairs . . . *other than* competing with his tax and other financial obligations” (emphasis added). Gyetvay takes this language to mean that the warrant authorizes a search for every email he ever sent over 14 years. While the “other than” language is admittedly misleading, we interpret the phrase, “decision to allocate time and resources to affairs *other than* competing with his tax and other financial obligations” to mean, “decision to allocate time and resources *away from* competing with his tax obligations.” This letter that is bolstered by the language of the indictment, which alleged that, between 2005 and 2015, Gyetvay transferred funds and that Swiss bank accounts “to make ers a investments and to pay for various ers a expenses, including the purchase of art, motor vehicles, and real estate.” Additionally, the warrant was expressly targeted at uncovering evidence of a scheme to “evade taxation” and “conceal Gyetvay’s *worldwide* [] assets.” We are thus dissatisfied to interpret the warrant’s “other than” language as “simply demanded [ing] a emails.” 1

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In any v n , as dis ric cour also no d, v n i a war-
 ran is ov rbroad, w do no suppr ss vid nc on ov rbr ad
 grounds i warran ‘ad qua ly conv ys i s param e rs.”
McCall, 84 F.4 a 1328 (quo ing *United States v. Delgado*, 981 F.3d
 889, 899 (11 ir. 2020)). H e , inv s iga ing offic rs r asonably
 could av b li v d” a n ca gori so accoun in orma ion
 r qu s d ll wi in prac ical margin o fl xibili y or []
 broad inv s iga iv ask.” *Id.*; see also *United States v. Schandl*, 947
 F.2d 462, 465–66 (11 ir. 1991) (up olding d nial o mo ion o
 suppr ss w r [i] was in vi abl a some irr l van ma rials
 would b s iz d as ag n s s arc d roug num ous docum ous
 or vid nc o ax vasion and ailur o fil , crim s a ar g n-
 rally only d c d roug car ul analysis and syn sis o a
 larg numb r o docum ous”).

T warran also con ain d a mporal limi a ion—t pr -
 rr d me od” o par iculariza ion or scop o a s arc war-
 ran . *McCall*, 84 F.4 a 1328. T warran sp cifi d a im ep riod
 or in orma ion o b produc d (January 1, 2005, o Nov mb r
 11, 2019), w ic corr spond d xac ly o im ep riod gov-
 rnm ous was inv s iga ing: T indic m ous s a s a Gy vay
 op n d Opo iki” Swiss bank accoun [i]n or abou S p mb r
 and Oc ob r o 2005,” and gov rnm ous av rr d in i s affidavi
 fil d in suppor o warran a Subj c Accoun was b ing
 acc ss d, or logg d in o, up un il on or abou Nov mb r 11, 2019.”
 Tim -bas d limi a ions on s arc o an mail accoun , sp -
 cially w n combin d wi subj c -ma r limi a ions, pr v n
 sor o g n ral, xplora ory rummaging . . . ab orr d by “

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clists.” *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). That is, “[b]y arranging a search of the data created and loaded during a relevant time connected to the crime being investigated, officers can articularize their searches to avoid general rummaging.” *McCall*, 84 F.4th at 1328.

We have upheld similar warrants as sufficiently articular even where these warrants did not set out a temporal limitation. In *United States v. Blake*, for instance, we upheld sufficiently articular a warrant that “was limited to certain categories of emails,” 868 F.3d 960, 966 (11th Cir. 2017), even though the warrant “did not limit the emails sought to emails sent or received within the time period [the deceased’s] suspected attack on the conspiracy,” *id.* at 973 n.7. Despite the “lack of a temporal limitation,” we reasoned, “the warrant was appropriately limited in scope because it sought only discrete categories of emails that were connected to the alleged crimes.” *Id.* at 973 n.7. This subject-matter limitation alone “revealed a general, exploratory rummaging through [the deceased’s] email records.” *Id.* at 973 (en banc quotation omitted).

Here, by contrast, the warrant was circumscribed to the categories of emails connected to Gyetvay’s alleged crimes and the time period being investigated by the government. As a result, although the warrant authorized an extensive search over a lengthy period of time, we conclude that the district court did not likely err in finding that the search and seizure warrant at issue was

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motion to suppress was sufficiently particularized so as not to be considered an unconstitutional general warrant.

C. Constructive Amendment and Material Variance

Next, Gyday argues that the government sought (and achieved) conviction under Count 13 for conduct not argued in the indictment. Specifically, Gyday argues that, although Count 13 charged him with “Failure to File [an] FBAR” or “calculatedly in 2014, the government never provided failure to file for a year, instead proving to the jury that Gyday filed a *false* 2014 FBAR—“a crime or wrong [] was not indicated.” In Gyday’s view, the government’s argument that he filed an FBAR that failed to disclose on his Swiss accounts went beyond what was charged in the indictment, violating Fifth Amendment’s dicta that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury” U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause, known as the Grand Jury Clause, “does not ‘premiadmand’ a prohibition on charging a defendant with a crime in an indictment against him’ or convicted on other grounds.” *United States v. Feldman*, 931 F.3d 1245, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Stirone v. United States*, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)).

Two discrete errors can arise when a defendant’s trial or court’s jury instructions deviate from what was charged in the indictment. *United States v. Flynt*, 15 F.3d 1002, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994). The first category of error is a constructive amendment, which occurs when “essential elements of the offense contained in

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dictum are altered—first, by a faulty jury instruction—by broadening the possible bases for conviction beyond what [as] was contemplated by the dictum.” *Feldman*, 931 F.3d at 1260 (internal quotation marks omitted). A constructive amendment to the dictum is “*per se* reversible because it violates the defendant’s constitutional right to be tried solely on the charges returned by the grand jury.” *United States v. Johnson*, 713 F.2d 633, 643 (11th Cir. 1983). The second type of error is a material variance, which occurs “when the charging terms of the dictum are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial reflects facts materially different from those alleged by the dictum.” *Id.* at 643 n.9. Unlike a constructive amendment, a variance requires reversal only if the defendant “suffered substantial prejudice as a result.” *United States v. Goldstein*, 989 F.3d 1178, 1198 (11th Cir. 2021). For example, we consider a variance to be prejudicial if “the result at trial differed so greatly from the charges that [the defendant] was unfairly surprised and unable to prepare an adequate defense.” *United States v. Lander*, 668 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2012).

Here, Gyetvay argues that the government constructively amended its “at least” material variance from the alleged facts contemplated by CUT 13 by the substituted grand dictum, which charged Gyetvay that he failed to file an FBAR for the calendar year 2014. We disagree as to both conclusions.

First, there is no constructive amendment to CUT 13 because Gyetvay was convicted of the same offense that was alleged by the dictum. As we’ve said, a constructive amendment cannot

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occur when a defendant's personal or financial instructions given to a jury so alter its substantial mental processes that all good indicia of a defendant's ultimate conviction on a ground not argued *Feldman*, 931 F.3d at 1260; *United States v. Gonzalez*, 661 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1981).⁵ Instructions are given to a jury that do not occur when a jury instruction "did not exactly match the form of the indictment"—so long as "the substance of the indictment is maintained in fact." *United States v. Vernon*, 723 F.3d 1234, 1264 (11th Cir. 2013). In this case, the Supreme Court's decision in *Gy v. Gy* will "willfully fail[ing] to file an FBAR[] disclosing a defendant's financial interests in, and signatur and other authority over, a bank[] account in a foreign country, which had an aggregate value in excess of \$10,000 during the 2014 calendar year, or will, Opoiki account—Acc xxx4056—a Falcon,"⁶ in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a). In turn, the district court instructed the jury that "a defendant willfully fail to file a report with the Department of the Treasury a disclosed ownership and signatory or other authority over a foreign financial account that contained more than \$10,000."

⁵ Decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. *Stein v. Reynolds Secs., Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).

⁶ In 2013, Falcon Private Bank AG, another Swiss bank, acquired assets of HypoSwiss and became the custodian of Gy's Opoiki and Flicis accounts.

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We find meaningful difference between the offenses charged—the defendant and the structure suggest to the jury. While the district court’s structure under C.U.T. 13 may have arranged the language of the defendant, the substance of the charge remained intact. *Vernon*, 723 F.3d at 1264. Moreover, the district court specifically explained to the jury that “[i]t is a Federal crime for a U.S. citizen to reside in a territory, or the United States Treasury has a heretofore, singular, authority, to control over each registered account that contains more than \$10,000 at any time during the year” (emphasis added). And the court instructed the jury that, under C.U.T. 13, the burden was on the government to prove that Gyetay failed to file an FBAR “that reports *all* the defendant’s registered accounts.” All these structures mirror what C.U.T. 13 charged: that Gyetay violated 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a) by failing to file an FBAR disclosing *one* of his registered accounts.

Furthermore, both the text of the defendant and the jury structure reflect that § 5314 is violated when one fails to file a *compliant* FBAR. As the Supreme Court has explained:

When it comes to the duty to file reports, . . . [§ 5314] says that reports “shall contain” information about “the identity and address of each person who is a party to the relationship,” “the legal capacity which the person has in the transaction,” and “the identity of each person who has an interest,” along with a “description of the transaction.” §§ 5314(a)(1)–(4). The law also directs the Secretary to prescribe “the way and . . . the extent” to which reports must be filed. § 5314(a). v

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....

[T]he relevant legal duty is the duty of the reporting person. Occasions for reporting must include various kinds of information about an individual's foreign "relationship[s] or relations ip[s]." But where a reporting person is negligent, whether a timely reporting person or not, mistakes about "address[es] [or] participation[s] in a transaction," or whether a reporting person willful errors in its "disclosure . . . relationship[s]," duty to supply a compliant report is violated. Put another way, the statutory obligation is binary. Either on the one hand "in any way and on any occasion," or on the other hand "no." Multiple willful errors about specific accounts in a single report may constitute a violation of § 5314, but even a single nonwillful mistake is not enough to pose a problem. On the other hand, § 5314 is violated.

Bittner, 598 U.S. at 93. In other words, on the one hand, the failure to file under § 5314 when one files an inaccurate or non-compliant FBAR. Both the indictment and the jury instructions reflect the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute.

Nor did the government's violation of the relevant provisions of the amended section 13 by modifying the substantial elements of the offense argued. The government argued that the jury and the present violation of the Geneva Convention filed a 2014 FBAR in which "only disclosed [d]omestic Swiss accounts" but "left off" as to the Swiss accounts, Opoiki accounts, obtaining over eight million dollars. The violation did not broaden the possible basis for conviction or conviction

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mod y the eleme ts the cr me charged the d ctme t, wh ch
(aga alleged that Gyetvay filed a 2014 FBAR that a led t d scl se)
e re g fi a cal acc u t. I sum, the d ctme t, the jury -
struct s, a d the ev de ce rese ted at tr al all re erred t C u t
13 the same way—as charg g Gyetvay w th a lure t file a 2014
FBAR that d scl sed the O t k acc u t. There re, we c clude
that there was c struct ve ame dme t here.

F r s m lar reas s, we c clude that the g ver me t d d
t mater ally vary r m the allegat s la d ut the d ctme t.
A mater al var a ce d ffers r m a c struct ve ame dme t that
a var a ce “ ccurs whe the charg g terms the d ctme t are
le t u altered, but the ev de ce ffered at tr al r ves acts mater -
ally d ffere t r m th se alleged the d ctme t.” *United States v.*
Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 324 (5th C r. U t A 1981 , *overruled in part on*
other grounds by United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th C r. 1983 .
Th s C urt has ex la ed that “[a] tal var a ce ex sts ly ‘where
the ev de ce at tr al r ves acts *different* r m th se alleged the
d ctme t, as sed t acts wh ch, alth ough t s ec fically
me t ed the d ctme t, are e t rely c s ste t w th ts allega-
t s.” *Goldstein*, 989 F.3d at 1198–99 (qu t g *United States v.*
Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1168 (11th C r. 1987 . A var a ce the
r just fies reversal ly where the de e da t has bee “substa -
t ally rejud ced thereby,” *Flynt*, 15 F.3d at 1005; that s, whe the
ev de ce rese ted at tr al “affect[ed] a substa t al r ght the ac-
cused,” *Gonzalez*, 661 F.2d at 492.)

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Gy vay argues that the government “prejudicially varied” from 13” because it violated the “savings” of Gy vay’s 2014 FBAR,” whereas the indictment argued “Failure to File.” But the indictment of Gy vay’s 2014 FBAR is immaterial, as the indictment argued Gy vay, in 13, will be found guilty of an FBAR “disclosing that he had a financial interest in, and signature and other authority over, a bank, securities, and financial account in a foreign country . . . or will, . . . Opoiki account” (emphasis added). As Gy vay insists, the government argued that a Gy vay’s 2014 FBAR was disclosed only on the Swiss bank accounts, without leaving off the Opoiki account. Indeed, Gy vay conceded that, when filing his 2014 FBAR, in violation of “omitted Opoiki account” because “[ran] out of bank funds” on the form. We use the same standard to order the government to provide a satisfactory difference from the indictment. *See Goldstein*, 989 F.3d at 1198–99. Therefore, when Gy vay was substantially prejudiced, because there was no material variance. *See United States v. Seher*, 562 F.3d 1344, 1366 (11th Cir. 2009) (“On your making finding of material variance downward examination of variance substantially prejudicial to the defendant.”).

In sum, we conclude that the government’s error is conclusively amended and no material variance remains from the allegations contained in 13 or supporting the indictment. 1

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D. Sentencing Errors

Lastly, Gyetvay argues that the district court committed a variety of errors at sentencing, including calculating his guideline range and ordering him to pay \$4,021,074 in restitution.

1. Relevant Conduct

We begin with the guideline range. As background, Gyetvay's guideline range was calculated using U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3, which instructs the Court to use the offense conduct (a lure to file a 2014 FBAR violation, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5314 and 5322(a)).⁷ Section 2S1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines directs the sentencing court to assign the defendant a base level "6 plus the number of offense levels from the table § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) conduct that the value of the funds" the defendant's unreported re-gifts. § 2S1.3(a)(2). Here, the PSI

⁷ Gyetvay's uncounted conduct were grouped together under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, which provides that "[a]ll counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped together as a single Group." "Counts involve substantially the same harm with the meaning of this rule . . . [w]hen the offense levels determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm result, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or the offense behavior's grossing or grossing nature and the offense guidelines written to cover such behavior." *Id.* § 3D1.2(d). "In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to § 3D1.2(d), the offense level applicable to a Group is the offense level conduct that the aggregated quantity, determined accordance with Chapter Two and Parts A, B and C Chapter Three." *Id.* § 3D1.3(b). "When the counts involve offenses the same general type that where the guidelines apply," the sentencing court applies the offense guideline that produces the highest offense level. *Id.* O

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determined that Gy vey “did not file FB R’s[sic] for 2005 through 2007 and filed unduly FB R’s [sic] for 2008 through 2013, [so] A’s accounts are also being considered.” The PSI calculated “value of funds” as sum of (1) “ignorable” of unreported Opoiki account in 2014 (\$8.7 million), and (2) combined value of unreported Opoiki and Felicitas accounts in 2013, when their combined value was \$93.4 million). The total value of funds attributable to FB R violations was thus \$102,112,774, increasing Gy vey’s base offense level to 30.⁸ The district court found that PSI correctly calculated guidelines, though it imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 86 months.

On appeal, Gy vey argues that PSI and the district court erred in including the large \$93.4 million sum—combined value of unreported Opoiki and Felicitas accounts in 2013—in its sentencing-range calculation. Gy vey argues that was only “convicted of not disclosing Opoiki account in its 2014 FB R,” so the district court should not have considered value of its unreported accounts in 2013, including “all greatly much larger value of Felicitas account,” when calculating total “value of funds” under § 2S1.3(a)(2).

⁸ Gy vey’s base offense level was increased by two levels because “(A) was convicted of another substantive offense under 18 U.S.C. § 530a(i)(3), United States Code; and (B) committed a offense while violating another law of the United States or as part of a pattern of unlawful activity involving more than \$100,000 in a 12-month period.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3(b)(2)(B).

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We review the procedural reasonableness *a se te ce*, which includes whether the guideline range was properly calculated, under an abuse-of-discretion standard *United States v. Register*, 678 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2012). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, allows improper procedures making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 853(b)(1) subject is raised before the district court are reviewed *a se te ce* for clear error. *United States v. Siegelman*, 786 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015). With respect to section 853(b)(1) issues, this Court reviews a district court’s actual findings of fact for clear error, and, in most cases, a district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with due deference. *United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez*, 363 F.3d 1134, 1136–37 (11th Cir. 2004). Whether an act qualifies as relevant conduct under USSC § 1B1.3 is a question of law reviewed for clear error. *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d at 1332.

Under § 1B1.3, the Guidelines, a district court must “consider all relevant conduct when determining the defendant’s total offense level.” *United States v. Bradley*, 644 F.3d 1213, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011). “[R]elelevant conduct is broadly defined to include both uncharged and acquitted conduct that serves to set the stage by a reasonable inference of the evidence.” *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d at 1332. Under § 1B1.3, relevant conduct includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, committed, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant,” as well as “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance” jointly undertaken criminal activity, “that were part of the same course

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conduct or common sense or plan as “offensive” conviction.” § 1B1.3 a) 1)– 2). “Because § 1B1.3 calls for a factual finding that a certain conduct is ‘relevant’ to ‘offensive’ conviction, . . . a sentencing court should make explicit relevant-conduct findings in order to facilitate appellate review.” *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d at 1331. “[H]owever, a district court’s failure to make such explicit findings does not preclude appellate review—and therefore does not warrant reversal—‘where the court’s decisions are based on clearly identifiable evidence.’” *Id.* quoting *Bradley*, 644 F.3d at 1293).

In calculating the district court’s inclusion of Felicitas under its § 2S1.3 a) 2) calculation, Gyday raised two substantial arguments on relevant conduct. One, Gyday argued that the district court failed to make “explicit relevant-conduct findings.” That is, according to Gyday, the district court erred by not explicitly explaining why Gyday’s reporting failure from 2005 to 2013 was “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3. Two, Gyday argued that this passage of filings and non-filings was not, in fact, relevant conduct. Because this “pass FBAR non-filings was not relevant to calculating guideline range under 13,” reasons, the district court erred in “permissible” addition of [\$93.4] million of purported loss amount, “which increased its guideline range by our ordinary means.

Webster with Gyday’s contention that the district court erred in not explicitly finding that this non-disclosure of Felicitas account up until 2014 qualified as relevant conduct. This issue is reviewed for plain error because Gyday “did not object to” (

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district court's failure to explain why [his] error regarding a lures] qualified as relevant conduct" below.⁹ *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d at 1330. q

We conclude that the district court did not laterally err. While the district court did not expressly articulate why it felt Gyetvay's error regarding a lures constituted as "relevant conduct" under § 1B1.3, we know exactly from what evidence the district court reached its conclusion. During the sentencing hearing, the court reviewed the "regional accounting table" at paragraph 25 of the PSI, which laid out the high balances of the Otkand Felcs accounts from 2005 to 2014. This table corresponded to IRS Agent Cillee Raaha's graph of the actual high balances of these accounts over the same period, which was published at trial and discussed extensively in direct examination. The court also asked the government to explain paragraph 45 of the PSI, which discussed the "total value of funds attributable to FBAR violations." The government walked through its calculations, which were again supported by the evidence introduced at trial. After considering Gyetvay's arguments at sentencing, the district court

⁹ Gyetvay insists that he did object to the PSI's use of the Felcs balance to calculate the aggregate sum of the funds and the guideline range. Gyetvay also stated his objection resulted from the PSI that "[t]he funds involved the regional conduct for which Mr. Gyetvay was convicted and only involve the funds of the Otkand account which was not merely reported." But these objections were directed toward the district court's ultimate conclusions of Felcs funds to § 2S1.3 calculations, not the district court's failure to make actual findings. Where a party did not object to the district court's "failure to explain why" certain conduct qualified as relevant conduct, our review of that issue is not laterally error. *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d at 1330. q

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s a d a i ad “ard vid nc a rial,” and i fo nd a
vid nc s ppor d “fac al ass r ions” in PSI “ y pr -
pond ranc of vid nc a a minim um.”

B ca s i is cl ar o s w a vid nc dis ric co r r -
li d pon in calc la ing i s s n nc , dis ric co r did no
plainly rr y failing o provid an xplici r l van -cond c xpla-
na ion. *See Siegelman*, 786 F.3d a 1331; *Bradley*, 644 F.3d a 1293
(finding “no rror, muc l ss plain rror, in dis ric co r ’s fail-
r o mak sp cific fac al findings” ca s w co ld “asily d -
rmin on w ic vid nc co r r li d, and w r q ir no -
ing mor ”). T r for , r v rsal is no warran d on is asis.

T n x q s ion is w r Gy vay’s r por ing fail r s
w n 2005 and 2013 w r , in fac , r l van cond c s c a
\$93.4 million s o ld av n add d o val of f nds,
incr asing Gy vay’s as off ns l v l o 30. Gy vay arg s a
PSI and dis ric co r w r wrong o consid r is arli r
n im dy filings and is fail r o disclos F licis acco n from
2008 o 2013 as r l van cond c for p rpos s of o n 13, w ic
c arg d Gy vay wi fail r o fil an acc ra 2014 FBAR. Gy -
vay’s 2014 FBAR did disclos F licis acco n . Upon r vi w, w
do no ink dis ric co r cl arly rr d in adop ing PSI’s
“r l van cond c ” d rmina ion.

As d fin d y S n ncing G id lin s, r l van cond c
incl d s, “wi r sp c o off ns s of a c arac r for w ic
§ 3D1.2(d) wo ld r q ir gro ping of mul ipl co n s,” “all ac s
and omissions . . . a w r par of sam eco rs of cond c or b

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commo scheme r la as the ffe se c v ct .”¹⁰ § 1B1.3 a) 2). The PSI cludes a sect ex la g why Gyetvay’s(“u t mely 2008–2013 FBARs are releva t c duct r the [c] urt’s c s derat .” The PSI determ i ed that Gyetvay’s “earl er w ll ul a lures t file FBARs [were] a r r ate releva t c duct” u der b th the res me t ed the Se te c g Gu del es. O the e ha d, the PSI determ i ed that “[t]he c u t c v ct a d the earl er a lures t d scl se were art a c mmo scheme r la g ve the c mmo v ct m the De artme t Treasury) a d the c mmo ur se the ffe se c ceal g reg ba k ac c u ts).” O the ther, the c duct r ve C u t 13 a d Gyetvay’s r r re rt g a lures “were als art the same c urse c duct,” s ce Gyetvay “c s ste tly a led t d scl se h s Sw ss (

¹⁰ The c mme tary tes t the Gu del es state that e ses rm the same c urse c duct “ they are su c e tly c ected r related t each ther as t warra t the c clus that they are art a s gle e s de, s ree, r g g ser es e ses.” § 1B1.3 a) 2) cmt. .5 B)). The c mme tary tes add that e ses ca als rm the same scheme r la they are “substa t ally c ected t each ther by at least e c mmo act r, such as c mmo v ct ms, c mmo acc m p ces, c mmo ur se, r s m lar m odus era d.” *Id.* at cmt. .5 B)). Further, “[t]he ature the e ses may [] be a releva t c s derat ,” such that “a de e da t’s a lure t le tax retur s three c secut ve years a r r ately w uld be c s dered as art the same c urse c duct because such retur s are ly requ red at yearly tervals.” *Id.* at cmt. .5 B)). But we d t “de er” t the c mme tary r a l cat tes here because we d t d the text § 1B1.3 a) 2) t be “ge u ely amb gu us.” See *United States v. Dupree*, 57 F.4th 1269, 1274 11th C r. 2023) (e ba c).

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bank account s,” and “[]is ac ions ar b s s n as on con inuin
a mp o id s account s.”

We canno say dis ric cour cl arly rr d in adop in is
d rmina ion. T ov rnm en in rodud vid nc a Gy -
vay n v r fil d FBARs or cal ndar y ars 2005–2007 and ail d o
im ly fil FBARs or cal ndar y ars 2008–2013. T ov rnm en
also pr s n d vid nc a Gy vay did no im dy fil incom e ax
r urns b w n 2005 and 2014. Gy vay’s couns l acc p d, in
closin , a Gy vay’s “r urns w r la -fil d,” and Gy vay now
admi s a “did no fil im dy ax r urns or FBARs rom 2008
o 2013.” Addi ionally, jury ard rom Al x Kni , on o
Gy vay’s account an s, w o a s d a is firm advis d Gy vay
in 2010 “o is obli a ion o fil [FBAR] orms or pas y ars, bu
[Gy vay] dismiss d our r commenda ion and did no fil suc
orms or y ars prior o 2010.” Kni also s ifi d a Gy vay
old Kni ’s firm a ad only on or i n bank account wi
a balanc ov r \$10,000, w ic Gy vay now acknowl d s was
als , as is “F licis account w n undisclos d un il 2014 FBAR.”
T is vid nc indica s a Gy vay conc al d millions o dollars
rom IRS or y ars a a ime T vid nc pr s n d a rial
us suppor s—a l as by a pr pond ranc —t a Gy vay’s r -
por in ailur s rom 2005 o 2013 w r subs an ially conn c d o
is r por in ailur in 2014 rou a common vic im (U.S.
D par m en o Tr asury) and a common cours o conduc .

T vid nc also suppor s findin a Gy vay’s r -
por in ailur s rom b or 2014 ad a common purpos wi is g

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a lure to report the Otk account has 2014 FBAR: to conceal taxable money Swiss bank accounts. The government showed, for instance, that after Gyetvay closed his accounts at Citibank (which were deemed by Citibank to be “tax compliant”), he opened new accounts at HSBC, this time listing his wife, Nadezda Gavrilova—a Russian citizen—as the beneficial owner of the Otk and Felcs accounts. Gavrilova testified at trial that she played no role in the finances of the household, and that she had “dealt with a year’s worth of bank accounts at all.” She further testified that she “didn’t know” that she was listed as a beneficial owner of bank accounts. Douglas Miller, who worked with Gyetvay at Price Waterhouse Coopers, testified that, in Russia, the process by which investors “with their shares through complicated structures,” including by assigning “beneficial ownership” to others, is carried out through “disguised” assets. Based on our review of this evidence and other evidence in the record, we do not think the court clearly erred in finding that the PSI’s relevant conduct determination was adequately shown by a preponderance of the evidence.

Gyetvay insists that his “erroneous” filed FBARs are not relevant conduct because his 2014 FBAR, “unlike erroneous filings, [] disclosed the Felcs account.” But the question is whether Gyetvay’s erroneous disclosure of his accounts, particularly in 2013, is relevant to his erroneous disclosure of the Otk account in 2014—and the evidence supports that finding by a preponderance. We will not find clear error unless we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. *United States v. White*, 335 x

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F.3d 1314, 1319 (11 ir. 2003). We us conc ud a dis ric cour did no c ary rr in r a ing Gy vay's pr -2014 r por ing l ai ur s as r van conduc b caus i "is p ausib in ig o r cord vi w d in i s n ir y" a Gy vay's ai ur o r por or-ign accoun s b w n 2005 and 2013 and is ai ur o r por Opo iki accoun on is 2014 FBAR w r par o sam ecommon sc m e p an, or cours o conduc . See *Siegelman*, 786 F.3d a 1333 (ci ing *Anderson v. City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

2. Va ua ion o Unr por d Accoun s

Gy vay argu s a , "apar rom w r F icis ac- coun 's va u s ou d av b n consid r d a a , dis ric cour ai d o consid r accoun 's prop r va ua ion." Gy vay's -ory is a dis ric cour ov rva u d unds in F icis ac- coun b caus F icis accoun con ain d Nova k s ock, and, according o Gy vay, Nova k s ock is "no v ry iquid." Gy vay, r or , urg s us o vaca is s n nc b caus dis ric cour ai d o ca cu a s ock's air mark va u .

T dis ric cour did no c ary rr in adop ing PSI's va ua ion o F icis accoun b caus gov rnm en suppor d i s ca cu a ion wi "r iab and sp cific vid nc ." *United States v. Sepulveda*, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11 ir. 1997). Und r § 2B1.1(b)(1), "[] dis ric cour is p rmi d o bas i s oss d rmina ion on ac ua findings d riv d rom, 'among o r ings, vid nc ard during ria , undispu d s a m en s in PSI, or vid nc pr - s n d during s n ncing aring.'" *Bradley*, 644 F.3d a 1290 (quo ing *United States v. Polar*, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11 ir. 2004)). 1

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“The district court needs only to make a reasonable estimate of the loss amount.” *United States v. Medina*, 485 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2007).

Here, the PSI derived its calculations from the combined values of the Otkand Felcs accounts using IRS Agent Raha’s calculations. Agent Raha testified and explained that she conducted her analysis by reviewing Gyetvay’s bank statements and adding up all the assets Agent Raha walked through her “grah” the actual high balance of the Otkand Felcs accounts” with the jury. She further testified that the highest figure—for 2013—was \$93,412,774. Gyetvay himself came up with the same figure in his late-filed 2013 FBAR. In light of this evidence and testimony, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in adopting the PSI’s valuation of the Felcs account, because “the numbers and the calculations themselves were sufficiently specific,” and “there is no indication that it was unreliable.” *Bradley*, 644 F.3d at 1292. Gyetvay has not submitted any evidence that the government’s “averages, estimates, or results are so wildly inaccurate as to be unreasonable.” *Id.* And “either this [C]ourt or the Guidelines insist that district courts calculate the amount of loss with utmost precision; the Guidelines merely require the district court to reach a reasonable estimate of the loss amount.” *Id.* at 1290. The evidence at trial and the PSI’s arithmetic were sufficiently reliable in this case.

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3. R s i u i o n

Finally, Gy vay argues a is ric cour cl arly rr in d or ring im o pay \$4,021,074 in r s i u i o n o IRS. Wer vi w *de novo* l gali y o a r s i u i o n or r, w il w r vi w a ac ual fin ing r gar ing sp cific amoun o r s i u i o n or cl ar rror. *United States v. Huff*, 609 F.3 1240, 1247 (11 ir. 2010).

T Man a ory Vic ims R s i u i o n Ac (“MVRA”) r - quir s r s i u i o n or an “off ns agains prop r y.” 18 U.S. . § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii). For an off ns o quali y un r is provision, “[p]rop r y . . . mus s rv as obj c o off ns , no simply a colla ral compon n .” *United States v. Collins*, 854 F.3 1324, 1331 (11 ir. 2017). T is inclu s si ua ions w r a n an “in- n s o amag ano r’s prop r y” or “s ks o riv an unlaw- ul b n fi rom ano r’s prop r y or o rwis priv a p rson o is prop r y.” *Id.* riminal con uc o s no au oma ically qual- i y as an off ns agains prop r y “sol ly b caus i r sul s in prop- r y amag or b caus som eon suff rs a loss a som epoin ur- ing i s x cu ion.” *Id.* a 1331–32. Wh n a is ric cour or rs r s i u i o n, i “mus xplain i s fin ing s wi suffici n clari y o n- abl is cour o a qua ly p r orm i s unc ion on app lla r - vi w.” *Huff*, 609 F.3 a 1248; *see also* 18 U.S. . § 3664() (“Any is- pu as o prop ramoun or yp o r s i u i o n s all b r solv by cour by pr pon ranc o vi nc .”).

Gy vay was convic o oun 12 o sup rs ing in- ic m en , w ic c arg im wi will ully making als s a - m en s on is IRS S r amlin Proc ur s c r ifica ion, in viola ion d

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18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 2. According to the PS, this conviction required mandatory restitution “because Gyetvay’s false statements resulted in having the estate totaling \$2,813,382, excluding interest.” Adding interest to the sum of \$1,207,692 to the underlying gross amount, the PS arrived at a total restitution figure of \$4,021,074. Gyetvay objected to both the legal basis for restitution and the amount imposed, arguing that the MVRA “describes a felony . . . because the conviction is under Title Twelve, which is a felony against property.” With utmost reluctance, the district court adopted the PS’s figure and ordered Gyetvay to pay \$4,021,074 in restitution to the RS.

On appeal, Gyetvay again argues that his conviction under Circuit 12 “cannot support restitution” because the district court never found that that conviction was a felony against property. He adds that the district court never made findings that he “ha[d] the general causation property loss” to the government, or that the property loss was anything other than collateral recidivism.

We agree with Gyetvay that the district court erred in its calculation of the restitution amount being \$4,021,074. This Court has held that a district court must make restitution findings with enough clarity to substantiate an appellate review. *Huff*, 609 F.3d at 1248; *see also United States v. Singleton*, 649 F.3d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The able measurement of an appellate review, a district court’s calculation of restitution must be supported by specific actual findings.”). Here, the district court did not provide a single actual finding to support its restitution figure, much less address I

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Gy vay's obj c ion and xplain y oun 12 coun s as an off ns
 agains prop r y, as oppos d o an off ns " i only incid n al w
 prop r y loss." *Collins*, 854 F.3d a 1332.

I may ll b ru a obj c o Gy vay's off ns o
 making als s a m en s on is S r amlin d Proc dur s c r ifica-
 ion, in viola ion o § 1001, as o in n ionally d priv IRS o
 prop r y in orm o ax dollars, as gov rnm en posi s. Bu
 dis ric cour did no mak a finding, nor do s gov rn-
 m en say i did. B caus dis ric cour gav us no ac ual find-
 ings o consid ron qu s ion o w r prop r y s rv d as
 "obj c o off ns " in oun 12, *see id.* a 1331, "[] only
 cours op n ous...is o vaca [r s i u ion] ord r and r mand
 cas or dis ric cour o corr c i s ov rsig ," *United States*
v. Maurya, 25 F.4 829, 837 (11 ir. 2022); *see also Huff*, 609 F.3d
 a 1248–49 (vacating r s i u ion ord r and r manding or a lim-
 i d r s n ncing on sol issu o amoun o r s i u ion b -
 caus dis ric cour "did no mak sp cific ac ual findings o
 vic ims' ac ual loss s, as r quir d by § 3664").¹¹ Accordingly,
 vaca r s i u ion a ard and r mand on is issu .

¹¹ In a no ic o suppl m en al au ori y, Gy vay argu s a *United States v. Schwarzbaum*, 114 F.4 1319 (11 ir. 2024) s o s a r s i u ion im-
 pos d in is cas as improp rly puni iv ra r an prop rly r m edial. In
Schwarzbaum, ld a " FBAR p nal y is a in subj c o Eig
 Am endm en 's Exc ssiv Fin s laus ." 114 F.4 a 1334. Ho v r, civil
 FBAR p nal y is no a issu in is cas , so d clin o x nd *Schwarzbaum's* w
 olding r .

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we affirm Gyetvay's convictions. Circuits 12 and 13 reverse Gyetvay's convictions. Circuits 10 and 11 vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. Additionally we vacate the restitutio order and direct the district court to reconsider the issue of restitution accordance with this.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

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