# ORIGINAL

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	x :	1.0.CRIM551
V.	:	Filed:
ALEXANDER W. WRIGHT,	:	Violations DC 18DNYC. § 371 DOCUMENT
Defendant.	:	ELECTRONICALLY FILED
\$	:	DOC #:
	X	DATE FILED: JUL 18 20

## PLEA AGREEMENT

The United States of America and the defendant, ALEXANDER W. WRIGHT, hereby enter into the following plea agreement ("Agreement") pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Fed. R. Crim. P.").

# AGREEMENT TO PLEAD GUILTY AND WAIVE CERTAIN RIGHTS

1. WRIGHT agrees to waive indictment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b), and plead guilty to a one-count Information, in the form attached, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in which WRIGHT is charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, in connection with a conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which began on or about June 12, 2002 and continued until on or about June 20, 2002. During the conspiracy period, WRIGHT, while working for a financial services company, a wholly owned subsidiary of a certain Financial Institution with its principal place of business in New York, New York, agreed to devise and devised

a scheme and artifice to defraud a municipal bond issuer by manipulating the bidding process for a municipal finance contract in favor of such Financial Institution, and for purposes of executing the scheme, caused the use of interstate wires.

#### **DEFENDANT'S COOPERATION**

- 2. WRIGHT will continue to cooperate fully and truthfully with the United States in the prosecution of this case, the conduct of the current federal investigation of violations of federal antitrust and related criminal laws involving municipal investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts, as well as any other federal investigation resulting therefrom, and any litigation or other proceedings arising or resulting from any such investigation to which the United States is a party (collectively referred to herein as "Federal Proceeding"). The ongoing, full, and truthful cooperation of WRIGHT shall include, but not be limited to:
- (a) WRIGHT agrees to produce to the United States all documents, information, and other materials, including any personal documents, in the possession, custody, or control of WRIGHT that may be requested by the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding;
- (b) WRIGHT agrees to make himself available for interviews with the attorneys and agents of the United States at the New York Office of the Antitrust

  Division, or at other mutually agreed upon locations, upon the request of attorneys and/or agents of the United States;

- (c) WRIGHT agrees to bring to the attention of the United States all crimes which he has committed, and all administrative, civil, and/or criminal proceedings, investigations, or prosecutions in which he, to his knowledge, is or has been a subject, target, party, or witness;
- (d) WRIGHT agrees to respond fully and truthfully to all inquiries of the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding, without falsely implicating any person or intentionally withholding any information, subject to the penalties of making false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001) and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, et seq.);
- (e) WRIGHT agrees, upon the request of the United States, to voluntarily provide the United States with any materials or information, not requested in (a)-(c) of this paragraph, that may relate to any such Federal Proceeding;
- (f) WRIGHT, when called upon to do so by the United States in connection with any Federal Proceeding, will testify in grand jury, trial, and other judicial proceedings fully, truthfully and under oath, subject to the penalties of perjury (18 U.S.C. § 1621), making false statements or declarations in grand jury or court proceedings (18 U.S.C. § 1623), contempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 401-402), and obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503, et seq.);
- (g) WRIGHT agrees to consent to such adjournments of his sentence as may be requested by the Antitrust Division; and

- (h) WRIGHT agrees to commit no further crimes whatsoever.
- 3. WRIGHT agrees that any assistance he may provide to federal criminal investigators in connection with any Federal Proceeding shall be pursuant to the specific instructions and control of the Antitrust Division and those federal criminal investigators.

### GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT

Subject to the full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of WRIGHT, as 4. described in Paragraph 2 of this Agreement, and upon the Court's acceptance of the guilty plea called for by this Agreement, WRIGHT will not be further prosecuted criminally by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and with respect to tax crimes, by the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, for crimes committed prior to the date of this Agreement arising from the following activity (to the extent that WRIGHT has disclosed his participation in such criminal activity to the Antitrust Division as of the date of this Agreement): (a) any act or conspiracy to allocate and rig bids or otherwise manipulate the bidding process for municipal investment agreements and other municipal finance contracts, from at least as early as 2001 until at least November 2006; and (b) any conspiracy or scheme to defraud municipal issuers or the Internal Revenue Service, including through the use of the mails or wires, from at least as early as 2001 until at least November 2006. This Agreement does not provide any protection against prosecution for any crimes except as set forth above. The non-prosecution terms of this paragraph do not apply to civil matters of any kind or crimes of violence.

5. It is understood that this Agreement does not bind any other federal agency or local prosecuting authority or administrative agency other than the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, or to the extent set forth in paragraph 4, the Tax Division of the United States Department of Justice. However, if requested, the Antitrust Division will bring the fact, manner and extent of the cooperation of WRIGHT to the attention of other prosecuting, administrative, and other agencies as a matter for such agencies to consider as appropriate.

#### POSSIBLE MAXIMUM SENTENCE

- 6. WRIGHT understands that the statutory maximum penalty which may be imposed against him upon conviction for a violation of Title 18, Section 371 charged in Count One of the attached Information is:
  - (a) a term of imprisonment of five (5) years (18 U.S.C. § 371);
- (b) a fine in an amount equal to the greatest of (1) \$250,000, (2) twice the gross pecuniary gain to any person derived from the offense, or (3) twice the gross pecuniary loss caused to a person other than the defendant from the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) and (d)); and
- (c) a term of supervised release of three (3) years following any term of imprisonment. If the defendant violates any condition of supervised release, the defendant could be imprisoned up to two (2) years (18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2) and (e)(3); and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2)).

- 7. In addition, WRIGHT understands and agrees that:
- (a) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3663A and 3664, the Court shall impose an order of restitution to the victims of the charged offense;
- (b) The restitution amount owed to the victim is \$29,600, and WRIGHT agrees to pay this amount; and,
- (c) Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A), the Court is required to order the defendant to pay a \$100 special assessment upon conviction for the charged crime.

#### SENTENCING AGREEMENT

8. WRIGHT understands that the sentence to be imposed on him is within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge. It is understood that the Sentencing Guidelines are not binding on the Court. WRIGHT acknowledges that his entry of a guilty plea to the charged offense authorizes the sentencing court to impose any sentence, up to and including the statutory maximum sentence. The United States cannot and does not make any promises or representations as to what sentence WRIGHT will receive. However, the United States will inform the Probation Office and the Court of (a) this Agreement; (b) the nature and extent of WRIGHT's activities with respect to this case, and all other activities of WRIGHT which the United States deems relevant to sentencing; and (c) the timeliness, nature, extent and significance of WRIGHT's cooperation with the United States. In so doing, the United States may use any information it deems relevant, including information provided by WRIGHT both prior and subsequent to the signing of

this Agreement. The United States reserves the right to make any statement to the Court or the Probation Office concerning the nature of the offense charged in the attached Information, the participation of WRIGHT therein, and any other facts or circumstances that it deems relevant. The United States also reserves the right to comment on or to correct any representation made by or on behalf of WRIGHT, and to supply any other information that the Court may require.

- 9. If the United States determines that WRIGHT has provided substantial assistance in any Federal Proceeding, and has otherwise fully complied with all of the terms of this Agreement, it will file a motion, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, advising the sentencing judge of all relevant facts pertaining to that determination and requesting the Court to sentence WRIGHT in light of the factors set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a)(1)-(5), and thus enabling the Court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence below the applicable Sentencing Guidelines ranges for incarceration and a fine. The United States and WRIGHT are free to recommend or argue for any specific sentence to the Court.
- 10. WRIGHT understands that this Agreement does not in any way affect or limit the right of the United States to respond to and take positions on post-sentencing motions or requests for information that relate to reduction or modification of sentence.
- 11. WRIGHT acknowledges that the decision whether he has provided substantial assistance in any Federal Proceeding is within the sole discretion of the United States. It is understood that should the United States determine that WRIGHT has not

provided substantial assistance in any Federal Proceeding, such a determination will release the United States from any obligation to file a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but will not entitle WRIGHT to withdraw his guilty plea once it has been entered. WRIGHT further understands that whether or not the United States files its motions pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the sentence to be imposed on him remains within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge.

- 12. It is understood that should the United States determine in good faith, subsequent to the filing of a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, that WRIGHT has violated any provision of this Agreement, the United States shall have the right to withdraw such motion.
- 13. WRIGHT understands and agrees that should the conviction following his plea of guilty pursuant to this Agreement be vacated for any reason, then any prosecution that is not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations on the date of the signing of this Agreement may be commenced or reinstated against him, notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations between the signing of this Agreement and the commencement or reinstatement of such prosecution. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.

#### REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL

14. WRIGHT has reviewed all legal and factual aspects of this case with his attorney and is fully satisfied with his attorney's legal representation. WRIGHT has thoroughly reviewed this Agreement with his attorney and has received satisfactory explanations from his attorney concerning each paragraph of this Agreement, and alternatives available to WRIGHT other than entering into this Agreement. After conferring with his attorney and considering all available alternatives, WRIGHT has made a knowing and voluntary decision to enter into this Agreement.

#### VOLUNTARY PLEA

- decided to plead guilty because he is in fact guilty. By entering a plea of guilty, WRIGHT waives any and all right to withdraw his plea or to attack his conviction, either on direct appeal or collaterally, on the ground that the United States has failed to produce any discovery material, Jencks Act material, exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), other than information establishing the factual innocence of WRIGHT, and impeachment material pursuant to Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), that have not already been produced as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.
- 16. WRIGHT's decision to enter into this Agreement and to tender a plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made and is not the result of force, threats, assurances,

promises, or representations other than the representations contained in this Agreement.

The United States has made no promises or representations to WRIGHT as to whether the Court will accept or reject the recommendations contained within this Agreement.

# **VIOLATION OF PLEA AGREEMENT**

- WRIGHT agrees that should the United States determine in good faith that WRIGHT has given false, misleading, or incomplete information or testimony, or that WRIGHT has failed in any other way to fulfill any of the obligations set out in this Agreement, the United States shall notify counsel for WRIGHT in writing by personal or overnight delivery or facsimile transmission of its intention to void any of its obligations under this Agreement (except its obligations under this paragraph), and WRIGHT will be subject to prosecution for any federal criminal violation of which the United States has knowledge, including but not limited to the substantive offense relating to the investigation resulting in this Agreement. It is the intent of this Agreement to waive all defenses based on the statute of limitations with respect to any prosecution that is not time-barred on the date that this Agreement is signed.
- 18. If WRIGHT violates any provision of this Agreement, he agrees that any documents, statements, information, testimony or evidence provided by him, whether before or after the execution of this Agreement, and any leads derived therefrom, shall be admissible in evidence in any and all criminal proceedings hereafter brought against WRIGHT, and that he will not assert a claim under the United States Constitution, any

statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, or any other federal rule, that such evidence, or any leads therefrom, should be suppressed.

# **ENTIRETY OF AGREEMENT**

19. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between and among the United States and WRIGHT concerning the disposition of the charge contained in the attached Information. Other than a tolling agreement executed between the parties on September 12, 2011, the United States has made no other promises to or agreements with WRIGHT. This Agreement cannot be modified other than in a writing signed by the parties.

Dated:  $\frac{7}{18}$ , 2011

ALEXÁNDER W. WRIGHT

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