

1 JONATHAN SALLET (DC Bar No. 336198)  
JUAN A. ARTEAGA (NY Bar No. 4125464)  
2 PATRICIA BRINK (CA Bar No. 144499)  
SCOTT SCHEELE (DC Bar No. 429061)  
3 LAWRENCE FRANKEL (DC Bar No. 441532)  
JARED HUGHES (VA Bar No. 65571)  
4 CORY BRADER (NY Bar No. 5118732)  
PATRICIA CORCORAN (DC Bar No. 461905)  
5 MATTHEW JONES (DC Bar No. 1006602)  
JONATHAN JUSTL (NY Bar No. 4928222)  
6 DAVID LAWRENCE (CT Bar No. 430642)  
ANNA SALLSTROM (CA Bar No. 300281)  
7 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
ANTITRUST DIVISION  
8 450 5th Street N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001  
9 Telephone: 202-514-5621  
Facsimile: 202-514-6381  
10 E-mail: [scott.scheele@usdoj.gov](mailto:scott.scheele@usdoj.gov)

*Additional Counsel Listed on Signature Page*

11 Counsel for Plaintiff,  
12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
14 **FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 DIRECTV GROUP HOLDINGS, LLC  
19 and AT&T, Inc.

20 Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-08150

**COMPLAINT**

1 The United States of America, by its attorneys acting under the direction of  
2 the Attorney General of the United States, brings this civil antitrust action against  
3 Defendants DIRECTV Group Holdings, LLC (“DIRECTV”) and AT&T, Inc.  
4 (“AT&T”) to obtain equitable relief to prevent and remedy violations of Section 1  
5 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

## 6 I. NATURE OF THE ACTION

7 1. For almost 60 years, the Los Angeles Dodgers have been a beloved  
8 professional sports team in Los Angeles (“LA”). During this time, LA Dodgers  
9 fans have seen their team win five World Series championships, closely followed  
10 the Hall of Fame careers of baseball greats such as Sandy Koufax and Tommy  
11 Lasorda, and listened to the play-by-play calls of broadcast legend Vin Scully. But  
12 a significant number of Dodgers fans have had no opportunity in recent years to  
13 watch their team play on television because overlapping and competitive pay  
14 television providers did not telecast Dodgers games. Those consumers were  
15 deprived of a fair competitive process when DIRECTV unlawfully exchanged  
16 strategic information with three competitors during their parallel negotiations  
17 concerning carrying Dodgers games.

18 2. This Complaint focuses on DIRECTV, the ringleader of information  
19 sharing agreements with three different rivals that corrupted the Dodgers Channel  
20 carriage negotiations and the competitive process that the Sherman Act protects.

1 DIRECTV was the one company that unlawfully exchanged information with  
2 multiple rivals, and without it competition would not have been harmed and none  
3 of the violations would have occurred. Accordingly, the United States seeks  
4 declaratory and injunctive relief against DIRECTV and its corporate successor  
5 AT&T.

6 3. In early 2013, SportsNet LA (the “Dodgers Channel”), a partnership  
7 between the LA Dodgers and Time Warner Cable (“TWC”), acquired the exclusive  
8 rights to telecast almost all live Dodgers games in the LA area. Beginning in  
9 January 2014, TWC offered various multichannel video programming distributors  
10 (“MVPDs”),<sup>1</sup> including satellite pay television provider DIRECTV, the  
11 opportunity to purchase a license to telecast the Dodgers Channel to their  
12 customers in the LA area. Distributing live local sports, like the Dodgers Channel,  
13 is a significant characteristic of competition between MVPDs, because MVPDs  
14 directly compete for subscribers who want to watch that content.

15 4. During negotiations with TWC and as he prepared for those  
16 negotiations, DIRECTV’s Chief Content Officer, Daniel York, exchanged  
17 information with his counterparts at Cox, Charter, and AT&T about their carriage  
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19 <sup>1</sup> MVPD is an industry acronym standing for multichannel video programming  
20 distributor, and it applies to a variety of providers of pay television services,  
including satellite companies (such as DIRECTV), cable companies (such as Cox  
and Charter), and telephone companies (such as AT&T).

1 plans for the Dodgers Channel. These unlawful exchanges were intended to reduce  
2 each rival's fear that competitors would carry the Dodgers Channel, thereby  
3 providing DIRECTV and its competitors artificially enhanced bargaining leverage  
4 to force TWC to accept their terms. Through each of these information sharing  
5 arrangements, Mr. York disclosed non-public information about the status of  
6 DIRECTV's negotiations with TWC and DIRECTV's future carriage plans and, in  
7 return, learned similar non-public information from each of these competitors.

8         5. The sharing of this competitively sensitive information among direct  
9 competitors made it less likely that any of these companies would reach a deal  
10 because they no longer had to fear that a decision to refrain from carriage would  
11 result in subscribers switching to a competitor that offered the channel. As each  
12 company's contemporaneous business documents show, the elimination of this risk  
13 was valuable because each company identified a competitor's decision to telecast  
14 the Dodgers Channel as a significant development that could force it to reach a  
15 deal with TWC.

16         6. These competitor information exchanges took place against the  
17 backdrop of limited competition among pay television providers. Most residential  
18 consumers in the LA area had a choice of only three or four pay television  
19 providers: the incumbent cable company (like Charter, Cox, or TWC); the two  
20

1 national satellite pay television providers (like DIRECTV) and sometimes a  
2 telephone incumbent (like AT&T).

3       7. Among the small group of competitors, DIRECTV stood apart.  
4 Unlike its cable company rivals such as Cox and Charter, which have concentrated  
5 geographic footprints within the LA area, DIRECTV directly competes for  
6 subscribers with every MVPD in the LA area. Consequently, DIRECTV—which  
7 has sought to distinguish itself from other MVPDs by offering subscribers the  
8 broadest range of live sports content—was more susceptible than other MVPDs to  
9 pressure to reach a deal with TWC. In addition, DIRECTV had the most  
10 subscribers that could watch the Dodgers Channel on TWC.

11       8. Conversely, as the largest direct competitor of every MVPD in the LA  
12 area, a DIRECTV plan to carry the Dodgers Channel would have increased the  
13 pressure on other MVPDs to do the same in order to avoid the risk of losing  
14 subscribers to DIRECTV. As one senior DIRECTV executive noted, with its  
15 competitors “sit[ting] on the sidelines,” the company was the “first domino in the  
16 sequencing of deals.” This potential domino effect made DIRECTV a central  
17 player in the Dodgers Channel negotiations. Indeed, Cox, Charter, and AT&T all  
18 viewed DIRECTV as the competitor whose decision to carry the Dodgers Channel  
19 could force them to reach a deal with TWC, even if doing so meant paying a price  
20 above the one targeted in their internal financial analyses.

1           9.       DIRECTV executives expressly acknowledged that they would be in a  
2 stronger bargaining position if DIRECTV's competitors stayed on the sidelines and  
3 did not launch the Dodgers Channel. For instance, DIRECTV's CEO Mike White  
4 told Mr. York that he believed the distributors "may have more leverage if we all  
5 stick together" and Mr. York "[a]greed" that "others holding firm is key." A  
6 DIRECTV content executive believed that TWC would "become more creative to  
7 improve [DIRECTV's] deal" as the rest of the industry was "waiting for us to  
8 launch." In May of 2014, while the negotiating process was ostensibly proceeding,  
9 Mr. White spoke publicly—and proudly—about what DIRECTV had achieved,  
10 telling the audience for a large telecommunications and media industry conference  
11 that it was important that "the distributors start to stand together, like most of us  
12 have been doing in Los Angeles for the first time ever, by the way, with the  
13 Dodgers on outrageous increases and excesses."

14           10.     Mr. York—the DIRECTV executive who orchestrated these bilateral  
15 information sharing agreements—regularly communicated with his counterparts at  
16 Cox, Charter, and AT&T during their Dodgers Channel negotiations with TWC.  
17 Many of these communications occurred at important points in the negotiations  
18 with TWC, such as within days of each company receiving TWC's initial offer and  
19 when Mr. York and his counterparts were preparing to make recommendations to  
20 their CEOs.

1           11. During some of these communications, Mr. York assured his  
2 counterparts at Cox, Charter, and AT&T that DIRECTV would not be launching  
3 the Dodgers Channel any time soon and received similar assurances.

4           12. For example, when informed by Cox's senior content executive that  
5 TWC had indicated that it was close to reaching a deal with another MVPD, Mr.  
6 York told this executive that DIRECTV was *not* the MVPD that was supposedly  
7 close to signing a deal with TWC—which was important because DIRECTV was  
8 the largest competitor to Cox in Cox's LA service area.

9           13. Mr. York and his counterpart at AT&T exchanged texts and voice  
10 messages that improperly discussed non-public information about their content  
11 negotiations and future plans, including the Dodgers Channel. For example:

- 12           • In March 2014, AT&T's most senior content executive, who was in frequent  
13 contact with Mr. York, left Mr. York a voicemail: "I had three things to  
14 catch up with you on, ah, two sports and one news." A few days later, they  
15 spoke on the phone for twelve minutes. That same AT&T executive  
16 recommended not launching the Dodgers Channel to AT&T's CEO the  
17 following day.
- 18           • Later that month, TWC told AT&T it was unlikely to lower its initial offer  
19 for Dodgers Channel carriage rights. That same AT&T executive—who has  
20 referred to content offers as "pitches"—again texted Mr. York: "Forgot to

1 tell you but we got a [##] mph pitch yesterday,”<sup>2</sup> and “Consistent with what  
2 you got?” Mr. York responded, “Hope u hit it out!”

3 14. Mr. York and his counterpart at Charter also communicated at key  
4 points in the Dodgers Channel negotiations. During those communications they  
5 shared non-public strategic information about their Dodgers Channel negotiations  
6 and future plans for the channel. For example, Charter’s most senior content  
7 executive recommended a Dodgers Channel strategy to his CEO for the first time  
8 the day after a phone call with Mr. York. The executive told the CEO he thought  
9 Charter should “sit[] [the Dodgers Channel] out until at least if and when Direct  
10 does a deal.” He testified that he based his recommendation on a “gut feeling”  
11 rather than a formal financial analysis. When a subordinate pushed back against  
12 his choice of strategy, the executive declined to change course, explaining “I think  
13 Direct will not be there at launch.” The Charter executive also texted Mr. York to  
14 ask to speak with him the day that he and Charter’s CEO met to set Charter’s 2014  
15 content budget, including for the Dodgers Channel. Later in the negotiations, Mr.  
16 York and the Charter executive spoke in person about “the high price that TWC  
17 paid for the rights to SportsNet LA and was demanding for carriage.” The Charter  
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20 <sup>2</sup> The actual price figures have not been included throughout the Complaint to  
protect competitively sensitive information. The speed of the quoted pitch in this  
text matched the cents in TWC’s offer to AT&T.



1 executive testified that they discussed that the price TWC offered their respective  
2 companies for carriage was “outrageous.”

3 15. Based on these private communications and a series of public  
4 communications, Mr. York and his counterparts at Cox, Charter, and AT&T knew  
5 they were unlikely to lose subscribers to each other while they waited to carry the  
6 Dodgers Channel. For example, when Mr. York’s counterpart at Charter  
7 recommended that Charter delay launching the Dodgers Channel because “I think  
8 Direct will not be there at launch,” he explained that as a result there would be  
9 “nowhere to get the games in [Charter’s] markets.” Similarly, Mr. York assured  
10 DIRECTV’s CEO, Mr. White, that DIRECTV’s competitors appeared “in no rush  
11 to do a deal” for the Dodgers Channel, which was a “strategic consideration”  
12 against DIRECTV launching the channel itself.

13 16. The information that was exchanged as part of this scheme had an  
14 anticompetitive effect on DIRECTV’s and its competitors’ decision-making about  
15 whether to carry the Dodgers Channel. DIRECTV’s unlawful information  
16 exchanges harmed competition by corrupting the competitive process that should  
17 have resulted in each company making an independent decision on whether to  
18 carry the Dodgers Channel, subject to competitive pressures arising from  
19 independent decisions made by other, overlapping MVPDs. Instead, key  
20 competing executives knew that they were safer than they should have been under

1 a competitive process; safer because they had reason to believe that they would not  
2 lose subscribers to other MVPDs if they opted not to telecast Dodgers games. The  
3 information they shared was a material factor in their companies' Dodgers Channel  
4 decisions, with the effect of making each company less likely to reach a deal. The  
5 ultimate result: many consumers in LA had fewer—or no—means by which to  
6 watch the Dodgers Channel. DIRECTV's unlawful information exchanges harmed  
7 consumers by making it less likely that they would be able to watch Dodgers  
8 games on television and, in the TWC territory, on the MVPD of their choice.

9 17. DIRECTV and each of Cox, Charter, and AT&T, respectively, agreed  
10 to share forward-looking strategic information about the Dodgers Channel, and did  
11 share that information. Their information exchanges demonstrate their agreements  
12 and reflect concerted action between horizontal competitors.

13 18. DIRECTV's unlawful information exchanges with Cox, Charter, and  
14 AT&T concerning carriage of the Dodgers Channel lack any countervailing  
15 procompetitive benefits and should therefore be condemned as unlawful.

16 19. The United States, through this action, asks this Court to declare  
17 Defendants' conduct unlawful and to enjoin Defendants from sharing strategic  
18 competitive information with other MVPDs and their executives in order to  
19 prevent further harm to competition and consumers.

20

1 **II. DEFENDANTS**

2 20. Defendant DIRECTV is a Delaware corporation with headquarters  
3 located in El Segundo, California, offering direct broadcast satellite service  
4 nationwide. As of 2014, DIRECTV had approximately 1.25 million video  
5 subscribers in the LA area. In 2015, Defendant AT&T acquired DIRECTV in a  
6 transaction valued at approximately \$49 billion.

7 21. Defendant AT&T is a Delaware corporation with headquarters located  
8 in Dallas, Texas. AT&T is a multinational telecommunications company offering  
9 mobile telephone service, wireline Internet and television service, and satellite  
10 television service through its 2015 acquisition of DIRECTV. AT&T offers  
11 wireline television service through its U-verse video product, which distributes  
12 video content using AT&T's telecommunications infrastructure. Following its  
13 acquisition of DIRECTV, AT&T is now the largest pay television provider in the  
14 United States with more than 25 million video subscribers nationwide. As of 2014,  
15 AT&T had approximately 400,000 video subscribers in the LA area.

16 **III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE**

17 22. The United States brings this action pursuant to Section 4 of the  
18 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, to obtain equitable and other relief to prevent and  
19 restrain Defendants' violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

1           23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under  
2 Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and  
3 1345.

4           24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each Defendant and venue is  
5 proper in the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and Section 22  
6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22. Each Defendant transacts business in this  
7 District. Each Defendant provides pay television services to customers in this  
8 District and has substantial contacts in this District. DIRECTV committed acts in  
9 furtherance of unlawful concerted action in this District.

10           25. Both DIRECTV and AT&T are engaged in, and their activities  
11 substantially affect, interstate trade and commerce. Each Defendant sells video  
12 distribution services throughout the United States to millions of consumers. These  
13 sales substantially affect interstate commerce. In 2014, U.S. consumers spent a  
14 total of about \$26 billion on DIRECTV's video distribution services, and a total of  
15 about \$6.8 billion on AT&T's video distribution services. Each Defendant also  
16 purchases television content from numerous content providers in the flow of  
17 interstate commerce. In addition, each Defendant's decision not to carry the  
18 Dodgers Channel substantially affected interstate commerce. DIRECTV and  
19 AT&T could have acquired the right to offer the channel to thousands of  
20 subscribers outside of California, including subscribers in parts of Nevada and

1 Hawaii. Moreover, each Defendant's decision not to carry the Dodgers Channel  
2 affected the sale of advertisements on that channel to companies based outside of  
3 California that would run during Dodgers games.

4 26. AT&T is DIRECTV's successor in interest, including for purposes of  
5 this action. When AT&T acquired DIRECTV, it acquired all of DIRECTV's stock  
6 (by merging DIRECTV into a subsidiary company wholly owned by AT&T), and  
7 thereby acquired all of DIRECTV's assets. AT&T proceeded to fully integrate  
8 DIRECTV's operations into its own, with the result that DIRECTV's operations  
9 have been continued within AT&T. Additionally, the merger agreement did not  
10 expressly limit AT&T's liabilities. These circumstances indicate AT&T's intent to  
11 assume DIRECTV's liability for these Sherman Act violations.

12 27. The Chief Content Officer of AT&T negotiates and supervises the  
13 negotiation of content agreements for DIRECTV, as well as for AT&T's other  
14 video platforms. These contracts may be negotiated across all AT&T's video  
15 platforms; in fact, when AT&T acquired DIRECTV, it noted that the combined  
16 companies' scale would give them greater leverage with content providers. The  
17 presence of AT&T is therefore necessary in order to effectuate the requested relief.

1       **IV. DIRECTV UNLAWFULLY EXCHANGED INFORMATION WITH**  
2                               **COX, CHARTER, AND AT&T WHEN NEGOTIATING**  
3                               **CARRIAGE OF THE DODGERS CHANNEL**

4       **A. MVPDs Are Motivated to Seek Bargaining Leverage When Negotiating**  
5                               **With Video Programmers**

6               28. MVPDs spend billions of dollars on sports content each year. Over  
7 the years, MVPDs have complained about the rising cost of such content. The  
8 desire to depress the cost of sports content—often a key component of competition  
9 between MVPDs—provides MVPDs a strong incentive to obtain bargaining  
10 leverage. MVPDs may seek to unlawfully obtain bargaining leverage by engaging  
11 in collusive action designed to force sports content providers—such as TWC in  
12 this case—to accept different terms than they otherwise would in a negotiating  
13 process where MVPDs make carriage decisions independent of each other. Such  
14 collusive activity harms competition by corrupting the competitive process and  
15 ultimately harms consumers by causing likely reductions in quality and output, as  
16 happened with respect to the blackout of the Dodgers Channel, which has now  
17 covered three baseball seasons.

1 **B. TWC Successfully Employed a Divide and Conquer Strategy When**  
2 **Negotiating Carriage of the Lakers Channel**

3 29. In 2011, TWC acquired the rights to locally telecast and distribute LA  
4 Lakers basketball games in the LA area.<sup>3</sup> As it would later do with the Dodgers  
5 Channel, TWC launched a new regional sports network (“RSN”) to serve as the  
6 exclusive channel telecasting these games (the “Lakers Channel”).

7 30. DIRECTV initially declined to carry the Lakers Channel, reasoning  
8 that TWC’s asking price was too high and that it could negotiate a better rate than  
9 its smaller competitors if it held out. However, TWC sought to increase the  
10 competitive pressure on DIRECTV, realizing that DIRECTV would be more likely  
11 to carry the Lakers Channel if its smaller competitors carried the channel because  
12 such a move would expose DIRECTV to the risk of losing subscribers to these  
13 competitors. Accordingly, TWC approached the smaller MVPDs with a time-  
14 sensitive offer: in exchange for an early agreement to carry the Lakers Channel,  
15 the smaller distributors would receive a size-insensitive most favored nation clause  
16 (“MFN”) in their carriage agreements. This clause would guarantee the smaller

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17  
18 <sup>3</sup> The Lakers ownership sold TWC the rights to telecast certain Lakers games to the  
19 local LA television market. This type of local, team-based rights deal, exemplified  
20 in TWC’s acquisition of the rights to both the Lakers and the Dodgers Channels, is  
distinct from the broadcasting deals negotiated by the leagues themselves, such as  
the NBA or MLB. Those national deals convey the rights to broadcast a certain  
number of league games on nationwide networks, such as ESPN or the Turner  
channels.

1 distributors that they would get the same price for the Lakers Channel as a larger  
2 distributor, such as DIRECTV (although it is common industry practice that larger  
3 companies with more subscribers pay a lower price per subscriber than their  
4 smaller competitors).

5 31. During the negotiations over carriage of the Lakers Channel, Mr.  
6 York heard a “rumor” about TWC’s size-insensitive MFN offer. Mr. York was  
7 concerned that if the smaller distributors buckled under the pressure of the MFN  
8 offer and agreed to carry the Lakers Channel before the larger distributors  
9 negotiated a deal, it would “empower[] TWC to hold firm on their price.” Mr.  
10 York was right.

11 32. Charter signed a Lakers Channel carriage agreement on October 25,  
12 2012, just before the NBA season started. At that time, Mr. York told a colleague  
13 that he believed Charter agreed to TWC’s rates in order to get the MFN protection.

14 33. Two days later, on October 27, 2012, AT&T signed a Lakers Channel  
15 carriage deal.

16 34. The Lakers season tipped off on October 30, 2012.

17 35. The MVPDs that had already launched the Lakers Channel  
18 aggressively marketed against their competitors that had not reached a deal with  
19 TWC. They sensed an opportunity to win subscribers who wanted to watch Lakers  
20 games live on television but could not due to their video provider’s lack of



1 carriage. For example, Charter ran radio advertisements targeting AT&T before  
2 AT&T's U-verse video service launched the Lakers Channel. Similarly, after  
3 launching the Lakers Channel, AT&T began using a marketing campaign in its  
4 stores targeting Cox subscribers: "See both Padres and Lakers on U-verse TV but  
5 not Cox."

6 36. TWC succeeded in its strategy. On November 7, 2012, less than one  
7 week after the NBA season started, Cox agreed to carry the Lakers Channel. Cox  
8 had intended to hold out, but AT&T—which offers its U-verse video service inside  
9 the Cox local market—was offering the Lakers Channel. Cox agreed to pay  
10 TWC's full asking price despite internal analyses estimating the Lakers Channel  
11 was worth significantly less. Indeed, Cox paid nearly 60% higher than its analyses  
12 had initially suggested the Lakers Channel was worth.

13 37. DIRECTV faced a similar dilemma. Most of its competing video  
14 distributors in the LA area had launched the Lakers Channel, and it was losing  
15 hundreds of customers per week to them. Consequently, on November 14, 2012,  
16 ten days after Cox agreed to carry the Lakers Channel, DIRECTV agreed to pay  
17 TWC's initial asking price, even though DIRECTV's internal analyses estimated  
18 that carriage of the Lakers Channel was worth significantly less. DIRECTV  
19 agreed to pay almost 50% more than its internal financial analysis suggested.

20

1           38. Moreover, TWC was able to point to the size-insensitive MFNs in the  
2 smaller distributor carriage agreements as a reason not to offer DIRECTV a lower  
3 per subscriber fee for the Lakers Channel.

4           39. Thus, DIRECTV rolled the dice during the Lakers Channel  
5 negotiations but lost because TWC was able to pursue a divide-and-conquer  
6 strategy by offering DIRECTV's smaller competitors financial incentives to sign a  
7 deal early in the negotiating process. Having been burned by this experience,  
8 DIRECTV approached the Dodgers Channel negotiations determined not to allow  
9 TWC to successfully employ such a strategy again.

10 **C. DIRECTV Was Intent on Ensuring That Its Competitors Stood With It**  
11 **Against TWC When Negotiating Carriage of the Dodgers Channel**

12           40. A few months after successfully outmaneuvering DIRECTV during  
13 the Lakers Channel negotiations, TWC acquired, in January 2013, the local telecast  
14 rights for Dodgers baseball games beginning in the 2014 season. As it had with  
15 the Lakers, TWC launched a new RSN—the Dodgers Channel—to serve as the  
16 exclusive home for Dodgers games. Media reports at the time suggested that TWC  
17 would likely seek monthly distribution rates close to \$5 a month per subscriber for  
18 the Dodgers Channel.

19           41. In January 2014, TWC began discussing carriage of the Dodgers  
20 Channel with other LA area video distributors. In doing so, TWC sought a higher

1 per subscriber rate from each distributor for carriage in the LA area (“Zone 1”),  
2 and lower per subscriber rates in other zones, located in regions further from LA.

3 42. But, unlike TWC’s experience with the Lakers Channel, none of  
4 TWC’s competitors agreed to carry the Dodgers Channel that year.

5 43. Hundreds of thousands of LA area residents—essentially, everyone  
6 living outside of TWC’s service area—were unable to watch most televised  
7 Dodgers games during the 2014 baseball season.<sup>4</sup>

8 44. To this day, TWC and its affiliates remain the only LA area video  
9 distributors that carry the Dodgers Channel, following a negotiation process  
10 corrupted by DIRECTV’s orchestration of unlawful information sharing  
11 agreements with Cox, Charter, and AT&T.

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18 <sup>4</sup> Bright House Networks, which is affiliated with TWC but does not operate in the  
19 LA area, carried the Dodgers Channel in its first season. Charter reached an  
20 agreement to carry the Dodgers Channel in 2015, after signing a deal to acquire  
TWC. Champion Broadband reached a deal to carry the Dodgers Channel in 2014,  
but had only about 3,000 video subscribers in Arcadia and Monrovia, California,  
and has since gone out of business.

1 i. DIRECTV, Cox, Charter, and AT&T Acknowledged That  
2 Their Competitors' Carriage Decisions Would Significantly  
3 Influence Whether They Decided to Launch the Dodgers  
4 Channel

5 45. In assessing whether to carry the Dodgers Channel, DIRECTV  
6 conducted financial analyses indicating that DIRECTV's decision not to carry the  
7 Dodgers Channel would cause it to lose tens of millions of dollars in subscriber  
8 revenues in 2014 and each year thereafter. These financial analyses also indicated  
9 that this anticipated loss would be reduced by approximately 40% if none of  
10 DIRECTV's competitors (other than TWC) carried the Dodgers Channel. Thus,  
11 DIRECTV calculated exactly how much money it would save if other MVPDs in  
12 the LA area did not launch the Dodgers Channel. Moreover, DIRECTV  
13 understood that, in order to reduce the likelihood that its subscribers would switch  
14 providers, it might have to pay more than its financial analyses suggested it should  
15 pay if any of its competitors decided to carry the Dodgers Channel, which is  
16 precisely what had happened with the Lakers Channel.

17 46. Similarly, Cox, Charter, and AT&T each concluded that the decision  
18 of a competitor to carry the Dodgers Channel would be a significant development  
19 that could force each of them to reach a deal with TWC. For example, on  
20 September 18, 2013, Charter's head of content acquisition suggested to Charter's

1 CEO that “we discuss sitting this one out until at least if and when Direct does a  
2 deal.” Similarly, an undated Cox “Dodgers Discussion” document states that Cox  
3 should “consider a rate MFN’d deal only in the event DirecTV, Dish or ATT do a  
4 deal, accept any related rate penalty if we are forced to.” In addition, a February  
5 26, 2014 Dodgers Channel presentation by AT&T’s President of Content  
6 recommended to his direct supervisor that a “key decision point[]/risk factor[]”  
7 would be “carriage decisions by DirecTV.”

8 **D. DIRECTV Orchestrated and Implemented Dodgers Channel Carriage**  
9 **Information Exchanges With Cox, Charter, and AT&T**

10 47. Given that TWC’s negotiating strategy had forced DIRECTV to pay  
11 more for the Lakers Channel than it thought the channel was worth, DIRECTV and  
12 its Chief Content Officer, Mr. York, were determined not to let that happen again.  
13 To achieve this objective, Mr. York orchestrated a series of unlawful bilateral  
14 information sharing agreements with three of DIRECTV’s MVPD competitors:  
15 Cox, Charter, and AT&T.

16 48. In numerous phone calls and other private conversations, Mr. York  
17 and his counterparts at DIRECTV’s rivals Cox, Charter, and AT&T discussed non-  
18 public information about the status of their negotiations with TWC and their future  
19 plans about whether to carry the Dodgers Channel. For instance:  
20

- 1 • Cox’s senior content executive, the Senior Vice President of Content  
2 Acquisition, testified under oath that he and Mr. York discussed their  
3 companies’ Dodgers Channel carriage plans on multiple occasions. During  
4 one of these conversations, the Cox executive inquired about the status of  
5 DIRECTV’s negotiations with TWC because TWC had indicated to him that  
6 it was close to reaching a deal with a video distributor. Mr. York responded  
7 that DIRECTV was not close to signing a deal and the two executives agreed  
8 to give one another a “heads-up” before launching the Dodgers Channel.
- 9 • Mr. York also offered to give this Cox executive an opportunity to sign a  
10 Dodgers Channel deal with TWC first before DIRECTV and thus protect  
11 any MFN terms.
- 12 • Charter’s senior content executive, the Senior Vice President of  
13 Programming, testified under oath that he and Mr. York discussed that the  
14 price TWC offered their respective companies for the right to carry the  
15 Dodgers Channel was “outrageous.”
- 16 • In a two-hour span the day after DIRECTV received TWC’s initial Dodgers  
17 Channel offer, Mr. York spoke or attempted to speak with his counterparts at  
18 Cox, Charter, and AT&T. Mr. York later recommended against launching  
19 the channel because “other MVPDs appear in no rush to do a deal.” At that  
20

1 point in time, no distributor had made public statements about its Dodgers  
2 Channel carriage negotiations or plans.

- 3 • AT&T's senior content executive, the President of Content and Advertising  
4 Sales, called Mr. York on the day that he presented his recommendation  
5 against AT&T carrying the Dodgers Channel to his direct supervisor. Over  
6 the course of the next few weeks, this AT&T senior executive attempted to  
7 speak with Mr. York on multiple occasions and did speak to him the day  
8 before he presented his recommendation to AT&T's CEO.

9 49. Despite reservations about the carriage price TWC would request for  
10 the Dodgers Channel, DIRECTV's content team indicated in October 2013 that the  
11 company should "Plan to Launch" the Dodgers Channel and directed DIRECTV's  
12 technical staff to allocate sufficient satellite capacity to accommodate the network.

13 50. On January 21, 2014, TWC presented its first formal Dodgers  
14 Channel carriage offer to a group of DIRECTV content executives, including Mr.  
15 York.

16 51. The next day, Mr. York spoke with his Cox counterpart for twenty  
17 minutes and his Charter counterpart on a call or voicemail lasting about thirty  
18 seconds. Later that day, Mr. York and his AT&T counterpart spoke for twelve  
19 minutes. Mr. York spoke with his Charter counterpart for twenty minutes on  
20 January 29, 2014.

1           52.    Around this time period, a senior DIRECTV content executive  
2           emailed Mr. York to discuss the disagreement between DIRECTV’s marketing and  
3           content groups about whether to carry the Dodgers Channel. He asked for Mr.  
4           York’s “thoughts about having a meeting” with the marketing team before the  
5           groups met with DIRECTV’s CEO, Mr. White, on February 4, 2014 about carrying  
6           the Dodgers Channel, because the content team “think[s] don’t do a deal,” while  
7           the marketing team “want[s] to do a deal.” The DIRECTV marketing team had  
8           calculated that TWC’s asking price was higher than financial analysis suggested it  
9           was worth—but nonetheless recognized that other factors not captured in that  
10          calculation made the Dodgers Channel worth carrying.

11          53.    In preparing for the meeting with DIRECTV’s CEO, the marketing  
12          team put together a draft presentation deck that emphasized the Dodgers’ iconic  
13          reputation and the fact that carrying the Dodgers Channel was important to  
14          DIRECTV’s marketing strategy of being a leader in sports content. For example,  
15          the deck listed as reasons for doing a deal that “LA is our largest subscriber  
16          market” and that “not offering a marquee franchise will significantly diminish our  
17          sports leadership claim.” Mr. York edited this deck before it was presented to  
18          DIRECTV’s CEO. Notably, on a slide listing strategic considerations for and  
19          against carrying the Dodgers Channel, Mr. York, having spoken with his  
20          counterparts at Cox, Charter, and AT&T added that one reason DIRECTV should



1 not carry the channel at TWC’s asking price was that “[o]ther MVPDs appear in no  
2 rush to do a deal.”

3  
4 **Against Deal**

5 ● Carriage of Dodgers and the associated high rates will set a precedent and embolden other rights holders, and lead to higher sports costs over time; Will require other trade offs →

6 ● other MVPDs appear in no rush to do a deal, Dish very unlikely  
7 ● Dish very unlikely & others? worse than Houston, which we don't carry 22

8 54. At the time that Mr. York made this edit, no other distributor had  
9 made public statements about its Dodgers Channel carriage negotiations or plans.

10 55. On February 4, 2014, Mr. York, along with members of his content  
11 team and DIRECTV’s marketing team, met with Mr. White to discuss their  
12 strategy for responding to TWC’s offer. At this meeting, Mr. York and his  
13 colleagues recommended against carrying the Dodgers Channel at TWC’s asking  
14 price. To support this recommendation, Mr. York used the presentation deck  
15 mentioned above, which incorporated his edit indicating that “[n]o other MVPD  
16 appears to be in a rush to do the Dodgers deal” in the final text.

17 **Against Deal**

- 18 ● Carriage of Dodgers and the associated above market rates will set a bad precedent and embolden all other rights holders (not just confined to sports) and will lead to higher content costs over time
- 19 ● No other MVPD appears to be in a rush to do the Dodgers deal; Dish very unlikely to ever carry network
- 20 ● Dodgers deal is a more expense, off-market deal than either the PAC-12 or CSN Houston which DTV chose not to carry

1           56. Based on the information he was provided, Mr. White “planned to  
2 carry the channel” and “budgeted to carry the channel,” but hoped to negotiate  
3 TWC down from its initial asking price. Following the February 4, 2014 meeting  
4 with Mr. White, DIRECTV informed TWC that its initial asking price was too  
5 high.

6           57. About one month later, Mr. White sent an email to Mr. York declaring  
7 that the MVPDs “may have more leverage if we all stick together” on the Dodgers  
8 Channel. Mr. York “[a]greed” that “others holding firm is key.” This email  
9 exchange occurred right before the start of the 2014 baseball season and during the  
10 heart of TWC’s Dodgers Channel negotiations.

11           58. Two months later, Mr. White made a similar pronouncement during  
12 an industry conference, stating that MVPDs should “start to stand together, like  
13 most of us have been doing in Los Angeles for the first time ever, by the way, with  
14 the Dodgers on outrageous increases and excesses.” At the time that Mr. White  
15 made this public statement, Mr. York had already been having discussions with his  
16 counterparts at Cox, Charter, and AT&T and, unsurprisingly, none of them had  
17 reached a deal with TWC to carry the Dodgers Channel.

18           59. During DIRECTV’s negotiations with TWC, at least one person  
19 informed DIRECTV that Mr. York had exchanged strategic information with  
20 competitors in order to facilitate a Dodgers Channel blackout in the LA area. In

1 April 2014, an anonymous complaint filed on the DIRECTV ethics portal claimed  
2 that Mr. York had been “[s]peaking with other satellite, cable, and telco companies  
3 about NOT carrying the Dodgers on DIRECTV.” Similar internal ethics  
4 complaints about Mr. York’s exchanges of information with competitors were filed  
5 in May and September 2014.

6         60. Publicly messaging its opposition to TWC’s initial offer for Dodgers  
7 Channel carriage also helped DIRECTV to further its information sharing scheme.  
8 A DIRECTV executive told Mr. York and others that DIRECTV’s competitors  
9 were emboldened to “sit on the sidelines” because they had not “seen any ‘not if,  
10 but when’ rhetoric from DTV” regarding carriage of the Dodgers Channel, and  
11 encouraged DIRECTV employees to “message internally and externally alike that  
12 we are NOT doing the Dodgers deal.” A DIRECTV executive testified that if  
13 DIRECTV had “started messaging that we are going to do a deal, that probably  
14 would have spurred on others to do the deal” and that such a scenario “wouldn’t  
15 benefit [DIRECTV] in any way.” This testimony further reflects the fact that  
16 DIRECTV understood that its expected carriage plans would have a domino effect  
17 on competitors in the Dodgers Channel negotiations with TWC.

18         61. Accordingly, DIRECTV employees regularly touted their opposition  
19 to carrying the Dodgers Channel in the press. For instance, in March 2014, Mr.  
20 York was quoted in the press stating that it was “highly unlikely that anybody of

1 any real merit will be carrying that network soon.” The same article also reported  
2 that Mr. York “predict[ed]” that the Dodgers carriage “logjam will not break  
3 before the first week of the new season is over and perhaps not for a long time after  
4 that.” In April 2014, Mr. York was quoted as stating that DIRECTV had an  
5 obligation to “not say[] yes to everything that’s proposed” to it when he was asked  
6 about carriage of the Dodgers Channel.

7 62. At the beginning of the 2014 baseball season, on March 29, 2014,  
8 TWC offered DIRECTV incentives and other terms of value that significantly  
9 improved its offer. DIRECTV did not accept the offer, but rather, on April 16,  
10 2014, responded by counter-proposing a lower rate structure and several free  
11 months.

12 63. After no MVPD agreed to carry the Dodgers Channel, TWC offered  
13 in August 2014 to allow immediate carriage of the Dodgers Channel by any video  
14 distributor that agreed to binding arbitration. Specifically, TWC proposed that  
15 both it and any interested distributor submit their best-and-final offer to a mutually  
16 agreed-upon arbitrator, who would then decide which proposal reflected the most  
17 fair carriage terms. This offer had no price floor, but no video distributor agreed to  
18 arbitration, even though arbitration would have allowed each MVPD to present its  
19 valuation analysis to a neutral party who could order TWC to accept that valuation  
20 without regard to TWC’s previous bargaining position.

1           64. DIRECTV still does not carry the Dodgers Channel even though it has  
2 otherwise sought to distinguish itself from competitors by offering consumers the  
3 broadest range of sports content.

4                   ii. DIRECTV and Cox Shared Non-Public Competitively  
5                               Sensitive Information about Their Future Dodgers Channel  
6                               Carriage Plans

7           65. Mr. York and his counterpart at Cox, the Senior Vice President of  
8 Programming, agreed to share forward-looking strategic information about the  
9 Dodgers Channel, and did share that information. Their exchanges of information  
10 demonstrate their agreement and reflect concerted action between horizontal  
11 competitors.

12           66. On October 2, 2013, Cox's then-incoming Senior Vice President of  
13 Programming and his colleagues met to discuss their carriage plans for the  
14 Dodgers Channel. They concluded that Cox should decline carrying the network  
15 unless one of the video distributors that overlapped with Cox's service area, such  
16 as DIRECTV or AT&T, reached a deal with TWC, at which point Cox would need  
17 to reassess its position.

18           67. Eight days later, on October 10, 2013, Cox's incoming Senior Vice  
19 President of Programming met Mr. York for breakfast in New York City. That  
20

1 executive has admitted that he and Mr. York discussed the “rising sports costs”  
2 their competing companies faced, including the Dodgers Channel.

3 68. On January 21, 2014, TWC presented its initial formal Dodgers  
4 Channel carriage offer to DIRECTV. The next day, Mr. York called his Cox  
5 counterpart and they spoke for twenty minutes. That same day, Mr. York also  
6 spoke or attempted to speak with his counterparts at Charter and AT&T.

7 69. On January 27, 2014, TWC presented its formal Dodgers Channel  
8 carriage offer to Cox. TWC asked for the same rate structure as it had sought from  
9 DIRECTV and other video distributors.

10 70. On February 4, 2014, Cox decided that it was interested in pursuing  
11 an *a la carte* carriage deal under which Cox would only pay a rate based on  
12 subscribers that watched the Dodgers Channel instead of a rate based on all its  
13 subscribers. That same day, Mr. York gave DIRECTV’s CEO a presentation  
14 reflecting Mr. York’s knowledge that DIRECTV’s competitors “appear[ed] in no  
15 rush to do a deal.”

16 71. During the first quarter of 2014, Cox increased its monthly fees for all  
17 subscribers in the LA area. Cox increased its prices in part to recoup the  
18 anticipated cost of carrying the Dodgers Channel, which it never launched.

19 72. Mr. York spoke with his Cox counterpart, the Senior Vice President  
20 of Programming, on at least ten separate occasions between March and July 2014

1 as the baseball season began and the companies' Dodgers Channel carriage  
2 negotiations continued. At least seven of their phone conversations were more  
3 than ten minutes long.

4 73. Cox's Senior Vice President of Programming has admitted under oath  
5 that he and Mr. York shared strategic information about their companies' non-  
6 public, future Dodgers Channel carriage plans on at least two calls.

7 74. During one call, which took place between March and June of 2014,  
8 Cox's Senior Vice President of Programming reached out to Mr. York after TWC  
9 told him that "an agreement between another distributor and SportsNet LA was  
10 imminent." The Cox executive called Mr. York to ask "if DIRECTV was the other  
11 distributor." Mr. York told the Cox executive that DIRECTV was not close to  
12 launching. During this conversation, they expressly agreed to "give each other a  
13 heads-up if their respective MVPDs were going to launch" the Dodgers Channel  
14 "before it was public knowledge."

15 75. In another call during the same time period, Mr. York called his Cox  
16 counterpart and said that "before DIRECTV were to sign a deal [to carry the  
17 Dodgers Channel], Mr. York would let [him] know, in case [he] wanted to sign a  
18 deal and protect any MFN terms, so [Cox] could choose to sign first." Mr. York's  
19 offer to forgo a first-mover advantage was contrary to DIRECTV's own economic  
20

1 interest as his plan could risk the terms DIRECTV would have negotiated with  
2 TWC and could also reduce the costs of one of DIRECTV's competitors.

3 76. Cox did not carry the Dodgers Channel in 2014 and has still not  
4 reached an agreement to carry the channel. Consumers located in the Cox service  
5 territory in the LA area did not have regular access to most televised Dodgers  
6 games during the 2014, 2015, and 2016 baseball seasons.

7 iii. DIRECTV and Charter Shared Non-Public Competitively  
8 Sensitive Information about Their Future Dodgers Channel  
9 Carriage Plans

10 77. Mr. York and his counterpart at Charter, the Senior Vice President of  
11 Programming (the most senior content executive at Charter), agreed to share  
12 forward-looking strategic information about the Dodgers Channel, and did share  
13 that information. Their exchanges of information demonstrate their agreement and  
14 reflect concerted action between horizontal competitors.

15 78. Charter conducted no formal analysis to assess the value of offering  
16 the Dodgers Channel. Instead, Charter's Senior Vice President of Programming  
17 recommended a strategy—that Charter hold out until DIRECTV carried the  
18 Dodgers Channel and then reevaluate. Charter's senior content executive testified  
19 that his recommendation on this important carriage decision was based on a "gut  
20 feeling early on in the process" that Charter should not be the first MVPD to



1 launch the Dodgers Channel, which “sort of solidified, came together by the end of  
2 summer, fall of 2013.” Mr. York and his counterpart at Charter spoke on the  
3 phone at least twice during that time period.

4 79. Mr. York and his Charter counterpart had a history of sharing  
5 information with one another about strategic negotiations and plans while  
6 negotiations were ongoing. In January 2014 (as discussions about the Dodgers  
7 Channel began to heat up), DIRECTV’s carriage negotiations with The Weather  
8 Channel failed and the channel went into a blackout on DIRECTV. During the  
9 blackout, The Weather Channel sought to run advertisements attacking DIRECTV  
10 over Charter’s service. Charter’s Senior Vice President of Programming left a  
11 voicemail for Mr. York. In the voicemail, this Charter senior executive assured  
12 Mr. York that he would stop The Weather Channel from running such an ad over  
13 Charter’s service, calling the favor “my little bit for the planet earth.”

14 80. Similarly, in September 2014, Charter’s Senior Vice President of  
15 Programming left Mr. York several voicemails concerning Charter’s negotiations  
16 with the co-owner of Hulu about Hulu’s online subscription video service, letting  
17 him know that Charter was not inclined to allow its video subscribers to access  
18 Hulu’s service using their Charter accounts, and asking if DIRECTV planned to  
19 reach a deal concerning Hulu. Charter’s Senior Vice President of Programming  
20 left Mr. York at least one voicemail speaking in coded language about Charter’s

1 ongoing negotiations with Hulu’s co-owner: “I was going to get doing it if I had  
2 to, but then I remembered a little birdie saying that you were busy with my  
3 heavyweight friend perhaps.”

4 81. On September 17, 2013, Mr. York and his counterpart at Charter  
5 spoke to one another on the phone. The day after this conversation, Mr. York’s  
6 Charter counterpart proposed for the first time to Charter’s CEO that Charter adopt  
7 a strategy of waiting for DIRECTV to carry the Dodgers Channel. Specifically,  
8 this senior executive “[s]uggest[ed] we discuss sitting this one out until at least if  
9 and when Direct does a deal.”

10 82. On October 24, 2013, Charter’s Senior Vice President of  
11 Programming met with his CEO to set Charter’s content budget for 2014, including  
12 estimated costs for carrying the Dodgers Channel. This senior executive proposed  
13 that Charter “hold tight, see where we are in July . . . if Direct goes in May/June  
14 we can still get that deal. But let it play out.” Later that day, this senior executive  
15 texted Mr. York: “Can I call you now? Funny had something for u. Where can I  
16 call.”

17 83. On November 5, 2013, a subordinate of Charter’s Senior Vice  
18 President of Programming suggested that Charter take a “first in strategy” with the  
19 Dodgers Channel that would “guarantee[] carriage and put[] pressure on others”  
20 while affording Charter “solid MFN” protection, such as the MFN protection

1 Charter received from TWC during the Lakers Channel negotiations. Charter's  
2 Senior Vice President of Programming declined to pursue the same strategy that  
3 Charter had used for the Lakers Channel, explaining that "I think Direct will not be  
4 there at launch. Maybe AT&T will but if no [satellite] carriage at launch there is  
5 nowhere to get the games in our markets." At the time, DIRECTV had not made  
6 any public statements about its Dodgers Channel carriage plans.

7 84. On January 21, 2014, TWC made its initial offer to DIRECTV. Mr.  
8 York called his counterpart at Charter the following afternoon (and spoke with  
9 both his Cox counterpart and AT&T counterpart). On January 23, 2014, TWC sent  
10 Charter its Dodgers Channel offer. After playing phone tag for several days, Mr.  
11 York and his Charter counterpart had a twenty-minute call on January 29, 2014.

12 85. Charter's Senior Vice President of Programming consistently told  
13 TWC that Charter would not consider carrying the Dodgers Channel unless  
14 DIRECTV launched first.

15 86. Charter's Senior Vice President of Programming admitted that, on  
16 April 30, 2014, about one month after the baseball season began but while  
17 negotiations were still continuing, he and Mr. York discussed "the high cost of  
18 sports programming, including the high price that TWC paid for the rights to  
19 SportsNet LA and was demanding for carriage." He also testified that he and Mr.

20

1 York discussed that the price TWC offered their respective companies for carriage  
2 was “outrageous.”

3 87. Charter did not carry the Dodgers Channel during the 2014 baseball  
4 season. Subscribers located in the Charter service territory in the LA area did not  
5 have regular access to most televised Dodgers games during the 2014 baseball  
6 season or at the start of the 2015 season.

7 88. Charter announced that it would acquire TWC in May 2015. Soon  
8 thereafter, Charter agreed to carry the Dodgers Channel.

9 iv. DIRECTV and AT&T Shared Non-Public Competitively  
10 Sensitive Information about Their Future Dodgers Channel  
11 Carriage Plans

12 89. Mr. York and his counterpart at AT&T, the most senior content  
13 executive there, agreed to share forward-looking strategic information about the  
14 Dodgers Channel, and did share that information. Their exchanges of information  
15 demonstrate their agreement and reflect concerted action between horizontal  
16 competitors.

17 90. Mr. York’s AT&T counterpart became President of Content and  
18 Advertising Sales (“President of Content”) in June 2013 and Mr. York, who  
19 previously had worked at AT&T, cultivated a close relationship with this person.  
20 Mr. York offered to “show [him] around [LA] and help meet the players in this

1 crazy content world.” Thus, as AT&T’s President of Content testified, Mr. York  
2 “helped [him] get a lay of the land in the industry” and introduced him to “various  
3 players in the industry.”

4 91. AT&T’s President of Content understood the importance of  
5 developing relationships with AT&T’s direct competitors. In a handwritten note  
6 taken a few weeks after assuming his new position, he wrote that he “need[ed] to  
7 go meet industry peers,” including DIRECTV. Mr. York organized a one-on-one  
8 breakfast with his AT&T counterpart several weeks later at a hotel near AT&T’s  
9 offices.

10 92. On January 16, 2014, TWC presented its formal Dodgers Channel  
11 carriage offer to AT&T. TWC asked for the same rate structure as it later sought  
12 from DIRECTV and other video distributors.

13 93. On January 21, 2014, AT&T’s President of Content met with other  
14 members of his content team to discuss TWC’s offer. Like Charter’s Senior Vice  
15 President of Programming, AT&T’s President of Content indicated that his “gut”  
16 instinct was to “sit on sidelines,” but noted that the possibility that “DIRECTV  
17 may move” was a factor that could cause AT&T to revisit its position.

18 94. On January 22, 2014, Mr. York and his AT&T counterpart spoke for  
19 twelve minutes. At the time of this call, DIRECTV and AT&T had both recently  
20 received Dodgers Channel offers from TWC.

1           95. On February 25, 2014, an AT&T Vice President expressed concern  
2 that his earlier public comments to Bloomberg News about the Dodgers Channel  
3 were “too vanilla” and stated that AT&T might “need to take more of a stand.”  
4 Ten days later, the executive suggested that AT&T publicly communicate its  
5 Dodgers Channel carriage “position more aggressively to influence other MVPD’s  
6 strategy.”

7           96. On February 26, 2014, AT&T’s President of Content and his content  
8 team recommended to his direct supervisor that AT&T decline to launch the  
9 Dodgers Channel at TWC’s asking price. They described AT&T’s “initial  
10 implementation strategy” as “[h]old-out as long as DirecTV does not carry.” The  
11 day of this presentation, AT&T’s President of Content left a voicemail for Mr.  
12 York. He then tried to reach Mr. York on February 28, 2014, texting “Just tried  
13 you. I am around if you free up. I will try u tomorrow if not.” Then, the next day,  
14 AT&T’s President of Content left another voicemail for Mr. York, this time stating  
15 “I had three things to catch up with you on, ah, two sports and one news.”

16           97. After leaving this message, AT&T’s President of Content went to  
17 AT&T’s Dallas headquarters for a series of strategy meetings and kept trying to  
18 reach Mr. York. This AT&T senior executive and Mr. York finally spoke for  
19 twenty minutes on March 4, 2014. The next day, this same AT&T executive met  
20 with AT&T’s CEO to discuss TWC’s Dodgers Channel offer. AT&T’s President

1 of Content “recommend[ed] not launching [the Dodgers Channel] unless TWC  
2 reduces the rate materially,” but noted that DIRECTV launching was an  
3 “outstanding risk factor.” This AT&T executive’s handwritten notes explained  
4 that AT&T’s “intent [was] to message but hold, pivot if we have to—DTV!”

5 98. On March 11, 2014, TWC told an AT&T negotiator that it “was  
6 unlikely to move off [its] initial asking price of \$[#.##] now because [TWC]  
7 wouldn’t be able to offer [AT&T] a lower rate and not offer it to a larger  
8 distributor.”

9 99. The next day, Mr. York texted AT&T’s President of Content “Got a  
10 sec to talk?” and Mr. York’s AT&T counterpart responded “Yep. You on cell or  
11 work?” Mr. York responded “Work.” The following day, AT&T’s President of  
12 Content—who has referred to carriage offers as “pitches”—again texted Mr. York  
13 “Forgot to tell you but we got a [##] mph pitch yesterday.”<sup>5</sup> A few hours later,  
14 AT&T’s President of Content continued “Consistent with what you got?” and Mr.  
15 York responded “Hope u hit it out!” This exchange occurred only two days after  
16 TWC had informed AT&T that it was unlikely to change its initial asking price.

17 100. AT&T acquired DIRECTV in July 2015. AT&T still does not carry  
18 the Dodgers Channel. AT&T subscribers outside of TWC’s service territory in the

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19  
20 <sup>5</sup> As explained above, although the actual price figures have been omitted to  
protect competitively sensitive information, the speed of the quoted pitch in this  
text matched the cents in TWC’s offer to AT&T.

1 LA area did not have regular access to most televised Dodgers games during the  
2 2014, 2015, or 2016 baseball seasons.

3 **V. DIRECTV’S INFORMATION EXCHANGES HAD THE LIKELY**  
4 **EFFECT OF HARMING COMPETITION**

5 **A. Defendants Have Market Power—the Ability to Harm Competition—in**  
6 **the Market for Video Distribution Services**

7 101. One tool that courts use to assess the competitive effects of concerted  
8 action is defining a relevant market—the zone of competition among the agreeing  
9 rivals in which the agreement may affect competition. A relevant market contains  
10 both a product dimension (the “product market”) and a geographic dimension (the  
11 “geographic market”). This case concerns the distribution of professional video  
12 content (especially sports content) by MVPDs in multiple geographic markets.

13 i. Video Distribution Service Is a Relevant Product Market

14 102. Video distributors acquire the rights to transmit video content from  
15 programmers, then aggregate that content and distribute it to subscribers who pay  
16 for the service. For example, subscribers to an MVPD’s pay television service  
17 typically purchase access to a sizeable array of channels, including for example  
18 news, dramas, and reality television programs, as well as the type of sports content  
19 at issue in this case. Subscribers, as well as industry participants, view these  
20 services as reasonably interchangeable with each other. Moreover, subscribers and



1 industry participants view video distribution services as distinct from—and not  
2 reasonably interchangeable with—other forms of entertainment, such as attending  
3 live sports games or a music concert. The distribution of professional video  
4 programming services to residential or business customers (“video distribution  
5 services”) is a relevant product market.

6 103. Video distributors compete with each other on price and programming  
7 content to attract and retain paid video customers. MVPDs, especially DIRECTV,  
8 often attempt to distinguish themselves from their competitors on the basis of  
9 sports content. DIRECTV bills itself as the “undisputed leader” for sports content  
10 among video distributors and, to support that claim, spends over \$1 billion each  
11 year to obtain the exclusive rights to provide NFL Sunday Ticket and features it  
12 prominently in its marketing materials.

13 104. Local sports content is a crucial component of competition between  
14 video distributors. Sports are often telecast locally on RSNs, and DIRECTV has  
15 publicly identified the availability of RSNs as vital to its ability to compete. In  
16 filings submitted to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regarding  
17 its program access regulations, which had previously reduced DIRECTV access to  
18 local RSNs, DIRECTV described local sports content on RSNs as “some of the  
19 most popular and expensive in the market” and questioned whether a video  
20 distributor could compete at all without access to this programming. DIRECTV

1 even complained that a cable company's decision to deny DIRECTV access to an  
2 RSN "caused a 33 percent reduction in the households subscribing to [satellite TV]  
3 service."

4 ii. The Cox and Charter LA Service Areas Are Relevant

5 Geographic Markets

6 105. Consumers seeking to purchase video distribution services must  
7 choose from among those providers that can offer such services directly to their  
8 home or business. Direct broadcast satellite providers, such as DIRECTV, can  
9 serve customers almost anywhere in the United States. In addition, online video  
10 distributors are available to any consumer with internet service sufficient to deliver  
11 video of an acceptable quality. In contrast, wireline video distributors such as  
12 cable and telephone companies, which include Cox, Charter, and AT&T, serve  
13 only distinct geographic areas where they have deployed network facilities. A  
14 customer cannot purchase video distribution services from a wireline distributor  
15 that does not operate network facilities that connect to the customer's home or  
16 business.

17 106. Thus, from a customer's perspective, the relevant geographic market  
18 for video distribution services is whatever services are available on an individual  
19 location-by-location basis. For ease of analysis, however, these markets can be  
20 aggregated to portions of the local franchise areas, or footprints, of the various

1 video distribution service providers where consumers face similar service-provider  
2 choices.

3 107. In the Dodgers Channel carriage area in 2014, three cable companies  
4 offered video distribution services to a significant area: TWC, Cox, and Charter.<sup>6</sup>  
5 The service areas of these three cable providers did not overlap.

6 108. Cox's service area within the LA area is a relevant geographic market.  
7 As discussed further below, consumers within this area generally faced the same  
8 service-provider choices. Customers within the Cox service area could choose  
9 from Cox, DIRECTV, DISH, and nationwide online providers. Some customers  
10 within the Cox service area might have AT&T or Verizon as an additional  
11 competitive option, but not both. Nevertheless, because a small but significant  
12 price increase by a hypothetical monopolist of video distribution services in this  
13 area would not be made unprofitable by consumers switching to other services  
14 offered outside of the area, the Cox LA service area is a relevant geographic  
15 market.

16 109. Charter's service area within the LA area is also a relevant geographic  
17 market. As discussed further below, consumers within this area generally faced

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18  
19 <sup>6</sup> Mediacom and Suddenlink also operated in the LA area in 2014, but each had  
20 fewer than 5,000 video subscribers. With less than 0.5% of LA area total  
subscribers, neither was competitively significant for purposes of this case. For  
comparison, TWC (30%), Charter (6.3%), and Cox (5.3%) each had at least  
200,000 video subscribers in the LA area.

1 the same service-provider choices. Customers within the Charter service area  
2 could choose from Charter, DIRECTV, DISH, and nationwide online providers.  
3 Some customers within the Charter service area might have AT&T or Verizon as  
4 an additional competitive option, but not both. Nevertheless, because a small but  
5 significant price increase by a hypothetical monopolist of video distribution  
6 services in this area would not be made unprofitable by consumers switching to  
7 other services offered outside of the area, the Charter LA service area is a relevant  
8 geographic market.

9           iii. There Are High Barriers to Entry, Expansion and Repositioning  
10                           in Local Video Distribution Services Markets

11           110. Local video distribution service markets are characterized by high  
12 barriers to entry. Providers seeking to expand their geographic reach or reposition  
13 themselves to offer such services in a particular area face high entry barriers as  
14 well.

15           111. In order to offer video distribution services, wireline and direct  
16 broadcast satellite providers must incur enormous upfront investment to construct a  
17 distribution infrastructure. Wireline distributors must construct network facilities  
18 that reach every home or business that they wish to serve. Likewise, satellite  
19 companies such as DIRECTV must launch satellites and deploy earth stations to  
20 receive signals from those satellites.

1           112. Providers may also need to obtain the proper regulatory authority  
2 prior to offering video distribution services. Wireline providers generally must  
3 obtain a franchise from local, municipal, or state authorities. Direct broadcast  
4 satellite providers must obtain approval from the FCC prior to operating the  
5 satellites and earth stations that comprise their networks.

6           113. Online video distributors represent the most likely prospect for  
7 successful and significant competitive entry, but they face significant barriers that  
8 limit their ability to compete with MVPDs in the short-to-medium term. One such  
9 barrier is the need to obtain access to a sufficient amount of content to become  
10 viable substitutes. Online video distributors generally offer less content than  
11 MVPDs and fewer live sports telecasts of local games. Due in part to these  
12 limitations, online video distributors account for only 5% of total video distribution  
13 service revenues.

14                   iv. DIRECTV, Cox, and AT&T Have Market Power in the Highly  
15                   Concentrated Cox LA Service Area

16           114. Consumers in the Cox service area faced limited choices for video  
17 distribution services in 2014. In many parts of this area, customers could access  
18 video distribution services from only three providers: Cox, DISH, or DIRECTV.  
19 In some areas within the Cox footprint, customers could also access video services  
20 from either AT&T or Verizon (but not both) where those companies had upgraded

1 their telephone networks to offer video service as a fourth alternative for  
2 consumers.

3 115. DIRECTV acted in concert with Cox and, therefore, it is appropriate  
4 to consider the combined market power of the two firms in the relevant geographic  
5 market. DIRECTV and Cox combined account for a greater than 70% share of the  
6 Cox local market. By acting in concert under these circumstances, DIRECTV and  
7 Cox had the ability to reduce output and product quality to subcompetitive levels.

8 116. DIRECTV also acted in concert with AT&T in Cox's service area.  
9 DIRECTV, Cox, and AT&T combined account for a greater than 75% share of the  
10 Cox local market. By acting in concert under these circumstances, the three  
11 companies had the ability to reduce output and product quality to subcompetitive  
12 levels.

13 v. DIRECTV, Charter, and AT&T Have Market Power in the  
14 Highly Concentrated Charter LA Service Area

15 117. Consumers in the Charter service area also faced limited choices for  
16 video distribution services in 2014. In many parts of the Charter service area,  
17 customers could access video services from only three providers: Charter, DISH,  
18 or DIRECTV. In some areas within the Charter footprint, customers could also  
19 access video services from either AT&T or Verizon (but not both) where those  
20

1 companies had upgraded their telephone networks to offer video service as a fourth  
2 alternative for consumers.

3 118. DIRECTV acted in concert with Charter and, therefore, it is  
4 appropriate to consider the combined market power of the two firms in the relevant  
5 geographic market. DIRECTV and Charter combined account for a greater than  
6 50% share of the Charter local market. By acting in concert under these  
7 circumstances, DIRECTV and Charter had the ability to reduce output and product  
8 quality to subcompetitive levels.

9 119. DIRECTV also acted in concert with AT&T in Charter's service area.  
10 DIRECTV, Charter, and AT&T combined account for a greater than 55% share of  
11 the Charter local market. By acting in concert under these circumstances,  
12 DIRECTV, Charter, and AT&T had the ability to reduce output and product  
13 quality to subcompetitive levels.

14 **B. The Information Exchanges Orchestrated by DIRECTV Are of the**  
15 **Type That Is Likely to Harm Competition When Carried Out by**  
16 **Parties With Market Power**

17 120. The market for video distribution services in the LA area is highly  
18 concentrated. The local markets for video distribution services are characterized  
19 by high barriers to entry, just three to four entrenched competitors, and a history of  
20 interdependent price and output.

1           121. Competition is likely to be harmed when competitors with market  
2 power in concentrated markets, such as the markets at issue, directly exchange  
3 strategic information about current and forward-looking plans for product features  
4 on which they compete. Here, the information exchanged directly concerned the  
5 negotiating positions that were being taken by competitors leading up to and  
6 during their negotiations with a common programming supplier. That supplier had  
7 every legitimate reason to believe that the companies were viewing each other  
8 warily and calculating the risk that the other might move first.

9           122. The strategic information that DIRECTV exchanged with Cox,  
10 Charter, and AT&T was competitively sensitive and a material factor to their  
11 decisions not to carry the Dodgers Channel. Like price, content carriage—and  
12 particularly local sports content carriage—is a crucial aspect of competition  
13 between video programming distributors to attract and retain subscribers. Just as a  
14 subscriber might switch away from a distributor in order to obtain a lower price, a  
15 subscriber might switch away from a distributor in order to watch programming  
16 that the subscriber's current distributor does not offer. But if the subscriber has no  
17 alternative video programming distributor from which to obtain the desired  
18 content, the possibility that this subscriber might switch to a competitor is  
19 eliminated. When video distributors that are competing for the same subscribers  
20 exchange their strategic carriage plans, comfort replaces uncertainty and reduces



1 their incentives to launch that content. After all, if no competitor offers particular  
2 content, there is no risk current subscribers would switch to a competitor in order  
3 to watch that content on another distributor's video service.

4 123. Information regarding sports content is particularly significant, as  
5 sports are an important aspect of the video distribution that customers in the LA  
6 region purchase. As noted above, DIRECTV has recognized that RSN content is  
7 "some of the most popular and expensive in the market" and it has attempted to  
8 differentiate itself as "the undisputed leader in sports."

9 124. The direct competitor communications at issue here took place  
10 between DIRECTV's Chief Content Officer and his counterparts at Cox, Charter,  
11 and AT&T. These high-level executives had direct authority over their respective  
12 companies' content carriage negotiations and significant influence over their  
13 companies' content carriage decisions, thereby allowing them to act on the  
14 information that they learned and steer their companies' decisions and negotiation  
15 strategies for the Dodgers Channel.

16 125. These direct communications took place in private settings and  
17 involved the exchange of confidential, non-public information. The information  
18 was at times exchanged in coded language intended to mask the content of the  
19 communications. In addition to the direct communications, DIRECTV executives  
20

1 consistently messaged DIRECTV's opposition to carriage of the Dodgers Channel  
2 through the press.

3 **C. DIRECTV'S Information Exchanges Corrupted the Competitive**  
4 **Process and Contributed to the Blackout of Dodgers Games**

5 126. The information sharing agreements that DIRECTV orchestrated with  
6 its direct competitors at Cox, Charter, and AT&T tainted the competitive process  
7 for carriage of the Dodgers Channel. They dampened the incentives of the  
8 companies to negotiate for and carry the Dodgers Channel, reduced their  
9 responsiveness to customer demand, and deprived LA area Dodgers fans of a  
10 competitive process that took into full account market demand for watching  
11 Dodgers games on television.

12 127. The information shared between DIRECTV and its competitors was a  
13 material factor in their decisions about whether and when to offer the Dodgers  
14 Channel in competition with one another.

15 128. During the Dodgers Channel carriage negotiations, DIRECTV learned  
16 valuable strategic information from Cox, Charter, and AT&T that reduced the  
17 uncertainty that DIRECTV should have faced from not knowing whether its  
18 subscribers would have the option of switching to these competitors in order to  
19 watch Dodgers games on television. This knowledge was a material factor in  
20 DIRECTV's decision not to launch the Dodgers Channel. Mr. York testified that

1 other MVPDs not appearing to be in any rush to do the Dodgers Channel deal was  
2 a strategic consideration against DIRECTV doing the deal. Indeed, he edited a  
3 presentation given to DIRECTV's CEO to make sure the presentation included that  
4 important factor. One of Mr. York's subordinates testified that information about  
5 competitors' plans could lead DIRECTV to be less aggressive in its proposals  
6 because the company would be "less inclined to engage more meaningfully if  
7 everybody was going to collectively sit on the sidelines."

8         129. Cox, Charter, and AT&T each used strategic information obtained  
9 from DIRECTV to reduce the uncertainty that they each should have faced from  
10 not knowing whether their respective subscribers would be able to switch to  
11 DIRECTV in order to watch Dodgers games on television. This strategic  
12 information was a material factor in their decisions not to launch the Dodgers  
13 Channel. Thus, this knowledge tainted what should have been their independent  
14 decisions about whether to launch the Dodgers Channel.

15         130. Because the information sharing agreements made it less likely that  
16 DIRECTV and its major MVPD competitors would carry the Dodgers Channel,  
17 those agreements had the tendency to reduce the quality of the video distribution  
18 services DIRECTV, Cox, Charter, and AT&T provided in the LA area. They  
19 likewise had the tendency to reduce output by delaying the day when, if ever, the  
20 Dodgers Channel will be widely carried. These effects were ultimately felt

1 throughout the Dodgers Channel broadcast territories where these companies offer  
2 service. The reduction in quality and output was felt acutely in the spring of 2014,  
3 when the actions of these MVPDs contributed to the Dodgers Channel not being  
4 carried during the first weeks of the new season, a time when DIRECTV believed  
5 ratings would peak. It continues to be felt by consumers today.

6 **VI. DIRECTV'S UNLAWFUL INFORMATION EXCHANGES HAVE**  
7 **NO PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATION**

8 131. DIRECTV's unlawful information exchanges with Cox, Charter, and  
9 AT&T were not reasonably necessary to further any procompetitive purpose. The  
10 information directly and privately shared between high-level executives was  
11 disaggregated, company specific, forward-looking, confidential, and related to a  
12 core characteristic of competition between them.

13 **VII. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED**

14 **Count 1: DIRECTV Violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Entering**  
15 **Into an Unlawful Information Sharing Agreement with Cox**

16 132. DIRECTV and Cox have engaged in an information sharing  
17 agreement in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce, constituting  
18 a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. This offense is likely  
19 to continue and recur unless the requested relief is granted.

20

1           133. This information exchange scheme consisted of an agreement between  
2 DIRECTV and Cox to share strategic information about their companies' Dodgers  
3 Channel carriage negotiations and plans in order to limit the competitive pressure  
4 on either of them to carry the Dodgers Channel.

5           134. The information sharing agreement between DIRECTV and Cox has  
6 harmed competition. Their exchange of strategic information blunted the  
7 companies' competitive incentives and corrupted the competitive process, which  
8 had the likely and foreseeable result of decreasing quality and reducing output by  
9 contributing to a blackout of the Dodgers Channel in part of the LA area.

10 **Count 2: DIRECTV Violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Entering**  
11 **Into an Unlawful Information Sharing Agreement with Charter**

12           135. DIRECTV and Charter have engaged in an information sharing  
13 agreement in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce, constituting  
14 a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. This offense is likely  
15 to continue and recur unless the requested relief is granted.

16           136. The information exchange scheme consisted of an agreement between  
17 DIRECTV and Charter to share strategic information about their companies'  
18 Dodgers Channel carriage negotiations and plans in order to limit the competitive  
19 pressure on either of them to carry the Dodgers Channel.

20

1           137. The information sharing agreement between DIRECTV and Charter  
2 has harmed competition. Their exchange of strategic information blunted the  
3 companies' competitive incentives and corrupted the competitive process, which  
4 had the likely and foreseeable result of decreasing quality and reducing output by  
5 contributing to a blackout of the Dodgers Channel in part of the LA area.

6 **Count 3: DIRECTV Violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by Entering**  
7 **Into an Unlawful Information Sharing Agreement with AT&T**

8           138. DIRECTV and AT&T have engaged in an information sharing  
9 agreement in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce, constituting  
10 a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

11           139. The information exchange scheme consisted of an agreement between  
12 DIRECTV and AT&T to share strategic information about their companies'  
13 Dodgers Channel carriage negotiations and plans in order to limit the competitive  
14 pressure on either of them to carry the Dodgers Channel.

15           140. The information sharing agreement between DIRECTV and AT&T  
16 has harmed competition. Their exchange of strategic information blunted the  
17 companies' competitive incentives and corrupted the competitive process, which  
18 had the likely and foreseeable result of decreasing quality and reducing output by  
19 contributing to a blackout of the Dodgers Channel in part of the LA area.

20

**VIII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

1  
2 141. WHEREFORE, the United States requests that final judgment be  
3 entered against DIRECTV and AT&T declaring, ordering, and adjudging that:

4 a. The aforesaid bilateral information sharing agreements unreasonably  
5 restrain trade and are unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15  
6 U.S.C. § 1;

7 b. DIRECTV and AT&T be permanently enjoined from transmitting  
8 non-public information concerning DIRECTV's and/or AT&T's negotiating  
9 position, strategy, or tactics concerning potential agreements for video  
10 programming distribution with any other MVPD when DIRECTV and/or  
11 AT&T and another MVPD anticipate negotiating, or are negotiating, with a  
12 common programming provider, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman  
13 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1;

14 c. DIRECTV and AT&T be required to monitor communications or  
15 other contacts between, on the one hand, the executives involved in these  
16 unlawful information sharing agreements and others who may take their  
17 place in the future, and on the other hand, their horizontal competitors, and  
18 to periodically report the time, place, participants, and substance of any such  
19 communications to the Department of Justice;  
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d. DIRECTV and AT&T be required to implement training and compliance programs to instruct their executives that exchanging non-public strategic information about competitive offerings with competitors when not necessary to further a procompetitive purpose is a violation of the antitrust laws and report on these programs to the Department of Justice; and

e. The United States be awarded its costs of this action and such other relief as may be appropriate and as the Court may deem just and proper, and such other relief as may be appropriate and as the Court may deem proper.



1 Dated: November 2, 2016

2 FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

3

4                   /s/ Jonathan Sallet  
JONATHAN SALLET  
5 Deputy Assistant Attorney General  
for Litigation

6

7                   /s/ Juan A. Arteaga  
JUAN A. ARTEAGA  
8 Deputy Assistant Attorney General  
9 for Civil Enforcement

10

11                   /s/ Patricia Brink  
PATRICIA BRINK  
12 Director of Civil Enforcement

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

                  /s/ Scott Scheele  
SCOTT SCHEELE  
Chief, Telecommunications &  
Media Enforcement Section  
LAWRENCE FRANKEL  
Assistant Chief  
JARED HUGHES  
Assistant Chief

                  /s/ Patricia C. Corcoran  
PATRICIA CORCORAN  
CORY BRADER  
DYLAN CARSON  
PETER GRAY  
DANIEL HAAR  
MATTHEW JONES  
JONATHAN JUSTL  
DAVID LAWRENCE  
ANNA SALLSTROM  
KRISTINA SRICA

Attorneys for the United States  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Antitrust Division  
450 5th Street N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001  
Telephone: 202-598-2529  
Facsimile: 202-514-6381  
E-mail: [patricia.corcoran@usdoj.gov](mailto:patricia.corcoran@usdoj.gov)