



U.S. & Plaintiff States  
v.  
Aetna Inc. & Humana Inc.

# **MEDICARE ADVANTAGE**

## **Market Definition**

# Market definition is about *reasonable* interchangeability

---

“The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the **reasonable interchangeability** of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it/”


**Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,**  
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)

# Medicare Advantage has distinct characteristics and uses

Medicare Age-Ins

## Decision Tree – Brand, Network and Costs are Key Considerations.

As consumers start to investigate they learn some plans have networks and that premiums and costs vary - the choice of an Advantage plan vs. a Med Supp plan is made on network and cost factors.



Source: Humana Age In Longitudinal Study 2012, other qualitative research


10

DX0490-045


DX0490, at 45 (June 26, 2015)

# Medicare Advantage plans have lower premiums

Estimated Average Monthly Premiums



# Aetna couldn't attract MedSupp customers to MA when it tried



Tr. 2094-95

Q. [J]ust focusing on this plan that you designed to compete for Med Supp members, your view is that the plan has not been successful. Correct?

**A. Not as successful as I thought it might be.**

Q. The plan has low membership?

**A. That's correct.**

- Cynthia Follmer,  
Deep South General Manager  
at Aetna

# Economic evidence shows that Medicare Advantage is a relevant product market

## Academic Literature

Low pass-through rates imply market power

Demand estimates show preference for MA

## Empirical Analysis of Demand

All estimates agree that many seniors have a distinct preference for MA

Analyzes real-world choices made by both new and existing consumers

## Hypothetical Monopolist Tests

Test #1: Critical loss using Nevo and Orszag nesting parameters

Test #2: Critical loss using nesting parameter from literature

Test #3: Merger simulation using both Nevo and Orszag demand estimates

# Both economists use a model that accounts for “age-ins”

**Prof. Nevo**

**Mr. Orszag**

1604

1 you can think of any -- almost any market, there would  
2 be a situation, right, where  
3 bought my brand and now are  
4 and there might be new consu  
5 If you think of auto  
6 new customers that maybe nev  
7 into the market. It's quite  
8 situation like that.

9 Q. And is the ne  
10 appropriate to evaluate the  
11 existing customers in one mo  
12 A. Yes, because  
13 demand that the firm is faci  
14 constitutes both age-ins in  
15 have previously made choices

16 Q. What did you  
17 results of your analysis were reasonable?

18 A. So what I did -- and this was the third  
19 component of how  
20 referred to earl  
21 these orange bar  
22 equivalent numbe  
23 excuse me. And  
24 And what  
25 this green bar t

Tr. 1604:9-15

3141

1 to price, it's not  
2 the purpose of the  
3 ducted what's called  
4 news is, because we  
5 to spend that much  
6 int of agreement.  
7 and we both have  
8 the control -- I  
9 rol variables in the  
10 el quite similarly.  
11 diversion, which  
12 uts, age-ins, and  
13 focus on. That's  
14 the right piece of information for the competitive  
15 effects analysis is the diversion analysis.

17  
18

Tr. 3141:12-15

Q. And is the nested logit approach appropriate to evaluate the choices of both new and existing customers in one model?

A. Yes, because it tells us what is the demand that the firm is facing. And that demand constitutes both age-ins in this case or people that have previously made choices.

So we both structure the model quite similarly. And that model produces estimates of diversion, which will take into account both switch-outs, age-ins, and switch-ins in response to price.


# MA overwhelmingly passes the hypothetical monopolist test regardless of the margin level

Hypothetical Monopolist Tests Using Mr. Orszag's Nesting Parameters

	Implied Economic Margin	Enrollment in Counties that Pass the Single-Product Test	Enrollment in Counties that Pass the Multi-Product Test
MA passes even with very low implied margins	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%
	██████████	99%	99%


PX0552, at Ex. 2, 3 & 12 (Supplemental and Rebuttal Report of Aviv Nevo, Ph.D.)

After Humana-Arcadian, prices went up despite the presence of Original Medicare, potential entry, CMS regulation, any efficiencies, “age-ins,” and divestitures



# Mr. Orszag's Error #1: No standard application of the hypothetical monopolist test

Instead of looking at demand substitution as the Guidelines instruct, Mr. Orszag conducted supply-side regressions.



“Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or service.”

**Horizontal Merger  
Guidelines § 4**

# Mr. Orszag's Error #2: His regressions miss important competition

**Aetna MAPD – Executive Summary** North Carolina

**Product and Pricing Strategy**

- Aetna & Coventry overlap market
- Footprint expansion underway
- Introduce AET National PPO expansion H5521 – 4.5 Star contract – Contingent upon success SAE
  - Positioned as lead plan in the market for new sales with \$0 premium
  - Price/Benefits developed to closely mirror 2014 H9847-001 plan in order to drive migration/re-sell strategy
  - Migration of ~25% from 3.5 Star H9847 (CVH) PPO to 4.5 Star H5521 (AET) PPO
- Narrow network HVN HMOs with CHS & Duke – Come 2016?
- Limit member losses
  - Will introduce \$29 premium on CVH H9847 PPO & slight degradation to benefits YOY
  - Careful consideration of SAR in Alamance county

**Impact to Value Proposition**

- Availability of 4.0 & 4.5 Star plans improves market value proposition
- Coventry PPO currently at 3.5 STARS, pathway to 4.0 unclear
  - YOY \$0 to premium increase may drive selection issues if first to move off of "zero"
  - BC/BS #1 competitor has 120K members in a 3.5 Star plan (dropped from 4.0) with ~\$6M hit to revenue – most likely will add a premium and decrease benefits
  - Humana 4.5 star plan in Western NC; potential expansion to match footprint
  - Broker feedback rumors Cigna to expand with 4.5 Star plan
  - Improved care model and delivery system via HVN products

**Impact to Portfolio**

- H5521 SAE to generate growth opportunity and facilitates migration strategy
- 2015 increase plan portfolio – 3 existing & 3 new products
  - Existing AET (broad HMO) plans will not be actively marketed during AEP (e.g., no Direct Mail)
- Limited full county withdrawal in support of corporate position on SARs
  - SAR Alamance county (1,400 member impact)

**Financials**

- 

CMS Funding Headwinds	
\$ 22	CMS Funding (Trend vs. R/M, PD, Rebate Dynamic)
\$ 29	Change in Margin Requirement
\$ 0	SG&A
\$ 24	Gross Medical Trend
\$ 3	Health Insurer Fee (1.9% HIF + 1.1% FIT = 3.0%)
<b>\$ 78</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>

Mitigating Actions		Conf.
\$ 8	SAIs	90%
\$ 5	Provider Recontracting	90%
\$ 4	Provider Collaboration / ACOs	90%
\$10	Risk Score Initiatives / CMS Changes	90%
\$ 9	SG&A Initiatives	80%
\$13	Part D	TBD
\$29	Market Exits / Reconfiguration	80%
<b>\$78</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	

	2013 Actual	2014 Q1 FC	2015 Forecast	2015 Target
Membership		2,356	7,164	6,819
MBR		83.7%	82.8%	82.9%
SG&A HIF		19.5%	14.1%	14.1%
		0%	2%	2%
BFIT Margin (excl. Nil & amort.)		-3.2%	1.1%	1%
BFIT Earnings		-\$5m	\$7m	\$6m

Executive Bid Review – Round 2

Aetna Inc. 4

- Mr. Orszag uses plan fixed effects in his price-regression model, ignoring the reality that Medicare Advantage insurers compete in part by introducing new plans into counties.
- For example, Aetna has aggressively competed in recent years by introducing a \$0 premium PPO plan.

PX0497, at 4

# Humana competed in San Antonio by offering a new plan

1040  
1 this year at 16.90?  
2 A  
3 Q 1 A Yes, they did. 1039  
4 to move at 2 Q It was a different product than the one  
5 3 being -- the lead product this year; right?  
6 area last 4 A Yes, sir.  
7 A 5 Q Okay. And was the premium -- what was the  
8 Q 6 premium of that lead product, the one a year ago?  
9 for Aetna 7 A It was \$20 a month.  
10 A 8 Q Okay. Now, Aetna has a PPO -- you  
11 Q 9 mentioned that earlier -- has a PPO product as well;  
12 2016 AEP, 10 right?  
13 sales go 11 A Yes, sir, they do.  
14 A 12 Q Okay. And what was the premium of Aetna's  
15 Q 13 PPO a year ago?  
16 that was, 14 A I believe it was \$19 a month.  
17 Aetna HMO 15 Q Okay. And when we look at the, at this  
18 A 16 new lead product, the PPO for 2017 for Humana, what  
19 the Human 17 was the -- what was the premium for that product or  
20 available 18 is the premium for that product?  
21 Q 19 A For the new Humana --  
22 over from 20 Q Yes, sir.  
23 A 21 A -- PPO?  
24 transition 22 Q The new Humana lead PPO.  
25 very simi 23 A It was \$16.90 a month.  
24 Q 24 So they had their lead last year at \$20,  
25 Aetna is at 19 and then Humana is with the new lead

Q. Now, did Humana introduce a new PPO in the 2017 AEP?

A. Yes, they did.

\* \* \*


Q. So [Humana] had their lead [plan] last year at \$20, Aetna is at [\$]19 and then Humana is with the new lead this year at [\$]16.90?

A. Correct.


- Raul Gonzalez,  
President of Texas  
Medicare Solutions

# Mr. Orszag's Error #3: Mistaken reliance on Example 6

Medicare Advantage Plans



Original Medicare combined with various  
MedSupp and Part D Plan Options




Prof. Nevo's  
product market  
definition

# Mr. Orszag's Error #3: Mistaken reliance on Example 6

Medicare Advantage Plans

Original Medicare combined with various  
MedSupp and Part D Plan Options




What Mr. Orszag  
suggests


# **MEDICARE ADVANTAGE**

## Competitive Effects

# The merger is presumptively unlawful in all 364 counties



# Aetna and Humana compete to win each other's customers



“[W\e had a one-time bonanza this year because UHC and Humana (the largest MA plans in the State) came off \$0 for their PPO's/”

- **Cynthia Follmer,**  
Deep South General Manager at Aetna

PX0393, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2015)

# Lost competition will cause prices for seniors to rise


**Simulated Changes in Rebate-Adjusted Premiums  
Using Mr. Orszag's Nesting Parameters**

Observed Pre-Merger	Simulated Post-Merger	Difference - The Expected Effect of the Merger
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████
████████	████████	████████


Even using Mr/ Orszag's nesting parameters, Prof. Nevo found that the merged company will have an incentive to increase prices, causing hundreds of millions of dollars of annual harm to consumers.

# Mr. Orszag's Entry Error #1: Ignoring unfavorable data

Survivors 1 year after entry




Survivors 2 years after entry



Mr. Orszag conveniently ignores entrants from 2012 (except when he is counting entrants) because the 2012 cohort has a relatively low rate of survival.

# Mr. Orszag's Entry Error #2: Counting Aetna and Humana

- Of the 398 entrants identified by Mr. Orszag, 191 of them (nearly 50%) are Aetna or Humana.
- Neither Aetna nor Humana will be available to enter in response to the anticompetitive effects of their own merger.
- By including Aetna and Humana, Mr. Orszag inflates his results.



# CMS sets the “contours” and “framework” for competition

Q. Does CMS regulation replace competition between Medicare Advantage plans?

**A. No. I think we think of our work as creating the framework that competition will happen within.**

- Sean Cavanaugh,  
Director of the Center for Medicare at CMS

**But the way to think about [CMS regulation] is it's setting the boundaries or the contours that the firms then would compete in."**

- Jonathan Orszag,  
Defendants' economic expert

1137

1 how they change from year to year sometimes needs to go through  
2 regulation, but a lot of the technical work can be done through  
3 sub-regulatory guidance. Those are the sorts of things we do.  
4 Q. Does CMS regulation replace competition between Medicare  
5 Advantage plans?  
6 A. No. I think we think of our work as creating the framework  
7 that competition will happen within.  
8 Q. I'd like to walk through a few specific categories of  
9 regulations that have been raised over the course of this  
10 litigation. The first is benchmarks. CMS sets the benchmarks  
11 for the Medicare Advantage market each year?  
12 A. Yes. We set the benchmarks. ...  
13 really specified in statute so it's an  
14 We have the data, we take the most  
15 them through the statutory formula  
16 that way.  
17 Q. What's the purpose of setting benchmarks?  
18 A. The benchmarks are the starting point for how firms  
19 The benchmark is the reference point for how firms  
20 compete with each other. They have to be relative to that benchmark. How that  
21 relative to that benchmark. How that determines whether they'll have  
22 benefits they'll be able to offer.  
23 Q. The benchmark's a tool that CMS uses to manage  
24 competition among Medicare Advantage plans.

Tr. 1137:4-7

3038

1 explain.  
2 And there's just different elements of  
3 regulatory intervention that the government uses. And  
4 we don't think it's fair to say the government sets the  
5 contours of competition through a number of different  
6 levers.  
7 We're going to talk a good amount about the  
8 medical loss ratio because that flows directly into  
9 certain analyses and various other forms of regulation.  
10 But the way to think about this is it's setting the  
11 boundaries or the contours that the firms then would  
12 compete in.  
13 Q. The title of the slide -- your title is  
14 "Contours of Competition."  
15 What does that mean?  
16 A. By a -- I'm trying to use a word, by a  
17 payor, by a competitor, and by a regulator, they're  
18 setting the terms of how the private firms then compete  
19 in the marketplace.  
20 Q. You said that this particular marketplace  
21 has some unique features to it.  
22 But looking simply at analyzing the contours of  
23 competition, is that something that you would typically  
24 analyze in a merger?  
25 A. You have to understand the contours of

# **MEDICARE ADVANTAGE**

## **Proposed Remedy**

# The proposed divestiture may never occur

---

**Q.** And it's also contingent upon Molina getting the novations that you talked about earlier. Right?

**A. Yes.**

**Q.** And on Molina getting the star scores transferred. Correct?


**A. Yes.**

**Q.** So it's not a done deal. Right?

**A. No, it's not a done deal.**

**Dr. Mario Molina,**  
CEO of Molina Healthcare

# Molina has failed at individual Medicare Advantage in the past



PX0559, at ¶ 31 and Ex. 1 (Expert Report of Dr. Lawton R. Burns)

The Defendants' expert agrees that Molina is “not a significantly competitive market player” in Utah today.

---

19 years of  
Medicaid  
experience

8 years of  
D-SNP  
experience



Fewer than  
**400**  
members

Less than  
**1%**  
market share

# Molina's management recognizes its limitations in Medicare Advantage

Our name recognition is largely tied to a lower-income population and product, so it will take a good deal of time and money in order to build the same name recognition for the more affluent population. Plus we believe that AET/HUM may target these members, not sure if we will have the same relationship with all of the brokers and providers.

- **John Molina**, Chief Financial Officer

I might have to chase the Suburban but I would love to catch the Cooper.

- **Dr. Mario Molina**, Chief Executive Officer

Aetna and Humana have had many years to build up name recognition, provider and broker relationships, as well as efficient processes. While we have been in the Managed Medicare market for 10 years, we do not have the same level of administrative expertise.

- **John Molina**, Chief Financial Officer


I'm not sure we are ready to take on traditional MA business.

- **David Pollack**, President of Molina Healthcare of Florida

# **PUBLIC EXCHANGES**

## Evasion of Scrutiny

# Aetna was ready to expand its exchange footprint



PX0113; PX0162, at 6; PX0115, at 1; PX0117, at 2; PX0120, at 5; Tr. 1437:21-24.

# The evidence contradicts Aetna's story

July 2016

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>
<p>After receiving financial information on July 9, Bertolini assembled a team including Fran Soistman, Karen Lynch, Steven Kelmar, and Jonathan Mayhew</p>						
<b>17</b>	<b>18</b> Soistman prepares Board notes – no mention of withdrawal	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b> Lynch sends financial results to Bertolini	<b>21</b> <b>Complaint Filed</b>	<b>22</b> Soistman: “all bets are off”	<b>23</b> Kelmar: “we have no choice”
<b>24</b> Lynch: “Does this include the 17 places in the DOJ complaint”	<b>25</b> Guertin gets involved	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b> Bertolini deposition	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>30</b>

# July 24: Mayhew added the 17 Complaint counties at Lynch's request

**Sunday, 6:42 a.m.**

Mayhew sends draft withdrawal options

## 2 - Remain Active in the Market; Optimize Product Mix

- Eliminate all gold metallic plans with the exception of one in the state as required to meet QHP certification req.
- Evaluate elimination of bronze metallic plans

**Sunday, 7:35 a.m.**

Lynch asks about Complaint counties

Does this include the 17 places in the DOJ complaint.

**Sunday, 11:55 p.m.**

Mayhew responds with revisions

## 1 - Remain Active in the State – Optimize Product Mix; Exit Targeted Service Areas

- Eliminate all gold metallic plans with the exception of one in the state as required to meet QHP certification requirements
- Evaluate elimination of bronze metallic plans
- Exit targeted service areas (17 counties in total; 3 states)

# Financial results sent to Mr. Bertolini on July 20 projected on-exchange profits in Florida

## Aetna Individual Business (Excluding Consumer) Results / Forecast As of June YTD 2016

Market	On-Exchange								
	FY 2015 Actual			June YTD Actual			2015 Q2 Forecast		
	Members (in 000's)	BFIT \$ (millions)	BFIT Margin %	Members (in 000's)	BFIT \$ (millions)	BFIT Margin %	Members (in 000's)	BFIT \$ (millions)	BFIT Margin %
North Carolina	82	(32)	(10.7%)	124	53	17.8%	112	27	5.9%
Florida	204	18	2.6%	235	36	8.4%	216	16	2.0%
South Carolina	23	(4)	(3.8%)	8	(9)	(41.9%)	8	11	7.9%
Arizona	3	(3)	(38.1%)	8	4	33.9%	7	3	13.8%
Delaware	2	(3)	(55.2%)	2	0	1.6%	2	(1)	(4.6%)
Illinois	1	2	21.3%	16	(4)	(12.8%)	15	(6)	(8.3%)
Iowa	39	(12)	(6.7%)	35	2	2.5%	32	(9)	(5.5%)
Kansas (W. MO)	98	(53)	(15.4%)	43	0	0.3%	39	(10)	(5.4%)
Virginia	81	6	2.1%	109	4	1.9%	98	(12)	(3.0%)
Ohio	17	2	4.1%	12	(4)	(16.2%)	11	(13)	(27.1%)
Nebraska	39	(14)	(10.6%)	38	(1)	(1.7%)	34	(18)	(11.2%)
Georgia	54	(14)	(9.2%)	75	4	3.1%	69	(20)	(7.8%)
Missouri (S. IL)	65	(8)	(3.3%)	60	(4)	(2.7%)	55	(32)	(12.8%)
Texas	17	(8)	(11.2%)	40	(17)	(18.1%)	37	(48)	(25.5%)
Pennsylvania	22	2	2.5%	32	(33)	(73.1%)	29	(49)	(45.8%)
All Other Markets	7	(4)	--	1,000	(47)	--	--	(38)	--
<b>Total All Markets</b>	<b>755</b>	<b>(\$125)</b>	<b>(4.7%)</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>(\$17)</b>	<b>(1.0%)</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>(\$195)</b>	<b>(6.0%)</b>

Aetna  
withdrew

Aetna  
remains

DX0009, at 2 (July 20, 2016)

# Soistman did not testify to explain the recommendation that he authored

Defendants' Preliminary Fact Witness List (September 9):

## Fran Soistman

#	Name	Title
1	Mark Bertolini	Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Aetna
2	Nancy Cocozza	President, Medicare Segment, Aetna
3	Shawn Gwertin	Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Aetna
4	David Horst	Executive Director, Finance, Aetna
5	Charles Kennedy	Chief Medical Officer/Integration, Aetna
6	James Paprocki	Head Actuary, Individual Medicare Advantage, Aetna
7	Julia May	Vice President, Medicare Providers, Aetna
8	James Paprocki	Head Actuary, Individual Medicare Advantage, Aetna
9	Fran Soistman	Executive Vice President, Government Services, Aetna
10	Bruce Brossnass	President & Chief Executive Officer, Humana
11	Jeffrey Fernandez	Segment Vice President, Humana
12	Kevin Meiwether	Vice President and General Manager, Southeastern Segment, Humana
13	Vanessa Olson	Vice President - Products, Humana
14	Alan Wheatley	President, Retail Sales, Humana
15	Tod Zacharias	Vice President, Commercial Products, Humana

Defendants' Final Fact Witness List (October 7):  
**Fran Soistman**

#	Name	Title/Employer
1.	Mark Bertolini	Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Aetna
2.	Nancy Cocozza	President, Medicare, Aetna
3.	Shawn Gwertin	Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Aetna
4.	David Horst	Executive Director, Finance, Aetna
5.	Charles Kennedy	Chief Medical Officer/Integration, Aetna
6.	James Paprocki	Head Actuary, Individual Medicare Advantage, Aetna
7.	Fran Soistman	Executive Vice President, Government Services, Aetna
8.	Julie May	Vice President, Medicare Providers, Aetna
9.	Cynthia Fallmeier-Crowley	Coach, General Manager and Executive Director, SE Territory, Aetna

Defendants' Case-in-Chief Witness List (December 9):

## Fran Soistman

Estimated Date	Witness
Friday 12/16	Lisa Kubano Senior Vice President, Strategic Products, Molina Healthcare
Friday 12/16	Renee Buckingham Vice President and Divisional Manager, Medicare Segment, Humana
Friday 12/16	Kathryn Coleman Director, Medical Drug and Health Administration Group, Center for Medicare Services, Aetna
Friday/Monday 12/16 or 19	Kevin Conahan Director, Center for Consumer Insurance Oversight, Marketplace CEO Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Monday 12/19	Fran Soistman Executive Vice President, Government Services, Aetna
Monday 12/19	Shawn Gwertin Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Aetna
Monday 12/19	David Horst Executive Director, Finance, Aetna
Monday/Tuesday 12/19-20	Rajiv Gokhale Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon
Tuesday 12/20	Jon Orszag Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon

Estimated Date	Witness
Thursday 12/15	Renee Buckingham Vice President and Divisional Manager, Medicare Segment, Humana
Thursday 12/15	Kathryn Coleman Director, Medical Drug and Health Plan Contract Administration Group, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Friday 12/16	Kevin Conahan Director, Center for Consumer Insurance Oversight, Marketplace CEO Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Friday 12/16	Shawn Gwertin Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Aetna
Friday 12/16	David Horst Executive Director, Finance, Aetna
Friday 12/16	Rajiv Gokhale Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon
Monday 12/19	Jon Orszag Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon

Defendants' Updated Case-in-Chief Witness List (December 12):

---

# **PUBLIC EXCHANGES**

## Competitive Effects

# Aetna retained the ability to re-enter the exchanges because it wants “to remain in the game”

---

9                   And so that was part of the mission. So just  
10    throwing it over our shoulder and running for the hills  
11    wasn't a legitimate response on my part. We needed to  
12    remain in the game. We needed to consider how we could  
13    help and we needed to find ways to make it better.

**Mark Bertolini,**  
CEO of Aetna

# EFFICIENCIES

# The claimed efficiencies do not outweigh the competitive harm

## Horizontal Merger Guidelines



U.S. Dept.

Federal Trade Commission

coordinated effects context, incremental cost reductions may make coordination less likely or effective by enhancing the incentive of a maverick to lower price or by creating a new maverick firm. Even when efficiencies generated through a merger enhance a firm's ability to compete, however, a merger may have other effects that may lessen competition and make the merger anticompetitive.

The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-specific efficiencies.<sup>13</sup> Only alternatives that are practical in the business situation faced by the merging firms are considered in making this determination. The Agencies do not insist upon a less restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.

Efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms. Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.

Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means. Projections of efficiencies may be viewed with skepticism, particularly when generated outside of the usual business planning process. By contrast, efficiency claims substantiated by analogous past experience are those most likely to be credited.

Cognizable efficiencies are merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service. Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced by the merger or incurred in achieving those efficiencies.

The Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market.<sup>14</sup> To make the requisite determination, the Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price

<sup>13</sup> The Agencies will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be attained by practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or licensing. If a merger affects not whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved, only the timing advantage is a merger-specific efficiency.

<sup>14</sup> The Agencies normally assess competition in each relevant market affected by a merger independently and normally will challenge the merger if it is likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market. In some cases, however, the Agencies in their prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant market, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive effect in the relevant market without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s). Inextricably linked efficiencies are most likely to make a difference when they are great and the likely anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s) is small so the merger is likely to benefit customers overall.

“Cognizable efficiencies are merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.”

Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10

# Defendants' "concurrent review" efficiencies are based on the assumption that the merged company will deny more care

3429

1 skipping slide 23.  
2 A. I'd just like to say one thing about this.  
3 Q. Oh, yeah.  
4 A. It seems to me that there's a question. If you're not  
5 comparing outcomes and policies -- in other words, if you're not

**Ms. Christine Hammer, CPA**

One insurance company could just decide, I'm going to increase my denial rates by X percent and save some money. So I also have a question not only about quality in this context but also about whether a merger is actually required to achieve these efficiencies.

21 review is impacting the doctors by denying admission or  
22 approving a lower level of care, and the next topic we'll come  
23 to is network. And it's decreasing the providers' revenue, if  
24 you will, on a procedure-by-procedure basis.  
25 So FWC had done a significant amount of work on

Tr. 3429:10-14

# The Defendants have made no showing to tie their claimed efficiencies to the challenged markets

---

The law does not allow “anticompetitive effects in one market” to be offset by “pro-competitive consequences in another/”

**U.S. v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank,**  
374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963)

Mr. Gokhale did not even attempt to quantify how much of his claimed efficiencies would remain with the merged company in the challenged markets, after all divestitures and individual commercial withdrawals.

**Tr. 3435:14-24 (Christine Hammer)**



U.S. & Plaintiff States  
v.  
Aetna Inc. & Humana Inc.


# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---

## MEDICARE ADVANTAGE

### Market Definition

# Brown Shoe: Industry Recognition



“We have – we’ve chosen to sell each of those types of products [Medicare Advantage, Medicare Supplements, and Part D plans], because we believe, and I think the data would – would probably back us up, that there’s a market for each of those – those products/There’s seniors that prefer a Medicare Supplement plan, and there are seniors that prefer a Medicare Advantage plan/”

**Todd Fincher,**  
President, Tidewater Management Group

Fincher dep. 73:19-74:3

# *Brown Shoe*: Medicare Advantage is separately managed and priced

---


8 Q. Because of the nature of the two categories of products, do  
9 you agree with me that it makes sense to have a different  
10 actuarial specialization around the pricing for the two  
11 products?

12 A. **I think -- yeah. I think it makes sense that we have two**  
13 **separate departments that do the work.**


**James Paprocki,**  
Head Individual Medicare  
Advantage actuary at Aetna

# The Defendants inserted Original Medicare into their trial demonstratives

## Competition in Bexar County – Non-SNP Plans 2016



## Competition in Mecklenburg County – Non-SNP 2016



DX-DEM-006

DX-DEM-002

# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers




# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers

## Kansas City Market Analysis

- Today, Humana (~50k mbrs.) and Aetna (~34k mbrs) dominate the Kansas City Market
- United (~6k mbrs.) and Cigna (new to KC for 2016) aren't strong competitors but are coming on strong in the KC market
- United is taking advantage of a contract consolidation with a Stars bonus increase to significantly improve benefits on it's existing premium HMO offering. Also, bringing to market a \$0 HMO that has slightly better benefits than Humana's \$0 plan
- Aetna is making moderate benefit improvements, maintaining their \$0 HMO & LPPO plans
- Cigna is entering the market with a strong \$0 HMO offering the lowest cost shares across the 5 key benefits

## MA Market Share



■ Humana 
 ■ Aetna 
 ■ Cigna  
■ United 
 ■ All Others

Carrier	Plan Type	STARS	Premium	MOOP	PCP	SPC	Inpatient	Rx
Humana	HMO	4	\$0	\$6,700	\$25	\$50	\$350 Days 1-5	6/11/47/99/25%
Humana	HMO	4	\$34	\$6,500	\$10	\$45	\$330 Days 1-5	6/11/47/99/29%
United	HMO	4	\$39	\$3900	\$5	\$40	\$275 Days 1-6	2/8/45/95/28%
United	HMO	4	\$0	\$6700	\$20	\$50	\$335 Days 1-5	2/12/47/100/26%
Aetna	HMO	3.5	\$0	\$5,000	\$5	\$40	\$300 Days 1-5	4/9/47/100/33%
Aetna	PPO	4	\$0	\$6,700	\$10	\$50	\$3505 Days 1-5	4/9/47/100/33%
Cigna	HMO	New	\$0	\$4,900	\$0	\$40	\$250 Days 1-6	1/3/45/95/30%

CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers

## IVL Medicare AEP: Competitive Analysis

IN 2015 AEP, Aetna ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> in growth among our top competitors; Humana took market share lead away from United

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Captured 38% of newly eligibles (21% market share); availability to 85% of beneficiaries</li> <li>• Vast improvement in STAR ratings; 92% of members in 4+ Star plans</li> <li>• Expanded provider relationships through acquisition and exclusive relationships</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued network reductions and market exits</li> <li>• Star ratings performance relatively flat year-over-year</li> <li>• #2 with 19% share</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Added 30k enrollees partly due to HealthSpring products</li> <li>• Improved Star performance; 5 star option in FL</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continued poor Star rating performance</li> <li>• Increased premiums in most markets</li> </ul>

**Key Trends**

**Slightly lower growth than last two years**

- Overall MA enrollment over 16 million (30% of Medicare beneficiaries)\*
- Industry growth of 4.4% below trend of 5% in 2014 and 2013
- Product exits impacted 5% of MA enrollees or 575k vs. 550k in 2014
- **11.5% of MA enrollees (~2M) in dual eligible programs**

**Competitors continue to move toward leaner products**

- Value added benefits reduced by ~15%
- Out of pocket costs increased by 5% compared to 10% in 2014

**Premiums increased and enrollment in premium products grew**

- **44% of enrollees in zero premium plans**, down from 56% in 2014
- Average monthly premium rising 20% to \$41

\*CMS Fact Sheet: Fact Sheet: Moving Medicare Advantage and Part D Forward 2/20/2015

# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers

## Competitor by Plan Type

Total Medicare Advantage (including group)										
Plan	HMO		LPPO		RPPO		PFFS		Total	
	Members	Growth								
<b>Humana</b>	60,101	36,899	59,860	6,134	28,421	302	7,903	1,675	156,285	41,056
<b>United</b>	76,839	196	90,202	3,517	0	0	5,053	1,377	172,094	2,336
<b>BCBS</b>	75,615	66,995	48,950	25,199	0	0	0	0	124,565	41,796
<b>Aetna</b>	2,523	713	29,417	24,076	0	0	0	0	31,940	24,789
<b>Cigna</b>	6,672	6,672	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,672	6,672

Medicare Advantage Individual Plans										
Plan	HMO		LPPO		RPPO		PFFS		Total	
	Members	Growth								
<b>Humana</b>	60,101	36,899	24,008	4,652	28,396	1,973	7,903	1,675	120,408	41,849
<b>United</b>	75,511	207	10,548	2,136	0	0	5,053	1,377	91,112	3,306
<b>BCBS</b>	75,615	66,995	48,950	25,199	0	0	0	0	124,565	41,796
<b>Aetna</b>	2,523	713	26,451	23,919	0	0	0	0	28,974	24,632
<b>Cigna</b>	6,672	6,672	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,672	6,672


**Humana**

Based on data from the Competitive Landscape Report.

11/2/2016 4:46 PM 9

CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER


# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers



This is Aetna's first year marketing MA products in this region. Our largest competitor is Humana who has both of the local hospitals in network.

PX0053 (Feb. 12, 2015)


# Defendants' actual business documents focus on other Medicare Advantage insurers




PX0071 (July 23, 2015)

# Few Medicare Advantage Enrollees Change Plans

Only **2%** of Medicare Advantage enrollees voluntarily switched to Original Medicare in 2013-2014.



# Consumers have durable preferences for Medicare Advantage



See PX0552, at 33 (Supplemental and Rebuttal Report of Aviv Nevo, Ph.D.); Tr. 929:25-930:15 (Prof. Gary Ford)

# The behavior of seniors with “guaranteed issue rights” shows these durable preferences

“Seniors with guaranteed issue rights are like age-ins in that they can enroll in Medicare Supplement plans without undergoing medical underwriting/”

**Nancy Coccozza,**  
Head of Medicare at Aetna

Page 430

1 was about 7 percent.

2 Q. Do you know how that compares

3 historically?

4 A. It's always been low.

5 Q. Are you familiar with the term

6 "guaranteed issue rights"?

7 A. Yes, I am.

8 Q. What are guaranteed issue rights?

9 A. That means that, depending on the

10 circumstances, an individual might not be required to go

11 through medical underwriting. And that would be called

12 guaranteed issue rights.

13 So when someone ages into Medicare, they have an

14 ability to join a Medicare Supplement plan without

15 providing any -- you know, any health information.

16 Similarly, if they were to lose their

17 Medicare -- Med Advantage plan -- maybe that plan

18 withdrew from the market or maybe they had

19 employer-sponsored coverage -- if they were to lose

20 coverage, then again they would lose coverage through no

21 fault of their own. They would also have guarantee

22 issue rights.

23 Q. And how does it relate to age-ins?

24 A. When someone ages in to Medicare and they

25 become originally eligible, they don't have to go

Page 431

choose a

used to them

designing

what

ective

dicare

onal choice

tances

ake

lio of

ise their

d their

I've

aking that

d be an

ility. Some


have the

et ability

24 relate to the difference between premiums and total

25 out-of-pocket costs that we saw in the plan?

# Medicare Advantage consumers with guaranteed issue rights overwhelmingly stay in Medicare Advantage



Q Did -- you said you had about 70 clients with Piedmont WellStar. Did they also come to you when Piedmont WellStar left the market?

A Yes.

Q Did you explain to them that they could switch to a Medicare Supplement without underwriting?

A Yes.


Q Of your about 70 or so clients, about how many of them stayed with another Medicare Advantage plan?

A It was over 90 percent that stayed with the Medicare Advantage plan.

**Robert Fitzgerald,**  
President,  
Robert Fitzgerald  
Insurance  
Agency  
Tr. 1080:2-14

# MA insurers can change prices at the county level even within a single plan through segmentation

---




# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---


## MEDICARE ADVANTAGE

### Competitive Effects

# The merger is presumptively unlawful



# The merger is presumptively unlawful



See PX0378 & PX0551, at Appendix I

# Aetna and Humana compete in Mecklenburg County today

Q Okay. So Humana -- if I'm a senior and I'm living in Mecklenburg County and I'm interested in that zero premium product, then if I want to go to Humana, I'm going to be looking at your HMO; right?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And then if I'm going to look at Aetna's product, I can look at their PPO product; right?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And that's the same in wherever they're selling that PPO product in the state; correct?

A Yes.


Q All right. And you have found over the last several years that the Humana HMO zero premium plan is actually competing against the Aetna zero premium PPO plan in the state; isn't that true?

A We were competing in particular areas with a zero HMO, which then went up to \$19. And we still competed against the zero LPPO Aetna plan in many of those counties.

Tr. 771:16-772:8

**Patrick Farley,**  
North Carolina sales  
director for Humana

# The merger is presumptively unlawful



# Aetna and Humana “are pushing each other to be more competitive” in Bexar County today

Let me ask you the other question,

though, that wasn't asked of you. If the merger were to go through and Aetna and Humana combine, would you have any concerns about what would happen in competition in San Antonio?

A I think, you know, the observations that I make between the two companies, between Aetna and Humana, is that they are pushing each other to be more competitive. Just my observation is that if, you know, if you look at Humana bringing down its specialist copay this year, I believe it was directly because or in response to Aetna's.

So if the competition is gone, then who is going to push Humana to be able to lower their copays.

**Raul Gonzalez,**  
President, Texas Medicare  
Solutions


# Aetna is a particularly aggressive competitor

---

“[A]n important consideration when analyzing possible anticompetitive effects” is whether the merger “would result in the elimination of a **particularly aggressive competitor** in a highly concentrated market/”


- *FTC v. Staples, Inc.*,  
970 F. Supp. 1066, 1083 (D.D.C. 1997)

# Aetna is a particularly aggressive competitor




# Past experience shows that entry will not cure the competitive harm

Over the last five years, most Complaint counties experienced no entry at all.




Most entrants from 2012, and nearly half from 2013, are no longer offering plans.



# Mr. Orszag's entry analysis double-counts incumbents

- By defining “entry” as any time an MA insurer reaches 5% MA market share and failing to exclude incumbents, Mr. Orszag overstates the amount of entry.
- Mr. Orszag's approach also overstates the timeliness of entry; his analysis does not identify *when* an insurer began offering plans and does not look at how long it took for any given insurer to reach 5% MA market share.



# CMS regulations do not replace competition or preempt the antitrust laws

## Individual Bid Margins

- No rule capping individual bid margins
- CMS requests margin reductions for a small number of plans per year
- MA insurers negotiate and “push back” on CMS’s requests

## Aggregate Margins

- MA insurers can choose the level of aggregation
- Aetna uses a “parent organization” level of aggregation
- Aetna and Humana file bids with margins as high as 20%

## Total Beneficiary Cost

- Can increase by \$32 per member per month annually
- Annual price or quality change of \$384 (\$32 per month for 12 months) not prohibited by the TBC test

## Medical Loss Ratio

- Measured at the contract level, not plan level
- Aetna’s CMS contracts contain dozens of individual plans
- Aetna has plans with MLRs below 85%

Tr. 2003:17-2014:19 (Paprocki); Tr. 574:7-18 (Wheatley)

# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---

## MEDICARE ADVANTAGE

### Proposed Remedy

# Molina exited individual Medicare Advantage in 2012 because of “limited expertise and competitive standing”

Message  
 From: Lisa Rubino [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=MMC/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=RUBINOLI]  
 Sent: 2/22/2012 10:36:50 PM  
 To: Steve O'Dell [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=MMC/cn=Recipients/cn=OdelStc]; Terry Bayer [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=MMC/cn=Recipients/cn=TerryB]  
 CC: Janet Fosdick [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=Fosdick]; Kamran Hashim [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=HashimKa]  
 Subject: RE: MAPD d/c

**Market Analysis:**  
 Options benefits, network and formulary by market is average or below average compared to MA-PD competitors.  
**Financial Performance:**  
 In 2010, Molina reported positive \$2.3 million EBIDTA & CC, but after those charges it was negative earner.

3. We have limited expertise and competitive standing and no clear strategy around our focus in the MAPD market;

Tissa  
 Thank you,  
 Lisa Rubino  
 Lisa A. Rubino  
 President  
 Molina Healthcare of California  
 200 Oceangate, Suite 100  
 Long Beach, CA 90802  
 \* (562) 491-7044  
 Fax (562) 499-8170  
 tissa.rubino@molinahealthcare.com  
 -----Original Message-----  
 From: Steve O'Dell  
 Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2012 1:43 PM  
 To: Lisa Rubino; Terry Bayer  
 Cc: Janet Fosdick; Kamran Hashim  
 Subject: RE: MAPD d/c  
 Lisa and Terry--  
 We appreciate the opportunity to give this issue some thought and provide our recommendations. Given all the activity we have going on right now, we are persuaded by the reasons Tom has provided to not bid on MAPD now. However, I would like us to make it clear that the decision is that we are suspending our MAPD effort now, rather than getting out of the MAPD market forever, in favor of focusing on the Duals and, further, that we intend to readdress the decision each year early enough to be able to bid when the opportunity arises.  
 In conclusion, the reasons that I recommend this approach are the following:  
 1. We have a major amount of work to do on the Duals;  
 2. We have few members except in Utah and it is not enough to sustain the resources we expend in the short term;  
 3. We have limited expertise and competitive standing and no clear strategy around our focus in the MAPD market;  
 4. We only have to be out of the market for 2 years and then can come back to serve this market when we have the focused product strategy noted above;  
 5. We can tell our providers that we have suspended our MAPD for all the reasons above and will be back in the market with them when we have developed the product strategy to serve our chosen market successfully.  
 Thanks again for allowing us to weigh in--it is a tough decision, but I think it is right for now. Let me know if you have any questions or concerns or want to talk about any of this information.

Plans must provide notice to members by October 1, 2012.  
**Arguments for and Against Retaining Options in 2013**  
 Pro (arguments for winding down)  
 • Options benefits and network are average to below average vis-à-vis competitors  
 • We are not aggressively marketing Options  
 • We don't have a cogent explanation on how we can and will grow Options enrollment in any state to critical mass; to grow it would require a significant infusion of capital  
 • With the low enrollment we are subject to high MLR volatility on the negative side (actuaries say you need 10k members to have diverse case mix)  
 • Options detracts from our core focus, serving duals  
 • Millinan charged Molina \$500k in 2011 to develop 10 Options plans, not counting internal time  
 • Non-renewing Options would increase overall risk scores 2.5% compared to current scores  
 Con (arguments for retaining)  
 • Star ratings... don't know the impact, don't have the data  
 • Options generated \$2.3M positive medical margin in 2010 (not counting admin), counting admin it was a loss, so we'd need to find savings/revenues elsewhere to make up for it

Options benefits and network are average to below average vis-à-vis competitors

200-250k FFL. This is the specific population we need to develop a strategy to attract with benefits, providers and sales approaches--and which we do not have now. I will ask Tom to do some further work here to figure out the product strategy that will allow us to accomplish that. Finally, our strategic provider partners will want to have us to be in the MAPD market in Medicare the same way that we are serving our other markets and we will need the volume over time to fuel those strategic provider partnerships.  
 CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER  
 PLAINTIFFS EXHIBIT PX0088 MOL0763774

Neutral  
 Cons (arguments for retaining)  
 • Options generated \$2.3M positive medical margin in 2010 (not counting admin), counting admin it was a loss, so we'd need to find savings/revenues elsewhere to make up for it  
 • Page 2

# Molina's Board recognizes its limitations in Medicare Advantage

---

We both agree that we don't have the internal talent to run it.

- **Dick Shapiro**, Molina Board member

Third, this is a very different business from what we do, including commercial marketing, pricing, contracting, etc. Unless we can acquire some talent as part of the deal, I think we are woefully under-resourced to be able to take this on.

- **Dale Wolf**, Molina Board member and former CEO of Coventry

I wonder how people will feel going from Aetna to a relatively unknown Molina in the medicare space. Wouldn't they be drawn to more recognized national brands?

- **Dick Shapiro**, Molina Board member

PX0086; PX0083; PX0499

# Aetna plans to continue its rapid expansion; Molina may reduce its footprint

- Aetna Board of Directors  
Presentation, July 2015

Q. And here you're conveying that Molina may reduce the county footprint of the divestiture assets if there's low membership?

A. It's always a possibility. That's the words on the paper there, yes.

Q. And that's an accurate statement?

A. Yeah, it could.

Q. Molina may reduce the footprint if there's low membership?

A. Sure.

- **Lisa Rubino**,  
Senior Vice President for  
Medicare at Molina

PX0075, at 7; Tr.  
2493:17-2494:1

# Before trial, Lisa Rubino raised the same concerns as Prof. Burns

Molina Would Not Receive the Resources that are Necessary to Compete

	Sale of an Intact Business	Proposed Divestiture
Provider Contracts	✓	✗
Star Ratings Infrastructure	✓	✗
Broker Network	✓	✗
Recognized Individual MA Brand	✓	✗
Employees and Infrastructure	✓	✗

Experience with PPO

Message  
 From: Craig Bass [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=BASSCRAI]  
 Sent: 7/14/2016 7:57:05 PM  
 To: Lisa Rubino [/O=MOLINA MEDICAL CENTER/OU=MMC/cn=Recipients/cn=RubinoLJ]  
 Subject: RE: is aetna's dental and vision their own or vendored

thanks - very helpful. chin up on the audit. i know how hard and humbling those are..

From: Lisa Rubino  
 Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2016 2:55 PM  
 To: Craig Bass  
 Subject: RE: is aetna's dental and vision their own or vendored

I would not focus on it yet.. we will know more in a few weeks..then it could get ball ed up in litigation. We will have a 12-18 month TSA in place with them.. to run the business under our oversight..stay tuned..

I have been clear with Dr. Mario and John-key to success:  
 Their Star ratings need to come over-4-4.5-if not we are at risk of not being able to honor current benefits  
 their network needs to be replicated.. lose key providers and we will lose members in droves  
 Sales and market engine-8 week selling period  
 GA and broker network..  
 Then the basics in ops and CM.. big fricken lift..

I have been clear with Dr. Mario and John-key to success:  
 Their Star ratings need to come over-4-4.5-if not we are at risk of not being able to honor current benefits  
 Their network needs to be replicated.. lose key providers and we will lose members in droves  
 Sales and market engine-8 week selling period  
 GA and broker network..  
 Then the basics in ops and CM.. big fricken lift..

- Lisa Rubino, Senior Vice President for Medicare at Molina

# Molina is unlikely to replicate Aetna and Humana's network

## Bruce Broussard

1888

1 value-based care relationships with local providers; is  
2 it?

3 A. It depends on the provider. I mean, we  
4 have the same difficulties as others. But yeah, it's  
5 not easy.

6 Q. One of the things a payor needs to  
7 develop these kind of value-based care relationships  
8 with local providers is a large book of business with  
9 the provider to make it worth the provider's while to  
10 invest in value-based care relationships; is that right?

11 A. It depends on where the provider -- if  
12 the provider is -- doesn't have other payors that are  
13 offering that capability. And so what we find is that  
14 the providers that are -- have, say, Medicare Advantage  
15 or have other means of value-based reimbursement that  
16 smaller companies like Humana can come in and be able to  
17 utilize the same kind of contracting platform that was  
18 there before.

19 Q. Did you just say that Humana was one of  
20 the smaller Medicare Advantage competitors?

21 A. I was referring to some markets where we  
22 don't have presence. So if we were going to enter a  
23 market, there are individuals -- I mean, organizations  
24 that already have value-based reimbursement mechanisms,  
25 and we can enter that market at that -- leveraging the

Tr. 1888:3-5

## Lisa Rubino

2399

1 the California plan. I've had responsibility for network  
2 development. I was a network developer in the early part of my  
3 career.

4 At Molina, that responsibility is in a shared services  
5 division, and I help set the strategic direction for network  
6 development.

7 Q. Let's start by just talking about the steps that a managed  
8 care plan takes to build a network. How do you go about doing  
9 that?

10 A. It's quite easy, and it's a formula that we've used for  
11 many, many years. So you target a geography, you enter that  
12 geography understanding the competitive landscape, you have  
13 individuals on the ground in that market, they know who the top  
14 competitors are, they know who the premier providers are, and  
15 you spend your time developing that relationship.

16 Q. So let's break it down into the actual steps that you take  
17 to do contracting, and let's start with physician contracting.  
18 What steps do you take to build a network of physicians for a  
19 managed care plan?

20 A. A similar process. Again, you understand who the key  
21 physicians are. They're either independent physicians or  
22 physicians that are a part of a medical group. And a lot of  
23 physician contracting is done by phone, by mail. So you can  
24 pretty easily build an individual physician network.

25 If you're going to be adding ACOs or IPAs, individual

Tr. 2399:10-15


But yeah, it's  
not easy.

It's quite easy

# Molina is unlikely to maintain Aetna and Humana's STAR scores

“The more I think about it, we should not stretch ourselves, but only pursue if we can get a clear bargain. I am most concerned about our ability to maintain the STAR ratings and the additional income that comes with those.”

- John Molina,  
Chief Financial Officer



# The risk of the proposed divestiture falls on seniors

---

“A purchaser’s interests are not necessarily identical to those of the public, and so long as the divested assets produce something of value to the purchaser (possibly providing it with the ability to earn profits in some other market or to produce weak competition in the relevant market), it may be willing to buy them at a fire-sale price regardless of whether they cure the competitive concerns.”

**U.S. Department of Justice, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 1 (2011)**

# The risk of the proposed divestiture falls on seniors

---

- Molina got “a screaming good price,” as one Board member put it.
- Molina agreed to acquire Aetna and Humana’s members for the “bargain price” of about \$1,400 per member (including statutory capital), a significant discount from the typical purchase price of \$3,000-\$10,000 per member.
- Molina has put only \$120 million at risk; the remainder of the purchase price of \$400 million is statutory capital reserves that would remain with Molina if it exits MA markets.

Tr. 2249:24-2250:13 (M. Molina); PX0100; Tr. 2328:24-2329:6 (M. Molina); Tr. 9882:1-21 (J. Molina)

# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---

## PUBLIC EXCHANGES

### Evasion of Scrutiny

# July 19: Fran Soistman prepared speaking notes for the Board meeting on July 22

## Opening Remarks (Framing the Growth Opportunity)

- Government Services has been the growth engine for the enterprise over the

**Our Individual & Public Exchange business has significant potential under the right conditions. Current projections indicate that the marketplace will grow from \$68B to \$99B in revenue by 2020 (10% CAGR).**

- The managed Medicaid marketplace will experience substantial growth over the next few years, increasing from \$282B to \$425B by 2020 (11% CAGR). This unprecedented growth will be driven by ACA expansion and continued outsourcing of traditional and high-acuity Medicaid programs, which drive 40% of state budgets.

- Our Individual & Public Exchange business has significant potential under the right conditions. Current projections indicate that the marketplace will grow from \$68B to \$99B in revenue by 2020 (10% CAGR). This growth is highly dependent on the evolving regulatory and political environments, marketplace stability and payers' abilities to achieve cost efficiency and profitability. In the short term, advocacy efforts will be our best option. Longer term, the industry will require legislative intervention to achieve stability.

- Not only do we expect continued growth in our Government businesses, but also continued innovation. We have made great advancements over the years by:

**For Individual, we will pursue a disciplined market participation strategy, targeting deliberate growth in on-exchange silver subsidized membership – our most profitable demographic.**

- For Medicare, this means expanding our county footprint to increase our coverage of Medicare eligibles from 48% today to 60% by 2018. Clearly, this is one area where the Humana transaction will enable

in existing states. This means raising our game to increase our investment in business development resources in new states and achieve excellence in RFP responses.

And the reputation we have earned in our existing state relationships can be instrumental in paving the way for new opportunities.

- For Individual, we will pursue a disciplined market participation strategy, targeting deliberate growth in on-exchange silver subsidized membership – our most profitable demographic.

- Alignment with enterprise priority geographies will enable us to achieve scale with providers, thereby improving engagement, outcomes, and cost positioning.

3. We will effectively manage our high-acuity and high-risk populations. In

ks of  
y-based  
artner

# July 19: Mark Bertolini testified that Aetna was still discussing expansion

1437

1 Q. So people who are subsidized are to a substantial degree  
2 insulated from rate increases. Right?  
3 A. **Not totally.**  
4 Q. But they're to a substantial degree insulated from rate  
09:56AM 5 increases?  
6 A. **15 percent of a large number is still a lot of money to  
7 some people.**  
8 Q. I think you told us that from the beginning you've had some  
9 voices on your board saying I don't want to really participate  
09:56AM 10 in these exchanges. Right?  
11 A. **Questions about why we are participating, yeah. They don't  
12 get a choice as to whether or not we participate. They get a  
13 choice of whether or not I get to make that decision.**  
14 Q. So far, you've always made the decision to continue  
09:57AM 15 participation. Right?  
16 A. **That's my role, yes.**  
17 Q. In your July 5 letter, which is PX 117 for reference, you  
18 were still holding open the possibility that you would enter  
19 more exchange markets. Isn't that right?  
09:57AM 20 A. **Well, we were hoping that we could, yes.**  
21 Q. And in your July -- the deposition where we met in July  
22 19th, you were still discussing the possibility that you could  
23 enter even more exchange markets. Right?  
24 A. **That was a potential longer term, yes.**  
09:57AM 25 Q. When you spoke this morning about the topic of regulatory

“Q. And in your July – the deposition where we met in July 19th, you were still discussing the possibility that you could enter even more exchange markets. Right?”

**That was a potential longer term, yes.**

Tr. 1437:21-24

# July 22: Soistman says that “all bets are off”

**Soistman:** “By the way, all bets are off on Florida and every other state given the DOJ rejected our transaction.”

**RE: qbr sga**

---

**From:**  
"Stelben, John J" <"/o=aetna/ou=exchange administrative group (fydibohf23spdlt)/cn=recipients/cn=a6276 12">  
**To:**  
"Soistman, Fran" <soistmanf@aetna.com>  
**Date:**  
Fri, 22 Jul 2016 20:30:12 +0000

---

got it, agree

---

**From:** Soistman, Fran  
**Sent:** Friday, July 22, 2016 4:25 PM  
**To:** Stelben, John J  
**Subject:** Re: qbr sga

By the way, all bets are off on Florida and every other state given the DOJ rejected our transaction. We will need to renegotiate the Form A's should we win our case in Court.

Fran Soistman  
Executive Vice President  
Head of Government Services  
Aetna  
[SoistmanF@Aetna.com](mailto:SoistmanF@Aetna.com)  
860.373.4158 Hartford  
301.581.5691 Bethesda  
860.977.8937 Mobile  
Sent from my iPad

On Jul 22, 2016, at 3:51 PM, Stelben, John J <[Stelbenj@AETNA.com](mailto:Stelbenj@AETNA.com)> wrote:

We have to stay on in FL per Form A. There may be a few others we stay and play in.. NC for example. Texas needs to go away. I talked to Peter as mayhew has been working a stack ranking.

I think a lot of this work is really probably done given the pdr, ytd current year run rate, and pricing. We save no SGA this year except for 2017 marketing cost and maybe other management costs. We will need to continue to do 3rs though next July with the same intensity nad then lower intensity through 2018 for what is left in 2017. We will need to run whatever we keep albeit at a lower overall absolute costs. Depending on market we have to keep 2 systems running. We have to pay renewal commission on brokers. We can dump variable prmpm on service, hps, exchange fees, rx admin fees, etc. I think we have all this handy from PDR.

You may want to invite Cowhey and Theresa as they still as CB.


Fran, I understand the importance. We need to do what we have to but, Peter and Bruce are overworked, Peter's family is leaving on vacation this weekend without him I believe and he is out part of next week. I just want to be organized and not have certain people grind and cycle and recreate the wheel all weekend.

You can sense my frustration as the past few weeks have been more grueling than usual.

**PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT**  
U.S. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
**PX0121**

CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER AET-LIT002-0000707106

# July 23: Kelmar says “we have no choice”



**Kelmar:** “Most of this is a business decision except where DOJ has been explicit about the exchange markets. There we have no choice.”

PX0125, at 1 (July 23, 2016)

# July 24: Mayhew says “I was told to be careful about putting any of that in writing”

Q. Now, Mr. Mayhew, you were told to have the attorney-client privilege cc'd in order to shield the e-mail discussion about the 17 complaint counties from being produced in the Department of Justice litigation. Is that right?

**A. Right.**

1508

1 right?

2 **A. I did not say that in this e-mail. That's right.**

3 **Q. Now, Mr. Mayhew, you were told to have the attorney-client**

4 **privilege cc'd in order to shield the e-mail discussion about**

11:56AM 5 **the 17 complaint counties from being produced in the Department**

6 **of Justice litigation. Is that right?**

7 **A. Right.**

8 **Q. And by copying an attorney on your e-mail, those documents**

9 **could be shielded from production to the Department of Justice.**

11:56AM 10 **Right?**

11 **A. I don't know.**

12 **Q. Mr. Mayhew, I'm now showing you on your screen a different**

13 **plaintiffs' exhibit. This one is Plaintiffs' Exhibit 128, which**

14 **has been admitted into evidence. PX 0128 is a two-page e-mail**

11:56AM 15 **chain among you, Todd Lazar and Paul Wingle. The first e-mail**

16 **in the chain on page 2 of the e-mail is dated July 22, but the**

17 **other e-mails are dated the same date, July 24, as the prior**

18 **exhibit, with the same subject line, "Updated grid and draft**

19 **exec summary." And Mr. Lazar is an individual on your team in**

11:57AM 20 **charge of relationships with the local markets. Is that right?**

21 **A. That is right.**

22 **Q. And Mr. Wingle, he runs product compliance. Correct?**

23 **A. Correct.**

24 **Q. Mr. Mayhew, at the bottom of the first page, you write, "We**

11:57AM 25 **had several calls yesterday on this with Fran, Kelmar, Karen,**

Tr. 1508:3-7; PX0127.

# Soistman wrote a recommendation on behalf of the team, and Bertolini accepted it

Q. [To Bertolini] And you received a recommendation, I believe you even described it as an array, from staff.

A. I did.

\* \* \*

Q. But the counties that they recommended were the counties that ultimately your decision was to withdraw?

A. Right.

1 THE WITNESS: Not to any counties. I stuck strictly

1450

requires an

e're

the

commended

withdraw?

10:18AM 1 Exhibit 1 and Defense Exhibit 21 at the end of what Mr. Conrath

2 asked you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. If you look at PX -- I'm sorry -- I'll call it Plaintiffs'

5 Exhibit 1. The bottom of that document there, about eight or

6 nine bullet points that talk about slides 37 through slide 114.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So whatever this is referring to had at least at some point

9 114 slides or more?

10:18AM 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Could you just look to the back of Defendants' Exhibit 21?

12 How many slides are in that deck?

13 A. Thirty-five.

14 Q. Thank you, sir.

10:19AM 15 THE COURT: Mr. Bertolini, I have essentially one

16 question but it may take two or three questions to get to it. I

17 just want to return to the decision to withdraw from, I think

18 it's 536 counties in 2017 on the exchanges.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I kept track by states, but I

20 understand we're clearing 536 counties.

21 THE COURT: And you received a recommendation, I

22 believe you even described it as an array, from staff.

23 THE WITNESS: I did.

24 THE COURT: Did you make any changes to the states and

10:19AM 25 specifically the counties that were recommended for withdrawal?

# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---

## PUBLIC EXCHANGES

### Competitive Effects

# Economic evidence confirms both market definition and the importance of competition

## Academic Literature

HHS and Dafny & Gruber studies show that prices rise when exchange markets become more concentrated

HHS, Tebaldi, and Dafny et al. show customer substitution at levels that would allow a hypothetical monopolist to increase price

## Hypothetical Monopolist Test

On exchange plans pass the single product test

A 10 percent SSNIP would be profitable for at least one plan in all Complaint counties for a wide range of margins and measures of customer substitution

## Regression Analysis

A regression of price measures on HHI finds that an increase in concentration leads to higher premiums

Average second lowest silver premiums in Complaint counties would increase by 2.1 percent

PX0551, at ¶¶ 168-77, 277-81, 317-22, Ex. 32, 34 & 35 (Expert Report of Aviv Nevo, Ph.D.)

# Defendants' predictions of Humana's 2017 market share do not reflect reality

---

- Mr. Orszag predicted that Humana would have less than 1% market share in 2017 in the Complaint counties.
- But in 6 of the 17 counties, Humana will be one of only two insurers selling plans on-exchange.
- Basic economic theory teaches that firms compete where they expect to be profitable in the future.

PX0711; Tr. 1676:4-16 (Nevo)

# Aetna and Humana are significant competitors for individual insurance

## Western Missouri - competitors

- Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City – (our biggest competitor in Kansas City)
- Humana – (Biggest competitor in Joplin, and also very well priced in Kansas City)
  - 6%
  - We are neck and neck with Humana in Joplin
  - They will have a better price than us in Kansas City in 2016
  - Their network is very narrow. They only have one hospital system in network in Kansas City. Saint Luke's Health System. We do not have Saint Luke's but we have every other Hospital in Kansas City with the exception of Children's Mercy.
  - They also had problems with service for billing and enrollment. No problems with commission though

Confidential disclaimer or title of presentation here, to edit go to **View > Slide Master**

5

CONFIDENTIAL—SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

# Aetna and Humana are significant competitors for individual insurance

## Heads Up: Florida IVL 2016 Rate Adjustment Request

From: "Ciano, Christopher" <"/o=aetna/ou=aetnaus/cn=recipients/cn=a605745">  
 To: "Bahr, Michael D" <bahm@aetna.com>, "Mayhew, Jonathan E" <mayhewj@aetna.com>, "Kunkle, Jon (Jonathan)" <jkunkle@aetna.com>  
 Cc: "Finkelman, Robert" <rfinkelman@aetna.com>, "Wang, Yan" <yxwang2@aetna.com>, "Bauer, Craig" <bauer3@aetna.com>, "Keck, Kim A" <keckka@aetna.com>, "Walker, Jean H" <walkerj1@aetna.com>, "Campbell, Bruce T" <campbellb1@aetna.com>, "Weiss, Richard" <rbweiss@aetna.com>, "Ciano, Christopher" <cciano@aetna.com>  
 Bcc: "Arthur & Barbara Ciano (bmciano@aol.com)" <bmciano@aol.com>  
 Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2015 03:31:52 +0000  
 Mike/Jonathan/Jon:

We are concerned that we have dropped to #2 behind Humana

21 rates in Broward

	2015			2014			Rate Change	
	2016	2015	2014	2016/2015	2015/2014			
Humana	\$ 214	\$ 213	\$ 190	0.5%	12.1%			
Coventry	\$ 222	\$ 188	\$ 166	18.1%	13.8%			
Molina	\$ 225	\$ 225	\$ 242	0.0%	-7.0%			
Centene	\$ 225	\$ 225	\$ 260	0.0%	-11.9%			

We are concerned that we have dropped to #2 behind Humana and strongly believe that Molina may have filed a rate decrease similar to what occurred in 2015. This would position Molina below us and we would actually drop to #3. We are trying to avoid a repeat of what happened in 2015 with Dade County where Molina cut rates and jumped to #1 resulting in a net loss of about 60k members. In order to position ourselves ahead of Humana while also creating some distance between Molina/Centene in case they actually reduced rates, we believe that we need to lower our rates in Broward by 4%. If we do nothing with our rates and drop behind Molina/Centene, then we would expect a 60% drop (90k members) in our Broward membership. As a result, our overall profit target would drop from 6.1% to 3.6% or by 2.5%.

Unfortunately, the 4% reduction in Broward can only be achieved if applied to all counties. County specific rate changes could be made by adjusting the area factor, but the area factors are locked-in and certified at this time. Since the OIR questioned our late enrollment pricing adjustment, we believe we can utilize this factor to adjust our rates. Changing this factor impacts all counties. We are proposing a 4% reduction to our rates offset by a 1% reduction in commissions and a 1% additional SAI. The net result would be a reduction in our target profit from 6.1% to 4.1% or by 2.0% while putting us in the best position to maintain #1 in Broward and preserve our 150k members. There is a \$5 SAI that was not used in the original pricing for non-Broward/Dade counties. This is worth 0.3% and leaves 0.7% of the 1% SAI to solve for through improvements in leakage, trend and ER utilization.

Confidential Pursuant to 15 USC 18a(h)

PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT  
PX0263

AET-P001-0000280987

# Materials for Rebuttal & Appendix

---

## EFFICIENCIES

# Defendants calculated pharmacy efficiencies using just a single quarter of data

- Ms. Hammer testified that any pharmacy efficiencies based on rebates would require a longitudinal study.
- Aetna’s original consultant, Deloitte, agreed that a longitudinal study was needed, so Aetna chose a different consulting firm.

❖ Aetna and Humana’s expected future rebate rates for [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. (Stand-alone basis.)

Company	PSG		Rebate Data From Each Company			
	2015 Rebate %		2016 Rebate %		2017 Rebate %	
	Q4	Q1	Projected Exit	Contracted	Projected Exit	
[REDACTED]	40%	40%	40%	40%	40%	
[REDACTED]	28%	55%	66%	55%	69%	
<b>Rebate Differential</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>(15%)</b>	<b>(26%)</b>	<b>(15%)</b>	<b>(29%)</b>	

Source: PX0183, AET-PSGLIT-0000000065, AET-PSGLIT-0000000002



U.S. & Plaintiff States  
v.  
Aetna Inc. & Humana Inc.